

Governing Divided Societies

Habsburg Austria's Democratic Legacy
and the Czechoslovak First Republic



Philip J. Howe · Thomas A. Lorman · Daniel E. Miller



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Foreword by Arend Lijphart



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To those who taught us

Contents

List of Tables	x
List of Illustrations	xi
List of Abbreviations	xiii
Foreword	i
Preface	3
Introduction	13
 Chapter 1	
Consociationalism and Consensus Democracy	
in Theory and Practice	29
Introduction	29
The Development of the Consociational Model	30
The Consociational Model	38
<i>Grand Coalitions</i>	38
<i>Segmental Autonomy</i>	42
<i>Proportionality</i>	43
<i>Minority Veto</i>	44
<i>Summary</i>	45
Nine Conditions Favorable to Consociationalism	46
Consociationalism and Its Critics	52
Consociationalism and Constructivism	55
Majoritarian and Consensus Democracy	65
<i>Distinguishing Majoritarian from Consensus Democracy</i>	66
<i>The Relationship between Consociationalism and Consensus Democracy</i>	72
History, Political Science, Comparison, and Generalization	74
Conclusion	76
 Chapter 2	
Imperial Austria's Proto-consociational Legacy	79
Introduction	79
Historical Background and Terminology	83

Favorable and Unfavorable Conditions for Consociational Democracy	
in Imperial Austria	91
Imperial Austria as a Semi-Democratic,	
Proto-Consociational Political System	103
<i>Grand Coalitions</i>	104
<i>Minority Veto</i>	112
<i>Proportionality</i>	114
<i>Segmental Autonomy</i>	119
Regional Compromises as Semi-Democratic Consociationalism	122
Historians' Criticisms, National Flexibility,	
and the Institutionalization of Ethnicity	128
Conclusion	137

Chapter 3

Czechoslovakia as a Consociational Democracy	143
Introduction	143
Lewis Einstein and Other American Diplomatic Observers	154
The Favorable Conditions for Consociational Democracy in Czechoslovakia	160
The Components of Consociational Democracy in Czechoslovakia	199
<i>Grand Coalitions</i>	199
<i>Minority Veto</i>	219
<i>Proportionality</i>	224
<i>Segmental Autonomy</i>	233
Conclusion	245

Chapter 4

The Consociational Model and Interwar Slovakia	269
Introduction	269
The Favorable Conditions for Consociational Democracy in Slovakia	280
The Benefits of Participation	301
The Components of Consociational Democracy in Slovakia	313
<i>Proportionality</i>	313
<i>The Slovak Minority Veto</i>	321
<i>Grand Coalitions and Segmental Autonomy—Slovak Self-Government</i>	326
<i>Grand Coalitions and Segmental Autonomy—The Slovak Provincial Office</i>	333
Conclusion	349

Conclusion	355
Evidence of Consociationalism in Central Europe	358
Contributions to Consociational Theory	363
Consociationalism, History, and Habsburg Legacies	367
Bibliography	373
About the Authors	409

List of Tables

Table 1. A Summary of Arend Lijphart's Theory of Consociational Democracy	38
Table 2. Ten Institutional Variables	67
Table 3. Four Institutional Patterns with Representative Examples	70
Table 4. Ethnicity (Language of Everyday Use) in Austria, 1851–1910	92
Table 5. Major Religions ($\geq 1\%$ of the population) in Austria, 1869–1910	94
Table 6. Major Ethnic Groups by Province (≥ 1 percent of the Population) in Austria, 1910	98
Table 7. Austrian Governments, 1895–1914	105
Table 8. The Proportionality of Ethnic Representation in Austria, 1907	116
Table 9. Proportionality of Military and of Court and State Service Employment in Austria, 1910	117
Table 10. Language of Instruction in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools in Austria, 1881–1913	118
Table 11. Coalitions and Cabinets of the Czechoslovak First Republic (1918–1938)	258
Table 12. Extraconstitutional and Extraparliamentary Committees in Czechoslovakia, 1918–1938	265
Table 13. 1925 Elections to the Chamber of Deputies	266
Table 14. 1925 Electoral Districts for the Chamber of Deputies	266

List of Illustrations

- Map 1. Ethnographic Map of Austria-Hungary. Source: Helmut Rumpler and Martin Seger, *Die Gesellschaft der Habsburgermonarchie im Kartenbild, Verwaltungs-, Sozial- und Infrastrukturen, Nach dem Zensus von 1910*, cartography by Walter Liebhart, part 2 of *Soziale Strukturen*, ed. Helmut Rumpler et al., vol. 9 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1919*, ed. Helmut Rumpler and Peter Urbantisch (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2010), map 3.1.” 10
- Map 2. Administrative Map of Czechoslovakia (1930). Source: *Český historický atlas, Hranice a regiony–Správa 1918-1938*, “Zemské zřízení k roku 1930,” <https://cha.fsv.cvut.cz/mapp.php?map=2Db>. The authors appreciate the efforts of Mgr. Petra Justová at the Czech Technical University in Prague (České vysoké učení technické v Praze), which publishes the *Český historický atlas* (Czech Historical Atlas) with the Historical Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences (Historický ústav AV ČR, v. v. i.), for arranging permission to reproduce the map. 19
- Figure 1. *Badeni’s Egg Dance*. Source: Theodor Zajaczkowski, *Badeni’s Eiertanz*, in *Der Floh*, 28, no. 14 (April 5, 1896): 1. A short poem on p. 2 accompanies the illustration. 78
- Figure 2. The Austrian Reichsrat. Source: From an albumen silver print by Wilhelm Kral (died 1900), a Viennese photographer. The image is in the collection of Daniel E. Miller 110
- Figure 3. Tomáš G. Masaryk. Source: Washington, DC, Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Online Catalog, Bain News Service Collection of the George Grantham Bain Collection, <https://lcn.loc.gov/2014719422> 142

Figure 4. Lewis Einstein. Source: Washington, DC, Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Online Catalog, National Photo Company Collection, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/npc2007012499/	193
Figure 5. A Presidential Visit to Turčiansky Svätý Martin. Source: Martin, Slovakia, Slovenská národná knižnica, Zbierky a fondy Literárneho archívu SNK, Fotodokumentačné zbierky, Zbierka fotodokumentov osobností, PM 15/2018, “Návšteva prezidenta Dr. E. Beneša v Martine, 26. 9. 1936.”	223
Figure 6. The 1937 Commemoration of the Tragedy at Černová. Source: Martin, Slovakia, Slovenská národná knižnica, SH 13/172, “Slávnosť 30. výročia černovskej tragédie v Černovej, r. 1937.”	268
Figures 7a and 7b. The Anthems of the Czechoslovak Republic by Štefan Leonard Kostelníček. PhDr. Gabriela Čiasnohová of the Etnografické muzeum Humno, in Košice, kindly provided the images of Kostelníček’s works from her collection. She curated the exhibition in 2020 on <i>Slovenský rnament majstra Kostelníča</i> (The Slovak Ornamentation of Master Kostelníček)	310

List of Abbreviations

AHC – American Heritage Center

AK – *Arbeiterkammer* (Austria)

ANO – Akce nespokojených občanů (Action of Dissatisfied Citizens)

AKPR – Archiv Kanceláře prezidenta republiky (Archive of the Chancellery of the President of the Republic)

ANM – Archiv Národního muzea (Archive of the National Museum)

AÚTGM – Archiv Ústavu T.G. Masaryka (Archive of the Institute of T. G. Masaryk)

BdL – Bund der Landwirte, also referred to as the German Agrarian Party (Czechoslovakia)

BDP – Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei Schweiz

BGB – Bauern-, Gewerbe- und Bürgerpartei (Switzerland)

CDU/CSU – Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU; Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern, CSU

č.j. – číslo jednání (proceedings number)

č. inv. – číslo inventáře (inventory number)

ČSDSD – Československá sociálně demokratická strana dělnická (Czech), also known as the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party (ČSD)

ČSSDSR – Československá sociálnodemokratická strana robotnícka (Slovak), Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party of Workers, also known as the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party (ČSD)

ČSL – Československá strana lidová; Slovak: Československá strana ľudová (Czechoslovak People's Party, also known as the Czechoslovak Populist Party)

ČsND – Československá národní demokracie; Slovak: Československá národná demokracia (Czechoslovak National Democratic Party)

List of Abbreviations

- ČSNS – Československá strana národně socialistická; Slovak: Československá národnosocialistická strana, ČSNS (Czechoslovak National Socialist Party)
- ČSSD – Česká strana sociálně demokratická (Czech Social Democratic Party)
- CVP – Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz
- ČZOSS – Československá živnostensko-obchodnická strana středostavovská (Czechoslovak Business and Commerce Party of the Middle Class, also known as the Tradesmen's Party)
- DCVP – Deutsche Christlich-Soziale Volkspartei (DCVP, German Christian Social People's Party, also referred to as the German Christian Socialist Party)
- DOS – Department of State (United States)
- DSAP – Deutsche sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei
- DTV – Deutsche Turnverband
- FAR – Fond Aloise Rašína
- FDP – Freie Demokratische Partei (Germany)
- FDP – Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei (Switzerland)
- FO – Foreign Office (United Kingdom)
- FPÖ – Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs
- HHStA, GK-P – Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Gesandtschafts-, und Konzulat-sarchiv, Prag
- HSLS – Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana (Hlinka Slovak People's Party, also referred to as the Slovak Populist Party; for 1925 and before, see SLS)
- KPÖ – Kommunistische Partei Österreichs
- KSČ – Komunistická strana Československa (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia)
- KCVp – Konservativ-Christlichsoziale Volkspartei (Switzerland)
- LEP – Lewis Einstein Papers
- LK – Landwirtschaftskammer (Austria)
- MAB – Mezinárodní agrární bureau (International Agrarian Bureau)
- NA – Národní archiv (National Archive, in Czech or Slovak) or National Archives (United Kingdom)
- NARA – National Archives and Records Administration (United States)
- NÁRUS – Národohospodársky ústav Slovenska a Podkarpatskej Rusi (Economic Institute of Slovakia and Ruthenia)
- ODS – Občanská demokratická strana (Civic Democratic Party)
- ÖGB – Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund
- ÖVP – Österreichische Volkspartei

PMR – Předsednictvo ministerské rady (Chairmanship of the Council of Ministers)

PR – Proportional Representation

RGBL – *Reichsgesetzblatt*

ŘOH – Říšská odborová rada křesťanských organizací (State-wide Union Council of Christian Organizations)

RSZML or RSZaML – Republikánská strana zemědělského a malorolnického lidu (Republican Party of Agriculturalists and Small Farmers)

SbNU – *Sbírka nálezů a usnesení Ústavního soudu České republiky* (Collection of Findings and Resolutions of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic)

Sb. z. a n. – *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení* (Collection of Laws and Orders)

SdP – Sudetendeutsche Partei

SLS – Slovenská ľudová strana (Slovak People's Party, 1913-1914 and 1918-1925, also referred to here as the Slovak Populist Party; for 1925 and after, see HSLS)

Smer-SD – Smer-sociálna demokracia (Direction-Social Democracy)

SNS – Slovenská národná strana (Slovak National Party, also referred to as the Slovak Nationalists)

SP – Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz

SPD – Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands

SPÖ – Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs

SÚS – Státní úřad statistický (State Statistical Office)

SVP – Schweizerische Volkspartei

UW – University of Wyoming

WKÖ – Wirtschaftskammer Österreich

Foreword

This book is an admirable and much-needed contribution to the literature on consociational democracy. In particular, by bringing together scholars from the fields of political science and history, it shows how much both disciplines can gain through conversation with each other. By applying consociational theory to historical cases, Phil Howe, Tom Lorman, and Dan Miller show that consociationalism is not merely a post-World War II phenomenon; rather, the historical roots of Central European consociationalism are far more extensive than scholars had previously appreciated. Earlier work by me and others has drawn connections between consociationalism and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, in particular, the development of the “personality principle” by Austro-Marxists Otto Bauer and Karl Renner. The authors significantly expand on this theme, revealing that aspects of the consociational model could be found in rudimentary form throughout many parts of the Imperial Austrian political system. Furthermore, this work shows how that political legacy transferred to interwar Czechoslovakia, providing a solid defense of that state as an early consociational democracy. By challenging conventional wisdom in several branches of political historiography, the authors provide a much more positive story about Central European history than is usually the case. Conventional scholarship almost invariably portrays that history as a series of traumas that led to catastrophe. This work shows that, on the contrary, there is much to be learned about politics in divided societies from both the Habsburg Monarchy and interwar Central Europe. It therefore promises to inspire additional research and debate in both disciplines for some time.

Arend Lijphart,

Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of California at San Diego

Preface

This project has had a lengthy gestation period of nearly 15 years. It started in 2010 when Daniel E. Miller delivered a paper that applied the consociational theory to Czechoslovakia between the two world wars. Later that same year, he recruited Philip J. Howe for a panel on consociationalism at the American Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES), in Los Angeles, CA. Discussions that Miller and Howe had with Thomas A. Lorman, who had chaired the 2010 panel, drew him into the joint effort to author this examination of the historical cases of consociationalism in Imperial Austria, interwar Czechoslovakia, and Slovakia.

Although this volume was a collaborative effort, each of the three authors inevitably played a larger role in certain sections. Some of their acknowledgments appear separately, reflecting their different areas of expertise and interest.

Miller became intrigued with applying the consociational model to the Czechoslovak First Republic in the second half of the 1980s. His opportunity to examine the topic arose in April 2010, when Bruce M. Garver, now professor emeritus at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, and other organizers of a conference on “Czech and Slovak Americans: International Perspectives from the Great Plains,” which took place at the Lincoln Campus of the University of Nebraska, invited Miller to deliver the keynote address at a luncheon. Financial assistance for Miller’s participation in the Nebraska conference came from the Center for Great Plains Studies at the University of Nebraska at Lincoln and the Nebraska Humanities Council. After the conference, the American Heritage Center at the University of Wyoming provided Miller with a grant to examine the papers of Lewis D. Einstein in its archive. Miller further refined certain aspects of his research in a paper for the November 2010 ASEEES conference and

in subsequent papers. Partial financial assistance for Miller's research in Prague during the summers of 2009 and 2014, as well as during a sabbatical in 2016, came from the University of West Florida in Pensacola, FL, which also awarded Miller with travel grants to attend several conferences.

Miller's chapter on Czechoslovakia benefitted from the advice of several individuals who read all or part of the manuscript, especially Michelle H. Williams, then a member of the Department of Government at the University of West Florida in Pensacola and now executive vice chancellor for academic affairs at Indiana University Southeast (New Albany, IN), and Michael R. Cude, then a graduate student at the University of Colorado at Boulder and now at Schreiner University in Kerrville, TX. Students in several of Miller's classes had to tolerate vignettes about consociationalism and Czechoslovakia's democratic achievements, and their questions helped make his explanations more concise. Other individuals who provided Miller with specific advice include Pavel Dufek and David Hubený at the National Archive (Národní archiv) in Prague, Jaroslav Rokoský at Jan Evangelista Purkyně University (Univerzita Jana Evangelisty Purkyně) in Ústí nad Labem, Johannes Florian Kontny with the Austrian Academy of Sciences (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften), and Barbora Štolleová at the Institute for Economic and Social History at Charles University (Ústav hospodářských a sociálních dějin FF UK) in Prague. Pavel Marek and Miloš Trapl, both professors emeriti at Palacký University (Univerzita Palackého) in Olomouc, recommended sources concerning cooperation between German and Czech Catholics.

Philip J. Howe's oldest debt of gratitude is to Mr. Lewis, his high school history teacher, for first bringing the Habsburg Monarchy to his attention and for calling all of his students scholars. Howe has been engaged closely with various aspects of Habsburg-era politics since graduate school. He therefore would like to thank his dissertation committee for having encouraged and supported his early efforts to study a case that was quite unusual for political science. (He feels vindicated that a growing new generation of comparative political scientists have taken up an increasing variety of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century topics in recent years.) Above all, he wishes to thank his *Doktormutter*, the late Ellen Turkish Comisso (1947–2013), for instilling in him that one needs to understand the Central and East European past to comprehend its political present. It is one of his greatest regrets that she was unable to read this completed manuscript. She inevitably would have found a way to disagree with much of it. Howe also would like to thank his other former committee members: Arend Lijphart, whose work informs not only this book but nearly every aspect of Howe's research and teaching; the late Victor V. Magagna (1954–2022), a political scientist with a great appreciation for history whose profound intellectual

impact on every graduate student passing through the UCSD Department of Political Science is incalculable; as well as Iván T. Berend of the UCLA History Department and David Luft of the UCSD History Department for sharing their deep historical knowledge and for their openness to an aspiring political scientist intruding in their field of study. Finally, he thanks the late John Richardson (1967-2002), a fellow Oberlin alum and Comisso PhD student at UCSD, for first drawing his attention to Central and East European politics. John had begun a dissertation related to the topic of this book when he died from a sudden illness. The resulting work certainly would have been brilliant; hopefully, the present monograph will make up, in some small part, for that tragic loss to Richardson and Howe's shared field.

The other historians and political scientists who have supported Howe's work on the Habsburg Monarchy and its legacies over the years, by sharing their insights into Austrian political history and by providing crucial source materials, are too numerous to mention in their entirety. Such a list certainly includes Harald Binder at the Center for Urban History in Lviv, David Laitin at Stanford University, as well as Börries Kuzmany, Emmerich Tálos, and Karl Ucakar, all at the University of Vienna. Franz Adlgasser at the Austrian Academy of Sciences and Lothar Höbelt at the University of Vienna have been especially generous both with their time and by sharing their mastery of the intricacies of Habsburg-era politics since Howe first began attempting to disentangle the complex mess that was *fin-de-siècle* Austria's parliamentary electoral and legislative behavior. Howe is also grateful for the feedback from the discussants Eileen McDonagh and Kevin Narizny, as well as the audience, at "Historical Analyses of European State Systems," Panel 54-11, at the April 5, 2014, annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, in Chicago, IL, where he presented an earlier version of a section in Chapter 2 titled "Regional Compromises as Semi-Democratic Consociationalism." To these acknowledgments, he must add his research partners on the Habsburg Manifesto Project, Edina Szöcsik at the University of Fribourg and Christina Isabel Zuber at the University of Konstanz, for providing intellectual stimulation, for serving as model colleagues, and for their friendship. It is a joy to find other political scientists with an interest in matters Habsburg, although he doubts that they knew what they were in for when they first suggested a collaboration. Similarly, he would like to thank the wonderful staffs of the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, the Parlamentsbibliothek, and the Universitätsbibliothek Wien, all located in Vienna, for their invaluable assistance over the years, as well as the staff of the Harlan Hatcher Graduate Library at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Richard Geyer at Adrian College's Shipman Library deserves special mention for dealing with Howe's innumerable interlibrary loan requests.

Much of Howe's initial work on this project began at the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen/Institute for the Human Sciences (IWM) in Vienna, which, as an institute for advanced study, provides the ideal interdisciplinary environment for a project such as this. In particular, he would like to thank the late Krzysztof Michalski (1948–2013), along with Clemena Antonova, Holly Case, Ludger Hagedorn, János M. Kovács, Ivan Krastev, Klaus Nellen, and Mary Niklas, for their intellectual stimulation and support over the years. Howe's time at the IWM would not have been possible were it not for a generous 2011–2012 Visiting Fellowship from the European Institutes for Advanced Study (EURIAS). Howe presented much earlier versions of his contributions to this volume at an IWM Junior Fellows conference, which Agnieszka Pasieka, David C. Petruccielli, and Ben Roth played a central role in organizing. At that conference, he received valuable discussant comments from Tamara Banjeglav. Howe also would like to thank Günter Frühwirth and Lonnie Johnson of the Austrian Fulbright Commission; Károly Jókay, Annamária Sas, and Csanád Nagypál of the Hungarian Fulbright Commission; and Zsolt Boda of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Those individuals and their institutions made various aspects of this work possible. Furthermore, Howe thanks the Adrian College Association of Professors for regularly funding his research efforts in Central Europe.

Lorman wishes to extend his thanks to those fellow academics who discussed and read earlier drafts of his contribution to this manuscript, especially Philip Barker, Jakub Benes, Simon Dixon, Martyn Rady, Trevor Thomas, and James Ward. The value of their advice, encouragement, and friendship is immeasurable. He also wishes to thank the staff of the library of University College London's School of Slavonic and East European Studies as well as the staff of the Slovak and Hungarian National Libraries and the British Library in London who all proved to be efficient, knowledgeable, kind, and patient. When lingering restrictions from the coronavirus pandemic still made international travel difficult, Vojtěch Kocek, who resides in Prague, verified several sources for the Slovak section in the National Archive and the National Library in Prague.

All three authors are grateful to many scholars who supported their joint efforts. At the 2010 ASEES conference, Howe presented "Historical Applications of the Consociational Democratic Model: Imperial Austria as a Proto-Consociational State" and Miller delivered "Czechoslovakia in the 1920s as a Consociational Democracy through the Perspective of Lewis Einstein, America's Envoy in Prague" during a panel titled "The Development of Consociational (Consensual) Democracy in Central and East-Central Europe." Howe and Miller wish to thank Blanka Říchová, of Charles University in Prague,

who wrote the third paper for the panel, and the discussant, Michael Kraus of Middlebury College.

As they made progress with the manuscript, the three authors delivered papers at several venues. The first was on May 30, 2014, at a conference titled “Between Politics and Culture: New Perspectives on the History of the Bohemian Lands and the First Czechoslovak Republic (1880s–1930s),” whose sponsors were the Masaryk Institute and Archives of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic and the Department of German and Austrian Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, at Charles University, in Prague. The paper resulted in an overview of their research that appeared as “The Creation of the Conditions for Consociational Democracy and Its Development in Interwar Czechoslovakia,” in *Bohemia: Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur der böhmischen Länder/A Journal of History and Civilisation in East Central Europe* 56, no. 2 (2016): 362–380. On 23 November 2014, Howe, Lorman, and Miller presented three separate papers that reflected portions of their research at a panel they organized at the ASEES conference in San Antonio, TX. They are thankful to Mary Hrabik Samal, then at Oakland University, in Troy, MI, who commented on the papers, and to Robert Kent Evanson, now associate professor emeritus at the University of Missouri at Kansas City, KS, for chairing the session. The three authored “Consociationalism in the Habsburg Empire and Interwar Czechoslovakia,” which Lorman presented on January 9, 2015 at a conference on “National-Personal Autonomy, Non-Territorial Autonomy, Cultural Autonomy” at the Institut für Osteuropäische Geschichte, Universität Wien, Austria. Finally, on April 1, 2016, the three jovial jesters wrote “The Development of Consociational Democracy in the Habsburg Monarchy and Interwar Czechoslovakia,” which Miller presented at the Sixteenth Czech Studies Workshop. The National Czech and Slovak Museum and Library in Cedar Rapids, IA, provided financial assistance for the workshop attendees. Howe, Lorman, and Miller recognize all of these conference organizers, commentators, and participants whose efforts enabled them to refine aspects of their arguments.

The authors are indebted to many individuals and institutions who aided them in numerous ways. They thank Tihana Luetic of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts (Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti) for providing sources regarding students at the University of Zagreb that appear in the Habsburg chapter. Paul Robert Magocsi at the University of Toronto answered several questions about Ruthenia. Gabriela Čiasnohová of the Ethnographic Museum Humno (Etnografické muzeum Humno) in Košice, Slovakia, furnished scans of the Czechoslovak national anthems by Štefan Leonard Kostelníček. Assisting Miller with scanning images was John W. Barksdale at the University of West Florida.

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In several footnotes throughout the text, the authors express their appreciation for specific assistance and advice from colleagues in various fields.

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LINGUISTIC-NATIONAL MAJORITIES 1910:

On the basis of Gerichtsbezirke and Statutarstädte in Austria, of Bezirke, Munizipalstädte and Magistratsstädte in Hungary, and of Bezirke and Statutarstädte in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Sources:

Öst. Statistik, N.F. I/1, Tab. 3;
Ung. Statist. Mitteilungen, N.S. XLII, Tab. 1
Volkszählung Bosnien-Herzegovina 1910, Tab. V

Administrative Structure and Topography:

Politische Einteilung der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie /
Az osztrák-magyar Monarchia Politikai beosztása [1916] (1.800.000);
Spezialortsspektorium Österreich 1900, 1910; Allgemeines Verzeichnis der
Ortsgemeinden und Ortschaften Österreichs 1910;
Helységnevtár 1913; Jekelfalussy 1892; Popis žiteljstva 1910;
Volkszählung Bosnien-Herzegovina 1910

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46° nördl. Breit.

National Majorities

Nationalities ^{a)}	Proportion in Percentage of the population ^{b)}		
	20-50	50-80	>80
Germans			
Czechs ^{c)}			
Slovaks			
Hungarians			
Serbs ^{d)}			
Croats ^{d)}			
Slovenes			
Bosniacs ^{e)}			
Romanians			
Poles			
Ruthenians			
Italians			
Miscellaneous ^{f)}			

Nationally mixed areas, on the basis of districts, are indicated by full color and stippling in the colors of the respective nationality.

a) By Umgangssprache in Austria, by Muttersprache in Hungary, and by religious confession in Istria, Dalmatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

b) For reasons of comparison, in Austria "local population of Austrian citizenship" (including military) and "non-citizens" ("total");

in Hungary "local population" (including military and "foreign citizens"); and in Bosnia-Herzegovina "local population" (including military).

c) From the language survey in Austria "Bohemian-Moravian-Slovak" and in Hungary "Slovak."

d) Calculated by dividing those with "Serbo-Croatian" as their language of everyday use, according to Österreichischer Statistik,


into Serbs and Croats in Istria, Dalmatia, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina. The totals also are calculated on the basis of the percentage

of the local population belonging to the Roman Catholic and Orthodox religions.

e) By religious statistics for Bosnia "Muslims" but not designated in the Hungarian statistics.

f) In Austria, "resident foreigners" plus "Serbo-Croatians" less than 2%, with the exception of Istria and Dalmatia (see note d); in Hungary, "miscellaneous and unknown," and in Bosnia-Herzegovina small groups and "others." Also in the miscellaneous group are the statistically nonindicated languages of everyday use: Polish, Czech, Slovene, and Italian (see note a). Where their share was substantial, they would be considered in a differentiated count (cf. Ung. Stat. LXIV, p. 60). In Fiume, therefore, 54.8% of miscellaneous 48.06% were Italian. In Trstena, of the 67.9% miscellaneous, the majority were Poles. In Muraszombat, of the 85.2% miscellaneous, more than 80% were Slovenes. The difference between miscellaneous and 100% in Fiume divided into 26% Croats and 13% Hungarians, in Trstena into 28.4% Slovaks, and in Muraszombat into 10.8% Hungarians. Small groups less than 2%, in general, were not considered.

Map 1. Ethnographic Map of Austria-Hungary



Introduction

In September 1897, the popular American writer, Samuel L. Clemens (1835–1910), better known as Mark Twain, arrived in Vienna to begin a twenty-month stay. Among the highlights of the time he spent in the imperial capital of the Habsburg Monarchy were a number of visits to the parliament, which he duly summarized in a series of articles for the American journal *Harper's New Monthly Magazine*. The picture he drew was unflattering. Elections to the recently expanded Reichsrat or Imperial Council had taken place in March with some of the deputies holding their mandates on the basis of universal manhood suffrage.¹ Twain noted that the Reichsrat had “425 deputies from ... nineteen or twenty states.... These men represent peoples who speak eleven different languages. That means eleven different varieties of jealousies, hostilities and warring interests.” As a result, “confusion and despair” characterized the public’s view of politics, parliamentary business was “paralyzed,” the government was “harried, bedeviled, and despairing,” and Twain himself wondered whether “parliament and the Constitution [can] survive the present storm.” Twain reasoned that the situation

could be expected to furnish forth a parliament of a pretty inharmonious sort, and make legislation difficult at times—and it does that. The Parliament is split up into many parties—the Clericals, the Progressists, the German Nationalists, the Young Czechs, the Social Democrats, the Christian Socialists,

¹ The Reichsrat had transformed earlier from a council for the emperor to a legislature, and it occasionally is referred to as a parliament. As with the German Reichstag, historians rarely translate Reichsrat.

and some others—and it is difficult to get up working combinations among them. They prefer to fight apart sometimes.

Twain described the Reichsrat session of October 28, 1897, when political sensitivities still were raw, in the wake of the ill-fated April 1897 language decree of Chancellor Count Kasimir Felix Badeni (1846–1909), which required administrators in Bohemia (Czech: Čechy; German: Böhmen) to know both Czech and German. He recounted what had occurred when one deputy rose to speak:

Then burst out such another wild and frantic and deafening clamour as has not been heard on this planet since the last time the Comanches surprised a white settlement at night. Yells from the Left, counter-yells from the Right, explosions of yells from all sides at once, and all the air sawed and pawed and clawed and cloven by a writhing confusion of gesturing arms and hands. Out of the midst of this thunder and turmoil and tempest rose Dr. Lecher, serene and collected, and the providential length of him enabled his head to show out of it.² He began his twelve-hour speech. At any rate, his lips could be seen to move, and that was evidence. On high sat the President, imploring order, with his long hands put together as in prayer, and his lips visibly but not hearably speaking. At intervals he grasped his bell and swung it up and down with vigour, adding its keen clamor to the storm weltering there below.³

In spite of his pessimism, Twain took solace in the assessment of another American traveler, Forrest Morgan (1852–1924), an editor and librarian, who had noted that the monarchy “has survived, much in its present shape, two centuries of storms that have swept perfectly unified countries from existence.”⁴ Twain

2 Otto Lecher (1861–1939), a deputy from Brno (German: Brünn), spoke against the renewal of the *Ausgleich* (Compromise), the 1867 agreement that enabled Hungary to manage its own affairs within the Habsburg Monarchy. After the First World War, Lecher, like a number of politicians from the Bohemian Lands, remained in Austria, and for several months, he was a member of the new Austrian National Assembly. After the war, he wrote the very Twainian satirical novel *Der Abgeordnete-Erzählung aus dem Franzisko-Josefinischen Österreich* (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1919), which portrays the disillusionment of a young radical from the provinces after his election to the Reichsrat.

3 Mark Twain, “Stirring Times in Austria,” *Harper’s New Monthly Magazine* 96, issue 574 (March 1898): 534.

4 Forrest Morgan, “Austria and the Hungarian Revolution,” 30 (June 1894): 2, as quoted in Twain, “Stirring Times in Austria,” 531.

concluded, in a follow-up article, that, in spite of everything, “things go along smoothly,” and parliament can “continue business at the old stand.”⁵

The major constitutional developments that had created the Reichsrat of Twain’s humorous piece were not even five decades in the past. In June 1859, the Kingdom of Sardinia and its ally, France, defeated the Austrian Empire at the Battles of Magenta and Solferino, and in the subsequent treaty, Austria lost Lombardy. In March 1860, hoping to restore his monarchy’s military strength and fiscal stability, Emperor Franz Joseph (1830–1916; reigned 1848–1916) expanded the Reichsrat, which he had created on April 13, 1851, more than tripling its original size of 12 members. The new body included 38 members, whom the diets selected, along with appointees who were archdukes, ecclesiastics, and other notables. The Reichsrat did not have legislative initiative, but, in July 1860, it gained the right to approve the budget.⁶ Then, through the October Diploma of 1860, Franz Joseph transformed the Reichsrat once more, ushering in what became known as the monarchy’s constitutional period. Under this short-lived, conservative federal experiment, the Reichsrat now had 100 members and largely advisory authority over a limited range of policy areas, while the diets held a predominant position over the Reichsrat. The arrangement suited the nobles because they enjoyed greater influence locally, but it angered the German liberals, who decried decentralization, the weakening of the Germans’ standing in the realm, and the overrepresentation of the nobility in both the Reichsrat and the provincial diets. Meanwhile, Bohemian and Galician nobles resented the privileged position granted Hungary, while the new arrangement failed to satisfy many Hungarians, who aimed for a restoration of their 1848 constitution.⁷

5 Mark Twain, “The ‘Austrian Parliamentary System’? Government by Article 14,” *Lords and Commons*, February 25, 1899, 59–61, as quoted in Carl Dolmetsch, *Our Famous Guest: Mark Twain in Vienna* (Athens, GA, and London: University of Georgia Press, 1992), 79.

6 *Reichsgesetzblatt (RGBl)*, no. 92, Patent of April 13, 1851, and no. 56, Patent of March 5, 1860. See also the no. 181, Regulation of July 17, 1860, which was in the form of a letter (*Allerhöchste Handschreiben*). Other measures also dealt with the functioning of the Reichsrat. For background information on the political changes in the monarchy, see John Deak, *Forging a Multinational State: State Making in Imperial Austria from the Enlightenment to the First World War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), ch. 4.

7 The provincial diets included those for the lands that were to become part of the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy in 1867. Simultaneously, the Diploma restored the Hungarian Diet and granted Hungary a constitutionally privileged position within the new political system, thereby foreshadowing the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise. The Diploma also made special arrangements for Croatia and Transylvania. See Franz Joseph’s letter to Johann Bernhard, Count von Rechberg und Rothenlöwen (1806–1899), *RGBl*, no. 226, Diploma of October 20, 1860; Deak, *Forging a Multinational State*, 145–49; and Steven Beller, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1815–1918* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 109–110.

Such opposition prompted Franz Joseph to issue the Patent of February 26, 1861, which abandoned the federative approach and adopted a more centralist course. The Reichsrat remained, but it now had two chambers: an appointed House of Lords (Herrenhaus) and a popularly elected Chamber of Deputies (Abgeordnetenhaus). The lower house had 343 deputies whom four curiae elected—the estate owners, chamber of commerce members, townsmen, and peasants—with the franchise for the last two curiae based on a minimum tax.⁸ The Hungarian parliament, also dissatisfied with the February Patent, refused to send delegates to the Reichsrat, and the Croats, who anticipated a special arrangement with the Hungarians, followed suit. In the Reichsrat, some supported the February Patent, while others opposed it. Soon, all Polish and Czech representatives left the Reichsrat, which put the monarchy in political limbo.

A crisis broke the stalemate. Austria faced another international embarrassment, with its defeat in the 1866 Austro-Prussian War, also known as the Seven Weeks' War, and its loss of Venetia to Italy, which had been Prussia's ally. Franz Joseph was determined to exact revenge on Prussia and restore Austria's honor, but in order to strengthen the state internally, he first had to solve the political impasse. Instead of crafting a compromise with centralists and federalists, he sought to satisfy what seemed to be the most vocal group, the Hungarian nobles. The resulting *Ausgleich* of May 1867 divided the internal affairs of the monarchy into Austrian and Hungarian halves, each with a separate constitution.⁹ The Reichsrat, which had the power of legislative initiative, now met without its Hungarian deputies, who formed their own bicameral Parliament (Országgyűlés) for the Kingdom of Hungary.¹⁰

What Twain had witnessed in the legislative chamber was a continuation of the struggle between centralism and federalism in the monarchy, which the *Ausgleich* made more complicated because both the Austrian and Hungarian sides had to approve any constitutional changes. As a result, deputies from Bohemia were well aware that Budapest would veto any attempt to elevate the

8 The details concerning the Reichsrat are in *RGBl.*, no. 20, Patent of February 26, 1861.

9 Although Compromise is an accurate translation of both the German term *Ausgleich* and the Hungarian term *kiegyezés*, it arguably misrepresents the actual nature of the agreement, which was more like a settlement or even a concession.

10 For Austria, the *Ausgleich* was tied to the first of six laws that form Austria's 1867 constitution. See *RGBl.*, nos. 141 and 146, Laws of December 21, 1867, as well as nos. 142–145, Basic Laws of December 1867. For Hungary, the *Kiegyezés* is Law XII of 1867. *RGBl.*, no. 141, Law of December 21, 1867 set the size of the lower house of the Reichsrat. The Hungarian legislature before 1867 usually is referred to as a diet, and after 1867, parliament is the common term. The literal translation of the Hungarian Országgyűlés is National Assembly, which is the current official name for the Hungarian legislative body.

Bohemian Lands to the status that Hungary enjoyed in order to prevent the weakening of Hungary's influence in the monarchy. The rise of ethno-nationalism and increasingly confrontational language politics within that Czech- and German-speaking province further complicated the already-existing constitutional struggles.

After the *Ausgleich*, clashes between the various nationalities also bedeviled the Kingdom of Hungary, where the governing elite's efforts to inculcate a sense of Hungarian national identity provoked the non-Magyar population, which accounted for roughly half of the kingdom's inhabitants. As in Austria, there was plenty of rowdy behavior in the Hungarian parliament, but a restricted franchise, electoral corruption, and ruthless politicking ensured that the Hungarian parliament compliantly endorsed the government's policy of Magyarization. Nevertheless, the legislature in Budapest had surprising complexities, with backers of the government coming from several different quarters: Jews who overwhelmingly saw the government as philo-Semitic; industrialists and commercial classes who supported the government's policies favoring free trade and economic advancement; and many who feared that challenges to the government's authority could lead to revolution. Regrettably, Twain never reported on the Hungarian parliament. Had he done so, he might have drawn the conclusion that a clear parliamentary majority was no guarantee of sensible decision making.

With a few editorial changes, Twain could have been writing about the ethnic and ideological divisions of the Czechoslovak First Republic (1918–1938). In fact, a quarter of a century after the publication of “Stirring Times in Austria,” another astute American observer, Lewis Einstein (1877–1967), arrived in Central Europe to assume his post as envoy to Czechoslovakia, one of the successor states of Austria-Hungary and a country that many writers, at the time, referred to as a Habsburg Monarchy in miniature. He, too, faced an array of squabbling parties that represented peoples speaking at least six separate languages (Czech, Slovak, German, Hungarian, Polish, as well as Ukrainian or other East Slavic languages) and possessing six different varieties of what Twain had described as “jealousies, hostilities and warring interests” that threatened to render the country ungovernable. At times, like Twain before him, Einstein railed at the malpractices and feuding of Czechoslovakia's politicians, but he came to recognize that the Czechoslovak political system actually worked surprisingly well.

Both Einstein and Twain's ability to recognize the profound divisions and the simultaneous resilience of the respective political systems they encoun-

tered raises a question that continues to occupy historians and political scientists alike: how do politics operate effectively when societies are deeply divided? To answer this question, the current study examines the political systems that attracted Twain and Einstein's attention. It considers the Habsburg Monarchy's democratic legacy in Central Europe first by focusing on Imperial Austria, in roughly the two decades preceding the outbreak of the First World War, and then by examining Czechoslovakia, from its creation, in 1918, until the 1938 Munich Agreement. While it is a historical narrative, it also employs the relatively uncomplicated consociational model, which political scientists have devised to explain stable democracy in divided societies, in order to analyze the tendencies that enabled the representative political institutions of Imperial Austria and interwar Czechoslovakia to function.

Czechoslovakia was one of a number of states that, at the end of the First World War, rose from the ashes of the Austro-Hungarian, German, Ottoman, and Russian empires. The breakup of Austria-Hungary gave birth to an independent Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, while other portions of Austro-Hungarian territory went to recreate Poland, to expand Romania and Italy, as well as to augment the new state of Yugoslavia, until 1929 known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The other great empires of Central and Eastern Europe suffered similar convulsions. Germany started anew as a republic, having lost territories to France, Belgium, Denmark, Lithuania, Poland, and 20 square kilometers of land to Czechoslovakia. The war resulted in the dissolution and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Its rump became Turkey, while Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, as well as Palestine and the future state of Israel emerged from its former territories. Russia's poor military performance during the war and its 1917 revolutions led to the creation of the new Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), along with the independent states of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Belarus and Ukraine also became independent, but the Soviet Union absorbed them in the early 1920s, as it did other states, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, that had broken away from Imperial Russia. Romania took Bessarabia, once part of Russia, and Russian Poland joined German and Austrian territories to form a resurrected Polish state. By the end of 1923, when European borders and internal politics had stabilized somewhat, there were 11 new states and five enlarged states in Central and Eastern Europe.

Even the casual observer of European history between the two world wars is bound to wonder why, among all the new states that had emerged from the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy, only Czechoslovakia managed to fulfill the two



Map 2. Administrative Map of Czechoslovakia (1930)

As of 1928, Czechoslovakia had four provinces: Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia (previously two separate provinces), Slovakia, and Ruthenia. Each province had a provincial president, whom the president of the republic named, and district heads, whom the Ministry of Interior appointed. Each province also had a provincial assembly, with voters electing two-thirds of the members and the government appointing the remaining one-third. Map Legend: 1) the red dots are provincial capitals; 2) the dark gray lines are the country's borders; 3) the red lines are the provincial borders; and 4) the thin gray lines are the borders of political districts.

Source: Český historický atlas, Hranice a regiony–Správa 1918-1938, “Zemské zřízení k roku 1930,” <https://cha.fsv.cvut.cz/mapp.php?map=2Db>. The authors appreciate the efforts of Mgr. Petra Justová at the Czech Technical University in Prague (České vysoké učení technické v Praze), which publishes the Český historický atlas (Czech Historical Atlas) with the Historical Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences (Historický ústav AV ČR, v. v. i.), for arranging permission to reproduce the map.

essential criteria of a democratic state for the entirety of the interwar period: first, the citizens regularly chose the government through popular vote; and second, the state constitutionally protected political rights and civil liberties.

Immediately after the war, Austria was a parliamentary democracy, but political and ultimately civil conflict between socialists and nonsocialists resulted in a dictatorship of the right. By the 1930s, Austria was a democracy in name only. Immediately after becoming independent, Hungary briefly experimented with a democracy and then a Bolshevik-style dictatorship. By 1920, it reverted to a parliamentary democracy, but a restrictive franchise, a lack of respect for civil liberties, and political manipulation ensured that a single government party remained in power throughout the entire interwar period. Transylvania, formerly in Hungary, became part of Romania, a country that ended its flirtation with democracy in 1938, with a royal dictatorship. Slovenes, who historically had resided in Austria and joined with their fellow South Slavs to form the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, also experienced a royal dictatorship, which, from 1929 until its dismemberment during the Second World War, ruled the country, newly renamed Yugoslavia. Finally, Austrian Galicia (Polish: *Galicja*; Ukrainian: *Галичина*; German: *Galizien*) became part of a reunited Poland, but political bickering among the politicians who had built their careers in three different political traditions hampered efforts to rebuild the country, contributing to the 1926 coup d'état of Marshal Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935) that put an end to genuine parliamentary government.

By contrast, through most of Czechoslovakia's history, the authorities avoided banning the antisystem parties, turning to that drastic measure only in 1933, when they outlawed the German National Socialist Workers' Party, which resurfaced under different names. Czechoslovakia's democracy survived despite ethnic divisions, religious differences, economic downturns, political fractures, regional disparities, and foreign threats. Its politicians practiced the fine art of compromise in a number of coalitions, most of which spawned several cabinets. The polity struggled with accommodating its minorities, but it eventually gave them some role in governing the state. Slovak politicians regularly participated in the cabinets. Then in 1920, the German representatives entered the legislature, and starting in 1926, they always had at least one ministerial post. In 1928, a provincial system took effect that gave new powers to Slovakia (Slovak and Czech: *Slovensko*; German: *Slowakei*; Hungarian: *Szlovákia*) and Ruthenia, and politicians were preparing further legislation to give full autonomy to Ruthenia, well before the pressures of the crisis with Germany had peaked. Even though its democracy was imperfect—other democratic states, at the time,

certainly had their own flaws—the country thrived, until the Great Depression heightened ethnic strains that Nazi Germany exploited. Compromise and co-operation, the hallmark of parliamentary politics in open societies, preserved Czechoslovak democracy for nearly two decades.

Traditionally, explanations as to why Czechoslovakia uniquely preserved a vibrant democracy in Central Europe have invoked political culture. Simplistic accounts attribute the country's successes in the interwar years to a dubious link between democracy and a Czech pre-Luther religious reformation experience as well as the more tenable intellectual legacy of nineteenth-century liberals, such as Karel Havlíček (1821–1856), an author and journalist, and František Palacký (1798–1876), a historian and politician. A more logical connection was with the country's recent past—the latter years of the Habsburg Monarchy. In the closing decades of Austria-Hungary, Bohemian society—both Czech and German speakers—benefitted from broad freedom of expression and widespread education, while its politicians built mass political parties and debated in provincial diets and the Reichsrat. After 1918, the Czech political establishment coopted Slovaks and Ruthenians, who had built their own traditions of cooperation and compromise, into Czechoslovakia's democratic framework.

Historians often have looked disparagingly at representative political institutions in the late Habsburg Monarchy. They see the eastern half as repressive because the Hungarian nobility and their allies monopolized politics, even to the detriment of the Hungarian peasantry. The Hungarian government also alienated the Croats, who had received a specific number of seats in the Hungarian Parliament and certain cultural rights, as part of the 1868 *Nagodba* (Croatian for *compromise*) with the government in Budapest. Historians also observe significant flaws in the politics of the western half of the monarchy. Elections to the Reichsrat were based on universal manhood suffrage beginning in 1907, but that was not the case for the provincial diets. Furthermore, the cabinet was not responsible to the legislature, so the ministers and chancellors served at the behest of the emperor. Indeed, the same situation existed in Germany, where universal manhood suffrage applied to the Reichstag elections since its establishment in 1871, which was not the case for other electoral contests in the Reich, and the Kaiser appointed and dismissed the chancellors and ministers, without the Reichstag's input. Both Austria-Hungary and Germany were poor training grounds for democrats, according to some, and the proof was not only the failure of these monarchies to fully democratize but also the foibles of their successor states. A general consensus maintains that the politicians of the Weimar Republic, who had little experience with democracy, could not handle the freedoms

that had materialized, in the wake of the Kaiser's abdication, and the result was the rise of German National Socialism.¹¹ Likewise, most of the successor states of Austria-Hungary abandoned democracy and resorted to authoritarianism.

While many scholars maintain that Habsburg political institutions failed to impart the ideas of compromise and tolerance to their political participants, characterizing the monarchy as a failing school that left all its pupils behind, the authors of this volume take a different approach. They see the glass as half full. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy never became completely democratic, but the Austrian half took significant steps in the direction of democracy. The monarchy's positive experiences then transferred to the Czechoslovak First Republic. It was in Austria-Hungary where politicians learned not only that cooperation was desirable but also that specific political mechanisms could foster the sort of cooperation needed in a deeply divided polity. Historians generally fail to recognize the positive political heritage of the Habsburg Monarchy. The same is true of political scientists, to the extent that they have considered the monarchy at all. The problem has resulted from their attempts to view the monarchy and its successor states through the lens of the majoritarian democracies prevalent in the Anglo-American world. A far more useful tool for understanding Austro-Hungarian politics, particularly as it developed in the Austrian half of the monarchy and in interwar Czechoslovakia, is the consociational model of democracy, whose most noted theorist is the political scientist Arend Lijphart (born 1936).

The focus of Lijphart's analysis was neither interwar Czechoslovakia nor the Habsburg Monarchy but rather the political systems of small Western European democracies after the Second World War. Nevertheless, the parallels between his case studies and those in this book are striking. Like Twain and Einstein, Lijphart was interested in how polities managed to function effectively in deeply divided or what he often referred to as plural societies. As a result, the theoretical model he developed to tackle this question applies not only to contemporary states but also to historic ones, such as interwar Czechoslovakia and the Habsburg Monarchy.

Social scientists now apply Lijphart's theory to an expanding number of countries, but regrettably, most case studies concentrate on political systems that emerged in the last few decades. This is unsurprising. Lijphart is a politi-

¹¹ Historians recently have questioned long-standing criticisms of Imperial German elections and their implications for German democracy. See Margaret Lavinia Anderson, *Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

cal scientist, and his research involved postwar political systems. Only in a few cases have scholars analyzed earlier political systems to see if they, too, fit his model.¹² Even political scientists, however, essentially have ignored Central Europe, with the exception of the successor states of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and most notably Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the 1995 Dayton Agreement created consociational institutions in an attempt to prevent further disintegration.¹³

In his survey of the European Union, John McCormick referred to consociationalism as an “uncongenial label.”¹⁴ Although the term may be intimidating, the model is easily comprehensible, and its application is not complex. Briefly stated, a consociational democracy involves institutions and practices that enable elites to reach compromises in societies that experience deep ideological, religious, or ethnic divisions. Meanwhile, it reinforces the tendency of those societies’ main groups or segments to be isolated organizationally from each other, thus avoiding conflict and affording the leaders the opportunity to make compromises for the good of the whole.

A few comments are necessary regarding terminology. One concern constructivists frequently raise is that historians and social scientists too often engage in the “realism of the group,” that is, the tendency to treat national and ethnic group identities as if they were not social constructs but rather perma-

¹² For example, see Philip Manow, “Consociational Roots in German Corporatism: The Bismarckian Welfare State and the German Political Economy,” *Acta politica: Tijdschrift voor politicologie* 37 (2002): 195–212; and Gerhard Lehmruch, “Quasi-Consociationalism in German Politics. Negotiated Democracy and the Legacy of the Westphalian Peace,” *Acta politica: Tijdschrift voor politicologie* 37 (2002): 175–94.

¹³ Karen Henderson, “Czechoslovakia: The Failure of Consensus Politics and the Breakup of the Federation,” *Regional and Federal Studies* 5, no. 2 (1995): 111–33; Petr Kopecký, “From ‘Velvet Revolution’ to ‘Velvet Split’: Consociational Institutions and the Disintegration of Czechoslovakia,” in *Irreconcilable Differences?: Explaining Czechoslovakia’s Dissolution*, ed. and trans. by Michael Kraus and Allison Stanger, Foreword by Václav Havel (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 69–86; Roberto Belloni, “Peacebuilding and Consociational Electoral Engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 334–353; and Adis Merdzanovic, *Democracy by Decree: Prospects and Limits of Imposed Consociational Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Stuttgart: ibidim-Verlag, 2015).

¹⁴ John McCormick, *Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction*, 5th ed. European Union Series (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 7. A recurring complaint is that the term *consociationalism* is quite a mouthful, for both native and nonnative English speakers. Lijphart regularly acknowledged this problem, and he often used the alternative phrase *power sharing*, when addressing nonacademic audiences. Arend Lijphart, “Introduction: Developments in Power Sharing Theory,” in *Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice*, ed. Arend Lijphart (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 6. Unfortunately, like *antidisestablishmentarianism*, consociationalism’s meaning is precise, and, by now, it is so deeply entrenched in the literature that any attempt to change it would be fruitless.

nent, homogeneous, objective entities in their own right.¹⁵ As Chapter 1 will reveal, consociational theory is compatible with and even is premised on constructivist assumptions. Generally, the authors have strived to avoid groupist language. Nevertheless, to avoid the opposite risk of getting bogged down in excessive caveats and circumlocution, the authors occasionally resort to shortcuts, such as *Czechs* or *Czech culture*. Such instances do not deny the existence of individuals who were nationally indifferent or flexible. Instead, they are convenient oversimplifications, akin to the invocation of groups in such ordinary statements as “Iraq invaded Kuwait” or “Americans elected Obama.” Wherever possible, to minimize false impressions of group unity, this monograph employs terminology suited to a specific context, for example *German speakers*, when summarizing linguistic data, or *German nationalists*, when referring to political actors of a particular ideological stripe. (The former example, of course, is itself a convenient simplification in a context where multilingualism was relatively widespread.) By contrast, the text uses terms such as *Czechs*, *Germans*, and *Poles*, when referring to formally institutionalized group identity categories, for example the nationalities (*Nationalitäten* or *Volksstämme*) that were entrenched in the Imperial Austrian constitution.

Discussing identity politics of any sort opens a linguistic can of worms, given the many varied and contested usages of terms such as *ethnicity*, *ethnic group*, *nation*, or *nationality*, and their counterparts in other languages. Here, the authors default to the terms *ethnicity*, *ethnic identity*, and occasionally *ethnic group*, in Kanchan Chandra’s broad sense of “a subset of categories in which descent-based attributes are necessary for membership.”¹⁶ Such identity categories can be “based on the race, region, religion, sect, language family, language, dialect, caste, clan, tribe or nationality of one’s parents or ancestors, or one’s own physical features”—a range of possibilities sufficiently broad to accommodate wide variation in how individuals actually categorize themselves and others.¹⁷ The authors reserve the term *nationality* for specific technical or legal contexts, such as the *Volksstämme* and *Nationalitäten* invoked in Imperial Austrian legal language, while they do not attempt to address the question of whether Czechs, Germans, or any other people constitute a *nation*.

¹⁵ Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2006).

¹⁶ Kanchan Chandra, “Introduction, in *Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics*, ed. Kanchan Chandra (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 9.

¹⁷ Chandra, “Introduction,” 9.

Although most of the demonyms in this monograph are relatively straightforward, one offers particular difficulties. For reasons of stylistic consistency, this volume uses the general term *Ruthenians* and its derivatives, rather than *Carpatho-Rusyns*, *Rusyns*, or *Ukrainians*, to identify an inhabitant of the geographical territory known alternately as Subcarpathian Ruthenia, Transcarpathian Ruthenia, or Ruthenia that is now the Zakarpatska Oblast (Закарпатська область) in Ukraine. It also refers to *Ukrainian and Rusyn speakers*, without any intent to assign a specific linguistic identity to any speakers of East Slavic languages. This was not an obvious choice, and the difficulties in making it say much about the complexities of Central and East-European identity politics to the present day. The official German sources consistently used the term *Ruthenen*, and *Ruthenian* frequently appears in the English sources. The census of the Czechoslovak First Republic placed speakers of any East Slavic language into the broad category of Russian speakers, which included those who spoke Russian, Ukrainian, and Carpatho-Russian (*karpatoruský*), which roughly equates to today's Rusyn language. The crucial point is that *Ruthenian*, along with *Ukrainian and Rusyn speakers*, in the present context, are blanket labels, which gloss over a variety of often competing ethnic identities. For example, Russophile (Russophil), Ukrainian Party (Ukrainische Partei), and Ukrainian Radical (Ukrainisch radikal) candidates ran in the 1911 Reichsrat elections in Bukovina (German and Polish: Bukowina; Ukrainian: Буковина; Romanian: Bucovina) and Galicia, alongside their various Ruthenian Social Democratic (Ruthenische Sozialdemokraten) and Young Ruthenian (Jungruthenen) competitors.¹⁸ Much the same could be said of Imperial Austria's other segmental groups, each of which encompassed identities far more complex than such official designations as Czech, German, or Italian, reflected.

Finally, in this monograph, place names reflect current usage, and the appearance of alternate place names, in Czech, German, Hungarian, Slovak, and other languages, is based on historic usage. Demonstrating the multiethnic character of Bohemia, Moravia (Czech: Morava; German: Mähren), and Silesia (Czech: Slezsko; Polish: Śląsk; Silesian: Ślōnsk; Lower Silesian: Schläsing; German: Schlesien), this text refers to the Bohemian Lands, as opposed to the Czech Lands, a term that is appropriate after the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans immediately after the Second World War. Translations or foreign terms appear

¹⁸ Bureau der k.k. statistischen Zentralkommission, *Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen in den im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreichen und Ländern im Jahre 1911*, Österreichische Statistik, New Series, vol. 7, part 1 (Vienna: k. u. k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1912), Table II, 118–45.

in parentheses. Spellings and transliterations, as much as possible, conform to current standards.

The first chapter of this volume provides an overview of the theory and its development. It explains consociationalism's four characteristics or components—grand coalitions, segmental or cultural autonomy, proportionality, and mutual or minority veto—as well as the conditions favorable to consociational democracy. The chapter also introduces the reader to the existing literature on this topic. The last several sections of the first chapter consider the thematic and conceptual issues relevant to the remainder of the book: the more prominent criticisms of the consociational model and consociationalists' responses to them; the relationship among consociationalism, constructivism, and the recent historical literature on national flexibility; the differences between consociationalism and the related but distinct concept of consensus democracy; and the ways in which both history and political science can benefit from interdisciplinary dialogue about the politics and events this book covers.

The next chapter considers Imperial Austria, that is, the western half of the Habsburg Monarchy, from 1867 until the First World War. While never fully democratic, Imperial Austria made surprising advances in that direction in the decades before the war. Furthermore, it fulfilled a surprising number of Lijphart's favorable conditions for successful consociational politics, while Austria's representative institutions acquired a progressively more consociational character. For example, the electoral system, which was based entirely on universal manhood suffrage after 1907, produced increasingly proportional representation for the various segments of the population. The same can be said of the distribution of civil service jobs, the dispersal of educational resources, and the composition of Austrian cabinets. Meanwhile, Austria's segments gradually acquired organizational autonomy as well as impressive formal and informal means of protecting group interests. In other words, although the Austrian political system became neither fully democratic nor fully consociational under Habsburg rule, it made impressive strides in both directions.¹⁹ The chapter also pays close attention to the series of compromises that representatives of many of Austria's nationalities reached, in the last decade before the outbreak of the First World War, in several cities and regions within Austria, specifically Bukovina, České Budějovice (German: Budweis), Galicia, and Moravia. These special agreements produced a proportional allocation of influence in local government, closely corresponding to consociational principles, and they served as models

¹⁹ Not every democracy is consociational, of course, while consociational oligarchy also is possible.

for the possible reconstruction of democratic politics for the entire monarchy. Viewing them from this perspective forces a renewed appreciation of what these compromises accomplished, especially in light of historians' recent criticisms.

The third chapter examines the political system of interwar Czechoslovakia. The authors directly challenge the notion that Czechoslovakia was an immature or badly functioning democracy. Instead, they demonstrate that the historical evidence places Czechoslovakia firmly among consociational states. Einstein's assessments of Czechoslovak politics in the 1920s and archival research show that Czechoslovakia was perfectly situated to build on the Habsburg Monarchy's proto-consociational legacy, in part because it met the favorable conditions Lijphart identified in his model. Features of Czechoslovakia's social and political system, although at times puzzling to Einstein, demonstrate that Czechoslovakia was a successful consociational democracy. Its governments depended on grand coalitions that included not only parties from across the political spectrum but individuals or parties representing Czechs, Slovaks, and Germans. Minority language laws, schools for minorities, and holidays that accommodated religious interests were examples of cultural autonomy. Provincial assemblies afforded Slovakia and Ruthenia with a measure of autonomy, and lawmakers considered expanding minority self-rule. Predominantly minority electoral districts provided a measure of proportionality, and parties representing various ethnic, class, religious, or ideological segments staked their claims to a share in the state administration. Czechoslovakia had no constitutional minority veto to prevent a majority from forcing its will on a minority; however, political parties, working in the cabinet or in the extraparliamentary and extra-constitutional associations of the parties that influenced Czechoslovak politics through most of the 1920s, had the informal ability to block policies that threatened their constituencies.

The next chapter focuses more narrowly on interwar Slovakia, an eastern region of Czechoslovakia, whose population included Slovaks as well as Hungarians, Germans, and others, to examine how consociational politics operated at both the national and local levels. Slovakia, as a distinct territory, possessed some of the favorable conditions in Lijphart's model. The authors examine how the Czechoslovak political system successfully incorporated Slovakia by ensuring that the Slovaks and others obtained representation at all levels of the state administration and government. Furthermore, the Slovaks had capable local institutions that worked harmoniously with the government in Prague, and they influenced policy making by extracting concessions and wielding an informal minority veto. The Provincial Office, with its seat in Bratislava, was

an autonomous institution that had its own growing budget and was responsible for important areas of policy. It also included a range of subsidiary institutions, such as an elected assembly and a number of significant committees. The Provincial Assembly records reveal that a range of parties across the ideological spectrum cooperated to ensure that the Slovak autonomous government would be capable of defending Slovak interests within Czechoslovakia. The chapter demonstrates that politicians specifically constructed the Provincial Office and its predecessor, the local county assemblies in Slovakia, to foster cooperation. The effectiveness of these institutions, which functioned along consociational lines, compels social scientists to reconsider the prevailing nationalist interpretations of interwar Slovakia.

The concluding chapter summarizes the evolution of consociationalism in Imperial Austria, its consolidation in Czechoslovakia between the world wars, and its influence, within Czechoslovakia, on Slovakia. The Central European experience of building consociational democracy suggests that, once consociational practices take hold in a given polity, they become a firm part of the political culture. Furthermore, to borrow a concept from the development of the European Union, they broaden, reaching to other aspects of the polity and to other geographic areas, and they deepen, in the sense that they grow more intense and become more rooted in everyday politics. The conclusion then summarizes additions to Lijphart's model the authors suggested in the individual chapters. It also proposes new avenues of research, based partly on the novel interpretations that the consociational model brings to the political experiences of Imperial Austria at the *fin de siècle* and to Czechoslovakia between the two world wars. Such avenues could include gender and environmental issues as well as studies of other ethnicities, such as Rusyns and Roma, and of the other successor states. This initial foray into the historical application of consociationalism in Central Europe makes no claim, therefore, to being exhaustive. It is, rather, the authors' hope that the application of Lijphart's theory to pre-1918 Austria and interwar Czechoslovakia will lead to a broader reexamination of the narratives of crisis and paralysis that previously have dominated the historiography of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Central Europe.

Chapter 1

Consociationalism and Consensus Democracy in Theory and Practice

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the origins and development of the consociational model of democracy, with a heavy emphasis on the work of Lijphart, the dominant figure in this research area. It elucidates the four attributes that characterize consociationalism—grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality, and minority veto—and the nine conditions that are favorable to its success. Afterward, there is a brief survey of the major criticisms and debates in the academic literature. An overview of Lijphart's contrast between majoritarian and consensus democracy follows, because even though that line of research is not part of the consociationalism literature, there has been sufficient confusion between consociationalism and consensus democracy to justify some clarification. Finally, the chapter's conclusion explains how consociationalism is relevant to the study of Imperial Austria and interwar Czechoslovakia. This chapter is for the benefit of historians and others who are not political scientists, although political scientists should find it a useful review of the literature. Readers who already are well grounded in consociational theory may wish to advance to the empirical chapters that follow.¹

¹ Parts of this and the following chapter are based on Philip J. Howe, "Well-tempered Discontent: Nationalism, Ethnic Group Politics, Electoral Institutions and Parliamentary Behavior in the Western Half of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 1867–1914," PhD diss., (University of California at San Diego, 2002) and "Imperial Austria as a Precursor to Consociational Democracy," in *Re-thinking European Politics and History*, ed. Agnieszka Pasieka, David Petrucci, Benjamin Roth (Vienna: Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, 2012), at <http://www.iwm.at/publications/5-junior-visiting-fellows-conferences/vol-xxxii/imperial-austria-as-a-precursor-to-consociational-democracy/>.

The Development of the Consociational Model

Consociationalism is strongly associated with and for some is synonymous with the work of comparative political scientist Lijphart, who spent his career articulating the model and promoting consociational democracy in practice.² Nevertheless, the efforts of Lijphart's precursors are worth examining, to highlight the underexamined prehistory of contemporary consociational theory and practice as well as to account for the intellectual context from which Lijphart's research emerged. *Consociationalism*, admittedly an unwieldy term, did not originate with Lijphart. Rather, a seventeenth-century Calvinist political philosopher, Johannes Althusius (1563–1638), coined the term *consociato* in his *Politica Methodice Digesta, Atque Exemplis Sacris et Profanis Illustrata* (1603), which had a powerful early influence on the development of federalist thought.³ Meanwhile, several aspects of the consociational model have precedents in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century political theory. One characteristic, the minority veto, is identical to the concept of a concurrent majority that John C. Calhoun (1782–1850) devised in 1849.⁴ Lijphart also noted that some aspects of consociationalism are foreshadowed in the writings of the Austro-Marxists Otto Bauer (1881–1938) and Karl Renner (1870–1950).⁵ Finally, a number of Lijphart's contemporaries, in-

2 Those who wish to explore further the vast body of consociational research should start with Arend Lijphart's *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977), his first general formulation of the consociational model. "The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation," *American Political Science Review* 90 (June 1996): 258–68, constitutes Lijphart's "final" formulation of consociational theory," according to his "Introduction," in *Thinking about Democracy*, 4. The next place to turn are the remaining chapters in *Thinking about Democracy*, an invaluable representative collection of Lijphart's work that emphasizes his writings about consociationalism and consensus democracy. Finally, two edited volumes and one journal special issue consider recent developments: Stefan Köppl and Uwe Kranenpohl, ed., *Konkordanzdemokratie: Ein Demokratietyp der Vergangenheit?* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012); Joanne McEvoy and Brendan O'Leary, eds., *Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); and *Swiss Political Science Review. Special Issue: Half a Century of Consociationalism—Cases and Comparisons* 25, no.4 (December 2019). Other major works appear in the notes to this chapter.

3 Johannes Althusias, *Politik*, trans. Heinrich Janssen, ed. Dieter Wyduckel (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, [1614] 2003), chaps. 3–5. Althusias wrote his work in 1603 and expanded it in 1610 and 1614. See also Rudy B. Andeweg, "Consociational Democracy," *Annual Review of Political Science* 3 (June 2000): 510; and Lijphart, "Introduction."

4 Lijphart, *Democracy*, 37. See also John C. Calhoun, "A Disquisition on Government," in *A Disquisition on Government and Selections from the Discourse*, ed. C. Gordon Post, Foreword by Shannon C. Stimson (New York: MacMillan Company; London: Collier-Macmillan, Ltd., 1952), 3–81. Although this principle originally protected slave owners from an abolitionist majority, it can serve to protect minorities within a democracy.

5 Lijphart, "Introduction," 4. See Otto Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, Marx-Studien: Blätter zur Theorie und Politik des wissenschaftlichen Sozialismus (Vienna: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchshandlung Ignaz Brand, 1907); Robert A. Kann, *Das Nationalitäten-*

cluding Robert A. Dahl, Jane Mansbridge, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., and William H. Riker, have explored nonconsociational alternatives to majoritarian democracy.⁶

Beginning in the 1960s, a number of scholars began studying cases of consociationalism in Europe and Africa, occasionally with the label *Konkordanzdemokratie* or *Proporzdemokratie*.⁷ One important inspiration for this emerging line of scholarship was the 1965 Whidden Lecture by the economist Sir William

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- problem der Habsburgermonarchie: Geschichte und Ideengehalt der nationalen Bestrebungen vom Vormärz bis zur Auflösung des Reiches im Jahre 1918*, vol. 2: *Ideen und Pläne zur Reichsreform*, 2nd expanded ed. (Graz and Cologne: Verlag Hermann Böhlau Nachfolger, 1964), chap. 20; Rudolf Springer [Karl Renner], *Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen um den Staat*, part 1: *Das nationale Problem als Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsfrage* (Leipzig and Vienna: Franz Deuticke, 1902); Karl Renner, *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen in besonderer Anwendung auf Oesterreich*, part 1: *Nation und Staat* (Leipzig and Vienna: Franz Deuticke, 1918); and Synopticus [Karl Renner], *Staat und Nation: Staatsrechtliche Untersuchung über die möglichen Principien einer Lösung und die juristischen Voraussetzungen eines Nationalitätengesetzes* (Vienna: Verlag von Josef Deitl, 1899). Several other Austrian thinkers contributed to the development of the concept of national autonomy, which is closely related to Lijphart's segmental autonomy. These include the nineteenth-century liberal reformer Adolf Fischhof (1816–1893) as well as the members of the National Autonomy association, which included Renner, Nathan Birnbaum (1864–1937), Richard Charnatz (1879–1965), Friedrich Hertz (1878–1964), Jan Machar (1864–1942), Tomáš G. Masaryk (1850–1937), and Aurel von Onciul (1864–1921). See S. A. Birnbaum, "Nathan Birnbaum and National Autonomy," in *The Jews of Austria: Essays on Their Life, History and Destruction*, ed. Josef Fraenkel (London: Vallentine, Mitchell and Co., 1967), 131–46; Gerald Stourzh, "The Ethnicizing of Politics and 'National Indifference' in Late Imperial Austria," in *Der Umfang der österreichischen Geschichte. Ausgewählte Studien 1990–2010*, ed. Gerald Stourzh (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2011), 322, note 122; and Gerald Stourzh, "Ethnic Attribution in Late Imperial Austria: Good Intentions, Evil Consequences," in *The Habsburg Legacy: National Identity in Historical Perspective*, ed. Ritchie Robertson and Edward Timms (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), 68. Finally, the ideas of the late-nineteenth-century legal scholar Georg Jellinek (1851–1911) are clear precursors to consociationalism's minority veto. See Stourzh, "Ethnicizing," 309.
- 6 Arend Lijphart, "Varieties of Nonmajoritarian Democracy," in *Democracy and Institutions: The Life Work of Arend Lijphart*, ed. Markus M. L. Crepaz, Thomas A. Koelble, and David Wilsford (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 225–45. See Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Jane Mansbridge, *Beyond Adversary Democracy* (New York: Basic Books, 1983); G. Bingham Powell, *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982); and William H. Riker, *Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1982).
- 7 Claude Ake, "Political Integration and Political Stability: A Hypothesis," *World Politics* 19, no. 3 (April 1967): 486–99; David E. Apter, *The Political Kingdom of Uganda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Lucien Huyse, *Passiviteit, Pacificatie en Verzuiling in de Belgische Politiek: een sociologische studie* (Antwerp: Standaard Wetenschappelijke Uitgeverij, 1970); Gerhard Lehmbuch, "Konkordanzdemokratie im politischen System der Schweiz," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 9, no. 3 (1968): 443–59; Gerhard Lehmbuch, *Proporzdemokratie: Politisches System und politische Kultur in der Schweiz und in Oesterreich* (Tübingen: Verlag J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1967); Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968); Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," *Comparative Political Studies* 1, no. 1 (April 1968): 3–44; Kenneth David McRae, ed., *Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974); Eric A. Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies* (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1972); G. Bingham Powell, *Social Fragmentation and Political Hostility: An Austrian Case Study* (Stanford: Stanford Univer-

Arthur Lewis (1915–1991), who argued that conventional models of democracy simply did not apply to the politics of postcolonial West Africa.⁸ Lijphart's own research on his native Netherlands began at that time, eventually evolving into an extensive body of comparative work, with a much greater geographic reach, that has come to dominate the study of consociationalism and of democracy in divided societies. Lijphart's research on consociationalism, along with his voluminous writings on the classification of democratic regimes, electoral systems, and comparative methodology, has made him one of the most prominent political scientists of the late-twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.⁹

Consociationalism challenged two long-maintained assumptions in democratic theory. The first was the supposition of Aristotle (384–322 BCE) that “social homogeneity and political consensus are ... prerequisites for, or factors strongly conducive to, stable democracy,” which John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) echoed, many centuries later, when he maintained that “free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities.”¹⁰ Directly contesting this view, Lijphart argued that “it may be *difficult*, but it is not at all *impossible* to achieve and maintain stable democratic government in a plural society.”¹¹ Lijphart also objected to a second, often implicit assumption that democracy is synonymous with majority rule.

The defining feature of the plural societies the consociational theorists studied is that they had many *segmental cleavages*, which Harry Eckstein defined as divisions that “may be of a religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial, or ethnic nature. A further characteristic ... is that political parties, interest groups, media of communication, schools, and voluntary associations tend to be organized along the lines of segmental cleavages.”¹² Mere religious diversity, for example, the presence of large numbers of Catholics and Protestants,

sity Press, 1970); and Jürg Steiner, *Gewaltlose Politik und kulturelle Vielfalt: Hypothesen entwickelt am Beispiel der Schweiz* (Bern and Stuttgart: Paul Haupt, 1970).

8 W. Arthur Lewis, *Politics in West Africa: The Whidden Lectures* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1965), 64–90.

9 Lijphart, *Thinking*; and David Wilsford, “Studying Democracy and Putting It into Practice: The Contributions of Arend Lijphart to Democratic Theory and to Actual Democracy,” in *Democracy and Institutions*, 1–7.

10 Lijphart, *Democracy*, 1 (Aristotle); and John Stuart Mill, “Considerations on Representative Government,” in *On Liberty, Utilitarianism and Other Essays*, ed. with an Introduction and notes by Mark Philp and Frederick Rosen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 372.

11 Lijphart, *Democracy*, 1.

12 Harry Eckstein, *Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 34, quoted in Lijphart, *Democracy*, 3–4. In parts of the consociational literature, these also are referred as pillars or by using case-specific terms, such as *familles spirituelles* (Belgium and Luxembourg), *Lager* (Austria), or *zuilen* (Netherlands).

may not be sufficient to make a society plural. Rather, a plural society has much deeper political and social divisions. It may be one in which Catholics and Protestants attend different schools, join different business associations and unions, read different newspapers, and vote for different political parties. In a sense, a plural society comprises multiple societies living side-by-side.

Democratic theory and comparative political science traditionally have been quite pessimistic about democracy's prospects in such societies. Lijphart, by contrast, was concerned that this pessimism could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.¹³ In the face of a growing number of new Third World democracies in the decades after the Second World War, another possibility was that social heterogeneity could lead to attempts to eradicate "primordial loyalties" to create more homogeneous populations.¹⁴ The belief in the necessity of social homogeneity became intertwined with a majoritarian conception of democracy. In his influential attempt at creating a typology of democracies, Gabriel A. Almond distinguished between Anglo-American democracy, as in the United Kingdom and United States, and Continental European democracy, such as in the French Fourth Republic and Italy. Anglo-American democracy had "its homogeneous political culture ... its autonomous parties, interest groups, and communications media," and "stability," while the typical Continental European democracy had "a fragmented political culture,... mutual dependence of parties and groups," and "instability." Almond's analysis, under the influence of the systems theory prevalent at the time, favored functional boundary maintenance between groups and institutions as well as groups with overlapping memberships, rather than segmental fragmentation. Modern political institutions and organizations, such as legislatures or unions, needed to serve specific political or economic functions that transcend group identities. Almond's notions about democracy were reflected in his "traditional dichotomous classification of democratic politics" into two-party and multiparty systems. Because "interest aggregation" is "the foremost and distinctive function of the political parties," two-party systems were an ideal since they presented two contrasting ideological alternatives that transcended such distinctions as ethnicity or religion.¹⁵

Lijphart raised two criticisms of this view. First, Almond's classification failed to explain smaller European democracies, such as the Netherlands, which fell into the residual category of working multiparty systems. Austria, the Low Coun-

¹³ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 2-3.

¹⁴ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 1-4, 19-20, and 24.

¹⁵ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 6-14.

tries, Switzerland, and other countries were deeply divided ideologically, linguistically, and religiously, and they produced multiparty systems that tended to represent relatively narrow interests and groups. Yet, all of these countries were remarkably politically stable.¹⁶ Second, Lijphart argued that “much of the theoretical literature on political development” exaggerated “the degree of homogeneity of the Western democratic states,” compared to the Third World.¹⁷ The postwar political development literature was concerned with tradeoffs between nation-building and democratization in newly independent states. Given the perception that such societies tended to be very heterogeneous and especially prone to democratic failure, it generally favored homogeneity, in the name of stability. Doing so, unfortunately, overlooked “the fact that several plural societies in Europe have achieved stable democracy by consociational methods,” thereby providing an alternative possibility for democracy in the developing world.¹⁸

Lijphart’s generalization of the consociational model, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, drew primarily from the experiences of four small European states from the late 1950s and early 1960s: Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, and Switzerland.¹⁹ Subsequently, the list of states that scholars have classified as consociational, for at least part of their history, as well as non-consociational states that they have examined through the lens of consociational theory has expanded significantly.²⁰ These include such diverse countries as Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Canada, Columbia, Congo, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia after the end of communist rule, Fiji, Gambia, Germany, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Italy, Japan, Kashmir, Kenya, Kosovo, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Montenegro, Netherlands Antilles, Nigeria, Northern Ireland, Rwanda, Serbia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Suriname, the United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.²¹ A sig-

¹⁶ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 14–16.

¹⁷ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 16.

¹⁸ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 16–24.

¹⁹ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 1–2.

²⁰ Political institutions and practices evolve over time, and countries that become consociational do not necessarily remain so. Over time, even the four core cases have varied, in the extent to which they were consociational.

²¹ Andeweg, “Consociational”, 514–15; Tozun Bahcheli and Sid Noel, “Power Sharing for Cyprus (Again)?: European Union Accession and the Prospects for Reunification,” in *From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies*, ed. Sid Noel (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 215–38; Susanne Baier-Allen, “The Failure of Power-Sharing in Cyprus: Causes and Consequences,” in *Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts: Perspectives on Successes and Failures in Europe, Africa, and Asia*, ed. Ulrich Schneckener and Stefan Wolff (New York and London: Hurst Publishers, 2004), 77–93; Dragica Banovic, *Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Bosnien und Herzegowina: Geschichte, Prozessrecht, Verfassungsrechtsprechung und das Paradigma der internationalen Regulierungen* (Hamburg: Verlag Dr.

Kovač, 2009), 82–90; Roberto Belloni, “Peacebuilding and Consociational Electoral Engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 334–53; Roberto Belloni, *State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007); Florian Bieber, “The Balkans: The Promotion of Power Sharing by Outsiders,” in *Power Sharing*, 312–26; Bieber, “Consociationalism: Prerequisite or Hurdle for Democratization in Bosnia?: The Case of Belgium as a Possible Example,” *South-East Europe Review* 2 (October 1999): 79–94; Bieber, “Power Sharing after Yugoslavia: Functionality and Dysfunctionality of Power-sharing Institutions in Post-war Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo,” in *From Power Sharing to Democracy*, 85–103; Ed Cairns, “Northern Ireland: Power Sharing, Contact, Identity, and Leadership,” in *Power Sharing*, 278–94; Maya Chadda, “Between Consociationalism and Control: Sri Lanka,” in *Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts*, 94–114; Vedran Džihic, *Ethnopolitik in Bosnien-Herzegowina: Staat und Gesellschaft in der Krise* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), 390–97; Thorsten Gromes, “Die Konkordanzdemokratie als Instrument der Friedenskonsolidierung,” in *Konkordanzdemokratie*, 355–70; Adrian Guelke, *Politics in Deeply Divided Societies* (Cambridge, UK, and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2012); Landon E. Hancock, “Significant Events in the Northern Ireland Peace Process: Impact and Implementation,” in *From Power Sharing to Democracy*, 67–84; Kristen Henrard, “Power Sharing and Rights Protection in the Prevention and Management of Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Post-apartheid South Africa,” in *From Power Sharing to Democracy*, 140–63; Mario Hirsch, “Sind Konkordanz-, Konsens- und Drei-Partnermodelle Schönwetterveranstaltungen?: Das Beispiel Luxemburg,” in *Konkordanzdemokratie*, 117–32; Eike-Christian Hornig, “Ist die abrogative Referendum in Italien ein konkordanzdemokratisches Verfahren?” in *Konkordanzdemokratie*, 169–88; Philip J. Howe, “The United States as a Plural Society: Towards a Consociational Solution?” *Swiss Political Science Review* 25, no. 4 (December 2019): 476–97; Colin Irwin, “Public Opinion and Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places,” in *Power Sharing*, 295–311; Samuel Issacharoff, “Courts, Constitutions, and the Limits of Majoritarianism,” *Power Sharing*: 214–27; Mirjana Kasapović, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Consociational or Liberal Democracy?” *Politička misao* 42, no. 5 (December 2005): 3–30; Sören Keil, “Konkordanzdemokratie im Westlichen Balkan–Alter Wein in neuen Schläuchen?” in *Konkordanzdemokratie*, 371–94; Jörg Kemmerzell, “Power Sharing–Konkordanz–Integration: Institutionelle Aspekte der Machtteilungsabkommen in Kenia und Simbabwe,” in *Konkordanzdemokratie*, 419–42; Paul Kevenhörster, *Politik und Gesellschaft in Japan* (Mannheim and Vienna: BI-Taschenbuchverlag, 1993), 46–48; Köppl, “Die besondere Form der Konsensdemokratie in Italien. Entwicklung vom consociativismo zum Konkurrenzmodell?” in *Konkordanzdemokratie*, 147–68; Lijphart, *Democracy*, ch. 4–6; Lijphart, “Puzzle,” 258; Allison McCulloch, *Power-Sharing and Political Stability in Deeply Divided Societies*, (London: Routledge, 2014); McCulloch, “The Track Record of Centripetalism in Deeply Divided Places,” in *Power Sharing*, 94–111; McEvoy, “We Forbid! The Mutual Veto and Power-Sharing Democracy,” in *Power Sharing*, 253–77; Philip Manow, “Consociational Roots in German Corporatism: The Bismarckian Welfare State and the German Political Economy,” *Acta politica: Tijdschrift voor politicologie* 37, nos. 1–2 (2002): 195–212; Gerhard Lehmbruch, “Quasi-Consociationalism in German Politics: Negotiated Democracy and the Legacy of the Westphalian Peace,” *Acta politica: Tijdschrift voor politicologie* 37, nos. 1–2 (2002): 175–94; John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, “Iraq’s Constitution of 2005: Liberal Consociationalism as Political Prescription,” *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 5, no. 4 (October 2007): 670–98; Merdzanovic, *Democracy by Decree*; Helga Michalsky, “Liechtenstein: Konkordanzdemokratie und Parteienwettbewerb,” in *Politischer Wandel in konkordanzdemokratischen Systemen: Symposium des Liechtenstein-Instituts*, 23–25. November 1989, ed. Helga Michalsky (Vaduz: Verlag der Liechtensteinischen Akademischen Gesellschaft, 1991), 133–57; Patrick J. O’Halloran, “Post-conflict Reconstruction: Constitutional and Transitional Power-sharing Arrangements in Bosnia and Kosovo,” in *From Power Sharing to Democracy*, 104–119; Gordon Peake, “Power Sharing in a Police Car: The Intractable Difficulty of Police Reform in Kosovo and Macedonia,” in *From Power Sharing to Democracy*, 120–39; Ulrich Schneekener, *Auswege aus dem Bürgerkrieg: Modelle zur Regulierung ethno-nationalistischer Konflikte in Europa*, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), 272–83 and 284–307; Ian S. Spears, “Anarchy and the Problems of Power Sharing in Africa,” in *From Power Sharing to Democracy*, 184–97; Roland Sturm, “Das Karfreitagsabkommen–Eine konkordanzdemokratische Lösung des Nordirlandkonflikts?” in *Konkordanzdemokratie*, 337–54; Ru-

nificant literature takes the consociational model to the international level, using it to appraise politics in the European Union.²² Scholars also have begun to examine consociationalism and its alternatives on the level of regional government, such as the Austrian provinces of Carinthia, Salzburg, Styria, and Vorarlberg, Bosnia's Republika Srpska, and especially Italy's South Tyrol.²³ Similarly,

pert Taylor, ed., *Consociational Theory: McGarry and O'Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2009); Christian Thueselt, "Und wenn die Krankheit sich der Behandlung widersetzt (...), vielleicht existiert dann die Verpflichtung zur Revolution: Systemantagonistische Opposition im Konkordanzsystem am Beispiel des Libanon," in *Konkordanzdemokratie*, 395–418; Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay, "Afghanistan: Multicultural Federalism as a Means to Achieve Democracy, Representation, and Stability," in *From Power Sharing to Democracy*, 198–214; Ronald Wintrobe, "A Theory of Accommodation Versus Conflict: With Special Reference to the Israel-Palestine Conflict," in *Power Sharing*, 135–75; and Stefan Wolff, "Between Stability and Collapse: Internal and External Dynamics of Post-agreement Institution Building in Northern Ireland," in *From Power Sharing to Democracy*, 44–66.

There is a body of literature that deals with consociationalism with respect to Czechoslovakia between 1989 and 1993. The list is lengthy, but there are several significant studies: Henderson, "Czechoslovakia: The Failure of Consensus Politics"; Vít Hloušek and Lubomír Kopeček, "Česká republika–konsensuální nebo majoritní model demokracie?" *Politologická revue* 1 (June 2002): 3–21; Vít Hloušek and Lubomír Kopeček, "Konsensuální a konkurenční demokracie," in Vít Hloušek and Lubomír Kopeček, *Konfliktní demokracie: Moderní masová politika ve střední Evropě* (Brno: Masarykova univerzita v Brně, Mezinárodní politologický ústav, 2004), 203–231; Michal Klíma, "Skrytá tichá velká koalice," *Politologický časopis* 6, no. 2 (1999): 170–82; Kopeček, "From 'Velvet Revolution' to 'Velvet Split'"; Miroslav Novák, *Jakou demokracií pro nové demokracie? Konsensuální model, efektivita a kulturní homogenní společnosti* (Brno: International Institute for Political Studies, 2001); Miroslav Novák, "Je konsensuální 'model' nejlepší?" *Sociologický časopis* 34, no. 1 (1998): 3–21, and 34, no. 2 (1998): 131–44; and Blanka Říchová, *Přehled moderních politologických teorií Empiricko-analytický přístup v soudobé politické vědě* (Prague: Portal s.r.o., 2006), ch. 13. Several Czech scholars also have examined consociationalism elsewhere in Europe, for example, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

- 22 Matthijs Bogaards and Markus M. L. Crepaz, "Consociational Interpretations of the European Union," *European Union Politics* 3, no. 3 (September 2002): 357–81; Holger Huget, *Demokratisierung der EU: Normative Demokratietheorie und Governance-Praxis im europäischen Mehrebenensystem* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaft, 2007), 110–14; Ondřej Kalina, "Europa in Prokrustes' Bett?: Die Europäische Union als Konkordanzsystem im Demokratiedilemma," in *Konkordanzdemokratie*, 189–215; Olaf Leiße, *Europa zwischen Nationalstaat und Integration*, (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaft, 2008), 252–57; Stefan Oeter, "Die Europäische Union zwischen organisierter Verantwortungslosigkeit und föderaler Konkordanzdemokratie," in *Demokratie in der Weltgesellschaft*, ed. Hauke Brunkhorst (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), 405–35; and Steven I. Wilkinson, "Conditionality, Consociationalism, and the European Union," in *From Power Sharing to Democracy*, 239–62.
- 23 Christian Andreas Dörner-Hörig, "Soziogenese und Psychogenese der politischen Kultur Kärntens" (PhD Diss. University of Graz, 2012); Franz Fallend, "Konkordanz, Proporz und Koalition: Kabinettsystem und Entscheidungsfindungsprozesse in den Landesregierungen von Salzburg, der Steiermark und Vorarlberg" (PhD diss. University of Salzburg, 1997); McCulloch, "Track Record"; Günther Pallaver, "Südtirols Konkordanzdemokratie: Ethnische Konfliktregelung zwischen juristischem Korsett und gesellschaftlichem Wandel," in *1992: Ende eines Streits: zehn Jahre Streitbeilegung im Südtirolkonflikt zwischen Italien und Österreich*, ed. Siglinde Clementi (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003), 177–203; Günther Pallaver, "Ethnische Konkordanzdemokratie: Südtiroler Autonomie zwischen 'Gemeinschaft' und 'Gesellschaft,'" in *Minderheitenkonflikte in Europa: Fallbeispiele und Lösungsansätze*, ed. Samuel Salzborn (Innsbruck and Vienna: Studien-Verlag, 2006), 63–86; Günther Pallaver, "Südtirols Konkordanzdemokratie," in *Die Region Trentino-Südti-*

several recent studies used consociational theory to analyze urban politics in Aceh, Baghdad, Belfast, Brussels, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, Kirkuk, and Sarajevo, along with the Austrian cities Graz, Linz, Salzburg, Innsbruck, Klagenfurt am Wörthersee, Villach, Wels, St. Pölten, Steyr, Wiener Neustadt, and Krems an der Donau.²⁴ One recent work focused on the role of consociational political parties (as opposed to political systems) in Canada, Fiji, India, Kenya, Malaysia, South Africa, and Yugoslavia.²⁵ Furthermore, some scholars have identified consociational characteristics in nondemocratic states, like Bolivia, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Paraguay, and Uganda, and in historic cases, such as the United Province of Canada, nineteenth- and twentieth-century Lebanon, Ottoman Empire, Safavid Empire, Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia.²⁶ Studies of certain nondemocratic polities identify the presence of consociational oligarchies, suggesting a further conceptual distinction between consociationalism and consociational democracy. In short, the application of consociational theory to the Habsburg Monarchy, a historic nondemocratic regime, unquestionably has its precedents.

rol im 20. Jahrhundert, vol. 1: *Politik und Institutionen*, ed. Giuseppe Ferrandi and Günther Pallaver, *Grenzen/Confini*, vol. 5 (Trento: Museo Storico in Trento, 2006), 527–53; Günther Pallaver, “Transformationsprozesse der Südtiroler Autonomie 1972–2012: Konfliktlösungsmodell, Konkordanzdemokratie, Parteien,” in *Politika 12. Jahrbuch für Politik/Annuario di politica/Anuer de pulitica (Südtiroler Gesellschaft für Politikwissenschaft/Società di Scienza Politica dell’Alto Adige/Società de scienza pulitica de Südtirol)*, ed. Günther Pallaver (Bozen: Edition Raetia, 2012), 205–237; Stephanie Risse, *Sieg und Frieden: Zum sprachlichen und politischen Handeln in Südtirol/Südtirol/Alto Adige* (Munich: Iudicium-Verlag, 2013), 30–32; Schneckener, *Auswege*, 263–72; Gottfried Solderer, ed., *1980–2000: Zwischen Europa und Provinz* (Bozen: Ed. Raetia, 2003), ch. 3; Stefan Wolff “Complex Power Sharing as Conflict Resolution: South Tyrol in Comparative Perspective,” in *Tolerance through Law: Self Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol*, ed. Jens Woelk, Joseph Marko, and Francesco Palermo (Leiden: Brill/Nijhoff, 2007), 329–70; Stefan Wolff, “The Institutional Structure of Regional Consociations in Brussels, Northern Ireland, and South Tyrol,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 10, no. 3 (April 2001): 387–414; and Stefan Wolff, “Settling an Ethnic Conflict through Power-sharing: South Tyrol,” in *Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts*, 57–76.

²⁴ Liam Anderson, “Power Sharing in Kirkuk: the Need for Compromise,” in *Power Sharing*, 365–85; Scott A. Bollens, “Governing Polarized Cities,” in *Power Sharing*, 327–63; Johann Lefenda, “Bringing the ‘Stadt’ Back in”—*Stadtpolitik in Österreich: Urban politics—die Stadt zwischen politischer Herausforderung und gesellschaftlicher Innovation* (Frankfurt am Main and Vienna: Peter Lang, 2009); and Alfred Stepan, “A Revised Theory of Federacy and a Case Study of Civil War Termination in Aceh, Indonesia,” in *Power Sharing*, 231–52.

²⁵ Matthijs Bogaards, *Democracy and Social Peace in Divided Societies: Exploring Consociational Parties* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). In several of his works, Lijphart maintained that India’s dominant Congress Party was itself consociational.

²⁶ Eduardo Wassim Aboultaif, *Power Sharing in Lebanon: Consociationalism since 1820* (London and New York: Routledge, 2019); Nikola Ambarkov, “Ottoman Millet System and the Political System of Both Yugoslavias as Pre-Consociational Experience for the Macedonian and the Bosnian Multicultural Society,” *Iustinianus Primus Law Review* 6, no. 1 (2014): 1–13; Benjamin Braude, “The Success of Religion as a Source for Compromise in Divided Empires: Ottoman and Safavid, Past and Present,” in *Power Sharing*, 176–97; Milton J. Esman, “Power Sharing and the Constructionist Fallacy,” in *Democracy and Institutions*, 91–112; and Lijphart, “Puzzle,” 258–59.

The Consociational Model

Four characteristics define consociational democracy: grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality, and minority veto (see Table 1).²⁷ Each of these involves a set of political institutions and practices that maintain democracy in societies with significant social divisions, either by ensuring the inclusion of all major social segments or by preventing conflict over highly divisive policy areas.

Table 1. A Summary of Arend Lijphart’s Theory of Consociational Democracy

Four Characteristics
grand coalition
segmental autonomy
proportionality
mutual or minority veto
Nine Favorable Conditions
absence of a unified majority
lack of large socioeconomic disparities among groups
groups that are roughly the same size
a relatively small number of groups
relatively small population
external danger to promote internal unity
overarching loyalties
geographic concentration of groups
traditions of compromise and accommodation

Grand Coalitions

The purpose of the grand coalition in a consociational democracy is to ensure that no major social segments are excluded from the executive. Grand coalitions, in the conventional sense, are executive cabinets that comprise all the ma-

²⁷ Lijphart’s, “Puzzle” is the most definitive of his many accounts of consociationalism. According to Lijphart (“Introduction,” 4–5), between the late 1960s and the middle of the 1990s, he made “five significant improvements” to the model: 1) the definition of “consociational democracy in terms of four basic characteristics”; 2) the “distinction between primary and secondary characteristics”; 3) the emphasis on “the fact that all four consociational characteristics can assume quite different forms but, at the same time, that these different forms do not work equally well and are not equally to be recommended”; 4) the identification of “a list of nine favorable conditions” and of “the absence of a solid ethnic or religious majority and the absence of large socioeconomic inequality... as the two most important of those nine favorable factors”; and 5) the determination “that the nine conditions should not be regarded as either necessary or sufficient conditions.”

for political parties. Multiparty cabinets often are minimal winning coalitions, that is, assemblages of parties that collectively are just large enough to control a majority in the legislature; by contrast, a grand coalition is oversized in that it involves more parties than necessary to achieve a majority. This inclusive approach to government formation stands in contrast to the more exclusive governments of majoritarian democracies in which typically a two-party system produces a one-party government, as is the norm in the United Kingdom and the United States.²⁸ In the United Kingdom, one-party governments have been the rule since 1945, the sole exception being the 2010–2015 Conservative-Liberal Democrat minimal winning coalition government.²⁹ In presidential systems, such as the United States, the chief executive typically appoints a cabinet from among the members of his or her own party, occasionally including a few members of the opposing party, out of political or practical considerations.³⁰

Grand coalitions are quite common in present-day democracies, although there is some room for dispute over how inclusive a cabinet must be to meet the definition. Typical examples are the coalition governments of Germany's two largest parties, the center-right Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU; Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern, CSU) and the center-left Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD), that occurred in 1979–1984, 2005–2009, and 2013–2021.³¹ As Lijphart noted, in times of crises, even majoritarian democracies are known to rely on grand coalitions. The United Kingdom, for example, formed a national unity government, including both Conservative and Labour ministers, during the Second World War, under Winston Churchill (1874–1965), and the political scientist Robert Dahl once proposed a similar bipartisan administration for the United States, in the wake of the resignation of President

²⁸ These countries have many parties; however, in both cases, the two main parties (Labour and Conservatives in the United Kingdom, along with Democrats and Republicans in the United States) are sufficiently large that one or the other almost inevitably controls the majority of seats in the lower house.

²⁹ Illustrative of the competition and rotation in power that are typical of majoritarian systems, the party excluded from government in Britain forms a shadow cabinet, which is prepared to step into office once it comes back into favor with the electorate.

³⁰ For example, after assuming office in 2009, Democratic President Obama (born 1961; president 2009–2017) in the United States retained the Republican appointee, Robert Gates (born 1943), as Secretary of Defense.

³¹ The CDU and CSU, although technically separate parties, do not compete with each other in elections and consistently unite when forming governments. More typical of postwar Germany has been a minimal winning coalition of the smaller Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP) with either the CDU/CSU or the SPD, although in recent decades, the relative decline of the larger parties has made German coalition formation less predictable.

Richard M. Nixon (1913–1994; president 1969–1974).³² A defining characteristic of all such cabinets is that they violate the majoritarian principle by including more parties than necessary for controlling a mere majority of legislators.

Two of Lijphart's core cases, Austria and Switzerland, have maintained grand coalitions, in this conventional sense, throughout most of their postwar history. Every Austrian cabinet, from the end of the Second World War until 1966, was a coalition of the two largest parties, the conservative Austrian Peoples Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP) and the Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, SPÖ), and the first two of these governments also included the tiny Austrian Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Österreichs, KPÖ).³³ Switzerland institutionalized grand coalition to an even greater degree, through its so-called "magic formula" (*Zauberformel*). According to this convention, from 1959 to 2003, the seven-member Swiss Federal Council comprised two members each of the three largest parties—the Free Democratic Party (Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei, FDP), the Conservative Christian Social People's Party (Konservativ-Christlichsoziale Volkspartei, KCSV, which became the Christian Democratic People's Party (Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz, CVP, in 1970), and the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz, SP)—along with one member of the fourth largest party. Between 1959 and 1971, the fourth largest party was the Farmers, Traders, and Citizens' Party (Bauern-, Gewerbe- und Bürgerpartei, BGB), and between 1971 and 2003, it was the Swiss People's Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei, SVP), which formed through a merger of the BGB with a faction of the Democratic Party.³⁴ Switzerland's collective executive, unlike a British cabinet, is not subject to a no-confidence vote and serves a fixed four-year

³² Lijphart, *Democracy*, 28–29.

³³ This corresponds to the period during which Austria most closely fit the consociational model. See Lijphart, *Democracy*, 1–2. From 1966 to 1983, conservative and socialist single-party majority governments alternated, after which Austria returned to grand coalitions, along with several instances, in 1983–1986, 1986, 2000–2003, 2003–2007, and 2017–2019, of either conservative or socialist minimum winning coalitions with the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) or, from 2019 to the present, of conservative minimum winning coalitions with the Greens (Die Grünen–Die Grüne Alternative).

³⁴ As with Austria, the first decade of this period overlaps with the time frame Lijphart originally studied. Even without the magic formula, the remaining postwar Federal Councils have been highly inclusive: FDP-KVP-SP-BGB governments, from 1947 to 1954; FDP-KVP-BGB governments, from 1954 to 1959; SVP-FDP-SP-CVP governments, from 2003 to 2008; a Civic Democratic Party (Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei Schweiz, BDP)-FDP-SP-CVP government, from 2008 to 2009; FDP-SP-CVP-SVP-BDP governments, from 2009 to 2015; and SVP-FDP-SP-CVP governments, from 2016 to the present. Although shifts in party support have undermined the specific party constellation that the magic formula originally had enshrined, the Federal Council continues to include representatives of the major parties.

term. Underscoring its nature as a consensual body, the presidency and vice presidency of the Council rotate among its members.

This type of grand coalition government has appeared in such countries as Austria, Malaysia, and South Africa.³⁵ Lijphart, however, often used a modified notion of grand coalition, and his definition has broadened over time.³⁶ The underlying principle of what might be termed a Lijphartian or consociational grand coalition is that all of a plural society's major segments are represented in the executive branch in some manner. This is not something that the inclusion of the largest parties automatically guarantees unless those parties happen to correspond with the most important societal segments. That was the case in postwar Austria, where the major societal division was an ideological one between the conservative ÖVP and socialist SPÖ. In Switzerland, party affiliation tends to cut across linguistic divisions; therefore, an additional informal practice of representing each language group, "more or less proportionally," in the Federal Council supplements the magic formula.³⁷ Belgium has taken a similar approach. Although the Council of Ministers has excluded some major parties, it nevertheless includes equal numbers of Flemish and French speakers.³⁸

Additionally, a Lijphartian grand coalition can include mechanisms and institutions external to the cabinet. As Lijphart noted, "even where the cabinet itself is a grand coalition, it may not be the only or the most important consociational organ."³⁹ Several examples exist of such arrangements: the Dutch Social and Economic Council, a democratic corporatist body facilitating coordination between trade unions and employers; the 1917 and 1958 "school pacts" in the Netherlands and Belgium, respectively, which were agreements between temporary coalitions of party leaders that resolved divisive educational issues; and the extraconstitutional Austrian Coalitions Committee, whose conservative and socialist members' decisions outweighed those of the cabinet itself.⁴⁰

³⁵ Lijphart, "Puzzle," 259.

³⁶ Andeweg, "Consociational," 520.

³⁷ See Lijphart, *Democracies*, 83–85, for party affiliation cutting across language differences. On language groups in the Federal Council, see Jürg Steiner, *Amicable Agreement versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in Switzerland*, trans. Asger Braendgaard and Barbara Braendgaard (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1974), 34–35.

³⁸ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 32.

³⁹ *Democracy*, 33. See also Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," in *Consociational Democracy*, 76–77.

⁴⁰ Democratic corporatism is a form of economic policy making that involves continuous consultation and negotiation among peak organizations that represent labor, business, and the relevant state organs. It is corporate in that it involves negotiation between organized, legally constituted groups, not in the sense that business corporations dominate policy making, a usage that recently has come into vogue in American political discourse. Furthermore, the term does

A further consociational alternative to a grand coalition, in the conventional sense, involves allocating major executive offices to individuals representing specific social segments.⁴¹ Cyprus's four-year postindependence consociational experiment, for example, included arrangements for a Greek president and a Turkish vice president, each with nearly equal powers, along with Turkish overrepresentation in the cabinet.⁴² Similarly, until its civil war in 1975, postindependence Lebanon maintained an informal "national pact," calling for "a Maronite president, a Sunni prime minister, a Shiite chairman of the legislature, and a Greek Orthodox deputy chairman and deputy prime minister."⁴³ An additional alternative is government by a dominant "party of consensus," such as India's large, centrist Congress Party, whose numerous smaller "parties of pressure" keep its decisions in check.⁴⁴ Finally, another means of attaining the inclusiveness of a grand coalition is through a "diachronic coalition," one in which the party in power rotates over time. In Columbia, from 1958 to 1974, for example, an agreement resulted in the presidency alternating between Liberals and Conservatives, along with party parity at lower levels of government.⁴⁵

Segmental Autonomy

The second characteristic of consociationalism is that it allows each segmental group maximum autonomy in cultural matters, such as education, language policy, or personal law, thereby taking potentially divisive issues off the table. Lijphart emphasized that this actually "increases the plural nature of an already plural society," the purpose being "not to abolish or weaken segmental cleavages but to recognize them explicitly and to turn the segments into constructive elements of stable democracy."⁴⁶

not refer to the fascist corporatism associated with Italy under Benito Mussolini (1883–1945). See Peter J. Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985), ch. 1. On the matter of consociational bodies outside of the cabinet, see Lijphart, *Democracy*, 32–33. Lijphart mentioned interwar Czechoslovakia's five-party Pětka as another such example, although he did not discuss that case in detail.

⁴¹ Lijphart, "Puzzle," 259.

⁴² Lijphart, *Democracy*, 158–59.

⁴³ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 33–34 and 148.

⁴⁴ Lijphart, "Puzzle," 259–60. See also Bogaards, *Democracy*.

⁴⁵ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 33. Majoritarian democracy, of course, also involves a rotation in power, corresponding with the rising and declining fortunes of the two main competing political parties. What makes the Columbian case and similar arrangements more akin to a grand coalition is that the parties agreed to this rotation in advance, thereby guaranteeing each party a share in the future control of the executive.

⁴⁶ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 42.

Lijphart identified three major ways to achieve such autonomy.⁴⁷ First, countries in which social segments are separated geographically can employ federalism, as is the case in Belgium, Switzerland, and post-Communist Czechoslovakia. For example, speakers of Switzerland's four official languages, French, German, Italian, and Romansh, tend to be concentrated in different cantons. A highly decentralized federal system, which places significant decision-making authority on the cantonal level, facilitates their cultural autonomy.

Second, in several countries, nonterritorial (or sociological) federalism supplements conventional federalism, granting authority over specific policy areas, like education, to institutionalized social segments, rather than to territories. In Belgium, the Flemish-, French-, and German-speaking cultural communities (the *Vlaamse Gemeenschap*, the *Communauté française*, and the *Deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft*) administer publicly funded education, while the 1958 school pact granted equal funding to secular and Catholic schools. In the Netherlands, similar arrangements for secular and Catholic schools are rooted in the 1917 school pact, which resolved a heated conflict over education, the so-called *schoolstrijd*, that had been ongoing since the middle of the nineteenth century.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, India's constitution explicitly guarantees the right of linguistic and religious minorities to administer their own schools.⁴⁹

Finally, some countries allow what Lijphart described as "separate 'personal laws'—concerning marriage, divorce, custody and adoption of children, and inheritance—for religious minorities," examples of which include Lebanon and Cyprus. From the period of British rule, India inherited separate personal laws for Hindus, Muslims, and religious minorities, and the country maintained or amended them after independence. Significantly, although legislative majorities passed the relevant laws, their drafts were in accordance with the wishes of the communities in question.⁵⁰

Proportionality

The third consociational characteristic, proportionality, refers primarily to the electoral system, although the principle also can apply to other areas, such as the distribution of public funding or civil service appointments.⁵¹ Regarding elections, consociational democracies typically use a proportional repre-

⁴⁷ Lijphart, "Puzzle," 260.

⁴⁸ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 42.

⁴⁹ Lijphart, "Puzzle," 260–61.

⁵⁰ Lijphart, "Puzzle," 261.

⁵¹ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 38–41; and Lijphart, "Puzzle," 261.

sentation (list PR) formula, whereby each constituent votes for a party list, after which each party wins a number of legislative seats, corresponding with its share of the overall vote. This is the case in all four of the main countries Lijphart originally examined (Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, and Switzerland). List PR has the advantage of reflecting the electorate's wishes more accurately than majoritarian formulas, such as single-member district plurality and majority runoff, which may produce disproportional results and create artificial majorities.⁵²

There are other ways to achieve electoral proportionality. In some districts of Malaysia, minority parties have exclusive nominating rights, thereby guaranteeing them a share of legislative seats. India found ways of ensuring greater proportionality, despite using a single-member district plurality electoral formula. There, the geographic concentration of minorities makes it possible to reserve a specific number of seats for their representatives through the careful delineation of electoral districts.⁵³ In the name of inclusion, consociational arrangements sometimes go beyond proportionality by deliberately overrepresenting small segments or even through artificial parity in the distribution of seats.⁵⁴

Minority Veto

The final consociational characteristic, the minority veto, serves to protect minority interests. As Lijphart notes, it “usually consists of merely an informal understanding that minorities can effectively protect their autonomy by blocking

52 In a single-member district, only one candidate can win a seat. PR typically uses multimember districts or eschews districts entirely, thereby allowing greater proportionality. A plurality formula is one whereby the party with the largest share of the district vote wins the seat, even if that party receives less than half the vote. Under a majority runoff formula, a party must receive more than half the vote, and a runoff election takes place if no party obtains a majority in the first round of voting. Disproportionality refers to a discrepancy between the proportion of the vote and the proportion of the seats that political parties receive. An artificial majority occurs when a party wins more than half of the seats, even though it received fewer than half the votes. Although no electoral system is perfectly proportional and any formula potentially can produce an artificial majority, both problems are especially commonplace in countries, such as the United Kingdom and United States, that use single-member district plurality. Artificial majorities are, in fact, the norm for elections to the British House of Commons, where, since the Second World War, either Labour or the Conservatives have consistently acquired a substantial majority of seats with a mere plurality of votes. More thorough investigations of the effects of different electoral formulas include such classic works as Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, eds., *Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences* (New York: Agathon, 2003); Arend Lijphart, *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945–1990* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); and Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg Shugart, *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989).

53 Lijphart, “Puzzle,” 261.

54 Lijphart, *Democracy*, 40–41.

any attempts to eliminate or reduce it,” as is the case in the Netherlands and Switzerland. At times, however, the “veto is formally entrenched in the constitution,” as in Belgium, Cyprus, and post-Communist Czechoslovakia, where one segment formed a clear majority of the population. In Austria, the creation of grand coalitions involves the conclusion of a formal agreement, between the Christian Socialists and the Social Democrats, specifying that the decisions of the Coalition Committee must be unanimous. In Belgium, there was a long-standing informal agreement that rendered majority decisions lacking the support of both parts of the country less legitimate. This understanding eventually became entrenched through a constitutional amendment, which requires laws affecting cultural and educational interests to receive majorities among both Flemish- and French-speaking parliamentary representatives.⁵⁵ Indian examples of an informal veto include a 1965 decision that Hindi could not become the official language without the concurrent approval of non-Hindi regions and the government’s reversal of a 1985 Supreme Court decision, in a personal law case, in the face of objections from the Muslim minority.⁵⁶

The overly frequent exercise of a minority veto could undermine effective government; however, a peculiarity of the consociational democracies is that they rarely use it. Rather, its effectiveness stems from its potential use. Majorities are disinclined to propose measures that violate minority interests or to introduce especially controversial bills through the legislative process when it is apparent that they would face a veto.⁵⁷

Summary

The four characteristics of consociational democracy facilitate stable democracy in plural societies in two different ways. The first involves including every social segment in the decision-making process. This is accomplished through various forms of consociational or Lijphartian grand coalitions and through the principle of proportionality. The second involves leaving particularly divisive issues, such as culture, education, language, and religion, to the segments themselves. Segmental autonomy does this by giving each segment control over the policy areas most important to it, while mutual veto prevents others from impinging on those interests.

⁵⁵ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 38; and Lijphart, “Puzzle,” 261.

⁵⁶ Lijphart, “Puzzle,” 261–62. The court case, Mohammed Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, involved the right of a divorced Muslim woman to alimony. Many Muslims saw the court’s decision as violating *sharia*.

⁵⁷ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 36–38; and “Puzzle,” 261–62.

Consociationalism is “both an empirical and a normative model.”⁵⁸ In other words, in societies with deep divisions, it either can explain the stability of an existing democracy or serve as a prescription for successful democracy. Naturally, consociationalism’s empirical track record and the possibility of introducing it to additional countries raise the question of where it has the greatest potential for success.

Nine Conditions Favorable to Consociationalism

With the growing number of recognized consociational cases, Lijphart strove to compile a list of factors favorable to that form of democracy. The conditions he identified are neither necessary nor sufficient for successful consociation. A consociational democracy’s fate is not preordained, after all, because the actions of political elites are central to its success. This conclusion, which Almond and Robert J. Mundt stated and Lijphart adopted, “may be disappointing for ‘political *science* [sic], but for political problem solving there may be cause for satisfaction.”⁵⁹ Favorable or unfavorable conditions merely suggest how risky a proposition consociationalism may be for a specific country; with sufficient political determination, it potentially can succeed in a wide range of circumstances. Over time, Lijphart identified nine conditions favorable to consociational democracy (see Table 1): the absence of a unified majority; the lack of large socioeconomic disparities among the segments; an assemblage of segments of “roughly the same size”; the presence of a relatively small number of segments; the existence of a comparatively small population; a combination of “external dangers” that “promote internal unity”; a number of “overarching loyalties” to the existing state, such as nationalism; the concentration of segments in specific geographic territories; and the maintenance of “traditions of compromise and accommodation.”⁶⁰

Lijphart further argued that two of these conditions—the absence of a unified majority, and the lack of large socioeconomic disparities among segments—are the most important since both have to do with the precise nature of a society’s divisions.⁶¹ A unified majority is a threat to consociationalism, for the simple rea-

⁵⁸ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 1.

⁵⁹ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 55, quoting Gabriel A. Almond and Robert J. Mundt, “Crisis, Choice and Change: Some Tentative Conclusions,” in *Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development*, ed. Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan, and Robert J. Mundt (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 649.

⁶⁰ Lijphart, “Puzzle,” 262–63.

⁶¹ Lijphart, *Democracy*, ch. 3; and Lijphart, “Puzzle,” 262–63. See also Ulrich Schneckener, “Making Power Sharing Work: Lessons from Successes and Failures in Ethnic Conflict Regulation,” *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 2 (March 2002): 210–17.

son that the members of such a social segment have much to gain from a majoritarian system of rule. According to Lijphart, a unified Greek majority was the main reason why Cyprus's consociational experiment was so short-lived.⁶² Majorities in consociational systems, however, are much less of a threat if they are not unified. In India, for example, Hindus make up approximately 83 percent of the population, a seemingly formidable obstacle. Such a judgement, however, overlooks the extreme pluralism that characterizes Indian society. As Lijphart noted, "India's numerical Hindu majority is internally divided to such an extent that the country consists of minorities only."⁶³

All of Lijphart's four original cases lacked a unified majority. Austria, in the 1950s and 1960s, was divided into conservative and socialist ideological camps (*Lager*) of roughly equal size, accompanied by a minuscule National-Liberal camp. Belgium came close to violating this principle. Although its Catholic, Liberal, and Socialist *familles spirituelles* were each a minority of the population, Catholics came close to having a majority. Interestingly, as Lijphart noted, "the most turbulent episodes in the development of the royal question and the school conflict were preceded by electoral victories of the Catholic party."⁶⁴ Meanwhile, Belgium's Flemish- and French-speaking populations were roughly equal in size, each of these ethno-linguistic segments being subdivided into smaller ideological and religious subcultures. The Dutch Catholic, Protestant, Liberal, and Socialist *zuilen* [pillars] each made up between 13 and 34 percent of the population. Finally, Switzerland contains many small minority subcultures, and its major linguistic and religious groups are further subdivided into regional "cantonal subcultures."⁶⁵

In a plural society, large socioeconomic disparities between the segments pose another major threat to consociational democracy. Two of Lijphart's examples, both from the developing world, illustrate this problem. In India, large disparities exist between regions as well as between linguistic and religious groups; however, there are three mitigating factors. First, despite the developmental disparities between Hindus and Muslims, both groups have roughly comparable literacy rates. Second, although Hindi-speaking regions tend to be poorer, for historical reasons, these regions have played a greater role in the government. Lijphart noted a similar "tradeoff between the economically dominant Chinese and the politically dominant Malays in consociational Malaysia." Third, Indian

62 Lijphart, "Puzzle," 262.

63 Lijphart, "Puzzle," 262.

64 Lijphart, *Democracy*, 60–61.

65 Lijphart, *Democracy*, 60.

intrasegmental disparities are so significant that they politically overwhelm intersegmental economic differences.⁶⁶

The first four favorable conditions are closely interrelated. The presence of a unified majority negates two other favorable conditions: a rough balance of power among groups and a relatively small number of groups that are all approximately the same size. A large number of socioeconomic disparities among groups, regardless of their size, also translates into significant differences in political power. Size matters, and groups that are roughly equal in size also have an impact on the balance of power since they are more likely to compromise when none of them are in a position to dominate the others.

The condition that there be a relatively small number of segments—Lijphart suggests three to four as ideal—has to do with avoiding political polarization while simultaneously minimizing the complexity of intersegmental political bargaining. In a society with only two major segments, politics might become a zero-sum game, as each group attempts to dominate the other. Furthermore, a society in which major sociological divisions coincide—for example, one in which there is great socioeconomic disparity between two segments that speak different languages and practice different religions—is at great risk of political polarization since they would have difficulties finding common ground. Austria, with its two conservative and socialist *Lager*, had fewer segments than would be ideal. Fortunately, Austria's population is overwhelmingly German-speaking and its main ideological divisions tended to cut across rather than reinforce class divisions, two factors that weaken the risk of political polarization.⁶⁷ Conversely, a society with a large number of small segments might have difficulty getting anything done. Switzerland, with at least 25 subcultures, and India, with 14 major languages and numerous other divisions, face less than ideal conditions for consociationalism.⁶⁸ The fact that both countries have maintained consociational democracy over a significant period, however, underscores the fact that these favorable conditions are not absolute.

It is no coincidence that Lijphart's original four cases were among the smallest countries in Europe, each with a population, in 1960, of less than 12 million.⁶⁹ A relatively small population, like a comparatively small number of cleavages, favors consociationalism by facilitating political negotiation and compromise. Lijphart provided four reasons why this is so. First, "the *direct internal* effect of

66 Lijphart, "Puzzle," 262–263.

67 Lijphart, *Democracy*, 56 and 75–81.

68 Lijphart, *Democracy*, 60 and 72–74; and "Puzzle," 263.

69 Lijphart, *Democracy*, 65.

smallness is that the elites are more likely to know each other personally and to meet often; this increases the probability that they will not regard politics as a zero-sum game and hence ... that they will choose coalescent instead of adversarial styles of decision making.⁷⁰ Second, the “indirect internal” effect of smallness is that “smaller countries are easier to govern than large ones because they tend to be less complex.”⁷¹ With a population of more than one billion, India clearly fails to meet this favorable condition, illustrating, once again, that these conditions, though helpful, are not necessary for consociationalism to succeed.⁷²

Small size correlates with the next favorable condition, “external dangers” to the state that, according to Lijphart, “promote internal unity.” The “*direct external* effect” of smallness “is that small countries are more likely to be and feel threatened by other powers than larger countries. Such feelings of vulnerability and insecurity provide strong incentives to maintain internal solidarity.”⁷³ Lijphart observed that all four of his original cases moved toward consociationalism in response to some external crisis. After the Second World War, Austrian consociationalism evolved under foreign occupation. Belgian consociationalism began as the country strove for independence, and it made significant progress during the First World War, when the Netherlands also took major steps toward consociationalism. The Swiss grand coalition government originated during the Second World War.⁷⁴ The independence struggle against Britain and the 1962 war with China prompted Indian unity, although wars with Pakistan exacerbated tensions between India’s Hindu and Muslim communities.⁷⁵

There are two important aspects to a foreign threat as a favorable condition. First, the case of India underscores Lijphart’s caveat that a foreign “threat must be perceived as a common danger by all of the segments.”⁷⁶ Lijphart maintained that divided loyalties led to increased tensions between linguistic communities in Belgium, in both world wars, and in Switzerland, during the First World War. The extreme case of a foreign threat exacerbating internal tensions was interwar Austria, where competing pressure from the Bolshevik Revolution, fascist ideology, and Nazi Germany magnified internal political divisions.⁷⁷ Second, in an earlier work, Lijphart discussed an additional way in which small

⁷⁰ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 65.

⁷¹ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 68.

⁷² Lijphart, “Puzzle,” 263.

⁷³ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 66.

⁷⁴ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 66–67.

⁷⁵ Lijphart, “Puzzle,” 263.

⁷⁶ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 67.

⁷⁷ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 67–68.

size might have a positive impact on consociationalism. The “*indirect external effect of small size*” is “a small state’s limited power on the international scene, its tendency to abstain from an active foreign policy, and, as a result, its greater chance of avoiding difficult choices in this realm.” Significantly, “all four European consociational democracies have had neutrality imposed on them at one time or another.”⁷⁸

“Overarching loyalties” that unite the separate segments also favor consociationalism.⁷⁹ One example of this is nationalism, which provides a level of identity that can transcend such divisive factors as ethnicity and religion. Regarding his four original cases, Lijphart argued that nationalism was strongest in the Netherlands. Austrians, by contrast, remained divided, even after the Second World War, between those who saw themselves as Austrian and those who considered themselves to be part of a larger German community. Belgians expressed an exceptionally weak sense of national identity, which divisive Flemish nationalism further undermined. Finally, the Swiss tended to identify more with their cantons than with Switzerland, as a whole.⁸⁰ Meanwhile, the Indian National Congress played a major role in fostering a sense of Indian national identity, one that strengthened after Pakistani independence.⁸¹

Another possible source of overarching loyalty can be a monarch who serves as a symbol of national unity and as a neutral head of state. Belgium’s King Albert I (1875–1934; reigned 1909–1934) and the Netherlands’ Queen Wilhelmina (1880–1962; reigned 1890–1948) were both examples of such unifying figures, although Belgian and Dutch monarchs, at other times, have proven to be divisive because of their association with one or another social segment. Austria and Switzerland are republics, but both have approximated such unifying figures: Austria, by electing a socialist president, when a conservative chancellor heads the grand coalitions (and vice versa), and Switzerland, by rotating the presidency of the Federal Council among the coalition parties.⁸²

Segmental isolation, meaning the concentration of segments in different geographic regions, also facilitates consociationalism. Lijphart maintained that this is true, in part, because “clear boundaries between the segments of a plural so-

⁷⁸ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 69.

⁷⁹ Lijphart, “Puzzle,” 263.

⁸⁰ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 82–83.

⁸¹ Lijphart, “Puzzle,” 263.

⁸² Lijphart, *Democracy*, 35–36. The 2016 runoff between Alexander Van der Bellen (born 1944; president 2017–present), once the leader of the Green Party, and the FPÖ’s Norbert Hofer (born 1971), in a contested presidential election, marked a significant shift away from conventional consociational politics in Austria.

ciety have the advantage of limiting mutual contacts and consequently of limiting the chances of ever-present antagonisms to erupt into actual hostilities.”⁸³ Although this view contradicted widely held notions that close contact between segments can lead to mutual understanding, the underlying assumption is that such contacts are much riskier in deeply divided societies. In short, as the neighbor repeated in *Mending Wall* (1914), by Robert Frost (1874–1963), “good fences make good neighbors.”⁸⁴

The geographic concentration of segments also facilitates using federalism to ensure segmental autonomy. Switzerland is the strongest example of this. In 1960, its 25 cantons were generally very homogeneous in terms of language and religion. Swiss federalism, in turn, placed linguistically sensitive policy areas, such as education and culture, in the hands of the cantonal governments. Occasionally, it has resolved issues of local diversity simply by creating smaller cantons. In Austria, by contrast, ideological divisions existed throughout each of the *Länder*, thereby limiting territorial federalism’s usefulness. Austria, like the Netherlands, therefore, relied on nonterritorial federalism, that is, granting cultural autonomy to organizations that represented sociological segments, rather than geographic units.⁸⁵ By contrast, Belgium, based on Lijphart’s analysis, “moved in the direction of a semi-federalism entailing both functional and territorial separation in order to find a solution to its linguistic problem.”⁸⁶ Finally, although India’s religious divisions tend to cross territorial boundaries, Lijphart concluded that “the geographical concentration of linguistic groups has made India’s highly successful linguistic federalism possible.”⁸⁷

Lijphart’s final favorable condition is the existence of “traditions of compromise and accommodation.”⁸⁸ Put simply, a political elite is more likely to overcome its internal divisions if it already has a history of doing so. The Austrian case is interesting, in this regard, in that the utter failure of elite accommodation between the world wars led to civil war, providing a strong incentive to avoid repeating the same mistake. In the Netherlands and Switzerland, the lack of experience with an absolutist monarchy accompanied long historical tradi-

83 Lijphart, *Democracy*, 88–89.

84 Robert Frost, “Mending Walls,” in *North of Boston* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1914), 11–13.

85 Lijphart, *Democracy*, 89–97 and 98–99. The autonomous organizations in Austria are the Austrian Union Federation (Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, ÖGB), the Chamber of Labor (Arbeiterkammer, AK), the Austrian Chamber of Commerce (Wirtschaftskammer Österreich, WKÖ), and the Chamber of Agriculture (Landwirtschaftskammer, LK).

86 Lijphart, *Democracy*, 97.

87 Lijphart, “Puzzle,” 263.

88 Lijphart, “Puzzle,” 263.

tions of intersegmental compromise. The same tradition exists in Belgium, while in both Austria and Switzerland, local grand coalitions preceded grand coalitions at the national level.⁸⁹ Similar traditions of consensus exist in India, both within the Indian National Congress and in village decision making.⁹⁰ Important as such traditions may be, however, Lijphart emphasized the “voluntary, rational, purposive, and contractual elements of consociational democracy,” positing that “one should not rule out the possibility that leaders in plural societies are capable of a creative and constructive act of free will.”⁹¹

Consociationalism and Its Critics

This introductory overview cannot engage with every facet of the ongoing debates within the extensive and still-expanding literature about consociational democracy. Nevertheless, it would be remiss not to direct those who are interested toward some of the major issues social scientists and historians have raised. In the past few decades, after all, consociationalism has become a major tool for international policy makers and therefore stands at the center of important real-world political discourse.

Fortunately, a number of published works thoroughly survey the major normative, empirical, conceptual, and methodological issues surrounding consociationalism, including persuasive defenses of the model, on the part of Lijphart and his fellow consociationalists.⁹² Of perhaps the greatest general interest are debates about consociationalism’s potential for addressing the problems of divided societies in the post-Cold War world, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland, and South Africa.⁹³ The most famous of

89 Lijphart, *Democracy*, 100–103.

90 Lijphart, “Puzzle,” 263.

91 Lijphart, *Democracy*, 103.

92 See Andeweg, “Consociational,” 517–31; Matthijs Bogaards, Ludger Helms, and Arend Lijphart, “The Importance of Consociationalism for Twenty-First Century Politics and Political Science,” *Swiss Political Science Review* 25, no. 4 (December 2019): 341–56; Lijphart, *Democracy*, 47–52; John McGarry, “Classical Consociational Theory and Recent Consociational Performance,” *Swiss Political Science Review* 25, no. 4 (December 2019): 538–55; Brendan O’Leary, “Consociation in the Present,” *Swiss Political Science Review* 25, no. 4 (December 2019): 556–74; Brendan O’Leary, “Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments,” in *From Power Sharing to Democracy*, 3–43; and Andrew Reynolds, “Majoritarian or Power-Sharing Government,” in *Democracy and Institutions*, 165–70.

93 Andeweg, *Consociational*, 516–17; Banovic, *Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit*; Belloni, *State Building*; Bieber, “The Balkans”; Bieber, “Consociationalism”; Bieber, “Power Sharing”; Cairns, “Northern Ireland”; Džihic, *Ethnopolitik*; Gromes, “Die Konkordanzdemokratie”; Guelke, *Politics*; Hancock, “Significant Events”; Henrard, “Power Sharing”; Irwin, “Public Opinion”; Issacharoff, “Courts”; Kasapović, “Bosnia”; Keil, “Konkordanzdemokratie”; McEvoy, “We Forbid!”; McCulloch, *Power*.

these is the so-called “Lijphart-Horowitz Debate” of the 1990s. Brought about by competing proposals for a post-Apartheid South Africa, the central question dividing Lijphart from political scientist Donald L. Horowitz (born 1939) was whether democratic institutions in ethnically divided societies should reinforce those divisions, as the consociational model prescribes, or whether they should bridge them, for example, by encouraging multiethnic majoritarian parties.⁹⁴ The form of democracy South Africa eventually chose clearly was Lijphartian, while this debate continues to inspire scholarly work on Southern African countries.⁹⁵ Meanwhile, drawing on his research on consensus democracy (see below), Lijphart has presented a powerful general defense of his own proposals against Horowitz’s alternatives.⁹⁶

The Lijphart-Horowitz debate took place during the emergence of a wave of new democracies in the aftermath of the Cold War, inspiring further interest in democratic institutional design both in the former Eastern Europe as well as in Latin America.⁹⁷ The experience of post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular, has prompted criticisms of imposed consociationalism. Those advocating this concept argue that consociational democracy is less likely to function when international organizations or other states prescribe it, although they generally concede that some sort of consociationalism is nonetheless the best alternative available.⁹⁸

Another recent development in the study of consociational democracies, John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary’s distinction between corporate and liberal consociation, is directly related to the politics discussed in the current study. According to these authors, “corporate consociation accommodates groups ac-

Sharing; Merdzanovic, *Democracy*; O’Halloran, “Post-conflict Reconstruction”; Schneckener, *Auswege aus dem Bürgerkrieg*, 284–307; Sturm, “Das Karfreitagsabkommen”; Taylor, *Consociational Theory*; Wintrobe, “A Theory”; and Wolff, “Between Stability.”

94 Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985); Donald L. Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa?: Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991); and Arend Lijphart, *Power-sharing in South Africa* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1985).

95 Reynolds, “Majoritarian,” 155–95.

96 Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” *Journal of Democracy* 15 (April 2004): 96–109. Impressive comparative evidence in favor of Lijphart also can be found in McCulloch, *Power-Sharing*.

97 Lijphart, “Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland 1989–1991,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 4, no. 2 (April 1992): 207–223; Arend Lijphart and Carlos Waisman, ed., *Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Boulder, CO, and Oxford: Westview Press, 1996).

98 Bieber, “Consociationalism”; Bieber, “The Balkans”; Kasapović, “Bosnia”; and Merdzanovic, *Democracy*.

cording to ascriptive criteria and tacitly assumes that group identities are and should be fixed and that groups are both internally homogeneous and externally bounded (e.g., in Lebanon, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Belgium, and Cyprus at various junctures).” By contrast, “a liberal consociation ... allows groups (and individuals) to self-determine their organization and representation. It rewards whatever salient political identities emerge in democratic elections, whether these are ethnic, religious, linguistic, or based on other criteria.”⁹⁹ Examples of the latter are “South Africa’s transitional power-sharing arrangements (1994–1996),” while “Northern Ireland’s 1998 Agreement combines both corporate and liberal elements.”¹⁰⁰ McGarry and O’Leary argue that liberal consociationalism has a greater chance of success because more individual choice in assigning group identities yields greater flexibility and democratic legitimacy. Significantly, they note that, although “academic consociationalists are supporters of democratic and liberal consociations,” they frequently “are (unfairly) accused by [so-called] integrationists of being ‘undemocratic,’ ‘illiberal,’ ‘essentialist,’ and ‘primordialist.’”¹⁰¹

Finally, within the larger literature on democracy in divided societies, two additional potential alternatives to consociationalism have arisen recently. In her analysis of Indian democracy, Kanchan Chandra emphasized how “ethnic identities can be fluid, multidimensional, and endogenous to competitive politics.”¹⁰² This constructivist premise led her to conclude that divided societies can achieve stable democracy by designing institutions that encourage the proliferation of multiple, alternative ethnic majorities. Such a democracy would take advantage of the fact that identity is multilayered by producing shifting majorities, based on different levels of identity.¹⁰³ Meanwhile, Hanna Lerner advocated an incrementalist approach. Drawing on India, Ireland, and Israel as key

99 Brendan O’Leary, “Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places: An Advocate’s Introduction,” in *Power Sharing*, 27–28.

100 O’Leary, “Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places,” 28.

101 O’Leary, “Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places,” 28. The liberal-corporate distinction emerged earlier, in the context of appraising Iraq’s 2005 constitution. See McGarry and O’Leary, “Iraq’s Constitution of 2005,” 670–698. Integrationists are those who, unlike assimilationists, do “not seek to the full cultural homogenization of minorities” but “confine their homogenizing ambitions to the ‘public sphere.’” Unlike consociationalists and other accommodationists, integrationists favor a public sphere, with “a common public language, public symbols, and common party politics.” O’Leary, “Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places,” 16–17. In short, integrationists seek a form of democratic politics that bridges rather than incorporates social divisions.

102 Kanchan Chandra, “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability,” *Perspectives on Politics* 3, no. 2 (June 2005): 236.

103 Chandra, “Ethnic Parties.” See also Kanchan Chandra’s, *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press: 2004).

examples, Lerner argued that, rather than imposing a predefined solution on a deeply divided society, stable democracy can result from building fundamental intergroup disagreements into the constitution. Divided societies can accomplish this by completely avoiding a written constitution, by making the relevant constitutional provisions ambiguous, or by making them mutually contradictory. The logic behind all three strategies is to allow political actors to work out their differences gradually, in an *ad hoc* manner, within an open-ended democratic constitutional framework.¹⁰⁴ What is especially intriguing about these new lines of investigation is that Chandra, Lerner, and Lijphart all claim India as a central example to confirm their respective democratic proposals.

Consociationalism and Constructivism

One frequent criticism of the consociational model deserves separate treatment, given its relevance to the historical literatures later chapters address. This is the charge that consociational theory is guilty of groupism, that is, of treating complex, changing, constructed group identities as if they somehow were uniform, permanent, and real.¹⁰⁵ This concern is central to much of the recent revisionist history about national flexibility and national indifference in the Habsburg Monarchy. Arising in the wake of Rogers Brubaker's criticisms of the realism of the nation, this literature, which has produced some of the most influential developments in nationalism studies in recent decades, deals with notions of national flexibility, national indifference, national amphibians, and national hermaphrodites. It emphasizes such matters as multilingualism, intermarriage, the coexistence of individuals claiming multiple identities within individuals, the existence of competing definitions of the nation, the availability of transnational loyalties, the institutionalization of nationhood, the significance of local contexts, and the instrumental use of national identities in the rhetoric of nationalist politicians.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Hanna Lerner, *Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

¹⁰⁵ The authors thank Bőrris Kuzmany for organizing the January 8–10, 2015 workshop “National-Personal Autonomy Non-territorial Autonomy Cultural Autonomy,” at the University of Vienna, where Thomas A. Lorman presented an earlier version of this segment of our research. We especially thank Jeremy King, who participated in the workshop, for raising several of the concerns we address here.

¹⁰⁶ Regarding the “realism of the nation,” see Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*; and Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups*. Major works in the “national indifference” literature include James E. Bjork, *Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European Borderland* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008); Emil Brix, *Die Umgangssprachen in Altösterreich zwischen Agitation and Assimilation* (Vienna: Hermann Böhlau Nachfolger, 1982); Gary Cohen, *The Politics of Ethnic Survival*, 2nd edition (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2006);

Such criticisms would seem to apply to consociationalism since it involves institutionalizing groups and therefore appears to treat groups and their interests as real. There are, however, two highly compelling reasons to reject this argument. The first is that the consociational model does not require a commitment to any particular theory of group identity. The second is that consociationalists already have addressed the specific criticisms that constructivists raise.

In 2001, while addressing these exact issues, Lijphart noted that, “during the first phase of [his] work on power-sharing, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, the primordial view of ethnicity was still widely accepted in the social sciences.” He, “too, accepted it without giving it much critical thought.” In his work since about 1980, however, his “interpretation of ethnic identity [had] become mainly constructivist.” He added that, “as a consequence, the explanatory power of consociationalism as well as its precision as a prescriptive model have been greatly improved.”¹⁰⁷

Interestingly, empirical observation drove Lijphart’s early constructivist turn more than the new theoretical developments did. Specifically, he noticed that “primordial assumptions concerning the fixed and stable nature of the sectarian segments” caused some of the problems Lebanon’s short-lived consociational experiment had faced. Meanwhile, a major difficulty in introducing consociational democracy to post-Apartheid South Africa, in the 1990s, “was that,

Laurence Cole, *Military Culture and Popular Patriotism in Late Imperial Austria* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Laurence Cole and Daniel Unowsky, eds., *The Limits of Loyalty: Imperial Symbolism, Popular Allegiances, and State Patriotism in the Late Habsburg Monarchy* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007); Pieter M. Judson, *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007); Pieter M. Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016); Pieter M. Judson and Marsha L. Rozenblitt, eds., *Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005); Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848–1948* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002); Scott O. Moore, *Teaching the Empire: Education and State Loyalty in Late Habsburg Austria* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2020); Markian Prokopovych, Carl Bethke, and Tamara Scheer, eds., *Language Diversity in the Late Habsburg Empire* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2019); Adam Świątek, *Gente Rutheni, Nazione Poloni: The Ruthenians of Polish Nationality in Habsburg Galicia*, trans. Guy Russel Torr (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press; Cracow: Wydawnictwo Księgarnia Akademicka, 2019); and Tara Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900–1948* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2008). The entire volume 43 (2012) of the *Austrian History Yearbook* was dedicated to this theme, as was a lengthy forum titled “The Adriatic, the Alps, and the Danube. Identities, Categories of Identification, and Identifications,” which appears in *Austrian History Yearbook* 49 (2018): 17–102.

¹⁰⁷ Arend Lijphart, “Constructivism and Consociational Theory,” *APSA Comparative Politics: Newsletter of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics of the American Political Science Association* 12, no. 1 (Winter 2001), 11–13. See also Matthijs Bogaards, “Making a Difference: An Interview with Arend Lijphart,” *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Politikwissenschaft* 9, nos. 1–2 (June 2015): 83–96.

while there was broad agreement that South Africa was a deeply divided society, the identification of the constituent segments was both objectively difficult and politically controversial.”¹⁰⁸

This insight led to Lijphart’s distinction between predetermined and self-determined segments. He long had maintained that “consociational democracy does not mean one specific set of rules and institutions,” but rather was “a general type of democracy in a plural (deeply divided) society defined in terms of four broad principles, all of which can be applied in a variety of ways.” Predetermined and self-determined segments—the two alternative ways of incorporating social divisions into a political system—are merely variations on a theme. Making this distinction enables one to consider a range of different means for specifying the segments that make up a consociational democracy and to weigh their respective merits and demerits. “Allowing groups to identify and define themselves,” Lijphart concluded, “is generally preferable to predetermination.”¹⁰⁹ Lijphart found an early example of self-determination in the system of educational autonomy in his native Netherlands, the original inspiration for the consociational model. There, the 1917 educational law “was primarily designed to accommodate the main religious groups . . . but it was formulated in neutral language and allowed any group to establish and run schools as long as basic educational standards would be observed. As a result, it has been taken advantage of by small secular groups interested in particular educational philosophies to establish, for instance, Montessori schools.”¹¹⁰ Furthermore, these insights led to practical political action. In 1978, South Africa’s Progressive Federal Party adopted two consociational proposals—elections based on proportional representation and a grand coalition government—to facilitate group self-determination. In 1982, Lijphart endorsed these proposals as a member of the Buthelezi Commission.¹¹¹

The second reason to reject constructivists’ critiques of the consociational model is that political scientists already have raised, addressed, and incorporated these arguments into the consociational literature. A recurring criticism of consociationalism is that it constrains individuals within a single, predefined identity (as Chapter 2 of this volume discusses in greater detail). Under Imperial Austria’s 1905 Moravian Compromise, for example, the so-called *Lex Perek*

¹⁰⁸ Lijphart, “Constructivism and Consociational Theory,” 12.

¹⁰⁹ Lijphart, “Constructivism and Consociational Theory,” 12.

¹¹⁰ Lijphart, “Constructivism and Consociational Theory,” 12.

¹¹¹ Lijphart, “Constructivism and Consociational Theory,” 12–13. See also Lijphart, “Self-Determination versus Pre-Determination of Ethnic Minorities in Power Sharing Systems,” in *Thinking about Democracy*, 66–74; John McGarry and Brendon O’Leary, “Iraq’s Constitution of 2005”; and O’Leary, “Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places,” 25–28.

made it possible for individuals to challenge the national status of others, leading to the state attempting to assign individuals to what it perceived as the correct nationality, based on allegedly objective criteria.¹¹² This was a crucial step in what historian Gerald Stourzh termed the “ethnicizing of politics.”¹¹³

Consociationalism scholars share these concerns. Lijphart’s distinction between pre- and self-determination has been highly influential as the basis for what political scientists Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry termed corporate versus liberal consociationalism.¹¹⁴ There now is a widespread consensus that the latter generally is preferable. The significance of the aforementioned observations about Moravia, therefore, is not that they refute the consociational model; rather, it is that they highlight an already recognized flaw in some consociational systems, thereby providing yet more evidence against corporate consociationalism, in favor of the liberal consociational alternative.

A constructivist might respond that, even with self-determination as a basis for selection, requiring individuals to claim membership in an exclusive group remains problematic. Doing so forces them to emphasize one among a multitude of identities. Furthermore, it rarefies some types of identity, such as ethnicity, reinforcing artificial and arbitrary divisions among people by institutionalizing them. Any response to these criticisms must begin by acknowledging that consociationalism does this, in some sense. One of consociationalism’s four defining characteristics, segmental autonomy, “increases the plural nature of an already plural society” by building existing social divisions into the political system.¹¹⁵ Doing so certainly entails a cost—in Lijphart’s words, the democratic ideal of “fraternity means ‘positive’ peace, and the mere ‘negative’ peace of consociational democracy pales by comparison.” He argued, however, that

peaceful coexistence should not be belittled. The relevant question is not which of the two is in abstract terms the more desirable but which goal is realistically attainable. Positive and fraternal peace are obviously more worthy goals to strive for than mere peaceful coexistence, but in a plural society democratic peaceful coexistence is vastly preferable both to undemocratic peace and to an unstable democracy rent by segmental strife.¹¹⁶

¹¹² Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*, 32–48.

¹¹³ Stourzh, “Ethnicizing,” 283–323.

¹¹⁴ O’Leary, “Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places,” 27–28. See also Bogaards, “Making a Difference,” 92.

¹¹⁵ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 42.

¹¹⁶ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 49.

Although the costs of self-identification to an individual's freedom were real, one must weigh these against the relative lack of nationalist conflict in Moravia, compared to Bohemia and elsewhere. While such works as Zahra's *Kidnapped Souls* are useful in illuminating what some of those costs actually were, the concept of self-determination prompts a consideration of measures that could have mitigated them.

The idea that some societies are, in Lijphart's words "already plural," is especially important when considering nationalism in Imperial Austria. In his widely praised history of the Habsburg Monarchy, Pieter Judson took on the daunting task of writing a history without nations, emphasizing the ways in which the Monarchy provided a source of shared identity for its peoples, even in contexts that brought out people's differences, such as elections.¹¹⁷ Overall, Judson actually complements the consociational interpretation of Imperial Austrian politics quite well, most generally in that his work, like our own, rejects the "cage of nations" thesis, while emphasizing the Monarchy's positive political accomplishments. In particular, his focus on imperial attachments and rituals reinforces the consociational notion that Habsburg subjects shared an overarching identity that facilitated cooperation, while his willingness to take seriously Imperial Austrian legislative elections supports the view that it was a democratizing state, though not a democracy.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, his brief account of Czechoslovakia as a successor state acknowledges some of the parallels between Slovak demands for political autonomy between the world wars and previous practices under the Habsburgs as well as Czechoslovakia's greater protection of minority rights, relative to other successor states.¹¹⁹

Nevertheless, one of Judson's main concerns is that imperial institutions helped create and reinforce national group identities. "At the dawn of the twen-

¹¹⁷ Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*.

¹¹⁸ See, for example, Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 1–4. Judson's use of the Reichsrat 1911 election to introduce his thesis is commendable, but several small errors exist regarding the elections that followed the 1896 and 1907 electoral reforms. The Taaffe reform enfranchised all adult men into a Fifth Curia in 1896, not in 1897, the year of the first election under that reform. In 1907, male residents acquired the right to vote at age 24, not 23. Finally, with 87 members, the Social Democrats had the second largest, not the largest club in the Abgeordnetenhaus following the 1907 election, trailing the Christian Social Club, with its 96 members. It is also worth noting that parliamentary clubs were not congruous with the parties under whose banners candidates ran for office and that club membership changed frequently between elections, although the Christian Social and Social Democratic Clubs were more stable than most. See Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 2–3 and 374; k.k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, *Klubs des Abgeordnetenhauses XVIII. Session* (Vienna: k.k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1907), 3–5, 31–33; *RGBl.*, no. 168, Law of June 14, 1896; *RGBl.*, no. 169, Law of June 14, 1896; and *RGBl.*, no. 15, Law of January 26, 1907, §7.

¹¹⁹ Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 446–47.

tieth century,” he wrote, “the insistence that all people belonged to ethnic or national communities must be understood partly as a product of political work accomplished by nationalist activists. It was also, however, a product of the ways agents of the empire categorized its diverse peoples in order to govern them more effectively.”¹²⁰ This chapter already has addressed the idea that group categorization of the sort Judson described in his second sentence can make stable representative government more likely. More important is his preceding acknowledgment that the state is not alone in constructing national identities.

Long before local experiments in interethnic compromise took place in Moravia and elsewhere, national activists already had accomplished much of the political work of categorizing people along national lines. By the turn of the century—several years before those compromises and before the creation of linguistically determined electoral districts through the 1907 electoral reform—nearly all Austrian parties claimed to represent some national group, while parties continued to make explicit, unapologetic nationalist appeals in their campaign materials, to which numerous voters responded under every electoral system. For example, the German People’s Party, one of the largest Germanophone parties under universal manhood suffrage, began one of its 1907 electoral announcements with the declaration that “Our urgent call does not come from narrow partisan hearts, it is not about party power, but rather concern for the power of the entire German people,” calling on German voters to “think of the superiority of 283 foreigners over 233 German voices, a large part of whom will blindly obey a black or red pope; unfree men of two party popes, for whom the political power of the ecclesiastical hierarchy or international party power is everything.”¹²¹ In the same electoral contest, each Czech party attempted to convince voters that it was best suited to combat the German threat. The Agrarian Party stated that “the influence of the government has increased, the old centrism has grown stronger, and the boldness of the *German* rage has grown! Therefore, it is inevitable that the new, young, fresh, and determined parties, not beholden to anyone, should be represented in the leadership of our deputies.”¹²² On the same day, the Young Czechs published one of their manifestos:

So, on the eve of the election, the spirit of all Germandom is filled with feelings against us Slavs, in general, and against the Czech nation, in particular.

¹²⁰ Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 10.

¹²¹ Deutschen Volkspartei für die Alpenländer, “Deutsche Wähler!” *Grazer Tagblatt*, May 12, 1907, 1.

¹²² “Za boje hlasovacího,” *Venkov*, May 14, 1907, 1. The emphasis on *German* is in the original.

To maintain centralism, to make German the state language, to destroy the unity of the Czech Kingdom, to force the further domination of the Slavic majority, by all terrorist means, perhaps even with the most brutal obstruction power of their “veto,” and so on—these are the slogans, goals, and efforts with which the German parties in Austria are going into the election battle.¹²³

Not to be outdone, the National Socialists claimed that “the most brilliant pages of [Czech] history are those written by a confident, enthusiastic hand, armed with a Hussite flail! The struggle which you are now waging, Czech people, is not one involving the healing of bloody wounds but one that is equally fierce and equally decisive regarding your fate. Your weapons are the ballots with which you elect your representatives!”¹²⁴

It very well may be the case that “nationalist movements did not always influence the concerns and rhythms of everyday life in more than a passing manner.”¹²⁵ Nevertheless, they clearly had a significant influence on how ordinary people elected their political representatives.¹²⁶ Furthermore, it is a fair assumption that, short of abolishing representative political institutions, such a development was largely unavoidable. Parallel to what James Madison (1751–1836) wrote about attempts to abolish factions in *The Federalist No. 10*, any effort to avoid nationalism in Imperial Austria would have involved either destroying liberty or insisting that no one claims to belong to a distinct national group. Either effort would have been both impractical and undesirable. By the Monarchy’s last decades, the question was not whether there would be nationalist movements but what form of political organization could steer them in the most constructive direction. One who rejects the realism of the nation still must deal with the reality of nationalists.¹²⁷

¹²³ “Výstraha svědomí českému!” *Národní listy*, May 5, 1907, 1.

¹²⁴ “V boj!” *České slovo*, May 14, 1907, 1.

¹²⁵ Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 10.

¹²⁶ Additional evidence of the peoples of Austria-Hungary taking their national identities seriously can be found in the censuses. In each census, large numbers of respondents described themselves as belonging to ethnic communities, even if that rendered them subject to discrimination, especially in Transleithania. This was clear evidence that national self-identification mattered, even if it came with costs.

¹²⁷ Rok Stergar makes this same point quite strongly while introducing a recent forum on national indifference: “the aim of this forum is not to whitewash the history of Austria-Hungary, to claim that there were not nationalists and nationalism, to suggest that the empire was a paragon of peaceful coexistence without conflicts. Certainly not! Nationalism was a salient ideology, capable of mobilizing thousands, and there were many nationalist conflicts, some quite violent. Yet workers in, for instance, Marburg/Maribor, a town on the so-called language frontier, continued to celebrate May Day together, and self-identifying Czech workers often felt greater affinity

A comparison of the views of Milton J. Esman, a consociationalist who, unlike Lijphart, strongly rejected constructivism, and Kanchan Chandra, arguably the leading constructivist scholar of ethnic politics among political scientists, provides a valuable perspective on the larger debates about constructivism and consociationalism.¹²⁸ In “Power Sharing and the Constructivist Fallacy,” Esman combined an attack on constructivism with a defense of consociationalism. Regarding the former, his main concern was political science’s tendency “to evaluate and explain away what appears to the naked eye to be ethnically based political actors.”¹²⁹ Due largely to the dominance of Marxist and liberal paradigms, political science tended to view ethnic attachments as illusory, treating them either as a by-product of class politics or as irrational and premodern. Social constructivism, which Esman identified as “one of the reigning and dominant fashions in contemporary social science,” reinforced these tendencies.¹³⁰ His main criticism of constructivist arguments is that, although constructivism “is a useful hypothesis for explaining ethnogenesis” (that is, the origin of ethnic identities), it

has no explanation for the many ethnic solidarities that are demonstrably long-lasting, whose roots are decades and centuries deep, and which have survived, adapted and maintained the loyalty of constituents over successive generations. Periods of activism may be succeeded by periods of quiescence, strategies may be contested and revised, but the community with its distinct collective identity in relation to outsiders persists.¹³¹

He then dismissed a straw man version of primordialism.¹³² Acknowledging that ethnic identity is neither “a static phenomena” nor one that “can claim monopoly status,” over a range of competing group identities, he made three claims: 1) ethnic communities are real and objective, not imagined or invented entities; 2) they serve the intrinsic as well as instrumental needs of their members, which accounts for their cohesiveness and longevity; and 3) they are political structures that adapt continuously to threats and opportunities in their external environment.¹³³

toward German-speaking workers than toward the Czech middle class and nobility.” Rok Stergar, “Introduction,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 49 (2018): 17–22 (quotation on pp. 20–21).

¹²⁸ Esman, “Power Sharing,” 91–112; and *Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics*.

¹²⁹ Esman, “Power Sharing,” 91.

¹³⁰ Esman, “Power Sharing,” 94.

¹³¹ Esman, “Power Sharing,” 94.

¹³² Esman, “Power Sharing,” 95.

¹³³ Esman, “Power Sharing,” 95–96.

The practical implications of Esman's criticism of constructivism are essential to his defense of consociationalism. Once "ethnic entrepreneurs" mobilize ethnic communities, those communities "tend to become dominant, eclipsing and superseding all others." Even though "competing, even hostile ethnic identities may become amalgamated into a more inclusive collective identity," this can take place "only over extended periods of time measured in centuries and under a common political authority."¹³⁴ Especially when facing the possibility of violence, political scientists have little choice but to "treat the contesting parties and the solidarities they represent as 'givens,'" in their "search for practical formulas to moderate the conflicts, mitigate human suffering, and work out consensual patterns of coexistence within a single state if possible, or in separate states if necessary."¹³⁵

Esman's harsh condemnation of constructivism represents only one view among political scientists. Lijphart warmed to constructivism early on, notwithstanding Esman's claims to the contrary.¹³⁶ Chandra, in contrast to Lijphart and Esman, was less concerned with consociationalism than with ethnic politics more broadly, aiming to fulfill the need for "a single work that [integrates] the constructivist insights of the last 30 years."¹³⁷ The result is "one of the first rather than the last words on constructivism," a "synthesis of constructivist arguments" that invites "readers to disagree with, modify, replace, or transcend this formulation," thereby creating "the foundation for better formulations to emerge."¹³⁸

A significant part of clarifying constructivist theories of ethnic politics involves defining what they are not, specifically: 1) "constructivism is not the argument that 'biology does not matter'"; 2) "constructivism is not the argument that 'ethnic identities are created out of thin air'"; 3) "constructivism is not an argument that 'ethnic identities are always fluid'"; and 4) "constructivism is not (only) the argument that 'ethnic identity change is a product of instrumental

¹³⁴ Esman, "Power Sharing," 96–97.

¹³⁵ Esman, "Power Sharing," 98.

¹³⁶ Esman, "Power Sharing," 99.

¹³⁷ Chandra, "Introduction," in *Constructivist Theories*, 5. Although Chandra was critical of the allegedly excessive rigidity consociationalism entails, she and her contributors provided minimal comments about it, and in places they appeared open to consociational solutions, at least under certain circumstances. Compare Chandra, "How Ethnic Identities Change," in *Constructivist Theories*, 138, note 2; Chandra, "Introduction," 39; Chandra and Cilanne Boulet, "A Baseline Model for Change in an Activated Ethnic Demography," in *Constructivist Theories*, 267; Karen Ferree, "How Fluid Is Fluid?: The Mutability of Ethnic Identities and Electoral Volatility in Africa," in *Constructivist Theories*, 316; and David Laitin and A. Maurits Van der Veen, "Ethnicity and Pork: A Virtual Test of Causal Mechanisms," in *Constructivist Theories*, 357.

¹³⁸ Chandra, "Introduction," 5.

calculation.”¹³⁹ What is striking about these four *nots* is the repeated emphasis on constraints on the malleability of ethnic identities. This is apparent in Chandra’s statement that, “paradoxically, one accurate way of describing constructivism as applied to the study of ethnic identities would be that it is the study of constraints on how ethnic identities change. Any study that meets that description must take as its starting premise the essence of the constructivist position—the fact that ethnic identities *can* change.”¹⁴⁰

The study of constraints on ethnic identity change remains a central theme throughout *Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics*. The centerpiece of the book is Chandra and Boulet’s “basic model of ethnic identity change,” a model they expect future researchers to build upon and to modify. One of the “extensions of the model” could “consider restrictions that make some combinations [of attributes to form group identities] more viable than others.”¹⁴¹ Furthermore, one of the main empirical contributions to the book draws the (admittedly tentative) conclusion that, in recent African elections, the fluidity of ethnic identity is limited.¹⁴²

This juxtaposition of Esman and Chandra brings out the many sharp conceptual and theoretic disagreements between the constructivist and anti-constructivist positions. This debate, overlapping with arguments among the many varied shades of constructivists, is worth having if only to improve conceptual clarity and precision.¹⁴³ Nevertheless, what is most interesting about these disputes is the degree to which the two approaches’ expectations about ethnic identity and ethnic politics converge. Both see ethnic rigidity coexisting with ethnic flexibility. The disagreement is about which requires the most explanation. Given the degree to which even constructivists can disagree about how much flexibility actually exists, both empirical political science and history can play a central role in resolving the competing factual claims underlying these debates.

Regarding the national indifference literature on the Habsburg Monarchy and its successor states, there can be little objection to the argument that Czech and German identities, for example, emerged and changed over time.¹⁴⁴ Nevertheless, it is hard to overlook the fact that both categories still are in use today, despite the many changes that have taken place in their content. Furthermore, versions of these group identities were in place and were impacting politics de-

¹³⁹ Chandra, “How Ethnic Identities Change,” 149–152.

¹⁴⁰ Chandra, “How Ethnic Identities Change,” 150.

¹⁴¹ Chandra and Boulet, “A Baseline Model,” 269–70.

¹⁴² Ferree, “How Fluid Is Fluid?” 337–40.

¹⁴³ Chandra, “Introduction,” 4–6, 18–20.

¹⁴⁴ Cohen, *The Politics of Ethnic Survival*; and King, *Budweisers*.

cade before the events this text describes, regardless of how much they may have changed intergenerationally or at the margins.¹⁴⁵

Regarding national flexibility in Imperial Austria and Czechoslovakia, it is worth urging care in the use of this new terminology. Although one of the virtues of the historical literature is its rich, non-groupist vocabulary, many of these terms are not synonyms.¹⁴⁶ In particular, scholars should distinguish between national flexibility, which indicates flexibility in choosing from among national identities, and national indifference, which suggests prioritizing nonnational identities. The national borderlands that such works as Judson's *Guardians of the Nation* examine are distinctive because of their linguistic diversity. Similarly, the many examples of flexibility that Jeremy King provided are somewhat unsurprising, given Budweis's mixture of Czech-speaking, German-speaking, and bilingual residents.¹⁴⁷ By contrast, although one easily can imagine a resident of *fin-de-siècle* Salzburg, for example, prizing their identity as a Salzburger, an Austrian, a Catholic, or a loyal subject of the emperor over their Germanness, certainly few of them were wondering whether they were not really Romanian. Once nationalists begin to play a major political role by mobilizing people along linguistic lines, the national flexibility of most individuals within the Monarchy was subject to fairly broad constraints.

Majoritarian and Consensus Democracy

Another of Lijphart's contributions to political science, arguably his most important, has been his effort to classify late twentieth-century and early twenty-first-century democracies in terms of their major political institutions.¹⁴⁸ Although less directly relevant to the subject of this book than his writings on

¹⁴⁵ Recent historical work on Central Europe and the Balkans has begun to push back against the constructivist turn in nationalism studies. See John Connelly, *From Peoples into Nations: A History of Eastern Europe* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2020); Helmut Walser Smith, *Germany: A Nation in Its Time: Before, During, and After Nationalism, 1500–2000* (New York: Liveright, 2020); and Kurt Weyland, "Firmer Roots of Ethnicity and Nationalism? New Historical Research and Its Implications for Political Science," *Perspectives on Politics* 19, no. 2 (June 2021), 564–70. This back-and-forth among historians tends to parallel the previously discussed debates among political scientists.

¹⁴⁶ Stourzh, "Ethnicizing," 300–306, for an in-depth discussion of many of these usages as well as of the important distinctions between ethnic and linguistic indifference.

¹⁴⁷ Judson, *Guardians*; and King, *Budweisers*.

¹⁴⁸ Lijphart's earliest version of this project was *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984). He later expanded and refined that work into *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999). Finally, in the second edition of *Patterns* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012), Lijphart

consociationalism, that research project nevertheless calls for some consideration here for two reasons. First, in elaborating on the distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracy, Lijphart demonstrated the wide variety of political institutions that are compatible with representative democracy. Second, similarities between the concepts of consensus democracy and consociational democracy have led to some confusion about the relationship between the two. It is therefore important to underscore the differences between these distinct but related research projects.

Lijphart devised the consociational model to explain democratic success in some plural societies and to prescribe solutions for others. His work on majoritarian and consensus democracy, by contrast, has been primarily typological. His purpose was to determine how many different democratic institutional patterns exist in the contemporary world—the answer, incidentally, is four. His secondary purpose, developed in the later iterations of that project, has been to ascertain which type of democracy functions best, in terms of a number of widely accepted normative criteria. In this case, Lijphart's answer, perhaps unsurprisingly, is consensus democracy. The following discussion explains the differences between majoritarian and consensus democracy and the relationship between consensus democracy and consociationalism.

Distinguishing Majoritarian from Consensus Democracy

Patterns of Democracy classifies 36 countries that were stable democracies after the Second World War, based on ten institutional variables: 1) single-party versus coalition cabinets; 2) executive dominance versus executive-legislative balance; 3) two-party versus multiparty systems; 4) majoritarian versus proportional electoral systems; 5) pluralist versus corporatist interest groups; 6) unitary and centralized versus federal and decentralized government; 7) unicameral versus bicameral legislatures; 8) flexible versus rigid constitutions; 9) the presence versus the absence of judicial review; and 10) dependence versus independence of central banks from the executive.¹⁴⁹ Much of Lijphart's analysis involved technical concerns, such as determining the best means of operationalizing these variables, measuring them for each case, and identifying corre-

confirmed his conclusions from the first edition, analyzing a slightly different set of countries over a longer period of time and with refinements to his methods of measurement.

¹⁴⁹ These 36 cases included all sovereign states that met widely accepted criteria for representative democracy, had been continuously democratic for more than 20 years, and had a population of at least 250,000. Lijphart elaborated and justified these case selection standards in *Patterns*, 2nd ed., ch. 4. Descriptions of the ten variables appear in Lijphart, *Patterns*, 2nd ed., 3–4.

lations between them. The purpose of doing so was to discern clusters among the variables, in order to establish which types of democratic institutions tend to coexist within the same country.¹⁵⁰

In the earliest version of this project, Lijphart hypothesized a dichotomy between majoritarian and consensus democracies. Surprisingly, he found that institutional variables tended to cluster along the executive-parties and the federal-unitary dimensions. Existing democracies, in other words, tended to fall into not two but four institutional patterns: purely majoritarian democracy, purely consensus democracy, and two different combinations of majoritarian and consensus institutions (see Tables 2 and 3).¹⁵¹

Table 2. Ten Institutional Variables

		Majoritarian	Consensus
Executive-Parties Dimension	Concentration of Executive Power	Single-party or minimum winning coalition cabinet	Oversized coalition cabinet
	Executive-Legislative Relations	Executive dominance	Executive-legislative balance
	Party System	Two-party	Multiparty
	Electoral System*	Plurality, majority, etc.	Proportional representation, etc.
	Interest Groups	Pluralist, competitive	Corporatist, coordinated
Executive-Unitary Dimension	Division of Power	Unitary, centralized	Federal, decentralized
	Legislature	Unicameralism	Strong bicameralism
	Constitution	Flexible	Rigid
	Judicial Review	Weak	Strong
	Central Bank	Dependent on executive	Independent of executive

* The majoritarian electoral system includes plurality, majority runoff, majority-plurality, alternative vote, and other formulas that tend to produce highly disproportional results. The consensus electoral systems include open- and closed-list proportional representation, mixed member proportionality, single transferable vote, and other formulas that tend to produce more proportional results.

¹⁵⁰ Lijphart, *Patterns*, 2nd ed., ch. 14.

¹⁵¹ Lijphart discussed the distinctions between the two dimensions, as well as other possible dimensions of democracy, in "Varieties," 234–38. Adrian Vatter proposed an alternative set of institutional dimensions in "Lijphart Expanded: Three Dimensions of Democracy in Advanced OECD Countries?" *European Political Science Review* 1, no. 1 (March 2009): 125–54, while Anthony J. McGann and Michael Latner have advocated modifying Lijphart's two-dimensional model in "The Calculus of Consensus Democracy: Rethinking *Patterns of Democracy* without Veto Players," *Comparative Political Studies* 46, no. 7 (July 2013): 823–50.

Much of the correlation Lijphart found among types of democratic institutions is rather straightforward, reflecting causal relationships that political scientists have recognized for some time. Along the executive-parties dimension, majoritarian democracies tend to use plurality or majority electoral systems, such as Britain's "first past the post" system. These, in turn, tend to produce two large parties, and two-party democracies are likely to produce single-party governments.¹⁵² Single-party governments, meanwhile, are prone to dominate their legislatures, at least in parliamentary systems, because they control a legislative majority. Empirically, such institutions also tend to correlate with a pluralist, competitive arrangement of interest groups, although here the causal connection appears to be more indirect.¹⁵³ In any case, the underlying principle is the concentration of power in the hands of a majority.

This set of executive-parties institutions dramatically contrasts with those found in consensus democracies. Democracies such as Germany and Switzerland tend to use one or another type of proportional representation and usually produce multiparty legislatures that are more likely to require a coalition cabinet. Since the Second World War, German governments, without exception, have been coalitions of at least two parties, while Swiss governments typically have been coalitions of the four largest parties. Because coalition cabinets depend on maintaining broad multiparty legislative support, they are less likely to dominate the legislative process. Meanwhile, these institutional arrangements tend to correspond with a corporatist system of interest groups.¹⁵⁴ In contrast to majoritarianism, the underlying principle is the inclusion of as many political groups as possible in the decision-making process.

The other important contrast is along the federal-unitary dimension. In majoritarian democracies, decision-making takes place within a small number of

¹⁵² Gary W. Cox, *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, trans. Barbara North and Robert North (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963); and William H. Riker, "The Two-party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science," *American Political Science Review* 76, no. 4 (December 1982): 753–66.

¹⁵³ Interest group pluralism involves a large number of small interest groups, such as unions and business associations, which compete for influence over government officials. A description of its opposite, interest group corporatism, appears in the following footnote.

¹⁵⁴ Interest group corporatism has a small number of large interest groups, typically peak associations, representing organized labor and business. Corporatist, in this context, refers to democratic corporatism, a system of economic decision making in which representatives of business, labor, and government meet regularly to reach a consensus on major economic policies. A well-known example of this is *Sozialpartnerschaft* (literally: social partnership) in the Austrian Second Republic. Similar arrangements appear in Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and to some degree Germany. See Katzenstein, *Small States*.

bodies: the national government, a single legislative house, and in the case of monetary policy, the executive. Meanwhile, easily amended constitutions and the absence of judicial review minimize the restrictions on decision makers' options. Britain again provides a good example. Power is concentrated in the government in London; the House of Lords no longer has real influence on policy making (this is known as asymmetric bicameralism); and, until 1998, the Bank of England was dependent on the executive.¹⁵⁵ Meanwhile, Britain's constitution is unwritten, making it highly flexible and not subject to judicial review. In short, once a majoritarian government is in place, there are relatively few institutional restrictions on what it can do.

Consensus democracy, by contrast, distributes decision making among a greater number of bodies. Federalism designates separate jurisdictions for the federal and provincial governments. Legislatures have two houses, with unique electoral procedures, thereby representing different constituencies. Central banks operate with great autonomy. Meanwhile, constitutions are difficult to amend and are subject to strong judicial review, both means of curtailing majority power. Switzerland, whose 26 cantons play a significant role in what is probably the world's most decentralized democracy, exemplifies these characteristics. The Swiss Federal Assembly comprises two houses with identical powers: the Council of States, to which each canton sends two representatives, and the National Council, which the people directly elect. The independence of the Swiss National Bank is anchored in the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation. Finally, the Federal Supreme Court reviews the laws, and amending the constitution requires a majority of the popular vote, both nationally and in a majority of cantons. Consensus democracy makes it difficult for a political majority to get what it wants since doing so requires it to control simultaneously multiple levels and branches of government.

The clustering of institutions along the two dimensions yields four democratic ideal types: one purely majoritarian, one purely consensual, and two mixed types (see Table 3). Through the middle of the 1990s, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and similar countries provided very close approximations of the majoritarian ideal, combining plurality electoral races, between two dom-

¹⁵⁵ More recently the concentration of power in the United Kingdom has changed, due to the devolution of power to Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. Nevertheless, devolution is not federalism. In federal democracies, like the United States, the constitution guarantees provincial or state governments a degree of sovereignty, with jurisdiction over specific policy areas, such as education. In the United Kingdom, the central government voluntarily granted power to certain geographic areas. In 1998, the Bank of England Act, which Gordon Brown (born 1951), then chancellor of the Exchequer, had promoted, gave the Bank of England independent control over monetary policy.

inant parties, with a concentration of power in the hands of the national government.¹⁵⁶ Countries that combined proportional elections and multipartism with federalism, such as Germany and Switzerland, closely approximated pure consensus democracy. Meanwhile, certain countries, such as Israel and Finland, combined proportionality and multipartism with unitary government, while the United States and Canada combined British-style elections and party systems with federalism.

Table 3. Four Institutional Patterns with Representative Examples

		Federal-Unitary Dimension	
		Majority	Consensus
Executive-Parties Dimension	Majority	New Zealand United Kingdom	Canada United States
	Consensus	Finland Israel	Germany Switzerland

All the examples are based on countries’ “average” institutions during the period Lijphart analyzed, that is, from the time of their first post-1945 elections until the first decade of the twenty-first century and therefore do not reflect later institutional changes. New Zealand, for example, adopted a proportional representation electoral system in 1996 and no longer exemplifies the majority-majority classification.

Having confirmed his earlier typological findings with a larger set of cases, Lijphart, in both editions of *Patterns of Democracy*, subsequently questioned whether majoritarian or consensus democracy produced better results, based on a range of widely accepted measures. This was in response to the “conventional wisdom...that there is a tradeoff between the quality and effectiveness of

¹⁵⁶ Lijphart did not assess a country’s institutional arrangements at a specific point in time. Rather, his institutional measured average values from the first legislative election after the Second World War through the middle of 2010. See Lijphart, *Patterns*, 2nd ed., Table 4.1. Some countries subsequently altered their institutions in important respects. New Zealand, for example, switched from single-member-district plurality to a list PR electoral system, thereby moving in the direction of consensus democracy. Similarly, recent British experiments with devolution and increased independence of the national bank represent a slight shift toward consensus.

democratic government,” that is, between broad, inclusive representation and decisiveness.¹⁵⁷ Contrary to this common perception, regression on variables that measure democratic quality and effectiveness yielded a striking affirmation of consensus democracy.¹⁵⁸

Lijphart began this analysis by examining the relationships among majoritarian and consensus democracies and such factors as rule of law, macroeconomic performance (economic growth, inflation, unemployment, strikes, and deficits), indices of economic freedom, and levels of political violence. Although consensus democracies tended to perform slightly better in these respects, most of these correlations were not statistically significant.¹⁵⁹ “The most important conclusion,” Lijphart argued, “is negative: majoritarian democracies are clearly *not* superior to consensus democracies in providing good governance, managing the economy, and maintaining civil peace.”¹⁶⁰ More recent research builds on these findings, and one study suggests that consensus democracies are significantly less prone to fatalities from domestic terrorism.¹⁶¹

Where consensus democracy seems to make a real difference is in the quality of democracy and in specific policy areas.¹⁶² Consensus democracies tend to receive higher ratings than majoritarian democracies, on a range of indices that measure degrees of democracy. On average, they have better representation of women, more economic equality, greater electoral participation, and higher rates of popular satisfaction with democracy. Compared to majoritarian democracies, their government policies more closely approximate popular opinion, and somewhat ironically, they were more likely to involve majority, rather than plurality rule, although the correlation for this last factor was rather weak.¹⁶³ Finally, consensus democracies did more than their majoritarian counterparts to promote social welfare, strong environmental policies, and less punitive crimi-

¹⁵⁷ Lijphart, *Patterns*, 2nd ed., 255.

¹⁵⁸ Multivariate regression is a well-established statistical technique for measuring the correlation between several independent variables and some other phenomena of interest to the researcher (the dependent variable). For example, a bivariate regression of voter turnout on race might reveal that members of racial minority groups are less likely to vote. A multivariate regression of voter turnout on race and education, however, could reveal the extent to which varying levels of education between racial groups, rather than race alone, might explain differences in turnout.

¹⁵⁹ Lijphart, *Patterns*, 1st and 2nd ed., ch. 15.

¹⁶⁰ Lijphart, *Patterns*, 2nd ed., 273.

¹⁶¹ Matt Qvortrup and Arend Lijphart, “Domestic Terrorism and Democratic Regime Types,” *Civil Wars* 15, no. 4 (December 2013): 471–85.

¹⁶² Lijphart, *Patterns*, 1st and 2nd ed., ch. 16.

¹⁶³ A relevant discussion of majority rule, as rule by the largest minority, appears in Mill, “Considerations,” ch. 7, and Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*, part 1: *The Contemporary Debate* (Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, 1987), 133–37.

nal justice. They also contributed more to foreign aid. Through these findings, Lijphart complemented his institutional typology with powerful empirical and normative arguments in favor of consensus democracy. Such democracies' governments are as effective as their majoritarian counterparts, are more representative of their populations, and are good at promoting the "kinder, gentler" policies that many people favor.

The Relationship between Consociationalism and Consensus Democracy

Lijphart's writings on comparative democratic institutions have led to some confusion about the relationship between consociationalism and consensus democracy. Indeed, Lijphart originally intended that his 1984 work, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*, would build on and further generalize the consociational model.¹⁶⁴ Additionally, there are strong parallels between consociationalism and consensus democracy in principle. Consociational mechanisms and practices serve to include all groups in decision making, while preventing majorities from encroaching on minority interests. Similarly, consensus democracy's executive-parties dimension emphasizes inclusion, while its federal-unitary dimension hinders majorities. Lijphart himself often underscored these similarities, lumping both under the category of power-sharing democracy.¹⁶⁵

Furthermore, one hardly can overlook that, in his later work, Lijphart classified all four of his original examples of consociationalism—Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, and Switzerland—as consensus democracies. Consociational democracy, therefore, might appear to be simply a subset of consensus democracy.¹⁶⁶ Beyond the fact that the two categories are not mutually exclusive, the important consideration is that they come from two different typologies. In other words, asking whether a given country is a consensus or a consociational democracy is a bit like asking if a given musical composition is Baroque or a concerto. The first category involves musical period (for example, Baroque, Classical, Romantic, or Impressionist); the second is a compositional form (for example, concerto, string quartet, symphony); and it is possible that the piece in question is both or neither.

¹⁶⁴ Lijphart, "Varieties," 229.

¹⁶⁵ Lijphart, "Introduction," 6.

¹⁶⁶ Lijphart, "Varieties," 228–34. See also Thomas A. Koelble, "The New South African Constitution: A Case of Consensus Democracy?" in *Democracy and Institutions*, 129–53; and Reynolds, "Majoritarian."

Given that consensus democracy and consociational democracy invoke two separate typologies, it is necessary to highlight the very real conceptual, methodological, and practical differences between the two. First and most important, each term originated from a distinct intellectual project. Lijphart developed the consociational model to explain deviant cases of stable democracy in divided societies. Consensus democracy, by contrast, emerged from his effort to classify all existing democracies in terms of their political institutions. Second, consociationalism has four characteristics, while consensus democracy has ten. Third, the four consociational characteristics are broader than the consensus ones. As a result, the latter are better suited for quantitative measurement. Fourth, unlike consociational democracies, consensus democracies may possess but do not require segmental autonomy or a minority veto. Furthermore, in consociational democracies, the minority veto extends beyond constitutional amendments to include decision making in the cabinet and legislature. Fifth, a consensus democracy has a specific set of institutional arrangements, but unlike a consociational democracy, it does not require the institutionalization of segmental cleavages. A consensus democracy, after all, represents parties, not necessarily social divisions, and consensus democracy can exist in a homogeneous society. Sixth, in consociational systems, government power-sharing arrangements and other practices tend to be informal, while those in consensus democracies are formal and well defined. Seventh, consociational democracies often need to modify federalism to include the representation of geographically dispersed groups, something which is less common with consensus democracies. Finally, consociationalism is a stronger remedy than consensus democracy for the ills of divided societies.¹⁶⁷

Such distinctions are crucial for avoiding confusion between two distinct but interrelated academic literatures and terminologies. Nevertheless, consensus and consociational democracy have at least one more important thing in common: they challenge prevailing, often implicit, majoritarian biases in the discourse about democracy. Both illuminate the great diversity of possible democratic arrangements and show that nonmajoritarian democracies not only can function as well as majoritarian ones but can offer additional benefits of their own. The concepts of consociationalism and consensus democracy thereby improve our understanding of and appreciation for democracy in general.

¹⁶⁷ Lijphart, "Introduction," 6–9; Lijphart, "Varieties," 228–29; and Reynolds, "Majoritarian," 157 and 170–74.

History, Political Science, Comparison, and Generalization

Because this book aims for an audience that includes both historians and political scientists, it is necessary to address some of the different ways of thinking that characterize each discipline. Although very much a simplification—the field of comparative history is just one counterexample—it seems fair to claim that historians tend to be more concerned about getting the details of a particular set of historical events right, whereas political scientists are driven to make generalizations about multiple cases.¹⁶⁸ The two disciplines overlap, however, with what political scientists term single-case studies. The potential merits such studies might have, from the point of view of both political science and history, are worth considering.

Oddly, although Lijphart has not concerned himself primarily with methodological questions, his most frequently cited article is “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” a work that played an important role in clarifying the logic of making comparisons at a time when the field of comparative politics was just blossoming.¹⁶⁹ In elaborating the respective benefits and limitations of the experimental, statistical, comparative, and case study methods, Lijphart claimed that all four of them are comparative, at least implicitly. This includes single-case studies, which, he argued, political scientists always undertake with the possibility of broader comparisons and generalizations in mind. The possible benefits of such focused studies for political science are several, depending on the specific kind of case study. Atheoretical case studies, Lijphart argued, are a partial exception, in that they “are entirely descriptive and move in a theoretic vacuum.” Even these, however, “have great utility as basic data-gathering operations,” which “can thus contribute indirectly to theory-building.” He further noted that an “actual instance of an atheoretical case study probably does not exist because almost any analysis of a single case is guided by at

¹⁶⁸ Historian George M. Frederickson, in advocating for comparative history, explained this as follows: “One reason why so few historians have actually produced thoroughly comparative works is that the typical aim or inclination of historians tends to differ from that of most social scientists. The latter are quite properly concerned with discovering and testing general hypotheses about human behavior and social organization. The former are likely to be fascinated by variety and concerned with the special features of individual societies.” George M. Frederickson, *White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), xiv.

¹⁶⁹ Bogaards, “Making a Difference,” 94–95; and Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” *American Political Science Review* 65, no. 3 (September 1971), 682–93. See also Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation*, 15, note 42, which reveals a close connection between the case study method and the consociational model. The 1971 article, in many respects, is an expansion of the 1968 footnote.

least some vague theoretical notions and some anecdotal knowledge of other cases, and it usually results in some vague hypotheses or conclusions that have wider applicability.”¹⁷⁰

Aside from atheoretical case studies, the remaining five types of case studies include the following: 1) interpretive case studies in which “a generalization is applied to a specific case with the aim of throwing light on the case rather than of improving the generalization in any way”; 2) hypothesis-generating case studies, which “attempt to formulate definite hypotheses to be tested subsequently among a larger number of cases”; 3 and 4) theory-confirming and theory-infirming case studies, which test “established generalizations”; and 5) deviant case studies, which “are studies of single cases that are known to deviate from established generalizations,” their purpose being to “uncover additional variables that were not considered previously, or to refine the (operational) definitions of some or all of the variables.”¹⁷¹

For political scientists, the present work combines the benefits of several types of case studies. It generally confirms the consociational model, in particular, Lijphart’s list of conditions favoring consociationalism, while the conclusion suggests a number of new hypotheses regarding those conditions. Historians, of course, may be less interested in contributions to political scientific theories and might shun the very use of the term *case* to describe the object of their research. Even such a historian would benefit from approaching the present book as an interpretive case study because the consociational model presents the political history of late Imperial Austria and interwar Czechoslovakia in a new light. In doing so, one should view consociationalism as an ideal type, that is, one should not expect any real-world polity to meet its criteria perfectly. In this respect, this book is no different from historical works that describe political history with such general (and contestable) categories as democracy, constitutional monarchy, absolutism, nationalism, modernity, legislature, or empire. The extent to which the polities this book examines match the consociational ideal type, albeit to varying degrees, is interesting, in its own right, as are the ways in which they deviate from it.

This consideration of Lijphart’s six-fold typology of case studies also suggests how to evaluate this book. The fundamental assertion simply is that viewing Central European politics through the lens of consociational theory is illuminating, a claim that does not depend on the study’s specific conclusions. Consider,

¹⁷⁰ Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” 691.

¹⁷¹ Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” 692.

for example, Lijphart's favorable conditions in the case of interwar Czechoslovakia. Logically speaking, there were four possible findings: 1) Czechoslovakia largely met these conditions and was a successful consociational democracy; 2) it largely did not meet these conditions and was not a successful consociational democracy; 3) it largely met these conditions, yet it was not a successful consociational democracy; and 4) it largely did not meet these conditions and nevertheless was a successful consociational democracy. The first and second possibilities would be confirming, while the third and fourth would be infirming case studies. Each of these possibilities would be informative, in its own way. In fact, this study's conclusion, that Czechoslovakia largely met the favorable conditions and was, on balance, a successful consociational democracy, is much less interesting than the third and fourth possibilities. It also happens to be the one that the historical evidence best supports.

Conclusion

The consociational model of democracy provides political scientists with a useful explanation of democratic success in many divided societies, and it continues to be a significant tool for policy makers attempting to establish stable democracies in such countries. There are a number of good reasons for interdisciplinary research in this area, in particular, for the expanded use of historical cases in consociational research. Although many historians have examined instances of consociationalism, they typically are unaware of the political scientific literature and its terminology. Drawing their attention to that literature, therefore, provides a shared language and broader comparative perspective with which to evaluate the successes and failures of historical democracies that have faced deep ethnic, religious, social, or other divisions. Meanwhile, political scientists can benefit from increasing the number of cases at their disposal, thereby improving the reliability of their generalizations while simultaneously bringing variations in consociational practice to light. Furthermore, examining historical examples of and precursors to consociationalism broadens the perspective social scientists and historians have on the origin and development of consociational democracy.

The authors of this volume hope to promote a historical approach to consociational studies, and in the process, they anticipate a livelier dialogue between political scientists and political historians. To accomplish these goals, this book examines three interrelated historical cases. Chapter 2 draws on consociational theory in appraising representative political institutions and practices in the

Western half of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Although Imperial Austria was neither fully democratic nor fully consociational, it arguably took significant steps in both directions, providing a useful legacy that successor states, such as Czechoslovakia, could embrace. Chapter 3 turns to Czechoslovakia itself, a rare instance of successful democracy in interwar Central and Eastern Europe. Challenging the existing literature on the subject, this chapter argues that, by the 1930s, Czechoslovakia effectively had become a fully-fledged consociational democracy. Subsequently, by illuminating consociational practices within Slovakia as well as Slovakia's status within the larger Czechoslovak political system, the fourth chapter undermines the prevailing view in the historical literature, which has miscast interwar Slovak politics in terms of the centralization and the attempted Czechification of Slovak society. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the authors' findings and suggests potentially fruitful lines for future research.




Figure 1. *Badeni's Egg Dance*. In this illustration, by the Brno-born illustrator and writer Theodor Zajackowski (1852–1908), Minister-President Kasimir Badeni (1846–1909) dances among the eggs representing the issues facing the Austrian half of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1896—the bank question, anti-Semitism, clericalism, reaction, the *Ausgleich*, tax reform, salary increases for civil servants, electoral reform, increased beer tax, and “Br-steuern,” possibly a tax on spirits.

Source: Theodor Zajackowski, *Badeni's Eiertanz*, in *Der Floh*, 28, no. 14 (April 5, 1896): 1. A short poem on p. 2 accompanies the illustration.

Chapter 2

Imperial Austria's Proto-consociational Legacy

Introduction

At first glance, discussing politics within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in terms of any kind of democracy might appear to be absurd. It was, after all, famously denounced as a “Prison of Nations.” Furthermore, even when narrowly focusing on parliamentary affairs in the Austrian half of the monarchy, it is hard to overlook many observers’ harsh comments about deputies’ behavior, such as the Twain quotations that appear in the introduction to this volume. Indeed, for quite some time, the common wisdom among historians was that Austria’s nationality problem, as Alan Sked stated, determined “the whole course of political life.” Furthermore, Sked noted that “the Austrian Germans found it much more difficult to control their Slavs than the Hungarians after 1867. The result was that government fell into the hands of the bureaucracy as parliamentary life became paralyzed and [the monarch] selected premiers from the ranks of the high civil service. There is no controversy surrounding the course of events.”¹

The academic historical literature on legislatures, political parties, and elections in Austria-Hungary has expanded rapidly in the decades since Sked originally gave this appraisal. This scholarship has taken a more nuanced view of Austrian politics and has developed a greater respect for the Reichsrat’s practical accomplishments.² Furthermore, the criticisms of Austrian parliamentary

¹ Alan Sked, *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire 1815–1918* (London: Longman, 1989), 218–19.

² A representative, but by no means complete, list of examples includes Franz Adlgasser, *Die Mitglieder der österreichischen Zentralparlamente, 1848–1918: Ein biographisches Lexikon*, 2 vols., *Studien zur Geschichte der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie*, vol. 33 (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2014); Franz Adlgasser et al., eds., *Hohes Haus!: 150 Jahre moderner Parlamentarismus in Österreich, der Tschechoslovakei und der Republik*

Tschechien im mitteleuropäischen Kontext (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2015); Birgitta Bader-Zaar, "Democratization and the Practices of Voting in Habsburg Austria, 1896–1914: New Directions in Research," *Austrian History Yearbook*, 53 (2022): 107–120; Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1988); Beller, *The Habsburg Monarchy*; Jakub S. Beneš, *Workers and Nationalism: Czech and German Social Democracy in Habsburg Austria, 1890–1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Harald Binder, *Die österreichische Wasserstraßenvorlage von 1901: Ein Jahrhundertprojekt im Spannungsfeld wirtschaftlicher und politischer Interessen* (Thun: self-published, 1989); Harald Binder, *Galizien in Wien: Parteien, Wahlen, Fraktionen und Abgeordnete im Übergang zur Massenpolitik* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2005); John W. 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Oldenbourg, 1993); Lothar Höbelt, "'Well-tempered Discontent': Austrian Domestic Politics," in *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary: A Multinational Experiment in Early Twentieth-Century Europe*, ed. Marc Cornwall, rev. and expanded ed., (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2002), 47–74; Lothar Höbelt, *Franz Joseph I: Der Kaiser und sein Reich. Eine politische Geschichte* (Vienna and Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2009); Lothar Höbelt, *Parliamentary Politics in a Multinational Setting: Late Imperial Austria* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, Center for Austrian Studies, 1992); Philip J. Howe, "Electoral Institutions and Ethnic Group Politics in Austria, 1967–1914" *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 16, no. 2 (July 2010): 164–191; Philip J. Howe, "Voting across Ethnic Lines in Late Imperial Austria," *Nations and Nationalism* 16, no. 2 (July 2010): 308–334; William A. Jenks, *Austria under the Iron Ring, 1879–1893* (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1965); Pieter M. Judson, *Exclusive Revolutionaries: Liberal Politics, Social Experience, and National Identity in the Austrian Empire, 1848–1914* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Pieter M. Judson, "'Where Our Commonality Is Necessary ...': Rethinking the End of the Habsburg Monarchy," *Austrian History Yearbook* 48 (April 2017): 1–21; T. Mills Kelly, *Without Remorse: Czech National Socialism in Late-Habsburg Austria* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2006); Vincent Knapp, *Austrian Social Democracy, 1889–1914* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1980); Jonathan Kwan, *Liberalism and the Habsburg Monarchy, 1861–1895* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Robert Luft, *Parlamentarische Führungsgruppen und politische Strukturen in der tschechischen Gesellschaft: Tschechische Abgeordnete und Parteien des österreichischen Reichsrats, 1907–1914*, 2 vols. Veröffentlichungen des Collegium Carolinum, vol. 102, nos. 1–2 (Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag GmbH, 2012); Vasilij Melik, *Wahlen im alten Österreich: am Beispiel der Kronländer mit slowenischsprachiger Bevölkerung* (Vienna and Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1997); Maria Mesner, Robert Kriechbaumer, Michaela Maier, and Helmut Wohnout, eds. *Parteien und Gesellschaft im Ersten Weltkrieg: Das Beispiel Österreich-Ungarn* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2014); Hans Mommsen, *Die Sozialdemokratie und die Nationalitätenfrage im habsburgischen Vielvölkerstaat* (Vienna: Europa-Verlag Mommsen, 1963); Andreas Moritsch, ed., *Der Austroslavismus: Ein verfrühtes Konzept zur politischen Neugestaltung Mitteleuropas* (Vienna and Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1996); Jana Osterkamp, *Vielfalt ordnen: Das föderale Europa der Habsburgermonarchie (Vormärz bis 1918)*, Veröffentlichungen des Collegium Carolinum, vol. 141 (Göttingen and Bristol, CT: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2020); Jana Osterkamp, ed., *Kooperatives Imperium: Politische Zusammenarbeit in der späten Habsburgermonarchie. Vorträge der gemeinsamen Tagung des Collegium Carolinum und des Masarykův ústav a Archiv AV ČR in Bad Wiessee vom 10.–13. November 2016*, Bad Wiessee Tagungen des Collegium Carolinum, vol. 39 (Göttingen and Bristol, CT: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2018); Stanley Z. Pech, "Political Parties among Austrian Slavs," *Canadian Slavonic*

politics often reflect a Westminsterian or majoritarian bias, that is, an implicit assumption that legislatures should be mature deliberative bodies in which two parties, representing broad ideological positions and diverse constituencies, calmly debate matters of policy. Complicating matters, unfamiliarity with developments in comparative political science has led historians to misinterpret consociational elements of the Imperial Austrian political system. This is especially true regarding the debates about the various regional compromises that emerged in the monarchy's last decades. Although the historical literature often describes institutions and practices that reflect consociational principles, it typically does not use the terminology of consociationalism, and it engages with actual consociational scholarship only in passing, if at all.³ Whether one

Papers/Revue Canadienne des Slavistes 31, no. 2 (1989): 70–193; Bernd Rottenbacher, *Das Februarpatent in der Praxis: Wahlpolitik, Wahlkämpfe und Wahlentscheidungen in den böhmischen Ländern der Habsburgermonarchie, 1861–1871* (Frankfurt am Main and New York: Peter Lang, 2001); Helmut Rumpler, *Eine Chance für Mitteleuropa: Bürgerliche Emanzipation und Staatsverfall in der Habsburgermonarchie*, new ed. (Vienna: Carl Ueberreuter, 2007); Helmut Rumpler and Peter Urbanitsch, eds., *Verfassung und Parlamentarismus*, 2 parts with map supplement, vol. 7 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848–1918*, ed. Helmut Rumpler and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2000); Helmut Rumpler and Peter Urbanitsch, eds., *Politische Öffentlichkeit und Zivilgesellschaft*, 2 parts, vol. 8 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848–1918*, ed. Helmut Rumpler and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2006); Sabine Rutar, *Kultur–Nation–Milieu: Sozialdemokratie in Triest vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg* (Essen: Klartext, 2004); Herbert Schambeck, ed., *Österreichs Parlamentarismus: Werden und System* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1986); Eva Schmidt-Hartmann, *Thomas G. Masaryk's Realism: Origins of a Czech Political Concept* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1984); Karl Ucakar, *Demokratie und Wahlrecht in Österreich: Zur Entwicklung von politischer Partizipation und staatlicher Legitimationspolitik* (Vienna: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, 1985); Anna Veronika Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien: Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Rußland, 1848–1915* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften Wendland, 2001); Frank Wiggermann, *K.u.K. Kriegsmarine und Politik: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der italienischen Nationalbewegung in Istrien* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2004); and Eduard Winkler, *Wahlrechtsreformen und Wahlen in Triest, 1905–1909: Eine Analyse der politischen Partizipation in einer multinationalen Stadtreigion der Habsburgermonarchie* (Munich: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2000). See also R. J. W. Evans, "Remembering the Fall of the Habsburg Monarchy One Hundred Years on: Three Master Interpretations," *Austrian History Yearbook* 51 (May 2020): 269–91.

- 3 One political historian of Imperial Austria who mentioned the consociational literature was Boyer, in his study of Karl Lueger (1844–1910) and the Christian Social Party (Christlichsoziale Partei, CS). See Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, 71, notes 161–162, and 414. In general, Boyer showed an impressive command of what, at the time, were quite recent developments in another discipline. Similarly, in one of his chapter titles, Höbelt succinctly characterizes Imperial Austrian politics under Franz Joseph as "Konkordanzdemokratie und autoritäres Regiment" (consociationalism and authoritarian regulation), although he does not directly engage with the consociationalism literature. See Höbelt, *Franz Joseph I*, 105. Finally, although Luft's in-depth analysis of the structure of Czech politics in the monarchy does not address the consociational model, it draws on the political scientific literature on segmental pluralism, on which consociational theory is based, in part, particularly on the foundational work of Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan. See Luft, *Parlamentarische Führungsgruppen*, vol. 1 (untitled), 20–22, 157–60, and 587–94. Other scholars have considered the legacy of Imperial Austrian politics for later consociational

condemns or praises Austrian political developments, it is important to do so using an appropriate standard.

The Austrian half of the monarchy, although by no means a democracy, became increasingly democratic over time. As it did so, it often adopted institutions and political practices quite similar to consociationalism. It was, in other words, a semi-democratic, proto-consociational political system. Whether these developments might have progressed further, had the First World War not taken place, remains, like so many important questions about the late monarchy, unknowable. Nevertheless, Austria-Hungary left a legacy of institutions and practices that politicians in its successor states, such as those in the Czechoslovak First Republic, could reproduce or even refine. Elaborating on this argument involves the reinterpretation of established facts, within a new framework, as much as it does the presentation of new information.

This chapter begins with an overview of Imperial Austria's political system and an introduction to the lands it encompassed. The purposes here are to clarify terminology, to provide the reader with background necessary to understand the ways in which Austria was democratizing, and to show that it was very much a plural society in the Lijphartian sense. The second section assesses Imperial Austria's potential for consociationalism in terms of Lijphart's list of favorable conditions. It begins with a detailed analysis of demographic conditions, to introduce the reader to Austria's great sociological diversity, followed by appraisals of relevant historical and political conditions. Some of these conditions were more favorable than others, suggesting that neither the evolution of Austria's political institutions and practices in an increasingly consociational direction nor its difficulties in fully adopting consociational principles are particularly surprising.

The third section shows the ways in which Austrian politics approximated consociationalism. Austria's governments never were true grand coalitions, but its cabinets were increasingly diverse, and, at times, ministers became *de facto* accountable to oversized legislative majorities. There never was a formal minority veto, but minorities in the legislature had numerous opportunities to block policies that threatened their constituencies, even though such an action may

developments in Austria. See Dominic Lieven, "Empire, History and Contemporary Global Order," in *Proceedings of the British Academy*, vol. 131, ed. P. J. Marshall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 147; and Kurt Richard Luther and Wolfgang C. Müller, "Consociationalism and the Austrian Political System," *West European Politics* 15, no. 1 (1992): 1–15. Also see Kurt Richard Luther and Wolfgang C. Müller, "Consociationalism and the Austrian Political System," in *Politics in Austria: Still a Case of Consociationalism?*, ed. Luther and Müller (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd.: 1992), 1–15; Kurt Steiner, *Politics in Austria* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972).

have resulted in fairly messy politics. True proportionality never became reality, but over time, the distribution of legislative seats, civil service jobs, and educational facilities became increasingly proportional. Finally, by the end of the monarchy, Austria's various nationalities had achieved some degree of autonomy, both legally and in practice. The discussion then moves beyond the central politics of the Reichsrat, turning to local compromises, between 1905 and 1914, in Moravia, Bukovina (German: Bukowina; now divided between southwestern Ukraine and northeastern Romania), Galicia, and České Budějovice (German: Budweis). Although historians have considered these attempts to address nationalist tensions and preserve representative government on the regional and city levels, they have not made the connection between these developments and the literature on consociationalism. Understanding the various compromises as consociational, if only semi-democratic, leads to a renewed appreciation of Imperial Austria's actual political accomplishments. Furthermore, viewing them from this perspective requires reconsidering one of the most important developments within recent Habsburg historiography, that is, the growing literature on national flexibility.

Historical Background and Terminology

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was the final outcome of centuries of Habsburg experimentation with a variety of institutional forms.⁴ Established under the terms of the 1867 Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich* (Compromise), it comprised two separate constitutional monarchies that shared a number of joint institutions and policies as well as the person but not the office of the monarch. Specifically, Franz Joseph held the simultaneous titles Emperor of Austria and Apostolic King of Hungary, as did his successor, Karl I/IV (1887–1922; reigned 1916–1919).⁵ This

4 Fundamental changes in the political institutions of the Habsburg Empire tended to oscillate between absolute and constitutional monarchy. A survey of these developments, from the rise of enlightened absolutism in the eighteenth century, through the set of fundamental laws that emerged in the aftermath of the *Ausgleich*, appears in Wilhelm Brauner, *Österreichische Verfassungsgeschichte*, 8th rev. ed. (Vienna: Manz'sche Verlags- und Universitätsbuchhandlung GmbH, 2001), 21–186; Wilhelm Brauner, “Die Verfassungsentwicklung in Österreich, 1848 bis 1918,” in *Verfassung und Parlamentarismus*, part 1: *Verfassungsrecht, Verfassungswirklichkeit, zentrale Repräsentativkörperschaften, Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848–1918*, 69–237; Deak, *Forging a Multinational State*, ch. 4; László Péter, “Die Verfassungsentwicklung in Ungarn,” in *Verfassung und Parlamentarismus*, vol. 7/1 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848–1918*, 239–540; and Ucakar, *Demokratie*, 29–140.

5 Franz Joseph's full title was unwieldy: “Franz Joseph, Emperor of Austria; King of Hungary, of Bohemia, of Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, Galicia, Lodomeria, and Illyria; King of Jerusalem, etc.; Archduke of Austria; Grand Duke of Tuscany and Cracow; Duke of Lothringia, of Salzburg, Styria,

dualism resulted in an often baffling official language in which the acronym *k.k.* (*kaiserlich-königlich* or imperial-royal) prefaced Austrian institutions and offices, *k.* (*königlich* or royal) denoted Hungarian ones, and *k.u.k.* (*kaiserlich und königlich* or imperial and royal) indicated joint administrative bodies. These distinctions acknowledged the Hungarian political elite's conviction that Hungary remained a distinct kingdom that was not part of a larger empire.⁶ Specific policy areas, rooted in the Pragmatic Sanction of 1713, fell within the jurisdiction of the Austro-Hungarian state as a whole. These "pragmatic matters" (*pragmatische Angelegenheiten*) included foreign policy, the joint military (the k.u.k. Heer and the k.u.k. Kriegsmarine), the central administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the relevant parts of fiscal policy. The two portions of the monarchy had separate administrations but periodically coordinated other matters of shared commercial, industrial, and fiscal interest, including the railway system and common currency.⁷ Delegations from the Austrian Reichsrat and the Hungarian Országgyűlés handled matters of joint concern. They alternated between Vienna and Budapest and corresponded only in writing, emphasizing that no legislature existed above the two constitutional states.⁸ The historian Robert A. Kann eloquently characterized these unique arrangements:

Carinthia, Carniola and Bukovina; Grand Duke of Transylvania, Margrave of Moravia; Duke of Upper and Lower Silesia, of Modena, Parma, Piacenza and Guastella, of Ausschwitz and Sator, of Teschen, Friaul, Ragusa and Zara; Princely Count of Habsburg and Tyrol, of Kyburg, Görz and Gradiska; Duke of Trient and Brixen; Margrave of Upper and Lower Lausitz and in Istria; Count of Hohenems, Feldkirch, Bregenz, Sonnenberg, etc.; Lord of Trieste, of Cattaro and above the Windisch Mark; Great Voyvod of the Voyvodina, Servia, etc., etc." Oscar Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*, 1st Phoenix ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 34. This official title included claims on lands no longer actually in the family's possession, such as the Habsburg itself, as well as some that no longer existed, such as the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The numbering of the Habsburg monarchs' names is a perfect illustration of their dual role. Franz Joseph's successor was simultaneously Karl I of Austria and Karl IV of Hungary. He held the title Karl I in Austria, despite having several predecessors of the same name, because the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire and subsequent 1806 declaration of an Austrian Empire by Franz II/I restarted the count. Meanwhile, he was the fourth Karl to wear Hungary's Crown of St. Stephen.

- 6 Robert Musil famously coined the scatological variant Kakania (Kakanien) to name the semi-fictional state, which is the location of his unfinished novel, *The Man without Qualities* (*Der Mann Ohne Eigenschaften*), 2 vols., trans. Burton Pike and Sophie Wilkins (New York: Vintage Books, 1996). For a fascinating treatment of the propensity to create fictionalized versions of the monarchy, in the wake of its dissolution, see Adam Kozuchowski, *The Afterlife of Austria-Hungary: The Image of the Habsburg Monarchy in Interwar Europe* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2013), ch. 3.
- 7 Braunereder, "Die Entstehung des Parlamentarismus 1861/1867," 112; and Braunereder, *Österreichische Verfassungsgeschichte*, 185.
- 8 Braunereder, *Österreichische Verfassungsgeschichte*, 183–85.

What in practice amounted to a constitution for the Habsburg Empire was strictly speaking a treaty between two in major respects sovereign states—but by no means all. Nevertheless, in view of the restrictions of the sovereignty of each state, the Compromise was not an international treaty. It was not a federation or confederation either. There was no state above the two member states as in a federation nor were they fully sovereign as in a confederation. Neither were the Austrian and Hungarian versions of the Compromise embedded in the constitutional laws of both states completely alike. In other words, the Compromise represented a political structure *sui generis*. Not in a strictly legal but in a figurative way it is thus still permissible to speak of a Habsburg Empire [after 1867].⁹

The somewhat artificial term Imperial Austria, or simply Austria, refers to the western half of the Dual Monarchy, the adjective *imperial* distinguishing between that political unit and the much smaller postwar Austrian state. Alternative formulations, though more strictly correct, are unnecessarily confusing. Austria and Austria-Hungary were indeed common usages at the time, but from a legal point of view, the Western half of the monarchy had an unwieldy name: “the kingdoms and lands represented in the Reichsrat.” Specialists often label the Western and Eastern halves Cisleithania and Transleithania, referring to their respective locations in relation to the Leitha River.¹⁰

Geographically, Imperial Austria encompassed territories far beyond the current boundaries of the Austrian Second Republic (1945–present). Its 17 provinces formed a giant crescent, beginning at the easternmost edge of the monarchy, with the Duchy of Bukovina (now divided between Romania and Ukraine).¹¹ It passed westward, through the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria (Galicia now is in southern Poland and western Ukraine) and the Duchy of Upper and Lower Silesia (now largely in the Czech Republic, although a small part is in Poland). Turning southward, it extended through the Kingdom of Bohemia and the Mar-

9 Robert A. Kann, *A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526–1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 333–34.

10 Anyone traveling between Vienna and the current Austrian province of Burgenland crosses this tributary to the Danube. Burgenland was in the Kingdom of Hungary, until a plebiscite after the First World War awarded it to the Austrian First Republic (1918–1938), aside from Sopron, which remained Hungarian. Interestingly, the Leitha also was the site of a 1246 battle in which King Béla IV (1206–1270; reigned 1235–1270) of Hungary defeated Duke Frederick II (1211–1246; reigned 1230–1246, also known as Frederick the Quarrelsome) of Austria, thereby ending Austrian claims on the Western parts of Hungary.

11 The generic term *provinces* appears here as a convenient term for the 17 Austrian lands that had a variety of specific legal designations, such as kingdom, duchy, and margravate.

gravate of Moravia (now components of the Czech Republic). As it continued toward the south, it included the Archduchies of Austria, above and below the Enns (Lower Austria and Upper Austria), and the Duchy of Salzburg (all three now are provinces of the Austrian Second Republic). Then it reached deeper into the Alps to include the Princely County of Tyrol (now split into the Austrian province Tyrol and northern Italy's South Tyrol) and the Land of Vorarlberg (on Austria's eastern border with Germany, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland).¹² Finally, the crescent curved toward the southeast, into the Duchy of Carinthia and the Duchy of Styria (each now divided between Austria and Slovenia), the Duchy of Carniola (in Slovenia), and down the Adriatic coast, through the Princely County of Goritz and Gradisca (currently divided between Italy and Slovenia), the Free Imperial City of Trieste (now in Italy), the Margravate of Istria (now divided between Croatia, Italy, and Slovenia), and the Kingdom of Dalmatia (in present-day Croatia).

Imperial Austria wrapped around the northern and western borders of the Kingdom of Hungary, and the Western and Eastern Carpathian Mountains separated the two in the north. Lacking Austria's federal structure, the extensive but much more compact Lands of the Crown of Saint Steven comprised the Kingdom of Hungary, the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia, and the City of Fiume (now Croatia's Adriatic seaport Rijeka). The first of these was much larger than the current Hungarian Third Republic (1989–present), encompassing present-day Hungary and Slovakia, as well as parts of Austria (Burgenland), Romania (Transylvania), Serbia, and Ukraine. Meanwhile, most of semi-autonomous Croatia-Slavonia later formed Yugoslavia's Sava Banovina, which Croatia and Slovenia since have divided between themselves.

Finally, Bosnia-Herzegovina constituted a third major division within Austria-Hungary. Although Bosnia technically remained an Ottoman possession until the early twentieth century, the 1878 Congress of Berlin approved the Habsburg occupation of the province as a political concession to compensate for Russia's establishment of an independent Bulgarian state. Already effectively under Austro-Hungarian control, Vienna announced its formal annexation in 1908, setting off the so-called Bosnian Crisis, and the Ottoman Empire, Russia, and Serbia recognized its incorporation into the Habsburg Monarchy the following year. Bosnia subsequently received a constitution and its own diet; al-

¹² Vienna, now Austria's largest province (*Bundesland*) in terms of population, did not acquire provincial status until 1986. Simultaneously, the capital of Lower Austria moved from Vienna to St. Pölten.

though, in the years leading up to the First World War, its final status within the monarchy continued to be a matter of significant dispute.

Neither half of the monarchy ever became a fully-fledged representative democracy. Nevertheless, Austria was democratizing, in the sense of a political system undergoing “processes whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles ... or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations ... or extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subject to citizen participation,” as the political scientists Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter defined the term.¹³ Although room for dispute remains, regarding the significance and implications of democratic tendencies in Imperial Austria, specialists long have recognized the trend. In surveying the constitutional developments and elections from the late-eighteenth century through the Austrian Second Republic, the political scientist Karl Ucakar characterized this entire period as one of gradual if uneven development toward democracy in which the post-Ausgleich Austrian constitution provided a major step forward.¹⁴ Meanwhile, Kann, far ahead of his time in discerning the monarchy's actual political accomplishments, recognized that, “in spite of all shortcomings, possibilities for peaceful evolution in the direction of democratic government existed in both” Austria and Hungary.¹⁵ More recently, the historian Bader-Zaar noted that “while abolition of unequal representation and the curial system was still no longer in sight by 1914 at the level of local government and the diets of the crownlands, cautious democratization was the focus of multiple reforms in the two decades preceding World War I.”¹⁶

Austrian democracy had several real limitations: Austro-Hungarian dualism and the constraints it placed on joint policy making; a formally unaccountable executive (comprising the Kaiser and his appointed ministers); an upper house or Herrenhaus, composed of aristocrats and dignitaries, who shared legislative power with an elected lower house or Abgeordnetenhaus; limited manhood suffrage for most of the period between 1867 and 1918 (and, with minor exceptions, no female suffrage); and federalism (which was less than democratic because no provincial diet ever fully implemented universal manhood suffrage).¹⁷

¹³ Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 8.

¹⁴ Ucakar, *Demokratie und Wahlrecht*, 23–27.

¹⁵ Kann, *History of the Habsburg Empire*, 341.

¹⁶ Bader-Zaar, “Democratization and the Practices of Voting,” 13.

¹⁷ Until the elimination of the class-based curial electoral system in 1907, a small number of aristocratic women could vote, by virtue of being great landowners, although only through a des-

Nevertheless, the Fundamental Laws, promulgated in the aftermath of the 1867 *Ausgleich*, and several reforms, in subsequent decades, pointed the country in a democratic direction.¹⁸ Among these were a written constitution, the separation of church and state (although the dynasty retained its strong ties with the Roman Catholic Church), a bill of fundamental rights, and the gradual expansion of the suffrage for both parliamentary and dietal elections. Specifically, elections under universal manhood suffrage occurred for approximately 17 percent of a newly enlarged Abgeordnetenhaus after 1896, and for that entire body as of 1907.¹⁹ In this respect, Imperial Austria became more democratic than some of its nominally democratic contemporaries, such as the United Kingdom, where tax restrictions on the suffrage remained until after the First World War, and the United States, where racial restrictions on voting effectively persisted until 1965 and where efforts to restrict the voting rights of racial minorities persist to this day. It was not until after 1918 that women secured the right to vote in any of these countries or their successor states.²⁰

igned male representative. The role of women voters in Imperial Austria is worthy of further study. One compelling example is Jiří Malý's examination of debates surrounding women's voting rights, on the occasion of an 1865 by-election in Moravia, one in which women's votes happened to be decisive in determining the outcome. Jiří Malý, "Die Teilnahme von Frauen an den Ergänzungswahlen in den mährischen Landtag 1865," in *Magister Noster: Sborník statí věnovaných in memoriam prof. PhDr. Janu Havránekovi, CSc.; Festschrift in memoriam Prof. PhDr. Jan Havránek, CSc.; Studies Dedicated to Prof. PhDr. Jan Havránek, Csc., in memoriam*, ed. Michal Svatoš, Luboš Velek, and Alice Velková (Prague: Karolinum, 2005), 419–31. See also Birgitta Bader-Zaar, "Re-thinking Women's Suffrage in the Nineteenth Century: Local Government and Entanglements of Property and Gender in the Austrian Half of the Habsburg Monarchy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom," in *Constitutionalism, Legitimacy, and Power: Nineteenth-Century Experiences*, ed. Kelly L. Grotke and Markus J. Prutsch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 107–126; and Birgitta Bader-Zaar and Carola Riedmann, "Stimmberechtigte Frauen vor 1918: Zum kommunalen, Landtags- und Reichsratswahlrecht für Frauen in der österreichischen Reichshälfte der Habsburgermonarchie," in *"Sie meinen es politisch!" 100 Jahre Frauenwahlrecht in Österreich: Geschlechterdemokratie als gesellschaftspolitische Herausforderung*, ed. Blaustumpf ahoi! (Vienna: Loecker Erhard Verlag, 2019), 65–79.

- 18 The scoring of Polity V, one of several efforts by political scientists to classify countries systematically by their degree of political democratization and one of the few to categorize historical cases, fails to reflect the significant institutional changes in Imperial Austria between the 1867 *Ausgleich* and the First World War. Furthermore, by treating Austria as a single case from 1800 to the present and by treating Hungary as a single case from 1867 to the present, it also fails to account for the significant, complex changes that took place in those countries' borders, populations, institutions, and relationship with each other over the last two centuries. See Center for Systemic Peace, "Polity V Annual Time-Series, 1800–2018," <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>, last accessed 18 July 2023.
- 19 See respectively *RGBl.*, no. 168, Law of June 14, 1896, *RGBl.*, no. 169, Law of June 14, 1896, and *RGBl.*, no. 17, Law of January 26, 1907. For a more extensive treatment of these developments, see Braunecker, "Verfassungsentwicklung," 192–203.
- 20 Before the First World War, the only countries to adopt universal adult suffrage for both men and women in elections to their national legislatures were Finland (1906) and Norway (1913).

To state that Imperial Austria was moving toward democracy does not imply that Imperial Austria was ever going to get there. Part of the usefulness of O'Donnell and Schmitter's definition of democratization is that it encompasses processes that stall, reverse, or simply fail. One implication of viewing democratization as a process is that it continues to take place in states once they cross the democratic threshold.²¹ In the case of Austria-Hungary, the monarchy's destruction, as a result of the First World War, prevents one from ever knowing what the final outcome of these political processes might have been. In order to assess whether that semi-democratic system had consociational elements, it is sufficient to note that parts of the political system had become significantly more democratic and that these reforms were maintained and even expanded over several decades.

Imperial Austria was very much a plural society, in the Lijphartian sense, since it had multiple segmental cleavages. Austria's great ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity is well known, but the term *segmental cleavage* implies not only diversity but also a significant degree of organizational segregation of groups. Organizational segregation certainly characterized Austrian society, where political parties, school and agricultural boards, colleges of physicians and engineers, trade associations, volunteer fire brigades, parishes, restaurants, and banks, and other public and private organizations increasingly were divided along ethnic lines.²²

Robert Luft's analysis of segmentation in the Bohemian Lands is especially relevant, in the present context, because they later were to become part of Czechoslovakia.²³ Arguing that segmentation (*Versäulung*) characterized the Bohemian Lands in the last decades before the First World War, Luft emphasized that the multiple segments or pillars (*Säulen*) within both the Czech- and German-speaking populations each had a unified character, even though the segments contained multiple competing political parties. Nationalist competition between national groups was not the only factor influencing the process of segmentation. Others were the constitutionally protected opportunities to form private associations and the gradual expansion of the suffrage. Luft argued

21 An important recent elaboration of the idea of democratization as a process is Charles Tilly's *Democracy* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), the fifty-first and final book in what was certainly one of the world's most prolific academic publishing careers. Tellingly, Tilly originally intended the title to be *Democracy, Democratization, and De-Democratization*. See p. ix.

22 Stourzh, "Ethnicizing," in *Der Umfang der österreichischen Geschichte. Ausgewählte Studien, 1990–2010*, ed. Gerald Stourzh (Vienna and Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2011), 293–96.

23 Luft, *Parlamentarische Führungsgruppen*, vol. 1, 20–22, 157–170, and 587–94.

that segmentation among and within Austria's nationalities was even more pronounced than in Belgium, Netherlands, and Switzerland.²⁴

Rough estimates indicate an unusually high degree of membership in party organizations among Czech speakers.²⁵ Nonparty organizations and the media in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia were highly segmented as well.²⁶ Czech society was increasingly oriented around five camps (Luft used the German word *Lager*): agrarian, bourgeois-national, Catholic-national, national social, and social democratic.²⁷ Luft noted that, "through the context of everyday life, nearly every Czech man and every Czech woman thus belonged to a segmented social structure that was camp-specific if not actually party-specific."²⁸ As a consequence, the particular organizational agglomeration of the Czech segments meant that, in principle, all citizens, regardless of their status and profession, could spend their entire lives in a politically and ideologically (*weltanschaulich*) determined world of nonpolitical organizations and local networks without directly being members of a party. This held true for women as well as men and for all ages, professions, and stations in life, and it even encompassed the areas of culture, education, entertainment, sports, and hobbies.²⁹

Although Austrian society certainly was segmented, historians and social scientists should be cautious about using the term *consociational* in dealing with this peculiar case. Consociationalism can imply consociational democracy, while consociational oligarchy specifically refers to nondemocratic states with features analogous to consociational democracy.³⁰ Oligarchy, however, in the traditional sense of rule by the rich (or the few), does not accurately characterize the Imperial Austrian political system, which embodied a mix of monarchic, oligarchic, and democratic elements.³¹ That system was semi-democratic, accentuating the presence of democratic elements within an otherwise nondemocratic political system. It also was proto-consociational in that it had several features

²⁴ Luft, *Parlamentarische Führungsgruppen*, vol. 1, 157, 160–61, 168–69, and 587–88.

²⁵ Luft, *Parlamentarische Führungsgruppen*, vol. 1, 161–62 and Table 1 (p. 163).

²⁶ Luft, *Parlamentarische Führungsgruppen*, vol. 1, 163–65, Table 2 (p. 166), and 167–68.

²⁷ Luft, *Parlamentarische Führungsgruppen*, vol. 1, Figure 6 (p. 156) and 589–94.

²⁸ Luft, *Parlamentarische Führungsgruppen*, vol. 1, 167.

²⁹ Luft, *Parlamentarische Führungsgruppen*, vol. 1, 167.

³⁰ Several such cases are discussed in ch. 1.

³¹ On the definition of oligarchy, see Aristotle, "The Politics," in *The Politics and the Constitution of Athens*, rev. student ed., ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 72–73. There is something conceptually unsatisfying about the notion of a consociational oligarchy. Consociationalism involves a careful balancing act on the part of segmental political elites, who must simultaneously cooperate among themselves while maintaining the support of ordinary citizens within their own segment. The more such elites are accountable to ordinary citizens, however, the less they are oligarchic.

foreshadowing consociationalism but required further developments in that direction to fully qualify as consociational. For example, the distribution of seats by ethnic groups was increasingly proportional, but some minority groups remained underrepresented.

Such semantic hair splitting admittedly risks burdening the reader with a proliferation of social-scientific jargon. However, it has the important advantage of making significant distinctions between the different regimes this book examines. Specifically, if Imperial Austria was a semi-democratic proto-consociational political system, the various regional compromises that appear toward the end of this chapter were examples of semi-democratic consociationalism, a term that acknowledges limits on democracy while simultaneously stressing that these political experiments were essentially consociational in character. Finally, the Czechoslovak First Republic, discussed in the last two chapters, evolved into a mature consociational democracy.

Favorable and Unfavorable Conditions for Consociational Democracy in Imperial Austria

Lijphart identified nine conditions favorable to consociationalism (see Chapter 1). They are neither necessary nor sufficient for consociationalism to succeed; rather, they are a means of assessing how likely it may be for consociationalism to succeed in a given country. They also aid in discerning the obstacles political leaders must overcome to construct consociational arrangements. The purposes of the following discussion are twofold. First, it provides a general assessment of the prospects of consociationalism in Imperial Austria. Applying Lijphart's model demonstrates that these prospects were mixed, so it is unsurprising that consociationalism failed to develop further there. Second, this examination provides readers who are unfamiliar with the historical literature with necessary background information. It is not a complete account of the many changes that took place over Austria's long history, but it provides a general overview of relevant conditions during the country's last decades.

In the western portion of the Habsburg Monarchy, one of the conditions most favorable to consociationalism was that no language group came close to being a majority of the population (see Table 4). Austria's 1910 population had major linguistic divisions: German and Czech speakers made up roughly one-third and one-quarter of the population, respectively; Polish as well as Ukrainian and Rusyn speakers were roughly one-sixth and one-eighth of the population; and small groups of Italian, Romanian, Serbo-Croatian (following the

Table 4. Ethnicity (“Language of Everyday Use”) in Austria, 1851–1910

Ethnic Group	Population (Percent)				
	1851	1880	1890	1900	1910
Czechs	22.74	23.77	23.32	23.23	23.02
Germans	36.12	36.75	36.05	35.78	35.58
Italians	3.02	3.07	2.88	2.84	2.75
Jews	2.54	—	—	—	—
Magyars and Armenians	0.03/0.03	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04
Poles	11.45	14.86	15.84	16.62	17.77
Romanians	1.07	0.87	0.89	0.9	0.98
Ruthenians	13.84	12.81	13.22	13.17	12.58
Serbo-Croatians	3.06	2.59	2.75	2.77	2.8
Slovenians	6.1	5.23	5.01	4.65	4.48
Total	17534948	21794231	23473056	25632805	27963872

Source: Peter Urbanitsch, “Die Deutschen in Österreich,” in *Die Völker des Reiches*, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, vol. 3, part 1 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848–1918*, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980), Table 1 (after p. 38). This and the following tables use the official designations *Ruthenian* and *Serbo-Croatian*, under which the census categorized these data.

census categories) and Slovenian speakers each had less than one-twentieth of the population.³² These proportions were quite stable over time.

The census data about the monarchy’s officially recognized nationalities (*Nationalitäten* or *Volksstämme*), which authorities gathered on the basis of self-declared “language of everyday use,” require further elucidation. First, given the intense nationalism at the time, answers to the census taker potentially reflected political pressures as much as the identities that those surveyed actually claimed. Furthermore, they tend to mask such widespread complicating factors

³² This characterization leaves out the tiny Hungarian/Armenian (*Magyarisch bzw. Armenisch*) category as well as the many micro-nationalities that are not in the official statistics. See Wolfdietter Bihl, “Notizen zu den ethnischen und religiösen Splitter-, Rest- und Sondergruppen in den habsburgischen Ländern,” in *Die Völker des Reiches*, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, vol. 3/2 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848–1918*, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980), 949–74. Although the tiny Armenian minority often played a significant role within the life of the monarchy, they were subject to significant, if never fully realized, pressures to assimilate in Galicia and Hungary (see 950–55).

as multilingualism and mixed households.³³ (The usages *Czech speakers*, *German speakers* and similar constructs in this book are suitable for indicating the rough share of the population that spoke that language without presuming that the label was the favored or the only language any particular individual spoke.) In the case of Austria, the concern here is less with precise numbers than with providing a bird's-eye perspective on the relative frequency with which the most common languages were spoken. Because nationalist mobilization in Austria tended to take place along linguistic lines, these linguistic data provide a rough idea of the potential size of the groups in question.

Second, although *Jewish* was a separate census category in 1851, that was no longer the case after the decennial censuses commenced in 1880, under the post-*Ausgleich* constitutional system. Although later censuses included Jews as a religious category, the state did not officially recognize any Jewish language, despite the attempts of some individuals to claim Yiddish. Officially, 25.88 percent of Austrian Jews, defined in terms of religion, spoke German, 3.86 percent Czech, 61.70 percent Polish, and 1.80 percent Ukrainian or Rusyn. More accurate estimates, however, suggest that nine-tenths of the Jews in Galicia and Bukovina, provinces with exceptionally large Jewish populations, spoke Yiddish as their mother tongue. The realities of assimilation and widespread multilingualism presented further complications.³⁴ Overall, Jews, as a self-declared religious group, constituted approximately 5 percent of the population, and this affiliation tended to overlap with other linguistically defined ethnic categories (see Table 5). Simultaneously, Jewish identity provided an alternative basis for ethno-political mobilization, as the emerging Zionist movement demonstrated.

Third, the census counted Serbs and Croats as one nationality and listed Serbo-Croatian as a single language. In this instance, religion served as an additional marker of potential ethnic affiliation. In 1910, 167,366 of 168,184 Serbian and Croatian speakers in Istria—99.51 percent of the inhabitants—were Roman Catholic. In Dalmatia, 508,430 Serbian and Croatian speakers (83.31 percent)

33 In *Die Umgangssprachen in Altösterreich zwischen Agitation und Assimilation* (Vienna and Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1982), Emil Brix thoroughly appraised the difficulties in interpreting Austrian census data. See also Wolfgang Göderle, *Zensus und Ethnizität: Zur Herstellung von Wissen über soziale Wirklichkeiten im Habsburgerreich zwischen 1848 und 1910* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2016).

34 See Wolfdieter Bihl, "Die Juden," in *Die Völker des Reiches*, vol. 3/2 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie*, 902–908 and Table 92 (p. 905).

Table 5. Major Religions ($\geq 1\%$ of the population) in Austria, 1869–1910

Religion	Population (Percent)				
	1869	1880	1890	1900	1910
Greek Catholic	11.5	11.44	11.78	11.98	11.96
Greek Orthodox	2.2	2.22	2.28	2.32	2.33
Jewish	4.28	4.54	4.78	4.68	4.6
Protestant (Augustan)	1.2	1.31	1.32	1.4	1.56
Roman Catholic	80.3	79.92	79.24	79	78.85
Total	20213127	22144244	23895413	26150708	28571934

Source: Peter Leisching, “Die römisch-katholische Kirche in Cisleithanien,” in *Die Konfessionen*, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, vol. 4 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848–1918*, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1985), Table 3 (after p. 88).

were Roman Catholic, and 101,828 (16.67 percent) were Orthodox.³⁵ Assuming that the Catholic/Orthodox distinction largely corresponded with Croatian/Serbian ethnic identity, Serbian and Croatian ethnopolitics in Imperial Austria generally meant Croatian ethnopolitics, while the division between Croats and the tiny Serbian minority was potentially significant on the local level.

Linguistic divisions as a basis for ethnic or national identity are of primary concern here. Because nationalist mobilization, predominantly along linguistic lines, tended to eclipse other types of rivalries in late Imperial Austria, any consociational solution to those contests presumably would center around linguistically defined segments.³⁶ Nevertheless, an examination of Austrian religious divisions provides a fuller picture of that society (see Table 5). In 1910, Catholics were overwhelmingly in the majority, representing 78.86 percent of all the inhabitants of Imperial Austria. Lijphart’s concerns about majorities suggest that an attempt to build a consociational system around religious segments would have been unsuccessful. The remaining religious divisions tended to complement and reinforce linguistically defined differences. In 1910, 90.02 percent of Ukrainian and Rusyn speakers were Greek Catholic, with very few Greek Catholics to be

35 Arnold Suppan, “Die Kroaten,” in *Die Völker des Reiches*, vol. 3/2 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie*, 628–29.

36 Although this view still reflects much of the common wisdom, whether ethnic loyalty actually trumped religious, socioeconomic, regional, urban, rural, or ideological identities and interests in Austrian politics is much less certain. See Howe, “Electoral Institutions” and “Voting.”

found among the other linguistic groups, thereby providing yet another distinction between Ukrainians and Rusyns, on the one hand, as opposed to their overwhelmingly Catholic Polish neighbors, on the other hand.³⁷ Similarly, Orthodoxy served as a nonlinguistic marker to distinguish Serbs from Croats, while Jews were defined more by religion than by language. The fact that 98.45 percent of Romanian speakers were Orthodox distinguished them from the overwhelmingly Catholic general population. Finally, Protestants were a small minority, specifically 2.48 percent of Czech speakers, 2.70 percent of German speakers, 0.08 percent of Italian speakers, 3.64 percent of Magyar speakers, 1.61 percent of Poles, 0.06 percent of Romanians, 0.03 percent of Ukrainian and Rusyn speakers, 0.02 percent of Slovene speakers, and 0.01 percent of Serbian and Croatian speakers.³⁸

Although German speakers certainly maintained a strong position in the monarchy's last decades, conventional notions that they completely dominated politics during that period are overstated. They held an artificial majority in the Austrian Reichsrat in the first decades after the *Ausgleich*; however, internal divisions undermined this position, while the expansion of the suffrage soon eroded their artificial majority.

Along with the absence of a linguistic majority, Imperial Austrian society, to a great extent, also met the other main condition favorable to consociationalism, the absence of large socioeconomic disparities among segments. Although the monarchy was largely agricultural—by 1910, 53.1 percent of Austrians were still employed in agriculture, compared to 24.0 percent in industry—more recent economic histories have replaced earlier condemnations of economic backwardness with acknowledgments that the country had a rapidly modernizing economy, one in which significant economic integration occurred both within and between Austria and Hungary.³⁹ This is not to say that all groups were on an equal

37 The term *Greek Catholic* refers to a number of churches, located largely in East-Central Europe and the Middle East, that are in full communion with the Roman Catholic Church but maintain their own rites, including their own languages in the era before the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965). The Roman Catholic Church refers to them as Eastern Rite churches, and in East-Central Europe, they also are known as *Uniate Churches*, although this term can be controversial. The 7.87 percent of Rusyns who were Orthodox provided one potential division within that ethnic group.

38 Peter Urbanitsch, "Die Deutschen," in *Die Völker des Reiches*, vol. 3/1 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie*, Table 5 (after p. 54).

39 On the statistics from 1910, see Nachum Th. Gross, "Die Stellung der Habsburgermonarchie in der Weltwirtschaft," in *Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung*, ed. Alois Brusatti, vol. 1 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848–1918*, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1973), Table 2 (p. 18). In these statistics, industry includes mining and construction. See also Iván Berend and György Ránki, *Economic Development in East-Central Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, translated, Foreword by István Deák (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1974); and David Good, *The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, 1750–1914* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984).

economic footing since some were certainly more socioeconomically developed than others. Czech speakers were most advanced by this standard, with 37.11 percent of the population employed in industry, and close behind were the Germans, with 36.99 percent, and Italians, with 23.40 percent. On the other end of the spectrum, a mere 5.32 percent of Serbian and Croatian speakers, 3.81 percent of Romanian speakers, and 2.72 percent of Ruthenian speakers worked in the industrial sector.⁴⁰ Nonetheless, all these groups were industrializing, and each of them produced significant middle-class parties with the rise of mass suffrage.

Two caveats are necessary. The first involves the province Galicia, which had sharp socioeconomic disparity between its moderately industrialized Polish speakers (58.55 percent of Galicians) and the barely industrialized Ukrainian- and Rusyn-speaking populations (40.20 percent of Galicians).⁴¹ Specifically, while Galician agriculture was rapidly modernizing and highly productive, Poles, about 65 percent of whom were employed in agriculture, made up most of the large landholders who owned the greatest share of the farmland.⁴² Meanwhile, about 90 percent of Ukrainian and Rusyn speakers worked in agriculture, and roughly two-thirds of them as seasonal migrant workers.⁴³ The Poles of Galicia long had enjoyed a privileged political position, as manifested in Galicia's powerful Polish Central Electoral Committee (German: Polnische Zentralwahlkomitee; Polish: Centralny Komitet Wyborczy), circumstances that corresponded with exceptional levels of electoral corruption on the part of Polish administrators after the introduction of universal manhood suffrage.⁴⁴ Consequently, politics was significantly less consociational and less democratic in Galicia than elsewhere in that Ukrainians and Rusyns benefitted substantially less than others from the increasing proportionality of Austrian politics. The Galician Compromise of 1914, discussed below, suggested that this situation was beginning to change.

The second caveat is that some regions of Austria lagged behind others, even though the monarchy was becoming increasingly integrated economically.⁴⁵ For

⁴⁰ Urbanitsch, "Die Deutschen," Table 16 (after p. 138). Here and in the discussion that follows, the term *Ruthenian* reflects the official designations of recognized nationalities.

⁴¹ Urbanitsch, "Die Deutschen," Tables 1 (after p. 38), and Table 16 (after p. 138).

⁴² Berend and Ránki, *Economic Development*, 32–41 and 39–58.

⁴³ Henryk Batowski, "Die Polen," in *Die Völker des Reiches*, vol. 3/1 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie*, 541; and Wolfdieter Bihl, "Die Ruthenen," in *Die Völker des Reiches*, vol. 3/1 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie*, 562–64.

⁴⁴ Binder, *Galizien*, 190–201; William A. Jenks, *The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1907* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), 178. Cases of electoral fraud in Galicia had decreased substantially by the 1911 elections. See Binder, *Galizien*, 295–308.

⁴⁵ Good, *Economic Rise*, ch. 5.

example, in 1910, the density of industrial concerns, as measured in number of factories per 100 square kilometers, was the greatest in Lower Austria, with Silesia and Bohemia close behind. It was by far the lowest in Carniola, Galicia, Tyrol, Bukovina, and Dalmatia.⁴⁶ A similar regional pattern is apparent in net domestic product per capita, which was highest in the Alpine Lands, followed by Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, and was lowest in Galicia.⁴⁷ Since different peoples were concentrated in each province, their income reflected varying levels of regional development. For example, in 1900, German speakers paid 22.4 Kronen per capita in direct taxes, Italian speakers 11.9, Czechs 10.5, Slovene speakers 7.8, Polish speakers 5.1, Romanian speakers 4.6, Serbian and Croatian speakers 3.6, and Ukrainian and Rusyn speakers 3.5.⁴⁸

Other demographic conditions in Imperial Austria had mixed implications for consociationalism. With a 1910 population of 27,963,872, the Western half of the monarchy was somewhat larger than Lijphart's four post-1945 consociational core cases, all of which had populations of less than 12 million in 1960.⁴⁹ It was significantly smaller than India, however, with currently more than one billion people, suggesting that this factor was not critical.⁵⁰

The presence of a relatively large number of ethnic and linguistic groups also posed a challenge for efforts to reach political compromise. Nine were politically significant, in the sense of being politically mobilized along national lines and increasingly institutionalized within the Imperial Austrian political system: Czechs, Germans, Italians, Jews, Poles, Romanians, Rusyns, Serbo-Croats, and Slovenes.⁵¹ Less important were such smaller groups as Magyars and Armenians. By contrast, the demographic landscape was much simpler at the provincial level (see Table 6). The German-speaking provinces of Lower Aus-

⁴⁶ The specifics are as follows: 3,194 (16.1 per 100 km²) for Lower Austria; 677 (13.2) for Silesia; 5,878 (11.3) for Bohemia; 141 (1.4) for Carniola; 1,022 (1.3) for Galicia; 306 (1.1) for Tyrol; 102 (1.0) for Bukovina; and 78 (0.6) for Dalmatia. Herbert Matis and Karl Bachinger, "Österreichs industrielle Entwicklung," in *Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung*, vol. 1 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie*, Table 42 (p. 232).

⁴⁷ Respectively, 790, 630, and 250 *Kronen* per capita in 1913. László Katus, "Die Magyaren," in *Die Völker des Reiches*, vol. 3/1 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie*, Table 44 (p. 446).

⁴⁸ Urbanitsch, "Die Deutschen," Table 15 (after p. 134).

⁴⁹ On Austria's population in 1910, see Urbanitsch, "Die Deutschen," Table 1 (after p. 38). On the populations of consociational states, see Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, 65.

⁵⁰ Lijphart, "The Puzzle of Indian Democracy," 263.

⁵¹ Here the terms *Ruthenian* and *Serbo-Croatian* reflect the official designation of these nationalities. This usage masks significant ethnic divisions within those two official categories. Although the imperial administration did not recognize them as a nationality, Jews also are included on this list, because some of them, by the first decade of the twentieth century, had begun to organize themselves into separate Jewish political parties. Furthermore, some of the institutional reforms discussed in this chapter, for example the 1910 Bukovina Compromise, unofficially treated Jews as a distinct group.

Table 6. Major Ethnic Groups by Province (≥ 1 percent of the Population) in Austria, 1910

Province	Ethnic Group (percentage of population)								
	Czechs	Germans	Italians	Magyars and Armenians	Poles	Romanians	Ruthenians	Serbo-Croatians	Slovenes
Bohemia	63.19	36.76							
Bukovina		21.24		1.31	4.55	34.37	38.38		
Carinthia		78.61							21.24
Carniola		5.36							94.36
Dalmatia			2.84					96.19	
Galicia		1.13			58.55		40.2		
Goritz and Gradiska		1.79	36.06						61.85
Istria		3.29	38.14					43.52	14.27
Lower Austria	3.75	95.91							
Moravia	71.75	27.62							
Salzburg		99.73							
Silesia	24.33	43.9			31.72				
Styria		70.5							29.37
Tyrol		57.31	42.09						
Trieste		6.21	62.31					1.26	29.81
Upper Austria		99.7							
Vorarlberg		95.36	4.41						
Overall	23.02	35.58	2.75	0.04	17.77	0.98	12.58	2.8	4.48

Source: Based on Peter Urbanitsch, "Die Deutschen," in *Die Völker des Reiches*, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, vol. 3, part 1 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848–1918*, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980), Table 1 (after p. 38).

tria, Salzburg, Upper Austria, and Vorarlberg were effectively linguistically homogeneous. Provinces with only two major languages were fairly typical, with examples including Bohemia (63.19 percent Czech and 36.76 percent German speakers), Carinthia (78.61 percent German and 29.37 percent Slovene speakers), Galicia (58.55 percent Polish and 40.20 percent Ukrainian and Rusyn speakers, the latter counting as a single linguistic group), and Tirol (57.31 percent German and 42.09 percent Italian speakers). The ethnodemographically most heterogeneous province was Bukovina, with five main language groups recognized in the census (Germans, Magyars and Armenians, Poles, Romanians, and Rusyns) plus Jews.⁵² Precisely because of its great diversity, however, Bukovina turned out to be especially open to intersegmental political compromise.

⁵² There were 3.20 effective language groups, based on calculations using the Laakso-Taagepera index to account for their relative sizes. Although political scientists typically employ this mathematical index to count political parties, they also use it to count other subgroups within a population.

A propensity toward factionalization multiplied the already large number of politically relevant groups that resulted from ethno-linguistic diversity.⁵³ For example, in 1907, Czech speakers, who, like German speakers, had one of the most highly developed party systems, elected representatives with 13 different party labels, plus two independents.⁵⁴ Such partisan diversity was both a challenge and an opportunity. Although it certainly complicated the policy-making process, it also provided additional possibilities for compromise across ethnolinguistic lines, based on shared socioeconomic, urban, rural, religious, regional, or ideological concerns.

The relative size of Austria's ethno-linguistic social segments was favorable to consociationalism. The difference between the largest group (German speakers, with 35.58 percent of all inhabitants of Imperial Austria in 1910) and the second smallest (Romanian speakers, with 0.98 percent—the census classified the Magyar/Armenian group as the smallest) was substantial. Nevertheless, Austria's complicated ethnodemographics boiled down to a rough, three-tiered balance, with two large, linguistically defined groups (Germans and Czechs), two medium-sized groups (Polish speakers as well as Ukrainian and Rusyn speakers), and several much smaller groups.

Finally, the partial geographic concentration of Austria's linguistic groups had mixed implications. The existence of several largely homogeneous German-speaking provinces simplified the situation; however, the fact that provinces corresponded with long-standing "kingdoms and lands," most of which were ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous, belied any simple territorially federal solution to intergroup tensions.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the existing federal system broke down the nationality question into several smaller issues. For example, Czech-German interrelations largely were a Bohemian, Moravian, and Silesian matter, while the situation among Germans, Italians, and South Slavs centered on the Alpine-Adriatic region.⁵⁶ In several instances, this pattern facilitated separate provincial compromises.

53 For an institutionalist explanation of the hyper-fragmentation of the Austrian party system, see Howe, "Electoral Institutions," 186–89.

54 Howe, "Electoral Institutions," 184–86 and Figure 1 (p. 187).

55 A thorough overview of incomplete, potential, and hypothetical federal and other reforms of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy appears in Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1848–1918*, vol. 2: *Empire Reform* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950; reprint, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Octagon Books, 1964).

56 Andreas Moritsch has long advocated the notion of a distinct geographic, sociological, and cultural Alpine-Adriatic region. See Andreas Moritsch, ed., *Alpen-Adria-Städte im nationalen Differenzierungsprozeß* (Klagenfurt and Lubljana: Verlag Hermagoras, 1997).

Consociational systems often develop, in part, because an external threat helps unite the various segments. In the case of Austria, external factors both united and divided Austria's ethnic groups. On the one hand, Austria-Hungary faced significant military competition from its neighbors, and many foreign policy challenges, such as Italian irredentism, tended to magnify rather than ameliorate the monarchy's domestic nationalist tensions. Additionally, the Kingdom of Hungary's special status within the Dualist system was the equivalent of an external threat, insofar as the Hungarians vetoed any solution to Austria's ethnopolitical problems that would diminish their privileged constitutional position. Simultaneously, the subordination of Hungary's minorities had political ramifications in Austria. In 1905, the Austrian military even devised Plan U to invade Hungary should the nobility there become a threat to the Dual Monarchy's existence. On the other hand, nationalist ploys, on the part of Austria-Hungary's neighbors, often had much less appeal than many at the time believed. Russian-sponsored Pan-Slavism, for example, was of limited interest to Austrian Slavs, given the relatively favorable political, economic, and social conditions under Habsburg, as opposed to tsarist rule, although Russophiles remained an important strand within Rusyn and Czech party politics.⁵⁷ Furthermore, two of the monarchy's main foreign policy organs, the Habsburg officer corps and diplomatic corps, were noteworthy for institutionalizing a solidly transnational identity, based on loyalty to the dynasty and to the state as a whole.⁵⁸ Finally, loyalty to the monarchy remained surprisingly strong among ordinary soldiers in the early years of the First World War. The most famous example of nationalism allegedly undermining military morale was the desertion of the 28th Infantry Regiment, in the face of a Russian attack, on April 3, 1915, near Zborów (Ukrainian: Зборів). Jeremy King's close examination of this incident, however,

57 Wendland, *Russophilen*. Some Young Czechs expressed Pan-Slavist and Russophile tendencies. Stanley B. Winters, in his posthumously published book *Karel Kramář's Early Political Career* (Port Charlotte, FL: Published by the author's widow, Zdenka Winters, 2012), noted that, in the 1890s, the "ideas on Slavonic matters" of Karel Kramář (1860–1937), a prominent member of the Young Czech Party (Czech: Mladočeská strana; formally the National Liberal Party or Národní strana svobodomyšlná), "were Austroslav and mainly cultural," in contrast to some more zealous Pan-Slavs in the party. Kramář "definitely was not a Panslav in the political sense of wanting Russia to act either to 'liberate' the Slavs of Austria or to place them under her wing. But he did want Russia brought into the mainstream of European culture and exposed to modernizing and liberalizing influences, and he looked for Austria to play a conciliatory role in this process" (238–239). During the First World War, however, Kramář hoped to see the Kingdom of Bohemia become a part of a democratized Russian empire.

58 See István Deák, *Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848–1918* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); and William D. Godsey, Jr., *Aristocratic Redoubt: The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office on the Eve of the First World War* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1999).

undermined any straightforward attempt to attribute desertion to nationalism.⁵⁹ King noted the "Army High Command ... immediately commissioned an investigation," the findings of which "did cite Czech sentiments within the regiment, but laid more blame on inexperienced officers, who had maintained a scandalously loose discipline." He concluded that

some of the twenty-eighters who had waved the white flag on April 3 probably had done so for national and anti-Habsburg reasons. Others, though, had probably acted in a blur of undisciplined group dynamics and terror. Some soldiers who fell in the war no doubt fell for Francis Joseph rather than for a national cause, and others for the reverse—and still others for both, or for neither.⁶⁰

Centuries of shared Habsburg rule arguably created an overarching loyalty, thereby facilitating intersegmental cooperation. Franz Joseph's nearly seventy-year reign provided a significant degree of continuity in its own right. This possibility was limited, to the extent that many, somewhat unjustly, perceived the Habsburgs as German.⁶¹ Nevertheless, loyalism was a reality of Austro-Hungarian life, publicly enacted and reinforced through such things as imperial visits and inspection tours, the popular mythology surrounding former Emperor Joseph II (1741–1790; reigned 1780–1790), the celebrity of Empress Elisabeth (1837–1898), patriotic education, and veterans' associations.⁶² Furthermore, the dynasty promoted the notion of *kaisertreu*, that is, loyalty to the emperor as su-

59 King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans*, 148–52.

60 King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans*, 149 and 150.

61 As a rule, aristocratic dynasties, reflecting premodern social stratification, do not fit neatly into nationalist categories. Emperor Franz Josef, for example, was trained in the major languages of the monarchy from an early age. Similarly, although born in Bavaria, Elizabeth (1837–1898; Empress of Austria, 1854–1898, and Apostolic Queen of Hungary, 1867–1898) famously made a determined effort to master Hungarian, the language in which she wrote much of her correspondence. Brigitte Hamann, *Elisabeth: Kaiserin wider Willen* (Vienna; Munich: Amalthea), 216–22.

62 On loyalism, see Hugh LeCaine Agnew, "The Flyspecks on Palivec's Potrait: Francis Joseph, the Symbols of Monarchy, and Czech Popular Loyalty," in *The Limits of Loyalty*, 86–112; Sarah Kent, "State Ritual and Ritual Parody: Croatian Student Protest and the Limits of Loyalty at the End of the Nineteenth Century," in *Limits of Loyalty*, 162–77; and Daniel L. Unowsky, "Celebrating Two Emperors and a Revolution: The Public Contest to Represent the Polish and Ruthenian Nations in 1880," in *Limits of Loyalty*, 113–37. On Joseph II and Elisabeth, see Nancy M. Wingfeld, "Emperor Joseph II in the Austrian Imagination up to 1914," in *Limits of Loyalty*, 62–85; and Alice Freifeld, "Empress Elisabeth as Hungarian Queen: The Uses of Celebrity Monarchism," in *Limits of Loyalty*, 138–61. Ernst Bruckmüller, "Patriotic and National Myths: National Consciousness and Elementary School Education in Imperial Austria," in *Limits of Loyalty*, 11–35, considers patriotic education. Finally, Laurence Cole, "Military Veterans and Popular Patriotism in Imperial Austria, 1870–1914," in *Limits of Loyalty*, 36–61, examines veterans' associations.

perior to ethnic affiliation. The resulting overarching loyalty existed across segments, and it provided an opportunity to strengthen cooperation, even if not everyone embraced it. The predominant religion of Catholicism, with its shared beliefs, institutions, practices, rituals, and values, was another potential source of overarching loyalty. In this regard, it is noteworthy that, under mass suffrage, major clerical parties tended to have pronounced loyalist leanings, a generalization that applied to the various Czech clerical parties and especially to Polish conservatives.⁶³ The Habsburgs' devotion to Catholicism, in turn, facilitated the religion's role as a guarantor of loyalty to the state and the dynasty.

Finally, Austrian politics shared traditions of both cooperation and conflict, a mix that characterized politics on both the Austrian and the provincial levels throughout the Dualist period. This pattern of behavior had deep historical roots. Since the early 1500s, the monarchy's peoples shared a complex and frequently changing set of political institutions.⁶⁴ This long constitutional evolution, from early modern monarchy through eighteenth-century absolutism and the French Revolution to the nineteenth century's oscillation between various absolutist and constitutional experiments, included its fair share of unresolved disagreements, concessions, and resentments. To cite one obvious example, many Czechs continued to oppose the special status that Dualism granted Hungarians. Nevertheless, this history was one of continuous negotiation and renegotiation. Despite disputes, often over fundamental political principles, the political elite continued to work within the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy in the centuries leading up to the final establishment of Austria-Hungary. Furthermore, the aristocracy, long dominant in Habsburg politics, provided an important precedent for elite cooperation and competition across ethno-linguistic lines. This precedent carried over into the Reichsrat's first decades during which a gradual transition from cadre to mass political parties occurred.⁶⁵

63 Garver, *Young Czech Party*, 283–88; Armin Theodor Dross, "Polen," in *Lexikon zur Geschichte der Parteien in Europa*, ed. Frank Wende (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1981), 471–94; and R. F. Leslie, ed., *The History of Poland since 1863* (Cambridge and London: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 94–96.

64 In his *History of the Habsburg Empire*, Kann presented a convincing argument that the Habsburg Monarchy was a single entity controlling more or less the same set of lands, beginning with the dynasty's 1526 acquisition of the Bohemian and Hungarian kingdoms, in the wake of the Battle of Mohács, even though no state officially going by that name ever existed. The Habsburgs' possession of their hereditary lands dates to the thirteenth century, and at its height, their dynasty claimed a large portion of Europe as well as colonies in the Americas.

65 A consideration of the nature, status, and evolution of political parties in Imperial Austria appears in Brauner, "Verfassungsentwicklung," 226–35. The classic distinction between the cadre parties typical of the early nineteenth century—usually small, inclusive groups formed within the political elite—and the mass parties that eventually replaced them—elaborate formal orga-

The social, political, and historical conditions in which Imperial Austrian politics took place were both favorable and unfavorable for a consociational experiment. Given that most of these conditions were either favorable or mixed and that Austria largely met the two most important conditions, circumstances leaned toward favorable. The implications of this conclusion, however, are somewhat ambiguous. Lijphart was clear that his favorable conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient but are strengths and weaknesses that politicians must consider when attempting to build consociational institutions and practices.⁶⁶ On the one hand, it is not particularly surprising that Imperial Austria was evolving in a consociational direction. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how developments in the direction of representative democracy could have gone otherwise. On the other hand, given the mix of favorable and less favorable conditions, it also is unsurprising that democratic development was uneven and often problematic.

Imperial Austria as a Semi-Democratic, Proto-Consociational Political System

Imperial Austria was never fully consociational; nevertheless, it underwent significant developments in that direction, especially during its last decades. This section surveys those developments, beginning with the closely related topics of grand coalition and minority veto, before turning to the interrelated matters of proportionality and segmental autonomy. A close examination of Austrian institutions and informal political practices shows how they approximated consociationalism's four defining characteristics, albeit without fully realizing any of them.

This section does not claim to provide a full historical account of the evolution of Imperial Austrian politics. Such an effort that would be both impractical, for reasons of length, and redundant, given the vast secondary literature previously cited. Furthermore, it would be unnecessary, since the purpose of this section is merely to highlight specific aspects of Imperial Austrian politics that had a consociational character, even though the Austrian half of the monarchy never became a true consociational system. The importance of the institutions and practices emphasized here comes from the fact that they provided a political legacy which Czechoslovakia could adopt and develop.

nizations that attempt to mobilize a large popular membership—appears in Duverger, *Political Parties*, Ch. 2.

66 Lijphart, *Democracy*, ch. 3; and Lijphart, "Puzzle," 262–63.

Grand Coalitions

Imperial minister-presidents and their cabinets were never formally accountable to either legislative chamber. Rather, the Kaiser appointed them, and they served so long as he judged them to be effective. One consequence of this procedure was that the progression of governments bore little direct chronological relationship to Abgeordnetenhaus elections (see Table 7). Not only was the Reichsrat not truly parliamentary, in the narrow sense, but actual grand coalitions could not exist, since this term implies a cabinet that the parliamentary parties themselves select.⁶⁷ Furthermore, Imperial Austrian cabinets never reflected the Reichsrat's full partisan diversity, and some parties never participated in the government. Nevertheless, cabinet appointments consistently were broadly inclusive and therefore were more consociational than majoritarian, single-party governments would have been. This is true in terms of both the partisan and the ethnic composition of cabinets.

One receives two impressions from a list of Imperial Austrian ministers. The first is the elite social composition of the cabinets. The titles *Ritter* (knight), *Baron*, and *Graf* (count, earl) were common, the occasional *Prinz* or *Fürst* makes an appearance, and *Doktor* seems to have been a minimum entry requirement. The second is the abundance of non-Germanic surnames, such as Abrahamowicz, Chłędowski, Dzieduszycki, Fořt, Giovanelli, Prařak, Trnka, and Ziemialkowski, alongside such names as Auersperg, Böhm-Bawerk, Härdtl, Meyer, Putzwald, Wurmbbrand, and Zenker.⁶⁸

Alois Freiherr von Czedik (1830–1924) presented an intriguing but incomplete assessment of the national and political affiliation of the ministers from 1861 to 1916. Of the 155 ministers he listed for this period, 24 came from Galicia and 17 from Bohemia. There were 23 conservative civil servants, 11 conservatives from other backgrounds, nine active military officers, 47 liberal civil servants, and 26 other German nationals and liberals. Given the incomplete set of categories presented, it is difficult to assess what this means in terms of proportionality, although it reveals a strong leaning toward the established order as well as the privileged position of Polish-dominated Galicia.⁶⁹

67 Parliamentarism has three defining characteristics: the legislature rather than the voters chooses the executive; the executive is accountable to the legislature, through the vote of no confidence; and the cabinet is collegial rather than hierarchical. Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, 2nd ed., 106–113. The Austrian Reichsrat was certainly a parliament in the broader sense of a legislature.

68 Alois Freiherr von Czedik, *Zur Geschichte der k.k. österreichischen Ministerien, 1861–1916*, vol. 1 (Teschen and Vienna: Verlagsbuchhandlung Karl Prochaska/k.u.k. Hofbuchdruckerei, 1917), 3–13.

69 Freiherr von Czedik, *Zur Geschichte*, 12–13. The authors compiled the totals.

Table 7. Austrian Governments, 1895–1914

Year	Abgeordnetenhaus Election		Minister-President	
	Date	Electoral System	Name	Term
1895			Kasimir Felix Badeni	September 1895–November 1897
1896		Badeni Reform ¹		
1897	May 1897		Paul Gautsch von Frankenthurn	November 1897–March 1898
1898			Franz von Thun und Hohenstein	March 1898–September 1899
1899			Manfred von Clary-Aldringen Heinrich von Witteck	September–December 1899 December 1899–January 1900
1900			Ernest von Koerber	January 1900–December 1904
1901–1903	January 1901			
1904–1905			Paul Gautsch	January 1904–May 1906
1906			Konrad von Hohenlohe-Waldenburg-Schillingfürst Max Wladimir von Beck	May 1906 May 1906–November 1908
1907	May 1907	Beck Reform ²		
1908–1910			Richard von Bienenrth-Schmerling	November 1908–June 1911
1911–1914	June 1911		Paul von Gautsch Frankenthurn Karl von Stürgkh	June–November 1911 November 1911–October 1916

¹ The Badeni Reform introduced a Fifth Curia, elected through universal manhood suffrage, and added 72 seats to the 353 previously existing ones that the four socioeconomic curiae elected for a total of 425 seats. Voting took place through *Wahlmänner* (electors) in some Fourth Curia (Rural Communities) and Fifth Curia districts.

² The Beck Reform replaced the curial system with direct elections, based on universal manhood suffrage, and it expanded the Abgeordnetenhaus to 516 seats.

More recent appraisals of the cabinets uncover much greater partisan diversity than von Czedik acknowledged, especially following the rise of mass parties toward the end of the nineteenth century.⁷⁰ This was true of both so-called parliamentary cabinets and bureaucratic cabinets.⁷¹ There are several examples of the former.⁷² One is the cabinet of Fürst Franz Thun (1847–1916), a mem-

⁷⁰ See, for example, Helmut Rimpler, “Parlament und Regierung Cisleithaniens, 1867 bis 1914,” *Verfassung und Parlamentarismus*, vol. 7/1 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie*, 880, 886, 888, and 890; and Lothar Höbelt, “Parteien und Fraktionen im cisleithanischen Reichsrat,” in *Verfassung und Parlamentarismus*, vol. 7/1 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie*, 972, 977–80, 984, and 986–88.

⁷¹ Historians of the Austrian Parliament often use the phrase *Parlamentarisierung des Kabinetts* to refer to increasing numbers of parliamentary representatives joining the government and the term *Beamtenkabinette* to refer to cabinets of nonpartisan administrators and technocrats. No cabinet in Imperial Austria was strictly parliamentary, for reasons just noted.

⁷² The information that follows is based on a number of biographical sources, including Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, *Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon*, <http://www.biographien.ac.at/oebf>; Miroslav Buchvaldek et al., *Dějiny Československa v datech*, 2nd ed. (Prague: Svoboda, 1987), 589–91; and Teresa Stochel-Nabielska, “Das polnische Parteienspektrum in Galizien vor 1914: Eine Bestandsaufnahme der Bemühungen um die Demokratisierung des Landes” (PhD diss., University of Vienna, 2008).

ber of the Right Club in the Herrenhaus who was minister-president from 1898 to 1899 and whose ministers included members of the Constitutionally Loyal Great Landowners Party (Verfassungstreuer Großgrundbesitz Partei), Catholic People's Party (Katolische Volkspartei), Young Czech Party, Christian Social Party, and Kraków Conservative Party (Krakauer Konservative Partei; Polish: Konserwatyści krakowscy stańczycy), which was in the Polish Club (Polenklub; Polish: Koła Polskiego). Another nominally parliamentary government was that of the bureaucrat Dr. Baron Max Wladimir Beck (1854–1943), in office from 1906 to 1907, whose ministers came from the German People's Party (Deutsche Volkspartei), German Progressive Party (Deutsche Fortschrittspartei), Young Czech Party, and Polish Club, specifically a member of the Polish Podolaken (Polish: Podolacy), a conservative group centered in Eastern Galicia, and another from the Kraków Conservatives. A reconstituted Beck cabinet, following the first elections under universal manhood suffrage, included representatives of the Christian Social Party, German Agrarian Party (Deutsche Agrarpartei), German Progressive Party, German People's Party, Czech Agrarian Party (Czech: Česká strana agrární), Young Czech Party, and Polish Club, specifically one member of the Podolaken and one from the Kraków Conservatives. Both Beck cabinets also included two civil servants (counting Beck), officials who happened to be members of the Herrenhaus (two in the first cabinet and one in the second), and military officers who headed the Ministry of Defense. The government of a longtime civil servant, Graf Dr. Richard Bienerth (1863–1918), from 1908 to 1911, was a bureaucratic cabinet that the minister-president supplemented with spokesmen (*Vertrauensmänner*) for the German Agrarian Party, Christian Social Party, Constitutionally Loyal Great Landowners Party, Polish National Democratic Party (Polish: Stronnictwo Narodowo-Demokratyczne or Stronnictwo Demokratyczno-Narodowe), Polish Podolaken, Polish Democratic Party (Polish: Polskie Stronnictwo Demokratyczne or Stronnictwo Polskiej Demokracji), Kraków Conservative Party, and Old Czech Party (Czech: Staročeská strana; formally the National Party or Národní strana).⁷³ Finally, the bureaucratic government of Graf Dr. Karl Stürgkh (1859–1916), a member of the Constitutionally Loyal Great Landowners Party, that lasted from 1911 to 1916 included one member each of the Kraków Konservative Party, the Polish People's Party (Polish: Stronnictwo Ludowe), and the Old Czech Party (the Christian Socialist Party turned

73 The member of the Kraków Conservatives was Leo von Biliński (1846–1923), who, in 1907, won election to the Reichsrat, but also was in the Herrenhaus since 1900. From February 10, 1909 to January 9, 1911, he served as minister of finance in Bienerth's government. Note also that Bienerth did not concede to later Slavic Union demands for three additional Slavic ministers.

down a seat).⁷⁴ In these cabinets, the prominent role of professional politicians, all of whom came from Czech, German, and Polish parties in the Reichsrat, is apparent when one considers the balance between politicians and civil servants. Of the parliamentary governments, Thun's cabinet had six politicians, as opposed to four civil servants; Beck's initial cabinet had seven politicians and six civil servants; and Beck's reconstituted government had ten politicians and four civil servants. Even the allegedly nonpolitical cabinets had a significant number of partisan political figures: Bienenrth's cabinet had ten politicians and 18 civil servants, while Stürgkh's ministry had six politicians and 15 civil servants.

None of these ministries were proper grand coalitions, even had they been accountable to the Reichsrat. Nevertheless, several recurring patterns suggest a trajectory that was more consociational than majoritarian. First, from the beginning, cabinets consistently included representatives of Austria's three largest linguistic groups, German, Czech, and Polish speakers, which together comprised more than three-quarters of the Austrian population. Despite their exclusivity, Austrian cabinets hardly were simple tools of German or majority domination. Second, although there were pronounced leanings in favor of conservative, Christian, and liberal parties—the highly popular Social Democrats, for example, never were invited to join a cabinet—the so-called parliamentary cabinets included representatives from a wide variety of competing political camps. Finally, the 1871 creation of the Minister for Galician Affairs hints at the consociational practice of incorporating group representation into the executive. This last point should not be overstated, since that office essentially was a political sop to assure Polish loyalty and did nothing to raise the status of Galicia's sizeable Rusyn minority.⁷⁵

In this context, it is worth considering some aspects of the internal organization of the legislature itself, as they provide additional evidence of Austria's broadly inclusive approach to policy-making. The presidents and vice presidents of the Abgeordnetenhaus were not part of the executive, since these offices involved presiding over legislative sessions, not executing laws.⁷⁶ Lists of these of-

⁷⁴ The minister for Galician affairs, between November 19, 1911 and December 26, 1912, was Władysław Długosz (1864–1937), who, at the time, was in the Polish People's Party, essentially a peasant party. In 1913, he was one of the founding members of the breakaway Polish People's Party "Piast" (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe "Piast").

⁷⁵ Binder, *Galizien*, 329–30.

⁷⁶ Specifically, house presidents conducted the business of the Abgeordnetenhaus and maintained order, while it was in session; made preparations for forthcoming sessions; oversaw the lower house Secretariat; coordinated communication within the lower house; handled behavioral problems, such as excessive absences; and served as the lower house's external representative. Karl Neißer, *Beilage: Geschäftsordnung für das Abgeordnetenhaus des Reichsrates, Beschlossen am*

ficeholders, however, say much about the nature of authority within that chamber, encompassing an ever-increasing geographic and ethno-linguistic diversity. This is apparent from the officers' names and party affiliations. Between the First Session of the so-called enlarged Reichsrat, on April 29, 1861, and the Twenty-second Session, from July 21, 1911 to November 23, 1913, the Presidiums (Präsiden) grew from a president and two vice presidents to one president (by right of seniority) and nine vice presidents. In the last session, these included Victor Freiherr von Fuchs (Christian Socialist Party, Salzburg), Julius Sylvester (German National Party, Salzburg), Enrico Conci (Italian Peoples' Party, Tyrol), Ludomil German (Polish Democratic Party, Galicia), Karl Jukel (Christian Socialist Party, Lower Austria), Engelbert Pernerstorfer (Social Democratic Party, Lower Austria), Jožef Pogačnik (Croatian-Slovenian Club, Carniola), Julian Romanczuk (Ukrainian Club, Galicia), Josef Žďarský (Czech Agrarian Party, Bohemia), and Valeriano Freiherr von Malfatti (Italian Liberal Party, Tyrol).⁷⁷

The composition of committees in the Abgeordnetenhaus was similarly diverse. The lower house elected both standing and ad hoc committees, and it determined the number of members on both. The committee members, in turn, elected a *Vorsitzender* (chair), his *Stellvertreter* (deputy), and two *Schriftführer* (secretaries).⁷⁸ The 1906–1907 Electoral Reform Committee's membership reflects the broad inclusiveness of such bodies. That committee, whose members had stood for election under the 1896 five-curiae system and had been responsible for hammering out the details of the 1907 electoral reform, had 49 members. These represented 20 different parties and comprised 26 Germans, eight Czechs, seven Poles, four South Slavs, two Italians, one Romanian, and one Ruthenian. Of these, 22 came from the urban curiae, 12 came from rural communities, nine came from the curia of the great landowners, and six came from the Fifth Curia, which was elected on the basis of universal manhood suffrage.⁷⁹ Since this committee had the power to determine the degree of representation

2. März 1875; *Mit den Änderungen vom 16. Juli 1908 (Nebst einem Anhang)*, (Vienna and Leipzig: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1909), §§4, 6, 10, 12, 15, 18, 27–32, 36, 38–39, 41, 44, 46–48, 50, 52–53, 57, 60–63, 67–68, 72, and 74–77; *RGBl.*, no. 94, Law of 12 May 1873, §§3, 7–8, 10–12, and 16; *RGBl.*, no. 204, Law of December 20, 1909; and *RGBl.*, no. 232, Law of 22 December 22, 1910. Unlike ordinary representatives, the president was permitted to attend any lower house committee meeting, in an advisory capacity. Neißer, *Beilage*, §25. He was required to step away from his chair when speaking before the plenary as a representative, and he could not vote on matters before the lower house, with the exception of lower house elections. Neißer, *Beilage*, §§54 and 64.

⁷⁷ Adlgasser, *Mitglieder*, vol. 1, 163, 312–13, 334–35, and 537–38, and Tables 6 (p. XXXV), 9, (pp. XLIII–XLV), and 12 (pp. LX–LXI), as well as vol. 2, 755–56, 902–903, 941, 1033–1034, 1259–1260, and 1458.

⁷⁸ Neißer, *Beilage*, §§19 and 24.

⁷⁹ Jenks, *Austrian Electoral Reform*, 53; and Rumpler, "Parlament," 879.

each nationality was to have in future parliaments, the great diversity of its membership is especially noteworthy. The ethnic proportionality of committee memberships was even more pronounced under that new electoral system. After the 1911 election, for example, the Committee for Consultation on Nationalities Affairs (Ausschuß zur Beratung der nationalen Angelegenheit) included 51 members from 13 different provinces.⁸⁰ Of these, 18.87 percent were Czech (in terms of the national affiliation of their party and district), 39.62 percent German, 5.66 percent Italian, 15.09 percent Polish, 1.89 percent Romanian, 7.55 percent Ukrainian or Rusyn, 3.77 percent Slovene, and 3.77 percent Serbian or Croatian, numbers that corresponded very closely with each group's share of the Austrian population (Table 4).⁸¹

Even more revealing, in this regard, is the relationship between the Presidium and the Leadership Conference (Obmännerkonferenz or Senioren-Konvent). Although the Presidium formally controlled the flow of parliamentary business, for the most part, the leaders of the main parliamentary clubs actually made those decisions. This was the case, even though the constitution and Parliament's rules of procedure officially recognized neither the Leadership Conference nor the clubs themselves. Tellingly, until the 1896 electoral reform, the Conference included only the leaders of clubs supporting the government; however, by the early twentieth century, it included all clubs. In short, it went from being more of a majoritarian, exclusive institution to being a consensual, inclusive one. Its powers were extensive, effectively deciding the lower house's agenda and schedule, determining the size, composition, and activities of committees, and interpreting the rules of procedure. One of its main successes was helping to overcome recurrent obstruction after 1909, while simultaneously revising the procedural rules. After the 1907 electoral reform, both the legislative and executive branches de facto recognized its central role, and it often was referred to as the Presidium Conference (Präsidialkonferenz). It continued to meet after the outbreak of the First World War, when Parliament itself was out of session. After the war, equivalent bodies emerged in the legislatures of Austria-

80 Specifically, every province except for Carniola, Salzburg, Tyrol, and Vorarlberg.

81 Bureau der k.k. statistischen Zentralkommission, *Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen, 1911*, Table II (pp. 14–206); *Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten des österreichischen Reichsrats im Jahre 1911*, XXI. Session, vol. 1 (Vienna: k.k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1911), 1042. Here, the nationality of representatives is based on the linguistic majority in their electoral district, or in the case of Galicia's two-member districts, it is based on the membership in either Polish versus Ukrainian or Rusyn parliamentary clubs. Although the *Stenographische Protokolle* state that there were 52 committee members, it provides only 51 names.



Figure 2. The Austrian Reichsrat building or Reichsratsgebäude (constructed between 1874 and 1883), which the Danish architect, Theophil von Hansen (1813–1891) designed in the neoclassical style in accordance with the decision of an imperial commission Franz Joseph had appointed to oversee the construction of the legislature. The date of the photograph is between 1883, when the Reichsrat opened, and 1902, when the completed statue of Athena and the fountain, both of which Hansen had designed, finally appeared in front of the structure. This is the way the Reichsrat appeared in the autumn of 1897 when Mark Twain visited Vienna and wrote “Stirring Times in Austria” for *Harper’s New Monthly Magazine*. Source: From an albumen silver print by Wilhelm Kral (died 1900), a Viennese photographer. The image is in the collection of Daniel E. Miller.

Hungary's successor states.⁸² In a sense, the cabinets and the Leadership Conference were two halves of a true parliamentary government, with the cabinet taking on the conventional executive role, while the Conference focused on coordinating the legislative parties and on passing legislation. Strikingly, both of these bodies were essentially consociational in character.

The relationship between the minister-presidents and the Reichsrat is crucial for understanding how the cabinets approximated grand coalitions. Austrian governments faced a recurring threat of obstruction in the Abgeordnetenhaus, circumstances that typically led the Kaiser to seek the resignation of the minister-president if the latter failed to facilitate compromise and build a working majority among the elected representatives.⁸³ The most successful in creating such a majority was Graf Eduard Taaffe (1833–1895), who replaced earlier German liberal dominance in the Reichsrat with his famous Iron Ring, a coalition that lasted from 1879 to 1893 and consisted of Slavic, clerical, and conservative representatives.⁸⁴ Taaffe's much less skillful successors attempted to emulate his approach. Graf Kasimir Badeni (1846–1909), for example, formed a working majority, from 1895 to 1897, of 216 representatives—Czechs, Poles, Slavic-Christian-Nationals, Catholic populists, great landowners, and Romanians—that accounted for 50.82 percent of the 425-seat Abgeordnetenhaus. Later, Thun attempted something similar, with a thin majority that included the Catholic People's Party and Catholic Conservative Party.⁸⁵

It soon became apparent that a mere working majority was insufficient. Beginning with the ministry of Dr. Ernst von Koerber (1850–1919), which lasted from 1900 to 1904, minister-presidents began what has been termed a double majority system, one which combined a working majority (*Arbeitsmajorität*) with a much larger tolerance majority (*Toleranzmehrheit*), one that did not necessarily support the government but did not obstruct the legislature's proceedings.⁸⁶ Even Koerber's narrow working majority was quite diverse, including 216 Polish, Romanian, Slavic Center, Progressive South Slav, Czech, and German Catholic-Conservative representatives (defined in terms of their party and district), who accounted for 50.82 percent of the Abgeordnetenhaus. Later governments provided variations on this theme. Beck's efforts to create an all-party government,

82 Luft, *Parlamentarische Führungsgruppen*, vol. 1, 490–92.

83 Höbelt, *Parliamentary Politics*, 3.

84 Jenks, *Austria under the Iron Ring*.

85 Höbelt, "Parteien," 951–54 and 961–62.

86 This practice parallels Calhoun's concept of the "concurrent majority" that appeared in Ch. 1 of this study, in connection with the consociational minority veto. See Höbelt, *Parliamentary Politics*, 7.

a two-thirds majority that excluded only Social Democrats, liberal Ruthenians, Czech National Socialists, Czech Radical Progressives, and various German anticlerical radicals, came closest to a true grand coalition. Bienerth reverted to a narrow majority government, rooted in German, Polish, and Italian middle-class parties, but he continually renegotiated the government's composition, as parties entered and left the working majority. Finally, Stürgkh attempted a complex combination of parties, which he drew from all the nationalities, in order to play off divisions within each of them, thereby hobbling the opposition and further blurring the distinction between majority and opposition.

It would be a great exaggeration to claim that Imperial Austrian cabinets exemplified the kinds of intergroup cooperation and compromise characteristic of consociationalism. More accurately, something akin to that style of politics emerged occasionally, for example under Koerber's double majority system, providing a model for how a divided legislature potentially could get things done. The *de facto* requirement of a tacit supermajority magnified the already somewhat consociational character of Imperial Austrian cabinets. Although they were neither actual parliamentary governments nor true grand coalitions, the cabinets themselves were hardly majoritarian, thanks to the partisan and ethnic diversity of the ministers. Meanwhile, legislative institutions and procedures further emphasized inclusiveness in the legislative process. Finally, the politics of the double majority that arose, as the suffrage expanded, provided a kind of informal accountability to an oversized majority, pushing Austrian policy making in an even more inclusive, if often chaotic direction.

Minority Veto

Although the 1867 constitution did not grant Austria's nationalities a specific right to veto legislation, such a formal provision is not necessary for consociationalism, which often enshrines the minority veto in informal practice.⁸⁷ Something akin to that practice existed in the Austrian legislative process, which frequently was a messy affair, one in which even small groups held the power to block unwanted legislation by using procedural obstruction.⁸⁸ The Reichsrat's rules of procedure specified the absolute number of legislators necessary for

⁸⁷ Lijphart, "Puzzle," 261.

⁸⁸ Detailed accounts of the history of parliamentary obstruction in the Austrian Parliament appear in Höbelt, "Parteien"; Rumpel, "Parlament"; and Berthold Sutter, "Probleme einer österreichischen Parlamentsgeschichte, 1848–1918," in *Verfassung und Parlamentarismus*, vol. 7/1 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie*, 541–68. For an elaboration of this interpretation of Austrian obstructionism, see Howe, "Well-Tempered Discontent," 365–75.

specific procedural motions. Because these rules remained largely unchanged, increasingly tiny fractions could make such motions as the legislature increased in size over the decades. By 1907, 50 of the 516 representatives (9.69 percent) could demand a roll-call vote, 20 (3.88 percent) could introduce a motion, 15 (2.90 percent) could call for an interpellation, and a single member (0.19 percent) could introduce a petition.⁸⁹ Austria's highly fragmented party system further enhanced the potential for obstruction.⁹⁰ In 1907, for example, the so-called Pan-German Club held a mere three out of 233 German seats and faced numerous ideologically similar competitors.⁹¹ Furthermore, the absence of a formal vote of no confidence meant that obstruction was the main way to keep the executive in check. The immediate consequences of doing so often were minimal because, when the Reichsrat was out of session, the Kaiser consistently refused to use his formally impressive emergency powers to decree fundamental constitutional or policy changes. Small groups in the Reichsrat, therefore, could block unwanted legislation without fearing a significant change in the status quo.⁹²

"The very fact that the veto is available as a potential weapon gives a feeling of security, which makes the actual use of it improbable," Lijphart observed.⁹³ This hardly applied to the Reichsrat. Nevertheless, Austrian politicians stumbled across the correct principle: creating a set of practices that prevented the executive and parliamentary majorities from imposing their will on reluctant minorities. Unfortunately, these same practices were bound up with some of the remaining undemocratic characteristics of the Austrian political system, such as the lack of formal ministerial responsibility to the legislature and the executive's power to rule by decree. That they, at various times, prevented the Reichsrat from doing anything at all is a major reason for that body's ongoing poor reputation as a legislature.⁹⁴

89 Neißer, *Beilage*, §§18, 63, 68, and 70.

90 Howe, "Electoral Institutions," 184–89.

91 One cannot underestimate factionalism within the German national-liberal camp. In 1911, the already tiny Pan-German faction, for example, faced electoral competition from "Free Pan-Germans" (*Freialldeutsche*). See Bureau der k.k. statistischen Zentralkommission, *Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen, 1911*, Table I-2 (p. 6).

92 See Gernot D. Hasiba, *Das Notverordnungsrecht in Österreich (1848–1917)* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1985) for a full history of these emergency powers and their use.

93 Lijphart, *Democracy*, 37.

94 One must not overlook the Reichsrat's significant legislative accomplishments. Numerous examples can be found in Höbelt, *Parliamentary Politics*, 5–6; Höbelt, "Parteien," 951, 957, 960, 963, 967–68, 971–74, 979, 981–83, 988, and 990–92; Kann, *History*, 356–58, 422, and 427–30; Rumppler, "Parlament," 833–37, 852–53, 858–59, 872–81, 886, and 891; and Sutter, "Probleme," 548, 550, 552, and 565–66.

Proportionality

With each expansion of voting rights, the ethnic distribution of parliamentary mandates among the officially recognized nationalities, though never perfectly proportional, became increasingly so. This gradual shift to universal manhood suffrage took place through four electoral reforms.⁹⁵ Originally, the elections were indirect, in that voters elected the Diets, which in turn chose the 203 Abgeordnetenhaus representatives, as established in Statute 141 of the 1867 constitution.⁹⁶ Because exclusive socioeconomic curiae elected these diets, the Abgeordnetenhaus, at the time, was very much an elite institution. Furthermore, German representatives initially held a clear majority.⁹⁷ Afterward, progressive reforms increasingly undermined the elite character of the Reichsrat and rapidly evaporated the Germans' artificial majority.

Four reforms that expanded the franchise took place in 1873, 1882, 1896, and 1907. The reform of 1873 introduced direct elections to the Abgeordnetenhaus, which simultaneously grew to 353 mandates. Four curiae—Great Landowners, Cities and Markets, Chambers of Commerce, and Rural Communities—elected the deputies, with suffrage limited to those paying at least 10 Gulden in taxes.⁹⁸ Elections in the Fourth Curia remained indirect because electors (*Wahlmänner*) mediated the voting, and in some places, voting in that curia took place publicly. Qualified voters, in all curiae, were male citizens who were at least 24 years old, although a few female great landowners could vote, albeit through an appointed male representative. The relatively minor 1882 reform redrew some of the districts, and, in a more significant step, it lowered the tax requirement to 5 Gulden, thereby bringing more members of the middle class and well-off farmers into the electorate.⁹⁹ The 1896 reform was a much bigger step in the direction of democracy.¹⁰⁰ This reform introduced a Fifth Curia, elected through universal manhood suffrage, thereby establishing plural voting for those men who already had been qualified to vote in one of the older curiae. The lower house expanded to 425 seats in order to accommodate these new mandates, while the tax requirement for curial voters dropped to 4 Gulden. Voting took place through electors in some Fourth and Fifth Curia districts, reflecting a linger-

95 For a more detailed account of each of these reforms, see Howe, "Electoral Institutions," and Howe, "Well-Tempered Discontent."

96 *RGBl.*, no. 141, Law of December 21, 1867, §§ 6-7.

97 Lothar Höbelt, "Die Vertretung der Nationalitäten im Reichsrat," in *Österreichs Parlamentarismus*, Table 1 (p. 193).

98 *RGBl.*, no. 40, Law of April 2, 1873.

99 *RGBl.*, no. 142, Law of October 4, 1882.

100 *RGBl.*, no. 168, Law of June 14, 1896.

ing distrust in some regions of Austria of ordinary peoples' ability to choose their own representatives.

The 1907 reform was the final step in the process toward democratizing the electoral system. This reform abolished the curial system, along with public voting, replacing it with direct elections, based on universal manhood suffrage, to a newly expanded 516-seat lower house.¹⁰¹ The elections for most of these seats used an absolute majority runoff formula in single-member districts.¹⁰² In a fascinating attempt to accommodate Eastern Galicia's complex ethnolinguistic demography, the 1907 reform prescribed that voting there take place in two-member districts, an incredibly awkward system intended to guarantee one Polish and one Rusyn representative from each district.¹⁰³ Meanwhile, Czech and German voters in Moravia registered on separate voters' lists, thereby guaranteeing a specified number of ethnically homogeneous districts for each ethnic group.

The electoral reforms that took place between 1867 and 1907 made the distribution of seats by nationality increasingly proportional (see Table 8). The 1907 reform was an explicit attempt to create districts with clear national majorities, much like the system that exists today in India. Some of the remaining disproportionality resulted from the principle that provinces paying a greater amount in direct taxes should have a greater share of seats, thereby favoring the wealthier ethnic groups.¹⁰⁴ Some smaller groups benefitted as well. Specifically, based on the official designation of nationalities, Germans, Italians, and Romanians received more mandates than their population warranted, while Slovenes acquired a proportional share, and Czechs, Poles and Serbo-Croatians obtained a somewhat lesser portion. Meanwhile, Ruthenians received less than half their share of mandates, while explicitly Jewish districts did not even exist.¹⁰⁵ Crucially, no one group held a majority after the earliest years of par-

¹⁰¹ *RGBL*, no. 17, Law of January 26, 1907.

¹⁰² "Single-member districts" elect only one representative.

¹⁰³ The scheme was only partially successful. For details on the workings of this unique but ill-conceived effort at electoral engineering, see Binder, *Galizien*, 189–90; and Howe, "Well-tempered Discontent," 161–66.

¹⁰⁴ Brauneder, *Österreichische Verfassungsgeschichte*, 159–60.

¹⁰⁵ The lesser share of mandates for Ruthenians was nonetheless a substantial gain, in the face of ongoing Polish dominance in Galicia, explaining Ruthenian politicians' willingness to concede to the 1907 reform. Harald Binder, "Die Wahlreform von 1907 und der polnisch-ruthenische Konflikt in Ostgalizien," *Österreichische Osthefte* 38, no. 3 (1996): 311–12. Under universal manhood suffrage, Jewish National and Zionist candidates represented many Jews. Furthermore, as part of the Bukovina and Galician Compromises, gerrymandering safe Jewish seats in German districts indirectly guaranteed Jewish representation in the diets of those two provinces. John Leslie, "Der Ausgleich in der Bukowina von 1910: Zur österreichischen Nationalitätenpolitik von dem Ersten Weltkrieg," in *Geschichte zwischen Freiheit und Ordnung: Gerald Stourzh zum 60. Geburtstag*, ed. Emil Brix, Thomas Fröschl, and Josef Leidenfrost (Graz: Böhlau Verlag GmbH & Co.

Table 8. The Proportionality of Ethnic Representation in Austria, 1907

Ethnic Group	Number of Seats	Percentage of Seats	Population (1900)	Percentage of Population (1900)	Population per Seat	Ratio of Percentage of Seats to Percentage of the Population
Czechs	107	20.74	5,955,397	23.23	55,658	0.89
Germans	233	45.16	9,170,939	35.78	39,360	1.26
Italians	19	3.68	727,102	2.84	38,269	1.3
Poles	81	15.7	4,259,152	16.62	52,582	0.94
Romanians	5	0.97	230,963	0.9	46,193	1.08
Ruthenians	33	6.4	3,375,576	13.17	102,290	0.49
Serbo-Croatians	13	2.52	711,380	2.77	54,722	0.91
Slovenes	24	4.65	1,192,780	4.65	49,699	1
Undetermined	1	0.19				
Total	516	100	25,632,805	100	49,676	1

Source: Based on Bureau der k.k. statistischen Zentralkommission, *Ergebnisse der Reichsratswahlen in den im Reichsrat vertretenen Königreichen und Ländern im Jahre 1907*, Österreichische Statistik, vol. 84, part 2 (Vienna: k.-k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1908), Table II (p.V); and Peter Urbanitsch, "Die Deutschen," in *Die Völker des Reiches*, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, vol. 3, part 1 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848-1918*, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980), Table 1 (after p. 38).

liamentary elections, and since the 1870s, the entire process of electoral reform moved overwhelmingly in the direction of electoral proportionality.

Similar developments took place in public employment and education. Throughout the monarchy's history, the state was a significant source of employment. As a somewhat rough measure, at the time of the 1910 census, 14.42 percent of employed Austrians worked in "public service, the free professions, etc." (öffentliche Dienst, freie Berufe, u.a.).¹⁰⁶ All linguistic groups benefitted from public employment. Although some were more likely to be in the bureaucracy and military than others, each group's portion of such employment was at least roughly equivalent to their share of the Austrian population (see Table 9). Specifically, German speakers were overrepresented in both the active military and in the category of court and state service, Italian speakers were overrepresented in court and state service, and Magyar and Polish speakers were more or less fairly represented in both the active military and in the court and state service.

KG, 1991), 124-32; Gerald Stourzh, "Ethnic Attribution in Late Imperial Austria," 73-74; and Stourzh, *Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten in der Verfassung und Verwaltung Österreichs 1848-1918* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1985), 233-40.

¹⁰⁶ Bureau der k.k. statistischen Zentralkommission, *Berufsstatistik nach den Ergebnissen der Volkszählung vom 31. Dezember 1910 in Österreich: Hauptübersicht und Besprechung der Ergebnisse*, Österreichische Statistik, New Series, vol. 3, part 1 (Vienna: kaiserlich-königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1916), Übersicht 5 (p. 16).

Table 9. Proportionality of Military and of Court and State Service Employment in Austria, 1910

	Czechs	Germans	Italians	Magyars	Poles	Romanians	Ruthenians	Serbo-Croatians	Slovenes	Total
Percentage of Population	23.02	35.58	2.75	0.04	17.77	0.98	12.58	2.8	4.48	100
Percentage of Active Military	17.96	42.13	2.37	0.04	11.59	0.64	9.26	2.27	3.39	89.652
Percentage of Court and State Service ¹	20.6	46.09	3.93	0.01	17.33	0.64	3.97	1.89	2.93	97.393
Ratio of Active Military to Population	0.78	1.18	0.86	1	0.65	0.65	0.74	0.81	0.76	1
Ratio of Court and State Service to Population	0.89	1.3	1.43	0.25	0.98	0.65	0.32	0.68	0.65	1

¹ The German term for the category is "*Hof- und Staatsdienst u.a.*"

² Noncitizens were 10.35 percent of Austria's active military.

³ Noncitizens were 2.61 percent of those employed in court and state service.

Source: Based on Bureau der k.k. statistischen Zentralkommission, *Berufsstatistik nach den Ergebnissen der Volkszählung vom 31. Dezember 1910 in Österreich: Hauptübersicht und Besprechung der Ergebnisse*, Österreichische Statistik, New Series, vol. 3, part 1 (Vienna: kaiserlich-königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1916), "Sprachenverteilung nach Berufsgruppen," Übersicht 70, p. 90; and Peter Urbanitsch, "Die Deutschen," in *Die Völker des Reiches*, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, vol. 3, part 1 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848-1918*, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980), Table 1 (after p. 38) and Table 16 (after p. 138).

To some extent, these proportions paralleled the relative economic standing of each group, and some of the less-represented groups may have made advancements had the monarchy survived and continued to integrate economically. Furthermore, although the language of the bureaucracy remained a hotly contested issue, the principle that civil servants, in the Austrian portion of the monarchy, were able to use the local language when communicating with the populations they served was entrenched firmly in practice.¹⁰⁷ Most important, proportionality, even though it lacked firm legal grounding, ensured that one group did not completely dominate the bureaucracy.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, public primary schools (*Volkschulen*) and secondary schools (*Bürgerschulen*) had become highly proportional in their languages of instruction (Table 10).¹⁰⁸ Just before the First World War,

¹⁰⁷ For considerations of the status of the languages in each province and the politically crucial legal distinction between a "provincial language" (*Landessprache*) and a "customary language of a province" (*landesübliche Sprache*), see Kann, *The Multinational Empire*, vol. 1: *Empire and Nationality*, 196–200; Sked, *Decline*, 220–221.

¹⁰⁸ The term *secondary school*, used here in place of *Bürgerschule*, obscures the great variety of secondary educational institutions in Austria. *Bürgerschulen* were public schools that offered a secondary education as preparation for a trade. The distribution of other secondary institutions,

Table 10. Language of Instruction in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools in Austria, 1881-1913¹

Language of Instruction ²	1881-1882				1893-1894				1912-1913			
	Schools		Population 1880	Ratio	Schools		Population 1890	Ratio	Schools		Population 1910	Ratio
	Number	Percent	Percent		Number	Percent	Percent		Number	Percent	Percent	
Czech	4031	26	24	1.07	4,716	26	23	1.11	5,974	26	23	1.11
German	7,059	45	37	1.22	7652	42	36	1.17	8819	38	36	1.06
Hungarian	3	0	0	0.38	3	0	0	0.41	4	0	0	0.43
Italian ³	892	6	3	1.84	862	5	3	1.65	730	3	3	1.13
Polish	1,485	9	15	0.63	1,966	11	16	0.68	3,512	15	18	0.84
Romanian	93	1	1	0.68	156	1	1	0.96	214	1	1	0.93
Ruthenian	1,779	11	13	0.88	2,089	12	13	0.87	2,778	12	13	0.94
Serbo-Croatian	312	2	3	0.76	376	2	3	0.75	621	3	3	0.95
Slovene	682	4	5	0.83	783	4	5	0.86	1026	4	5	0.98
Total	15788	100	100	1	18182	100	100	1	23409	100	100	1

¹ The German phrase for “public elementary and secondary schools” was “*öffentliche Volksschulen und Bürgerschulen*.” Other secondary schools were not as proportional as the *Bürgerschulen*. For the different kinds of secondary schools in Austria, see note 110 in this chapter.

² Each category includes schools with multiple languages of instruction, for example, the German category includes schools with instruction in German and in German as well as other languages, such as German and Czech or German and Polish.

³ Includes Ladin (German: *Ladinisch*).

Source: Based on Hannelore Burger, *Sprachenrecht und Sprachgerechtigkeit im österreichischen Unterrichtswesen, 1867-1918* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1995), Table 1A (pp. 246-247); and Peter Urbanitsch, “Die Deutschen,” in *Die Völker des Reiches*, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, vol. 3, part 1 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie. 1848-1918*, ed. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980), Table 1 (after p. 38).

the language of instruction in these schools had become almost perfectly proportional, with Czech, German, and Italian speakers having slightly more than a proportional share of schools in their language and other groups having nearly

by contrast, was less proportional. See Hannelore Burger, *Sprachenrecht und Sprachgerechtigkeit im österreichischen Unterrichtswesen, 1867-1918* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1995), Table 2A (p. 250), Table 3 (p. 254), Table 4A (p. 256), and Table 4C (p. 260). Other kinds of secondary schools included *Realschulen*, which emphasized mathematics and the natural sciences, *Lehrer- und Lehrerinnen-Bildungsanstalten*, which were teacher education schools; *Gymnasien*, which were schools that provided a general education as preparation for university; and *Realgymnasien*, a hybrid of *Realschulen* and *Gymnasien*. Although not strictly proportional, these schools taught in Czech, German, Italian, or Polish, that is, the languages of the largest and most industrialized groups, revealing significant pluralism in the language of instruction, even at that more elite educational level.

a proportional share. The two outstanding exceptions were the Polish speakers, who had a slightly lesser share, and the Magyar speakers, whose much lesser share might have resulted from their small numbers in the western half of the monarchy and their lack of representation in the Reichsrat.

The principle of proportionality, although never fully achieved in Imperial Austria, characterized both elections and important parts of public policy. Still skewed somewhat in favor of wealthier linguistic groups, the distribution of parliamentary mandates, civil service, and military employment, as well as public education became increasingly proportional over time. By the first decades of the twentieth century, no group could claim a monopoly on any major aspect of public life.

Segmental Autonomy

The ethno-linguistic heterogeneity of most of Imperial Austria's 17 provinces prevented territorial federalism from being an easy solution to the problems of nationalist conflict. Nevertheless, several aspects of the political system at least pointed in the direction of non-territorial federalism.¹⁰⁹ One example is the establishment of separate, ethnically defined homogeneous electoral districts for Czechs and Germans in Moravia, which built parliamentary representation around group identity as much as territory, at least for a fraction of the Austrian citizenry. Another is a series of regional compromises that provided a degree of group autonomy on the provincial and city levels and promised to curtail nationalist antagonism in the diets and in city governments. In addition, cultural autonomy increasingly characterized educational policy.

The Austrian constitution, specifically Article 19 of the December 31, 1867 basic law, regarding the rights of citizens, stated:

All of the state's nationalities have equal rights, and each nationality has an inviolable right to the protection and cultivation of its nationality and language. The equality of all languages customary to a province, in schools, government offices, and public life, is recognized by the state. In provinces in which several nationalities live, public educational institutions shall be established in such a way that each of these nationalities receives the necessary means for education in its language, without being forced to learn a second provincial language.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ See the discussion of this variety of federalism in ch 1.

¹¹⁰ "Alle Volksstämme des Staates sind gleichberechtigt, und jeder Volksstamm hat ein unverletzliches Recht auf Wahrung und Pflege seiner Nationalität und Sprache. Die Gleichberechtigung aller Landesüblichen Sprachen in Schule, Amt und öffentlichem Leben wird vom Staate anerkannt.

Despite this constitutional guarantee, the extent of and means of implementing the group rights of Austria's nationalities were never clear, and politicians still were working out their legal and political bases in the monarchy's last years.¹¹¹ Nevertheless, the principles that bureaucrats should communicate with their constituents and that children should receive an education in their own language were firmly in place by the last decades before the First World War. In fact, the 1873 Bohemian School Supervision Law (*Schulaufsichtsgesetz*), one of the provincial laws passed to implement the May 25, 1868, School-Church Law, which provided for secular education throughout Austria, established separate Czech and German local school boards (*Ortsschulräte*) in linguistically mixed regions.¹¹² Over time, school boards were increasingly segregated, on the provincial level, through specific compromises.¹¹³

The creation of separate universities provided an additional form of educational autonomy, although the emergence of universities for specific nationalities was more a result of ad hoc concessions than a uniformly applied principle. Sometimes, this practice engendered heated conflicts, such as German protests in response to the introduction of parallel Slovene classes in Celje (German: Cilli), located in the Imperial Austrian province of Styria, now in Slovenia, and protests that prevented the opening of an Italian law faculty in Innsbruck, in the northern part of Tyrol, now in Austria. Nonetheless, there were several successful compromises: the Czech-German partitioning of the university in Prague (German: Prag), Bohemia, now in the Czech Republic; the introduction of courses taught in Ukrainian at the Polish university in Lviv (Polish: Lwów; Ukrainian: Львів), in the eastern part of the province Galicia, now in Ukraine; and the cre-

In den Ländern, in welchen mehrere Volksstämme wohnen, sollen die öffentlichen Unterrichtsanstalten derart eingerichtet sein, daß ohne Anwendung eines Zwanges zur Erlernung einer zweiten Landessprache jeder dieser Volksstämme die erforderliche Mittel zur Ausbildung in seiner Sprache erhält." *RGBl.*, no. 142, Basic Law (*Staatsgrundgesetz*) of December 21, 1867, Art. 19.

¹¹¹ Two volumes—Edmund Bernatzik, ed., *Die österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze mit Erläuterung*, 2nd expanded ed., Studienausgabe Österreichischer Gesetze, vol. 3 (Vienna: Manzschke k.u.k. Hof-, Verlags-, und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1911), 883–1016; and Stourzh, *Gleichberechtigung*—provide comprehensive overviews of the ambiguities and ongoing evolution of nationalities' rights from the 1867 basic law to the end of the monarchy. This area of Austrian law and practice appears to comply with Hanna Lerner's principle that constitutions in deeply divided societies should not be too specific, thereby allowing the relevant groups to work out the details with each other in an ad hoc manner. See Lerner, *Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies*.

¹¹² Burger, *Sprachenrecht*, 41–42.

¹¹³ Emil Brix, "Der Böhmisches Ausgleich in Budweis," *Österreichische Osthefte* 24 (1982): 225–48; Hannelore Burger, "Der Verlust der Mehrsprachigkeit: Aspekte des Mährischen Ausgleichs," *Bohemia: Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur der böhmischen Länder/A Journal of History and Civilization in East Central Europe* 34/1 (1993): 77–89; Leslie, "Ausgleich"; Stourzh, "Ethnic Attribution"; Stourzh, "Ethnicizing"; Stourzh, *Gleichberechtigung*, 213–40; and Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*, 32–48.

ation of a Croatian university in Zagreb (German: Agram; Hungarian: Záráb), in the Hungarian portion of the monarchy, now in Croatia.¹¹⁴ The last example was not in the Western half of the monarchy, but, given that a significant Croatian population lived in both halves of the monarchy and that South Slav nationalism and partisan politics by no means stopped at the border, the creation of a Croatian university was an important development for Austrian Croats as well as Croats in Hungary. The fact that ethnically Croatian students from Imperial Austria studied in Zagreb, just as Slovaks studied in Prague, underscored the cultural importance of the University of Zagreb.¹¹⁵

Imperial Austria never thoroughly instituted segmental autonomy. Nevertheless, various forms of federalism were among the Austrian strategies for managing intergroup tensions. Austria was a plural society, and both public and private organizations became increasingly segregated, the case of educational institutions being the most striking.¹¹⁶ In short, the very consociational notions that power be divided along group lines and that each group have a major voice in its own education and language policy increasingly became a part of actual political practice in Austria.

Although Imperial Austria was neither democratic nor consociational, major interrelated developments in both directions took place. Austrian cabinets became more inclusive and informally answered to an oversized majority in the elected Abgeordnetenhaus. The rules of procedure and political practice provided ample opportunity for even very small groups of representatives to block policies that threatened their constituents. The distribution of seats in the lower house as well as public employment and educational opportunities increasingly corresponded with linguistic usage among the inhabitants of Cisleithania. Non-territorial electoral districts in Moravia, language policy, and education emphasized group cultural and political autonomy. Meanwhile, a series of compromises that occurred on the provincial and city levels, in the last years before the First World War, took these developments even further.

¹¹⁴ Kann, *History*, 439; and Banac, *National Question*, 91–115.

¹¹⁵ Although the University of Zagreb did not attract as many students from Imperial Austria as administrators had expected, the numbers were significant. Between 1875 and 1911, 8.41 percent of the entire student body came from Cisleithania. The annual percent fluctuated, at first, and then steadily increased, beginning in 1902, with the exception of 1908. In 1910, it peaked at 17.98 percent. Kr. Zemaljskog statističkov ureda, *Statistički godišnjak Kraljevina Hrvatske i Slavonije*, vol. 1: 1905 (Zagreb: Kr. Zemaljski statistički ured, 1913), Table 73E (p. 752); and Kr. Zemaljskog statističkov ureda, *Statistički godišnjak Kraljevina Hrvatske i Slavonije*, vol. 2: 1906–1910 (Zagreb: Kr. Zemaljski statistički ured, 1917), Table 39E (p. 523). See also Tihana Luetić, “Struktura studenata Filozofskog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu (1874–1914.) po mjestu rođenja i zavičajnosti,” *Historijski zbornik* 60 (2007): 103–117.

¹¹⁶ Stourzh, “Ethnicizing,” 293–96.

Regional Compromises as Semi-Democratic Consociationalism

In the first decades of the twentieth century, Austrian politicians implemented a series of regional compromises intended to curtail nationalist conflict. The earliest and most thoroughly studied of these is the 1905 Moravian Compromise.¹¹⁷ This compromise became the model for the Bukovina Compromise of 1910, a similar compromise in the town of České Budějovice (German: Budweis), and another, on the eve of the First World War, in the province of Galicia.¹¹⁸ These reforms were part of a broader trend, as talk of further compromises in Bohemia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Olomouc (German: Olmütz) were in the air, although the war prevented these from becoming reality.¹¹⁹

The Moravian Compromise attempted to reconcile the competing demands of Czech and German political forces within that province by reforming existing representative institutions. Moravia, whose population, according to the 1910 census, was 71.75 percent Czech-speaking and 27.62 percent German-speaking, did not experience the levels of hostility associated with nationalist politics in neighboring Bohemia; therefore, it was an ideal setting for such a compromise.¹²⁰ Four laws that reformed the provincial diet, electoral system, school administration, and provincial language policy constituted the compromise, which Franz Joseph sanctioned on November 27, 1905.¹²¹

The compromise implemented institutions and practices that students of consociationalism should find quite familiar. The Moravian Diet increased in size,

¹¹⁷ Burger, "Der Verlust"; Horst Glassl, *Der mährische Ausgleich* (Munich: Fides-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1967); Peter Haslinger, *Nation und Territorium im tschechischen politischen Diskurs, 1880-1938* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag), 192-97; T. Mills Kelly, "Last Best Chance or Last Gasp? The Compromise of 1905 and Czech Politics in Moravia," *Austria History Yearbook* 34 (2003): 279-301; Stourzh, "Ethnic Attribution"; Stourzh, "Ethnicizing"; Stourzh, *Gleichberechtigung*, 213-28; Solomon Wank, "Some Reflections on the Habsburg Empire and Its Legacy in the Nationalities Question," *Austrian History Yearbook* 28 (1997): 131-46; and Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*, 32-48.

¹¹⁸ See Glassl, *Der mährische Ausgleich*, 243; Haslinger, *Nation und Territorium*, 196; Leslie, "Ausgleich"; Stourzh, "Ethnic Attribution," 73; Stourzh, "Ethnicizing," 320-21; Brix, "Der böhmische Ausgleich in Budweis," 225-48; King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans*, 115, 133, 137-47, 150-52, 173, 180, and 209-210; Börries Kuzmany, "Der Galizische Ausgleich als Beispiel moderner Nationalitätenpolitik?" in *Galizien: Peripherie der Modern-Moderne der Peripherie?*, ed. Elisabeth Haid, Stephanie Weismann, and Burkhard Woller (Marburg: Verlag Herder-Institut, 2013), 123-41; Stourzh, "Ethnic Attribution," 73-74; Stourzh, "Ethnicizing," 321; and Stourzh, *Gleichberechtigung*, 229-40.

¹¹⁹ Brix, "Der böhmische Ausgleich in Budweis," 238; Glassl, *Der mährische Ausgleich*, 243; Stourzh, "Ethnicizing," 320; Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*, 34; and Eva Drašarová, Roman Horký, Jiří Šouša, and Luboš Velek, ed., *Promarněná šance: Edice dokumentů k česko-německému vyrovnání před první světovou válkou. Korespondence a protokoly, 1911-1922*, 2 vols., trans. Wolf B. Oerter and Jaroslav Koláčný (Prague: Národní archiv, 2008).

¹²⁰ Urbanitsch, "Die Deutschen," Table 1 (after p. 38).

¹²¹ Glassl, *Der mährische Ausgleich*, 10 and 236.

from 100 to 151 mandates, 73 designated for Czechs, 40 for Germans, 30 for provincial aristocrats and great landowners, six for members of the chambers of commerce, and two for high ecclesiastical figures, specifically, the Prince Archbishop of Olomouc and the Bishop of Brno (German: Br $\ddot{u}$ nn).¹²² The purpose of these arrangements was to guarantee that neither Czechs nor Germans could override each other on issues they perceived as essential for their group's interest.¹²³ Meanwhile, the reorganized Provincial Executive Committee included four Czechs, two Germans, and two great landowners. To produce the desired distribution of seats in the diet, Moravian citizens had to enroll in either a Czech or a German register of voters (*Wahlkataster*), and the compromise gerrymandered the districts to provide separate Czech and German representatives for each Moravian city or judicial district (*Gerichtbezirk*) that had a mixed population. Simultaneously, separate national school boards at the local and provincial levels came into being, although the compromise did not create a separate Czech university.¹²⁴

These arrangements corresponded with all four consociational principles. First, the distribution of seats involved proportionality—in fact overrepresentation—for the German-speaking minority.¹²⁵ Second, the guaranteed inclusion of Czechs and Germans on the Provincial Executive Committee matches one of the forms of grand coalition that Lijphart described.¹²⁶ Third, the creation of a legislative balance of power to protect German interests provided a *de facto* minority veto. Finally, the separation of school boards is an example of segmental autonomy for the two linguistically defined communities.

Although these arrangements may have been consociational, they were not thoroughly democratic. For one thing, provincial elections did not adhere to the principle of universal and equal suffrage. In the decades following the 1867 Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich*, the Moravian Diet, like those of the other prov-

¹²² Kelly, "Last Best Chance," 294.

¹²³ Glassl, *Der mährische Ausgleich*, 10.

¹²⁴ Glassl, *Der mährische Ausgleich*, 236–38; Kelly, "Last Best Chance," 295–96; and Stourzh, "Ethnic Attribution," 72–73.

¹²⁵ Were only German candidates elected to the 40 guaranteed German seats, German representatives would have made up 26.5 percent of the Diet, quite close to German speakers' share of the Moravian population. The actual proportion of Germans in the Diet depended on the nationality of the representatives of the landowners and chambers, and there was the possibility that these representatives did not identify with either national group. Meanwhile, the 73 Czech seats fell short of a majority (48.3 percent), despite the fact that Czech speakers were nearly three-quarters of the population. Kelly noted that Czechs eventually could hope to approach a true majority by dominating the Chambers of Commerce. Kelly, "Last Best Chance," 294.

¹²⁶ Andeweg, "Consociational Democracy, 520; Lijphart, *Democracy*, 31–36; and Lijphart, "Puzzle," 259–60.

inces, gradually expanded voting rights. Unlike elections to the lower house of the Austrian Reichsrat, however, elections exclusively through universal manhood suffrage never took place at the provincial level, and elections to the 17 provincial diets continued under the old curial system. The overrepresentation of the socioeconomic elite, especially of great landowners, was a consequence of that system. Tax requirements for voting in these curiae further restricted the suffrage. A number of provinces, following the model of the 1896 Reichsrat electoral reform, eventually added a curia elected through universal manhood suffrage, thereby establishing plural voting for adult men who also qualified to vote in one of the other curiae.¹²⁷ Such arrangements severely disadvantaged the newly rising mass parties, such as the Social Democrats and clericals. For example, in the 1905 Moravian Diet election, such parties received only 51 percent of the vote for seats elected on the basis of restricted suffrage, compared to 86 percent of the vote for the small number of seats elected through universal manhood suffrage.¹²⁸ Meanwhile, the executive on the provincial and central levels remained undemocratic, evolving into a “duplication of administration” (*Doppelgleisigkeit der Verwaltung*), by which provincial (*Landesverwaltung*) and state administrations (*staatliche Verwaltung im Lande*) simultaneously governed the provinces.¹²⁹

In 1910, a similar compromise took place in Bukovina, Imperial Austria’s easternmost province. At that time, Bukovina had a population that was 38.38 percent Ukrainian- and Rusyn-speaking, 34.37 percent Romanian-speaking, 21.24 percent German-speaking, and 4.55 percent Polish-speaking, along with a small number of people whom the census identified as Hungarians and Armenians.¹³⁰ The linguistic basis of these data conceals a substantial German-speaking Jewish population of 12.84 percent, which had the potential to be a distinct nationality, even if the Imperial administration did not officially recognize it as such.¹³¹ The absence of an ethnic majority and a solid history of interethnic accommodation facilitated the compromise, despite the rise of national tensions toward the end of the nineteenth century.¹³²

¹²⁷ For detailed surveys of representative institutions and electoral reforms in each of the provinces, see *Verfassung und Parlamentarismus*, part 2: *Die regionalen Repräsentativkörperschaften*, ed. Helmut Rumpler and Peter Urbanitsch, vol. 7 of *Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848–1918*, ed. Helmut Rumpler and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2000).

¹²⁸ Kelly, “Last Best Chance,” 281, note 7.

¹²⁹ Brauneder, “Verfassungsentwicklung,” 204–05.

¹³⁰ Zöllner, “Perioden,” Table 1 (pp. 38–39).

¹³¹ Leslie, “Ausgleich,” 117–18; Stourzh, “Ethnic Attribution,” 73; and Stourzh, “Ethnicizing,” 320.

¹³² Leslie, “Ausgleich,” 113, 115–16, and 119; and Stourzh, “Ethnicizing,” 321.

The Bukovina Compromise resulted from a long series of reform proposals in the diet, and on October 16, 1909, the final version won a two-thirds majority. The process culminated, on May 26, 1910, with the establishment of an ethnicity-based register of voters.¹³³ This system identified four national constituencies—German, Polish, Romanian, and Ruthenian. Earlier proposals for Jewish constituencies drew strong objections from Vienna, since their existence would have set a precedent for the legal recognition of Jews as a nationality.¹³⁴ As a way around this dilemma, the delineation of several multimember German constituencies accomplished the same thing, effectively guaranteeing both German Jews and German Christians a specific number of safe seats.¹³⁵

According to the Bukovina Compromise, the 28 seats in the rural communities' curia, which were elected through restricted suffrage, included 10 Romanian constituencies, 10 Ruthenian constituencies, three German single-member constituencies, two German two-member constituencies, and one Polish constituency. Meanwhile, the compromise established a curia that elected 18 seats through universal manhood suffrage: six Romanian constituencies, six Ruthenian constituencies, three German single-member constituencies, one German two-member constituency, and one Polish constituency. Assuming that the university chancellor (*Universitätsrektor*) would be German, that two representatives of the great landowners and two of the chambers of commerce would be Jews, and that Romanians, Ruthenians, and Poles could expect additional representation as great landowners, this arrangement yielded a total of 23 Romanian, 17 Ruthenian, nine Jewish, eight German Christian, and six Polish seats.¹³⁶ Of the 63 seats in the Diet, in other words, 36.5 percent were Romanian, 27.0 percent were Ruthenian, 14.3 percent were Jewish, 12.7 percent were German Christian, and, 9.5 percent were Polish, a fairly close approximation of population shares, although Poles and Germans were somewhat over-represented, presumably as a consequence of their socioeconomic status. As

¹³³ Glassl, *Der mährische Ausgleich*, 243; and Leslie, "Ausgleich," 120–33.

¹³⁴ Under the Austrian constitution, legally recognized nationalities (*Volksstämme*) held communal rights and privileges, although the extent of these rights and the means of enforcing them remained a work in progress. The fundamental laws made individual Jews legally equal with non-Jews, and the constitutional and legal system protected their freedoms as members of a religious group. Nevertheless, they did not enjoy recognition as a distinct, linguistically defined *Volksstamm*. Jews long had played a prominent role in non-Jewish party groupings, for example, as liberals and social democrats, but the rise of the Jewish National Party and the Zionist Party, which accompanied the gradual expansion of the suffrage, tended to challenge that status quo.

¹³⁵ Glassl, *Der mährische Ausgleich*, 243; Stourzh, "Ethnic Attribution," 73; and Stourzh, "Ethnicizing," 320–21.

¹³⁶ Leslie, "Ausgleich," 129–30.

was the case in Moravia, Jewish and Social Democratic politicians objected to the fact that these arrangements were insufficiently democratic due to the continuation of curial voting.¹³⁷

České Budějovice and Galicia also reached compromises but never implemented them, thanks to the onset of war. České Budějovice, a city in Southern Bohemia, had a highly mixed Czech-speaking and German-speaking population. The 1910 census claimed the population was 62 percent Czech and 38 percent German-speaking, although the reality of bilingualism, prevalent throughout the monarchy, made matters more complicated.¹³⁸ Brix praised the České Budějovice Compromise as the product of an “epoch full of unrealized possibilities.”¹³⁹ The final 1913 proposal resulted from a long process of negotiations that had begun late in 1906.¹⁴⁰ The various drafts included an array of provisions: to establish ethnic *Wahlkataster*; to distribute mandates proportionally, between Czechs and Germans; to provide minority representation for Germans in the Chamber of Commerce; to regulate language use in representative bodies; to set a quota for Czech officials in the communal administration; to hinder electoral fraud; to ban the use of communal public funds for one-sided nationalist purposes; to require that children be educated in their own language; to establish nationally autonomous local school boards; and to create a court of arbitration.¹⁴¹ The expected national ratio of town aldermen was 20 Czechs to 16 Germans, reflecting the composition of the elite, rather than of the entire population, thereby overrepresenting the German minority.¹⁴² The Social Democrats raised the familiar concerns about the undemocratic character of a curial electoral system.¹⁴³ Nevertheless, the České Budějovice Communal Committee (Budweiser Gemeindeausschuß) unanimously accepted the final draft, on February 26, 1914 and in May 1914, the district committee (Bezirksausschuß) approved it.¹⁴⁴ A few details still had to be addressed, but the onset of the First World War not only resulted in postponing their resolution but also in the failure to implement the compromise.¹⁴⁵ Inhabitants of

¹³⁷ Leslie, “Ausgleich,” 133; and Stourzh, *Gleichberechtigung*, 236–38.

¹³⁸ King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans*, 141 and throughout the text.

¹³⁹ Brix, “Der böhmische Ausgleich in Budweis,” 241.

¹⁴⁰ Brix, “Der böhmische Ausgleich in Budweis,” 226–38; King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans*, 137–40; and Stourzh, *Gleichberechtigung*, 232.

¹⁴¹ Brix, “Der böhmische Ausgleich in Budweis,” 229–30; King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans*, 140–47; and Stourzh, *Gleichberechtigung*, 232.

¹⁴² King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans*, 141.

¹⁴³ Brix, “Der böhmische Ausgleich in Budweis,” 236.

¹⁴⁴ Brix, “Der böhmische Ausgleich in Budweis,” 238–39.

¹⁴⁵ Brix, “Der böhmische Ausgleich in Budweis,” 239.

České Budějovice expected, however, that the compromise would be the basis of their postwar politics.¹⁴⁶

Events in Galicia followed a similar course. Acquired through the annexation of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century, this province's 1910 population was 58.55 percent Polish-speaking, 40.20 percent Ukrainian- and Rusyn-speaking, and 1.13 percent German-speaking.¹⁴⁷ Galicia also had a substantial Jewish population that the linguistic statistics did not reflect but that comprised approximately 11 percent of the population.¹⁴⁸ The Galician Compromise resulted from a long process of negotiations that began in 1905.¹⁴⁹ Its main provision involved ensuring representation for Poles and Ruthenians, using a mix of single- and two-member constituencies. In contrast to previous regional compromises, it did not introduce separate registers of voters but used the census to delineate districts ascribed to specific nationalities. The electoral reform that was part of the compromise increased the size of the Galician Diet from 164 to 228 seats. Aside from 13 mandates reserved for specified bishops, archbishops, and university chancellors (collectively referred to as *Virilisten*), curiae representing the great landowners, cities, chambers of commerce, and trade cooperatives (*Gewerbegenossenschaften*) as well as an urban and a rural curia, each of which used universal manhood suffrage, all elected representatives to the diet.¹⁵⁰ Once again, the retention of a curial system, which involved unequal representation and (in some instances) plural voting, drew objections from many mass parties.¹⁵¹ According to Börries Kuzmany's calculations, this system yielded 166 Polish and 62 Ruthenian seats, although the numbers could have varied somewhat in practice, depending on how each curia actually divided its votes.¹⁵² Ruthenians were underrepresented, with only 27 percent of the seats. Meanwhile, while the tiny German and Armenian minorities were included among Polish voters, the wealthier and more numerous Jews received representation through careful gerrymandering of the Chamber of Commerce curia. Nevertheless, Jews were underrepresented, receiving approximately 5 percent of the total seats. Apart from these electoral reforms, the compromise was to include the establishment of a univer-

146 King, *Budwesiers into Czechs and Germans*, 150–52.

147 Zöllner, "Perioden," Table 1 (pp. 38–39).

148 Kuzmany, "Galizische Ausgleich," 129.

149 Kuzmany, "Galizische Ausgleich," 10–14.

150 Kuzmany, "Galizische Ausgleich," 125–33; Stourzh, *Gleichberechtigung*, 239–40; Stourzh, "Ethnic Attribution," 73–74; and Stourzh, "Ethnicizing," 321.

151 Kuzmany, "Galizische Ausgleich," 123–25 and 133–37.

152 Kuzmany, "Galizische Ausgleich," 129–30.

sity and several high schools for Ukrainian and Rusyn speakers. The government in Vienna approved the compromise on July 8, 1914, but the outbreak of the war, several months later, meant that the educational reforms and new elections never took place.¹⁵³

Historians' Criticisms, National Flexibility, and the Institutionalization of Ethnicity

The historian Solomon Wank's negative appraisal of the Moravian and Bukovina Compromises presented several criticisms common to historians' accounts of these and the other compromises. Skeptical that such regional reforms offer any positive lessons, he argued that they were "the products of conditions unique to the two provinces and not applicable in Bohemia or elsewhere in Austria." He further wrote that "the Moravian Compromise was not a compromise at all, but a separation of Czechs and Germans." Finally, he labeled the agreement "undemocratic" because it "consolidated the positions and privileges of the Moravian aristocracy and the German minority . . . by giving both of them a grossly disproportionate share of political power, which blocked any fundamental change in the compromise."¹⁵⁴

The first of these objections, that circumstances in Moravia and Bukovina were somehow unique and therefore irrelevant in some other location, is doubtful. For one thing, the range of conditions under which consociationalism can be feasible is broad, especially in light of Lijphart's insistence that none of his nine favorable conditions are strictly necessary.¹⁵⁵ Although it is reasonable to assume that some provinces would have had better chances of success with such agreements than others, one cannot exclude the possibility that a consociational solution might have worked in Bohemia or elsewhere. Furthermore, the spread of regional reform attempts, on the eve of the First World War, suggests that such solutions held promise throughout the monarchy.

The second objection, that these compromises involved separation rather than compromise is, in fact, a basic premise of consociationalism. As Lijphart noted, the implementation of consociationalism "increases the plural nature of

¹⁵³ Kuzmany, "Galizische Ausgleich," 123, 138, and 141; Stourzh, *Gleichberechtigung*, 238–39; and Stourzh, "Ethnicizing," 321.

¹⁵⁴ Wank, "Some Reflections," 144–5. Haslinger similarly argued that a lesser degree of segmentation, along with a more traditional and local and less nationalist politics than that found in Bohemia, facilitated compromise in Moravia, through the mediating role of the great landowners. See Haslinger, *Nation und Territorium*, 192–95.

¹⁵⁵ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 53–55; and Lijphart, "Puzzle," 262–63.

an already plural society.”¹⁵⁶ Whether such a loss of fraternity is justified depends on whether the new solution promotes stable representative politics. Strikingly, even critics of the regional compromises conceded that they did just that. Glassl, an early defender of the Moravian Compromise, argued that, although “not all points of contention were put aside, for the time from 1905 to 1918, both ethnic groups faced each other as partners with equal rights.”¹⁵⁷ Viewing that compromise more critically, Kelly conceded that “the framers managed to pull off what their conationals in Bohemia did not, namely structuring a power-sharing relationship in the provincial diet that made it possible for the diet to continue to function effectively, thereby forestalling direct administration from Vienna, as happened in Bohemia in the last years before the war.”¹⁵⁸ Similarly, Stourzh argued that the “‘pacification by separation’ principle did not work so badly on the parliamentary level,” and he acknowledged further that “a look at the neighboring ‘non-compromise’ country, Bohemia ... would suggest that Moravia may have been better off in the post-1905 period than Bohemia.”¹⁵⁹

The last objection, that these compromises privileged socioeconomic elites, such as the Moravian aristocracy and businessmen, and that they overrepresented ethnic minorities, specifically, the Moravian Germans, calls for two separate responses. First, as far as privileged elites are concerned, the central problem would seem to be oligarchy, not consociationalism. A defender of these arguments might very well maintain that reform was an incomplete but nonetheless needed step in the right direction. After all, the history of both parliamentary and dietal electoral reform, from 1867 onward, consistently involved the broadening of suffrage and its increasing proportionality.¹⁶⁰ It is impossible to determine definitively how things might have played out had the monarchy survived, and one must not presume that provincial suffrage restrictions would have been permanent. Furthermore, Kelly credited the Moravian Compromise to “liberals and conservatives (mostly, but not exclusively Czech) in a loose and not entirely happy alliance with a group of Czech-leaning great landowners,” arguing that the

¹⁵⁶ Lijphart, *Democracy*, 42.

¹⁵⁷ Glassl, *Der mährische Ausgleich*, 244.

¹⁵⁸ Kelly, “Last Best Chance,” 300–301.

¹⁵⁹ Stourzh, “Ethnicizing,” 310. Stourzh credited the early twentieth-century Austrian legal scholar Rudolf von Herrnhart (1865–1945) with coining the phrase “pacification by separation.” Stourzh, “Ethnicizing,” 308, note 81. More recently Zahra, by no means a fan of the Moravian Compromise, uses the strikingly Lijphartian idiom “good fences make good neighbors,” a proverb that Frost popularized in his poetry. Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*, 34.

¹⁶⁰ Howe, “Electoral Institutions,” 169–71.

Czechs in this middle group found themselves torn between their desire to achieve a position of at least parity and perhaps dominance for the Czech majority in Moravia and their fear of the masses. Similarly, the great land-owners were torn between loyalty to the emperor and his government, loyalty to their *Land* and class, and for some, their own national feelings. Ultimately it was this conflicted center that hammered out the compromise agreement of 1905.¹⁶¹

Kelly's stance was that the compromise depended on this particular constellation of political interests. However, there is no way of knowing whether ongoing pressures for equal suffrage, had they succeeded on the provincial level, ultimately would have undermined this loose alliance and the compromise itself. It is just as plausible that the compromise founded the kind of tradition of elite accommodation that, according to consociational theory, actually could have facilitated future democratic consociationalism.

Second, the concern that the Moravian German minority was overrepresented is misplaced. Overrepresentation of minorities, even artificial parity in representation, are standard consociational practices.¹⁶² Furthermore, the German minority's ability to effectively veto legislative action was a standard consociational mechanism for protecting minority interests, thereby preventing conflict over highly divisive issues. In this regard, the compromise appears to have been quite successful.

One additional criticism remains. Recently, historians concerned with the ethnicizing of politics have scrutinized the various regional compromises, particularly regarding their effects on educational policy and their legacies after the First World War.¹⁶³ This line of criticism has developed both out of and in reaction to the growing literature on national flexibility and indifference discussed in the Introduction.

This literature on the ethnicizing of politics is concerned primarily with the consequences of establishing ethnic registers of voters and segregated schools. The core claim is that the Moravian and other compromises involved, as Tara Zahra stated,

¹⁶¹ Kelly, "Last Best Chance," 291.

¹⁶² Lijphart, *Democracy*, 38–41; Lijphart, "Puzzle," 261. Deliberate group overrepresentation should be familiar to students of federal democracies. The United States Senate, for example, significantly overrepresents Delawareans and Wyomingites at the expense of Californians and Michiganders.

¹⁶³ Burger, *Sprachenrecht*, 189–200; Haslinger, *Nation und Territorium*, 196–97; Stourzh, "Ethnic Attribution"; Stourzh, "Ethnicizing"; and Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*.

a misreading of the nationality conflict in that it presumed not only that ordinary Bohemians and Moravians were nationalized but also that nationalist tensions were so explosive that the only solution was an administrative separation of the two populations. In fact, that national cadastres created by the Moravian Compromise were not an organic reflection of self-evident national loyalties. Rather than ameliorating national conflict over children, the Compromise further enflamed disputes over which children belonged to which nation and to which school, over how the nation's new rights to its children should be defined and enforced in practice.¹⁶⁴

A telling example of the degree to which ordinary Moravians and Bohemians were indifferent to Czech and German nationalist demands is the practice of exchanging children (*Kindertausch* or *Kindewechsel*), whereby Czech- and German-speaking families exchanged a child, for a period of time, so that both children would have the advantages of bilingualism.¹⁶⁵

This literature places the four regional compromises within a broader account of the gradual institutionalization of ethnic ascription, during the monarchy's last decades, those compromises being "important elements of the ever more powerful ethnicizing process going on—and speeding up—in Austria."¹⁶⁶ These historians' accounts emphasize the fact that individuals could claim that they were registered on the wrong register of voters and could challenge the right of others to be on a particular list. In either case, the government authorities made the final determination.¹⁶⁷ The literature also concentrates on school reform. Both the requirement that teacher disciplinary boards include a member of the relevant nationality and the separation of school boards along national lines required the determination of individuals' nationalities. Of particular concern is Moravia's so-called *lex Perek*, by which children, as a rule, were to attend schools whose language of instruction was the same as their own.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁴ Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*, 34.

¹⁶⁵ Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*, 1–3. For a thorough account of how difficult it can be for nationalists to convince their alleged conationals to embrace a single national identity, see King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans*, which carefully traces the evolution of such attempts from 1848 to 1948 in České Budějovice. There is no specific Czech equivalent for the term *Kindertausch*. Instead, the Czechs use the informal phrase *poslat dítě na handl*, which means "to send a child on a trade." The Czechs borrowed *handl* from the German language.

¹⁶⁶ Stourzh, "Ethnicizing," 283–323 (quotation on 307); Stourzh, "Ethnic Attribution," 68–72; and Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*, 33–39.

¹⁶⁷ Stourzh, "Ethnic Attribution," 74–76; and Stourzh, "Ethnicizing," 310.

¹⁶⁸ Stourzh, "Ethnicizing," 311–12.

Stourzh discerned four troubling developments resulting from these reforms. The first was their new method of determining national belonging, whereby the government determined ethnicity based on “tangible signs” instead of an individual’s declaration.¹⁶⁹ In fact, he argued that both subjective and objective approaches to determining nationality were problematic, the former possibly leading to political opportunism and the latter to government prying.¹⁷⁰ The second was that they changed the nature of school boards, effectively transforming them into corporate representatives of ethnic groups.¹⁷¹ Third, the compromise engendered the right to contest the national belonging of school board members, in order to guarantee a “nationally minded” membership.¹⁷² These reforms’ fourth and greatest flaw, Stourzh argued, was their introduction of the principle that schoolchildren belong to a nationality.¹⁷³ Abuses resulted, such as “child capture” (*Kinderfang*), which occurred when employers pressured Czech workers to send their children to German schools, thus limiting parents’ right to choose their children’s school, a right the Austrian Civil Code protected.¹⁷⁴ In her work, Zahra gave a detailed account of the “reclamation ritual,” by which nationalists returned children to their supposedly correct nationality.¹⁷⁵

Historians generally portray the long-term consequences of these developments, which were part of a larger European trend toward ethnic ascription, as catastrophic.¹⁷⁶ Kelly put this in the strongest possible terms:

The insidious consequences of admitting that nationality/ethnicity could be determined through an administrative process were not readily apparent at the time, but following the Nazi takeover in 1938-1939, data collected in this administrative process were often used to ferret out Jews from among the Czech and German residents of Moravia. Immediately following the war, these data were once again employed by local officials, this time to locate German citizens for expulsion.¹⁷⁷

¹⁶⁹ Stourzh, “Ethnic Attribution,” 74–76; and Stourzh, “Ethnicizing,” 314–17.

¹⁷⁰ Stourzh, “Ethnic Attribution,” 78.

¹⁷¹ Stourzh, “Ethnic Attribution,” 77–78; and Stourzh, “Ethnicizing,” 317–18.

¹⁷² Stourzh, “Ethnic Attribution,” 76; and Stourzh, “Ethnicizing,” 318–19.

¹⁷³ Stourzh, “Ethnicizing,” 319.

¹⁷⁴ Stourzh, “Ethnicizing,” 313.

¹⁷⁵ Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*, 39–47.

¹⁷⁶ Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*, 47–48.

¹⁷⁷ Kelly, “Last Best Chance,” 295.

Although Stourzh distanced himself from that particular interpretation, he similarly drew on the experience of Nazism to emphasize the dangers of ethnicizing politics.¹⁷⁸ As Stourzh noted,

the ethnicizing process tended to deemphasize the position of individual persons as citizens, as “Staatsbürger,” as citizens with equal rights—“gleichberechtigte Staatsbürger.” Instead, the individual’s position as member of an ethnically defined unity, alternatively called “nationality,” “Nation” or “Volk” became more important . . . The time would come, 1933 in Germany and 1938 in Austria, when ethnic membership would break the barriers of equal citizenship. The member of the “Volk,” the “Volksgenosse” in the new vocabulary of racial superiority, replaced the citizen with equal rights, and we all know the dreadful consequences for those who were to be denied membership in the ruling ethnos.¹⁷⁹

Finally, Zahra argued that “when the Nazis did march eastward, they built on native understandings of children as national property and on local practices of national ascription as they attempted to implement their racial program.”¹⁸⁰

In addressing these various concerns, one should keep in mind that consociational theory implicitly acknowledges or is at least compatible with the claim that individual identities are more flexible than rigid segmental cleavages might suggest.¹⁸¹ As stated in the Introduction, Lijphart recognized that consociationalism heightens pluralism because it reinforces a previously existing propensity for populations to form separate parties, trade unions, schools, and other organizations along segmental lines.¹⁸² In the case of Imperial Austria, the political elite already had gone a long way toward segregating political

¹⁷⁸ Stourzh, “Ethnicizing,” 317, note 106.

¹⁷⁹ Stourzh, “Ethnicizing,” 322–23. Elsewhere, noting ethnic attribution’s potential as a legal pretext for anti-Semitism in the monarchy’s successor states, Stourzh argued that “ethnic attribution could become a trap for many, for example, the Moravian grocer, Johann or Jan Lehar, who could not send his daughter to the school of his choice. For the Jews of Central Europe, once the National Socialists took over, this trap was to become deadly.” Stourzh, “Ethnic Attribution,” 79–81 (quotation on 81). Further, when discussing guarantees that school board members be “nationally minded,” he observed that “it is difficult, in retrospect, not to think of the ‘ethnic cleansing’ that was to ravage East Central Europe and Southeastern Europe during the course of the twentieth century.” Stourzh, “Ethnicizing,” 319.

¹⁸⁰ Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*, 10.

¹⁸¹ Milton J. Esman raised related concerns about consociationalism and constructivism in “Power Sharing and the Constructivist Fallacy,” in *Democracy and Institutions*, 91–112.

¹⁸² Lijphart, *Democracy*, 42.

parties and other institutions long before the Moravian Compromise, even though the population, as a whole, never fully embraced exclusive Czech, German, or other identities. The question, therefore, becomes whether the consequences of heightening pluralism are so severe as to render consociationalism itself undesirable.

The connection between the various compromises and the Holocaust are overdrawn. Nazi racial policies, in Czechoslovakia or elsewhere, would not have been any more benign had Habsburg-era ethnic data been unavailable to them. Furthermore, the number of major historical changes that had to take place to make the rise of the Nazis possible should caution historians from drawing a straight line between the Moravian Compromise and what occurred several decades later. As Zahra noted,

it would take the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy ... to transform many of [Edmund] Bernatzik's predictions [about a court determining a person's ethnicity] into a legal reality. Without the moderating influence of the supra-national Habsburg state, nationalists were free to pursue their campaign to eradicate national indifference with more radical efficiency.¹⁸³

Additionally, government accumulation of ethnic, linguistic, and racial data is more of a norm than an exception, in the contemporary world, and it is often necessary for such important policy matters as determining whether there is discrimination in hiring or in university admissions. These considerations provide additional reasons for avoiding hyperbole, unless one wishes to argue that much of the world is on the verge of genocide. Nevertheless, criticisms of Imperial Austrian educational reforms point out some possible consequences of official ethnic ascription, in particular, the potentially intrusive role of government in citizens' lives, the loss of individual flexibility in defining one's own identity, and the decline of bilingualism.

Several additional considerations put these concerns in a broader perspective. Although nationalist abuses occurred under the Moravian and later compromises, they were a product of specific policies, not general consociational practices. Rules that allowed nationalists to challenge the ethnic ascription of others were a flaw in these compromises. Austrian political reformers were aware of this problem, in the wake of the Moravian Compromise, and they attempted

¹⁸³ Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*, 48. Edmund Bernatzik (1854–1919) was a legal scholar as well as a dean and then rector at the University of Vienna.

to address it. The České Budějovice Compromise, for example, made provisions for individual choice, even though, admittedly, a law analogous to the *lex Perek* sneaked into the final draft.¹⁸⁴ The Galician Compromise evaded such complications by not instituting separate registers of voters.¹⁸⁵

The very issues these historians raised have been a topic of discussion in the consociational literature for some time.¹⁸⁶ As early as 1991, in the context of debates about a democratic constitution for post-Apartheid South Africa, Lijphart drew the distinction between “self-determination” and “pre-determination” of segmental cleavages, arguing that, although “both in contemporary and historical cases of consociationalism, pre-determination is more common . . . self-determination has a number of great advantages and ought to be given much more attention by constitutional engineers who are trying to devise solutions for divided societies.”¹⁸⁷ Specifically, in the case of South Africa, he noted that “while there is broad agreement that [it] is a plural society, the identification of segments is both objectively difficult and politically controversial.”¹⁸⁸ Fortunately, he concluded, “these disagreements do not need to be resolved, since we can design a consociational system on the basis of self-determined segments.”¹⁸⁹ The solution involved several steps: a party-list proportional representation (list-PR) electoral system; a rule requiring that all parties of a minimum size be included in the cabinet; the distribution of public funds and jobs along proportional lines; a minority veto for any group of legislators of a minimum size; and a system of non-territorial “cultural councils,” based on examples found in Belgium and on the 1925 Law of Cultural Autonomy in Estonia. The result was to be a consociational democracy grounded in segments that South Africans themselves chose.¹⁹⁰

Beyond offering specific prescriptions for South Africa, Lijphart maintained that self-determined segments are generally preferable. Strikingly, one of his main arguments in favor of self-determination echoes the concerns that critics of the Moravian and other regional compromises have raised. Specifically,

184 Stourzh, “Ethnicizing,” 320.

185 Stourzh, “Ethnicizing,” 321.

186 Lijphart, “Self-determination versus Pre-determination of Ethnic Minorities in Power Sharing Systems,” in *Thinking*, 66–74; McGarry and O’Leary, “Iraq’s Constitution of 2005”; and Brendan O’Leary, “Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places: An Advocate’s Introduction,” in *Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places*, ed. Joanne McEvoy and Brendan O’Leary, *National and Ethnic Conflict in the Twenty-First Century* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

187 Lijphart, “Self-determination,” 66.

188 Lijphart, “Self-determination,” 69.

189 Lijphart, “Self-determination,” 69.

190 Lijphart, “Self-determination,” 69–71.

predetermining the segments to be incorporated into a consociational democracy entails not only potential discrimination against groups but, as a rule, also involves the assignment of individuals to specific groups. Individuals may well object to such labeling. In fact, the very principle of officially registering individuals according to ethnic or other group membership may be controversial, offensive, or even completely unacceptable to many citizens. Self-determination avoids the entire problem of placing people in groups and of establishing procedures for making decisions in individual cases.¹⁹¹

Self-determination of segments has several additional advantages. It “avoids the problem of invidious comparisons and discriminatory choices,” regarding the inclusion of groups, a problem that is particularly contentious in societies with two or more large segments. Apart from representing segments, it provides opportunities for “groups and individuals who explicitly reject the idea that society should be organized on a segmental basis.” It is more flexible, in that it avoids establishing fixed shares of representation for each group. Finally, it avoids the limitations of territorial federalism. Although the arguments in favor of self-determination, are strong, Lijphart presented two caveats. First, “the main segments of a plural society may be absolutely clear and uncontroversial, and these segments may want to be recognized as formally and specifically as possible.” In such circumstances, he recommended combining elements of self- and pre-determination. Second, self-determination precludes the deliberate overrepresentation of minorities. The protections a self-determined consociational system offers more than compensate for the advantages of overrepresentation.¹⁹²

The existing debates within the consociational literature put historians’ interpretations of the Moravian and other compromises in an interesting perspective. Whatever dilemmas ethnic ascription may have created, they were not problems with consociationalism, as such; rather they were difficulties with a specific kind of consociationalism. In other words, although Austrian politicians indeed had found a real solution to the problems of representative government in divided societies, its execution was less than ideal. In this respect, they were not out of line with other historical and contemporary examples of consociationalism with predetermined group identities. Part of the significance of these

¹⁹¹ Lijphart, “Self-determination,” 72.

¹⁹² Lijphart, “Self-determination,” 71–74.

historical regional compromises is that they provide additional examples confirming the established findings in the political scientific literature about the varieties of consociationalism.

These criticisms also raise the question of whether and why Imperial Austria was different from other divided societies. The western half of the monarchy may have experienced a peculiar ethnicization process that became ingrained in Habsburg political culture, or during that era, there may have been a general European problem of ethnicization. Another possibility is that Austria's difficulties resulted from ethno-linguistic ascription becoming intertwined with a pedagogical distrust in bilingualism.¹⁹³ Perhaps Imperial Austria demonstrated the negative consequences of consociationalism built around ethnicity, rather than other kinds of social identity. In short, the faults of the monarchy's regional compromises demand an empirically broad examination of ethnic ascription and its consequences, one that builds on the existing consociational literature.

In addressing these criticisms, it is important not to overlook Imperial Austria's actual achievements in managing nationalist disputes. Whatever new problems they may have created, the Moravian and subsequent compromises made it possible for local representative governments to function within a society subject to deep ethnic political divisions. Furthermore, they were remarkable in that they foreshadowed late-twentieth-century practices, decades before a consociational literature existed and before consociationalism had become a standard tool for addressing the problems of democracy in divided societies. Of particular interest is how Austrian politics might have developed past the fateful year of 1914. There might have been further regional compromises, a greater degree of democracy, and a reduction of nationalist abuses in education and other areas. Social scientists and historians do not have the luxury of speculation, but the trajectory of change suggested the country could have experienced more democracy and more consociationalism had it not faced the turmoil of the Great War.

Conclusion

So much emphasis has been placed on Imperial Austria's unresolved issues that it is easy to overlook how successfully the monarchy's politicians accommodated the competing demands of its many diverse peoples. Within the western half of

¹⁹³ Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*, 23–27.

the monarchy, the institutional reforms and the evolution of political practices were significant steps, albeit incomplete ones, toward consociational democracy. The bulk of the evidence supports this reinterpretation of Austrian political history: the diversity of government cabinets and of their broad tacit parliamentary support; the ability of small groups to veto policies that threatened their interests; the steady increase of proportionality, in terms of legislative representation, public employment, and educational resources; and autonomy for Austria's segmental groups that was meaningful and that increased over time. In addition, in several of Austria's provinces and towns in the last years before the First World War, further steps in the direction of consociational democracy took place, and additional reforms along these lines appeared to have been on the horizon. All this calls for greater appreciation of the connection between the developments in pre-1914 Imperial Austria and later practices in deeply divided democracies from the middle of the twentieth to the early twenty-first century.

The findings of this chapter are significant in several respects. On the simplest level, additional cases of consociationalism are always welcome, in that they help social scientists and historians better understand the origins and nature of such political systems. In particular, Imperial Austria shows that the roots of consociationalism in Central Europe are much deeper than researchers previously had appreciated. Simultaneously, viewing its politics through the lens of consociational theory yields a more nuanced appreciation of what Austrian politicians actually achieved. Examining the monarchy's regional compromises forces historians and social scientists to reassess ongoing debates about national flexibility and the ethnicization of politics. However flawed, those reforms marked significant progress in regions where populations that embraced complex and shifting combinations of identities nevertheless were subject to disruptive nationalist political appeals.

The next chapters demonstrate that, after the First World War, Czechoslovakia became a fully-fledged consociational democracy, an interpretation that a narrow focus on Slovakia's evolution within the larger state reinforces. Czechoslovakia's success is linked to its Habsburg legacy. The monarchy, after all, provided plenty of examples, both positive and negative, of how representative political institutions in a deeply divided society can function, examples from which Czechoslovak politicians sometimes learned. Such a view is consistent with Luft's comprehensive study of Imperial Austria's Czech representatives:

Without Czech participation in the stateliness of the Habsburg Monarchy, the founding of a [Czechoslovak] state would have been notably more difficult.

Then again, the simultaneous existence of a parallel mental distance from the Cisleithanian state was a prerequisite for the success of the separation process, which was partly described as “de-Austrianization.”¹⁹⁴

The claim that the Austrian legacy influenced Czechoslovak politics is especially compelling, given the continuity between the two states' political elites.¹⁹⁵ Of the 163 Czech representatives elected to the Austrian Abgeordnetenhaus after 1907, 138 (84.67 percent) were still alive after the First World War.¹⁹⁶ In 1918, the mean age of this subgroup was 52, while the median age was 51. By the end of the monarchy, the average Czech former Reichsrat deputy had approximately three decades of adult experience in the Austro-Hungarian political world.

Viewing this cohort from another angle, its average member was qualified to vote in all four Austrian parliamentary elections that used universal manhood suffrage. The youngest of them—Rudolf Bechyně (1881–1948), Bohumír Bradáč (1881–1935), and Tomáš Mlčoch (1881–1940)—were 37 years old in 1918, and they qualified to vote in both elections held after the full implementation of universal manhood suffrage. Meanwhile, the oldest members of this group, including Josef Dürich (1847–1927), Hynek Srdínko (1847–1932), and Josef Svozil (1847–1931), were 71 in 1918. They all had turned 20 in the year of the Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich*, spending effectively their entire adult lives in that particular political culture. One therefore can assume that the political socialization of the Czech former members of the Abgeordnetenhaus was largely complete by the creation of the Czechoslovak First Republic.

Furthermore, surviving Czech members of Austria's Abgeordnetenhaus continued to be highly politically active in their new republic. Specifically, after 1918, at least 83.33 percent brought their significant political experience to elected, ministerial, or civil service positions.¹⁹⁷ These included some of the most prominent figures in interwar Czechoslovak politics, not the least of whom was President Tomáš G. Masaryk (1850–1937). Furthermore, even those who pursued non-political careers after Czechoslovak independence did not withdraw en-

¹⁹⁴ Luft, *Parlamentarische Führungsgruppen*, vol. 1, 588.

¹⁹⁵ The authors examine this matter in greater detail in their publication “Continuity and Discontinuity in Legislative Representation from Austria-Hungary to the Austrian and Czechoslovak First Republics,” in *Das Erbe der Habsburgermonarchie in den Nachfolgestaaten (Brüche und Kontinuitäten)/The Legacy of the Habsburg Monarchy in the Successor States (Ruptures and Continuities)*, ed. Ulrike Harmat, 295–332, Sonderband of *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2025).

¹⁹⁶ All calculations here are based on the biographical data in Luft, *Parlamentarische Führungsgruppen*.

¹⁹⁷ Of 138 former representatives who survived past 1918, 115 held at least one such position in the successor republic, 19 did not, and four had careers that are unclear.

tirely from public life. There are a number of prominent men from this group: Josef Brdlík (1848–1932), president of the Wool Committee of the Czechoslovak Textile Industry Association; Ladislav Čech (1864–1943), president of Lloyd Insurance and of American Heating AG in Prague as well as vice president of the Prague Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Josef Švejk (1865–1939), who held positions in multiple agricultural associations; and Josef Svozil (1847–1931), landowner and journalist.¹⁹⁸ In short, a large proportion of Czechoslovakia's Czech political elite came from the former Austrian political elite—prominent men who had learned their vocation in the context of the former monarchy.

¹⁹⁸ Luft, *Parlamentarische Führungsgruppen*, vol. 2: *Biographisches Handbuch der tschechischen Mitglieder des Abgeordnetenhauses des österreichischen Reichsrats, 1907 bis 1914*, A56–A57, A64–A66, A368–A370, and A374–A377.




Figure 3. Tomáš G. Masaryk (1850–1937), the first president of Czechoslovakia (1918–1935), photographed in the 1920s.

Source: Washington, DC, Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Online Catalog, Bain News Service Collection of the George Grantham Bain Collection, <https://lcn.loc.gov/2014719422>.

Chapter 3

Czechoslovakia as a Consociational Democracy

Introduction

In late January 2010, Miloš Zeman (born 1944), the former leader of the Czech Social Democratic Party (Czech: Česká strana sociálně demokratická, ČSSD), and Václav Klaus (born 1941), the president of the republic, concurred that the country needed to reform what Klaus had termed an “unfortunate electoral system” to facilitate the creation of stronger governments.¹ Their stance was far from novel. In July 1998, the same two men—Zeman, as head of the ČSSD and prime minister designate of a minority government, and Klaus, as leader of the Civic Democratic Party (Czech: Občanská demokratická strana, ODS) and future speaker of the Chamber of Deputies—had signed a controversial opposition agreement, with a vaguely worded provision to reform the electoral system to increase the chances of one party gaining a majority, presumably through mechanisms making it more difficult for small parties to enter the parliament. When their parties passed such a measure in the lower house, over the objection of the smaller parties, President Václav Havel (1936–2011), who ironically had advocated the creation of an electoral procedure that combined majoritarian and proportional voting and even had proposed an essentially majoritarian system before the breakup of Czechoslovakia, succeeded in having the Constitutional Court rescind it.² In the Czech Republic, the topic of electoral reform

¹ “Zeman a Klaus se shodli, že je třeba změnit volební systém,” Radio Prague, Zprávy, January 26, 2010, available at <https://cesky.radio.cz/zpravy-8577121>. Oddly enough, the electoral reform would have had an adverse effect on the success of the new party Zeman had established in 2009, the Party of Civic Rights–Zemanovci (Czech: Strana práv občanů–Zemanovci). Just the same, his party did not gain enough seats in the 2010 election to enter the Chamber of Deputies.

² “Opoziční smlouva,” British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Česká redakce, Volby 2002, http://www.bbc.co.uk/czech/volby2002/parties_opsmouva.htm. For news on the 2000 electoral reform

resurfaced, from time to time, with some favoring change and others viewing it as stifling the voices of a significant segment of voters.³

In September 1921, Edvard Beneš (1884–1948), the nonpartisan foreign minister, convinced President Masaryk to name him prime minister, displacing the projected government of Antonín Švehla (1870–1933), the leader of the Republican Party of Agriculturalists and Small Farmers (Czech: Republikánská strana

attempt, see “ODS a ČSSD prosadily v Poslanecké sněmovně novelu volebního zákona,” Radio Prague, Zprávy, May 27, 2000, <https://cesky.radio.cz/zpravy-sobota-27-kvetna-2000-8056417>; “Prezident Václav Havel navrhl Ústavnímu soudu zrušit část volebního zákona,” Radio Prague, Zprávy, July 18, 2000, <https://cesky.radio.cz/zpravy-utery-18-cervence-2000-8056469>; and “Ústavní soud zrušil na Havlův návrh část novely volebního zákona,” Radio Prague, Zprávy, January 25, 2001, <https://cesky.radio.cz/zpravy-ctvrttek-25-ledna-2001-8056657>. The decision of the Constitutional Court is available at *Sbírka nálezů a usnesení Ústavního soudu* (SbNU), “Změna volebního systému,” January 24, 2001, Plénium Ústavního soudu (Pl. ÚS) 42/2000, Nález (N) 16/21, SbNU, 113, 64/2001 Sb., <http://nals.usoud.cz/Search/GetText.aspx?sz=Pl-42-2000>. For Havel’s plan of mixing proportional and majority voting, see his *Letní přemítání* (Prague: Odeon, 1991), 40–43. For his majoritarian proposal, see Federální shromáždění České a Slovenské Federativní Republiky (1990–1992), *Tisky*, c. 1125, Návrh prezidenta České a Slovenské Federativní Republiky, Zákon o volbách do Federálního shromáždění, 1991, available at https://www.psp.cz/eknih/1990fs/tisky/t1125_01.htm. For a description of Havel’s suggested reform, see Jan Filip, “Volební inženýrství v ČSR a ČR v letech 1990 až 1992,” in *Volební a stranické systémy ČR v mezinárodním srovnání*, ed. Miroslav Novák, Tomáš Lebeda, et al., 227–29 (Dobrá voda u Pelhřimova: Vydavatelství a nakladatelství Aleš Čeněk, 2004). An excellent description of the electoral changes that would have resulted from the opposition agreement is Tomáš Dušek, “K diskusi politiků o volební reformě: Od voleb 1998 do rozhodnutí ústavního soudu,” in *Volební a stranické systémy ČR*, 365–74. In the same volume, also see Tomáš Lebeda, “Konečná podoba volebního systému pro Poslaneckou sněmovnu: Otazníky nad vynucenou úpravou z roku 2002,” 231. Several authors in *Volební a stranické systémy ČR* discussed various suggested and implemented electoral reforms. Jiří Pehe considered the opposition agreement to be “the peak of the degeneration of the political parties” that was “at once the culmination of the gradual draining of the parties as the bearer of programs and ideas at the expense of a cynical division of power.” He viewed the parties, at the time, as lacking “effective intraparty democracy nor feedback to the voters.” Jiří Pehe, *Demokracie bez demokratů: Úvahy o společnosti a politice*, Edice Střed (Prague: Prostor, 2010), 27–28. See also Lubomír Kopeček, *Deformace demokracie?: Opoziční smlouva a česká politika, 1998–2002* (Brno: Barrister & Principal, 2015).

- 3 For samples of Klaus’s comments in favor of electoral reform, see *Rok druhý, 2004: Projevy, články, eseje* (Prague: Knižní klub, 2005), “Záznam z vystoupení na setkání s předními manažery,” *Ekonomický týdeník Euro*, January 5, 2004, 67; “Širší souvislosti naší vládní krize,” *MF Dnes*, July 15, 2004, 219–21; “Co očekávám od nové vlády?” *MF Dnes*, July 27, 2004, 225–27; and “Jednání s vedením Poslanecké sněmovny,” July 2, 2004, 295. See the angry response to the 2006 discussions about strengthening the major parties by Daniela Rázková, representative in Prague 12 for the Christian and Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People’s Party (Křesťanská a demokratická unie-Československá strana lidová, KDU-ČSL), “Zase chytají politický kartel?” *Hospodářské noviny*, Trendy a analýzy, July 25, 2006. Oskar Krejčí presented statistics, from the early 1990s, demonstrating the voters’ ambivalence about changing the electoral system. Approximately one half in May 1992 and fewer in July and November 1993 favored a majoritarian system of representation for the lower house, while the remainder was divided between those who wanted to retain the proportional system and those who did not know. He also provided statistics from 1993 relating to the Senate. Based on the statistics, Krejčí concluded that “the proportional representation system reflects more exactly the will of voters than the majoritarian system.” Oskar Krejčí, *The History of Elections in Bohemia and Moravia* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1995), 260–61.

zemědělského a maloroľnického ľidu, RSZML or RSZaML; Slovak: Republikánska strana poľnohospodárskeho a maloroľníckeho ľudu, previously known as the Agrarian Party).⁴ In constructing his government, Beneš had two major intentions. The first was to destroy the influential Pětka (Committee of Five), an informal association to coordinate policy that brought together the leaders of the five major parties: the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party of Workers (Czech: Československá sociálně demokratická strana dělnická, ČSDSD; Slovak: Československá sociálnodemokratická strana robotnícka, ČSSDSR, also known as the Czechoslovak Social Democrats), the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party (Československá strana národně socialistická; Slovak: Československá národnosocialistická strana, ČSNS), the Republican Party, the Czechoslovak People's Party (Czech: Československá strana lidová; Slovak: Československá strana ľudová, ČSL, also known as the Czechoslovak Populist Party) and the Czechoslovak National Democratic Party (Czech: Československá národní demokracie; Slovak: Československá národná demokracia, ČsND).⁵ The Pětka initially directed a government of experts, under Jan Černý (1874–1959), the head of the Moravian provincial administration, during the potentially disruptive 1920 separation of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Czech and Slovak: Komunistická strana Československa) from the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, and the Pětka had assumed a degree of permanency. Second, individual parties had begun to exert their grip on specific ministries, and Beneš promised to distribute the cabinet seats to disrupt the existing pattern. Ultimately, Beneš's efforts failed. The Pětka leaders, aside from Msgr. Jan Šrámek (1870–1956), of the Czechoslovak People's Party, did not enter the government.⁶ Meanwhile, the party leaders continued using the Pětka to advance their own agenda and to limit Beneš's effectiveness. A year later, in October 1922, Beneš

4 The Czech Agrarian Party (Czech: Česká strana agrární) came into existence in 1899. After the First World War, it became the Republican Party of the Czechoslovak Countryside (Czech: Republikánská strana československého venkova). In June 1922, the Slovak National Peasant Party (Slovak: Slovenská národná a roľnícka strana) united with the Republican Party, which became the Republican Party of Agriculturalists and Small Farmers.

5 The Czechoslovak National Socialist Party had nothing in common with Germany's National Socialist Party, other than its name. The party emerged from the Social Democratic movement in 1897, and its ideology cast aside Marxist internationalism in favor of Czech nationalism. In the first year of its existence, the party was known as the National Workers' Party (Strana národních dělníků), and then it became the Czech National Social Party (Česká strana národně sociální), which also is the current name of the party. After the First World War, it was the Czechoslovak Socialist Party (Československá strana socialistická) until it became the ČSNS in 1926.

6 The most comprehensive treatment of Šrámek's political career during the Czechoslovak First Republic is Miloš Trapl, Karel Konečný, and Pavel Marek, *Politik dobré vůle: Život a dílo msgr. Jana Šrámk* (Praha: Vyšehrad, 2013), "Šrámkovy aktivity v letech první republiky" (171–261).

resigned in frustration, and Švehla became premier at the head of the All-National Coalition (Všenárodní koalice, 1922–1926), whose first government (1922–1925) included all the leaders of the Pětka and restored to the parties their preferred ministries.⁷

The two circumstances above have an essential common ingredient: Zeman and Klaus, on the one hand, and Beneš, on the other hand, endeavored to break what they perceived as a political stalemate that had resulted from a voting process in which dramatic shifts in the electoral fortunes of parties were rare and majorities were elusive. For them, disrupting the balance of political power among a constellation of parties in order to manufacture a one-party majority was more logical than engineering workable multiparty coalitions. Fate may preclude the success of such majoritarian experiments. Since the fall of Communism in 1989, elections in Czechoslovakia and then in the Czech Republic and Slovakia yielded only one majority victory, when Direction-Social Democracy (Slovak: Smer–sociálna demokracia, Smer-SD) won the Slovak election of 2012 and formed a majority government that lasted until 2016. Otherwise, coalitions have been the rule.⁸

The situation was no different during the Czechoslovak First Republic (1918–1938), when gaining a plurality of votes and subsequently seats in the National Assembly was a significant victory and constructing coalitions was essential.⁹

7 Daniel E. Miller, *Forging Political Compromise: Antonín Švehla and the Czechoslovak Republican Party, 1918–1933* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999), 78–84. The surprise among the leading politicians that Beneš emerged as prime minister and not Švehla appears in Cyril Horáček, *Vzpomínky z mého života*, ed. Svatopluk Herc (Prague: Nakladatelství lidové noviny and Masarykův ústav a Archiv, 2017), 255. Horáček (1862–1943), who, for a short while, served as a minister of finance when he was a Republican, and then became a National Democrat and a long-term member of the Senate, remarked that the reason for Beneš and not Švehla becoming prime minister in 1921 “remains a mystery.” The ruling coalitions and governments of the Czechoslovak First Republic appear in Table 11.

8 In the Czech Republic, there were only two instances when political parties ruled without the need for a coalition, but both were minority governments and therefore required the support of nongovernmental parties to form legislative majorities: Zeman’s Social Democratic government of 1998–2002 and the 2017–2018 cabinet of Andrej Babiš (born 1954), who headed Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (Czech: Akce nespokojených občanů, ANO).

9 There are many English-language sources that review the creation of the Czechoslovak First Republic, including Victor S. Mamatey’s “The Establishment of the Republic,” in the classic work *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918–1948*, ed. Victor S. Mamatey and Radomír Luža (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 3–38. For a brief overview of the First Republic’s history, see John Bradley, “Czechoslovakia: External Crisis and Internal Compromise,” in *Conditions of Democracy in Europe, 1919–1939: Systematic Case Studies*, ed. Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Jeremy Mitchell (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 85–105. A very succinct and balanced interpretation of the First Republic’s history is Jürgen Tampke, *Czech-German Relations and the Politics of Central Europe: From Bohemia to the EU* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 25–37. A comprehensive examination of interwar Czechoslovakia is Zdeněk Kárník’s

There were 18 governments between 1918 and 1938—15 essentially political cabinets and three bureaucratic cabinets—and ministerial reshuffling was constant (see Table 11). Four named coalitions and two without monikers were the source of the 15 largely political cabinets, one of which was a minority coalition that relied on the support of other parties in the National Assembly to pass legislation. Three governments were totally in the hands of bureaucrats, some of whom had party connections, but even the political cabinets contained bureaucrats, making them mixed political-bureaucratic governments.¹⁰ No government lived out its term of six years, which the constitution had prescribed, and the longest survived slightly more than three years and one month. One lasted a little more than two years and ten months; another had a life just shy of two years and four months. The average life of a government was about 13 months, and eight of the governments fell in less than a year. The disconnect between the constitution and reality, with respect to how long a government should have lasted, may seem great, yet Lijphart determined that oversized coalitions, of the type that the politicians of Czechoslovakia favored, usually have a life span of slightly more than two years.¹¹ Even by that measure, most of the First Republic's governments fell short of expectations in terms of duration.

There were other glaring political deficiencies. Politicians representing the ethnic Germans, who comprised approximately a quarter of the population, did not enter a cabinet until 1926. Even after German voters in the 1935 election had deserted the so-called German activist parties, which advocated cooperation with the Czechs and Slovaks, to back the negativist, antisystem Sudeten

České země v éře první republiky (1918-1938), 3 vols., *Dějiny Českých zemí* (Prague: Nakladatelství Libri, 2000–2003); as well as two volumes by Antonín Klimek in *Velké dějiny zemí Koruny české: 1918-1929* (vol. 13) and *1929-1938* (vol. 14), (Praha and Litomyšl: Paseka, 2000 and 2002). *Velké dějiny zemí Koruny české* began publication in 1999 and is ongoing. Other surveys of the First Republic in Czech and Slovak appear as references in this chapter.

10 The authors treat cabinets of experts, technicians, bureaucrats, and officials as well as nonpolitical cabinets as synonymous. As far as individual ministers are concerned, experts and technicians imply those whose experiences lie outside the administrative realm, such as financiers, industrialists, lawyers, educators, and military officers. Bureaucrats and officials are members of the administrative bureaucracy, often section heads who take on the portfolios of the ministries in which they serve. Nonpolitical cabinets often are a mixture of the two. Should politicians enter such cabinets, they supposedly set aside their party affiliations. Caretaker cabinets, known in the Netherlands as demissionary cabinets, submit their resignations but remain in power until a new government replaces them. Rump cabinets emerge when one or more parties leave the ruling coalition without collapsing the government. Mixed or semi-political cabinets include experts and politicians. In their article, "Caretaker Governments in Czech Politics: What to Do about a Government Crisis," *Europe-Asia Studies* 66, no. 8 (October 2014): 1323–1349, Vít Hloušek and Lubomír Kopeček confusingly consider caretaker governments as a general term for nonpolitical cabinets (see pp. 1323–1326).

11 Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, ch. 7, esp. Table 7.2 p. 137.

German Party (Sudetendeutsche Partei, SdP), the Czech and Slovak politicians insisted on keeping the activist parties in the governments.¹² The republic's other minorities also complained about their treatment, while the Slovak and Ruthenian representatives claimed that promises of autonomy went unfulfilled. Melissa Feinberg demonstrated that there were limits on gender equality, with women having the right to vote but not, for example, the right to determine their citizenship after marriage or the right to a legal abortion.¹³ Women were in the National Assembly, but no woman ever received a cabinet post.

Some claim these and other shortcomings warrant labeling the First Republic as an immature democracy or dismiss it as a badly functioning democracy. Mary Heimann referred to it as a "troubled democracy."¹⁴ Orzoff termed it a "managed democracy," banking on the thoughts of Walter Lippmann (1889–1974).¹⁵ Sabrina P. Ramet and Carol S. Leff observed that scholars and other ob-

12 The Sudeten German question in interwar Czechoslovakia is the subject of numerous studies. In ch. 5 of *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans*, King presents a clear analysis of the difficulties the Germans faced in the republic.

13 Melissa Feinberg, *Elusive Equality: Gender, Citizenship, and the Limits of Democracy in Czechoslovakia, 1918–1950* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), 6–97 (citizenship) and 129–58 (abortion).

14 Mary Heimann, *Czechoslovakia: The State That Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), ch. 3.

15 Andrea Orzoff, *Battle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914–1948* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 59. Lippmann did not actually use the terms *managed democracy* or *guided democracy*, but he mentioned that public affairs in democracies are "managed, if they are managed at all, at distant centers, from behind the scenes, by unnamed powers" and are of little concern to the average individual. Walter Lippmann, *The Phantom Public*, Introduction by Wilfred M. McClay (New Brunswick, CT, and London: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 3. Lippmann originally published the work in 1922. The Austrian-American theorist Edward L. Bernays (1891–1995), who respected Lippmann's work, also did not use these terms. Edward L. Bernays, *Crystallizing Public Opinion*, new ed. (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1934). Bernays originally published the work in 1923. Connolly, in *From Peoples into Nations*, borrowed Orzoff's characterization of Czechoslovakia as a managed democracy and even referred to it as "a staged democracy held together by a rhetoric that made rule of the people an absolute value, with producer and director in the person of President Masaryk, who helped keep the democratic pieces in proper motion from his perch above party politics in Prague's Castle" (p. 411). Connolly, like many historians, casts Masaryk in an outsized role as the guarantor of Czechoslovak democracy. Most certainly, Friday meetings that Karel Čapek (1890–1938) hosted with the *Pátečníci* (Friday Men)—Tomáš Masaryk and a select group of intellectuals, journalists, cultural figures, individuals from the President's Chancellery, and occasionally Beneš and Jan Masaryk (1886–1948), the president's son who was the Czechoslovak minister to the United Kingdom (1925–1938)—did not serve as the loci of the country's politics. On the *Pátečníci*, see Orzoff, *Battle for the Castle*, 88–93; and Connolly, *From Peoples into Nations*, 411. Karel Čapek was the author of the play *R.U.R.* (also known in English as *Rossum's Universal Robots*, 1920), the novel *War with the Newts* (*Válka s mloky*, 1936), and the play *White Plague* (*Bílá nemoc*, 1937). Čapek and Tomáš Masaryk were friends, and as a proponent of the Hrad, Čapek often informed Masaryk about the opinions of various politicians.

A significant body of literature discusses the difficulties of democracy in interwar Czechoslovakia. Orzoff, in *Battle for the Castle*, did not focus on the specific problems Czechoslovakia faced,

servers “both glorified [the First Republic] as a shining exception to democratic collapse in interwar Europe and vilified [it] as an elitist Potemkin democracy.”¹⁶ For Giovanni Capoccia, the First Republic was a “difficult democracy,” and he cited “important legitimacy problems,” along with “ethnic and ideological differences [that] resulted in an extreme fragmentation and polarization of the Czechoslovak party system.”¹⁷ In an earlier study, F. Gregory Campbell referred to Czechoslovakia as a presidential democracy because of the dominant role of T. G. Masaryk.¹⁸ The historian Maurice Baumont, thinking of Masaryk’s influence over the political system, called Czechoslovakia’s democracy a “dictatorship of respect.”¹⁹ These and many other attempts at employing adjectives to better define the democracy in the First Republic provide an inadequate measure of the quality of that democracy. They sometimes diminish the country’s

but she considered the efforts of the political elite, including Masaryk, in promoting the country’s democratic image at home and abroad (hence the word *myth* in the subtitle). Michal Pehr, in “Chvála a kritika prvorepublikové demokracie,” *Historie-otázky-problémy* 6 (2014): 120–34, examined the opinions of Czechoslovak citizens in the interwar years that praised the democracy and criticized it, including those in the antisystem parties, like the Communists and the Sudeten Germans, but also those who felt, during the Great Depression, that democracy had inherent faults. These two studies are thought provoking. All regimes, including democracies, justify their existence and tout their accomplishments, both real and perceived. Orzoff convincingly described how Czechoslovakia went about constructing its propaganda campaign, and she weighed the credibility of the effort’s claims and its effectiveness. One must bear in mind, however, that, in democracies, citizens may discuss the faults their society faces, consider potential corrective measures, and even advocate dramatic systemic change. The history of democracies is replete with cries for reform, some of which may take decades to enact. One need only consider Britain’s Chartist movement that started in 1836 and lasted into the 1850s. The Chartists set an agenda for reform, and the tenets of the first document came into fruition gradually, with Britain meeting them fully only in 1918, aside from the call for annual parliaments. Democracies, like any political system, except for those on the verge of collapse, are dynamic, but they may undertake changes conservatively, not always rapidly. Pehr’s article points out that certain individuals in interwar Czechoslovakia also called for improvements to the democratic system, but the republic never had the luxury of adopting many changes. For an excellent essay about interwar context of the First Republic’s democracy, see Antonie Marès, “Několik zamyšlení nad československou demokracií ve srovnání s dalšími středoevropskými státy,” in 1938: *Československo a krize demokracie ve střední Evropě ve 30. a 40. letech XX. století. Hledání východisek*, ed. Ivan Šedivý, Jan Němeček, Jiří Kocian, and Oldřich Tůma, trans. Jan Kuklík, vol. 2 (Prague: Masarykův ústav a Archiv AV ČR, 2010), 197–207.

- 16 Sabrina P. Ramet and Carol Skalník Leff, “Interwar Czechoslovakia: A National State for a Multi-national Population,” in *Interwar East Central Europe, 1918–1941: The Failure of Democracy-Building, the Fate of Minorities*, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet (London and New York: Routledge, 2020), 75.
- 17 Giovanni Capoccia, “Legislative Responses against Extremism: The ‘Protection of Democracy’ in the First Czechoslovak Republic,” *East European Politics and Societies* 16 (Fall 2002): 696. Capoccia also referred to “difficult democracies” on p. 753. Essentially, Capoccia’s generalization about Czechoslovakia corresponds to Lijphart’s notion of a deeply divided society.
- 18 F. Gregory Campbell, “Central Europe’s Bastion of Democracy,” *East European Quarterly* 11 (Summer 1977): 155–76, esp. 171.
- 19 Maurice Baumont, *La Faillite de la Paix (1918–1939): De Rethondes à Stresa (1918–1935)* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), 438–39. The original edition appeared in 1945.

democratic achievement, exaggerate its weaknesses, or unduly amplify the role of T. G. Masaryk.

Criticisms of democracy today in the Czech Republic often resemble some of the negative assessments of the Czechoslovak First Republic, particularly unstable cabinets and overbearing presidents. The parallels in politics between 1918 and 1938, on the one hand, and after 1989, on the other hand, are more than coincidental. They are products of political cultures that prevent these polities from functioning like majoritarian democracies, such as the United Kingdom, and even many democracies employing proportional representation. Nevertheless, they are not unique.

The historical evidence suggests that interwar Czechoslovakia was a consociational state, like Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, and post-1945 Austria, all of which Lijphart used in the 1970s to construct his consociational theory. If Czechoslovakia was a consociational democracy between the world wars, it follows that the genesis of consociationalism in the republic predates the state's founding. Furthermore, if Czechoslovakia after 1989 was consociational and if the Czech Republic and Slovakia continue to exhibit consociational traits, as some maintain, then the Second World War and Communist Party rule did not excise the propensities for consociational democracy from the Slovak or Czech political cultures. Nevertheless, no historian has employed consociationalism to analyze First Republic's democracy, and political scientists have focused on applying the theory largely to the post-1989 period.²⁰

20 In the immediate postcommunist era, a number of political scientists considered not only the links the newly restructured democratic Czechoslovakia had with the not-so-distant past, including the First Republic, but also consociationalism and the applicability of the consociational model to post-1989 Czech and Slovak politics. A partial list of these sources includes Pavel Barša, "Jakou demokracií pro Československo," *Prítomnost* 11, no. 7 (July 1991): 3; Lubomír Brokl, "Mezi listopadem 1989 a demokracií-antinomie naší politiky," *Sociologický časopis* 28, no. 2 (April 1992): 150–64; Eva Broklová and Lubomír Brokl, "Hledání demokracie pro Československo," *Prítomnost* 3, no. 1 (January 1992): 28–29; Vladimíra Dvořáková and Jiří Kunc, *O přechodech k demokracii* (Prague: SLON, Sociologické nakladatelství, 1994); Jiří Kunc, *Stranické systémy v re/ konstrukci: Belgie, Itálie, Španělsko, Československo, Česká republika* (Prague: SLON, Sociologické nakladatelství, 2000); Arend Lijphart, interview by Blanka Říchová, "Atraktivní model demokracie," *Prítomnost* 3, no. 1 (January 1992): 8; Miroslav Novák, "Is There One Best 'Model of Democracy'? Efficiency and Representativeness: 'Theoretical Revolution' or Democratic Dilemma?" *Czech Sociological Review* 5, no. 2 (1997): 131–57; Miroslav Novák, *Jakou demokracií pro nové demokracie?: Konsensuální model, efektivita a kulturně homogenní země* (Brno: Masarykova univerzita v Brně, Mezinárodní politologický ústav, 2001); Miroslav Novák, "Je konsensuální 'model' demokracie nejlepší?" *Sociologický časopis* 34, no. 1 (1988): 3–21, and 34, no. 2 (1988): 131–44; Blanka Říchová, "Čas a prostor pro konsensus (konsociační demokracie pro Československo)," *Prítomnost* 11, no. 10 (October 1991): 22–23; and Blanka Říchová, *Přehled moderních politologických teorií* (Prague: Portal, 2000). Four political scientists—Stanislav Balík, Vít Hloušek, Jan Holzer, and Jakub Šedo—examined the long-term development of Czech political structures in *Politický systém českých zemí, 1848–1989* (Brno: Masarykova univerzita, Mezinárodní politologický

When analyzing the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, which occurred between 1989 and 1992, some social scientists considered the breakup of the state to be a failure of consociationalism. In these cases, most researchers hardly paid any attention to the interwar years. One such example is the study of Abby Innes, who incorrectly assumed that the dysfunctional “nominally ‘consociational’ system” after 1989 “was largely inherited from the communists.”²¹ Petr Kopecký argued that the consociational institutions of Czechoslovakia after 1989 were flawed and that the country did not meet all the favorable conditions of the consociational model.²² Through her study of Czechoslovakia after 1989 and the Union of Serbia and Macedonia after 1992, Emanuela Macek-Macková aptly demonstrated that the insufficient favorable conditions for consociationalism, the difficulties in transitioning to democracy, and the pressure of gaining entry into the European Union brought about the collapse of consociationalism. She reached conclusions that are similar to those of Kopecký with respect to Czechoslovakia. Yet, her assumption that the consociational model is unfavorable for societies undergoing dramatic change may be incorrect. In the case of Czechoslovakia, for example, the consociational structure was one the Communist regime devised to operate under the umbrella of the Communist Party. It was largely synthetic and not entirely organic. Furthermore, not every dramatic political transition for a consociational polity will take place in the absence of elite accommodation, as it did in Czechoslovakia, where the Communist leadership lost power and where there were weak bonds binding the new political leaders, who once had been dissidents and low-level Communist functionaries. In contrast, the 1918 emergence of Czechoslovakia illustrates how elite cooperation can exhibit continuity.²³ Both Lauri Karvonen and Gregory Luebbert identified Czechoslovakia between the world wars as consociational, but they did so within the context of examining many countries, and they had a number of misperceptions about the First Republic.²⁴ Peter Bugge briefly delved

ústav, 2007). Although they were aware of the consociational theory, they did not employ it. Some references to consociationalism appear in connection with the 1905 Moravian Compromise in works cited in Chapter 2 and later in this study. For references by Henderson, Hloušek, Kopeček, Klíma, Novák, and Říhová to interwar Czechoslovakia in the examination of consociationalism in the final years of Czechoslovakia and the early years of the Czech Republic, see ch. 1, note 21.

²¹ Abby Innes, *Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 116.

²² Kopecký, “From ‘Velvet Revolution’ to ‘Velvet Split,’” 69–86.

²³ Emanuela Macek-Macková, “Challenges in Conflict Management in Multi-Ethnic States—The Dissolution of Czechoslovakia and Serbia and Montenegro,” *Nationalities Papers* 39 (July 2011): 615–33. See also Howe, Lorman, and Miller, “Continuity and Discontinuity in Legislative Representation.”

²⁴ Lauri Karvonen, *Fragmentation and Consensus: Political Organization and the Interwar Crisis in Europe* (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1993); and Gregory M. Luebbert, *Liberalism*,

into the historical background to politics in the Bohemian Lands, with references to the First Republic, and concluded that the evidence points toward the development of a majoritarian democracy in the Czech Republic, with aspects of consociationalism.²⁵

The 2002 study of Hloušek and Kopeček viewed Czech (as opposed to Czechoslovak) consociationalism in a historic light, but it has a number of shortcomings. A basic difficulty is that, while the authors distinguished between consociational and consensus democracy, they referred to Czechoslovakia as a consociational democracy, arguing that the term had a “‘more descriptive’ character,” but in reality, they effectively combined the two models.²⁶ The authors admitted that they had little space to explore the topic, so in the few pages dealing with the interwar years, it is no surprise that they did not apply systematically either the consociational or consensus model.²⁷ They mentioned the deep segmentation of the society that had its origins in the Habsburg Monarchy, the eventual accommodation with the German activists, the importance of cabinet-level grand coalitions, and the long-term reliance on the Pětka and its successors. They reasoned that “consensus was very fragile,” since the German parties lost control over “‘their’ segment,” the Hungarians were not involved in the governing elite, and “a large portion of the Slovak populace ... was capable of accepting the given framework of consensus only temporarily and with exceptions.”²⁸ The current study, in contrast, will show that the political consensus in Czechoslovakia had a solid basis, even in the face of the Nazi threat and the loss of support for the activist parties, that the Hungarian politicians were engaged in democratic politics, and that the Slovak leaders were crucial partners in the cabinets and in the governance of Slovakia. Hloušek and Kopeček then surveyed the Second Republic (1938–1939) and Third Republic (1945–1948), noting that they were more akin to the majoritarian model. When addressing the Czech Republic after 1989, they concluded that, although there are some elements of majoritarian democracy, the Czech system inclines more

Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

25 Peter Bugge, “Democracy and Parliament in Czech Politics,” in *Forward to the Past: Continuity and Change in Political Development in Hungary, Austria, and the Czech and Slovak Republics*, ed. Lene Bøgh Sørensen and Leslie B. Eliason, 161–77 (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1997), see esp. 169–70.

26 Hloušek and Kopeček, “Česká republika–konsenzuální nebo majoritní model demokracie?” 11.

27 Hloušek and Kopeček, “Česká republika,” 11 and 12–14.

28 Hloušek and Kopeček, “Česká republika,” 13 (first quotation), 13–14 (second quotation), and 14 (third quotation).

toward the consensus model.²⁹ Since the authors conflated consensus and consociational democracies, it is difficult to determine whether they believed the current system is merely consensus or has strong consociational elements. In any case, they judged the mix of consensual and majoritarian democracy as problematical because it has contributed to frequent political stalemate, and they admitted to being “inclined to the greater benefits of moving in the direction of a majoritarian democracy.”³⁰

A more recent effort to consider interwar Czechoslovakia through the lens of consociationalism is the work of Jeffrey S. Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg, who termed the republic a quasiconsociational democracy. The two authors did not account for the social and ethnic complexity of governments before 1926, including the fact that Slovaks, not all of whom were autonomists, held cabinet seats as influential members of major parties. Although there were Germans in the government in the early 1920s, Kopstein and Wittenberg neglected the efforts of Masaryk, Švehla, and others to break the resistance of the conservative National Democratic Party that prevented any Germans from receiving ministries.³¹ In 1926, their efforts finally bore fruit. The socialists were far more important as coalition partners with the Republicans than with the National Democrats, yet Kopstein and Wittenberg maintained that the “Agrarians dominated their coalition with the bourgeois National Democrats.” The authors practically ignored the Social Democratic Party, even though it was a crucial player in every coalition, aside from the three-year period between 1926 and 1929, and they incorrectly assumed that the National Socialist Party was as vehemently anti-German as it had been before the First World War.³²

The current work is the first to apply the consociational model to Czechoslovakia between 1918 and 1938 in a systematic manner, but given the limitations of space, it focuses on a limited body of evidence and only begins to consider the complexity of the topic.³³ It also does not attempt a thorough assessment

²⁹ Hloušek and Kopeček, “Česká republika,” 17–19.

³⁰ Hloušek and Kopeček, “Česká republika,” 19.

³¹ In 1934, the National Democratic Party merged with two smaller far-right parties to form National Unification (Czech and Slovak: Národní sjednocení).

³² Jeffrey S. Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg, “Beyond Dictatorship and Democracy: Rethinking National Minority Inclusion and Regime Type in Interwar Eastern Europe,” *Comparative Political Studies* 43 (May 2010): Germans (1098), Slovaks (1099), Republican and National Democrats as coalition partners (1112).

³³ Miller presented evidence supporting aspects of the consociational theory in *Forging Political Compromise* but lacked the space to apply the theory. In his survey titled “The Czech Republic,” in *Eastern Europe: An Introduction to the People, Land, and Culture*, ed. Richard Frucht, 203–281 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2004), esp. 232–33, 238–39, and 250, Miller identified the

of Lijphart's theory, although it does contribute to debates about consociationalism. The main goal here is to demonstrate that Lijphart's model is the most appropriate tool for describing the political system of the Czechoslovak First Republic. In doing so, this study also shows that interwar Czechoslovakia confirms Lijphart's generalizations about the conditions that favor consociationalism. To some extent, it also will evaluate the quality of Czechoslovakia's democracy and suggest ways in which scholars can further refine consociational theory.

Lewis Einstein and Other American Diplomatic Observers

Finding a skilled and objective historian who assembled data useful for determining the applicability of the consociational theory to Czechoslovakia in the 1920s and 1930s seems unlikely, but such an individual existed: Lewis David Einstein (1877–1967), the American envoy in Prague.³⁴ The scion of a wealthy family and the son of a magnate in the fabric industry, Einstein completed a bachelor's degree in history at Columbia University in 1898 and a master's degree the following year. Shortly after graduating, he published two books in Renaissance studies.³⁵ He entered the Foreign Service, in 1903, with Paris as his first

Czech Republic and Czechoslovakia as consociational and contended that the consociational relationships originated in the Habsburg Monarchy.

- 34 Lewis Einstein described his career in his memoirs, *A Diplomat Looks Back*, ed. Lawrence E. Gelfand (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). Additional information appeared in the social news of the *New York Times*, including "Diplomatic Appointments: Lewis Einstein of This City Gets a Secretaryship in the Embassy at Paris," *New York Times*, May 20, 1903, 3; Marconi Transatlantic Wireless Telegraph, "Lewis Einstein in London: American Minister to Costa Rica Is Taking Sick Wife to Paris," *New York Times*, February 11, 1912, C5; "Lady Waldstein Claims \$1,250,000: Names Herself Heir to Fund Trustees Say Was for Her Brother If He Left Wife," *New York Times*, December 2, 1913, 1; and "Mr. Lewis Einstein: Diplomatist and Man of Letters," *The Times*, December 13, 1967, 13. See also Laramie, WY, University of Wyoming (UW), American Heritage Center (AHC), Lewis Einstein Papers (LEP), box 15, folder 15, "Einstein Is Named Minister in Prague," *Evening Mail*, undated newspaper clipping; and "Czechoslovakia Honors Retiring U.S. Minister," *New York Herald*, February 2, 1930. In *Diplomacy between the Wars: Five Diplomats and the Shaping of the Modern World* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2008), George W. Liebmann devotes his first chapter to aspects of Einstein's diplomatic and literary career. A summary of Einstein's career also appears in Milada Polišenská, *Diplomatické vztahy Československa a USA 1918–1968*, vol. 1: 1918–1938, Part 1: *Ministerstva, legace a diplomaté* (Prague: Nakladatelství Libri, 2012), 175–80.
- 35 See Lewis Einstein, *Italian Renaissance in England: Studies* (New York: Columbia University Press, and London: Macmillan, 1902); and Lewis Einstein, *Luigi Pulci and the Morgante Maggiore* (Berlin: Felber, 1902). A bibliography of Einstein's works appears in Einstein, *A Diplomat Looks Back*, 251–56. Einstein spoke French, German, and Italian. On Einstein's ability to speak German, which most formally educated Czech-speaking politicians knew, see Prague, Archiv Kanceláře prezidenta republiky (AKPR), Fond Kancelář prezidenta republiky, protokol T (Tajné), signature T1069/25, carton 152, T154/26, report of February 8, 1926. The author of the memo was Přemysl Šámal (1867–1941), who was a member of Masaryk's Realist Party. During the war, he was a member of the Czech Maffia, and after the war, he was the mayor of Prague and a deputy

appointment. In the following year, Einstein transferred to London, and then, in 1906, he became the secretary of the American delegation to the First Moroccan Conference.³⁶ Between 1906 and 1909, he served as second secretary, first secretary, and charge d'affaires in Constantinople, where he witnessed the Young Turk Revolution. In 1909–1910, he was in China, just before the republican revolution there. He was the American envoy to Costa Rica in 1911–1913, but he interrupted his diplomatic career because his wife had taken ill. From February to September 1915, Einstein was in the Ottoman Empire as a special agent to supervise the treatment of Allied prisoners of war. During the Gallipoli Campaign, he was in Constantinople, and he later criticized the Armenian atrocities in his memoir, *Inside Constantinople*, which remains a valuable primary source.³⁷ From the autumn of 1915 until the spring of 1916, Einstein had the same position in Bulgaria as he had held in the Ottoman Empire. With no appointment during the presidency of Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924, president 1913–1921), Einstein prepared short manuscripts on foreign policy, including some position papers for the Republican Party.³⁸ In October 1921, Warren G. Harding (1865–1923, president 1921–1923) named Einstein the American minister in Prague, replacing Richard T. Crane II (1882–1938), who had been close to Wilson and was a personal friend of Masaryk.

Einstein remained devoted to history and was remarkably unbiased in the conduct of diplomatic affairs, despite his political leanings. During his career with the Department of State, he continued his intellectual pursuits, and by the time he assumed his post in Prague, he had written eight books on history, foreign policy, and culture, along with 34 articles and other short works, including a piece published in 1913 that not only predicted the outbreak of what was to become known as the First World War but also America's entry into that

in the Revolutionary National Assembly. In 1919, he left party politics to head the Chancellery of the President of the Republic (Kancelář prezidenta republiky). In this position, Šámal was an essential component of the Hrad, the politicians and intellectuals who cooperated with Masaryk.

³⁶ In the year he went to Britain, Einstein married Hélène Ralli (1863–1949), a marriage that cost him the bulk of his inheritance because his parents disapproved of the older, twice-divorced woman who, unlike the Einsteins, was not Jewish. His wife's significant social connections in Britain, combined with his family's American business and political contacts, particularly with the Republican Party and Theodore D. Roosevelt (1858–1919, president 1901–1909), presented opportunities for Einstein, although it was his talent as a diplomat that enabled him to advance in the Foreign Service.

³⁷ Lewis Einstein, *Inside Constantinople: A Diplomat's Diary during the Dardanelles Expedition, April–September, 1915* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1918).

³⁸ See for example Laramie, WY, UW, AHC, LEP, "Draft of Plank on Foreign Policy: Mr. Wilson's Record," box 9, folder 3, n.d.; "The Republican Idea of Peace," box 9, folder 6, n.d.; "Sir Edward Grey and Secret Diplomacy," box 9, folder 8, December 1914; and "Mr. Wilson's Failure at the Peace Conference," box 9, folder 11, n.d.

bloody conflict. Before the war, he edited the “Humanists’ Library,” which released nine volumes of primary sources from the Renaissance.³⁹ Among his fellow diplomats, Einstein had the reputation of being knowledgeable and socially refined. The British minister to Prague, Sir Ronald Macleay (1870–1943), at the behest of his superiors, provided the Foreign Office with information about the diplomats and politicians in Prague. He observed that Einstein “is a clever and well-read man . . . [and he] entertained lavishly in the fine old Schonborn Palace which he induced the American government to buy and which he and Mrs. Einstein furnished with great taste out of their own pockets.”⁴⁰

Einstein’s political views were moderate, and he strove to separate them from his work as a diplomat. When helping to draft the Republican platform on foreign policy, in an effort to defeat Wilson, Einstein reflected some of his party’s isolationist views, including the avoidance of hostilities abroad and opposition to the League of Nations, but he advocated an active foreign policy with states whose commercial and other interests intersected those of the United States.⁴¹ His earlier opinions notwithstanding, Einstein’s postwar diplomatic reports were not disparaging of the League, which he seemed to have viewed as a useful supplemental venue to traditional diplomatic exchanges. In his reports to Washington, Einstein never took issue with the postwar situation in Europe, including efforts to treat all nations equally, a hallmark of Wilsonian diplomacy. Without passing judgement on the treaties that had ended the war, Einstein noted Masaryk and Beneš’s willingness to adjust Czechoslovakia’s borders by ceding some land to Germany and Hungary on the basis of ethnicity. Instead of espousing a traditionalist view that might have justified one nation’s domination of another, Einstein was as critical of the largely Czech-dominated central government’s administration of Slovakia and Ruthenia as he was of many Slovak and Ruthenian party leaders whom he believed were unappreciative of the Czech politicians’ efforts to raise their provinces’ cultural and economic levels. Einstein praised Masaryk’s success in remaining above the fray of politics, which he saw as an idealistic standpoint, and he admired Švehla’s practical skills as a power broker. In short, Einstein, as a diplomat, was neither truly traditional nor strictly Wilsonian, and he strove to maintain objectivity. His expe-

39 For his prediction, see “The United States and Anglo-German Rivalry,” *National Review* 60 (January 1913): 736–50. Einstein completed *Tudor Ideals* (London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1921) just before going to Czechoslovakia.

40 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Political Departments, General Correspondence, 371/14328, 1930, report of Macleay to the Foreign Office.

41 Laramie, WY, UW, AHC, LEP, “Draft Plank on Foreign Policy,” box 9, folder 3, n.d.

rience as a diplomat as well as his powers of observation and analysis as a historian make his reports from Prague to Washington valuable sources on the internal and foreign affairs of Czechoslovakia.

In 1928, Einstein unsuccessfully sought a position at an embassy with more exposure, and in January 1929, after not having received a suitable offer, he resigned his appointment in Prague, where he had been for nearly nine years. Herbert Hoover (1874–1964, president 1929–1933) replaced him with Abraham C. Ratschesky (1864–1943), a political appointee.⁴² When Einstein departed from Prague in February 1930, he ended a long diplomatic career of approximately 20 discontinuous years that entailed six regular appointments and three special assignments. As a well-trained historian, successful writer, and career diplomat, Einstein was a notable exception in an age when America's diplomatic corps was grounded in politics as opposed to professionalism.⁴³

While Einstein authored the most revealing reports about the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia to emerge from the American mission, others also sent useful information to Washington. Reports on politics and culture came from John Sterett Gittings (1888–1961), who arrived in Prague in 1926 as the third secretary of the legation and at one point served as chargé d'affaires ad interim. Born in Maryland, he finished some of his basic education in Switzerland, studied at the University of Lausanne, completed a bachelor's degree at Harvard, and took additional courses at Columbia and the University of Maryland. Although he became a lawyer in Maryland, he went abroad to assist various American emissaries in Latin America and Europe in a private capacity, which then was an

⁴² Einstein, *A Diplomat Looks Back*, 207; Laramie, WY, UW, AHC, LEP, box 3, letter from Frank B. Kellogg (1856–1937) to Einstein, April 2, 1928; report of Einstein to the United States Department of State (DOS), January 22, 1929; and Henry L. Stimson (1867–1950) to Einstein, January 3, 1930. On Einstein's resignation, see Polišenská, *Diplomatické vztahy Československa a USA 1918–1968*, 1/1, 194–98.

⁴³ In retirement, Einstein spent nearly four decades publishing a variety of works: articles, short comments, poetry, art books, and memoirs, in addition to *Roosevelt: His Mind in Action* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1930); *Divided Loyalties: Americans in England during the War of Independence* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1933); *Historical Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1946), which is a historiographical essay; and *The Holmes-Einstein Letters: Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Lewis Einstein, 1903–1935*, ed. James Bishop Peabody (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964). Between 1905 and 1932, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1841–1935) served on the Supreme Court. In the 1930s, he advised Cordell Hull (1871–1955), the American secretary of state, on foreign policy issues, although Hull's brief and cordial responses suggest that he may not have valued Einstein's observations. See Laramie, WY, UW, AHC, LEP, box 3. For *The Times* of London and other British newspapers, Einstein wrote a number of articles that defended Czechoslovakia, in the face of Nazi Germany's propaganda, and he criticized the Munich Agreement. His most complete assessment of it is "The Munich Agreement: A Retrospect," *History* 23 (March 1939): 331–40. He spent the first half of his retirement in London, and after his wife had died in 1949, he moved to Paris and remarried.

accepted practice. During the First World War, he served as a lieutenant commander in the US Navy. Afterward, he took a position with the Department of State but left, a few months later, to work in the financial industry. In 1922, he returned to the Foreign Service and took assignments in Chile, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Sweden, before arriving in Prague, where he remained until his transfer, in late 1929, to the legation in Finland.⁴⁴

Other Foreign Service personnel also sent meaningful dispatches to Washington about Czechoslovak internal affairs. In 1920, Charles S. Winans (1863–1935), who had a background in business and academia, came to the American legation in Prague as consul. He became consul general in 1924 and retired in 1928.⁴⁵ Frederick F. A. Pearson (1888–1958) arrived in Prague in 1922, and two years later, he became the second secretary of the legation and once served as chargé d'affaires ad interim.⁴⁶ Sidney E. O'Donoghue (1895–1964) was in Prague between 1924 and 1926 as a Foreign Service officer, and at one point, he was consul-in-charge.⁴⁷ Between 1929 and 1931, Barton Hall (1881–1951), another experienced diplomat, was the second secretary of the legation in Prague.⁴⁸ Frank

44 *Register of the Department of State, January 1, 1932*, Department of State Publication no. 287 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1932), 162.

45 Winans was born in Michigan and studied at Albion College (Albion, MI). After a career as an importer of American goods to Chile, Winans became a professor of English, at Iquique English College, in Chile. In 1893, he assumed the presidency of the institution and simultaneously served as its business manager. In 1900, he became the American consul in Iquique, Chile (he temporarily retained his position at Iquique English College), and he later was consul in Spain, Germany, Cuba, the UK, and finally Czechoslovakia. *Register of the Department of State, January 1, 1928* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1928), 217–18; *Register of the Department of State, January 1, 1930*, Department of State Publication no. 60 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1930), 234; and Senate, US Congress, *Message from the President of the United States in Response to the Resolution of the Senate of March 2, 1901, a Communication of the Secretary of State Submitting Reports from Consular Offices of the United States Giving Account of Each Consulate and Consular Agency, Showing Its Principal Industries and Exports, the Surrounding Climactic Conditions, the General Cost of Living, and Similar Information*, 57th Congress, 1st session, Document no. 411 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1902), 92.

46 In 1911, Pearson graduated from Harvard with a master's degree. Before the First World War, he worked as a journalist, and during the war, he served in the military. In 1919, he joined the Department of State and had postings in the Netherlands, the UK, and Hungary. Between 1922 and 1926, he was in Prague and then accepted a transfer to Chile. *Register of the Department of State, January 1, 1931*, Department of State Publication no. 170 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1931), 211–12; and Town of Hamilton, MA, *Annual Report for the Town of Hamilton, Massachusetts* (Published by the author, 1958), 41.

47 O'Donoghue attended Mount St. Mary's College (Emmitsburg, MD—the city where he was born), Fordham University, and Georgetown Foreign Service School. He was in the US Army during the First World War. Afterward, he began working for the State Department and was in Russia, Singapore, Italy, and Greece before his assignment to Czechoslovakia. *Register of the Department of State, January 1, 1932*, 217; and “Sidney E. O'Donoghue,” *New York Times*, July 29, 1964, 33.

48 In 1907, Hall studied at Harvard, completed a degree in architecture, and then worked as an architect in New York. In 1919, after having served in the military during the First World War,

C. Lee (1891–1963) joined the Department of State in 1915, was in Petrograd and Moscow during the two Russian revolutions of 1917, and he came to Prague as consul general in 1931.⁴⁹ J. Webb Benton (1892–1947), who held a master's degree from Cambridge University, was in Prague between 1932 and 1936. He arrived as second secretary, and in 1935, he advanced to first secretary while on assignment in Czechoslovakia.⁵⁰

Einstein, along with Gittings, Winans, Pearson, O'Donoghue, Hall, Lee, and Benton had much in common. All of them completed formal education beyond secondary school, and both Gittings and Benton studied abroad. Gittings and O'Donoghue completed postbaccalaureate course work, while Einstein, Pearson, and Benton had master's degrees. Gittings, Pearson, O'Donoghue, Hall, and Benton had performed military service during the First World War. Several of them had experience in other careers before coming to the Foreign Service: Einstein published books on Renaissance studies; Gittings was a lawyer who worked as a private assistant to American envoys and in the finance industry; Winans was an importer, college instructor, and college president; Pearson was a journalist; and Hall was an architect. The only individual who entered the diplomatic service immediately after college was Lee. All had come to Prague with extensive diplomatic backgrounds in several locations. Their formal training, varied careers, and individual professional accomplishments made the American diplomats excellent observers of the situation in Prague and throughout the country. As a result, their reports serve as valuable additions to the body of primary sources relating to the Czechoslovak First Republic.

he joined the Department of State and had positions in Greece, Germany, and Finland before moving to Czechoslovakia. *Register of the Department of State, January 1, 1932*, 167; and James Howard Means, comp., *Fiftieth Anniversary Report of the Harvard Class of 1907*, Harvard College Class of 1907, Secretary's Eleventh Report (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 294–95.

49 Lee graduated from the University of Colorado and held consular positions in France, Russia, Sweden, United Kingdom, Singapore, and Canada before his posting in Czechoslovakia. Between 1926 and 1928, he lectured on consular practices at Georgetown University. *Register of the Department of State, January 1, 1928*, 164; and *Register of the Department of State, January 1, 1932*, 102.

50 Benton was a native of Virginia, studied abroad as a youth, and graduated from Cambridge University in 1914. During the First World War, he served in the British-American Ambulance Corps, was secretary of the War Relief Association, and had a commission as a first lieutenant in the US Army. In 1918–1919, he was the assistant to the military attaché in Tokyo, Japan, and in 1919, he completed a master's degree at Cambridge. In 1920, Benton joined the Department of State and had postings in Brazil, Uruguay, Venezuela, Portugal, Poland, and Spain before coming to Prague. *Biographic Register of the Department of State, September 1, 1944*, Department of State Publication no. 2326 (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1944), 14.

The Favorable Conditions for Consociational Democracy in Czechoslovakia

With some qualifications, Czechoslovakia met all of the conditions that favor consociational democracy (see Table 1). It fulfilled the favorable conditions of having external dangers, overarching loyalties, geographic concentrations of social segments, historic traditions of compromise and accommodation, and no unified majority. Some special considerations are necessary with respect to the preconditions that a polity have a minimum of socioeconomic disparities, a small number of segments, the lack of large differences in the sizes of the segments, and a small population. The following discussion explains how Lijphart's favorable conditions pertained to Czechoslovakia by highlighting the analysis of academics as well as the observations of Czechoslovak interwar politicians and others, including American diplomats in Czechoslovakia.

Lijphart maintained that populations in consociational states ideally are relatively small, but he did not pose a strict limit on size. Czechoslovak citizens viewed themselves as living in a small state, even though, with 14.7 million inhabitants in 1930, Czechoslovakia had a greater population than any other European consociational state at the time—Belgium and Netherlands had slightly more than half the number inhabitants of Czechoslovakia; Switzerland, slightly less than half.⁵¹ Yet, in comparison to some of its neighbors, Czechoslovakia was small. Poland's population was twice the size of Czechoslovakia, and Germany's approached four and one-half times that of Czechoslovakia. In comparison to its allies in the region, Czechoslovakia had a slightly larger population than Yugoslavia and a somewhat smaller population than Romania. Only Austria and Hungary were significantly smaller—Austria had less than half the population of Czechoslovakia, and Hungary had more than half.

Another condition favoring consociationalism is that all the segments should be roughly the same size so that none forms a majority. In a strict sense, interwar Czechoslovakia did not meet this requirement, even though no ethnic group actually formed a majority. Before 1918, Germans and Czechs in the Bohemian Lands claimed every individual they could to strengthen their numbers, and the creation of Czechoslovakia gave new urgency to their efforts.⁵² So that the new republic remained a Slavic enterprise, as opposed to a multinational venture,

⁵¹ Státní úřad statistický (SÚS), *Statistická ročenka Republiky československé, 1935* (Prague: Nakladatel Orbis, 1935), Table II-1, p. 5.

⁵² Zahra examined German- and Czech-speaking nationalists' efforts to claim children to bolster their respective population numbers in *Kidnapped Souls*. See chs. 4–5 for the interwar years.

some Slovak and Czech leaders felt it was necessary for their ethnic groups to form one Czechoslovak nation, which had Slovak and Czech branches. Therefore, as of 1930, with Czech speakers comprising approximately 50 percent of the population and Slovak speakers comprising about 16 percent, the country had a majority of 66 percent of the population that was “Czechoslovak,” the artificial legal ethnic designation that the State Statistical Office used. Despite their contrived majority, Czech and Slovak politicians could not always overcome their lack of cohesion in order to act in unison. After the opportunistically constituted Czechoslovaks, the German speakers were the second largest ethnic group, with 23 percent of the population, and until the latter half of the 1930s, they, too, did not act in unison. Other ethnic groups were substantially smaller: Hungarian speakers were 5 percent of the population; Ukrainian and Rusyn speakers were 4 percent; and Jews who claimed distinct Jewish nationality and Polish speakers each were about 1 percent.⁵³

Czechoslovakism was an informal ideology that appeared in many official settings, but while its proponents promoted the existence of a single Czechoslovak nation, with two branches, they recognized and accepted the linguistic and other differences between Slovaks and Czechs. Politicians who invoked Czechoslovakism did so to refer to brotherhood and cultural unity, to extend the notion of a small, peaceful, and democratic people to the Slovaks, or to link

53 The percentages are based on statistics in *Statistická ročenka Republiky československé, 1935*, Table II-8, p. 7. The Jews accounted for less than 1.4 percent of the population, according to ethnicity (Jews could claim Czechoslovak, German, or some other ethnicity). According to religion, Jews accounted for 2.42 percent of the country's population—1.07 percent in Bohemia, 1.16 percent in Moravia and Silesia, 4.11 percent in Slovakia, and 14.14 percent in Ruthenia. *Statistická ročenka Republiky československé, 1935*, Table II-10, p. 8. On the Hungarian and other minorities in Czechoslovakia, see Martin Pekár, et al., *Ethnic Minorities in Slovakia in the Years 1918-1945: A Survey*, trans. Štefan Franko (Prešov: Universum-EU, s.r.o., 2011). Attila Simon, *The Hungarians of Slovakia in 1938*, trans. Andrew Gane (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs; Highland Lakes, NJ: Atlantic Research and Publications, Inc.; Budapest: Balassi Institute, 2012), is an excellent source for Hungarians in Slovakia throughout the interwar years, despite the book's title. Ukrainian was the language that most Slavic speakers of Ruthenia used, although some had flirted with Russian. For some time, there was a debate about whether to use Latin script, but many argued that Latin advanced Czech efforts of assimilation. Cyrillic eventually prevailed. See Geoffrey Brown and Alexander Maxwell, “Czechoslovak Ruthenia's 1925 Latinization Campaign as the Heritage of Nineteenth-Century Slavism,” *Nationalities Papers*, 44, no. 6 (November 2016): 950–66. Brown and Maxwell explained that the Republican Party advanced the Latin alphabet (958–959). There is another layer of complexity to the issues that Brown and Maxwell described regarding the Republican Party's support for the Latin alphabet. Oddly enough, on July 5, 1922 (p. 4), *Venkov* (Countryside), the Republican Party newspaper, featured its first news report for readers in Ruthenia, and it appeared in the Cyrillic alphabet. Afterward, the “Russian Department” (Русский отдѣлъ) was a frequent feature that took up between one-quarter and one full page. After a brief hiatus, the somewhat regular report using Cyrillic reappeared on March 8, 1923.

the phrase to class, like workers or peasants.⁵⁴ In public appearances, political leaders referred to Czechoslovakism, but they never elevated their rhetoric to the level of any type of well-defined state propaganda. Slovak autonomists dismissed the notion, but they also must have realized its usefulness, since without a Czechoslovak nation, Slovaks would have constituted the third largest ethnic group in the country, after Germans. In 1928, during a conversation with Andrej Hlinka (1864–1938), the leader of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party (Slovak People's Party or Slovenská ľudová strana, abbreviated SLS, from 1913 to 1925, and the Hlinka Slovak People's Party or Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana, abbreviated HSLS, between 1925 and 1945), Masaryk put it bluntly: "without Slovakia, the state would be Czech-German."⁵⁵ A few Czech intellectuals advanced Czechoslovakism, often linking it with Slav reciprocity. The greatest Slovak proponent of Czechoslovakism was Ivan Dérer (1884–1973), a Slovak Social Democrat who was close to Masaryk and held nine ministerial resorts—once when Švehla was the interior minister and once when he was prime minister.⁵⁶ Not even in school texts was Czechoslovakism a frequent topic.⁵⁷ Czechoslovakism and its accompanying myth of a Czechoslovak nation had limitations as unifying factors and were not concepts that contributed to the creation of a majority, in consociational terms.

Religion provided another potential source of segmentation in Czechoslovakia. Throughout the republic, 74 percent of the population claimed to be Roman Catholic, but the Catholic Church had difficulties transcending ethnic divisions and religious apathy among many Czech-speaking Catholics. Sect and ethnicity divided the Protestants, who comprised approximately 8 percent of the population. Other denominations included the adherents of the Czechoslo-

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- 54 Elisabeth Bakke, "Conceptions of Czechoslovakism among Czech Politicians in Government Inauguration Debates, 1918–1938," in *Czechoslovakism*, ed. Adam Hudek, Michal Kopeček, and Jan Mervart (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, UK, and New York, NY: Routledge, 2022), 162–65. See also Elisabeth Bakke, "Czechoslovakism in Slovak History," in *Slovakia in History*, Mikuláš Teich, Dušan Kováč, and Martin D. Brown, ed. (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 255–61. Bakke also summarized her analysis of references to Czechoslovakism in textbooks in "The Making of Czechoslovakism in the First Czechoslovak Republic," in *Loyalitäten in der Tschechoslowakischen Republik 1918–1938: Politische, nationale und kulturelle Zugehörigkeiten*, ed. Martin Schulze Wessel, Veröffentlichungen des Collegium Carolinum, vol. 101 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004), 27–28.
- 55 Prague, Archiv Ústavu T.G. Masaryka (AÚTGM), Fond T. G. Masaryk, R (Republika), carton 405, folder "Ludová strana, 1928," "Hlinka," July 14, 1928, notes on a conversation with Hlinka.
- 56 Róbert Arpáš and Matej Hanula, "The Positions of Major Slovak Political Movements on the Concept of Czechoslovakism during the Interwar Period," in *Czechoslovakism*, 212–13, 219–20, and 224.
- 57 Dana Nádvozníková, "The Idea of Czechoslovakism in Czech History Textbooks and Civic Education Textbooks Published between 1918 and 1938," in *Czechoslovakism*, 273–92.

vak National Church (a breakaway movement from the Catholic Church that maintained it was not Protestant), at 5 percent of the population; Eastern-Rite Catholic Churches or Uniates (Christians with Orthodox liturgical traditions in communion with the Roman Catholic Church), at 4 percent; Jews, at 2 percent; as well as nonbelievers and agnostics, at 6 percent.⁵⁸

A full array of ideological divisions adorned the political spectrum: communism, socialism, agrarianism, clericalism, conservatism, and fascism. Yet, none of these movements could claim ascendancy because of ethnic and religious differences as well as doctrinal schisms. Only the clericals and communists could boast of an international orientation, but the latter had a narrow appeal. An example of the multitude of political divisions in Czechoslovakia appears in a report of Pearson, the chargé d'affaires ad interim at the American embassy, who summarized Švehla's observation of the situation during a speech to the National Assembly after the 1925 election. Because there were 16 parties in the legislature, only two of which, the Republicans and the Communists, had garnered a little more than 10 percent of the votes, the parties needed to cooperate to pass legislation.⁵⁹ One might argue that the Czech-speaking elite controlled political and economic affairs, but that is an oversimplification. The Czech politicians could not manipulate the levers of state unless they had the consent of their Slovak counterparts, and Czech industrialists and financiers hardly could control the economy without their German peers. Furthermore, there were notable divisions among Czech speakers, based on politics, class, and even religion. In a 1928 letter to Justice Holmes, Einstein recognized the cleavages among Czechs: "But scholarship, the arts, and learning cannot divorce themselves from the furious struggle over nationality and party which is everywhere going on. Only the other night the American soprano wife of a Czech opera singer told me she no longer was able to get an engagement at the National Opera House because they were not socialists."⁶⁰ Differences in ethnicity, religion, and ideology kept society fragmented, even though a theoretical majority existed, enabling Czechoslovakia to meet Lijphart's condition that the society is to have no dominant social or economic group.

⁵⁸ SÚS, *Statistická ročenka Republiky československé, 1935*, Table II-10, p. 8.

⁵⁹ Washington, DC, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), DOS, 86of.00/239, report of Pearson to DOS, November 28, 1925.

⁶⁰ Einstein and Holmes, *The Holmes-Einstein Letters*, Einstein to Holmes, February 28, 1923, 211. The opera singer in question was undoubtedly Mary Cavan (1889–1968), who married Otakar Mařák (1872–1939), a Czech tenor.

The next favorable condition for consociational democracy is that all of the segments have roughly the same socioeconomic status. In the republic, a remarkable balance existed between industry and agriculture: in 1930, 5.1 million were employed in agriculture; 5.1 million were in industry and commerce.⁶¹ The German and Czech speakers predominated in terms of wealth and ownership of major financial, industrial, commercial, and agro-industrial firms, but they both also had large numbers of workers and agriculturalists. By contrast, Slovak, Ukrainian, Rusyn, and Hungarian speakers were largely agricultural. The concentration of industry in the western part of the state made the Bohemian Lands wealthier than the provinces of Slovakia and Ruthenia. In 1935, the average individual in Bohemia paid 1.6 times more in taxes than a person in Moravia, 2.7 times more than someone in Slovakia, and 6.3 times the amount of a resident of Ruthenia.⁶² Even though rural poverty was greatest in Ruthenia, the Bohemian Lands had their share of poor agriculturalists. In 1930, for example, there were 31,501 agricultural enterprises, representing 2.9 percent of all agricultural enterprises in the Bohemian Lands, with less than a hectare of land, while less populated Slovakia and Ruthenia together had 9,965 enterprises, 1.8 percent of the enterprises in those two provinces, in the same category.⁶³ Furthermore, the lifestyle of a worker, artisan, or small shopkeeper was hardly better than that of many small or medium agriculturalists. As a result, while the Bohemian Lands, as a whole, were better off than Slovakia and Ruthenia, neither wealth nor poverty was concentrated specifically in one area or with one linguistic group.

According to Lijphart, a consociational democracy is more likely where there is a low number of segments. Czechoslovakia, however, contained many cleavages since the linguistic, religious, ideological, and economic groups themselves were divided. For example, there were only three significant ethnolinguistic groups: Czech, German, and Slovak speakers. Hungarian speakers, Ukrainian and Rusyn speakers, Jews, and others only accounted for slightly more than 10 percent of the population. Nevertheless, certain factors subdivided the major ethnolinguistic groups. Religion served as a cleavage point, with Catholicism as the major religion and various types of Protestantism forming minorities among Czech and Slovak speakers. Protestants also differed in terms of sects, since

61 An additional 1.9 million were in finance; 0.9 million were in the military, free professions, and public service; 0.2 million in domestic services; and 1.5 million in other professions. SÚS, *Statistická ročenka Republiky československé, 1935*, Table II-13, p. 11.

62 Compiled from SÚS, *Statistická ročenka Republiky československé, 1935*, Table XVI-12, p. 292.

63 SÚS, *Statistická ročenka Republiky československé, 1935*, Table IV-17, pp. 46–48.

the Czech Brethren and Hussites predominated in the Bohemian Lands, in contrast to Lutherans in Slovakia.⁶⁴ Furthermore, Czech speakers, especially in the western portion of the Bohemian Lands, tended to be more secular than Slovak speakers. A half-dozen influential ideologies that intersected with class interests also existed within the ethnolinguistic groups. Furthermore, the German political parties were separated into the activist political camp that partnered with the Czech and Slovak parties, while German negativist parties shunned cooperation with Slavic parties. Finally, economic interests, largely defined in terms of industry and agriculture, separated Czech and German political parties in the Bohemian Lands, while agricultural concerns dominated the economic discourse of political parties in Slovakia and Ruthenia. Although the internal religious, ideological, and economic diversity of ethnolinguistic groups had the potential to produce a hyperfragmented polity, cross-cutting cleavages resulted in a remarkable degree of unity. For example, a Czech might have viewed herself or himself as different from a German, but both may have found a common bond in terms of religion, socioeconomic interests, or political goals.

Two favorable conditions for consociationalism relate to geography: the concentration of segments and the presence of one or more external threats. Czechoslovakia met the requirement that the segments be contained in particular geographical regions, with only a few exceptions. The three major Slavic ethnolinguistic groups—Czech speakers in the western part of the country, Slovak speakers in the center, and both Ukrainian and Rusyn speakers in the east—inhabited specific areas, as did German speakers in the Sudetenland and Hungarian speakers in the southern districts of Slovakia and Ruthenia.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, mixed Slovak-Hungarian, Rusyn-Hungarian, Slovak-Rusyn, Czech-Polish, and Czech-German areas existed, and there were Germans in the Carpathians of Slovakia. German speakers and Jews were important inhabitants of urban centers throughout the republic, as were Hungarian speakers in Slovakia and Ruthe-

64 The Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren (Českobratrská církev evangelická) formed in 1918 when Lutheran and Calvinist faiths in Czechoslovakia united. The Czechoslovak Church (Církev československá), now the Czechoslovak Hussite Church (Církev československá husitská), broke away from the Catholic Church in 1918. Both denominations have as their bases the teachings of Jan Hus (c. 1372–1415), a Czech church reformer before Martin Luther (1483–1546).

65 On the border between Hungary and Slovakia, see Leslie Waters, *Borders on the Move: Territorial Change and Ethnic Cleansing in the Hungarian-Slovak Borderlands, 1938–1948* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2020), with references to the situation during the First Republic on pp. 3–22. The Czechoslovak–Hungary Boundary Commission awarded Hungary slightly more and Czechoslovakia slightly fewer square kilometers when adjusting the borders, despite Czechoslovakia's dogged determination to resist changes. Haslinger Peter, "Dilemmas of Security: The State, Local Agency, and the Czechoslovak-Hungarian Boundary Commission, 1921–1925," *Austrian History Yearbook* 49 (2018): 187–206 (actual square kilometers on 204).

nia.⁶⁶ Polish speakers were concentrated in the northern part of Moravia-Silesia (Czech: Země Moravskoslezská; German: Land Mähren-Schlesien). During the First Republic, nearly all the Roma were in Slovakia and Ruthenia.

66 In *Franz Kafka and Prague* (New York: Golden Griffin Books [Arts, Inc.], 1950), Pavel Eisner (1889–1958) wrote that Prague, although overwhelmingly Czech, had three ghettos: Czech, German, and Jewish. Franz Kafka (1883–1924) was not grounded in any of them. Eisner maintained that a Prague Jew was “German only in culture, to the Czech, nevertheless, he was unqualifiedly a German, a stranger, an opponent and intruder, a national enemy.” The Jews, therefore, heightened their German sentiments, which irritated the Czechs as well as the “‘genuine’ or ‘Aryan’ Germans in the country,” the most radical of whom “despised the Teutonizing Jews in Bohemia” (32–33). For the Jewish writers, intellectual and social concerns complicated ethnicity. Eisner identified these issues even in the 1930s in his contributions to *Prager Presse*. Hartmut Binder, in “Paul Eisners dreifaches Ghetto: Deutsche, Juden und Tschechen in Prag,” in *Le monde de Franz Werfel et la morale des nations/Die Welt Franz Werfels und die Moral der Völker: Actes du Colloque Franz Werfel à l’Université de Dijon, 18–20 mai 1995*, ed. Michel Refett, *Bohemia: Publikationen der Internationalen Franz Werfel-Gesellschaft*, vol. 1 (Bern and Berlin: Peter Lang AG, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften 2000), 17–137, views the boundaries between the various groups as more blurry than Eisner had presented. The most recent and thorough study of interwar Prague as the home of three ethnic groups is Ines Koeltzsch, *Geteilte Kulturen: Eine Geschichte der tschechisch-jüdisch-deutschen Beziehungen in Prag (1918–1938)*, Veröffentlichungen des Collegium Carolinum, 124 (Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag GmbH, 2012). Of course, one cannot assume that all Jews experienced cultural ambiguity. Furthermore, the republic’s acceptance of Jews is apparent in the many who became legislators—both deputies and senators: Franz Bacher (1884–1945), Fanni Blatny (1873–1949), Ludwig Czech (1870–1942), Zoltán Farkas (1880–1940), Angelo Goldstein (1889–197), Viktor Haas (1882–1964), Otto Hahn (1885–1946), Karl Heller (1872–1944), Ernst Hirsch (1874–1925), Arnold Holitscher (1869–1973), Bruno Kafka (1881–1931), Irene Kirpal (1886–1977), Robert Klein (1885–1941), Chaim Kugel (1897–1963), Samu Mayer (born 1882), Alfred Meissner (1871–1950), Johann Polach (1874–1942), Julius Reisz (1880–1976), Ignaz Schultz (1894–1954), Ludvík Singer (1876–1931), Rudolf Slánský (1901–1952), Ludwig Spiegel (1864–1926), Adolf Stránský (1880–1932), Jaroslav Stránský (1884–1973), Siegfried Taub (1876–1946), Viktor Stern (1885–1958), Arnost Winter (1880–1944), Lev Winter (1876–1935), and Zikmund Witt (1875–1942). Of these, several became ministers in the First Republic: Czech, Meissner, Adolf Stránský, and Lev Winter. Two were women. Provincial Assembly members were Franz Bacher, before entering the National Assembly, and Emil Strauss (1889–1942). Most of the names on this list, along with several other names of prominent Jews in the republic, appear in Johann Wolfgang Brügel (1905–1986), “Jews in Political Life,” in *The Jews of Czechoslovakia: Historical Studies and Surveys*, vol. 2 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America; New York: Society for the History of Czechoslovak Jews, 1971), 243–252. Brügel, who was the private secretary of the German Social Democrat Ludwig Czech, emigrated before the outbreak of the Second World War. For Goldstein, Kugel, Reisz, and Singer, all of whom represented the Jewish Party (Czech: Židovská strana; German: Jüdische Partei) in the National Assembly, see Aharon Moshe K. Rabinowicz, “The Jewish Party,” in *The Jews of Czechoslovakia*, vol. 2, pp. 280, 288, and 296. Kateřina Čápková considered German-Jewish, Czech-Jewish, and Zionist identity in *Czechs, Germans, Jews?: National Identity and the Jews of Bohemia*, trans. Derek and Marzia Paton (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2012), while Rebekah Klein-Pejšová presented the very different experience in Slovak with Magyar-Jewish, Slovak-Jewish, and Zionist identities in *Mapping Jewish Loyalties in Interwar Slovakia* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2015). See also Ines Koeltzsch, Michal Frankl, and Martina Niedhammer, “Becoming Czechoslovaks: Jews in the Bohemian Lands, 1917–1937,” in *Prague and Beyond: Jews in the Bohemian Lands*, ed. Kateřina Čápková and Hillel J. Kieval (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 157–95.

Czechoslovakia, like other consociational democracies, faced external threats that caused anxiety in all segments of the country, not just among the Czech, Slovak, Ukrainian, and Rusyn speakers, and it encouraged cooperation in the interest of preserving the state. Czechoslovakia bordered on five states, and throughout the interwar years, only Romania made no claim on Czechoslovak territory. In the Bohemian Lands, as the First World War ended, tension between the Czech speakers and the new minority of German speakers increased and sometimes resulted in violence.⁶⁷ Those German speakers in Czechoslovakia who believed that ethnic self-determination would apply even to the vanquished states saw the prospect of union with either Austria or Germany as a panacea. After the peace treaties, Czechoslovakia and Austria were on excellent terms, which is why the Czechoslovaks invested little in defending their border with Austria. Relations with Germany were good until 1933, when the Nazis came to power and started supporting the SdP.⁶⁸ The German threat to Czechoslovakia's existence heightened after the March 1938 *Anschluss*, and in October 1938, as a result of the Munich Agreement, Germany acquired Czechoslovak territory. Relations with Hungary always were strained. With the aim of recovering lost territory and spreading the socialist revolution, communist Hungary invaded Slovakia and Ruthenia, and for a few months in 1919, it set up communist satellite states in those territories. The regime of Miklós Horthy (1868–1957), which followed the Communists and remained in power until the close of the Second World War, supported irredentist movements in Slovakia and Ruthenia.⁶⁹ In November 1938, Hungary received territory from Slovakia and Ruthenia in the First Vienna Award, and in March 1939, it occupied

67 Among the many secondary sources devoted to the German speakers in Czechoslovakia between the world wars are works that focus on the immediate postwar years. An innovative approach that examines the role of public statues as a focus of attention of both Czech and German speakers is Nancy M. Wingfield, *Flag Wars and Stone Saints: How the Bohemian Lands Became Czech* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2007), ch. 5. She revisited the topic, especially in the context of the controversy in the United States about Confederate and other statues in the 2010s and early 2020s, in "Democracy's Violent Birth: The Czech Legionnaires and Statue Wars in the First Czechoslovak Republic," *Austrian History Yearbook* 53 (2022): 1–17. An excellent collection of documents on the tensions between Czech- and German-speakers after the republic's creation is Josef Harna and Jaroslav Šebek, eds., *Státní politika vůči německé menšině v období konsolidace politické moci v Československu v letech 1918–1920: Edice pramenů* (Prague: Historický ústav AV ČR, 2002).

68 The Germans extended not only moral support and political advice to the Sudeten German Party, under the leadership of Konrad Henlein (1898–1945), but also significant financial support. See Patrick Crowhurst, *A History of Czechoslovakia between the Wars: From Versailles to Hitler's Invasion* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2015), 130–33.

69 For the difficulties between Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the interwar years, see Thomas A. Lorman, *Counter-Revolutionary Hungary, 1920–1925: István Bethlen and the Politics of Consolidation* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 2006); and Andrej Tóth, *Maďarsko ve dvacátých*

the remainder of Ruthenia. Czechoslovak interactions with Poland were correct at best. Immediately after the First World War, Czechoslovakia took part of Těšínsko (Polish: Śląsk Cieszyński) from Poland, after which the Allies, meeting at the Paris peace conferences, partitioned the territory between the two states. Afterward, Poland still claimed small amounts of Czechoslovak territory. In the wake of the Munich Agreement, Poland took Zaolší (Polish: Zaolzie), which included Těšínsko. In December 1938, it received bits of territory from Slovakia.

Einstein reflected on Czechoslovakia's external threats in 1926, when a cabinet of officials came to office:

So long as the international situation seemed precarious the sense of common danger brought together the different Czech elements within the state irrespective of their opposite economic and social interests. To-day when this feeling of danger for the existence of a new country has almost disappeared, the clash between the interests of the numerous parties tend to reassert themselves. For this state to progress farther a necessary evolution must take place between the former lines of division based primarily on nationality and the new lines which will be formed on other principles. Eventually this evolution must tend toward the formation of a government which will include the German, Slovak and Magyar elements within the country and not merely as hitherto only the Czech and a very few Slovaks. Although such a goal may still be distant the attempt will probably be made to find a common working basis for the Agrarians and their Clerical allies both among the Czechs, the Germans and the Slovaks.⁷⁰

In his memoirs, Einstein concluded: "No one knew better than [Beneš] the dangers of a state situated in the centre of Europe, surrounded on three sides by potential enemies, and with unassimilated, and partly hostile, minorities living within its frontiers. The Republic was confronted not with one, but with a dozen problems that touched, at some point, every combination of European politics and made certain that the country could not escape from being dragged into nearly any future conflagration."⁷¹

If an external threat can foster cooperation, the inverse is possible: a consociational state may be unlikely to menace its neighbors because conflict could

letech 20. století: "Bethlenovská" konsolidace nového státu a československo-maďarské hospodářsko-politické vztahy (Prague: Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, Nakladatelství Oeconomica), 2015.

⁷⁰ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.002/36, report of Einstein to DOS, 22 March 1926.

⁷¹ Einstein, *A Diplomat Looks Back*, 202.

destabilize the polity. In the middle of 1926, Einstein already reached this conclusion. He deemed the German activist leadership “not strong enough in face of electors, whom they themselves trained to regard Czechs as enemies. Meanwhile, Czechs search out lost Czech minorities in the German areas, including those who have been Germanized.” This ethnic bickering gave “a very erroneous impression of the instability of Czechoslovakia,” where wars in the distant past were religious but “never national.” He concluded that “the very balance between the two elements compels a pacific policy for this State which will always prevent it from becoming a danger to its neighbors.”⁷² Unlike the four traditional consociational states—Switzerland, Netherlands, Belgium, and post-1945 Austria—Czechoslovakia was never neutral, but its alliances with France and the other two members of the Little Entente, Yugoslavia and Romania, were intent on preserving the status quo—the Order of Versailles—and were decidedly not expansionist.

Overarching loyalties, another favorable condition for consociationalism that Lijphart identified, are sources of shared identity that transcend the bonds of the various segments, such as dynasties, nationalities, and religion. In a strict sense, Czechoslovakia did not meet this criterion. As a republic, it had no dynasty. Only rarely did ethnic origin unite Czechs and Slovaks, whose divergent historic experiences and political cultures often kept the two from cooperating. The best examples of Slavic unity come from the years immediately after the First World War, when the political representatives of Czechs and Slovaks consolidated the new state. Depending on the issue, Catholicism could draw together Czechs and Slovaks, but shared religious belief was not strong enough to overcome ethnolinguistic and other divisions on a regular basis. Yet, a loose interpretation of Lijphart’s theory suggests that overarching loyalties were present in Czechoslovakia in the form of political personalities as well as a developing civic nationalism, based on ideology, economics, and political stability.

⁷² Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/248, report of Einstein to DOS, 12 July 1926. From one perspective, Einstein’s observations strengthen the argument Jan Rovny presented in *Ethnic Minorities, Political Competition, and Democracy: Circumstantial Liberals*, Transformations in Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024), 160. In his study, which will be a chapter in a monograph, Rovny argued that the activist German parties found it expedient to cooperate with the liberal Czechoslovak regime because they had no other choice. The activist bloc abandoned its alliance with the Czechs and Slovaks, however, when they had the opportunity to “escape its minority position” (11). If Rovny is correct, his study is significant for understanding consociational arrangements. The logic inherent in Rovny’s thesis suggests that a minority has an incentive to compromise with the majority, which, in turn, seeks accommodation not only to ease tensions with the minority but also to reduce the possibility of an external threat, such as an irridentist campaign.

In many respects, Masaryk substituted for a monarch. People of every ethnicity respected Masaryk as a wise, impartial, and distinguished head of state, and his image helped ease the transition for many from the reign of the Habsburg emperor-king, especially Franz Joseph, to postwar democracy. Masaryk established his residence and offices in the Hrad [Castle], the former seat of the kings of Bohemia; he had one residence at a former palace of the Fürstenberg family in Láň, in Central Bohemia, and a summer residence in Topolčianky (Hungarian: Kistapolcsány), Slovakia, which had been in the hands of the Habsburg family.⁷³ In 1919, Masaryk arranged to have an expert on social conduct, Jiří Stanislav Guth-Jarkovský (1861–1943), prescribe ceremonies for the president, but they were not to be based on the Austrian imperial style. As Guth-Jarkovský stated, “now, everything had to be democratic.”⁷⁴ The Habsburgs openly supported the Roman Catholic Church, and Franz Joseph was prominent in various liturgical feasts, especially Corpus Christi. Masaryk generally attempted to remain distant from any particular faith and supported the notion of the separation of church and state, but one of the myths about the First Republic was Masaryk’s deep religious devotion and his morality.⁷⁵ As with Franz Joseph, a cult of personality around Masaryk emerged, but Orzoff noted that it “was never equivalent to leader cults in totalitarian states, buttressed by censorship and an obedient mass media.”⁷⁶ Writing just after Masaryk’s birthday in 1927,

73 On Masaryk’s efforts to shape the Hrad as a symbol of the presidency, see Bruce R. Berglund, *Castle and Cathedral in Modern Prague: Longing for the Sacred in a Skeptical Age* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2017), esp. 172–85 and 218–28. This discussion does not consider Masaryk’s constitutional powers that resembled those of Franz Joseph, such as dissolving the legislature and influencing the appointment of ministers. A consideration of the powers of the president during the drafting of the constitution appears in Jan Kuklík, *Příběh československé ústavy, 1920*, vol. 1: *Příprava a přijetí ústavní listiny* (Prague: Univerzita Karlova, Nakladatelství Karolinum, 2020), 79–96.

74 Jiří Stanislav Guth-Jarkovský, *Paměti*, vol. 3: *Na dvoře republikánském, 1919–1925: Vzpomínky a dojmy (výpisky z deníku)*, part 1: *Obradnictví*, Spisy Jiřího Stanislava Gutha-Jarkovského, vol. 7 (Prague: Nakladatelství Hejda a Tuček Knihkupectví, 1929), 88. To assist in establishing the social protocol for the Hrad, Masaryk gave Guth-Jarkovský a book about etiquette at the White House, in Washington, DC, and Guth-Jarkovský made trips to France and Switzerland to determine how those republics dealt with issues of protocol, but Guth-Jarkovský did not copy directly any of the ceremonies from these countries (65–66, 71–72, 73–76, and 235). Guth-Jarkovský was the first person to receive a doctorate from the Czech section of Charles-Ferdinand University, which is now Charles University, where Masaryk was one of his instructors. He participated in the first modern Olympic games, coauthored the first Olympic charter (1894), served as the chairman of the Bohemian then the Czechoslovak Olympic Committee, and was a long-time member of the International Olympic Committee. In 1922, he organized the Order of the White Lion for service to the Czechoslovak Republic, and until 1925, he continued to serve as its secretary. *Československo [České] biografie* (Prague: Státní tiskárna, 1936–1941), s.v. “Guth-Jarkovský, Jiří Stanislav (Series 26, 31 May 1940).

75 Berglund, *Castle and Cathedral in Modern Prague*, esp. chs. 4–5.

76 Orzoff, *Battle for the Castle*, 119–32, esp. 121 and 131 (quotation).

Einstein pointed out that “the old imperial tradition is still strong....President Masaryk, who is personally the simplest of men, often finds himself caught in a network very foreign to his personal tastes. The former Habsburg castles in Moravia and Slovakia have been prepared for his residence, he has his own bodyguard, his image is on postage stamps, [and] his portrait is in every railway station and in government offices.” In the same report, Einstein predicted Masaryk’s reelection as president in May 1927, writing that “no wiser choice would be made. He is rightly recognized by fair minded people as the ablest and the best man in this country and his influence has always been exercised in the direction of moderation, of justice and of tolerance.”⁷⁷ Einstein undoubtedly understood that, in a society where Czech and Slovak nationalistic pride could offend the country’s minorities, Masaryk was an exceptional leader. For example, during one of many conversations with Karel Čapek that appeared in 1935, Masaryk stated that “humanity does not preclude nor does it weaken

77 Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.001/11, report of Einstein to DOS, 8 March 1927. See also the comments about Masaryk in Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.001/12, report of Einstein to DOS, 3 May 1927. Several observers of Czechoslovak history have pointed out the connection between Masaryk and Franz Joseph, some of the most recent and most concise being Orzoff, 121; and Dagmar Hájková and Pavel Horák, “Narozeniny prezidenta republiky,” in *Sláva republiče! Oficiální svátky a oslavy v meziválečném Československu*, ed. Dagmar Hájková, Pavel Horák, Vojtěch Kessler, and Miroslav Michela, *České moderní dějiny*, vol. 4 (Prague: Nakladatelství Akademie; Prague: Masarykův ústav a archiv AV ČR, v.v.i., 2018), 137–178. Dagmar Hájková and Pavel Horák, in “Oslavy narozenin prezidentů v meziválečném Československu,” *Střed: Časopis pro mezioborová studia Střední Evropy 19. a 20. století/Centre: Journal for Interdisciplinary Studies of Central Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, 7, no. 2 (2015): 32–58, observed that Masaryk recognized the usefulness of celebrating his birthday, even if the minorities did not participate. Germans originally avoided President Masaryk’s birthday and other state celebrations, such as the Battle of Zborov (2 July) and Independence Day (28 October). Dagmar Hájková and Nancy M. Wingfield, in “Czech(oslovak) National Commemorations during the Interwar Period: Tomáš G. Masaryk and the Battle of White Mountain Avenged,” *Acta Histriae* 18, no. 3 (2010), 425–52, questioned whether increased German participation in the celebrations of Masaryk’s birthday and other state holidays was out of “loyalty, opportunism, fear, or ‘persuasion’ from the Czech authorities” (444). Johannes Florian Kontny, however, in “Herrschaftsvermittlung an der Staatsgrenze?: Der Staatsfeiertag und die Besuche der Präsidenten in Znojmo/Znaim während der Zwischenkriegszeit,” *Střed: Časopis pro mezioborová studia Střední Evropy 19. a 20. století* 2 (2015): 59–88, demonstrated that, while the German citizens of Znojmo (German: Znaim), in southern Moravia on the Czechoslovak-Austrian border, at first abstained from participating in the celebrations of Masaryk’s birthday and other national events, their inclusion became more common. By the middle of the 1920s, especially after German parties had entered the cabinet, Germans were more eager about joining in the celebrations (esp. 72–78). German enthusiasm about state holidays waned in the second half of the 1930s. The experience in Znojmo, located in a province that had developed consociational arrangements before the First World War, stands apart from the tension that Germans and Czechs experienced in České Budějovice, which King described in *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans*. On state celebrations, also see Wingfield, *Flag Wars and Stone Saints*, chs. 5–6, and the various contributions in *Sláva republiče!*

love for one's nation; I can and even must love my nation positively, but I must not hate other nations because of that."⁷⁸

Masaryk sought to include representatives of every ethnicity in the country's political decision-making process. In Einstein's estimation, Masaryk spent time in the German spa town of Karlovy Vary (German: Karlsbad) as a conciliatory gesture to the Germans.⁷⁹ When Masaryk toured Slovakia in 1923, Einstein remarked how "he has been everywhere received with great enthusiasm."⁸⁰ Masaryk made other concessions to the minorities, such as occasionally communicating in German, the language of his academic training, and Einstein even thought it was significant to inform Washington that Masaryk had greeted a delegation of Hungarians in Magyar.⁸¹ Similarly, Franz Joseph used his multilingual skills to his political advantage. Einstein often commented about Masaryk's belief that a German presence in the cabinet was important, a stance which won him the admiration of Germans. In 1922, Einstein observed Masaryk's attempts to bring members of the German parties into the government, something that did not occur until four years later.⁸² In 1924, Masaryk told Einstein that the Germans "have some 70 members in Parliament.... Let 60 of them accept the Czechoslovak state, and this will entitle

78 Tomáš G. Masaryk and Karel Čapek, *Hovory s T. G. Masarykem*, ed. with an Afterword by Miloš Pohorský, Karel Čapek Spisy, vol. 20 (Prague: Československý spisovatel, 1990), 342. Between 1926 and 1935, Čapek had a series of conversations with Tomáš Masaryk that he published gradually, with Masaryk's approval. In 1938, shortly after Masaryk's death, Čapek released a complete edition of the conversations. On Masaryk's position toward the ethnic minorities in the republic's early years, see Dagmar Hájková, "T. G. Masaryk and His Stances on Minority Issues after the Establishment of Czechoslovakia," in *Czech and Hungarian Minority Policy in Central Europe, 1918–1938*, ed. Ferenc Eiler, Dagmar Hájková, et al., trans. and ed. Andrew T. Gane, trans. Helena Holubová and Melvyn Clark (Prague: Masarykův ústav a Akademie věd ČR, v.v.i.; Budapest: MTA Etnikai-nemzeti Kisebbségkutató Intézete, 2009), 61–73.

79 Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/229, report of Einstein to DOS, August 26, 1924.

80 Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.01/148, report of Einstein to DOS, August 29, 1923.

81 Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/277, report of Einstein to DOS, May 23, 1928. Masaryk's mother spoke Czech, with a Moravian accent, but she communicated mainly in German. His father was Slovak. He heard some Hungarian from his father's relatives and gained a basic knowledge of the language. As president, Masaryk encouraged his son to learn Hungarian and told him that Beneš was learning it. Hájková, "T. G. Masaryk and His Stances on Minority Issues," 66. Masaryk learned German in school, and in the beginning, he was not as advanced as some of the children. He studied at a German gymnasium in Brno and then, beginning in 1869, in Vienna. He entered the University of Vienna in 1872, and in 1879, he completed his doctorate in philosophy. It was in Brno where Masaryk's Czech consciousness heightened, prompting him to improve his Czech language skills. On Masaryk's language experiences, see Stanislav Polák, *T. G. Masaryk: Za ideálem a pravdou*, vol. 1: 1850–1882 (Prague: Masarykův ústav AV ČR v.v.i., and Ústav T. G. Masaryka, o.p.s., 2000), 52–53, 59–60, 84–87, 90, 98, and 125; and R. J. W. Evans, "Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks: Some Mutual Perceptions, 1900–1950, in *Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe, 1918–1948*, ed. Mark Cornwall and R. J. W. Evans (Oxford and New York: British Academy and Oxford University Press, 2007), 114. Evans discussed Hungarian minority relations with Czechs and Slovaks between the world wars on pp. 113–119.

82 Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/212, report of Einstein to DOS, June 29, 1923.

them to three cabinet members. The other ten can stay out as wild men.”⁸³ Germans entered the cabinet in 1926, and in 1929, when politicians attempted to devise a cabinet without them, Masaryk convincingly insisted that they be included.⁸⁴

The Jews in Czechoslovakia also respected Masaryk. In 1899–1900, he condemned the charge of ritual murder against Leopold Hilsner (1876–1928), a Jew who went to trial for allegedly murdering a young Christian woman. The controversy that Masaryk and others caused prompted Franz Joseph to pardon Hilsner, who received a new sentence of life in prison (Emperor Karl released him in 1918).⁸⁵ When he was president, Masaryk made history as the first head of state to visit Palestine, where he met with Hugo Bergmann (1883–1975), the Prague-born philosopher who, between 1920 and 1935, headed the Jewish National Library.⁸⁶ The author Zdeněk Thon, writing in the *Kalendář českožidovský* (Czech-Jewish Calendar) in 1938–1939, stated that Masaryk was a kind father figure to Jews in Bohemia.⁸⁷ Despite Masaryk’s respect for Jews and his concern about his country’s democratic image abroad, anti-Semitism remained a feature of Czechoslovak society.⁸⁸

Masaryk was not always a unifying figure. He had a number of detractors, including individuals in certain political parties. The right wing of the Republican Party and several politicians in the National Democratic Party, including those around Karel Kramář, sought to limit the influence of Masaryk, Beneš, and the Hrad. Relations between the Roman Catholic Church and Masaryk were tense, the result of Masaryk’s advocacy of limiting the Church’s influence in the new republic and Masaryk’s personal religious beliefs that often were divergent from Roman Catholic dogma.⁸⁹

83 Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/228, report of Einstein to DOS, June 27, 1924. By “wild men,” Masaryk implied that those Germans not accepting a compromise with the Slovaks and Czechs could remain in the opposition as outsiders.

84 Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/308, report of Einstein to DOS, November 27, 1929.

85 On Masaryk’s role in the Hilsner case, see Miloš Pojar, “T. G. Masaryk’s Relations with the Jews,” *Judaica Bohemiae* 38 (2002): 164–167; and Steven Beller, “The Hilsner Affair: Nationalism, Anti-Semitism, and the Individual in the Habsburg Monarchy at the Turn of the Twentieth Century,” in *T. G. Masaryk (1850–1937)*, vol. 2: *Thinker and Critic*, ed. Robert B. Pynsent, 52–76 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: Macmillan; London: School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, 1989).

86 Koeltzsch, Frankl, and Niedhammer, “Becoming Czechoslovaks,” 165.

87 Zdeněk Thon, “Masaryk a židovská otázka,” *Kalendář českožidovský*, 1938–1939, 44, cited in Rudolf M. Wlaschek, *Juden in Böhmen: Beiträge zur Geschichte des europäischen Judentums im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, 2nd revised and expanded ed. (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1997), 84.

88 Orzoff, *Battle for the Castle*, 83. On Masaryk and the Jews, see Miloš Pojar, *T. G. Masaryk a židovství* (Prague: Nakladatelství Academia, 2016).

89 There are a number of studies that relate to Masaryk’s religious beliefs and his relationship with the Catholic Church. See Berglund, *Castle and Cathedral in Modern Prague*, esp. 203–212; and Marek Šmíd, “T. G. Masaryk: His Spiritual Life and His Disputes with the Catholic Church,” *Historia Ecclesiastica: Časopis pro dějiny církve a náboženství v Střední Evropě* 8, no. 1 (2017): 58–

Like Masaryk, although to a lesser extent, Švehla also had the esteem of politicians from parties to the right and left and is another example of how an individual politician can help construct overarching loyalties. Already in 1922, Einstein praised Švehla's desire to have the government incorporate the Germans.⁹⁰ A year later, he wrote, "Mr. Švehla's commanding position as the keystone of the Czech Majority Coalition has been due to his personality and not to his party. It has been solely owing to him that, in a land where party feeling runs high, such antagonistic positions as Clericals, Socialists and Conservatives have been able to work together in the same Cabinet and vote together in Parliament."⁹¹ When considering Švehla's chances of succeeding Masaryk as president, Einstein reasoned that Švehla's "control of Parliament and the talent he has exhibited to find a majority in any quarter would have made him a formidable candidate."⁹² The 1928 budget tested Švehla's abilities, but he managed to emerge successfully. When the budget proposal went to the Budget Committee of the National Assembly, some of the members from the opposition pressed Švehla not about the finances but about the role of the legislature as well as internal Czech-German relations. Švehla responded the next day with a lively speech about a number of topics, including a scornful admonishment to the parliamentarians that they had not learned to abandon their "selfishness for the welfare of all."⁹³ Although budgets normally passed through the committee in a week's time, the 1928 budget required nearly two weeks of deliberation. The socialists and Communists voted against it, but the measure carried because of votes from deputies outside the ruling coalition.⁹⁴ Gittings, the American chargé d'affaires ad interim, commented on Švehla's November 1927 speech to the parliamentary

74. For the roots of the tension between the Roman Catholic Church and Masaryk, see Marek Šmíd, *Masaryk a česká Katolická moderna* (Brno: L. Marek, 2007). Masaryk was raised Catholic, but he became Protestant. After the First World War, he was a member of the Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren.

90. Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/204, report of Einstein to DOS, December 11, 1922. On the objections of the National Democrats, socialists, and Czechoslovak Populists to the entry of the German Christian Social People's Party (Deutsche Christlich-Soziale Volkspartei, DCVP—referred to here as the German Christian Socialists) into the government in 1922, see Miloš Trapl, "Vztahy mezi českým a německým politickým katolicismem v Československu v letech 1918–1938," in *Procházka staletími: Sborník příspěvků k padesátinám PhDr. Vladimíra Wolfa*, ed. Jaroslav Šůla, Ladislav Hladký, and Vladomír Lesák (Hradec Králové: Historický klub Praha–pobočka Hradec Králové; Hradec Králové: Gaudeamus, 1993), 186.

91. Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.002/27, report of Einstein to DOS, January 4, 1923.

92. Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.001/12, report of Einstein to DOS, May 3, 1927.

93. The text of the speech is available in "Ministerský předseda Švehla," *Venkov*, November 9, 1927, 1.

94. Miller, *Forging Political Compromise*, 166–68. The most recent discussion of Švehla's 1927 speech is Eva Broklová, "Die tschechoslowakische Parlamentsdemokratie und der Parlamentarismus in der Zwischenkriegszeit," in *Hohes Haus! 207–209*.

Budget Committee, noting that “the Premier, although perhaps little known by the world outside, is without question one of today’s strong men in Czechoslovakia. His masterly handling of the various political groups which are represented in his coalition-cabinet mark him as a leader of high order.”⁹⁵ Gittings wrote on March 21, 1928 that, after Švehla temporarily had withdrawn from public life because of illness, “it would not be an exaggeration to say that he is today the man, after President Masaryk, who has contributed most to the political consolidation and progress of Czechoslovakia.”⁹⁶

Švehla’s contemporaries also recognized his importance in getting the various parties to cooperate. The memoirs of František Ježek (1890–1969), a deputy in the National Democratic (later National Unification) Party and cabinet minister in 1938, contain some insight into Švehla’s negotiating skills. Ježek wrote that “Švehla did not have a good deal of education, but he had a truly amazing memory, incredible organizational skills, and so-called rural cunning.”⁹⁷ Ježek recounted how Švehla had astounded Finance Minister Karel Engliš (1880–1961) by flawlessly retelling, at some length, the details of a budget to his party’s legislators that Engliš had explained to him privately.⁹⁸ Although his party represented agrarian interests, Švehla cooperated well with several parties across the political spectrum, including the socialists, which likely came from his attraction to Czech National Socialism as a youth. Ježek recounted stories about Švehla that he had heard from Rudolf Bergman (1876–1940), who had helped Švehla build the Agrarian Party before 1918, had split with the party in the 1920s, and had become a National Democrat. Ježek wrote that, despite the rupture between the two, Bergman admired Švehla. Bergman explained that, when the young Švehla drove to the city with a milk wagon from his family farm, his pockets were full of National Socialist literature. Ježek concluded that Švehla’s early dedication to socialism assisted him in cooperating with the socialists.⁹⁹

On the left, the Slovak Social Democrat Dérer was another admirer of the Republican Party leader. Upon Švehla’s death, Dérer addressed school students by radio and recounted Švehla’s contribution to the state:

95 Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/273, report of Gittings to DOS, November 10, 1927.

96 Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.002/43, report of Gittings to DOS, March 21, 1928.

97 František Ježek, *Mnichovská krize: Memoárové poznámky na okraj tragických dnů utrpení a hanby*, ed. Robert Kvaček et al., “Splacený dluh” by Robert Kvaček, “Solitér Hodžovy vlády: Život a odkaz Františka Ježka” by Josef Tomeš, “O mém dědečkovi” by Aleš Ulm-Ježek, EGO Paměti, deníky, korespondence, vol. 9 (Prague: NLN, s.r.o., Nakladatelství lidové noviny; Prague: Masarykův ústav a archiv AV ČR, v.v.i., 2016), 35.

98 Ježek, *Mnichovská krize*, 36.

99 Ježek, *Mnichovská krize*, 36.

In those states where the parties could not agree, tyranny ensued. The real democracy of Švehla's politics was that he always sought an agreement, and his greatness is that he always managed to reach this agreement. This was because he was strict not only with others but also with himself—not only with the other parties, but also with his own. A true democrat must mitigate the desires of his own people and must not promote always only what the nation likes, but what is beneficial to it...

The second basic idea of Švehla's politics was that the most numerous components of the nation, peasants and workers, must cooperate and help each other. True democracy (government by the people) occurs only where even these components of the nation have the fate of the state in their hands.¹⁰⁰

When Švehla was ill in 1931, Ferdinand Peroutka (1895–1978), a journalist and editor who was close to Masaryk and the Hrad, praised Švehla's character and dedication to building Czechoslovak democracy. Peroutka characterized Švehla as “a man who serves the state to the best of his mental and physical ability. It is known how necessary authority was, not just for one party but for all. He came to this by being able to rise above partisan thinking.” Peroutka maintained that, “even among the people of the left, he deserves a better fate than having his name spoken with nervousness. We will trust Švehla as long as he does not undermine our trust with any new actions. So far, our trust in him is a payment for his past [actions], and we have no basis for any other assessment.”¹⁰¹ In December 1938, after the Munich Agreement, Peroutka wrote about Švehla's

¹⁰⁰ Ivan Dérer, “Antonín Švehla (Řeč, pronesená 19. prosince 1933 do školského rozhlasu),” in *Naše problémy: Úvahy o základních otázkách Československa* (Prague: Nakladatelstvo Orbis, 1938), 343. Švehla had his detractors. Instead of seeing Švehla as an individual who brokered deals with parties across the political spectrum, Jiří Beneš (1898–1966), a journalist and the nephew of Edvard Beneš, saw Švehla as imposing his will not only on his party but also on the country. Jiří Beneš, “Demokratický diktátor,” *Prítomnost* 3 (December 9, 1926): 754–55. Jiří Beneš wrote the article a year after the 1925 election in which the party he had helped to establish, the National Party of Work (Národní strana práce), had failed to enter the National Assembly, a victim of the electoral reform that Švehla had helped to engineer to reduce the number of small parties in the legislature. His party's electoral loss certainly colored Jiří Beneš's view of Švehla.

¹⁰¹ –fp– [Ferdinand Peroutka], “Strach před Švehlou?” *Prítomnost*, February 4, 1931, 67. On the co-operation between Švehla and Masaryk, see F. Peroutka, “Vůdce odchází,” *Prítomnost* 12 (December 18, 1935): 785–88, esp. 786–87. Peroutka was the founding editor of *Prítomnost*, which was a highly respected news magazine between the world wars. Bohumil Němec (1873–1966), an internationally respected botanist, a National Democratic deputy and later senator, and a candidate, in the 1935 presidential election, against Beneš, also stated that Švehla was a “master at uniting political parties” and always worked to serve “the interest of the republic” and not for his own benefit or for some political advantage for his party. Bohumil Němec, *Vzpomínky*, ed. Jan Janko et al. (Prague: NLN, s.r.o.; and Masarykův ústav a Archiv AV ČR, v.v.i., 2020), 468.

ability to compromise and lamented that, “five years after his death, and again we need governments from such a constructive type as [Švehla]”:

A democratic revisionist, [Švehla] also apparently was convinced that, even in a democracy, a minority basically decides, that parliament needs leadership, and that the government often would wait in vain for an assembly of 300 different, mutually hostile, and ill-informed people to instruct it on what to do. Švehla’s method was to strengthen the government, at the expense of parliament, and to strengthen the leadership of the parties, at the expense of democracy in the parties. This method must be criticized and limited, as it easily can become excessive. But let us be righteous to Švehla: it is unclear if [depending entirely on the legislature] would not have turned out far worse. Everything has its faults. It is therefore necessary to ensure effective control and counterbalance.¹⁰²

Engliš, an economist and academic who served three times as a nonpartisan finance minister, came to admire Švehla and lauded him as “the most prominent person in our parliament.”¹⁰³ Engliš also maintained that “the peaceful development of the First Republic was the work of his masterful hand.”¹⁰⁴ He was very close to the socialists and they to him. Like Ježek, Engliš also remarked that Švehla understood the socialists and had no difficulty working with them, something that eluded Kramář.¹⁰⁵

Švehla employed personal friendships, humor, and persistence during negotiations. Once, when Švehla could not reach an agreement with Šrámek, he showed Šrámek a crucifix and said, “Christ the Lord, you had a robber on your right and a robber on your left, but you never had Šrámek against you.” The two, who had negotiated through the night, finally reached an agreement.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² F. Peroutka, “Švehlova tradice,” *Přítomnost* 15 (December 14, 1938): 785.

¹⁰³ Karel Engliš, *Paměti: Kdo sloužíš vlasti, odměny nečekej*, Martin Hlaváč, et al., eds., Pocta osobnostem, Dílo Karla Engliše, vol. 4 (Brno: Masarykova univerzita; Prague: Masarykův ústav a Archiv AV ČR, v.v.i., 2022), II/303. On Engliš’s respect for Švehla, see Martin Hlaváč, *Karel Engliš: Ekonom, který pomohl vybudovat Československo*, (Prague: Universum, 2021), 182–83.

¹⁰⁴ Engliš, *Paměti*, II/313.

¹⁰⁵ Engliš, *Paměti*, II/313.

¹⁰⁶ Karel Mečtř, *Rozmluvy s Antonínem Švehlou a o Švehlovi: Vzpomínky agrárního diplomata Karla Mečtře*, ed. Eduard Kubů and Jiří Šouša (Prague: Karolinum, 2018), 197. Karel Mečtř (1876–1947) was an editor, deputy in the Revolutionary National Assembly (1918–1919), and diplomat. For many years, he was the general secretary of the International Agrarian Bureau (Czech: Mezinárodní agrární bureau, MAB), often referred to as the Green International, an organization of agrarian parties that had its headquarters in Prague. Much of *Rozmluvy s Antonínem Švehlou a o Švehlovi* is based on conversations between Švehla and Mečtř, who became friends in 1904

František Hodáč (1883–1943), a deputy for the National Democratic Party (1929–1935) and a top official in the Central Union of Czech Industrialists (Czech: Ústřední svaz československých průmyslníků, ÚSČP) told Ježek how he, his friend Antonín Hampl (1874–1942), the chairman of the Social Democratic Party (1924–1938) and deputy throughout the interwar period, and others met with Švehla to solve a labor strike. The meeting began in the afternoon and continued into the morning, with Švehla drinking about ten cups of black coffee and Hodáč about 14 cups. The others, who had drunk less caffeine, found it hard to resist dozing. At five o'clock in the morning, Švehla, Hampl, and Hodáč successfully presented the terms they previously had arranged. By the time everyone was signing the agreement, a regimental band marched on the street outside, rousing everyone in the room. Hodáč claimed that the participants were so tired that they were unaware of the details of the agreement and only wanted to end the meeting. Although he knew the value of silence when another was speaking, Švehla's reputation for what Ježek referred to as the negotiating tactic of "fatigue by arguing" even spawned a popular joke.¹⁰⁷ During one of Švehla's many illnesses, Death came for him, but Švehla explained that this is not how things are done in politics. Death sat on the edge of the bed, and Švehla began to clean his spectacles and talk. Death grew weary and wanted to leave, but Švehla demurred, "nobody has ever left me without reaching a compromise." Švehla talked a bit longer until he and Death arrived at a reasonable arrangement.¹⁰⁸

(p. 151). In 1990, when Martin Hrabík (1904–1992), a former chairman of the Republican Party in Exile, visited Czechoslovakia, a friend of the Švehla family entrusted him with the Mečř manuscript. As requested, Hrabík sent a copy to Švehla's son in the United States, but he also kept a copy for his own archive. After her father's death, Mary Hrabík Šámal, a political scientist, provided the manuscript to Kubů and Šouša for publication (see pp. 331–34 of Mečř's book). No other primary source exists that reveals so many of Švehla's intimate thoughts.

107 Ježek, *Mnichovská krize*, 33. The strike in question may have occurred in 1926, after the government had agreed to increase the *congrua*, that is, the basic government salary for clerics, along with agricultural tariffs, which threatened to raise the cost of food. The socialists, at the time in opposition, and their affiliated unions vehemently opposed the two measures.

108 YES [Josef Stivín], *Hrozinky z národní bábovky: Sedmdesátpět anekdot o m. p. Antonínu Švehlovi a jiných velíkánech* (Prague: Ústřední dělnické knihkupectví, nakladatelství a antikvariát, 1925), 8–9. Josef Stivín (1879–1941) was a Social Democratic deputy throughout the life of the First Republic and the editor of *Právo lidu*, the main newspaper for the Social Democratic Party. Miller recounted the entire joke in *Forging Political Compromise*, 13, but at the time Miller published the political biography, Ježek's superb example of Švehla's use of "fatigue by arguing" during negotiations was unavailable. When Guth-Jarkovský spoke to Švehla about the possibility of establishing ceremonial procedures at the Hrad, he also encountered the negotiating style of Švehla. He recalled that "Minister Švehla explained to me, for almost half an hour, about my new office, until I wondered how to decipher the conversation. Another would have said a few words about it. He spoke with admirable thoroughness, broadly and at length, and if it was not about such a minor issue, I would say that it was as if a gold chain flowed from his mouth. In the end, I didn't really know what was happening. The exact opposite occurred with President

Humor was another negotiating tool of Švehla. Ježek recounted how Švehla once said that “it is difficult for us to do politics! One (Karel Kramář) marries a Russian and wants to do Russian politics; the other (T. G. Masaryk) marries an American woman and wants to do American politics; while Šrámek has his Church and Rome, and he wants to do Roman politics. Only I have a Czech woman [*panímáma*], so I do the politics of the land of the Czechs.” Ježek also noted how Bechyň, a Social Democratic deputy throughout the life of the republic and a minister in several governments, once “maliciously jumped on Švehla: ‘Please, did you say earthly or land [*řekl jste pozemskou nebo pozemkovou*]?’ Then Švehla looked at him squarely over his eyeglasses and snapped, ‘Both, comrade, like you’ (an allusion to the estate Bechyň’s son had obtained from the land reform).”¹⁰⁹

Although Švehla was very communicative when negotiating, Engliš commented that Švehla spoke so little in public that “it always was a celebration to hear him.”¹¹⁰ Švehla’s unwillingness to speak to the press and to address crowds was legendary. Peroutka surmised that Švehla passed on his hesitancy to engage the public to Šrámek, his counterpart in the Czechoslovak Populist Party:

[Šrámek] had very effective schooling in the old Pětka. He probably learned from Mr. Švehla that it was beneficial for a politician to surround himself with a mysterious nimbus. [Šrámek] does not like to speak in public, and he considers the press dangerous. His vocabulary is not rich, he certainly does not speak twenty-four thousand words like Shakespeare, but sometimes he can make an effective slogan. (The well-known “we have agreed that we shall agree” is from him.) Personally, he can be quite unpleasant and even ruthless as a minister. Between him and any other being, waves of sympathy rarely arise. The secret is if someone likes him.¹¹¹

Masaryk, who said to me either very little or nothing, and in the end, I also did not know what I was supposed to do. I hardly could get in a word. At least, after those long discussions, the dazzling ceased, and all that was left was a headache.” Guth-Jarkovský, *Paměti*, vol 3, part 1, 62–63. Guth-Jarkovský never received any clear direction about his tasks, and on 13 June 1919, after about two weeks of observing various official interactions, he took it upon himself to devise a proposal describing the competencies of the Ceremonial Office (Obřadnický úřad) at the Hrad (90 and 95–97). On Švehla’s listening skills as a part of negotiating, see Mečtář, *Rozmluvy s Antonínem Švehlou a o Švehlovi*, 206 and 222–23. Horáček faulted Švehla for rushing measures through the National Assembly and arranging votes just before the legislature adjourned. Horáček, *Vzpomínky*, 233.

¹⁰⁹ Ježek, *Mnichovská krize*, 57.

¹¹⁰ Engliš, *Paměti*, II/313.

¹¹¹ –fp– [Ferdinand Peroutka], “Osobnosti lidové strany,” *Přítomnost* 4 (5 January 1928): 821.

In reality Šrámek was reticent in his own right, and he had a reputation of not revealing his political positions.¹¹² Nevertheless, perhaps Švehla's example encouraged other leading politicians to resist speaking about political affairs, not only with the press but also with foreign diplomats, in order to facilitate negotiations.¹¹³

Švehla also alienated some politicians who envied his ability to influence Czechoslovak politics. Horáček, for example, at once praised and criticized Švehla, who, "though a pronounced autocrat, [was] energetic and unscrupulous, but at the same time, [he was] amenable to compromise and reconciling the sharpest contradictions. [He was] tenacious in negotiations [and] a shrewd expert on people and their weaknesses. [He] enjoyed unlimited authority not only within his own party but also within the other parties."¹¹⁴ He blamed Švehla, whom he called a "gifted statesman and . . . a horse trader," for the fixed lists of candidates for elections and for "the omnipotence of the political parties that were the cancer of the republic."¹¹⁵

In April 1926, as his second government was collapsing and a bureaucratic cabinet was in the offing, Švehla prepared to travel to Italy to restore his health. Vilém Neubauer (1892–1965) penned a brief poem in the weekly *Humoristické listy* (Humorous Paper) that highlighted the consternation of politicians from the governing parties who were dependent on Švehla's conciliatory skills.¹¹⁶

Panu Švehlovi

Odešel nám zas pan Švehla,
země se nám po něm slehla,
odjíždí na slunný jih—
rána přišla znenadání,
bude lkaní, porubání
v stranách státotvořivých.

Mr. Švehla

Mr. Švehla left us again.
The country has lost him.
He is leaving for the sunny South.
The blow came suddenly.
There will be cursing and wailing
among the state-forming parties.

¹¹² Trapl, Konečný, and Marek, *Politik dobré vůle*, 187.

¹¹³ Šámal observed that many politicians, not just Švehla, were hesitant to talk with diplomats. Prague, AKPR, Fond Kancelář prezidenta republiky, protokol T (Tajné), signature Tro69/25, carton 152, T154/26, report of 8 February 1926, by Šámal.

¹¹⁴ Horáček, *Vzpomínky*, 260.

¹¹⁵ Horáček, *Vzpomínky*, 285 (first quotation) and 304 (second quotation). On Švehla and the fixed lists, also see 285.

¹¹⁶ Vilém Neubauer, "Panu Švehlovi," *Humoristické listy*, 2 April 1926. The authors express their appreciation to Barbora Štolleová, at the Institute for Economic and Social History at Charles University, for calling our attention to Neubauer's poem.

In contrast to Masaryk and Švehla, it is difficult to categorize Beneš as a unifying figure, especially when one considers the opposition he faced in his efforts to succeed Masaryk in the presidency.¹¹⁷ Most of those who identified with the Hrad had no difficulty cooperating with Beneš and later backing him for the presidency. That included the politicians of the German activist parties. In 1929, for example, Franz Spina (1868–1938), the head of the Bund der Landwirte (BdL, also referred to as the German Agrarian Party), stated that, “after Švehla’s departure, there is no other statesman able to lead the state, aside from Beneš. The Germans especially can welcome Beneš because only Beneš—and even better than Švehla, who lacked [the perspective of] international politics—is able to bring about a solution to the national issue. Naturally, German Agrarians always will want to move forward with the Czechs . . . Beneš always can count on me.”¹¹⁸ Unlike Masaryk and Švehla, however, Beneš’s appeal had its limits, and many in the National Democratic Party and the conservative wing of the Republican Party were his political opponents. Immediately upon becoming president, Beneš began dealing with the existential threat to Czechoslovakia that Nazi Germany and the increasingly intense irredentism among the Su-

¹¹⁷ There are many accounts of Beneš’s controversies and his struggle to become president. See Antonín Klimek’s two-volume work *Boj o Hrad. Hrad a Pětka: Vnitropolitický vývoj Československa 1918–1926 na půdorysu zápasu o prezidentské nástupnictví* (Prague: Panevropa, 1996), and *Boj o Hrad. Kdo po Masarykovi?: Vnitropolitický vývoj Československa 1926–1935 na půdorysu zápasu o prezidentské nástupnictví* (Prague: Panevropa, 1998). See also Jaroslav Rokoský, “Presidential Succession and the Republican Party in the Czechoslovak First Republic: The Prelude to the Presidential Election of 1935,” *Kosmas: Czechoslovak and Central European Journal* 29 (2017): 1–17; and Jaroslav Rokoský, “Presidential Succession and the Republican Party in the Czechoslovak First Republic: The Election of Edvard Beneš as Czechoslovak President in 1935,” *Kosmas: Czechoslovak and Central European Journal* N.S., 1, no. 1 (2018): 57–76. An earlier English analysis of the political machinations involving Beneš and his election to the presidency appear in ch. 7 of Zbyněk Zeman, with Antonín Klimek, *The Life of Edvard Beneš, 1884–1948: Czechoslovakia in Peace and War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). The most thorough account of Beneš’s career is Jindřich Dejmek, *Edvard Beneš: Politická biografie českého demokrata*, 2 parts (Prague: Univerzita Karlova v Praze, Nakladatelství Karolinum, 2006 and 2008). Much of Dejmek’s work deals with foreign policy, but internal affairs appear from time to time. For example, see the political affair involving Milan Hodža (1878–1944), a Republican who was the country’s first and only Slovak prime minister, and other matters in Part I, 470–79, and his election as president in Part I, 623–31.

¹¹⁸ Prague, AKPR, Fond Kancelář prezidenta republiky, protokol T (Tajné), signature T606/26, carton 152, 510/29, “Spina o Benešově a Masarykově politické koncepci,” Report of 13 February 1929. On Spina’s political and academic career, see Ludger Udolph and Steffen Höhne, eds., *Franz Spina (1868–1938): Ein Prager Slavist zwischen Universität und politischer Öffentlichkeit* (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2012). Several of the chapters demonstrate how Spina adhered to his statement of 1928: “for both nations, which live in the same area and have worked and fought with each other as long as there has been a history of Bohemian countries, there is a wide range of common interests, and the existing antagonisms were, to a large extent, artificially caused.” Franz Spina, “Sudetendeutscher Aktivismus,” in *Süddeutsche Monatshefte*, 26, 88, as quoted in Steffen Höhne, “Franz Spina—Ein Prager Slavist zwischen Universität und politischer Öffentlichkeit,” in *Franz Spina*, 28. Höhne’s chapter provides a survey of Spina’s academic and political career.

deten German areas posed, and he simultaneously wrestled with strengthening demands for broad Slovak and Ruthenian autonomy. As a result, the vast majority of Czech-speaking politicians and those Slovak politicians who wished to preserve the unity of the Czechoslovak state rallied behind Beneš.

Another source of unity among Czechoslovakia's social segments was at least some sense of civic nationalism, which had a basis in the Habsburg Monarchy's effort to encourage its subjects to be *kaisertreu*, that is, loyal to the Kaiser. In Czechoslovakia, a civic nationalism, not to be confused with Czechoslovakism, entered an embryonic stage as the product of ideology, economics, and the political stability of the state. Ideological interests helped cut across the barriers that resulted from pillarization, to enable the myriad ethnically based socialist, agrarian, and clerical parties to find the common ground needed to govern: the German Social Democrats (Deutsche sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei, DSAP) cooperated with the Czech and Slovak socialist parties; the German Agrarians worked with the Republicans; the German Christian Socialists occasionally found allies in the Czechoslovak Populists and Slovak Populists; and the German Business Party (Deutsche Gewerbepartei) had its parallel in the Czechoslovak Business and Commerce Party of the Middle Class (Czech: Československá živnostensko-obchodnická strana středostavovská, ČZOSS), whose members were referred to as Tradesmen.

Economic success united various groups in Czechoslovakia, a country with significant industrial and agroindustrial concerns that were dependent upon exporting the goods they produced. German economic leadership was essential to the Czechoslovak economy, and cooperation between Slavic and non-Slavic business leaders was common. Einstein surmised that Germans controlled four-fifths of the industry and that the Czechoslovak state contributed to their wealth through high tariffs.¹¹⁹ His estimate of German ownership of Czechoslovak industry may have been high. Oldřich Krepec and Vít Hloušek concluded that, in 1927, Germans owned between 52.0 and 65.6 percent of the assets in the textile (65.6 percent), chemical mining and extraction, stone and glass, and ironworking (52.0 percent) industries. They owned between 11.1 and 49.1 percent of the assets in other areas—agriculture (49.1 percent), rubber, construction, wooden goods, paper and pulp, leather and hair [sic], food, electrical, garment, energy,

¹¹⁹ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/248, report of Einstein to DOS, 12 July 1926. Einstein used a figure of 3.5 million Germans in Czechoslovakia, which was inflated. In the 1930s, high tariffs served as a barrier to trade.

and machine (11.1 percent) industries.¹²⁰ In the 1920s, only small percentages of the coal, steel, textile, glass, and ceramics industries belonged to Czechs, who dominated automobile, airplane, and armaments manufacturing, which needed the goods the German firms produced.¹²¹ Krepec and Hloušek argued that, for the first half of the 1920s, the most important industries that the Germans controlled were export oriented, and the increase of tariffs and strong Czechoslovak crown, both of which the National Democrats supported, ultimately hurt the German industries but benefited those firms in Czechoslovak hands. The German export-oriented firms adapted, however, and in 1926, when the German parties entered the government, they supported high tariffs.¹²² Christoph Boyer concluded that the economic position of the Germans in Czechoslovakia induced them to be loyal to the state until the Great Depression and the late 1930s, when Germans began to ally themselves with the SdP.¹²³ Elsewhere, Boyer investigated the cooperation among German industrialists in the German Central Association of Industry (Deutscher Hauptverband der Industrie, DHI) and their largely Czech counterparts in the ÚSČP. Because of their common interests, the two associations merged in 1928, one small rapprochement of many that occurred throughout Europe after the Locarno Treaty. Representation for the Germans within the ÚSČP was proportional, with a “solid ‘national key’ guaranteeing the interests of both sides.”¹²⁴ Heightening ethnic tensions did not adversely

¹²⁰ Oldřich Krepec and Vít Hloušek, “Czechoslovak Tariffs in the 1920s: An Example of Historical Specificity in Economic Policy,” *Slavic Review*, 80, no. 3 (Fall 2021): 539–40.

¹²¹ Czechs, in the middle of the 1920s, owned only one-sixth of the coal and steel industries, one-eighth of the textile industries, and one-fifteenth of the glass and ceramics industries in the Czech areas, according to Christoph Boyer, “Staatspolitisch unzuverlässig?: Zur Loyalität der deutschen Wirtschaft in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik,” in *Loyalitäten in der Tschechoslowakischen Republik*, 114. In the latter half of the 1920s, the Czech-owned firms manufactured 85 percent of the automobiles, 100 percent of the airplanes, and 95 percent of the armaments, as stated in Jiří Hejda, “Komu patří československý průmysl?” *Prítomnost* 4 (December 8, 1927): 759–60. Hejda concluded his series with the statement “for whether industry is Czech or German, in the first place it must be Czechoslovak.” See Hejda, “Komu patří československý průmysl?” *Prítomnost* 5 (March 1, 1928): 118.

¹²² Krepec and Hloušek, “Czechoslovak Tariffs in the 1920s,” 541 and 542.

¹²³ Boyer, “Staatspolitisch unzuverlässig?” 123–24, and 128–29. The Czechoslovak economy depended on exports, so stability in Central Europe and good economic relations with Germany were essential. The close economic ties between Germany and Czechoslovakia that lasted from the end of the First World War until the Nazi regime came to power in Germany undoubtedly contributed to the good relations between German and Czech business leaders in Czechoslovakia. German and Czechoslovak economic ties between 1918 and 1992 were the subject of a 2018 exhibition at the National Archive (Národní archiv) in Prague. For the period between 1918 and 1933, see the exhibit catalog by Pavel Dufek, František Frnka, and David Hubený, *Handel im Herzen Europas: Deutsch-tschechoslowakische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, 1918–1992*, trans. Theresia Langer (Prague: Národní archiv, 2018), 11–50.

¹²⁴ Christoph Boyer, *Nationale Kontrahenten oder Partner?: Studien zu den Beziehungen zwischen Tschechen und Deutschen in der Wirtschaft der ČSR (1918–1938)* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), 101.

affect interethnic cooperation among major businesses until shortly before the Munich Agreement, when Nazi Germany intervened in the affairs of Czechoslovakia, which recently had lost its important Austrian market because of the *Anschluss*. The cooperation among the industrialists was typical, something that Boyer labeled “collaboration bridges.”¹²⁵ Such efforts to cooperate were not universal in the business world. Boyer noted that the chambers of commerce exhibited a good deal of ethnic tension, despite the joint efforts of the leadership of the chambers to work together. In this case, the difficulty was the attitude of the small business owners who largely were members of the staunchly nationalist National Democratic Party or German National Party (Deutsche Nationalpartei, DNP).¹²⁶ In the Sudetenland, many small German businesses complained about the infiltration of Czechs into German regions and economic policies that were disadvantageous to Germans.¹²⁷

In the late 1920s, a half dozen German and Czech consumer cooperatives began working together on the national level and formed the Interest Center of the Cooperative Unions (Czech: *Zájmové ústředí družstevních svazů*; German: *Interessenzentrale der Genossenschaftsverbände*). Despite wrangling in the districts, something common in the lower echelons of the pillars in a consociational democracy, they took advantage of government incentives, pursued common political goals, and forged economic alliances. Andreas Reich concluded that “national differences were pushed aside in favor of the cooperative interests.”¹²⁸ Elsewhere, Reich stated that “there was no question that Czech and German central associations looked after their common interests. The national question had no influence on the negotiation of economic matters. The Interest Center contained six Czechoslovak organizations and only secondarily associations of different nationalities.”¹²⁹

There were two sides of the economic coin for Slovakia and Ruthenia. The war, the brief Hungarian Bolshevik occupation of Slovakia in 1919, and the dif-

¹²⁵ Boyer, *Nationale Kontrahenten oder Partner?*, 115.

¹²⁶ As an example of the efforts of the leadership, see Boyer, *Nationale Kontrahenten oder Partner?*, 237.

¹²⁷ Catherine Albrecht, “Economic Nationalism in the Sudetenland, 1918–1938,” in *Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe*, 89–108.

¹²⁸ Andreas Reich, “Economic Interests and National Conflict: The Relationship between Czech and German Consumer Cooperatives in Czechoslovakia between 1918 and 1938,” in *Cooperatives in Ethnic Conflicts: Eastern Europe in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century*, ed. Torsten Lorenz (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2006), 274–77 (quotation on p. 277).

¹²⁹ Andreas Reich, *Von der Arbeiterselbsthilfe zur Verbraucherorganisation: Die deutschen Konsumgenossenschaften in der Tschechoslowakei, 1918–1938* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004), 525. On the cooperation between German and Czechoslovak cooperative associations, see esp. 380–93 and 519–32.

ficulties with converting the currency compounded the economic dislocation of Slovakia, while the general postwar economic downturn generated factory closings and unemployment. Strained relations with Hungary ensured the separation of both Slovakia and Ruthenia from their usual Hungarian markets. Smaller Slovak firms could not compete against their larger Czech counterparts, prompting some Czech firms to purchase Slovak assets. The result was what some refer to as the deindustrialization of Slovakia, which, in reality, was the lack of industrial expansion. Given the prevailing attitude that governments were not to interfere in economic matters, the central authorities did nothing to prevent factory closings in Slovakia and mergers of Slovak firms with those in the Bohemian Lands. Nevertheless, the state invested heavily in Slovak and Ruthenian schools and infrastructure, including roads and rail lines that linked the former Hungarian territories with the Bohemian Lands.¹³⁰ Electrification came to the East between the world wars, but the percentage of villages that received electricity in Slovakia was half of what it was in Bohemia, and in comparison to Moravia-Silesia, it was even less.¹³¹ The economic picture in Slovakia was not totally bleak. While some traditional industries lagged, others expanded: timber, beer, mining (including manganese), textile, and paper. Enterprises associated with the Second Industrial Revolution, such as cable, electric motors, rubber, and construction materials (including cement) flourished.¹³² Unfortunately, neither expansions in these areas nor emigration were sufficient to compensate for factory closures elsewhere and overall population growth. Finally, not only were the industrial sectors of the eastern portions of Czechoslovakia at a disadvantage, but also agriculture in Slovakia and Ruthenia suffered from poor pro-

¹³⁰ See, for example, Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/290, report of Einstein to DOS, July 31, 1929. On this topic, see Chapter 4. A profusely illustrated account of the development of Ruthenia within the First Republic is Vladimír Kuštek, *Československý svět v Karpatoch*. Чехословацький світ в Карпатах, 2 vols. (Bratislava: Združenie inteligencie Rusínov Slovenska, o.z., 2018). An excellent assessment of the Czech administration of Ruthenia as essentially Orientalist is Stanislav Holubec, "We Bring Order, Discipline, Western European Democracy and Its Culture to This Land of Former Oriental Chaos and Disorder: Czech Perceptions of Sub-Carpathian Rus and Its Modernization in the 1920s," in *Mastery and Lost Illusions: Space and Time in the Modernization of Eastern and Central Europe*, ed. Włodzimierz Borodziej, Stanislav Holubec, Joachim von Puttkamer, Europas Osten im 20. Jahrhundert/Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century. Schriften des Imre Kertész Kollegs Jena/Publications of the Imre Kertész Kellog Jena, vol. 5. (Munich: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2014). 223–50.

¹³¹ Ludovít Hallon, "Industrializácia v českých krajinách a na Slovensku, 1918–1938," in *Československo, 1918–1938: Osudy demokracie ve střední Evropě*, ed. Jaroslav Valenta, Emil Voráček, and Josef Harna, vol. 1 (Prague: Historický ústav AV ČR, 1999), 297. Statistics are available in SÚS, *Statistická ročenka Republiky československé, 1935*, Table VI–85, p. 88.

¹³² For the list of profitable interwar Slovak industries, see Jan Rychlík, *Češi a Slováci ve 20. století: Česko-slovenské vztahy, 1914–1945* (Bratislava: Academic Electronic Press; Prague: Ústav T. G. Masaryka, 1997), 95; and Hallon, "Industrializácia v českých krajinách a na Slovensku," 300.

ductivity, and agriculturalists there had to contend with higher railroad tariffs than in the Bohemian Lands.¹³³

Seemingly insignificant factors furthered civic nationalism. In 1925, an International PEN organization began in Czechoslovakia, but it initially included no Germans, even though the organization had welcomed their entry. After the German parties had entered the government, the situation changed, and in 1926, Germans entered PEN, although they were underrepresented. A half-dozen years later, a PEN Club opened in Bratislava, and the organization was influential in getting the Czechoslovak government to loosen its restrictions on literature entering the country from Hungary, much of which had irredentist overtones.¹³⁴

Einstein commented that Germans and Czechs worked together in sports.¹³⁵ That was true in some cases, but most of the sport organizations were ethnically divided, including the strongly nationalist gymnastic organizations, such as the Czech and Slovak Sokol and the German Deutsche Turnverband (DTV).¹³⁶ As the historian Jan Brožek concluded, “the structure of the entire sporting movement reflected the plural political system—a whole array of very differentiated sporting organizations developed, in terms of content, ideological and political focus, and both social and ethnic composition.”¹³⁷ Nevertheless, the instances when sportsman-like rivalry meant setting aside ethnic contention were remarkable. Between 1923 and 1929, an exceptional joint German and Czech scouting group existed in Prague.¹³⁸ The Czechoslovak Football Association formed in 1922 and included Czech, Moravian, and Slovak groups as well

¹³³ Rychlík explained, in *Češi a Slovinci . . . 1914–1945*, 96, that, in most respects, the notion that high railroad tariffs hampered Slovak industry is unfounded. In fact, they had a protectionist effect since they also made Czech goods more expensive in Slovakia.

¹³⁴ Orzoff, *Battle for the Castle*, 165–67.

¹³⁵ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 860f.00/248, report of Einstein to DOS, July 12, 1926.

¹³⁶ There are several recent studies of the German gymnastic associations, for example, Michal Burian, *Sudetoněmecké nacionalistické tělovýchovné organizace a československý stát v letech 1918 až 1938* (Prague: Nakladatelství Karolinum, 2012); and Mark Cornwall, *The Devil's Wall: The Nationalist Youth Mission of Heinz Rutha* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2012). On German youth organizations in general between the world wars, see Tomáš Kasper and Dana Kasperová, *Německé mládežnické hnutí a spolky mládeže v ČSR v letech 1918–1933* (Prague: Nakladatelství Academia, 2016).

¹³⁷ Jan Brožek, “Analýza sportovních oddílů v období první republiky,” in *Československo, 1918–1938/2018*, ed. Petr A. Bílek, Bohumil Jirošek, and Lukáš Novotný (České Budějovice: Jihočeská univerzita v Českých Budějovicích, 2018), 269–70.

¹³⁸ Tomáš Jelínek, “Německý skauting v Praze,” in *Češi a Němci ve světě tělovýchovy a sportu: Die Deutschen und Tschechen in der Welt des Turnens und des Sports*, ed. Marek Waic (Prague: Karolinum, 2004), 109.

as organizations for Germans, Hungarians, Jews, and Poles.¹³⁹ Three years later, in 1925, it had 12 Czech and four German professional clubs. In international matches, 17 Sudeten Germans played for Czechoslovakia, among them was Ehrenfried Patzel (1914–2004), a goalie on the team for the 1934 world cup, which Italy won.¹⁴⁰ There were additional indicators of multiethnic cooperation in the world of sports. In the middle of the 1920s, as another positive outcome of the spirit of Locarno, Czech and German social-democratic sport associations began cooperating.¹⁴¹ In 1935, the Czechoslovak Lawn-Tennis Association incorporated German and Hungarian groups, and the committee heading the organization expanded from ten to 16 members, with the individual nationalities having parity on the governing board.¹⁴² Even in the ethnically charged atmosphere of 1938, as a result of protracted negotiations that had lasted several years, Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks formed a united Czechoslovak Canadian Hockey League.¹⁴³

Finally, the political stability of Czechoslovakia, in contrast to the difficulties elsewhere in the region, prompted individuals of all ethnicities to appreciate the state, despite its faults. Czechoslovakia had relatively little turmoil immediately after the First World War, unlike Hungary and Germany. Democracy did not collapse in Czechoslovakia, as it had in Poland and Austria, and it even survived the economic hardships of the 1920s and the Great Depression, which was not the case in Germany.

In 1924, Einstein maintained that, “in spite of [Germans’] complaints, their cultural position is far better than that of German minorities in the other succession states. The spectacle of Germany during the past year has not been of a kind to encourage pan-German ambitions. Moreover, the strong separatism within Germany and the rift between North and South tend to make German

¹³⁹ V. Babička and J. Milotová, *Český svaz fotbalový v Praze, ČSF, 1926–1948 (1950): Inventář* (Prague: Státní ústřední archiv, 1979), 3–4.

¹⁴⁰ Marek Waic and Stefan Zeicker, “Proměny německo-českých fotbalových vztahů v českých zemích a Československu,” in *Německé tělovýchovné a sportovní spolky v českých zemích a Československu: Deutsche Turn- und Sportvereine in den tschechischen Ländern und in der Tschechoslowakei*, ed. Marek Waic (Prague: Nakladatelství Karolinum 2008), 99.

¹⁴¹ Thomas Oellermann, “Dělnický tělovýchovný a sportovní svaz v první Československé republice,” in *Německé tělovýchovné a sportovní spolky*, 80–82.

¹⁴² Zdeněk Hain, *Česká lawn-tennisová asociace, ČsLTA, 1906–1948: Inventář*, Finding Aid no. 963, Fond no. 525 (Prague: Státní ústřední archiv, 1977), 3–4; and Jaroslav Vrbata, et al., *Státní ústřední archiv v Praze: Průvodce po archivních fondech a sbírkách*, vol. 2, no. 3, Věra Helešicová, ed., Průvodce po státních archívech, no. 26 (Prague: Archivní stráž ministerstva vnitra ČR, 1990), 79.

¹⁴³ V. Babička and J. Milotová, *Český svaz ledního hokeje, ČSLH, 1937–1948 (1950): Inventář*, Finding Aid no. 1013, Fond no. 849 (Prague: Státní ústřední archiv, 1979), 2.

Bohemians better satisfied with their lot.”¹⁴⁴ From Gittings’s perspective, too, the odd marriage of Germans and Slavs functioned well, enabling Germans to give their allegiance to the state. That was why Spina, the German Agrarian leader, “was loudly applauded” during a 1927 party meeting, after he had praised the accomplishments of activism.¹⁴⁵ A few years later, Spina proclaimed that “this state is also our state.”¹⁴⁶ In 1936, Wenzel Jaksch (1896–1966), a German Social Democrat, wrote that “we share an unshakable commitment to democracy with the vast majority of the Czech people. We see in it not only the best protection of the social interests of the workers but also the only possible legal form for the coexistence of several nations in a state structure. We are strengthened in this conviction by the fate of the national minorities in countries without democracy.”¹⁴⁷ In April 1938, Jaksch told his party’s congress that “we are seeing a beginning in the European synthesis of world economic power of the Western nations, the creativity and organizational performance of the Germans, and the youthful power of the people of the Slavic nations. Our politics of understanding serves this purpose. We want to use this politics of understanding to build Czechoslovakia as a true homeland of nations and as a bridge between west and east.”¹⁴⁸

Attila Simon enumerated the combination of serious and petty annoyances the Hungarian minority endured, such as the difficulties in obtaining Hungarian-language publications, using Hungarian in official settings, educating children in the Hungarian language, celebrating Hungarian holidays, and even singing Hungarian songs.¹⁴⁹ Nevertheless, he concluded that

the First Czechoslovak Republic became for the Hungarian population of Slovakia a good homeland, as it provided them with relative material and social security, a wide range of cultural and educational opportunities, and the atmosphere of freedom of a liberal state. They, however, having brought

¹⁴⁴ Laramie, WY, UW, AHC, LEP, box 6, folder 11, report of Einstein to DOS, February 19, 1924.

¹⁴⁵ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/266, report of Gittings to DOS, 8 April 1927. Spina championed German-Czech cooperation and was a lecturer in Czech at the German University in Prague.

¹⁴⁶ “Spinás Rede bei der Křepok-Feier: Kooperation beider Völker kann beispielgebend für Europa sein,” *Prager Tagblatt*, January 16, 1930, 1. See also Johann Wolfgang Brügel, *Tschechen und Deutsche, 1918–1938* (Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1967), 196.

¹⁴⁷ Wenzel Jaksch, “Was uns alle verbindet,” in *Co nás všechny spojuje*, ed. Otakar Matoušek, *Přednášky československého rozhlasu*, no. 14 (Prague: Nákladem Radiojournalu, 1936), 23.

¹⁴⁸ Karel Nedved, “Němec, který zůstal demokratem (Wenzel Jaksch),” *Prítomnost* 15 (July 20, 1938): 454–57.

¹⁴⁹ Simon, *The Hungarians of Slovakia in 1938*, ch.1, esp. 39–40, 43, 46–51, 63, and 66.

with them their own forms of socialization, cultural traditions and a strong sense of national identity, were not able to accept as their own country and nation a Czechoslovakia that harbored its own nation-state ambitions. Nor were they able to identify emotionally with the new state. While the Hungarians of Slovakia valued and respected the democracy of the First Czechoslovak Republic (whose values they made their own), a majority of them considered their belonging to Czechoslovakia to be a temporary condition and were in favor of a revision of the borders.

Simon mentioned, however, that the Hungarians of Slovakia had “a sense of reality and common sense,” which “gave them the will to organize their lives within the given political framework, and they accepted Czechoslovakia as a reality.”¹⁵⁰

A degree of commonality among various ethnic groups resulted from their centuries of association with the Habsburg Monarchy. That commonality seemingly dissolved in 1918, but positive experiences in the Czechoslovak state helped induce the formation of new bonds among people of every ethnicity.

Elite cooperation, the final favorable condition for consociationalism, existed in the First Republic in politics and other matters, and it is linked with the overarching loyalties associated with political personalities. Even before the First World War, Czech political party leaders joined to form a single Czech Club in the Reichsrat, and they cooperated to decide the political fate of Karel Šviha (1877–1937), a National Socialist deputy accused of having collaborated with the Austrian police. Elite cooperation and the principle of proportionality were evident during the First World War, when Švehla suggested the composition of the National Committee, based on the distribution of Czech parties in the Vienna Reichsrat. The politicians then extended that so-called “key of Švehla” to create the Revolutionary National Assembly, legislative committees, and the first cabinet.¹⁵¹ The spirit of elite cooperation in politics was apparent in the creative ways in which politicians constructed and maintained governing coalitions.

In his correspondence to Washington, Einstein cited evidence of elite cooperation in Czechoslovakia. In February 1923, before Alois Rašín (1867–1923), the finance minister, died from an assassin’s bullet, Einstein reported that Rašín’s “last spoken words preached cooperation and confidence to his political associates. ‘If we remain united,’ he said, ‘we will maintain the Republic. Otherwise, we will

¹⁵⁰ Simon, *The Hungarians of Slovakia in 1938*, 302–303.

¹⁵¹ On the activities of the Revolutionary National Assembly, see René Petráš, “The Revolutionary National Assembly in Czechoslovakia, 1918–1920. Contentious Issues,” in *Hohes Haus!*, 215–225.

lose our independence.”¹⁵² Days later, Švehla became seriously ill, prompting Einstein to observe that Švehla “had been the soul of the Czech Five Party Coalition which is carrying on the government of this country. A resourceful politician[,] he alone, by his system of ‘small lies’ had been able to reconcile the contradictions in the political opinions of members of the Cabinet.”¹⁵³ Švehla gained the loyalty of so many politicians outside his party because they trusted him as an honest and disarming negotiator who delivered on his promises. It was the same bond among the members of the Pětka that enabled them to derail Beneš’s government, which was in power from 1921 to 1922, because Beneš had tried to resist the consociational practices of the parties, including their control over ministries that were crucial to the interest of the electorate they represented. From the standpoint of elite cooperation, Einstein deemed the fragmentation of the Czechoslovak polity as deceptive. “The traditional radical animosities inherited from Austria,” he wrote in 1924, “are as often as not more superficial and vocal than real and do not preclude a real understanding whenever this becomes mutually desirable.”¹⁵⁴ A purpose of the elite in a consociational system is to link segments at the top, in order to diminish potential conflict, and Einstein once remarked how a member of the elite guaranteed civility. In 1922, Alois Baeran (1872–1936), a German deputy from the negativist German National Party, threw a stink bomb at the speaker of the National Assembly and then fled. The head of the party, Rudolf Lodgman (1877–1962), surprisingly apologized for the act.¹⁵⁵ Leading politicians in the various parties often built surprisingly close personal ties with their colleagues in other parties that enabled them to surmount incessant political bickering. The spirit of cooperation and the bond of trust not only facilitated the building of compromise but also enabled these politicians, over the course of several years, to claim ministerial positions in a number of governments. Likewise, the increased importance of individual politicians to the elite cartel made their position within their political parties all the more secure. Preserving the well-functioning elite cartel may help account for why the party leaders in Czechoslovakia had such incredible staying power and why it was hard for the younger generation to attain top party positions.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵² Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.002/30, report of Einstein to DOS, February 21, 1923.

¹⁵³ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.002/29, report of Einstein to DOS, March 3, 1923.

¹⁵⁴ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/228, report of Einstein to DOS, June 27, 1924.

¹⁵⁵ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.032/1, report of Einstein to DOS, February 1, 1922. The incident is reported in *Těsnopisecké zprávy o schůzích poslanecké sněmovny Národního shromáždění republiky Československé*, first electoral period (1920–1925), 128th session, January 27, 1922.

¹⁵⁶ Miller, *Forging Political Compromise*, 199–200 (cabinets) as well as 96–101 and 176–77 (example of the generational difference in the Republican Party). Miller also examined the genera-

An essential hub of elite cooperation in Czechoslovakia was the group of officials and politicians around Masaryk in the Hrad.¹⁵⁷ Masaryk was apolitical, although he sympathized with the Social Democrats, and his Chancellery was a meeting point for amenable politicians from all parties, including Robert Mayr-Harting (1874–1948), a German Christian Socialist.¹⁵⁸ Masaryk did more than serve as a figurehead for foreign dignitaries and an honest broker during political crises. He and Beneš practically set foreign policy. Masaryk influenced domestic policy and helped make or break political fortunes behind the scenes. Einstein provided many examples of Masaryk's work with politicians throughout the years, and he observed how the president's involvement as a mediator among the politicians increased when Švehla became ill.¹⁵⁹

At times, historians view Masaryk's influence as overbearing. For example, in a brief discussion of the First Republic's politics, Chad Bryant concluded, "Masaryk's prestige and position as the sole arbiter among parties allowed him to foist favorites off on coalition governments."¹⁶⁰ As any head of state in a parliamentary system, Masaryk at times aided the process of building coalitions, and the constitution gave him certain powers, but he certainly did not dictate, with any regularity, which individuals were to hold certain cabinet posts. Whether he advanced a candidate for a position, as he did with Beneš, or attempted to exclude someone from the cabinet, Masaryk did so as a political actor who, in many ways, was on a par with the leaders of the major parties. If Masaryk ever attempted to dictate politics, other than the times he had to appoint a cabinet

tion question in the Republican Party as part of his study "The Social Backgrounds of the Leaders of the Republican Party between the Two World Wars," in *Politická a stavovská zemědělská hnutí ve 20. století: Sborník příspěvků z mezinárodní konference konané ve dnech 17.-18. 5. 2000*, ed. Blanka Rašticová (Uherské Hradiště: Slováké muzeum, 2001), 135–148.

¹⁵⁷ The classic work on the Hrad is Karl Bosl, ed., *Die "Burg": Einflußreiche politische Kräfte um Masaryk und Beneš*, 2 vols. (Munich and Vienna: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1973–1974).

¹⁵⁸ On Mayr-Harting, see Jaroslav Šebek, *Mezi křížem a národem: Politické prostředí sudetoněmeckého katolicismu v meziválečném Československu* (Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, 2006), 86. On the functions of the Chancellery of the President of the Republic, see Josef Schieszl, "Kancelář presidenta republiky," *Naše doba* 31 (April 15, 1924): 385–393. Josef Schieszl (1876–1970) was a National Democrat in the Revolutionary National Assembly and then left politics to head the Political and Legislative Department of the Chancellery of the President of the Republic. Politicians knew of Masaryk's affinity to the program of the Social Democratic Party, although he did not promote the party's interests. František Modráček (1871–1960), a Social Democratic deputy and senator throughout the life of the republic, aside from 1919 to 1923, when he represented his own socialist party in the National Assembly, once wrote that "Masaryk is a socialist. There is no doubt." He explained, however, that Masaryk's socialism was unconventional and "in a word, accurately expressed as humanist." František Modráček, "Masaryk a socialism," *Naše doba* 32 (January 15, 1925): 342.

¹⁵⁹ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/288, report of Einstein to DOS, April 2, 1929.

¹⁶⁰ Chad Bryant, *Prague in Black: Nazi Rule and Czech Nationalism* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2007), 20.

of experts (even then, he cooperated with the top politicians), it was with the creation of the Beneš government. Apparently, the intransigence of the politicians in the Pětka and the limited success of Beneš as prime minister taught Masaryk never again to impose his will so broadly on the country's politicians.

Although ideology can be divisive and either can create or intensify segmentation, it also can have the effect of unifying parts of a divided society. In the Czechoslovak case, the parties were crucial components of the various social pillars. As Josef Harna stated, the so-called state-creating parties (Czech: *státotvorné strany*; Slovak: *štátotvorné strany*) parties that had established the republic not only served a political function but also “influenced the daily lives of citizens” because of their ties throughout the bureaucracy and their nonpolitical affairs.¹⁶¹ Czech and Slovak speakers had three types of major socialist parties, each with their specific ideologies: Social Democrats, the nationally minded National Socialists, and the Communists.¹⁶² Nevertheless, socialist ideology enabled Social Democrats and National Socialists to cooperate in the cabinets and the National Assembly. During the first government of the All-National Coalition of 1922–1925, the Social Democrats negotiated with the Communists to bring them into the ruling coalition, but the effort collapsed under the strong influence of those Communists following Moscow's lead.¹⁶³ Later, the Social Democrats unsuccessfully explored the possibility of inducing a split in the Communist Party to isolate the Moscow faction and enable cooperation between the moderate Communists and the socialists.¹⁶⁴ At the time of the bourgeois-clerical Gentlemen's Coalition (Czech: *Panská koalice*) or Civic Coalition (Czech: *Občanská koalice*) between 1926 and 1929, Einstein posited that the government could have made the Communist Party illegal but did not do so because the moderate Communists would have joined and strengthened the Social Democratic Party.¹⁶⁵ In short, the moderate Communists and the left Social Democrats were not so far apart. During the Gentlemen's Coalition, socialism

161 Josef Harna, *Konsenzus a kompromis: Budování politického systému první ČSR* (Prague: Historický ústav AV ČR, 2013), 18. Harna's other narrative about the Czechoslovak interwar political system is *Krise evropské demokracie a Československo 30. let 20. století (Srovnávací sonda)* (Prague: Historický ústav AV ČR, 2006).

162 Adherents of the Communist Party essentially formed a consociational pillar unto themselves, and the members of the party even intermarried. Chad Bryant, *Prague: Belonging in the Modern City* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2021), 129–39.

163 Vienna, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Gesandtschafts-, und Konzulatsarchiv, Prag, Carton 15, Report 144 of 28 August 1924.

164 Vienna, HHStA, GK-P, Carton 16, Report 96, 19 June 1925.

165 Washington, DC, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Department of State (DOS), 86of.00B/34, report of Lewis D. Einstein to DOS, 2 April 1929. The Gentlemen's Coalition was the socialists' term that gained widespread popularity. Civic Coalition indicated the absence



Figure 4. Lewis Einstein (1877–1967), the minister to Czechoslovakia from the United States between 1921 and 1930. The photograph, taken in front of the American Embassy in Prague, is from October 28, 1924, the sixth anniversary of Czechoslovak independence.

Source: Washington, DC, Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Online Catalog, National Photo Company Collection, <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/npc2007012499/>.

bound together the opposition parties. For example, the socialists and Communists led street demonstrations to protest the May 1926 increases in both agricultural tariffs and the *congrua*, and they opposed various types of legislation, such as a change in the voting law and the 1927 tax reform.

Germans and Hungarians had their own social democratic parties, and socialism facilitated their cooperation with Czech and Slovak socialist parties. In early 1921, Crane, the first American minister to Czechoslovakia, observed that the German and Czechoslovak Social Democrats “[put] socialization before any national aims.” The German Social Democrats abstained from voting for President Masaryk instead of voting against him, like the other Germans in the National Assembly. “Once or twice,” wrote Crane to the Department of State in Washington, “they have sided with the Czech[oslovak] Social Democrats by leaving the parliament when the Czech[oslovak] party was in danger of not having a majority vote of those present.”¹⁶⁶ Even in the early 1920s, the Social Democrats advocated bringing the German parties, particularly the German Social Democrats, into the government. When the socialist parties were in the opposition, between 1926 and 1929, Czech and Slovak socialists cooperated with the German Social Democrats. For example, all the socialist parties, including the German Social Democrats, opposed the administrative reforms of 1927, even though the German Christian Socialists and the German Agrarians, both part of the ruling coalition at the time, supported them. Cooperation among the Czech, Slovak, and German socialists continued after 1929, when the three parties entered the cabinet.¹⁶⁷ The Hungarian-German Social Democratic Party began its existence after the creation of the republic, but it had no electoral success. In 1926, it merged with the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, and the head of the Hungarian socialists, Ignác Schulz (1894–1954), received a seat in the National Assembly, after the 1935 election, and was close to Dérer, the party’s leading Slovak member.

The ideology of agrarianism formed another pillar within the Czechoslovak polity. It was an important unifier of Czech, Slovak, Ukrainian, and Rusyn agriculturalists within the powerful Republican Party, and it was the basis of cooperation between the Republican Party and the Bund der Landwirte.¹⁶⁸ In 1921,

of the socialists from the government in the same way that *bürgerliche Parteien* or *občanské strany* (Czech) indicated nonsocialist (also civic or bourgeois) as opposed to socialist parties.

¹⁶⁶ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86oF01/113, report of Richard Crane to DOS, February 16, 1921.

¹⁶⁷ See Einstein’s comments in Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/301, report of Einstein to DOS, October 29, 1929.

¹⁶⁸ In the 1920s, the moderates within the Republican Party established the holders of small- and medium-sized agricultural enterprises as an important class of agriculturalists, who cooperat-

Crane stated that the Republicans and the German Agrarians were “closer together than any other group. They have drawn up a common program which has not been agreed to by both parties yet; but they will stand together on matters of common interest.”¹⁶⁹ In the summer of 1926, the Republicans and the Bund der Landwirte collaborated with other parties to raise agricultural tariffs. Several weeks later, the two parties joined with the Tradesmen, Czech Populists, Slovak Populists, and German Christian Socialists to form the Gentlemen’s Coalition.¹⁷⁰ Immediately, the activist German ministers influenced the government to initiate policies that favored the German-speaking minority, and not just through changes in the specific ministries they headed. The new cabinet had the parliamentary backing of two Hungarian parties, one of which was the Hungarian National Party (Hungarian: Magyar Nemzeti Párt), whose members were largely small farmers and peasants.¹⁷¹ Einstein’s observation of the Hungarian situation is informative:

Czechoslovakia, as a state, is largely built on a contented peasantry, and Magyar farmers also benefit by its policy. They enjoy better roads, schools, and sanitation than in Hungary, and they have been able to lease or purchase the land of their former masters acquired under the agrarian reform.

ed, in the Republican Party, alongside the landless agricultural workers, the estate owners, and the owners of agricultural processing concerns. See Miller, *Forging Political Compromise*; and Kuklík, *Příběh československé ústavy, 1920*, vol. 1: 265–68. On the effort of the Republican Party to support the class interests of peasants and farmers in other countries, through the MAB, see Alex Toshkov, *Agrarianism as Modernity in Twentieth-Century Europe: The Golden Age of the Peasantry* (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019); and Mečíř, *Rozmluvy s Antonínem Švehlou a o Švehlovi*, esp. 233–45. Toshkov could not benefit from the memoirs of Mečíř, the general secretary of the MAB; Toshkov’s book appeared immediately after the publication of Mečíř’s memoirs.

¹⁶⁹ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86oFo1/113, report of Crane to DOS, February 16, 1921.

¹⁷⁰ On the role of Spina in German activist economic politics, see Christoph Boyer, “Spina und der Wirtschaftsaktivismus in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik,” in *Franz Spina (1868–1938)*, 127–139. Oldřich Krpec and Vít Hloušek, in “Czechoslovak Tariffs in the 1920s: An Example of Historical Specificity in Economic Policy,” *Slavic Review: Interdisciplinary Quarterly of Russian, Eurasian, and East European Studies* 80, no. 3 (Fall 2021): 523–43, explained how Czechoslovak tariffs were not a matter of economic nationalism but the demand of the agricultural sector for protection that was equal to that of the industrial sector.

¹⁷¹ Einstein’s comments on the cooperation of German and Czech agrarian and Catholic parties appear in Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/248, report of Einstein to DOS, July 12, 1926. The conservative and nationalist National Democratic Party, which represented the interests of big business and finance, had opposed the entry of the German parties into the government until the Gentlemen’s Coalition. On the party lineup, see “Po násilnických scénách a událostech, které nebyly dosud v žádném parlamentě, schválila poslanecká sněmovna zákon o zemědělských clech,” *Venkov* June 13, 1926, 1, for the increased tariffs. For the *congrua* vote, see “Národní shromáždění: Poslanecká sněmovna (36. schůze plenární). Lomozné scény komunistů a českých socialistů. Kongruový zákon schválen,” *Venkov*, June 20, 1926, 1.

They can vote freely, and two of their parties are already affiliated with the Czechoslovak farmers. The Czechs have made a deliberate effort to win over the Magyar peasants, whose position to-day, in Slovakia, is superior to what it would be if they were still in Hungary.¹⁷²

Religion likewise both divided and unified the country. Protestantism had a number of followers, but the majority of Czech, Slovak, German, Hungarian, and Polish speakers were Catholic. Nevertheless, religion had only a limited ability to create overarching loyalties. Catholic Czech and Slovak speakers attempted to unite in one political party after the First World War, but the effort failed (the Czechoslovak People's Party, even though its members were overwhelmingly Czech speakers, maintained the Czechoslovak reference in its name).¹⁷³ After their failed merger, the Czechoslovak People's Party and the Hlinka Slovak People's Party generally did not have close ties, largely because of the HSLS demand for Slovak autonomy.¹⁷⁴ Nevertheless, the two largest Catholic parties worked together in the Gentlemen's Coalition. Like the Hungarian National Party, the Hungarian National Christian Social Party (Hungarian: Országos Keresztényszocialista Párt) also supported the Gentlemen's

¹⁷² Laramie, WY, UW, AHC, LEP, box 8, folder 13, "The Hapsburg Inheritance and the Succession States," n.d. (but April 1930 or shortly thereafter), 28. Einstein also reviewed the position of Slovaks in Czechoslovakia in this general report on the post-1918 situation in the states that once had been part of the Habsburg Monarchy. He concluded that, after a decade of improvement of economic and social conditions in Slovakia and the implementation of the provincial reform of 1927, "it can hardly be expected that two peoples, so different in character and historic experience, would at once blend together. But to-day, this unity of the State is little questioned, and granted time and greater prosperity, the wise moderation and tolerance which has always been the policy of President Masaryk should do the rest. There are now three Slovak Ministers in the cabinet at Prague, and Slovak political parties for some years already have been members of the government coalition" (p. 22).

¹⁷³ For a brief explanation of the break between the Slovak and Czech Catholics, see Miloš Trapl, *Political Catholicism and the Czechoslovak People's Party in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1938* (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1995), 57-58. On the friendly relationship between Šrámek and Hlinka, aside from the issue of Slovak autonomy, which divided them, see Zdislava Dvorščáková, "Vztah Jana Šrámka a Andreja Hlinku a jeho vplyv na vývoj pomeru medzi českým a slovenským politickým katolicizmom," in *Jan Šrámek a jeho doba*, Pavel Marek, et al. (Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, 2011), 268-81. Divergent trends even existed in the Czechoslovak People's Party, for example, regarding its participation in various governments. See Marek Šmíd, *Nepřítel: První republika: Radikalizace skupiny českých katolických intelektuálů v letech 1918-1938* (N.p.: Nakladatelství L. Marek, 2012), 111-15.

¹⁷⁴ On the issue of Slovak autonomy as a barrier to the creation of a unified Catholic bloc, see Prague, AÚTGM, Fond T. G. Masaryk, R (Republika), carton 405, report no. 45 d/34, "Slovenská ľudová strana," May 9, 1934. On the development of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, beginning in the nineteenth century, see Thomas A. Lorman, *The Making of the Slovak People's Party: Religion, Nationalism and the Culture War in Early Twentieth-Century Europe* (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019).

Coalition. The ties between the Czechoslovak Populist Party and the German Christian Social Party were strong, especially by the middle of the 1920s. Already in 1921, Crane concluded that they “act together on matters affecting the Catholic Church and in fighting the inroads of the Czecho-Slovak Church,” that is, a denomination that started in 1920, after a break with the Roman Catholic Church.¹⁷⁵ Ethnic divisions precluded any attempt of the Catholic parties to cooperate on more than religious and cultural issues, even after their shared experiences in the Gentlemen’s Coalition. When the Czech, Slovak, and German Catholic trade organizations attempted to unify, in the early stages of the Great Depression, the effort came to naught. One reason for the failure of such initiatives was how closely the unions were tied to the political parties.¹⁷⁶

Despite the occasional alignment of Catholic parties representing various ethnic groups regarding specific policy issues, such as increasing the *congrua*, the number of long-standing bonds among Catholics in the First Republic were limited and often were not particularly strong. German and Czech Catholics managed to build the greatest number of bridges, but they served very specific communities, and their users tended to be the notables from the two opposing embankments.¹⁷⁷ For example, the German and Czech trade unions cooperated during the 1923 miners’ strike.¹⁷⁸ In the middle of the 1920s, the Catholic trade unions began discussing the possibility of further collaboration, and in 1928, the German, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian movements established the Statewide Union Council of Christian Organizations (Říšská odborová rada křesťanských organizací, ŘOR). Despite these attempts at unity, the organizations serving different ethnicities functioned independently, and Germans ac-

¹⁷⁵ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86oFo1/113, report of Crane to DOS, February 16, 1921.

¹⁷⁶ Trapl, *Political Catholicism*, 83–84; Trapl, “Vztahy mezi českým a německým politickým katolicismem v Československu v letech 1918–1938,” 183–195, esp. 187–188 (union relations) and 189–190 (interaction during the 1936 Catholic Congress); and Karel Konečný, Pavel Marek, and Miloš Trapl, *Der politische Katholizismus in den tschechischen Ländern, 1848–1989* (Nordhauser: Verlag T. Bautz, 2015), ch. 2. On the Catholic trade unions and the efforts to unify the Slovak and Czech organizations, see František Čapka, “K postavení křesťanskosociálních odborů na počátku 30. let 20. století v Českých zemích,” in *Teorie a praxe politického katolicismu, 1870–2007*, ed. Pavel Marek (Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, 2008), 226–35. Unions were strong in Czechoslovakia, partly because the country based its workers’ compensation on the Ghent system, which meant that workers had to be members of unions to receive coverage.

¹⁷⁷ For an outline of Catholic politics in the First Republic, see Konečný, Marek, and Trapl, *Der politische Katholizismus in den tschechischen Ländern*, 116–203.

¹⁷⁸ František Čapka, *Odbory v českých zemích v letech 1918–1948* (Brno: Masarykova Univerzita, 2008), 77. Of course, there were other incidents of collaboration among trade unions of the various ethnic groups. For example, the German and Czechoslovak Social Democratic unions worked together during the 1925 elections. See Šebek, *Mezi křížem a národem*, 48. The Social Democratic unions were far more numerous and powerful than their Catholic counterparts. See Šebek, *Mezi křížem a národem*, 48; and Čapka, *Odbory v českých zemích*, 117.

counted for only about 3 percent of the members of ŘOR.¹⁷⁹ There were other examples of common efforts involving German and Czech Catholics. For example, Germans participated in the 1929 millennium celebration of the death of St. Václav, the Czechs' patron saint, and they took part in the First Statewide Catholic Congress, which took place in Prague in 1935.¹⁸⁰ Furthermore, after the German parties entered the cabinet in 1926, a number of individuals on both the German and Czech sides advocated for cooperation among Catholics, even in the second half of the 1930s.¹⁸¹

Economics is an important factor in building trust among pillars in a society, and Czechoslovakia was no exception to this principle. German and Czech industrialists eventually worked together in the Central Union of Czechoslovak Industry, while German and Czech bank managers joined together in the Union of Czechoslovak Banks (Svaz československých bank). Einstein reported that the German and Czech speakers cooperated because the former had ownership positions in heavy industry and finance, which benefited from the strong export policies of the state. He reasoned that Germans, with nearly a quarter of the population, controlled four-fifths of the industry and that the Czechoslovak state contributed to the Germans' wealth because high tariffs protected their firms from powerful businesses in Weimar Germany.¹⁸² In the spring of 1926, Einstein informed Washington that the alignment to increase agricultural tariffs and the *congrua* was logical since the constituents of both the Republicans and their clerical allies were small farmers and small-town businessmen.¹⁸³ Weeks later, when the legislature passed sliding tariffs, with the help of Germans, Einstein again remarked that the motivating factor was economics.¹⁸⁴ Finally, stability in Czechoslovakia, as opposed to the political turmoil and economic difficulties in surrounding states, contributed to financial prosperity and elicited loyalty from Germans, Magyars, and other minorities.

¹⁷⁹ Čapka, *Odbory v českých zemích*, 39.

¹⁸⁰ Šebek noted, on p. 65 of *Mezi křížem a národem*, some examples of Czech and German cooperation among Catholic youth organizations in the first few years of the republic, but he added that "groups that were accommodating to the Czechoslovak Republic were, even among young Catholics, an exception." That attitude changed when the Germans entered the government. On the issue of Sudeten German Catholics within the First Republic, see also Jaroslav Šebek, *Sudetendětscher Katholizismus auf dem Kreuzweg: Politische Aktivitäten der sudetendeutschen Katholiken in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik in den 30er Jahren* (Berlin: Lit Verlag Dr. W. Hopf, 2010).

¹⁸¹ Jaroslav Šebek, *Od konfliktu ke smíření: Česko-německé vztahy ve 20. století očima katolické církve* (Kostelní Vydří: Karmelitánské nakladatelství, 2013), 55–59; and Šebek, *Mezi křížem a národem*, 186–87.

¹⁸² Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/248, report of Einstein to DOS, July 12, 1926.

¹⁸³ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/244, report of Einstein to DOS, May 28, 1926.

¹⁸⁴ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/250, report of Einstein to DOS, July 13, 1926.

According to Lijphart, a polity does not need to meet any of the nine favorable conditions for consociationalism to succeed; however, the more of them it meets, the more successful it is likely to be. Interwar Czechoslovakia confirms this generalization in that, to varying degrees, it met all of these conditions. The country unquestionably fulfilled five of them. The polity had no unified majority, faced external dangers, had overarching loyalties, had groups that were concentrated geographically, and enjoyed a tradition of compromise and accommodation. The presence of the other four favorable conditions requires some special consideration. The economic disparity and social differences between Czech and German speakers, on the one hand, and Slovak as well as the Ukrainian and Rusyn speakers, on the other hand, seemed great, but the Czechs and Germans had their share of less fortunate workers, artisans, shopkeepers, and agriculturalists. The republic seems to have had a large number of segments: more than a half dozen ethnic groups, several religions, and a number of ideological currents. Nevertheless, several of these groups were small, and cross-cutting cleavages and some additional factors, such as religion, diminished the potential impact of these divisions. The social segments may not have been roughly the same size, but none were completely cohesive. Finally, the country's population was not small, considering the size of other consociational states, but the inhabitants viewed themselves as living in a small state, especially with respect to their two largest neighbors, Germany and Poland.

The Components of Consociational Democracy in Czechoslovakia

Grand Coalitions

The nine favorable conditions facilitate the development of a consociational democracy, which, in turn, has four characteristics. The first is the grand coalition (see Table 1). Conventionally, the term *grand coalition* refers to a cabinet whose members traverse the partisan spectrum. It is not only a diverse coalition but also an oversized one, that is, one whose parties' share of legislative seats is greater than the simple majority that defines a minimum winning coalition. As with any oversized coalition, a grand coalition government may survive if one or more of its members withdraw, although it might lose its status as an oversized coalition.

The Lijphartian or consociational grand coalition is distinct from a traditional grand coalition because its defining feature is the inclusion of representatives from the significant social segments in a polity rather than the inclu-

sion of all the major parties.¹⁸⁵ Furthermore, while these representatives may be members of several political parties, they also can be adherents to one party. India's Congress Party, which represented multiple segments in Indian society, is an example of such a consociational party.¹⁸⁶ In Czechoslovakia, consociational grand coalitions included parties on the left, center, and right of the political spectrum, but those parties also represented the major ideologies, social groups, religious denominations, and ethnic minorities.

In Czechoslovakia, some grand coalitions represented many social segments but failed to include an essential social segment, thereby leaving a key national minority or ideology in the opposition. These partial Lijphartian or partial consociational grand coalitions nevertheless were remarkably stable, and their members actually sought ways to incorporate the excluded parties. For example, the All-National Coalition members considered including German parties in the coalition, and the parties in the Gentlemen's Coalition ultimately succeeded in reconciling with the socialists. In other words, even when Czechoslovakia failed to form a true Lijphartian grand coalition, the politics of government formation remained broadly inclusive.

The cleavages in Czechoslovak society resulted in a multitude of political parties, and since the electorate sent many parties to the legislature, none of which received more than a plurality of seats, coalitions were a necessity. When noting that there were 39 parties in the 1925 election, 16 of which entered the National Assembly, Pearson, the American chargé d'affaires ad interim, quipped: "this plethora of parties may be ascribed to a passion for politics."¹⁸⁷ Those parties, of course, reflected not only a "passion for politics" but also the great diversity of Czechoslovakia. A further illustration of the First Republic's colorful politics came from Einstein, after the 1929 elections: "the mere fact that in a country as new and as artificially composed as Czechoslovakia a legislative body recruited under a democratic suffrage and including representatives of different races, loyalties, languages, traditions and interests, should be able to work together with some harmony is in itself an encouraging spectacle for the future of this State."¹⁸⁸ To overcome the large number of parties that entered the National Assembly, the Czechoslovak First Republic relied on variations of the Lijphartian grand coalition during much of its twenty-year existence.

¹⁸⁵ Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, 31.

¹⁸⁶ Lijphart, "The Puzzle of Indian Democracy," in *Thinking about Democracy*, 45-46; and Bogaards, *Democracy and Social Peace in Divided Societies*.

¹⁸⁷ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/239, report of Pearson to DOS, November 28, 1925.

¹⁸⁸ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/310, report of Einstein to DOS, December 24, 1929.

Czechoslovakia's ruling coalitions always included representatives from various segments of the polity. Although it appears that Slovak politicians were in a government only once, when the Hlinka Slovak People's Party entered the cabinet, and that no Rusyn or Ukrainian politician ever held any prominent position, politicians from Slovakia and Ruthenia were in statewide parties, and Slovaks actually held cabinet posts, even when no specific Slovak party was in the government. The first government, an unnamed grand coalition of parties across the political spectrum under Kramář, had five political parties as well as Slovak representatives. It had the backing of nearly the entire Revolutionary National Assembly, which Czech and Slovak politicians had constituted, in part, from their wartime National Council, with the addition of selected Slovak and Czech deputies who formed a Slovak Club to represent the inhabitants of Slovakia. The situation in that province still was unstable, so Czechs with a history of Slovak contacts temporarily held seats that otherwise would have gone to Slovaks. The German representatives chose not to participate because they held out hope that the Allied promise of ethnic self-determination would enable them to become part of a German state.¹⁸⁹ In the middle of 1919, after socialist victories in local elections, the Social Democrats and National Socialists—the two major socialist parties—and the Republicans formed the center-left Red-Green Coalition (Czech: *Rudozelená koalice*), which had a slim majority in the Revolutionary National Assembly. The first elections to the National Assembly under the newly completed constitution took place in May 1920, aside from a few districts where the state administration was weak or the borders were unresolved, and the newly elected deputies included Germans and other minorities. After the election, the socialist-agrarian block became a minority coalition and depended on the support of other parties that had been in the Kramář cabinet. That block collapsed when the Communists separated from the Social Democrats, leaving in doubt the number of deputies remaining in the socialist

¹⁸⁹ In 1918, Švehla and three other leading Czech-speaking politicians met with Lodgman, a key German representative, to invite them to join in building the new state. Lodgman refused, as did other German representatives in his camp. Similarly, the Czech politicians failed to reach an agreement with the leader of the German Social Democrats. Peroutka recounted the negotiations in *Budování státu: Československá politika v letech popřevrátových*, vol. 1: *Rok 1918* (Prague: Fr. Borový, 1933), 185–88. On p. 188 Peroutka also claimed that the Czech politicians, immediately before the October 28, 1918 revolution, decided to have a German minister without portfolio in the government. Peroutka, a journalist, was close to T. G. Masaryk, who arranged for Peroutka to have unprecedented access to information for his book, which came out in installments. Although the German representatives excluded the possibility of taking part in the institutions of the new state, the Czech and Slovak politicians likely did not exhaust every possibility to secure German cooperation.

camp, and in its wake, a bureaucratic government came to power that continued to count on the support of the parties from the Kramář government. The Beneš government, from 1921 to 1922, was not just a broad coalition but also for a short time was an oversized coalition, with a comfortable twenty-three-seat majority in the National Assembly, until the Slovak Populists separated from the Czechoslovak Populists and went into opposition. At that point, the Beneš government had only a narrow majority in the legislature, a situation that remained unchanged with Švehla's first cabinet in the All-National Coalition, from 1922 to 1925, which had the same party composition as the Beneš government. After the 1925 elections, Švehla expanded the All-National Coalition to include the Czechoslovak Business and Commerce Party, making it an oversized coalition with an eleven-vote margin.

With the 1926 collapse of Švehla's second cabinet, Czechoslovakia temporarily turned to a government of experts, once more under Jan Černý. It was a time when fascists were beginning to coalesce into a movement, agriculturalists demanded higher tariffs, and workers wanted augmented social insurance programs and struggled against higher agricultural tariffs. Just one month after Jan Černý took his post, there was talk of replacing him with Schieszl, the political expert in the Chancellery of the President who was Černý's minister of social care and minister of public health and physical education.¹⁹⁰ That would have meant transferring power from a bureaucrat who was close to the party figures, particularly Švehla, to one who was an exponent of the Hrad. The worst-case scenario was that Czechoslovakia's democracy would fail. The circumstances placed immense pressure on the parties to find common ground based on economic concessions.

190 An example of the public speculation about Schieszl becoming prime minister appears in "Vnitropolitická situaci se vyjasňuje," *Národní listy*, April 15, 1926, 1. The uncertainty of the situation, at the time, appears in a handwritten report of Šámal, who had a conversation with Schieszl. "The situation is bad!" Schieszl began. He had talked to those at Lány who were close to the president, and "they quite openly were expressing the opinion that, if there is talk of an octroyed [that is, dictated arrangement], let a bureaucratic government do it, not get angry with anybody, and pass a benefits law as an ordinance." The question of benefits was only one of the many controversial issues at the time. Siegfried Taub (1876–1946), a deputy for the German Social Democratic Party but whose parents were Czech-speaking Jews, asked Schieszl about a recent fascist meeting. Šámal noted that, "when Dr. Schieszl told him that it was nothing [and] that it was without significance, Taub objected: he was wrong. In all the political parties there are purely fascist elements that now are coming into force. He [Taub] himself was at a meeting at [the Prague conference center] Žofín that was well attended and much applauded." Prague, ANM, Fond Přemysl Šámal, carton 3, č. inv. 153, "Conversation with Dr. Schieszl," April 15, 1926. On the possibility of Masaryk assuming power, see Miller, *Forging Political Compromise*, 147 and 152–54.

Then, in October 1926, Švehla diluted the Czech and Slovak character of the government when he formed the Gentlemen's Coalition, with parties to the center and right: the Republican Party, Bund der Landwirte, Business and Commerce Party, Czechoslovak People's Party, and German Christian Social Party. The National Democrats and Slovak Populists agreed to enter the government, and in the parliament, they supported the coalition before they joined the cabinet. In January 1927, the Slovak Populists assumed their ministries; in April 1928, the National Democrats took their cabinet post (see Table 11, notes 11–13). The Hungarian National Party and the Hungarian National Christian Socialist Party (Hungarian: Országos Keresztényszocialista Párt) promised their "adherence" to the coalition, which, Gittings claimed, helped Švehla fulfill his desire to have his program "affirmatively accepted by a substantial margin and thus hearten the public."¹⁹¹ The Gentlemen's Coalition included Germans and a purely Slovak party, not just Slovak politicians from statewide parties, and it had one Hungarian party and the backing of another, yet it still was not a Lijphartian grand coalition because it excluded the socialists. In the middle of 1927, the full coalition had a fourteen-vote majority in the National Assembly, a margin larger than either the Tradesmen or the German Christian Socialists, both of which had 13 deputies. The government then came under the moderate Republican František Udržal (1866–1938) because Švehla had become ill, and it lost its majority in October 1929, when the Slovak Populists quit the coalition after a court had convicted one of their members of spying (see Table 11, note 15).

With socialist gains in the November 1929 elections, the coalition shed the German Christian Socialists and expanded, in December, to include three parties to the left—the Social Democrats, National Socialists, and German Social Democrats. The new constellation of parties became known as the Wide Coalition (Czech: Široká koalice). This indisputably multiethnic and multi-ideological Lijphartian grand coalition had a comfortable majority of 56 seats in the National Assembly. The two cabinets of the moderate Republican Jan Malypetr

¹⁹¹ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/256, report of Gittings to DOS, November 4, 1926. The Hungarian National Christian Socialists joined the group of parties in order to increase tariffs for grain, but they did not formally enter the coalition. The Hungarian Nationalists also supported the tariffs, and until September 1927, they were officially a part of the coalition. The Hungarian Nationalist Party was formally the Magyar National Smallholders' and Farmers' Party (Hungarian: Országos Magyar Kisgazda és Földműves Párt) from its founding, in 1920, until 1925, and for a short while in 1925, it was the Magyar National Smallholders', Farmers', and Hungarian Craftsman's Party (Hungarian: Országos Magyar Kisgazda, Földműves és Kisiparos Párt). In 1925, it became the Magyar National Party (Hungarian: Magyar Nemzeti Párt), and in 1936, it merged with the Hungarian National Christian Socialist Party to form the United Hungarian Party (Hungarian: Egyesült Magyar Párt).

(1873–1947) survived a reduction of official members of the coalition, although the parties that had lost their cabinet portfolios continued to back the government in the legislature. At its smallest, the coalition still had a margin of 28 votes. The elections of May 1935 brought an increase of support for the anti-system SdP at the expense of the German activist parties, but until the spring of 1938, one or two members of those parties—the German Christian Socialists, German Social Democrats, or German Agrarians—remained in the government. Throughout the Sudeten German crisis, the coalition maintained a majority of 15 or 16 votes in the National Assembly (see Table 11, notes 18 and 19). Furthermore, from Udržal's second cabinet that formed in December 1929 until the end of the republic, all the political cabinets were Lijphartian grand coalitions.

The Czechoslovak First Republic fulfilled Lijphart's condition of employing consociational grand coalitions. Four out of the six named and unnamed coalitions were broad in that they spanned the entire political spectrum. Furthermore, eight of the 15 political governments were based not only on the broad coalition model but also were oversized cabinets that could have shed at least one party and still have maintained a majority.¹⁹² Before 1926, the coalitions always contained various segments of the Czech population, but in addition, each major party included Czechs, Slovaks, Ukrainians, and Rusyns, and representatives of the first two ethnolinguistic groups always held the ministries. Of the major parties, only the Slovak and Czechoslovak Catholic parties, after their November 1921 split, catered to their specific ethnolinguistic groups, even though the Czechoslovak Populist Party, which was particularly strong in Moravia, never abandoned *Czechoslovak* as part of its name and maintained a presence in Slovakia and Ruthenia. Without the Germans, who made up one-quarter of the population, the broad and oversized coalitions were not fully Lijphartian because a significant social segment was absent. With the activist Germans' entry into the two governments between 1926 and 1929, the coalition still was only partially Lijphartian because it did not include the socialists. Czechoslovakia developed its first of seven true Lijphartian grand coalitions in 1929, when representatives in minority parties joined their counterparts across the political spectrum to form the second Udržal government. These were not only broad coalitions that spanned the political spectrum, but they incorporated all of the ma-

192 The prime ministers who presided over the ten oversized coalition governments were Kramář, Beneš, Švehla (third government), Udržal (first and second government), Malypetr (all three governments), and Hodža (first and third governments). The withdrawal of the German activist parties from Hodža's third government, in the spring of 1938, marked the end of the oversized coalition governments and the end of Lijphartian coalitions.

jor segments. Six of them happened to be oversized. In the end, out of Czechoslovakia's 15 political cabinets, eight were partial Lijphartian grand coalitions because they lacked either Germans or major parties to the left or right on the political spectrum, and seven were full Lijphartian grand coalitions.

The duration of the various forms of consociational coalition governments also suggests that the leadership elite considered them the preferable type of coalition. Throughout the two decades of the republic's existence, fully and partially Lijphartian coalitions governed for 15 years. Partial consociational coalitions accounted for slightly less than half that time, while fully consociational coalitions were in power for a little more than half the time.

Lijphart argued that, in a divided society, consociational grand coalition are more effective than regular coalitions, and this may well have been the case for both the third Švehla government, a partially consociational grand coalition, as well as Udržal's second government, a fully consociational coalition. Švehla's third government restructured the state administration to end the Ministry with Full Power for the Administration of Slovakia and to create provinces for Slovakia and Ruthenia. In a move it hoped would weaken the Communists, who appealed to the young soldiers, the government increased the term of military service and disenfranchised the military; to prevent election intimidation and fraud, it disenfranchised the gendarmerie. It executed a massive restructuring of the tax code. Political scandal rocked the government but did not topple it when the Hrad-Beneš, in particular—leaked false accusations to stunt the career of the minister of agriculture, Hodža, who ultimately cleared his reputation. One could praise Švehla's third cabinet for reaching a *modus vivendi* with the Vatican and signing the Kellogg-Briand Pact, but the credit for these accomplishments must go to Beneš, who held the portfolio of foreign minister as an expert, despite his membership in the National Socialist Party.

For the most part, Švehla's third cabinet appears to have been at least if not more productive than any of its predecessors. The Kramář government, itself a partial Lijphartian coalition, was responsible for setting up the state and enacting the land reform, but its life span was brief. In the Red-Green Coalition, the first Tusar cabinet passed the constitution, but the Social Democratic-Communist split distracted the second Tusar government. The cabinet of experts that followed Tusar undertook very few initiatives; and the Pětka ensured that Beneš accomplished little as prime minister. In his first two terms as prime minister, Švehla also had merely mediocre successes. Švehla's third cabinet may have been even more active if medical complications, resulting from diabetes and heart disease, had not incapacitated Švehla in December 1927. The politi-

cians were unable to replace Švehla until February 1929, partly because of the expectation that he would return to active political life and because of the parties' inability to agree on a successor. The first government of Švehla's successor, Udržal, lasted just shy of eight months, wrestled with political infighting among the Republicans, and dealt with parliamentary elections.¹⁹³

Udržal's second government, beginning in December 1929, ushered in a string of Lijphartian grand coalitions that continued until the end of the republic. Although this broad and oversized coalition, which included the minorities, still had to contend with leadership struggles in the Republican Party, it attempted to combat the Great Depression in a number of ways. Among its major accomplishments were the negotiation of a loan from French banks, an increase in agricultural tariffs, the extension of unemployment compensation from 13 to 26 weeks, the enlargement of the electrical grid, an expansion of minor public-works projects, and the implementation of a bank bailout. In 1930, in an overwhelming display of gratitude toward President Masaryk on his eightieth birthday, the government and the National Assembly passed Law 22 of February 26, 1930, the first sentence of which is "T. G. Masaryk contributed to the state," and subsequently Law 23 of February 26, 1930 that established a fund Masaryk could use, as he saw fit, for charitable purposes.¹⁹⁴ Throughout the tenure of Udržal's second government, which ended in October 1932, the Republican conservatives sought to expand their influence in the party and the government, and they succeeded, in part, through the removal of Udržal, who they felt was too close to the Hrad.

The consociational grand coalitions that succeeded Udržal's second government continued to implement measures to mitigate the effects of the depression. The growing state deficit resulted from additional initiatives of the succeeding cabinets, such as road building, railroad modernization, airport construction, river regulation, and electrification. The cabinets of the 1930s also were responsible for instituting measures to support industry and agriculture, such

193 Although the October 1929 election, which took place three days after the Wall Street Crash that began the Great Depression, was the main reason for the collapse of the Gentlemen's Coalition and the construction of Udržal's second government, which took office in December 1929, difficulties in the Gentlemen's Coalition were mounting. Already in September 1929, Tomáš Masaryk hoped to see its demise. Klimek, *Boj o Hrad*, vol. 2, 215.

194 *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení (Sb. z. a n.)*, no. 22, Law of February 26, 1930, and no. 23, Law of February 26, 1930. The exact phrase in §1 of the law is "T. G. Masaryk zasloužil se o stát." The best translation into English is as "T. G. Masaryk helped establish and keep the state." A consideration of this law appears in Jan Kuklík, *Příběh československé ústavy, 1920*, vol. 2: *Ústava a její proměny v meziválečném období* (Prague: Univerzita Karlova, Nakladatelství Karolinum, 2022), 315–23.

as the creation of the Grain Monopoly, as well as assisting citizens directly during the economic crisis. Then, in the middle of the 1930s, the Sudeten German question multiplied the woes of the leading politicians. Despite the economic difficulties throughout the 1930s, and the added burden of the state's existential crisis in the latter half of the decade, the case of Czechoslovakia provides some evidence to support Lijphart's contention about the effectiveness of consociational grand coalitions.

Einstein witnessed the parade of six governments during his nine years in Prague and at times found the political machinations of the party leaders baffling. He maintained that "personal jealousies and the absence of real party programs" accentuated divisions, and he lamented that the government ministers had "the most contradictory opinions," as did the various nationalities. "Such fractions of power," Einstein wrote, "tend to make more difficult the constructive work of the government and frequent complaints about the obstructive tactics of the politicians are heard from the Cabinet officials."¹⁹⁵ To Einstein, the country's democracy still was maturing, and its difficulties stemmed from "the peculiar circumstances in this country which remains imperfectly formed"; nevertheless, he paraphrased the comment of a cabinet minister, during the formation of Švehla's first government, that "the one thing the governing parties have agreed upon is to remain together."¹⁹⁶ Their cooperation, in his view, was not because of economics but ethnicity, which, according to him, had motivated politics in old Austria. He saw the sense of ethnicity as so strong—the fear of Germans and to some extent Hungarians as so intense—that it even wedded Czech and Slovak clericals with socialists.¹⁹⁷ To the glue of ethnic loyalties Einstein added the bonding agent of Švehla's negotiating skills, which were evident to him when, in October 1926, Švehla brought Germans and later the Slovak Populists into the government. "Although the majority [of the cabinet] inclines to ... the Bourgeois, Clerical and reactionary Right," Einstein noted, "no extreme measures need be expected from Mr. Švehla, who has always shown himself a sufficiently adroit taciturn, to conciliate the more moderate socialists.

¹⁹⁵ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/196, report of Einstein to DOS, March 2, 1922.

¹⁹⁶ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/201, report of Einstein to DOS, September 19, 1922. Einstein only identified the individual in question as a Czechoslovak Populist, but apparently, it was Šrámek. In 1925, when negotiations were taking place for a government, an article in the Republican newspaper, *Venkov*, claimed that what Šrámek once had said, presumably in 1922, applied at the time: "dohodli jsme se, že se dohodneme," that is, "we have agreed that we shall agree." "Pro vládu dorozumění," *Venkov*, December 2, 1925. Many mistakenly attribute this famous line to Švehla.

¹⁹⁷ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/204, report of Einstein to DOS, December 11, 1922.

He is well able to protect the security of his own position by seeking the assistance of other groups, and he has shown in the past that he is just as willing to turn to the Left as to the Right.”¹⁹⁸

Švehla aided interparty and interethnic cooperation, and Ježek observed that “Švehla’s ideal coalition was one with the greatest number of parties possible, with the Agrarians as leaders.”¹⁹⁹ It quickly became apparent that multi-party cooperation had become ingrained in the Czechoslovak political tradition, partly because of Švehla’s constant reliance on it when constructing cabinets whether or not he was to lead the government. Eight months after Švehla’s departure as prime minister, due to his lengthy illness, and two days after the October 1929 elections that led to the construction of the Wide Coalition, under Udržal, Einstein again praised the spirit of interparty cooperation:

The Elections indicate the growing consolidation of this State. In spite of fierce partisan rancor which prevails here, the members of the different parties in the past have shown an ability to work together and this tendency is even more noticeable to-day when the German Socialists have indicated their willingness to follow the example of the other two German parties (Christian Socialist and Agrarian) who had already become “Activist” by their participation in the Government. On the other hand the parties hostile to the State like the Communists, the Slovak Autonomists and the German Nationalists have lost considerably in numbers and in influence.²⁰⁰

It pleased Einstein that the German and Hungarian politicians were eager to help build a coalition and were concerned less about policies than obtaining cabinet seats.²⁰¹ In describing Udržal’s new coalition, with its legislative majority of 56 seats, Einstein concluded that “the present government in spite of its impressive majority contains very different elements and the great question as

¹⁹⁸ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/264, report of Einstein to DOS, January 24, 1927.

¹⁹⁹ Ježek, *Mnichovská krize*, 115.

²⁰⁰ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/301, report of Einstein to DOS, October 29, 1929. Einstein and the various chargés d’affaires included information about the Communist Party in several of their reports, especially noting its ties with Moscow and its strength. Einstein provided little information on the native fascist movement, which he dismissed as unlikely to gain many adherents. See Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00B/1 to 86of.00B/40, reports from 1920 through 1929. The first report by Einstein on the communists is 86of.00B/5 of June 16, 1922. On the 1926 fascist coup rumors, see Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00F/–, report of Einstein to DOS, May 28, 1926.

²⁰¹ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/303, reports of Einstein to DOS, November 13, 1929 (anxiousness to build a coalition), and December 24, 1929 (distribution of cabinet seats).

to whether the working class should enjoy cheap food, or the farmers receive protection is still a burning one.... [The] antagonism within the Coalition government tends toward compromises mainly over questions of a less controversial nature.”²⁰² To overcome the deep segmentation that could have threatened the state, the politicians—German and Slavic—opted for cooperation and further strengthened consociationalism. More divisive issues waited for the politicians to develop solutions through behind-the-scenes negotiations within each party and among the leaders of the various parties. Not everyone saw the new Udržal government in a positive light. Hlinka, the leader of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, criticized the government because it contained only two Slovaks, both of whom were Protestants, not Catholics.²⁰³ His disapproval stemmed from his party's failure to secure its demands and enter the government, but it also reflected his appeal to the Slovak-Catholic pillar.

A cabinet that is not only larger than a minimum winning coalition but also includes as many segments in the country as possible is only one type of consociational grand coalition. The same thing can be accomplished through informal arrangements among the political elite. Lijphart lists several possibilities: ad hoc grand councils or committees; the inclusion of parties in cabinets, based on certain ratios relative to the importance of the segments they represent, not merely the number of deputies they can muster; granting positions to representatives of various segments in political or administrative posts outside of the government; and the distribution of representation within a particular party, as in the case of the Congress Party of India.²⁰⁴

Czechoslovakia devised the most refined ad hoc organization of politicians among European democracies between the world wars in the institution of the Pětka.²⁰⁵ Its purpose was to guide the 1920–1921 government of experts, un-

²⁰² Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/310, report of Einstein to DOS, December 24, 1929.

²⁰³ Karol Sidor, *Slovenská politika na póde pražského snemu 1918–1938*, vol. 2 (Bratislava: Nákladom kníhtlačiarne “Andreja,” 1943), 23, as cited in Harna, *Krize evropské demokracie a Československo*, 106.

²⁰⁴ Lijphart, “The Puzzle of Indian Democracy,” 45.

²⁰⁵ Historians often treat the Pětka and its successors as synonymous with the leading politicians, making them little more than oligarchic institutions. This is the case with Klimek in *Bojo Hrad*. Others refer to the Pětka generically and ignore its successors, like Orzoff, in *Battle for the Castle*, 63–66, and Connelly, *From Peoples into Nations*, 380 and 411. Generally, historians analyze these ad hoc committees only when considering the contemporary criticisms of their undemocratic nature. References to the ad hoc committees appear in Klimek's work as well as in Miller, *Forging Political Compromise*, 74–79, 81–82, 113, 119, 121–24, 137–38, 141, 144–46, 148–60, 165–66, 191, 195–96, 197–98. In “The Failed Belginization of Post-Communist Czechoslovakia: Impacting Factors and Political Consequence,” *CEU Political Science Journal* 3 (2008): 14, Stefano Braghieri surmised that the Pětka “succeeded in moderating ethnolinguistic conflicts as it controlled the access to governing power, thereby conditioning political cooptation of junior

der Jan Černý, but it did not disband, continuing throughout the Beneš government and Švehla's first two governments (see Table 12).²⁰⁶ Aiding in the emergence of the Pětka was the absence of an organized and effective opposition to the leading parties; the Slovak Populists still were cooperating with the Czechoslovak People's Party, the antisystem Communist Party was isolated on the far left, and the German parties were fractured.²⁰⁷ The Pětka, which brought together the five leaders of the most influential parties in the state, was not proportional, other than the fact that its member parties had been the most successful in the recent elections, but it operated with the principle of mutual veto. All policy decisions that had a political character, even those affecting individual ministries, required the approval of the Pětka.²⁰⁸

Once the party heads reached a decision, they succeeded in passing their measures through the legislature because of strict party discipline, the basis for which included not only precedent but such practices as the party leaders keeping signed but undated letters of resignation for their deputies in the National Assembly.²⁰⁹ Furthermore, mandates were in the possession of the parties, and the Electoral Court removed National Assembly members who switched party affiliations.²¹⁰ Karel Baxa (1863–1938), a National Socialist, mayor of Prague

partners to the acceptance of the new polity and its constitutional basis." The Pětka hardly operated as a political gatekeeper, let alone serve as a mechanism to stifle ethnic tensions. The eventual expansion of the Pětka into the Šestka and Osmička as well as its formal reconstitution as the Political Committees (Czech singular: politický komitét) of the cabinets demonstrate that the Pětka and its successors reflected the strength of the political parties in the National Assembly and the coalitions that the leading political parties, including the German parties, established.

²⁰⁶ In "Caretaker Governments" (pp. 1328–1329), Hloušek and Kopeček acknowledge the influence of the Pětka on the creation of the Černý government, but they credit President Masaryk, whose role in determining the government certainly was significant, with too much influence in the matter. They fail to note that Černý was close to the Republican Party, just as other ministers in his government had the support of specific Pětka members. As usual, Beneš was the Hrad's main contact in the government.

²⁰⁷ Nearly five years after the Pětka's creation, Ferdinand Peroutka, in "Proč vznikla Pětka," *Prítomnost* 2 (April 23, 1925): 224–26, attributed the lack of an opposition to the parties that formed the Pětka as an explanation for the grouping's existence. Additional reasons Peroutka cited for the Pětka's creation and continued existence were the weaknesses of the National Assembly, particularly the Chamber of Deputies, and the undisputable strength of the five party leaders of the Pětka.

²⁰⁸ An example of the necessity of having the Pětka approve anything that appeared political is the request by Hodža, then minister of agriculture, to have the Pětka review changes to a draft law on agricultural chambers. Prague, Archiv Národního muzea (ANM), Fond Karla Kramáře, carton 9/3, folio ANM23, document 3274, Hodža to Švehla, January 12, 1925.

²⁰⁹ In a conversation with Mečtř, Švehla commented on keeping on file signed, undated letters of resignations. Mečtř, *Rozmluvy s Antonínem Švehlou a o Švehlovi*, 149.

²¹⁰ Law 125 of May 29, 1920, §13b, amended through Law 144 of June 18, 1924 and Law 145 of 30 May 1924 (the numbering of laws and the dates are not always sequential). Several parliamentarians lost their seats because they had attempted to switch parties, including some noteworthy cases. In 1924, Vladimír Drobný (born 1887) lost his seat as a Social Democrat and later

(1919–1937), and president of the Constitutional Court (1921–1938), once wrote that “the discipline of the coalition stems from the party discipline of the coalition [members].”²¹¹ In the National Assembly, a likeness of the Pětka—ten members in the Chamber of Deputies and ten in the Senate, all from the parties of the Pětka—ensured the passage of legislation the five party leaders had prepared.²¹²

Lijphart was correct in concluding that the Pětka was not the best example of a grand coalition because it excluded ethnic minorities, although all of the parties, aside from perhaps the Czechoslovak Populists, represented both Slovaks and Czechs. Nevertheless, over the years, the Pětka expanded, and it became more inclusive. In 1925, when the All-National Coalition added the Business and Commerce Party, the Pětka became the Šestka, or Committee of Six, and the corresponding legislative grouping doubled its members to become the Dvanáctka, the Committee of Twelve. The Gentlemen’s Coalition had its Osmička, or Committee of Eight, named for the eight party leaders of the coalition, and its Šestnáctka, or Committee of Sixteen, in the National Assembly.²¹³

joined the Business and Commerce Party, but he never reentered the National Assembly. After his expulsion as a National Socialist in 1923 Bohuslav Vrbenský (1882–1944) started an anarchist party and ended as a Communist. He never again became a parliamentarian. Alois Kaderka (1889–1975) lost his seat in 1924 as a deputy for the Czechoslovak People’s Party, and his new party failed to win a mandate in the 1925 election. In 1925, two Republicans, Karel Prášek (1868–1932) and Jaroslav Rychtera (1874–1948), forfeited their mandates (an economic conflict of interest complicated Prášek’s case). They formed the Czechoslovak Agrarian and Conservative Party (Československá strana agrární a konzervativní), which gained no seats in the 1925 election and dissolved. From these cases, parliamentarians understood that losing one’s mandate meant becoming a political outcast and sinking into political oblivion.

²¹¹ Baxa further explained that “the governing coalition relies on political parties not only in government and parliament, but also in public life: while the coalition struggles for its existence and carries out its program in parliament, the coalition parties create a strong sounding board outside of parliament and provide a foothold within the electorate.” Karel Baxa, “Parlamentarism a politické stranictví,” *Naše doba* 31 (April 15, 1924): 394.

²¹² This body was distinct from the Permanent Committee (Stálý výbor) in the Chamber of Deputies, which had 16 members, and in the Senate, with eight members, that the constitution mandated to deal with emergencies if the National Assembly was not in session. *Sb. z. a n.*, no. 121, Law of February 29, 1920, chapter 2, §54. The Desítka (the Ten) in the Senate apparently evolved because the senators envied the power the party leaders had amassed in the Pětka. It may have originated in the Chamber of Deputies for a similar reason. Prague, ANM, Fond Přemysl Šámal, carton 3, č. inv. (číslo inventáře or inventory no.) 153, report of November 10, 1922. The report is based on the comments of Senator Bohuslav Franta (1861–1929), who was a member of the National Democratic Party. It is stamped “Kancelář prezidenta republiky,” and Šámal often retained copies of reports he created.

²¹³ The parties that formed the Gentlemen’s Coalition and whose leaders were in the Osmička were the Republican Party, German Agrarian Party, Magyar Nationalist Party, Business and Commerce Party, Czechoslovak Populist Party, Hlinka Slovak People’s Party, German Christian Social Party, and National Democratic Party. The Magyar National Party never received a cabinet post, and it left the coalition in 1927. The Hlinka Slovak People’s Party left the coalition in 1929. Despite the loss of two parties, the Osmička retained its name. For the extraconstitutional and extraparlimentary committees, see Table 12.

All of these were only partial Lijphartian grand coalitions. Parties across the political spectrum participated in them, but the Pětka and the Šestka did not include the Slovak Populists, although Slovaks were prominent members of both the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party and the Republican Party, nor did they involve the German parties. The Osmička included the Germans and the Slovak in the government, but it had only parties on the center and right of the political spectrum and not the socialists.²¹⁴

A detailed treatment of Czechoslovakia's ad hoc committees of political leaders is difficult, in part because no records of their meetings existed, even in an unofficial form; however, culling through the archives affords the historian occasional bits of evidence that help piece together the way in which the Pětka and its successors functioned.²¹⁵ One such document, from the papers of Rašín, describes the structure of an executive committee that the leading members of all five parties were to create in 1922, when the first Švehla cabinet came into existence. Its purpose, as explained in the portion titled "Working Program and Directive of the Partnership," was to support the Beneš government, with a few additional goals. To ensure unity and to guarantee the loyalty of all the parties' legislators, the leaders agreed to specific organizational provisions. The combined executive committee was to have 25 members: ten from the Chamber of Deputies (two from each party), five from the Senate (one from each party), five from the executive committees of each party, and five from the government—presumably the five party leaders. The head of the combined executive committee was to be the prime minister. All issues were to receive the attention of the executive committee, which could form subcommittees to tackle specific problems, and nothing was to come before the parliament without the executive committee's approval. The members of the executive committee from the

²¹⁴ Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, 33, note 15.

²¹⁵ Minutes do not exist for the gatherings of the extraparlimentary and extraconstitutional committees. There are cabinet minutes, but they only record the topics of discussion and the decisions of the cabinet without revealing specifics about the voting. There appears to be no explanation for this practice, but most likely, it facilitated negotiations by preventing the exposure of any individual or party position. Knowing that cabinet deliberations were secret allowed government members to deviate from the publicized stance of their parties in order to make and gain concessions. In March 1938, when Ježek joined the cabinet as a minister without portfolio to represent National Unification, he took notes. His colleagues protested, although Hodža allowed him to continue. Šrámek happened to notice that Ježek used Greek letters and abbreviations, in an effort to speed his note taking and to ensure the privacy of his written records. When he had tennis elbow in his right arm, he used his left hand to write. That prompted Emil Franke (1880–1939), a National Socialist and the first to have complained about Ježek's minutes, to say, "so, I was happy because you would stop taking those notes, but for now, you even are writing them left-handed." Ježek, *Mnichovská krize*, 9–10 (quotation on p. 10).

Chamber of Deputies and the Senate were to rotate the leadership of their respective groups each month, based on an alphabetical list of names. This select group of parliamentarians was to make certain that their respective parties in the legislature carried out the decisions of the combined executive committee. Another task of the combined executive committee was to arrange for the party presses to support the government, limit discord, prevent personal attacks, and exclude polemics. All proceedings of the executive committee were to be secret, although there were to be minutes (none from this type of organization seem to have survived). To cover the expenses of the executive committee, each party was to pay 100 Kč monthly. A party wishing to withdraw from the cabinet and the executive committee was bound to submit its complaints to the executive committee, which was to hold a meeting, three days later, that all parties were obliged to attend. In the event that a majority of the executive committee members of the disaffected party still was dissatisfied, it could withdraw.²¹⁶ The fact that the agreement is unsigned and that no other copy has surfaced cannot rule out the possibility that the document was merely a proposal; nevertheless, it reflects much of what historians know about the operation of the Pětka, including the existence of what politicians at the time referred to as the Pětka in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate. The document also supports the notion that the true center of power was the five party leaders.

Another bit of information about how the Pětka functioned comes directly from Švehla's conversations with his friend and fellow Republican Mečtř. By Švehla's own admission, he spoke to the Pětka members separately, starting with the leader whose party may be the most likely to have difficulties with a policy. After securing an agreement through individual conversations, Švehla then brought everyone together. Each thought they had the advantage of possessing information the others did not know. Švehla added, however, that this process "often lasted many hours and late into the night." Švehla could not reveal, at the general meeting, that he had talked to someone separately, but if one member attempted to change the plan Švehla had worked out with him, the others pressured him to withdraw the suggestion.²¹⁷ Most likely, Švehla recounted his ideal negotiating tactic—one could imagine that the party leaders may have talked to each other before they met as a group or that they may have realized Švehla's scheme. Still, Švehla's admission is revealing. The conversations

²¹⁶ Prague, ANM, Fond Alois Rašín, carton 15, document 868, "Úmluva mezi stranami, tvořícími koncentraci v Národním shromáždění Československém," 1922.

²¹⁷ Mečtř, *Rozmluvy s Antonínem Švehlou a o Švehlovi*, 121–22 (quotation on p. 122).

gave each party an opportunity to add their own provisions to a draft policy or legislative proposal during the private negotiations. Theoretically, the parties also may have indicated to Švehla their inabilities to accept certain stipulations, enabling the Pětka to be a vehicle for exercising the power of the mutual veto. These aspects of the Pětka reinforced the importance of the individual parties rather than diminishing them.

Two of Einstein's *chargés d'affaires ad interim* considered the significance of the ad hoc committee of political leaders in 1929, after Udržal had replaced Švehla at the head of the Gentlemen's Coalition. Hall, in a report to Washington, described the Osmička as a "small cabinet" whose task "was to prepare the decisions which were afterward accepted by the entire Cabinet, and were presented by the Cabinet to the Parliament. All questions of importance were first taken up and agreed upon by this committee of eight. The work of the Cabinet became therefore more or less routine."²¹⁸ Nine months later, Gittings explained that "it lies within these eight men to iron out such differences and conflicting points of view as may arise, and to determine jointly, the exact nature and extent of any proposed bill, in order that a united majority vote may be secured."²¹⁹

The constitution made no provision for the Pětka or its successors as governmental bodies, nor did the legislature or cabinet officially create them as committees. As a result, they were at once extraconstitutional and extraparlimentary, which some politicians considered extra-democratic. The critics of these ad hoc bodies sought to paint them as antidemocratic and oligarchical, but in reality, they merely brought a degree of formality to the ordinary sort of informal negotiation of party leaders in a coalition. During the crisis of the Social Democratic-Communist split, the Pětka had wide respect, but afterward, it developed three influential enemies. The first was the Hrad, specifically Masaryk and Beneš, who had no direct voice in the body in its early years, even though the members of the Pětka and its successors were close to Masaryk.²²⁰ The socialist politicians formed the second group, but their involvement in the Pětka and Šestka muffled their criticism, which began to strengthen in the autumn of 1926 with their exclusion from the Osmička. Certain journalists and even non-socialist politicians formed a third source of criticism against the Pětka.²²¹ The

²¹⁸ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.002/61, report of Barton Hall, *chargé d'affaires ad interim*, to DOS, March 31, 1929.

²¹⁹ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.0312/–, report of Gittings to DOS, December 4, 1929.

²²⁰ Beneš had been in the government as an expert, but in early 1923, he joined the National Socialist Party and became its vice chairman, which enabled him to influence the party's policies.

²²¹ Horáček, for example, wrote that the Pětka, "which the constitution did not recognize, was a type of de facto secondary government and even was above the government." He later wrote

detractors' arguments that the Pětka had a dictatorial hold over the parties, the National Assembly, and ultimately the entire political system seemed compelling and even found their way into many historians' interpretations of the institution.²²²

Those who supported the Pětka did not articulate very well their defense of the institution.²²³ After the December 1929 elections and the entry of the socialists into the government, Udržal, who remained as prime minister, did away with the Osmička, ending the nine-year tradition of extraparlimentary-extraconstitutional committees in the cabinet and legislature. This likely was a concession to Masaryk and others around him in the Hrad. Another reason for the Osmička's demise was that such an ad hoc committee seemed to be superfluous when the government contained 16 members and had eight political parties. In the end, there was a persistent need for the party leaders to have a mechanism to coordinate their efforts—a means to sustain their tradition of political compromise. In Udržal's second cabinet, they met formally, as cabinet members, and constituted themselves as the Committee of Ministers for Questions about Political Matters, commonly known as the Political Committee (Czech singular: politický komitét). Initially, it included the prime minister and the ministries of agriculture, supplies, post and telegraph, unification of laws, commerce, health, railroads, and social care.²²⁴ In partisan terms, it

that, in 1922, "two governments, the official [cabinet of Beneš] and the secondary government of the Pětka, was impossible," which was why Beneš resigned and Švehla became prime minister. For Horáček, the Pětka was an example of "parliamentary absolutism under the cloak of formal democracy." Horáček, *Vzpomínky*, 254 (first quotation), 260 (second quotation), and 233 (third quotation).

²²² Bryant, in *Prague*, thought that Masaryk and the parties had a "stranglehold" on politics, despite the freedom of political expression (141). Orzoff, in *Battle for the Castle*, referred to the Pětka as "a dictatorship of the parties" (61). The Pětka and its successors did not stifle actual parliamentary debate, as Orzoff maintained, but along with strict party discipline, they limited the freedom of parliamentarians to vote against their parties' positions. Likewise, Orzoff's characterization of the Hrad as the only opposition to the Pětka is overdrawn. The two frequently disagreed, especially after the creation of the Gentlemen's Coalition, when the socialists were out of the government, but one must not ignore their extensive cooperation. Furthermore, the parties outside of the Pětka and Šestka were vocal opponents of the ruling parties. During the Osmička, the major socialist parties added their voices to the opposition.

²²³ Two brief sources that explained the general workings of the Pětka and its usefulness are Rudolf Bechyně, "Nebezpečí tří set," as quoted in Peroutka, *Budování státu: Československá politika v letech popřevratových*, vol. 4 (Prague: Fr. Borový, 1936), 2165–2166, and the comments of Alfred Meissner in Peroutka, *Budování státu*, vol. 4: 2163.

²²⁴ The minister of social care in Udržal's second cabinet was Ludwig Czech (1870–1942), the head of the German Social Democratic Party and a German-speaking Jew. As minister of social care, from 1929 until 1934, a time that corresponded to the worst years of the Great Depression, Czech was crucial for the government's efforts to deal with the economic downturn. Czech subsequently was the minister of public affairs (1934–1935) and the minister of public health and physical training (1935–1938). He died of pneumonia and heart failure while interned in the Terezín (Theresienstadt) Ghetto.

included two from the Republican Party and one each from the Social Democratic, National Socialist, Czechoslovak Populist, German Social Democratic, National Democratic, Bund der Landwirte, as well as the Business and Commerce Parties. The Political Committee continued to meet until the end of the republic, and its composition varied.²²⁵ Like the Pětka, Šestka, and Osmička, it was the most important decision-making mechanism for the government.²²⁶ One of the big differences between the Political Committees and their predecessors, the Pětka, Šestka, and Osmička, is that the Political Committees left a limited record of its discussions among the archival records of the cabinet meetings. The significance of all the unofficial or official committees is that they not only were prime examples of consociational cooperation but that they also were excellent illustrations of how elite cartels use less than democratic means to secure democracy. As such, they were far more important than merely a mechanism for combating the Communists and nationalist Germans as some maintain.²²⁷

A major criticism of the Pětka and its successors was that they stifled the parliament, and Bugge reviewed some of the arguments historians have presented, along these lines, in an examination of the flaws of Czechoslovak inter-

²²⁵ The first mention of the Committee of Ministers for Questions about Political Matters appeared in 1930 (Prague, NA, PMR, carton 205, sig. 414, č. j. 922, February 8, 1930). On the variations of the committee, see Prague, NA, PMR, carton 205, sig. 414, Politický komitét, č. j. 1047, February 23, 1934; and č. j. 4399, June 6, 1935. All files of the committee are in Prague, NA, PMR, cartons 205–207. Other types of interministerial committees existed throughout the life of the republic, but their composition reflected expertise, competency, and policy needs, rather than segmental proportionality. Kolektiv pracovníků SÚA, comp., *Katalog a rejstříky k protokolům schůzí 11. československé vlády (2. Udržalovy)*, Inventáře a katalogy fondů Státního ústředního archivu (Prague: Státní ústřední archiv, 2002), “6. schůze konaná dne 8. února 1930,” 24.

²²⁶ Václav Čada, “Politika republikánské strany na počátku velké hospodářské krize,” *Československý časopis historický* 22, no. 3 (1974): 336. Toward the end of the First Republic, the Osmička returned, but in a different context. The seven parties of the Political Committee in the last months of the Hodža government referred to themselves as the Sedmička (the Committee of Seven), but when they met with President Beneš, which usually took place in the morning, he became the eighth member, and the group referred to itself as the Osmička. Ježek noted that, during the time he was a cabinet minister in 1938, the most important individuals at these meetings were President Beneš, Hodža, as the prime minister from the Republican Party, and Bechyň, as the leader of the Social Democratic Party, whose party cooperated closely with the National Socialist Party. The Republican Party and the two socialist parties represented the bulk of the support for the coalition in the National Assembly. Like the Pětka and its predecessors, the Political Committee was an exclusive club of party leaders. The other cabinet members only attended the Political Committee meetings by invitation, and they frequently had to wait for lengthy periods—up to two hours—before they made their presentations. Ježek also pointed out the continuity of the Pětka, Šestka, Osmička, and the Political Committees. Ježek, *Mnichovská krize*, 98–100 (the association of the Political Committees with the earlier extraparlimentary and extraconstitutional committees is on p. 98).

²²⁷ Bugge, “Democracy and Parliament in Czech Politics,” 166.

war democracy.²²⁸ Consociationalism presents the situation in a different light. Given the deep cleavages within the Czechoslovak polity, the extraparliamentary-extraconstitutional committees as well as strict party discipline prevented politics in the National Assembly from becoming so fractured and elite cooperation so damaged that the democratic system might have teetered. Although in many ways restrictive, the ad hoc committees and strong party discipline enabled the party elites to achieve compromises despite the odds. Conventional wisdom regarding the hamstrung National Assembly, based in part on the polemics of certain political quarters and opposition parties in the 1920s and 1930s, may have distorted reality, at least to some extent. The evidence suggests that the leverage the National Assembly had on Czechoslovak politics was far more nuanced than it appears. The Pětka and its successors did not stifle completely all debate in the legislature, as was apparent on several occasions. The 1927 deliberations in the Budget Committee provided one example, and it was no exception. The parliamentary committees, all of which divided their seats in accordance with consociational proportionality, were important venues for discourse. Historians have not examined the workings of these committees, but if the Land Reform Committee in the National Assembly is any indicator, their deliberations influenced the party leaders, and objections in the committee occasionally forced changes in the policy of the State Land Office.²²⁹ Important debates also occurred in the Chamber of Deputies. In 1924, the government attempted to regulate the milling of flour by requiring certain blends of grains as a means of limiting imported flour, including bleached flour from the United States. Many people feared a return of low-quality “war flour,” and opposition among the deputies began to grow. The National Socialists were among those who decried the bill, despite the fact that their party was in the government and the Pětka. To avoid a defeat, which would have embarrassed not just the cabinet but also the Pětka, the government withdrew the bill.²³⁰ What never comes to a vote in a legislature often is as significant as the measures that pass or fail.

²²⁸ Peter Bugge, “Czech Democracy, 1918–1938: Paragon or Parody?” *Bohemia: Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur der böhmischen Länder/A Journal of History and Civilisation in East Central Europe* 47, no. 1 (2006–2007): esp. 13–17.

²²⁹ Miller discusses some of the work of the Land Reform Committee (initially the Colonization Committee) in “Colonizing the Hungarian and German Border Areas during the Czechoslovak Land Reform, 1918–1938,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 24 (2003): 303–317. His current research on the colonization of the great estates, during the land reform, involves minutes of the Land Reform Committee in the 1920s and 1930s found in Prague, Národní archiv, Státní pozemkový úřad.

²³⁰ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 66of.116/6, report of C. S. Winans to DOS, 19 September 1924. For the debate in the Chamber of Deputies, see *Těsnopisecké zprávy o schůzích Poslanecké sněmovny*

Other factors help paint a more accurate picture of the ad hoc committees. Most historians assume that the party leaders not only reached agreements but did so without contention. In reality, the leaders of the parties defended the interests of their constituents, sometimes testing their resolve to cooperate. Such was the case in 1921, during the first Černý government, when Rašín vehemently objected to the fiscal policies of Finance Minister Engliš, who ultimately resigned.²³¹ Furthermore, few observers consider the longevity of the ad hoc committees, which lasted between 1920 and 1929, just shy of a decade, and then continued, in another form, as the Political Committees in the cabinets. After the first Švehla government, the committees appeared to have diminished in importance, suggesting that the leaders found them less useful as the political turmoil of the 1920s abated. Contributing to their decline was the increase in the number of parties in the governing coalitions so that the total of party leaders in an ad hoc committee would have approached the number of cabinet ministers. Finally, in 1929, the end of the ad hoc committees coincided with the return of the socialists to the cabinet. During their nearly four years in opposition, the socialists increasingly intensified their criticism of the ad hoc committees as undemocratic, and public scrutiny could not permit the socialists to sanction the existence of the committees once they had entered the cabinet. The socialists had no objection to the Political Committees serving as formal replacements for the ad hoc committees.

In May 1934, with National Socialism securely in power in Germany and months after Engelbert Dollfuß (1892–1934) solidified his dictatorship in Austria after a brief civil war, Peroutka considered the achievement of Czechoslovak democracy:

We must be grateful to our politicians who have established this [democratic] tradition; we must also be very grateful, in this respect, for institutions, such as the Pětka and the bound candidate lists, which we do not like in other respects. We can say, with some pride, that our democracy can be governed like any other in the world, which means, in other words, that it belongs to the circle of advanced democracies. Dictatorships come when democratic parties are unable to agree with each other. Our country has elimi-

Národního shromáždění republiky Československé (Prague: Státní tiskárna, 1924), first electoral period (1920–1924), session (schůze) 281–82, September 4, 1924. The proposed law is *Tisky Poslanecké sněmovny Národního shromáždění republiky Československé*, (Prague: Státní tiskárna, 1924), first electoral period (1920–1924), 4817, “Vládní návrh o vymílání pšenice a žita.”

²³¹ Miller, *Forging Political Compromise*, 75–76.

nated this danger, perhaps too thoroughly for the taste of radicals. For the first few years, it was necessary to teach our radicals that compromise in politics is not something like a plague but that it is a fundamental principle of a democratic system. Political leaders who took responsibility for the compromises had to endure countless smiles and expressions of contempt. If we see the result—maintaining democracy is the result of this ability of the political parties to agree—we are grateful to them for their perseverance and for patiently enduring the lectures of those who should be their disciples. For a long time, a lot of politically immature people were eagerly instructing many of those who were politically mature. Today, the coalition's willingness to agree is such a strong tradition in our politics that it can account for our uniqueness. Perhaps no other country masters the art of forming and maintaining coalitions like ours. Our socialists are much better trained in the need for the virtues of coalitions than the socialists of any other country: they are, therefore, also in less danger.²³²

Minority Veto

Another defining feature of consociational democracy is a mutual or minority veto. Czechoslovakia had no minority veto as a constitutional provision or legislative measure, but the mechanism existed informally, which frequently is the case for consociational democracies. For example, Spina's intervention with the Hrad managed to prevent colonization, that is, the creation of new villages as part of the land reform, in his electoral district. Furthermore, he also secured a slight increase for his district in the allocation of land available for distribution.²³³ An informal minority veto also existed in the Pětka and its successors and as a component of elite cooperation. In many cases, even before measures came before the cabinet or appeared on the floor of the National Assembly, the party leaders determined their merit and their chance for support. Frequently, the objection of one party in the Pětka meant the death of a proposal. It was precisely this type of informal minority veto that the National Democrats used in the 1920s to halt the implementation of the county system throughout the republic and to secure Engliš's resignation. The National Socialists used it in 1924 to block the legislation on flour.

²³² F. Peroutka, "Bulletin demokracie," *Přítomnost* 11 (May 23, 1934): 322.

²³³ Prague, AKPR, Fond Kancelář prezidenta republiky, signature D 8078/32, carton 63, document D 777/2, Franz Spina to Tomáš G. Masaryk, February 6, 1926, notations of 2 and 20 February 1926, and letter to Spina of February 26, 1926.

In 1929, Einstein recounted evidence of another informal mutual veto, again involving the National Democrats, over the issue of Czechoslovakia's diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union. For several years, Beneš and the Social Democrats had sought normal relations with the Soviet Union, but Kramář, a Russophile who had married a Russian and had converted to Orthodoxy, along with his conservative National Democrats, who looked after the interests of the significant White Russian émigré community in Czechoslovakia, opposed legitimizing the Bolshevik regime. The National Democrats also knew that having regular diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union long had been a goal of Beneš, whom they disliked. Others also were suspicious of the Soviet Union, including many Republican and Slovak politicians. After the October 1929 elections, Udržal endeavored to expand his government to include the socialists, who supported recognizing the Soviets. Beneš told Einstein, on November 5, 1929, that the Social Democrats had made their entry into the cabinet contingent upon recognizing the Soviet Union. Einstein reported:

I asked [Beneš] if the National Democrats would agree to this and he said many would not and would in such event refuse to join the government, a result which would not prove displeasing to Dr. Beneš. The reasons for this desire to secure the recognition of the Soviet may not be altogether foreign to the wish to affect the withdrawal of his leading adversaries from the Cabinet. On the other hand the Social Democrats may not insist on this condition if it is rejected, as their desire to participate in the Government perhaps excludes even their wish to recognize the Soviet.²³⁴

The reward for the National Democrats' intransigence was partnering with the Social Democrats and other parties without having to normalize relations with the Soviet Union. That would have to wait until June 1934, a time when Beneš also encouraged the French and Soviets to form a collective security pact that would extend to other states. The National Democrats, then in the first government of Malypetr, finally acquiesced in the interest of state security.

To overcome the stalemates that the minority veto entailed, politicians in Czechoslovakia used logrolling, a common feature of consensus and consociational democracies. This involved one party backing legislation it otherwise

²³⁴ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/B40, report of Einstein to DOS, November 6, 1929. See also Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/305, report of Einstein to DOS, November 6, 1929, for National Democratic opposition to recognizing the Soviet Union.

would oppose to gain a second party's support for some legislative initiative. Several instances of logrolling occurred during the First Republic, but one that occurred in 1924, during Švehla's second government, is significant because it involved a combination of consociational logrolling, mutual veto, and the partial rupture of the elite cartel. In 1922, when Švehla formed his first cabinet, the interparty agreement stipulated, in general terms, that the government would achieve "parity [in tariffs] between industrial and agricultural production" and expand social insurance for "workers and the middle class."²³⁵ Once Švehla was in office, the parties failed to reach an understanding over these issues. The Republicans opposed the socialists' demand to broaden social insurance, which was to benefit workers but not agriculturalists, and the socialists objected to Republican-backed higher agricultural tariffs that would have increased the price of food for workers. In September 1924, the two sides devised a logrolling agreement, and the government passed the social insurance legislation; however, for nine months, the socialists, contrary to their commitment, exercised their mutual veto and refused to support the agricultural tariffs. Under pressure from his party, Švehla advanced the tariffs through the cabinet in early June 1925 over the objections of the socialists, precipitating the collapse of the government and early elections.²³⁶

The American legation watched the unfolding struggle between the socialists and the Republicans. Several reports to Washington noted that Czechoslovakia was not self-sufficient in grain and that higher tariffs on grain, while protecting the country's farmers from less expensive imports, would raise the price of food.²³⁷ After the cabinet agreed to the new sliding tariff, in June 1925, which angered the socialists, Einstein cited the claim of the National Socialist minister of food, Emil Franke (1881–1939), that the cost of food will rise considerably because of the increased tariffs, especially on fats. Einstein observed that the price of lard already was higher than the point at which the tariff would apply, so "the question is to-day of greater theoretical than of practical importance." He continued:

[The tariff issue] has...been fought out in the Cabinet with intense feeling owing to the strenuous opposition of the Social Democrats. Although in its

²³⁵ Prague, ANM, Fond Alois Rašín, carton 15, document 868, "Úmluva mezi stranami," 3 and 5.

²³⁶ Miller, *Forging Political Compromise*, 137–40.

²³⁷ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 66of.003/30, report of Einstein to DOS, September 6, 1923; 66of.003/31, report of Einstein to DOS, June 20, 1924; and 66of.003/32, report of Einstein to DOS, and September 16, 1924.

present form the result partakes of a compromise between the interests of the farmers and those of the workers who obtained as compensation a bill for compulsory insurance supplementary to the one passed last year for the insurance of employees, the three Social Democrats in the Cabinet have refused to approve these duties and handed in their resignations as Ministers to their party. It is not considered likely, however, that these will be accepted. The Czech Coalition Cabinet continues[,] halting and much divided[,] but as for the present no other form of government appears to be possible it is likely to go on for some time in spite of persistent reports to the contrary.²³⁸

Writing a few days later, the American consul-in-charge, O'Donoghue, speculated that the socialist ministers will remain at their posts because they had "succeeded in preventing the coalition government from establishing fixed duties on agricultural products, and the imposition of the 'sliding' duties will have no practical effect upon the party's immediate political future."²³⁹ Politics often is about perception, not reality, and such was the case in the tariff question. It became a highly charged issue in the press, and Švehla's highly uncharacteristic step of ignoring the principle of the minority veto and pushing it through the cabinet left the socialist parties with no alternative but to withdraw from the government.

Most likely, because the results of disregarding the mutual veto were so dramatic, the party leaders learned that, in the future, they could not risk forcing measures through the cabinet over the objections of a coalition partner. In June 1926, another incidence of logrolling occurred when Hodža arranged to advance a measure through the National Assembly to raise agricultural tariffs in return for another increase in the *congrua* for the clergy. The parties involved, then sometimes flippantly called the *Zollgemeinschaft*, served as the basis for the Gentlemen's Coalition: the Republicans, Tradesmen, Czech and Slovak Populists, German Christian Socialists, Magyar Christian Socialists, and National Democrats.²⁴⁰ Early in the legislative process, when the Senate began to discuss the imposition of higher fixed tariffs to replace the sliding tariffs, Einstein viewed the entire episode as an indication that politics in Czechoslovakia was beginning to take on an economic character, with politicians representing

²³⁸ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 66of.003/35, report of Einstein to DOS, June 9, 1925.

²³⁹ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 66of.003/34, report of Sidney E. O'Donoghue to DOS, June 16, 1925.

²⁴⁰ Miller, *Forging Political Compromise*, 154–55. Klimek, in *Boj o Hrad*, vol. 2, 152, also mentioned that Hodža claimed credit for bringing the Slovak and German parties into the coalition.



Figure 5. A presidential visit to Turčiansky Svätý Martin (known as Martin since 1951) on September 26, 1936. From left to right: Zora Hedánková in a folk costume; possibly Jan Hájek (1883–1969), the head of the News Section (Zpravodajská sekce) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Hana Benešová (1885–1974), the wife of the president; Edvard Beneš (1884–1948), president of Czechoslovakia between 1935 and 1938; and Jozef Országh (1883–1949), the Slovak provincial president between 1931 and 1938. Anton Horník (1905–1968), a photographer in Turčiansky Svätý Martin, captured this image during Beneš's first official visit to Slovakia after his election to the presidency on December 18, 1935.

Source: Martin, Slovakia, Slovenská národná knižnica, Zbierky a fondy Literárneho archívu SNK, Fotodokumentačné zbierky, Zbierka fotodokumentov osobností, PM 15/2018, "Návšteva prezidenta Dr. E. Beneša v Martine, 26. 9. 1936."

Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, and Hungarians willing to “[consider] a measure of common interest.”²⁴¹

A few years after Einstein had left Prague, the price of grain again became an issue. The Republicans and the socialists, now together again in the second government of Udržal, returned to bargaining, the outcome of which, a few years later, was the creation of the Grain Monopoly. Lee, the American consul at the time, wrote:

The creation of an organization of agricultural importers and exporters for the regulation of foreign trade, [sic] was proposed to the Czechoslovak Parliament just prior to its adjournment on July 21, 1932. As there was considerable difference of opinion among the various parties, what appeared to be a lack of confidence vote was registered on the question. Naturally, the strong Agrarian Party would be well represented, and “log-rolling” methods were eventually utilized with other strong groups, whereby certain personal gains accrued to the Social-Democrat and National-Socialist parties. Members of the latter group will be granted special privileges, such as permission to export products, agricultural or otherwise, by license.²⁴²

With no party ever enjoying a majority in the National Assembly, logrolling became another tool for striking bargains that both the cabinet and the legislature could accept.

With respect to the German activist parties, Boyer noted that, “although the reach of their influence is controversial and should not be overestimated, the assumption is plausible that they had a certain amount of negotiation and veto power.”²⁴³ Boyer is correct, but the same was true for all of the segments of the Czechoslovak polity. The use of the mutual veto and logrolling, as a whole, is vastly understudied, and further research into these two political devices is one of the ways in which applying the consociational model can help expand the understanding historians and social scientists have of the Czechoslovak First Republic.

Proportionality

Einstein did not consider proportionality in his reports, other than to discuss the composition of cabinets and to indicate the dissatisfaction of Slovaks with anticler-

²⁴¹ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 66of.003/38, report of Einstein to DOS, May 11, 1926.

²⁴² Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.6134/4, report of Frank C. Lee to DOS, August 1, 1932.

²⁴³ Boyer, *Nationale Kontrahenten oder Partner?*, 395.

ical Czech administrators.²⁴⁴ Nonetheless, the republic had some formal and informal mechanisms to ensure proportionality. The constitution created a National Assembly with a Chamber of Deputies of 300 seats, and the delineation of the 22 electoral districts left about half of the seats for Czech speakers, about a quarter for German speakers, a sixth for Slovak speakers, and the remainder for Ukrainian and Rusyn speakers, along with the other minorities. To create most of the 12 electoral districts for the Senate, which had 150 members, usually two electoral districts for the Chamber of Deputies combined to form one senatorial electoral district.²⁴⁵ As an unwritten rule, the politicians in the National Assembly followed a tradition of distributing chairmanships, vice chairmanships, and committee seats in a way that reflected the strength of the parties in the legislature and as a means of accommodating their economic, social, or ideological interests.

When the leading politicians determined the electoral districts, they gerrymandered the country to help dilute the impact of the Hungarian and German minorities. Otherwise, Czechoslovakia suffered from a degree of malapportionment, although it was not extreme. In the 1925 elections, for example, when the entire republic first voted in a general election at the same time, the Bohemian Lands elected 76.7 percent of the deputies, a slightly greater share than their 73.4 percent of the population, for a ratio of 1.04:1 (see Table 13). Slovakia received only 20.3 percent of the deputies, despite having 22.2 percent of the population (0.91:1). Malapportionment, although not egregious in any part of the country, was greatest in Ruthenia, whose 3.0 percent of the deputies represented that province's 4.3 percent of the population (0.70:1).

An examination of the numbers of citizens one deputy represented in a given district highlights the disparities in the electoral districts (see Table 14). For the entire country, one deputy represented an average of 45,789 citizens. In the Bohemian Lands, one deputy represented an average of 43,320 citizens (44,467 citizens without Prague). Prague—one electoral district with two divisions—had 48 deputies (24 for each division), with an average of 35,869 voters for each

²⁴⁴ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/262, report of Einstein to DOS, January 6, 1927.

²⁴⁵ The districts appear in *Sb. z. a. n.*, Law 123 of February 29, 1920, and SÚS, *Les élections l'Assemblée Nationale en Novembre 1925* (Prague: l'Office de Statistique de la République Tchécoslovaque, 1926), 8 (část textová). Prague's two electoral districts for the Chamber of Deputies formed one district for electing senators, which was the same for Pardubice (German: Pardubitz) and Hradec Králové (German: Königgrätz), and for a total of nine electoral districts for the Senate. Jihlava (German: Iglau), Brno, and Uherské Hradiště (German: Ungarisch Hradisch), each separate districts for electing deputies, joined to form one senatorial electoral district. Prešov (Hungarian: Eperjes; German: Preschau) and Uzhhorod were two separate electoral districts for both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. An excellent insight into the workings of the National Assembly appears in Bývalý poslanec, "My bývalí poslanci," *Přítomnost* 16 (July 19, 1939): 445–47.

deputy. In the capital city, with a population that was 94.2 percent Czechoslovak, one deputy represented fewer citizens than any other part of the country.²⁴⁶ For example, in the second largest electoral district, Moravská Ostrava (German: Mährisch Ostrau; Polish: Morawska Ostrawa), 64.7 percent of the inhabitants were Czechoslovaks, and 34.2 percent were Germans. Nevertheless, it had more inhabitants and fewer deputies than either division of Prague. Each of its 19 deputies represented 47,238 citizens, so one deputy represented 11,369 more citizens than the average for the deputies from Prague (based on the two Prague districts combined), 3,918 more citizens than the average for a deputy in the Bohemian Lands, and 2,771 more citizens than the average for a deputy in the entire country. The two districts in the Bohemian Lands with the largest percentage of Germans were Karlovy Vary, where Germans constituted 96.9 percent of the population and Czechoslovaks 3.0 percent of the population, and Česká Lípa (German: Böhmisches Leipa), where Germans were 88.9 percent of the population and Czechoslovaks 10.8 percent of the population. Contrary to expectations, in Česká Lípa, one deputy represented slightly fewer citizens than the average for the Bohemian Lands and more than 3,500 fewer citizens than the average for the country. The number of citizens one deputy from Karlovy Vary represented in the National Assembly was close to the average for the Bohemian Lands and 2,282 under the average for the country. Surprisingly, a deputy from Česká Lípa represented fewer citizens than his or her counterpart in České Budějovice, where Czechoslovaks were 72 percent of the total population. Imbalances were greater in Slovakia, and the worst was Košice (Hungarian: Kassa; German: Kaschau), where the Hungarians accounted for 16.9 percent of the population, the Ukrainian and Rusyn speakers 13.1 percent, and the Czechoslovaks (mostly Slovaks) 60.8 percent. In Košice, seven deputies each represented 50,658 inhabitants—9,755 more than the average for the country (12,224 more than the average for the Bohemian Lands). Uzhhorod (Ruthenia) formed one electoral district, with 62.2 percent of the population Ukrainian or Rusyn speakers, 17.0 percent Hungarian speakers, 13.4 percent Jewish, and 3.3 percent Czechoslovak. It was here that the divergence was greatest. Its nine deputies

²⁴⁶ The statistics on ethnicity in the administrative districts appears in SÚS, *Statistická příručka Republiky Československé*, vol. 2 (Prague: Nákladem vlastním v komisi Knihkupectví Bursík a Kohout, 1925), Table XIII-7, 362–63. Statistics on the voting districts appears in *Les élections l'Assemblée Nationale en Novembre 1925*, 8 (část textová). Only the percentages of Czechoslovak citizens appear in column 8 of Table 14 in this chapter. There were some anomalies in the electoral districts, a few of which were not always coterminous with the administrative districts. As a result, the statistics for ethnicity are approximate.

each represented 64,376 citizens, which was 18,587 more than the average for the entire country and 21,056 more than the average for the Bohemian Lands.

Ethnicity accounted for much of the malapportionment in Czechoslovakia, and the statistics reveal that the greater concern of the Slovak and Czech framers of the political system were the Hungarian speakers of Slovakia, not the German speakers of the Bohemian Lands. Nevertheless, two other factors are worth considering regarding the evenness of representation. One was that Prague, the country's capital city, had a disproportionately high number of deputies, given its population. Although it was overwhelmingly Czechoslovak, the percentage of Czechoslovaks in Uherské Hradiště (German: Ungarisch Hradisch), in Moravia, was even greater, and the percentage of Czechoslovaks in Turčiansky Sv. Martin, in Slovakia, was close to that of Prague. Neither of those districts, however, had the advantage of Prague, regarding the number of citizens each deputy represented. Surprisingly, although urban areas throughout the country had slightly more deputies than rural areas, the difference was not great. Based on the median ratio of rural to urban inhabitants, the comparatively more urban districts, with larger populations in cities of at least 10,000 inhabitants, sent to Prague 193 out of 300 deputies (64 percent), while the districts with comparatively larger rural populations had 107 deputies (36 percent). That nearly corresponded to the population differences: 62 percent for the more urban areas and 38 percent for the more rural areas. With Prague's 48 deputies out of the mix, the slight advantage of the urban districts is still visible: urban areas had 58.3 percent of the population and 149.5 out of 252 (59.3 percent) of the deputies, while the rural areas had 41.7 percent of the population and 102.5 (40.7 percent) of the deputies. The greatest disparities in apportionment, therefore, were not the result of favoring either more urban or rural areas but differences in electoral districts that gave Prague and the Czechoslovaks, as opposed to the Germans and particularly the Hungarians, more seats in the legislature.²⁴⁷

The composition of Czechoslovakia's coalition governments reflected proportionality in the legislature. The leading party politicians, with influence from the Hrad, elevated the construction of cabinets to a fine art. The framers of every cabinet considered election results, personalities, and party demands as they balanced the internal political tendencies within each of a potential coalition's parties. This informal and often lengthy process applied to simple cases, such

²⁴⁷ These conclusions are preliminary. Additional research is necessary to explain the statistical characteristics of legislative representation in the First Republic and what motivated politicians when they established the districts and the distribution of deputies.

as the three-party Red-Green Coalition of socialists and agrarians, in the early years of the republic, and the crowded Lijphartian grand coalitions, beginning in 1929 and lasting to the end of the republic (see Table 11). In 1919–1920, the first Red-Green Coalition government of Vlastimil Tusar (1880–1924), which included Social Democrats, National Socialists, and Republicans, reflected a perfect balance of eight cabinet positions in the hands of socialists (four for each of the two parties) and eight ministries for the Republicans. On the Republican side, however, there was an even more complex equilibrium since two Czech-speaking Republicans represented the party's moderate wing, and two were conservatives. The other four seats went to three members of the Slovak Club, all of whom were allied with the Republicans. The sole expert in the cabinet was Foreign Minister Beneš, representing the interests of the Hrad. After the April 1920 victory of the socialists at the polls, the negotiators required more finesse to tweak the balance of parties in the cabinet. The socialists now received nine cabinet posts, with the Social Democrats getting seven, two of which went to Slovak-speaking members of the party, while two portfolios went to the National Socialists. There also were nine ministries in the hands of eight non-socialist ministers. The Republicans retained their four cabinet posts, again with an even conservative-moderate division of ministries. Vavro Šrobár (1867–1950) of the Slovak National Peasant Party, who had been in the Kramář and first Tusar governments and who was an ally of the Republicans, held two ministries.²⁴⁸ The number of experts increased from one to three, all of whom were close to the Hrad: Beneš, again as foreign minister, along with Engliš, as finance minister, and Rudolf Hotowetz (1865–1945), as foreign trade minister. The cabinet contained a total of three Slovaks from two different parties—two Social Democrats and one from the Slovak National Peasant Party—who together held four ministries. The Lijphartian grand coalition of Udržal's second government, in office between 1929 and 1932, displays a similar balance. Seven parties were in the government, with six posts going to three socialist parties: three to the Social Democrats, two to the National Socialists, and one to the German Social Democrats. The Republicans had four ministries (all were in the moderate wing of the party), and their Bund der Landwirte allies had one, for a total of five agrarians. With one ministry in the hands of the Business and Commerce Party, which cooperated with the Republican Party, the Republicans and their allies had six cabinet posts, the same number of ministries as the three socialist

²⁴⁸ In 1922, Šrobár's Slovak National Peasant Party united with the Republican Party of the Czechoslovak Countryside to form the Republican Party of Agriculturalists and Small Farmers.

parties. Reflecting their electoral successes, the Czechoslovak Populists had two seats, and the conservative National Democrats had one. Beneš again headed the Foreign Ministry as an expert, even though he had joined the National Socialist Party. Overall, there were six who were socialists and ten who were not. Even without such detailed analysis, it is apparent, from Table 11, that each cabinet displayed similar efforts at informally accommodating religious, ethnic, and ideological concerns.

There was no formal method of proportionally filling vacancies in the bureaucracy, but Czech and Slovak speakers did not dominate the entire structure. There were large numbers of Germans in the ministries of health (25 percent), finance (13 percent), justice (nearly 23 percent of the prosecutors and 22 percent of the judges), education (34 percent of the inspectors and 21 percent of the professors, teachers, and staff of schools for the Bohemian Lands), railways (13 percent of the employees), as well as post, telephone, and telegraph (10 percent).²⁴⁹ After the creation of the state, the government reduced the number of Germans in the bureaucracy to a number roughly proportional to the size of the German population, although the percentage of Germans in the upper bureaucracy was unbalanced in favor of the Czechs and Slovaks.²⁵⁰ A document prepared for Beneš stated that Germans accounted for 7.6 percent of all administrators, 10.5 percent of all postal workers, 10.9 percent of all railroad employees, and 20.8 percent of all judges.²⁵¹ Although approximately 10

²⁴⁹ Milan Hodža, "The Prime Minister on Nationality Policy in Czechoslovakia: Speech Delivered before the Budgetary Committee of the Chamber of Deputies on November 17, 1937," in *Nationality Policy in Czechoslovakia*, 30; and Ivan Dérer, "The Minister of Justice on the Czechoslovak System of Justice from the Angle of Nationality," in *Nationality Policy of Czechoslovakia*, 92 (percentage of judges)-94. Some archival material exists on the ethnicity of the state administrators, but the SÚS did not publish such information. The closest were statistics from 1921, which characterized the distribution of ethnicities in the "state and other public service [and] free professions" in the Bohemian Lands as follows: 68.8 percent Czechoslovak; 30.2 percent German; 0.3 percent Polish; 0.6 percent Jewish, and 0.1 percent others. The population of the Bohemian Lands was 9,815,999, with the 2,973,208 German speakers forming 30.29 percent of the total population. In the early days of the republic, therefore, the number of German speakers in the state bureaucracy, at least in the Bohemian Lands, was somewhat proportional to their overall percentage in the population. SÚS, *Statistická příručka Republiky Československé*, vol. 2, Tables XIII-7, p. 362-63, and XVI-10-c, p. 427.

²⁵⁰ Tampke summarized some of the research on this issue in *Czech-German Relations and the Politics of Central Europe*, 38.

²⁵¹ Prague, AÚTGM, Fond Edvard Beneš, carton 73, R133.4. Národnost státních zaměstnanců, as cited in Simon, *The Hungarians of Slovakia in 1938*, 26. The percentage of other ethnicities in state employment also was not proportional to their share of the population. Hungarians (4.8 percent of the population) constituted 0.8 percent of the public administrators, 0.4 percent of the postal workers, 1.2 percent of the railroad workers, and 2.3 percent of the judges. Ukrainian and Rusyn speakers (3.8 percent of the population) constituted 1.2 percent of the public administrators, 0.5 percent of the postal workers, 1.0 percent of the rail workers, and 2.7 per-

percent of the military officer corps was German in 1918, the number diminished to less than 4 percent by the republic's end, and the dozen German generals in the Czechoslovak military held inconsequential posts.²⁵² Between 1922 and 1930, only 36 Germans and 74 Slovaks graduated from the Military Academy.²⁵³ Similarly, the number of German gendarmes also declined during the interwar years.²⁵⁴

On February 18, 1937, based on negotiations between the German activists in the government and their partners in the Political Committee, Hodža's second cabinet concurred that the state would ensure that "a decent proportional share of the positions in public service" would go to the minorities, including Germans. Ethnic proportionality for the ethnic groups in the state administration now became the norm. Minority-owned businesses were to receive more awards for publicly financed projects, assuming that they had competitive prices and that they employed qualified, local, minority employees. Budgetary equality among Czechoslovakia's ethnolinguistic segments became a requirement for public welfare, health, sport, and cultural affairs. Finally, in areas where minorities were in a majority over "Czechoslovaks" and the population was more than 3,000 inhabitants, the minorities could use their language for official correspondence without the need to request to exercise the right or to pay for translation charges.²⁵⁵ Ministerial orders made the stipulations of the agreement permanent

cent of the judges. Poles (0.6 percent of the population) constituted 0.1 percent of the administrators, 0.1 percent of the postal workers, and 0.8 percent of the rail workers. Jews (1.3 percent of the population) constituted 0.3 percent of the administrators and 0.5 percent of the judges.

²⁵² Pavel Šrámek, "Důstojníci německé národnosti v československé meziválečné armádě," in *Češi a Němci v meziválečném Československu: Sborník z kolokvia pořádaného Katedrou dějin státu a práva Právnické fakulty MU, The European Society for History of Law a Moravským zemským archivem v Brně*, ed. Jaromír Tauchen and Karel Schelle (Ostrava: KEY Publishing s.r.o., 2013), 255. According to the statistics at Beneš's disposal, the military officer corps was 95.8 percent Czechoslovak, 3.2 percent German, and 0.1 percent Hungarian. Prague, AUTGM, Fond Edvard Beneš, carton 73, R133.4. Národnost státních zaměstnanců, as cited in Simon, *The Hungarians of Slovakia in 1938*, 26.

²⁵³ Zdenko Maršálek, "The Failure of Czechoslovakism as a State-Civic Concept: National Minorities and the Army, 1918–1945," in *Czechoslovakism*, 235–236. During military mobilization in 1938, 10 percent of all those notified ignored the requirement, and about one-third of the Germans did not report to the military (p. 237).

²⁵⁴ Ondřej Kolář, "Němci v řadách československého četnictva," in *Češi a Němci v meziválečném Československu*, 147 and 153.

²⁵⁵ Prague, NA, PMR, Protokol ze schůzí ministerské rady, microfilm 8195, č. inv. 2960, carton 4131, meeting 38, February 18, 1937, item 7, "Otázky menšinové," pp. 18–19 (quotation p. 18). Information about the February 18, 1937 agreement appears in Brügel, *Tschechen und Deutsche*, 309–315; Eva Broklová, *Politická kultura německých aktivistických stran v Československu 1918–1938* (Prague: Karolinum–Nakladatelství Univerzity Karlova, 1999), 69–70; Josef Harna, "Národnostní politika Hodžovy vlády," in *Národnostní otázka v Polsku a Československu v meziválečném období: Sborník z mezinárodní vědecké konference (26.–27. 10. 2004)*, ed. Petr Kaleta, František Martínek, and Lukáš Novosad (Prague: Masarykův ústav AV ČR, 2005), 102–103; Jaroslav Kučera *Minder-*

policy, but they did not actually become law. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture's Land Reform Section ordered that communications in Slovakia be in Slovak and those in Ruthenia be in Czech (a large number of Czechs had moved to Ruthenia), Ukrainian, or Rusyn.²⁵⁶ The measures took effect without delay, and the number of minorities the state hired began to increase almost immediately.²⁵⁷ Einstein, then observing Czechoslovak affairs from London, praised such "measures intended to correct the admitted abuses."²⁵⁸

In Czechoslovakia during the 1920s and 1930s, proportionality was apparent in the elections to the National Assembly and local political organs as well as legal stipulations regarding the use of minority languages in the schools.²⁵⁹ In many respects, however, mechanisms to extend proportionality to the administration and other spheres of public life often were ineffective. Minorities occupied positions in the administration and military at rates far below the corresponding percentages of the minorities in the population as a whole. Nevertheless, debates, proposals, and initiatives of the 1930s suggest that legislation regarding proportionality may have evolved if the Sudeten crisis had not occurred. The ministers' discussions and subsequent cabinet decisions in February 1937 initiated further political debates about employment guarantees for minorities that extended to the National Assembly.²⁶⁰ Unfortunately, the strongest German party at the time, the SdP, vehemently opposed the solution and demanded administrative autonomy. Moreover, the deteriorating relations with

heit im Nationalstaat: Die Sprachenfrage in den tschechisch-deutschen Beziehungen, 1918–1938 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999), 145–46; Jaroslav Šebek, "Politický systém a jeho vývoj v meziválečném Československu (do jara 1938)," in *Československo: Dějiny státu*, Jindřich Dejmek, et al. (Prague: Nakladatelství Libri, 2018), 191–92; and Andrej Tóth, Lukáš Novotný, and Michal Stehlík, *Národnostní menšiny v Československu, 1918–1938: Od státu národního ke státu národnostnímu?* (Prague: Univerzita Karlova v Praze, Filozofická fakulta, 2012), 352–55 and 380–83. On the legal developments regarding minorities in Czechoslovakia, see René Petráš, *Menšiny v meziválečném Československu: Právní postavení národnostních menšin v první Československé republice a jejich mezinárodněprávní ochrana* (Prague: Universita Karlova v Praze, Nakladatelství Karolinum, 2009). Tampke stated that "most 'average citizens' could lead their lives without ever being confronted with the Czechoslovak language." Tampke, *Czech-German Relations and the Politics of Central Europe*, 42. While that may have been true for Germans in the Sudetenland, it was not the case for other minorities, including Hungarians.

²⁵⁶ Prague, NA, Státní pozemkový úřad, Ministerstvo zemědělství, carton 508, "Jazyková úprava předtisků čistopisů na Slovensku a Podk. Rusl.," č.j., 172.422/37-IX/1, February 27, 1927.

²⁵⁷ Hodža, "The Prime Minister on Nationality Policy in Czechoslovakia," 32–33.

²⁵⁸ Laramie, WY, UW, AHC, LEP, "The Czechoslovak Problem," box 8, folder 6, n.d. [1938], 7.

²⁵⁹ The number of German schools, for example, was proportional to the population, and the German schools had a better student-teacher ratio than even Czech schools. Tampke, *Czech-German Relations and the Politics of Central Europe*, 38.

²⁶⁰ For example, see *Těšnopisecké zprávy o schůzích Poslanecké sněmovny Národního shromáždění republiky Československé* (Prague: Státní tiskárna, 1937), fourth electoral period (1935–1938), session 122, December 4, 1937.

Germany did not afford the government the luxury of time to inaugurate gradual measures to rectify the imbalances.

Another aspect of proportionality that Einstein did not discuss in his reports was the tendency of the political parties to dominate the ministries that reflected the socioeconomic or ideological interests of their electorate. During the process of coalition building, the negotiators not only painstakingly balanced the number of portfolios each party held, but they also awarded cabinet posts to accommodate the special interests of the parties. Afterward, the parties staffed the ministries with their sympathizers, effectively politicizing the bureaucracy.²⁶¹ This is why the National Democrats so often were ministers of trade and finance, why one of the socialist parties commonly provided the ministers of railways or social work, and why the Republicans held the ministries of agriculture, interior, and defense (the military fed a large number of horses). The Ministry of Education often was a bone of contention between the socialists and the clericals, neither of which wanted the other to corrupt the minds of the youth. Beneš always was the foreign minister, not because he was a National Socialist but as an exponent of the Hrad.

In Czechoslovakia, proportionality may not have had strict legal guarantees, but it existed nonetheless as a result of a number of mechanisms. For the most part, electoral districts gave minorities a share in the legislative process that reflected their relative size in the population. Political agreements provided assurances that the bureaucracy would hire a larger number of minorities and that minority business would get more public contracts. The basis for the distribution of ministries was much more than a reflection of the strength of parties in the legislature. As they negotiated, politicians were conscious of the need to represent various segments of the polity, and they rewarded parties for their willingness to participate in the construction of coalitions. Finally, the parties entrenched their supporters in the civil service. In Czechoslovakia,

261 Krejčí, in *The History of Elections in Bohemia and Moravia*, maintained that the parties' staffing of the bureaucracies, the ad hoc committees of party leaders, the use of the Hare method instead of the Hagenbach-Bischoff method of distributing seats in the legislature in the first scrutiny, and the fixed or bound voting lists (he referred to them as categorical ballots) that prohibited voters from selecting candidates or crossing out candidates in the party of their choice made interwar Czechoslovakia a "state of parties" that limited the country's democracy (176–81). Even more evidence exists to justify Krejčí's assertion, some of which he presented elsewhere, such as the 1925 electoral reforms (170). Krejčí pointed out that these characteristics did not negate Czechoslovakia's democratic achievement (176). Czechoslovakia, of course, was not alone in the history of democracies—even exemplary ones—that had their imperfections. An additional view of Czechoslovakia's electoral system is Tereza Novotná, "Volební systém první československé republiky a jeho reformy," in *Volební a stranické systémy ČR*, 165–196. An explanation of the changes in 1925 is on 172–74.

proportionality may have lacked legal guarantees, but it became embedded in the political culture.

Segmental Autonomy

Czechoslovakia was a unitary state, and on the surface, it did not appear to comply with the second crucial component for a consociational state—segmental or cultural autonomy. Between the world wars, discussions about some sort of autonomy for certain ethnic groups were frequent, but the supporters of a unitary state maintained that decentralizing the state would be impractical. One such argument came from Masaryk, during his 1922 New Year's address, a translation of which Einstein sent to Washington:

The Czech parties have often emphasized that the example given by Switzerland would be desirable for us to follow. However, it might be more appropriate to cite the Belgium example as the formation of the state of Belgium is far more uniform. Switzerland has always been composed of many independent small cantons. Territorial autonomy cannot serve as a basis for negotiation as the unfortunate geographical location of the different minorities would not permit of its establishment.²⁶²

Masaryk understood that the ethnic situation in Belgium, a state that social scientists, writing nearly a half century later, were to identify as quintessentially consociational, was similar to the situation in Czechoslovakia, and that Belgium, as a unitary state at the time, still afforded its ethnic groups *de facto* cultural autonomy. In dismissing the idea of political autonomy, therefore, Masaryk did not envision a state in which the minorities had restricted rights and the government was under the exclusive control of Czechs and Slovaks. In his speech, Masaryk encouraged cooperation among the minorities and expressed his desire to see Germans in the government.

Although it never instituted political autonomy for any group, the republic had certain guarantees for cultural autonomy, and firmer legal foundations were evolving. It honored the freedoms of assembly and the press, although the censors occasionally suppressed passages with inflammatory language, even from the newspapers of the coalition parties, and all sorts of publications appeared in every language spoken in the country. Czechoslovakia's citizens instructed children in their own languages, and various religions had separate training

²⁶² Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.01/136, report of Einstein to DOS, January 12, 1922.

facilities for their clergy.²⁶³ The concentration of ethnolinguistic groups in certain electoral districts enabled them to elect their own local representatives and legislators. The artificially constituted Czechoslovak language was the “state official language,” according to a law appended to the constitution, but the minorities had the right to use their own languages with the administration and in the courts when they constituted more than 20 percent of the population in a district.²⁶⁴ The National Assembly was unique in Europe in that it recognized seven languages—Czechoslovak (that is, Czech or Slovak), German, Hungarian, Polish, as well as “Russian (Little Russian)” —both for the oath office and deliberations.²⁶⁵ This right did not extend to committee chairs and other parliamentary leaders who had to speak Czech or Slovak, which deterred prominent minority politicians from serving in such positions.²⁶⁶ Nevertheless, the use of minority languages in the National Assembly helped ensure the minorities’ cultural autonomy. It also may have hampered their participation in the work of the legislature and contributed to the deepening of segmentation.²⁶⁷ Lijphart contended that such a trend is a common feature of consociationalism. Heightening the distinctions between the pillars of a deeply divided society limits contact and conflict, while it simultaneously strengthens the patterns of elite cooperation.

Cultural autonomy, in consociational terms, is a broad notion, and it implies not only the rights derived from ethnolinguistic association but also those based

²⁶³ The rights of minorities meant that Czech and Slovak speakers themselves could be minorities in, for example, German- or Hungarian-speaking areas. Michal Šimáně considered the hurdles that faced Czech minority schools in *České menšinové školství v Československé republice* (Brno: Masarykova Univerzita, 2019).

²⁶⁴ *Sb. z. a n.*, no. 122, Law of February 29, 1920. For an analysis of the language law, see Václav Houžvička, *Czechs and Germans, 1848–2004: The Sudeten Question and the Transformation of Central Europe*, trans. Anna Clare Bryson-Gustová (Prague: Karolinum, 2015), 139–46, and Pekár, et al., *Ethnic Minorities in Slovakia in the Years 1918–1945*, 57–61. Another crucial source that focuses on controversial changes to the language law in 1926 is Kučera’s *Minderheit im Nationalstaat*.

²⁶⁵ Benjamin Conrad, “Das mehrsprachige Abgeordnetenhaus der Tschechoslowakei in seiner parlamentarischen Praxis, 1920–1938,” *Acta Universitatis Carolinae–Studia Territorialis* 16, no. 1 (2016): 44–63 (see esp. 48–49). In the Baltic States and Central Europe, as Conrad explained (46), the only other countries accepting more than one language were Finland (Finnish and Swedish) and Latvia (Latvian, German, and Russian). *Sb. z. a n.*, no. 325, Law of April 15, 1920, which dealt with the procedural rules for the National Assembly, stated, in § 49, section 2, that “the speeches of the deputies shall take place in the Czechoslovak language. Members of German, Russian (Little Russian), Hungarian, or Polish nationality may deliver speeches in the language of their nationality if they do not want to use the Czechoslovak language.” “Russians (Little Russians),” which appeared in Czech as the adjectives “ruský (maloruský),” pertained to the Ukrainian and Rusyn speakers.

²⁶⁶ Kučera, in *Minderheit im Nationalstaat*, 215, mentions the example of Ludwig Czech, who spoke Czech but would not assume a top position in the National Assembly because regulations prohibited him from using the German language.

²⁶⁷ Conrad, “Das mehrsprachige Abgeordnetenhaus,” 62–63.

on other cleavages, such as religion and ideology. In this realm, too, Czechoslovakia was accommodating. Although Einstein rarely addressed cultural autonomy in Czechoslovakia in his reports, he did so when a portion of the Czechoslovak polity reacted to a perceived threat to their rights or when the state prepared to expand segmental autonomy.

Religion was an important area of division in the state, and in the middle of the 1920s, Masaryk found himself in the midst of a controversy. In 1925, legislation came into force that cancelled the state recognition of three Catholic holidays, all of which had been legal holidays in the Habsburg Monarchy—the Feast of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary (December 8), Saints Peter and Paul (June 29), and Corpus Christi, or the Body of Christ (a moveable feast that occurs 60 days after Easter). In their place came three new religious state holidays: 5 June, celebrating the Catholic feast of Saints Cyril (827–869) and Methodius (813–885), the apostles to the Slavs; June 6, commemorating the martyrdom of the Czech religious reformer Jan Hus, whom the Council of Constance had burned at the stake for heresy; and 28 September, to remember St. Václav (c. 907–935 or perhaps 929; reigned 925–935 or perhaps 929), the murdered prince of Bohemia.²⁶⁸ The holiday recognizing Hus set Catholic piety against Czech nationalist and religious pride because Masaryk, Švehla, and other government officials attended a June 6, 1925 memorial to Hus. Furthermore, Masaryk flew a Hussite banner from his window at the Castle and made what many regarded as judgmental statements.²⁶⁹ The Vatican nuncio in Prague had protested the proposed legislation regarding holidays, and he now interpreted the acts of the top state officials as public support of the Czech Hussites and the Czech Brethren. As a result, he left the country and returned to Rome. Relations between the government, on the one hand, and the Vatican as

²⁶⁸ For the law regarding the holidays, see *Sb. z. a n.*, no. 66, Law of April 3, 1925.

²⁶⁹ Švehla realized that displaying the Hussite banner would be extremely divisive. Through Beneš, he specifically requested that Masaryk arrange to raise the Czechoslovak flags on the imposing flagpoles at the entrance to the Hrad, which the Slovene architect Jože Plečnik (1872–1957) had designed, but “absolutely no Hussite” banners (“Husitské vůbec ne”). Prague, AÚTGM, Fond T. G. Masaryk, R, carton 405, file “Klerikálové 1926 Vatikan,” document K129/26, June 4, 1926, report of a telephone conversation between Beneš and Vladimír Kučera (1891–1961), who was a staff member of the Chancellery of the President of the Republic at Lány. Masaryk often spoke of religion and morality, yet he wanted the separation of church and state; he was a member of the Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren, yet he was an anticleric. With all these contradictions, Švehla once told Masaryk, “you want to be both pope and heretic at the same time, and that cannot be,” which Masaryk found terribly amusing. Švehla was angry that the break had occurred, partly because he had good relations with the archbishop, who could keep Hlinka in line. Mečíř, *Rozmluvy s Antonínem Švehlou a o Švehlovi*, 194–202 (quotation on p. 195; relations with archbishop on p. 199).

well as the Catholic Church and the Catholic political parties in Czechoslovakia, on the other, remained strained for some time. The political elites learned to be more circumspect in the future. For example, on June 6, 1926, Masaryk flew only the Czechoslovak flag from his balcony.²⁷⁰ In 1925, when Einstein described the row that had accompanied the parliamentary debates about the proposed holidays, he understood that the underlying controversy was mainly between the clerics and the strongly anticlerical socialists, but he added that “the deeper significance of the crisis lies in its revelation of the extremely artificial nature of the political combination governing the country and of the possibility that the conflicting interests in the Coalition will eventually force it to make way for a government in which the minorities, Germans or other, will exert a more effective influence on foreign and domestic policy.”²⁷¹ Einstein’s predicted outcome indicates that he had begun to realize that any compromise had to be grounded on the assumption that the divisions in Czechoslovak society were deep and permanent.²⁷²

Minority control over education remained a recurring issue throughout the life of the First Republic. Czechs, Germans, Slovaks, and other ethnic groups had schools instructing in their own language that benefited from state funds, although the schools were not under local control. There also were denominational schools.²⁷³ In 1924, Einstein reported that Masaryk privately had sup-

270 On the issue of the Hussite banner and Masaryk, see Laramie, WY, UW, AHC, LEP, box 7, folder 5, report of Einstein to the DOS, July 8, 1926. Several recent studies exist on the so-called Marmaggi Affair, named after the papal nuncio, Francesco Marmaggi (1870–1949), who left Prague to protest the government’s participation in the commemoration of Hus. Among the most recent is the detailed study of Marek Šmíd, *Apoštolský nuncius v Praze: Významný faktor v československo-vatikánských vztazích v letech 1920–1950* (Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, 2015), 348–361. See also Pavel Večeřa, “Marmaggiho aféra: úloha katolicismu optikou dobových tištěných médií levice,” in *Teorie a praxe politického katolicismu, 1870–2007*, ed. Pavel Marek (Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, 2008), 205–225; as well as Michal Pehr and Jaroslav Šebek, *Československo a Svatý stolec: Od nepřátelství ke spolupráci (1918–1928)*, vol. 1: *Úvodní studie*, material from the Vatican Archiv comp. and trans. by Pavel Helan and Marek Šmíd (Prague: Masarykův ústav a Archiv Akademie věd ČR, v.v.i., 1912), 136–156. On Masaryk’s role in the affair, also see Marek Šmíd, “Prezident Tomáš Garraigue Masaryk ve vatikánských archívech v letech 1918–1929,” *Církevní dějiny* 5 (2010): 44–46. On the eventual improvement of relations between Prague and the Vatican, see Marek Šmíd, “Czechoslovak-Vatican Diplomatic Relations on the Eve of World War II,” *Central Europe* 18, no. 1 (2020): 16–29.

271 Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/234, report of Einstein to DOS, March 23, 1925. Polišínská mentioned some of Einstein’s comments about the controversy in *Diplomatické vztahy Československa a USA*, 1/1, 184–85.

272 The three religious new holidays of 1925 went by the wayside after 1948, but they reemerged after the collapse of communism, a reaffirmation of the strength of the Catholic and Hussite pillars within the Czech polity and a nod to the country’s national pride.

273 On the minorities and the schools, see, for example, Emil Franke, “The Minister of Education on the Schools and Education from the Angle of Nationality,” in *Nationality Policy in Czecho-*

ported steps to give minorities a greater say in the education of their children.²⁷⁴ The country had several universities: Czech-language, German-language, and Ukrainian-language universities in Prague; a Czech-language university in Brno; and a Slovak-language university in Bratislava (Hungarian: Pozsony; German: Pressburg).²⁷⁵ Likewise, Germans and Czechs had separate technical schools in Prague and Brno.²⁷⁶ Catholics had a long tradition of higher education at Charles University, dating to its establishment in 1348, and in Olomouc. After the First World War, the government approved a Hus Czechoslovak Evangelical Faculty of Theology in Prague. In the interwar years, there also existed an Evangelical Theological Academy in Bratislava. There were a number of other institutions of higher learning, including the German Conservatory of Music in Prague and the Academy of Music and Dramatic Arts in Bratislava to complement the Czech-language music conservatories in Prague and Brno. The Hungarians desired but never received a university for Hungarian speakers, and there was no institution of higher learning in Ruthenia.²⁷⁷

slovakia, Milan Hodža, Emil Franke, Jaromír Nečas, and Ivan Déřer (Prague: Orbis Publishing Company, 1938), 51–60.

²⁷⁴ Laramie, WY, AHC, UW, LEP, box 6, folder 13, Einstein to the Secretary of State, June 20, 1924.

²⁷⁵ In 1921, the Free Ukrainian University (Ukrainian: Український Вільний Університет) opened in Vienna, and in the same year, it relocated to Prague. In 1928, it came under the Ministry of Education. The university served mainly Ukrainian émigrés from the various short-lived Ukrainian states that the Soviet Union had absorbed by 1922 as well as others from Czechoslovakia. Nadia Zavorotna, *Scholars in Exile: The Ukrainian Intellectual World in Interwar Czechoslovakia* (Toronto and Buffalo, NY: University of Toronto Press, 2020), 34–36 and 47–48.

²⁷⁶ In retrospect, Jeřek justified Czechoslovakia's nationality policy, stating that "there is not a state in the world where the ruling nation would have given a national minority more than we did." He remarked that Germans, with one-third of the population, still have two German technical schools, while the Czechoslovaks, with a population three times greater than Germans, also have two. Jeřek, *Mnichovská krize*, 50–51 (quotation on p. 50). Many of Jeřek's Czech and Slovak contemporaries had similar standpoints, such as Ivan Déřer, *Antiflerlinger III: Mnichov 1938*, ed. Tomáš Jahelka and Roman Jančiga (Bratislava: Občianske združenie Communio Minerva and Vydavateľstvo FABER, 2017), 65–69. A brief background on the German Technical University in Prague appears in Milena Josefovichová, *Německá vysoká škola technická v Praze (1938–1945): Struktura, správa, lidé* (Prague: Univerzita Karlova, Nakladatelství Karolinum, 2017), 23–41. The Slovaks did not get a technical school, partly because of the resistance of Déřer, the Slovak Social Democrat minister of education, between 1929 and 1934 who supported Czechoslovakism and resisted any advances toward Slovak autonomy. Arpáš and Hanula, "The Positions of Major Slovak Political Movements on the Concept of Czechoslovakism during the Interwar Period," 220.

²⁷⁷ In Slovakia, the authorities closed the last Hungarian institution of higher education in 1922, arguing that there were not enough Hungarians to warrant a university. Soňa Gabzdilová, "University Education and Hungarian Minority in Slovakia, 1918–1938," *Central European Papers* 7, no. 2 (2019): 35, 37, 41–42. In addition to a university, the exiled Ukrainians established a number of other institutions that attracted students beyond the Ukrainian diaspora. The Ukrainian Economic Academy (Ukrainian: Українська господарська академія, 1922–1937), in Poděbrady, was under the Ministry of Agriculture in 1928. The Ukrainian Higher Pedagogical Institute (Ukrainian: Український високий педагогічний інститут, 1923–1932) was in Prague, as was

Einstein demonstrated his objectivity in his tendency to dismiss some of the claims of the Slovak autonomists while criticizing the Czech administrators in Slovakia.²⁷⁸ In December 1922, after Slovak senators had discussed Slovak autonomy with Masaryk, Einstein praised the efforts of the Czechs “to rescue Slovakia from its previous condition of illiteracy in which it had been held by the Magyars.” He reasoned, perhaps thinking of American history, that in literacy and railroads “lies future hope for the real unification of this country.” Slovaks were “inert and illiterate,” he reasoned, and they were “easy prey to the agitation of their leaders many of whom are Magyars or are Magyarized. Moreover, the religious feeling of the Slovaks has often been shocked by the tactlessness of free-thinking Czech officials.” Postwar economic dislocation added to the problem, in part because Slovak industry, which previously had met the needs of Hungary, no longer could do so because of tariff barriers. Furthermore, the strong Czechoslovak crown harmed exports, as did expensive railroad shipping costs. As a result, Einstein commented that industries migrated from Slovakia to Hungary and Transylvania, taking skilled workers with them.²⁷⁹ In a report a few months later that supported a proposed American lecture tour of the Slovak Republican politician Šrobár and the Slovak educator Václav Stanislav Maule (1884–1945), who hoped to counter anti-Czechoslovak sentiments that certain Slovak-American leaders had been promoting, Einstein wrote: “that the Czechs have made mistakes in their administration of Slovakia, particularly in their attitude toward the Catholic Church, is freely admitted. They have been blamed with less reason for the severe industrial crisis which the country is traversing. To their credit, however, can be placed an attention to education and hygiene previously unknown and a good administration of taxes and of justice which has already reconciled a part of the population.”²⁸⁰ In 1929, Einstein reiterated the Slovaks’ claims that the Czechs

the Ukrainian Academy (Ukrainian: Українська академія, 1922–1952), which focused on the visual arts. The mission of these institutions was to prepare a cadre of educated citizens for a liberated Ukraine. Zavorotna, *Scholars in Exile*, chs. 3–5.

278 Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/262, report of Einstein to DOS, January 6, 1927.

279 Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.01/146, report of Einstein to DOS, December 19, 1922. There even were reservations among many Slovak politicians about autonomy for Slovakia when they met, in Martin, on October 31, 1918, to condone Slovakia’s separation from Hungary and its association with what was to become Czechoslovakia. Their fear was that autonomy could have been a vehicle to destroy Czechoslovakia. Dušan Kováč, “TGM a Slovensko,” in *Masaryk: Politik na evropské úrovni. Sborník z konference konané u příležitosti 80. výročí úmrtí TGM*, ed. Daniel Ort and Patrik Eichler (Prague: Nakladatelství Academia, Středisko společných činností ABV ČR, v.v.i., 2022), 117.

280 Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.01/148, report of Einstein to DOS, August 29, 1923. Other documents in 86of.01 for 1923 include various complaints from strong Slovak nationalists

treated Slovakia like a colony as well as the Czechs' dislike of the staunch Catholicism in Slovakia, but he added that even the Slovaks have admitted that they needed the new schools, roads, justice, public health, and economic investment that had come from the Czechs.²⁸¹

Einstein took an ambivalent stance regarding the question of Ruthenian autonomy. In 1925, he held that Czechoslovakia "is entitled to great credit for the civilizing work it is accomplishing to-day in the Subcarpathian region among a very backward and illiterate population with whom no greater injury could be done now than the grant of autonomy. The elemental needs of this country are education, roads, sanitation and justice and all this the Czechoslovaks are trying to introduce." He added that the natural economic market of Ruthenia was Hungary, now a separate state, and that the "primitive agricultural population who have to scratch a mountainous soil" no longer can migrate to Hungary as agricultural laborers. According to Einstein, Ruthenia had plenty of wood and water, but it needed capital.²⁸² In early November 1929, after the socialists' electoral successes, Beneš spoke to Einstein about Ruthenia, claiming that he wanted to make it autonomous, and he decried the fact that "for the last ten years [it] has been turned into a scandalous Agrarian 'Pashalik.'"²⁸³ Three weeks later, perhaps after testing the waters about Ruthenian autonomy with other politicians during negotiations for a new government, Beneš hesitated about autonomy, telling Einstein that those living in Ruthenia still were too illiterate. At that time, Einstein noted that "schools and roads have been built and the plumbing of civilization introduced" in Ruthenia. Despite the progress in Ruthenia, Einstein reflected Beneš's standpoint:

the administration and resources of the country have been handled as a preserve of the Agrarian Party, certain of whose members are believed to have expressed a personal interest in the State forests.... Dr. Beneš now proposes to end a series of practices which had originally looked upon Ruthenia as a kind of Czechoslovak Congo. The inhabitants have not attained a level

in the United States against Šrobár's visit and a number of letters in support of his efforts. On Šrobár's American visit, see Daniel E. Miller, "The American Lecture Tour of Vavro Šrobár and Václav Stanislav Maule in 1923," *Kosmas: Czechoslovak and Central European Journal* 18 (Fall 2004): 1–19. An excellent political biography of Šrobár is Josette Baer, *A Life Dedicated to the Republic: Vavro Šrobár's Slovak Czechoslovakism*, Foreword by Milan Zemko (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2014). Ježek, in *Mnichovská krize* (p. 279), also mentioned that many Czechs were insensitive about Slovaks' religious beliefs.

²⁸¹ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/290, report of Einstein to DOS, July 31, 1929.

²⁸² Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.01/168, report of Einstein to DOS, August 1, 1925.

²⁸³ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/302, report of Einstein to DOS, November 1, 1929.

where they are ripe for autonomy for at the last elections the parties favorable to the Czechoslovak State polled an absolute majority. The time should, however, be close when the pledges made in the so-called Little St. Germain Treaty can be redeemed.²⁸⁴

Einstein claimed that German society in Czechoslovakia was as divided as its Czech counterpart, but he never presented an exposé about the German cultural segment.²⁸⁵ Furthermore, in the 1920s, he did not provide a detailed account of the tensions between Czechs and Germans in Czechoslovakia, although he inserted brief comments in his reports. For example, in 1926, he stated this:

It is easy for the superficial observer to obtain a very erroneous impression of the instability of Czechoslovakia, due to the vocal form taken by this conflict of races. This has already existed for five hundred years without affecting the essential unity of Bohemia, whose wars have often been religious but never national in this sense. Although many of the older forms of daily life preserve their venerable animosities, in sports for instance, which are a recent importation, Germans and Czechs now play together, and there are many business interests where they work in growing harmony. The very balance between the two elements compels a pacific policy for this State which will always prevent it from becoming a danger to its neighbors.²⁸⁶

Otherwise, Einstein's remarks largely pertained to the prospects for German entry into the cabinet, along with their participation in the government. The most illuminating report to Washington only came in the spring of 1934, when Benton described German-Czech relations in a manner that epitomizes the consociational concept of pillarization:

The German minority in Czechoslovakia clings tenaciously to its language, culture and customs. Any attempt at absorption by the Czechs is vigorously opposed. In Prague and other large cities, where the two races live side by side, there is little intercourse between them other than the essential. Each

²⁸⁴ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.01/176, report of Einstein to DOS, November 23, 1929. The Little Treaty of St. Germain refers to the treaty protecting minority rights that Czechoslovakia signed on September 10, 1919 at Saint-Germain-en-Laye.

²⁸⁵ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/228, report of Einstein to DOS, June 27, 1924.

²⁸⁶ Laramie, WY, UW, AHC, LEP, box 7, folder 5, Einstein to the Secretary of State, July 18, 1926.

have their schools, theaters and clubs, kept up at times at great personal sacrifice on the part of the Germans, and each strive to show to the world that their culture is supreme. Inter-marriage between the two races occurs; but not as frequently as might be supposed.²⁸⁷

Einstein echoed some of these notions in two manuscripts from the late 1930s and a 1936 article in *The Spectator* titled "The German Question in Czechoslovakia."²⁸⁸

Proposals for altering Czechoslovakia's unitary system, although never fully enacted, provide evidence that the politicians recognized the need for change and devoted energy to making it possible. When the state came into existence, the Bohemian Lands had three provinces, Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, while Slovakia and Ruthenia had counties. A 1920 law that was to have become valid in 1923 would have ended the provincial assemblies in the Bohemian Lands and apply the county system of the eastern provinces throughout the entire republic. In 1922, the parties in the Pětka that formed Švehla's first government agreed to implement the law, but it never came into effect.²⁸⁹ The National Democrats objected to the proposed counties in the Sudetenland coming under the control of German politicians. Meanwhile the Slovak Populists felt that the county system jeopardized their hopes for Slovak autonomy. Unfortunately, Einstein failed to report about the significance of the scuttled reform.

As a logrolling concession to the Slovak Populists that brought them into the cabinet in July 1927, the government abolished the counties of Slovakia and Ruthenia and applied a revamped model for the provincial administration throughout the state. The president of the republic named the provincial presidents, and the Interior Ministry appointed the district heads. The law established provincial assemblies of 120 members for Bohemia, 60 for Moravia-Silesia (the law also united the two provinces), 54 for Slovakia, and 18 for Ruthenia,

²⁸⁷ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86oF.00/363, report of Benton to DOS, May 5, 1934, including "Report by the Charge in Czechoslovakia (Benton) on the German Minority in Czechoslovakia." In a draft article about Czechoslovakia he wrote after the *Anschluß*, Einstein commented that enough intermarriage had taken place in the past so that "many German politicians bore Czech names and vice versa" and that among the aristocracy "one branch of a family or one brother wished to be known as Czech while the other was German." Laramie, WY, UW, AHC, LEP, "The Czechoslovak Problem," box 8, folder 6, n.d. [1938], 3. Einstein also wrote about the history of German-Czech intermarriages in "The Munich Agreement," 332.

²⁸⁸ Laramie, WY, UW, AHC, LEP, "The Czechoslovak Problem," box 8, folder 6, n.d., esp. pp. 1–4, and "Czechs and Sudeten" [sic.], box 8, folder 6. See also Einstein's "The German Question in Czechoslovakia," *The Spectator*, July 24, 1936, 135–136. Polišínská cites Einstein's observations from the 1930s in *Diplomatické vztahy Československa a USA*, 1/1, 185.

²⁸⁹ Prague, ANM, Fond Alois Rašín, carton 15, document 868, "Úmluva mezi stranami," 1922, p. 6.

with voters electing two-thirds of the members and the government appointing one-third. In a report to Washington, while the government still was working on the legislation, Einstein pointed out that the proposed provincial reform did not satisfy all the demands of the nationalist Slovaks or the Germans. Furthermore, the socialists, who were out of the coalition, opposed it, fearing it would encourage “reactionary trends,” that is, strong clericalism in Slovakia.²⁹⁰

In 1921, the government worked out a plan for Ruthenian autonomy, giving it a diet of 45 deputies that was to meet in Uzhhorod (Hungarian: Ungvár; Slovak and Czech: Užhorod) and guaranteeing it nine deputies in the Chamber of Deputies of the National Assembly and four senators. According to the draft law, Ruthenians were to handle their own local legal and administrative affairs as well as cultural and economic development.²⁹¹ As with the failed 1920–1923 scheme to extend Slovakia and Ruthenia’s county system into the Bohemian Lands and introduce the provincial assemblies of the Bohemian Lands in Slovakia and Ruthenia, the proposal for Ruthenian autonomy also came to naught. The governor of Ruthenia, Gregory I. Zhatkovich (1886–1967), who had immigrated to America from Ruthenia as a child, was disappointed that Prague did not move more quickly on Ruthenian autonomy and returned to practice law in America. Ruthenian politicians continued to cooperate with the central government in Prague, but many key figures continued to press for Ruthenian autonomy.

In 1937, Prime Minister Hodža, who addressed minority issues throughout his tenure, had his cabinet prepare legislation to introduce Ruthenian autonomy. It even drafted a press release to announce the proposal in the event that information about the plan leaked to the media. In the meantime, the government hoped to delay the announcement until April 1937, so it could conduct

²⁹⁰ See for example Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/265, report of Einstein to DOS, February 15, 1927; and Laramie, WY, UW, AHC, LEP, box 6, folder 11, report of Einstein to DOS, February 19, 1924, 2. With respect to the union of Silesia and Moravia, the provincial reform appears to be a step backward in the area of proportionality. Germans there formed the largest share of the population and Czechs the smallest, and it appears that the intent was to dilute the German population. Other factors, however, came into play. Most Germans in Silesia indeed objected to the change, but so did those who identified with all of the other ethnic groups. This included self-identified Czechs, most of whom fervently objected to losing their unique and historic administrative unit. Yet, a separate Silesian province would have been an anomaly, given the size of Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia, and even Ruthenia. On the issue of Germans in Silesia, see Bugge “Czech Democracy, 1918–1938,” 26, note 86.

²⁹¹ Prague, Národní archiv (NA), Předsednictvo ministerské rady (PMR), carton 1856, signature 401/368, č.j. 1943/1921, “Zákon o ústavě samosprávného území Podkarpatské Rusi.” The file contains a number of documents, dated between February 1920 and April 1921, that are related to the proposal. See esp. the draft constitution dated January 13, 1921. The authors wish to thank David Hubený of the Národní archiv in Prague for arranging the photocopies from carton 1856.

“further quiet deliberations,” that is, without public controversy.²⁹² Through Law 172 of June 26, 1937, the National Assembly restructured the administration of Ruthenia, although it fell short of granting it complete autonomy, which irritated many. For the most part, the changes were at the executive level. Instead of a provincial president, the government in Prague was to name and the president of the republic was to approve a governor for Ruthenia, a position that was a feature of the proposed 1921 constitution. The governor was to be accountable to the central government and the Ruthenian Diet, which did not yet exist. His decisions were to require the approval not only of the vice governor, whom the governor was to select and who was to have the powers equivalent to a provincial president, but also the Governor’s Council, which was to consist of the members of a Provincial Committee, nine members whom the Provincial Assembly were to elect, and nine members whom the governor was to select. The governor was to have the power over “language, teaching, religion, and local matters.”²⁹³ He also was to appoint and remove officials. With the onset of the Sudeten German crisis, the government never had the opportunity to act on Ruthenia autonomy.

In July 1938, in the midst of the Sudeten German crisis, the Hodža government proposed solutions it hoped would satisfy the minorities in the state, principally the German speakers. Part of the plan was a “Nationality Statute” (Czech: Národnostní statut) that spelled out a procedure through which individuals were to use language to declare their ethnic identity. It outlined the use of languages in various spheres of public life, including schools, and established principles for filling bureaucratic positions proportionally, according to language.²⁹⁴ In June 1938, Dérer, as minister of justice, headed a committee that envisioned new provincial assemblies with a provincial council, based on ethnically based curia elected from each administrative district, and a provincial committee.²⁹⁵ In many respects, these proposals resembled the consociational solutions inherent in the 1905 Moravian Compromise. These and other schemes for restructuring Czechoslovakia to satisfy ethnic demands had no chance of coalescing into

²⁹² Prague, NA, PMR, Protokol ze schůzí ministerské rady, microfilm 8195, č. inv. 2960, carton 4131, meeting 41, March 19, 1937, item VIII, pp. 41–42 (quotation p. 42). The entire cabinet heard about the preparations for Ruthenian autonomy during this meeting.

²⁹³ *Sb. z. a n.*, no. 172, Law of June 26, 1937, Paragraph 5, Section 2.

²⁹⁴ The proposed “Nationality Statute,” as of July 18, 1938, appears in Jan Kuklík and Jan Němeček, *Od národního státu ke státu národností?: Národnostní statut a snahy o řešení menšinové otázky v Československu v roce 1938* (Prague: Univerzita Karlova v Praze, Nakladatelství Karolinum, 2013), 392–416.

²⁹⁵ Kuklík and Němeček, *Od národního státu ke státu národností?*, 67–69. See also Simon, *The Hungarians of Slovakia in 1938*, 166–67.

policy because the Sudeten German Party, with the approval of Hitler, rejected everything the government advanced, in order to facilitate the incorporation of the Sudetenland into Germany, either by force or by diplomatic means. Nevertheless, the Sudeten German Party's six proposed laws of 1937 known as the *Volksschutzgesetze* that were based on nonterritorial autonomy and Henlein's April 1938 "Sketch for the Reconstruction of the Internal Order of the State on the Basis of Eight Points from the Speech of the Chairman of the Sudeten German Party," often referred to simply as "Skizze," that called for territorial autonomy incorporated some consociational principles, including the traditions of the 1905 Moravian Compromise and its national cadastres. The extent of the demands ensured that the legislature and government did not consider either plan seriously.²⁹⁶ As Lijphart posited, deeply divided societies turn to consociationalism when facing outside threats. In the crisis years of 1937 and 1938, Czechoslovakia already had functioning consociational institutions, so it was reasonable that the country's politicians, as a solution to their country's difficulties, sought to strengthen them.

As in Imperial Austria, the lack of a solution from above regarding segmental or cultural autonomy engendered creative thinking among Czechoslovak citizens, at least in one instance. In April 1922, German and Czech politicians in Znojmo (German: Znaim) concluded an arrangement that increased the qualified majority from 24 to 28 votes out of 42 members in the municipal council to ensure that German representatives were involved in the decision making.²⁹⁷ That sort of compromise, however, was an exception. Throughout its existence, the Czechoslovak First Republic did not grant any segment complete autonomy through nonterritorial federalism. Slovakia and Ruthenia received special status only after the Munich Agreement brought about the loss of the Sudetenland and the republic's restructuring.

²⁹⁶ The full title of the "Skizze" is "Skizze über Neuordnung der innerstaatlichen Verhältnisse auf Grundlage der 8 Punkte aus der Rede des Vorsitzenden der Sudetendeutschen Partei, Konrad Henlein, in Karlsbad am 24. April 1938." Several scholars recognized the consociational nature of the SdP's plans, especially the *Volksschutzgesetze*. See Oskar Mulej, "Territorial and Non-territorial Aspects in the Autonomist Proposals of the Sudeten German Party, 1937–38," *Nationalities Papers* 50, no. 5 (2022): 946 and 956.

²⁹⁷ Prague, NA, Ministerstvo vnitra, carton 584, oddělení spisovny 21, číslo 112, podčíslo 21, č. 35012/22, Zemská politická správa in Brno to the Ministry of Interior in Prague, April 30, 1922; and Johannes Florian Kontny, "Herrschaftssicherung in der Peripherie?: Die Transformation der städtischen Selbstverwaltung in Eupen und Znojmo/Znaim nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg (1918–1922)," in *Bohemia: Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur der böhmischen Länder/A Journal of History and Civilisation in East Central Europe* 56, no. 2 (2016): 381–405. The authors wish to thank Johannes Florian Kontny, with the Austrian Academy of Sciences, for providing us with the Ministry of Interior document related to the Znojmo agreement.

Conclusion

The American diplomats in Prague, especially Einstein, unwittingly gathered evidence that the majority of the nine favorable conditions and all four components of consociationalism, if at times to a limited degree, were present in the Czechoslovak First Republic. In other words, Lijphart's model describes that polity's internal politics more accurately than not. The reports of Einstein and others to the Department of State also provide material that, in combination with other sources, aid in determining the effectiveness of Czechoslovak democracy. At times, the information from the American diplomats was lacking. For example, although Einstein was well versed in the relationship among the parties in the government and the standpoint of the German politicians, it appeared that his opinions about Slovakia and Ruthenia reflected the perceptions of the politicians in Prague more than any independent investigation on his part. Noticeably absent from his reports is information on Hungarians, Jews, Poles, and Roma, aside from a few brief references. Furthermore, no examples of proportionality and only limited references to instances involving mutual vetoes and logrolling are in the Americans' reports. These shortcomings do not detract from the ability of these communiqués to show not only that conditions in Czechoslovakia were favorable to consociational democracy but also that politicians there successfully built and maintained such a democracy. They operated both formal and informal consociational grand coalitions. The state honored cultural autonomy, instituted some mechanisms for self-government, and was on the threshold of granting limited autonomy, at least to Ruthenia. Furthermore, the reports to Washington indicated that the political system exhibited a significant degree of proportionality, and representatives of the social segments informally applied the principal of minority veto. The observations of Einstein and other American diplomats help demonstrate the applicability of the consociational model to the First Republic and provide additional perspectives on the nature of democracy in Czechoslovakia, thereby demonstrating the usefulness of Lijphart's theory.

Although Einstein praised the accomplishments of Czechoslovakia in his reports, he failed to see the exceptional nature of democracy in the First Republic and lamented that the political process there was slow to develop in the Western mold, by which he meant either a majoritarian system or a reduction in the number of political parties. Ironically, his comments along these lines strengthen the case for consociationalism in Czechoslovakia. Without a full understanding of the political culture of Czechoslovakia, Einstein regarded the

ethnic and political fragmentation in the state, along with the vicissitudes of coalition politics, as signs of political immaturity. On more than one occasion, he sought evidence that a less crowded political spectrum was evolving, and he expected that development to correlate with the increased economic prosperity and social stability of the state. In 1923, for example, he anticipated the appearance of two large blocks: the socialists and agrarians, on the one hand, and the politicians around Kramář of the National Democratic Party and the emerging fascists, on the other hand.²⁹⁸

In the middle of 1926, during the second bureaucratic government of Jan Černý, the politicians in the center and to the right of the political spectrum engaged in lengthy negotiations for a new political government. Einstein saw this as a “consolidation of this state along other than national lines and this is attested by the increasing prosperity of this country.”²⁹⁹ As talks progressed and as politicians weighed the possibility of a center-right coalition without the socialists, Einstein again perceived developments as the creation of “new lines of cleavage” between the bourgeois and socialist parties that offered “proof of the growing stability of the state.”³⁰⁰ Einstein failed to see that occasional ruptures in the elite cartel were the exception to the pattern of broad multiparty collaboration. They were not, as he anticipated, opportunities to recast Czechoslovak politics in a majoritarian mold.

Beneš, like Einstein, also hoped for a realignment of parties that would serve to simplify the Czechoslovak political system. This was already apparent shortly after the creation of the republic, when Beneš indicated that he would like to see the creation of a “socialist block” of left state-creating parties, although he expressed no specific ideas about party mergers.³⁰¹ After the October 1929 elections, he told Einstein of possible party combinations for constructing a cabinet, one of which would be a socialist-clerical block that would exclude the Republicans, many of whom were Beneš’s detractors. Einstein responded that “if he was not careful he would displace Czechoslovakia from Central to Western Europe,” whereupon Beneš “declared that this was precisely his purpose.”³⁰² A cursory view of Beneš’s approach to politics, through the lens of consociational theory, with evidence from Einstein, suggests that Beneš was unable to comprehend that he could not force politics in Czechoslovakia to conform to other models

298 Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/212, report of Einstein to DOS, June 29, 1923.

299 Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.002/36, report of Einstein to DOS, March 22, 1926.

300 Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/245, report of Einstein to DOS, June 9, 1926.

301 Klimek, *Boj o Hrad*, vol. 1, 50 (quotation) as well as 51 and 101.

302 Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/302, report of Einstein to DOS, November 1, 1929.

of democracy. His disdain of interparty bargaining and the political compromises of the type that Švehla had brokered may have contributed to Beneš's unpopularity among his peers, all of whom comfortably operated within the consociational system. Of course, there were additional factors that caused enmity between Beneš and the other political leaders, including their jealousy over Beneš's position as the likely heir to Masaryk in the presidency.³⁰³ Jan Masaryk, the president's son, glossed over Beneš's domestic political problems with his famous disarming humor, as Einstein recounted: "Jan Masaryk the Czechoslovak Minister in London and an intimate friend of Dr. Beneš, lately expressed the situation to me in a nutshell by remarking that the people are tired of Dr. Beneš as they would be of the same suit of clothes if it had been worn as long as he had been minister."³⁰⁴

303 On the many personality conflicts with Beneš, see Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/273, report of Gittings to DOS, November 10, 1927; 86of.00/302, report of Einstein to DOS, November 1, 1929; and 86of.00/303, report of Einstein to DOS, November 13, 1929.

304 Beneš published his 1939 lectures at the University of Chicago as *Democracy Today and Tomorrow* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1939), which appeared in the United Kingdom with the same title but with a different preface (London: The Right Book Club, 1940). He wrote that "the democratic state will have to take into greater consideration *all the weaknesses and deficiencies of the present democratic party and voting system*. The system of political parties and the state, the difficulties of leadership, the problem of the press, its independence on one side and its corruption on the other—all these must and will be reconsidered" (215 in both editions). The passage does not appear in the first Czech edition. Beneš expanded on his ideas in later editions, and in the seventh edition of 1948, Beneš repeated what he had stated earlier: democracies must limit the number of political parties. He anticipated two parties, one on the left and one on the right, with the possibility of a third moderate party. He advocated the adoption of majoritarian democracy and the abandonment of the "great evil" of Continental democracies: coalitions." *Demokracie dnes a zítra*, 8th (7th Czech) ed., (Prague: Čin, 1948), 274, 278, and 281 (quotation). The Košice Government Program, of 5 April 1945, banned parties that had collaborated with the Nazis: the Republican Party, the National Democratic Party (known, from 1934 to 1938, as National Unification), the Business and Commerce Party, and the Hlinka Slovak People's Party. Beneš thus succeeded in removing his former political enemies, but he also deprived the country of important representatives of its traditional moderate and conservative political base. The only parties that could exist were those in the National Front (Slovak: Národný front; and Czech: Národní fronta), which included the Communist (a separate Slovak Communist Party existed between 1939 and 1947), Social Democratic, and National Socialist Parties on the left, and the moderate People's Party and Slovak Democratic Party. Beneš did not create the "left bloc" he had desired, but the politics of the left dominated politics in the National Front. Furthermore, the National Front only had a thin veil of consociationalism, and it did not function like the Pětka and its successors. It was one of many national fronts that enabled the Communist Parties in the region to steer politics to their advantage. On the Czechoslovak National Front as a reflection of the Pětka, see Bugge, "Czech Democracy, 1918–1938," 27; and Bugge, "Democracy and Parliament in Czech Politics," 167. See also Karel Kaplan, *Národní fronta, 1948–1960* (Prague: Nakladatelství Academia, 2012). Kunc, *Stranické systémy v rekonstrukci*, 173–79, esp. 178, characterized the First Republic as a state of parties, or as he phrased it, a partyocracy (*partitokracie*) in which the political parties, including those within the Pětka, made major decisions in ways that were undemocratic. Kunc maintained that Beneš's National Front continued this tradition. He overstated the former but not the latter.

Studying the Czechoslovak First Republic through the lens of consociational theory presents several opportunities for enhancing Lijphart's model. Interwar Czechoslovakia confirms Lijphart's account of the nine conditions that favor consociationalism. First, it corroborates the contention of many social scientists that consociational states are peaceful and nonexpansionist because involvement in international conflict could strain the overarching loyalties and cohesion of the elite cartel, possibly leading to the fragmentation of the polity and the destruction of the state. Additionally, the presence of certain segments within statewide political parties, specifically Slovak as well as Ukrainian and Rusyn speakers, enables researchers to better understand Lijphart's application of consociationalism to countries that, on the surface, lack formal representation for some important social segments but have large political parties that accommodate social diversity. Third, the Czechoslovak case seems to support Lijphart's contention that consociational coalitions are more productive than political scientists and historians generally have assumed.

The situation in Czechoslovakia suggests that the bases of overarching loyalties are more extensive than those on Lijphart's list, which includes dynasty, nationalism, and religion. First, ethnic nationalism may provide a blanket of unity where the major social divisions are religious or ideological. Czechoslovakia shows how, in cases where ethnicity itself is a divisive factor, civic nationalism can help accomplish the same thing. Second, the promise of economic prosperity can entice disparate groups to cooperate. Third, prominent politicians can serve in place of a monarch to unite the pillars of a deeply divided society. Fourth, institutions, including political parties, can bridge the gaps among the segments. Fifth, under the right circumstances, factors that segment a polity simultaneously can create partial overarching loyalties that bind together other social segments. Such a network of partial overarching loyalties can thereby prevent extreme fragmentation that otherwise would hinder consociational solutions. In Czechoslovakia, for example, socialist, agrarian, and Catholic parties faced internal divisions because of theoretical squabbles, ethnicity, and other factors. Nevertheless, their ideologies served, in many instances, to unite Slovak and Czech speakers as well as some other ethnolinguistic minorities. The links these ideologies formed, within their respective movements and across ethnic lines, wove a network of overarching loyalties that reinforced the unity of the republic.

A further opportunity for refining the consociational model, based on the Czechoslovak experience, is to expand the theory's treatment of elite interaction. The Pětko and its successors may not have been unique in Europe, but the

Pětka's creation for the purpose of guiding a cabinet of experts, the longevity of the Czechoslovak extraparlimentary-extraconstitutional committee experience, and its institutionalization as the Political Committees attest to the innovativeness of consociational democracies at preserving elite cooperation, even if their methods sometimes may be marginally undemocratic.³⁰⁵ The success of the ad hoc committees required that the elites negotiate in good faith, which involved not only the trustworthiness of those bargaining but also their ability to execute the agreements they had reached. Fulfilling the promises they had made to their counterparts in other parties hinged on the political leaders' ability to muster the support of their political parties, which necessitated that those parties exhibit a level of cohesion and discipline that might well be less necessary in nonconsociational democracies. The Czechoslovak experience with extraconstitutional and extraparlimentary committees and the Political Committees confirms Lijphart's characterization of consociationalism as intense cooperation among the political leadership, but it also demonstrates that strong party discipline may be a feature of consociational political systems.³⁰⁶

The behavior of the key political actors of the First Republic also suggests that consociational theory could profit from an examination of the personality of politicians. Consociational systems may tend to advance politicians who, like Švehla, are particularly strong behind-the-scenes negotiators, ideologically flexible, and typically comfortable with incremental as opposed to rapid change. It is possible that the tight bonds of friendship and trust that contributed to the permanency of elites in the cabinets and in top party positions may appear in consociational democracies other than Czechoslovakia.³⁰⁷ Many Czech-speaking politicians during the First Republic had worked together building political parties, like Švehla and Mečl, or even as legislative opponents before the First World War. For at least six months after the expulsion of Jiří Stříbrný (1880–1955) from the National Socialist Party and his move toward fascism, Švehla

³⁰⁵ On the use of undemocratic actions to preserve a democracy, see Giovanni Capocchia, *Defending Democracy: Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), esp. ch. 3.

³⁰⁶ One of the reasons Czechoslovakia divided in 1992–1993, according to Braghiroli, in "The Failed Belgianization of Post-Communist Czechoslovakia," 319, was that "the divisions at the bottom of the societal pillars could not be overcome by a cooperative behaviour at the top." In the First Republic, where consociationalism was fully functional, not dysfunctional, as in Czechoslovakia between late 1989 and late 1992, the bonds among the party leaders and strict party discipline in the National Assembly contributed to compromise, which the parties then presented to their constituents as desirable.

³⁰⁷ On the continuity of personnel in the political cabinets in Czechoslovakia between 1918 and 1929, see Miller, *Forging Political Compromise*, 191–94.

kept in touch with the former socialist.³⁰⁸ Václav Klofáč (1868–1942), who helped establish the National Socialist Party, served as minister of defense, and had a long legislative career, had shared an apartment in Prague during his college years with Antonín Hajn (1868–1949), who became a National Democrat. The two served together in the Reichsrat, Revolutionary National Assembly, and National Assembly. Also sharing the apartment was Antonín Hajn's brother Alois Hajn (1870–1953), who became a Social Democrat and who worked in the press section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³⁰⁹ Hodáč, a National Democrat, and Hampl, a Social Democrat, were friendly opponents. Švehla and Šmeral had been friends before the Social Democratic-Communist split. Letters that Bechyně, a Social Democrat, sent to Kramář, a National Socialist, reveal the friendship between the two. After a National Democratic deputy had resorted to personal remarks against Bechyně during a political speech, Bechyně did not hesitate to ask Kramář to intervene.³¹⁰ Rašín cooperated politically with the Hajns and Klofáč during his student years. He became critical of Tomáš Masaryk, but during the war, Rašín was in the Czech Maffia and was allied with Masaryk. Before Rašín's death from an assassin's bullet, Tomáš Masaryk did not sleep for four days, and he wept the day Rašín died.³¹¹ While Šrobár studied medicine in Prague, he was in Masaryk's student circle, as was Štefánik. Dérer did not study in Prague, but he also was among the group of young Slovak intellectuals who followed Masaryk.³¹² Before Beneš finished the *gymnasium*, he befriended Masaryk, who later taught Beneš for one semester at the university.³¹³ To be sure, there were tensions as well. Masaryk did not like the clerical parties and did not care for Šrámek, whom he never wanted to see as prime minister (and he never did).³¹⁴ Švehla and Hodža were among those who did not like Beneš, and Švehla did not like Šámal.³¹⁵ Masaryk and Kramář also had their differences. Despite the occasional conflicts, the Czechoslovak political elite was remarkable in the many examples of the ties of friendship that facilitated cooperation.

³⁰⁸ Klimek, *Boj o Hrad*, vol. 2, 178.

³⁰⁹ Prague, ANM, Fond Antonín Hajn, carton 317, Antonín Hajn to Václav Klofáč, "K jeho sedmdesátce," 1938.

³¹⁰ Prague, ANM, Fond Karla Kramáře, carton 6, Bechyně to Kramář, November 16, 1926.

³¹¹ Prague, ANM, Fond Přemysl Šámal, carton 3, č. inv. 153, report of February 19, 1923, Report on a statement by Jan Masaryk.

³¹² Kováč, in "TGM a Slovensko," 109, discusses some of the Slovak politicians who were close to Masaryk before the First World War.

³¹³ Dejmek, *Edvard Beneš*, part 1: *Revolucionář a diplomat (1884–1935)*, 34.

³¹⁴ Mečíř, *Rozmluvy s Antonínem Švehlou a o Švehlovi*, 179–80.

³¹⁵ Šámal was unsure of why Švehla did not care for him. Prague, ANM, Fond Přemysl Šámal, carton 3, č. inv. 153, report of June 1, 1923.

Logically, no party would scuttle a politician who energetically and successfully represented its interests. Similarly, the elite cartel would not squander its hard-won consociational capital. Spina recognized this and referred to “the Masaryk tradition that the leadership of the state should be, as far as possible, in the hands of a few people who remain in office for a long time. This is Masaryk’s ingenious political concept,” he concluded, and it “explains why Czechoslovakia is the most consolidated Central European state.”³¹⁶ Lengthy political careers and repeated ministerial appointments were common among the First Republic’s political elite, and that pattern is visible in the Czech Republic and Slovakia after 1993. In Slovakia, for example, Mikuláš Dzurinda (born 1955) became foreign minister in 2010, after he had been prime minister in 1998–2006, and before then, in 1994, he was minister of transport, post, and telecommunications. Long political careers, unfortunately, have their drawbacks. When elites monopolize power over time, they stunt the political development of a new generation of politicians, which was the case in interwar Czechoslovakia. The lengthy duration of generations in leadership positions, bordering on the creation of gerontocracies, may be one of the risks of consociationalism.

Staying power may not be important only for individuals but also for political parties. Interwar Czechoslovakia highlights a trait of consociational democracies that Lijphart did not consider in detail: the propensity of political parties to monopolize certain cabinet ministries that advance their social, ideological, or economic interests. Jacques Rupnik was critical of the First Republic for having developed such a tradition, claiming that “it not only dampened the room [in which] democratic debate [took place], but also the political parties grew into the state structure.”³¹⁷ Consociationalism casts a different light on the practice. The tendency of parties to create ministerial bailiwicks strengthens elite cooperation and is a type of proportional representation that provides assurance to party constituents that they will benefit from representation in the political system and from compromise. This custom is present in other consociational states. Austria, a consociational democracy whose brief incarnation as a consociational state between the world wars had failed, had, for two decades after the Second World War, a conservative or “black” Ministry of Finance and a socialist or “red” Ministry of Transportation.

³¹⁶ Prague, AKPR, Fond Kancelář prezidenta republiky, protokol T (Tajné), signature T606/26, carton 152, 510/29, “Spina o Benešově a Masarykově politické koncepci,” report of February 13, 1929.

³¹⁷ Jacques Rupnik and Karel Hvizďala, *Přilíš brzy unavená demokracie: Rozhovor s Karlem Hvizďalou* (Prague: Portal, 2009), 241.

If the Czechoslovak First Republic is any indicator, consociational democracies also may rely heavily on minority cabinets, caretaker governments, bureaucratic cabinets, and mixed cabinets, all of which must secure the backing of the elite in instances when the elite cartel has difficulties concluding agreements. Czechoslovakia had only one cabinet constituted as a minority government, the second Tusar cabinet, which emerged after the first Tusar cabinet lost its majority with the birth of the Communist Party; however, the first Udržal government, in its caretaker role after the withdrawal of the Slovak Populists, also had a minority in the legislature. Czechoslovakia's minority and caretaker cabinets reflected temporary crises in consociational practices, but they were not majoritarian breaks since minority cabinets are dependent on shifting legislative majorities and therefore require a consensual style of politics for governments to maintain a good working relationship with most parties in the legislature. The Czechoslovak experience underscores Lijphart's characterization of minority cabinets as "belonging to the consensus end of the spectrum" of cabinet types.³¹⁸ The recurrence of minority governments in the Czech Republic and Slovakia after 1993, two countries with certain consociational characteristics, further reinforces the notion that elites will forge unusual cooperative agreements if they fail to form conventional partnerships.

In its twenty years of existence, the First Republic experienced four caretaker governments, each serving an average of about three weeks (see Table 11, notes 10 and 14–17). Czechoslovakia between the world wars relied on three governments of technicians: one in 1920–1921, when the Communists split from the Social Democratic Party; again in 1926, when the parties were unable to engineer a political cabinet; and finally in 1938, just days before the Munich Agreement. Einstein viewed appointing a bureaucratic government as an imperfection inherited from the Habsburg Monarchy that he frequently termed "the old Austrian expedient."³¹⁹ He also described a cabinet of technicians as a means by which Masaryk forced the politicians to cooperate. Einstein offered the following colorful description of the state of affairs in November 1929, when the appointment of a bureaucratic government seemed likely:

Once more, selected permanent officials and bureau chiefs will leave their divisions to assume Ministerial roles, while the political leaders will have to

³¹⁸ Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, 91.

³¹⁹ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/211, report of Einstein to DOS, April 13, 1923. See also Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.002/36, report of Einstein to DOS, March 22, 1926; and 86of.00/308, report of Einstein to DOS, November 27, 1929.

purge the sins of their inability to cooperate by remaining without official position. A few months of non-Ministerial purgatory is usually sufficient to induce the latter to assume a more conciliatory attitude and as soon as the willingness to work together becomes manifest the bureaucrats retire gracefully to assume once more the direction of their respective departments.³²⁰

Then on December 9, 1929, Einstein wrote that “President Masaryk had ready on his desk a list of officials whom he was ready to summon to take over the Government in case no agreement could be reached and used this as a club with which to induce the parliamentary leaders to come to terms.”³²¹ In fact, Masaryk considered a cabinet of officials a means of increasing his own power, especially in light of Beneš’s comment to Crane that Masaryk regarded it as the “American system,” that is, a cabinet that carries out the will of the president.³²² In fact, the constitution gave Masaryk the power to appoint the prime minister and the cabinet, and it did not require the National Assembly to approve of these actions, a system reminiscent of the old Monarchy.³²³ Keeping the president from wielding too much influence over the naming and operation of the first cabinet of experts in 1920 might have given Švehla another incentive to form the Pětka. Švehla already was aware of Masaryk’s desire to be a strong president because of the latter’s efforts to secure the constitutional right to appoint certain cabinet seats without legislative interference and his practice of giving cabinet ministers written instructions when he appointed them, something which Švehla made Masaryk cease.³²⁴ The possible function of a cabinet of experts as an extension of presidential power helps account for just how effective the figurative “club” in Einstein’s December 1929 report might have been.

The parties’ bickering in the 1920s seemed to replay itself in the aftermath of the inconclusive June 2006 Czech elections. In its report to Washington, DC, on June 6, 2006, the Embassy of the United States noted “that given Klaus’ strong personality and the current stalemate, we expect Klaus to, once again, try and push the envelope on the powers and practices of the Office of the President.” The solution was a government of the Civic Democratic Party and experts, which

³²⁰ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/308, report of Einstein to DOS, November 27, 1929.

³²¹ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/309, report of Einstein to DOS, December 9, 1929.

³²² Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.002/10, report of Crane to DOS, May 15, 1920.

³²³ See Table 11, note 8. References to the president’s powers over the cabinet in the constitution are in *Sb. z. a n.*, no. 21, Law of February 29, 1920, §§ 64 and 70. For a general discussion, see Orzoff, *Battle for the Castle*, 59.

³²⁴ Miller, *Forging Political Compromise*, 63 and 239–40, note 110.

failed to obtain a vote of confidence, and then an ODS-led center-right coalition, which won a confidence vote because two Social Democrats had abstained from voting. The unstable political situation led certain politicians to raise the possibility of political reform. The author of the 6 June report commented that “this is now the third election in a row that has not resulted in a clear mandate. Many politicians are already discussing ways to change the electoral system to try and address such outcomes, although that, too, will depend on how the current impasse plays out.”³²⁵

The elite cartel in interwar Czechoslovakia did not view cabinets of technicians as the preferred method of governing, but the party leaders realized that such cabinets helped the democracy survive crises. Similarly, mixed cabinets—those that included both bureaucrats and politicians—helped the elites create cabinets under unusual circumstances: when party leaders disagreed as to who should take a particular portfolio; when they hesitated to take a ministry that faced making unpopular decisions that had the potential of harming a party’s reputation; or when they avoided assigning a ministry to a party because doing so would have upset the numerical balance of a coalition. Experts in cabinets also provided representation to a specific segment of the polity; thus, Beneš served as the voice of the nonaligned but left-leaning group around Masaryk in the Hrad and the only socialist in the Gentlemen’s Coalition, even though his role was that of an expert. Nonpartisan finance ministers whom the National Democrats supported, when they were out of the government, represented the interests of big industry and finance. Certain ministers in the bureaucratic cabinets also balanced the president’s influence over the administration because of their loose party affiliations. For example, Jan Černý, who was close to the Republican Party, not only twice headed cabinets of technicians but also was minister of interior while serving as prime minister. He then was minister of interior in the Beneš government, the third Švehla government, the first Udržal government, the first Malypetr government, and the government of Jan Syrový (1888–1970).³²⁶ The careers of other bureaucratic ministers mirrored that of Jan

³²⁵ [Michael J.] Dodman, United States Embassy, Prague, to the Department of State, Washington, DC, June 6, 2006, as quoted in Wikileaks, Public Library of US Diplomacy, cable o6PRAGUE607, released August 30, 2011, available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/o6PRAGUE607_a.html. Between 2004 and 2008, Michael J. Dodman (born 1961) was the political and economic counselor at the American Embassy in Prague.

³²⁶ Hloušek and Kopeček, in “Caretaker Governments,” 1330, wrote that “Syrový, like Černý before him, was completely loyal to the head of state and adhered fully to his decisions.” In reality, Černý was more of an instrument of the Pětka than the Hrad, but in the case of Syrový, Hloušek and Kopeček’s position has merit. Beneš and the Hrad dominated Czechoslovakia’s foreign pol-

Černý, but no historian has taken on the complex task of exploring this topic. A more extensive examination of the role of experts in governments not only would improve understanding of the functioning of the First Republic but also could expand consociational theory.

The Czechoslovak First Republic status as a consociational state suggests the importance of historical antecedents, which, in the case of Czechoslovakia, necessitates an examination of the Habsburg Monarchy. As discussed at greater length in the previous chapter, the Kingdom of Bohemia, as a unit within the Austrian half of the Monarchy, demonstrated tendencies toward building consociational democracy. The most apparent consociational feature was the Moravian Compromise of 1905, a power-sharing agreement between the Germans and Czechs in the Moravian Diet.³²⁷ The success of the Moravian Compromise prompted the Germans and Czechs in Bohemia to begin negotiating a similar agreement, but the lengthy discussions yielded little, in part because of the outbreak of the First World War.³²⁸ There are other examples of constructing consociational arrangements among the Czech parties, such as the methods they used to resolve the 1914 Šviha Affair as well as their creation of the Czech Union, Czech Mafia, and National Committee during the First World War. The development of pillars along the lines of ethnicity, ideology, social standing, and religion was evident throughout the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the Austrian half of the Monarchy as a whole was developing in the direction of consociationalism.³²⁹ In one report, Einstein commented that Czechoslovak political debates between the world wars were “petty political bickerings of party strife inherited from the Austrian days.”³³⁰ On another occasion, he wrote that “political passion runs very high in Czechoslovakia, and as in all confined atmospheres personal jealousies play a considerable part. Except for the President and Dr. Beneš all the

icy when Masaryk was president, and that did not change with Beneš in the Hrad. This is why Beneš, as president, was far more active than Masaryk in foreign negotiations.

³²⁷ On this topic, see T. Mills Kelly, “Last Best Chance or Last Gasp?”; and Lukáš Fasora, Jiří Hanuš, and Jiří Malý, ed., *Moravské vyrovnání z roku 1905: Možnosti a limity národnostního smíru ve střední Evropě. Sborník příspěvků ze stejnojmenné mezinárodní konference konané ve dnech 10.-11. listopadu 2005 v Brně. Der Mährische Ausgleich von 1905. Sammelband mit Beiträgen der gleichnamigen internationalen Tagung, die vom 10. bis 11. November 2005 in Brünn stattgefunden hat* (Prague: Historický ústav AV ČR, 2006). In the latter work, the chapter by Vít Hloušek, “Teorie konsociační demokracie a moravská praxe” (145–155), briefly examines the consociational features of the Moravian Compromise.

³²⁸ See *Promarněná šance*. In future volumes, the editors plan to carry the work to 1915, when the discussions ended.

³²⁹ For example, see Chapter 2 of this study and three studies by Howe: “Electoral Institutions,” “Voting across Ethnic Lines in Late Imperial Austria,” and “Well-Tempered Discontent.”

³³⁰ Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/246, report of Einstein to DOS, June 25, 1926.

other public men have had their political education in the tradition of the former Dual Monarchy, and the result has not been conducive either toward the breadth of their outlook or the fairness of their methods.”³³¹ From the perspective of Lijphart’s theory, the political struggles after 1918 were not the result of the pettiness of politics in “old Austria,” as Einstein was fond of saying, but the dynamics of politics in a deeply segmented society.

The origins of Slovak and Ruthenian consociationalism are different. Democratic institutions in the Kingdom of Hungary were far less developed than in Austria, but there were signs that a consociational solution would have been appropriate there as well. The ethnic minorities in Hungary were loyal but long had demanded cultural and political autonomy, and Croatia had a constitutional guarantee of seats in the parliament. After the formation of Czechoslovakia, politicians in Slovakia and Ruthenia may have learned from the Czechs and Germans how to maneuver in a consociational democracy, but Hungarian claims to Slovak and Ruthenian territory certainly pushed them farther along the path toward consociationalism. Another nudge was the lesson of failed political accommodation in the parliament in Budapest, and the Vienna Reichsrat fared little better in that regard, although for different reasons. These many experiences induced politicians from all the segments in Czechoslovakia to consider alternative avenues for working with colleagues within their own pillars and with their counterparts in other segments of the polity.

A further advantage of understanding the First Republic as a consociational democracy is an appreciation of the longevity of consociational practices within a political culture. The consociational features of the Czech Republic and Slovakia today are not products of post-1989 developments. They have their roots in the Habsburg Monarchy and matured in the First Republic. The Munich Agree-

331 Washington, DC, NARA, DOS, 86of.00/247, report of Einstein to DOS, July 10, 1926. Einstein may have been correct about Beneš, but Masaryk was active in politics for many years before the First World War and served as a member of the Reichsrat. Since Einstein must have been aware of those facts, one might conclude that he meant the approach of Masaryk and Beneš to politics was different from that of the other Czech and Slovak politicians. This study has demonstrated that Einstein would have been correct only in the case of Beneš, who wanted Czechoslovak politics to resemble the Westminster model. Unlike Beneš, Masaryk was comfortable operating within the realm of consociational politics, in a very quiet manner, especially because Švehla took the lead in building and maintaining coalitions. Einstein might have assumed incorrectly that Masaryk also favored the development of two strong parties, as Beneš did, simply because Masaryk was such a supporter of Beneš and had grown weary of the Pětka and its successors. After Švehla became seriously ill in 1929, Masaryk became far more active in coalition politics, attempting to fill the gap Švehla had left. During that time, Masaryk did nothing to disrupt consociational practices. Švehla’s exit from the political scene occurred around the time Einstein was departing from Prague. For Masaryk’s greater involvement in politics after 1929, see Miller, *Forging Political Compromise*, 168–84.

ment and the creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, along with the Slovak First Republic, did not destroy consociationalism, which sprouted again from the conflagration of the Second World War, albeit only for a brief period of time. Not even the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, the loss of Ruthenia, the transfer of a significant number of Hungarians, and the experience of 41 years of Communist Party rule were powerful enough to extinguish the consociational spirit. After 1989, it reemerged in the Czech and Slovak Federated Republic; beginning in 1993, it was evident in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. No longer is ethnicity a major factor in the Czech case, although it is to a degree in Slovakia, but in both states, segmentation along the lines of ideology, religion, and other factors is very much alive. Lijphart's theory helps explain the seemingly convoluted coalition politics in Bratislava and Prague. Similarly, realizing the patterns of elite behavior and what the electorates expect from political elites in consociational systems reveals the limits of the policies of Klaus, Zeman, and others who believe that altering the electoral rule book is more constructive than the tedious and sometimes painful work of developing the consociational compromises that other politicians and their constituents expect. It was a lesson that Beneš also never learned.

Instead of criticizing interwar Czechoslovakia as undemocratic or idealizing its accomplishments, the consociational model reveals the many ways in which the state was progressing as a democracy. Those who are quick to condemn the First Republic as a doomed democracy or a failed state frequently view politics in the 1920s and 1930s as ineffective and the progress of accommodating the needs of the national minorities as too slow. Their judgement is harsh and flawed. Only historic nostalgia permits the luxury of considering what would have happened to Czechoslovakia had there been no Munich Agreement; similarly, only presentism or the fallacy of *nunc pro tunc* justifies the condemnation of the First Republic because it was not democratic enough. After all, judged in early twenty-first century terms, the United States also failed to realize its full democratic promise throughout most of its history, at least until the end of the Jim Crow era.

Table 11. Coalitions and Cabinets of the Czechoslovak First Republic (1918–1938)

Coalition	Prime Minister	Tenure		Cabinet Composition				Strength in the National Assembly		Lijphartian Grand Coalition
		Dates in Office	Total Days	Total Seats	Participating Parties		Experts ³	Seats ⁴	Percent	
					Party Name ¹	Seats ²				
Unnamed	Karel Kramář	November 14, 1918–July 8, 1919	236	18	Social Democrats National Socialists Republicans Czechoslovak Populists National Democrats Slovaks ⁶	3 3 4 1 3 3	1	234/253 ⁵	925	Partial Oversized
Red-Green Coalition	Vlastimil Tusar	July 8, 1919- May 25, 1920	322	17	Social Democrats National Socialists Republicans Slovaks ⁶	4 4 4 4	1	189/276 ⁵	685	
	Vlastimil Tusar	May 25, 1920–September 15, 1920	113	18	Social Democrats National Socialists Republicans Slovaks ⁶	7 2 4 2	3	138/281 ⁷	497	
Bureaucratic Cabinet	Jan Černý	September 15, 1920– September 26, 1921	376	19	NA	NA	16	NA ⁸	NA ⁸	
Unnamed	Edvard Beneš	September 26, 1921–October 7, 1922	376	18	Social Democrats National Socialists Republicans Czechoslovak Populists National Democrats	4 2 3 2 2	4	166/285 ⁹	589	Partial Oversized

Coalition	Prime Minister	Tenure		Cabinet Composition				Strength in the National Assembly		Lijphartian Grand Coalition
		Dates in Office	Total Days	Total Seats	Participating Parties		Experts ³	Seats ⁴	Percent	
					Party Name ¹	Seats ²				
All-National Coalition	Antonín Švehla	October 7, 1922–November 15, 1925 ¹⁰	1,135 ¹⁰	17	Social Democrats National Socialists Republicans Czechoslovak Populists National Democrats	4 4 4 2 2	1	166/285	58	Partial Oversized
	Antonín Švehla	December 9, 1925–March 18, 1926	99	17	Social Democrats National Socialists Republicans Business and Commerce Czechoslovak Populists National Democrats	3 3 4 1 3 1	2	161/300	54	Partial
Bureaucratic Cabinet	Jan Černý	March 18, 1926–October 12, 1926	208	17	NA	NA	14	NA ⁸	NA ⁸	
Gentlemen's Coalition or Civic Coalition	Antonín Švehla	October 12, 1926–February 1, 1929	843	17	Republicans German Agrarians Business and Commerce Czechoslovak Populists German Christian Socialists Hlinka Slovak People's Party ¹¹ National Democrats ¹²	4 1 1 2 1 2 2	4	To January 15, 1927 127/300 After January 15, 1927 150/300 After April 28, 1928 164/300 See explanatory note 13.	To January 15, 1927 42 After January 15, 1927 50 After April 28, 1928 55 See explanatory note 13.	Partial Oversized
	František Udržal	February 1, 1929–October 27, 1929 ¹⁴	268 ¹⁴	16	Republicans German Agrarians Business and Commerce Czechoslovak Populists German Christian Socialists Hlinka Slovak People's Party ¹⁵ National Democrats	4 1 1 2 1 2 1	4	To October 8, 1929 164/300 After October 8, 1929 141/300 See explanatory note 15.	To October 8, 1929 55 After October 8, 1929 47 See explanatory note 15.	Partial Oversized

Coalition	Prime Minister	Tenure		Cabinet Composition				Strength in the National Assembly		Lijphartian Grand Coalition
		Dates in Office	Total Days	Total Seats	Participating Parties		Experts ³	Seats ⁴	Percent	
					Party Name ¹	Seats ²				
Wide Coalition	František Udržal	December 7, 1929–October 24, 1932 ¹⁶	1,052 ¹⁶	16	Social Democrats	3	1	206/300	69	Full Oversized
					National Socialists	2				
					German Social Democrats	1				
					Republicans	4				
					German Agrarians	1				
					Business and Commerce	1				
					Czechoslovak Populists	2				
					National Democrats	1				
	Jan Malypetr	October 29, 1932–February 14, 1934	473	16	Social Democrats	3	2	194/300	65	Full Oversized
					National Socialists	2				
					German Social Democrats	1				
					Republicans	3				
					German Agrarians	1				
					Czechoslovak Populists	2				
	National Democrats	1								
	Jan Malypetr	February 14, 1934–May 28, 1935 ¹⁷	468 ¹⁷	15	Social Democrats	3	2	179/300	60	Full Oversized
					National Socialists	2				
					German Social Democrats	1				
					Republicans	4				
					German Agrarians	1				
Czechoslovak Populists					2					
Jan Malypetr	June 4, 1935–November 5, 1935	154	16	Social Democrats	3	2	166/300	55	Full Oversized	
				National Socialists	2					
				German Social Democrats	1					
				Republicans	4					
				German Agrarians	1					
				Business and Commerce	1					
				Czechoslovak Populists	2					

Coalition	Prime Minister	Tenure		Cabinet Composition				Strength in the National Assembly		Lijphartian Grand Coalition
		Dates in Office	Total Days	Total Seats	Participating Parties		Experts ³	Seats ⁴	Percent	
					Party Name ¹	Seats ²				
Wide Coalition (continued)	Milan Hodža	November 5, 1935–December 18, 1935	43	16	Social Democrats	3	2	166/300	55	Full Oversized
					National Socialists	2				
					German Social Democrats	1				
					Republicans	4				
					German Agrarians	1				
					Business and Commerce	1				
					Czechoslovak Populists	2				
	Milan Hodža	December 18, 1935–July 21, 1937	581	16	Social Democrats	4	3	To July 2, 1936 138/300	To July 2, 1936 46	Full
					German Social Democrats	1				
					Republicans	4				
					German Agrarians ¹⁷	1		After July 2, 1936 139/300	After July 2, 1936 46	
					Business and Commerce	1		See explanatory note 18.	See explanatory note 18.	
					Czechoslovak Populists	2				
					German Christian Socialists ¹⁸	1				
	Milan Hodža	July 21, 1937–September 22, 1938	428	17	Social Democrats	4	3	To March 19, 1938 172/300	To March 19, 1938 57	Full Oversized
					National Socialists	1		March 19–23, 1938	March 19–23, 1938	
					German Social Democrats ¹⁹	1		189/300	63	
					Republicans	4		March 23–24, 1938	March 23–24, 1938	
					German Agrarians ¹⁹	1		184/300	61	
					Business and Commerce	1		March 24 – April 11, 1938	March 24 – April 11, 1938	
					Czechoslovak Populists	2		April 11, 1938	59	
					German Christian Socialists ¹⁹	1		178/300	After April 11, 1938	
					National Unificationists ¹⁹	1		After April 11, 1938 167/300	56	
								See explanatory note 19.	See explanatory note 19.	
Bureaucratic Cabinet	Jan Syrový	September 22, 1938–October 4, 1938	12	19	NA	NA	15	NA ⁸	NA ⁸	

Notes for Table 11:

Coalitions and Cabinets of the Czechoslovak First Republic (1918–1938)

- ¹ The party names appear here as they did through most of the First Republic's existence. Some name changes occurred immediately after the First World War, as parties merged, restructured, and split. For example, until March 1919, the National Democrats, the party of the first prime minister, Karel Kramář (1860–1937), were the State-Rights Democrats. The Czechoslovak Peoples Party or Czechoslovak Populists changed their name just before the October 28, 1918 revolution and did not alter it as other parties merged with them or when the party split. The Czechoslovak Agrarian Party became the Republican Party of the Czechoslovak Countryside in the spring of 1919 and then, when it merged with the Slovak National Peasant Party, in June 1922, it became the Republican Party of Agriculturalists and Small Farmers. The Slovak People's Party had its beginnings well before the First World War, and from the creation of the First Republic until November 1921, it formed a parliamentary club with the Czechoslovak Populists. In 1925, the party became known as the Hlinka Slovak People's Party after its founder, Andrej Hlinka (1864–1938).
- ² The numbers here indicate how many individuals a particular party had in the government. Furthermore, the numbers represent the cabinet at its full complement, not before parties entered or after they withdrew from the governing coalition. Not included in the tally are instances when one individual may have held a ministry but administered an additional ministry for a period of time. Not reflected in this table are instances when a minister left the cabinet and his replacement was from the same party; however, party changes appear. The number of cabinet posts reduced over the years. Furthermore, in the 1930s, the cabinet had some ministers without portfolios, and the tally includes them. The case of Edvard Beneš (1884–1948) deserves special attention. In early 1923, Beneš joined the National Socialist Party. Before that date, he served as an expert heading the Foreign Ministry. Afterward, he acted as an expert when the National Socialists were not in the government and as a National Socialist representative when that party was in the coalition. Beneš, who had been foreign minister since 1918, left the government, in December 1935, when he became president of the republic. Milan Hodža (1878–1944) formed his second government without Beneš and held the Foreign Ministry for slightly more than two months, after which Kamil Krofta (1876–1945) assumed the post as an expert.
- ³ In the event that an individual holding a ministry as an expert left the cabinet, his replacement also was an expert. See note 2 above for information about Beneš as an expert. On rare occasions, an individual may have held more than one cabinet post.
- ⁴ The total number of deputies in the National Assembly that supported a coalition includes only those parties in the government. Other parties may have backed a coalition from time to time (as an example, see note 13 below), especially if they were associated with the government party in a parliamentary club. When such a situation occurred, the size of the so-called guest party deputies usually was small. The Germans did not enter the Revolutionary National Assembly, which reduced the amount of opposition in the legislature. Although the vast majority of the Slovak and Czech deputies were enthusiastic about the republic, divisions in the Revolutionary National Assembly emerged, as some deputies supported bolshevism, and certain Slovaks began pressing for autonomy.
- ⁵ The Revolutionary National Assembly (1918–1920) began with 253 members. It expanded to 254 in December 1918, when it added an additional Slovak representative (see note 6 below); in January 1919 it had 255 deputies, after it had added a Social Democrat. With the addition of 14 more Slovak representatives in March 1919, the total came to 274 deputies. After two deputies had left the Social Democratic Party, in April 1919, the party insisted on replacing them, bringing the total number of deputies to 276. See Vladimír Záděra, *Politické strany v Národním shromáždění* (Prague: Published by the author, 1930), 42, and added information in Todd W. Huebner, "The Multinational 'Na-

- tion-State': The Origins and the Paradox of Czechoslovakia, 1914–1920," (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1993), 268.
- ⁶ This number represents Slovaks who were from parties based in Slovakia, identified themselves as representing rural interests, and were not members of the statewide socialist parties. Originally, the Slovaks did not have any functional political parties in the early months of the republic's existence. The Revolutionary National Assembly, which existed until it passed the constitution of February 29, 1920, coopted 40 deputies to represent Slovakia, some of whom actually were Czech. In December 1918, it added the daughter of the president of the republic, Alice Garrigue Masaryk (1879–1966), and in March 1919, it added 14 more Slovaks, one of whom soon left the Slovak group to become a Social Democrat. See Huebner, "The Multinational 'Nation-State,'" 268. Slovak agrarians were allies with the Republicans, and in June 1922, the two merged.
- ⁷ The first parliamentary election, which took place in 1920 and resulted in the second government of Vlastimil Tusar (1880–1924), did not take place in Ruthenia, which was just emerging from Hungarian occupation. The authorities delayed elections in several other border areas: Orava (Slovak: Oravská župa; Hungarian: Árva vármegye; German: Komitat Arwa) and Spiš (Hungarian: Szepes vármegye; German: Komitat Zips) in Slovakia; Těšínsko and Hlučínsko (Polish: Ziemia huleczyńska; German: Hultschiner Ländchen) in Silesia; Valticko (German: Feldsberger Gebiet) Southern Moravia; and Vitorazsko (German: Weitraer Gebiet) in Southern Bohemia. As a result, the April 1920 elections were for only 281 seats, rather than the 300 seats provided for in the constitution. When elections took place in Ruthenia, in March 1924, nine deputies entered the National Assembly. It was in 1925, during the general election, that the remaining districts first sent deputies to the National Assembly. Antonín Hajn, ed., *Ročenka Československé republiky*, vol. 1: 1922 (Prague: Nákladem Tiskového odboru Československé národní demokracie, 1922), 89, and Státní úřad statistický, *Les élections à l'Assemblée Nationale en Novembre 1925* (Prague: l'Office de Statistique de la République Tchecoslovaque, 1926), 7. On the Ruthenian elections, see Miloslav Naska, comp., *Národní shromáždění Republiky Československé: Poslanecká sněmovna–Senát, Národní výbor, Revoluční Národní shromáždění* (Jičín: Nákladem a tiskem firmy Šmejce a spol., 1924), 33.
- ⁸ There was no legal requirement to have the National Assembly approve a bureaucratic government, which the president of the republic had the power to appoint, just as he did with any political government, according to §§ 64 and 70 of the constitution. The first bureaucratic government of Jan Černý (1874–1959), which took office in 1920, received the support of a majority of the deputies, all of whose parties were part of the Pětka, but the stenographic protocols do not provide an exact number or party affiliation of those who voted for or against the government. Černý's second government of 1926 did not receive a majority, but it continued to operate with the backing of the parties that had been part of the All-National Coalition. After Jan Syrový (1888–1970) became the prime minister, in September 1938, the National Assembly did not meet until the following November, at which time the deputies officially heard of the changes that had taken place. See *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení*, no. 121, Law of February 29, 1920 (constitution); *Těšnopisecké zprávy o schůzích poslanecké sněmovny Národního shromáždění republiky Československé*, first electoral period (1920–1925), 14th session, October 16, 1920; second electoral period, 17th session, March 24, 1926; and fourth electoral period, 151th session, November 17, 1938; and Záděra, *Politické strany v Národním shromáždění*, 78–79.
- ⁹ In June 1921, the Czechoslovak Legionnaires temporarily received the right to elect four deputies, which brought the total in the National Assembly, at the time of Beneš's appointment as prime minister, to 285 deputies. The total number of deputies then should have been 304, but elections did not take place in all districts (see note 7 above).
- ¹⁰ The first government of Antonín Švehla (1870–1933) remained in office for 24 days after its resignation, until December 9, 1925, as a caretaker government. In the table, the day count does not reflect the additional time.
- ¹¹ On January 15, 1927, the Hlinka Slovak People's Party entered the government, but the party supported the coalition from its creation in October 1926. Until January 1927, other cabinet ministers administered the two ministries the Slovak Populists were to re-

ceive. One of the administrators was a Republican; the other, a Czechoslovak Populist. The reason the Hlinka Slovak People's Party delayed its entry into the coalition was because it demanded an end to the Ministry with Full Power for the Administration of Slovakia. Once the proper arrangements were complete, the party entered the government, and on June 28, 1928, the functions of the defunct ministry came under the Provincial Office in Bratislava.

- ¹² The National Democrats supported the coalition, but they continued to back the nomination of someone President Masaryk refused to approve, largely because of conflicts with Beneš. Finally, in April 1928, Ladislav Novák (1872–1946) proved an acceptable candidate. See Antonín Klimek, *Boj o Hrad*, vol. 1: *Hrad a Pětka: Vnitropolitický vývoj Československa 1918–1926 na půdorysu zápasu o prezidentské nástupnictví* (Prague: Pan-evropa, 1996), 106. Daniel E. Miller's explanation of the National Democrats' entry into the government on p. 159 of *Forging Political Compromise: Antonín Švehla and the Czechoslovak Republican Party, 1918–1933* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999) contains inaccuracies, but it is correct on p. 170.
- ¹³ Upon its creation in October 1926, the third Švehla government could count on the support of 164 deputies in eight parties: Republicans, German Agrarians (Bund der Landwirte), Magyar Nationalists, Tradesmen, Czechoslovak Populists, German Christian Socialists, Slovak Populists, and National Democrats. The Hlinka Slovak People's Party did not enter the cabinet until January 15, 1927, and the National Democrats did not join the government until April 28, 1928, but the parties supported the coalition in the National Assembly. The Republican Party during the third Švehla government provides an example of how coalitions sometimes received backing from parties outside of the cabinet. The Magyar National Party joined the coalition in the National Assembly, even though it did not have a seat in the cabinet. After the party withdrew its formal support in September 1927, it still voted with the coalition. Otherwise, the coalition would have had five votes less in the legislature. On the party's withdrawal, see "Různé zprávy: Proč převedena byla maďarská národní strana do opozice?" *Venkov*, September 18, 1927. For the first year of its existence, the coalition also had the support of the Hungarian National Christian Socialist Party.
- ¹⁴ The first government of František Udržal (1866–1938) remained in office for 41 days after its resignation, until December 7, 1929, as a caretaker government. In the table, the day count does not reflect the additional time.
- ¹⁵ The members of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party resigned from the government as a result of the trial and conviction of the Slovak Populist politician, Vojtech Tuka (1880–1946). Ludevít Labaj (1886–1937) resigned as minister of the unification of laws and the organization of the administration on October 8, 1929, and afterward the Republican Anton Štefánek (1887–1964) administered the ministry. Jozef Tiso (1887–1947) also resigned on October 8, 1929, as minister of public health and sport, and the ministry came under the administration of Jan Šrámek (1870–1956), the Czechoslovak Populist leader. The Hlinka Slovak People's Party had 23 seats in the National Assembly. When it withdrew from the coalition, the government lost its majority.
- ¹⁶ The second Udržal government remained in office for five days after its resignation, until October 29, 1932, as a caretaker government. In the table, the day count does not reflect the additional time.
- ¹⁷ The second government of Jan Malypetr (1873–1947) remained in office for 7 days after its resignation, until June 4, 1935, as a caretaker government. In the table, the day count does not reflect the additional time.
- ¹⁸ Franz Spina (1868–1938) from the German Agrarians served as minister without portfolio until July 2, 1936, when Erwin Zajicek (1890–1976), from the German Christian Socialists, took the position.
- ¹⁹ In October 1934, the National Democratic Party merged with two smaller right-wing groups to become National Unification. As the Sudeten German crisis intensified, the cabinet expanded, on March 19, 1938, to include the National Unificationists, adding František Ježek (1890–1969) as a minister without portfolio. When the cabinet formed, two German politicians became ministers without portfolios, despite their parties' weakening base, in

the hopes that their presence in the cabinet would discourage support for Sudeten German Party of Konrad Henlein (1898–1945): Spina, of the German Agrarians (Bund der Landwirte), who resigned on March 23, 1938, and Zajicek, of the German Christian Social Party, who resigned on March 24, 1938. Ludwig Czech (1870–1942) of the German Social Democratic Party headed the Ministry of Public Health and Sport until his resignation of April 11, 1938. He was the last German to leave the cabinet. After Czech's departure, Ivan Dérer (1884–1973), Social Democrat and minister of justice, administered the Ministry of Public Health and Sport, until May 10, 1938, when Ježek, of the National Unificationists, assumed the ministry and ceased to be a minister without portfolio.

Table 12. Extraconstitutional and Extraparliamentary Committees in Czechoslovakia, 1918–1938¹

Name of Informal Grouping of Party Leaders	Name in the National Assembly	Dates	Governments and Coalition Type		Participating Parties
			Governments	Lijphartian Grand Coalition ²	
Pětka (Committee of Five)	Pětka (Committee of Five)	September 1920–November 1925	First Černý (nonpolitical)	partial	Social Democratic Party National Socialist Party
			Beneš	partial	Republican Party Czechoslovak Populist Party
			First Švehla	partial	National Democratic Party
Šestka (Committee of Six)	Dvanáctka (Committee of Twelve)	December 1925–October 1926	Second Švehla	partial	Social Democratic Party National Socialist Party
			Second Černý (nonpolitical)	partial	Republican Party Business and Commerce Party Czechoslovak Populist Party National Democratic Party
Osmička (Committee of Eight)	Šestnáctka (Committee of Sixteen)	October 1926–December 1929	Third Švehla	partial	Republican Party
			First Udržal	partial	German Agrarian Party Magyar Nationalist Party ³ Business and Commerce Party Czechoslovak Populist Party Hlinka Slovak People's Party ⁴ German Christian Social Party National Democratic Party

¹ The extraparliamentary and extraconstitutional committees ended in 1929, with the second government of Udržal, but they evolved into the Political Committees (Czech singular: *politický komitét*) that met, as an extension of the cabinet, until the end of the republic.

² A Lijphartian or consociational grand coalition may be an oversized coalition, but its defining characteristics are that it is not only broad, including parties across the political spectrum that unite the most important ideologies, but it contains all major segments of the population, be they ethnic, cultural, or social. A partial Lijphartian or partial consociational grand coalition is missing at least one of the main segments but accommodates others.

³ In September 1927, the Magyar Nationalists left the coalition but continued to support it in the National Assembly. Despite their defection, the Osmička retained its name. "Různé zprávy: Proč převedena byla maďarská národní strana do oposice?" *Venkov*, September 18, 1927.

⁴ In October 1929, the Hlinka Slovak People's Party left the government and the Osmička. After its withdrawal, the six remaining coalition parties continued to be known as the Osmička.

Table 13. 1925 Elections to the Chamber of Deputies

	Czechoslovak Citizens	Population Percentage	Seats	Percentage of Seats	Ratio of Seats to Population	Per Seat		
						Citizens	Eligible Voters	Votes Cast
Bohemia	6,576,853	49.2	160	53.3	1.08	41,105	25,367	23,361
Moravia-Silesia	3,238,987	24.2	70	23.3	0.96	46,271	27,087	24,929
Bohemian Lands	9,815,840	73.4	230	76.7	1.04	42,678	25,891	23,839
Slovakia	2,973,457	22.2	61	20.3	0.91	48,745	26,361	23,664
Ruthenia	579,386	4.3	9	3.0	0.70	64,376	32,552	27,807
Total	13,368,683	100.0	300	100.0	1.00	44,562	26,186	23,922

Source: Compiled from Státní úřad statistický, *Les élections l'Assemblée Nationale en Novembre 1925* (Prague: l'Office de Statistique de la République Tchécoslovaque, 1926), Table 1, p. 8 (část textová), and Table I, p. 13 (část tabulková).

Table 14. 1925 Electoral Districts for the Chamber of Deputies

Electoral District ¹	Location ¹	Seats	Population of Electoral Districts					Per Seat	
			District ²	Urban Areas ³	Rural Areas ⁴	Ratio of Rural to Urban	Czecho- slovaks (percent) ⁵	Citizens	Eligible Voters
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
I. Prague A	B	24	843,524	743,050	978,649	1.32	94.2	35,147 ⁶	22,100
Prague B		24	878,175					36,591 ⁶	22,472
XIV. Moravská Ostrava	M-S	19	897,517	233,711	663,806	2.85	64.7	47,238	27,722
XII. Olomouc	M	17	793,684	163,412	630,272	3.86	62.4	46,687	27,386
VI. Louny	B	17	773,473	147,373	626,100	4.25	59.9	45,498	28,228
VIII. Plzeň	B	17	750,631	141,409	609,222	4.31	66.5	44,155	25,702
XI. Brno	M	17	746,122	221,758	524,354	2.36	81.1	43,890	26,424
IV. Mladá Boleslav	B	17	727,321	124,876	602,445	4.82	68.9	42,784	27,587
IX. České Budějovice	B	13	553,996	60,328	493,668	8.18	72.0	42,615	24,547
V. Česká Lípa	B	13	549,680	90,710	458,970	5.06	10.8	42,283	28,300
VII. Karlovy Vary	B	12	522,083	99,628	422,455	4.24	3.0	43,507	26,645
III. Hradec Králové	B	12	502,823	53,282	449,541	8.44	71.6	41,902	26,194
XVI. Nové Zámky	S	11	618,072	55,553	562,519	10.13	64.3	56,188	32,101
XVII. Turčiansky Sv. Martin	S	11	515,830	22,443	493,387	21.98	93.8	46,894	25,002
II. Pardubice	B	11	475,147	48,806	426,341	8.94	87.5	43,195	25,649

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
XXI. Prešov	S	10	444,921	17,577	427,364	24.34	85.8	44,492	22,433
XXII. Užhorod	R	9	579,386	67,147	512,239	7.63	32.9	64,376	32,552
XV. Trnava	S	9	431,321	121,580	309,741	2.55	60.4	47,925	25,612
X. Jihlava	M	9	424,063	64,588	359,475	5.57	69.4	47,118	27,325
XIII. Uherské Hradiště	M	8	377,601	53,058	324,543	6.12	97.8	47,200	26,089
XX. Košice	S	7	388,811	76,521	312,290	4.08	67.5	55,544	30,607
XVIII. Banská Bystrica	S	7	328,581	23,851	304,730	12.78	60.8	46,940	25,654
XIX. Liptovský Sv. Mikuláš	S	6	245,921	14,220	231,701	16.29	70.7	40,987	21,829
Total		300	13,368,683	2,644,881	10,723,802	4.05	65.5	44,562	26,186

Notes for Table 14: 1925 Electoral Districts for the Chamber of Deputies

- ¹ The locations are Bohemia (B), Moravia (M), Moravia and Silesia (M-S), Slovakia (S), and Ruthenia (R). All of Silesia was combined with Moravská Ostrava to form District XIV. Moravia and Silesia joined to form one province in 1927.
- ² The combined population of Districts I through IX was 6,964,443—more than half the country's population (6,684,342). All population statistics are from the 1921 census and subsequent updates.
- ³ The totals in column 5 are of urban areas with more than 10,000 inhabitants in an electoral district, based on the census of 1921, subsequent updates, and the size of cities at that time. Nitra (Hungarian: Nyitra and Nyitria; German: Neutra), Slovakia, had a population of 19,118 and was divided between Districts XV and XVI. Given the proportion of voters in each portion of Nitra in 1925, there were approximately 10,646 inhabitants in District XV and 8,472 inhabitants in District XVI. Those figures are calculated in the totals for Districts XV and XVI.
- ⁴ The rural areas included towns with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants.
- ⁵ The State Statistical Office counted Czechs and Slovaks together as Czechoslovaks.
- ⁶ Taken as a whole, the two electoral districts of Prague had 1,721,699 inhabitants, and each of its 48 deputies represented 35,869 citizens.

Sources: Information in columns 1, 3, 4, 9, and 10 is from Státní úřad statistický (SÚS), *Les élections l'Assemblée Nationale en Novembre 1925* (Prague: l'Office de Statistique de la République Tchecoslovaque, 1926), Table 1, p. 8 (část textová). Information in column 5 is from SÚS, *Statistická příručka Republiky Československé*, vol. 2 (Prague: Nákladem vlastním v komisi Knihkupectví Bursík a Kohout, 1925), Table XIII-36, pp. 394–397. In the same publication, the statistics in Table XIII-16, pp. 369–378, represent administrative districts that included not only the population of the towns and cities but also small satellite towns, villages, and rural areas. Information in column 8 is from SÚS, *Statistická příručka Republiky Československé*, vol. 2, Table XIII-7, pp. 362–363. There are discrepancies between the statistics that appear in *Statistická příručka Republiky Československé*, vol. 2, and *Les élections l'Assemblée Nationale en Novembre 1925*, since the former lists the entire population of the country as 13,374,364 and the latter 13,368,683, resulting in a difference of 5,681 inhabitants. The difference is not great, but it could result in a small change in the ratios or percentages for individual electoral districts. There were some anomalies in the electoral districts, a few of which were not always coterminous with the administrative districts.



Figure 6. The 1937 commemoration of the tragedy at Černová (Hungarian: Csernova). On October 27, 1907, in the town of Černová, near Ružomberok (Hungarian: Rózsahegy; German: Rosenberg), Slovakia, gendarmes fired on a crowd, killing 15 and wounding many others. Residents of Černová wanted Father Andrej Hlinka (1863–1938), who was from Černová and who spearheaded the fundraising for a new church, to officiate at the church's consecration. He was unable to attend because he was in prison for Slovak nationalist activities, and the church authorities refused to postpone the event. The shooting occurred when the gendarmes accompanying the procession to the church encountered a crowd intent on stopping the ceremony. The commander and most of the members of the contingent that fired on the crowd were ethnic Slovaks. On the tribune, from left to right, are Jozef Országh (1883–1949), the provincial president of Slovakia, Milan Hodža (1878–1944), a prominent Slovak politician of the Republican Party and prime minister between 1935 and 1938, and Andrej Hlinka, of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party.

Source: Martin, Slovakia, Slovenská národná knižnica, SH 13/172, "Slávnosť 30. výročia černovskej tragédie v Černovej, r. 1937."

Chapter 4

The Consociational Model and Interwar Slovakia

Introduction

In interwar Czechoslovakia, 22 percent of the population lived in Slovakia, and 15 percent of the population was ethnically Slovak. Czechoslovakia immediately incorporated Slovakia at the end of the First World War, although the redrawing of state borders was not formalized until the June 4, 1920 signing of the Treaty of Trianon. Up to that point, for almost a millennium, Slovakia was part of the Kingdom of Hungary, which, from 1526 until 1918, was within the Habsburg Monarchy. Among the ethnic Slovaks and the Rusyns, who populated the mountain valleys in the east, were Hungarians, Germans, Jews, and Roma, all of whom settled in towns, carved out their own villages, and farmed land from the lowlands along the Danube River to the foothills of the Tatra Mountains.¹ Ethnically diverse, predominantly agrarian, and renowned for its religious devotion, Slovakia before 1918 was isolated from the capitals of Budapest and Vienna because of poor transportation links, and its political over-

¹ As elaborated in the Introduction and in Chapter 1, the authors do not wish to imply, through their use of such terms as *Slovaks*, *Rusyns*, *Hungarians*, *Germans*, *Jews*, and *Roma*, that these indicate homogeneous, primordial groups that shared a single political agenda or even a single language. In fact, much of this chapter focuses on political and other divisions among Slovaks and on the construction of Slovak national identity. Nevertheless, especially when writing about nationalist conflicts and the means for alleviating them, these simple terms can be a convenient, even unavoidable shorthand for what are inevitably much more complicated forms of social and political interaction. Avoiding unembellished terms risks bogging down the narrative through the repeated use of phrases that are either convoluted (e.g., “individuals who viewed themselves as Slovaks”), overly specific, or misleading in a given context (e.g., “Slovak speakers” and “Slovak nationalists”). As a rule, this study has avoided phrases using the definite article (e.g., “the Slovaks”), except when this usage more accurately reflects the views of a cited scholar or of a specific political actor.

lords generally ignored the territory.² Slovakia was never a distinct province within Hungary, and neither the Hungarians nor the Habsburgs regarded Slovaks as a separate ethnic group. Along with other peoples in Central and Eastern Europe who, at the end of the First World War, broke away from the empires that had ruled over them, Slovaks detached themselves from the collapsing Habsburg Monarchy. Instead of forming their own nation state, they became a part of multiethnic Czechoslovakia in which they comprised less than one-sixth of the entire population.

This chapter examines how, in the interwar period, Slovaks integrated into the consociational political system that characterized the Czechoslovak First Republic. While a few social scientists posited the notion that Czechoslovakia between 1918 and 1938 was consociational, and the previous chapter in this volume is the first to systematically prove that it was, there is no body of literature that examines how Slovak internal politics and Slovakia's position within interwar Czechoslovakia conforms to Lijphart's consociational model.

Although Czech historians and politicians after 1989 have tended to adopt a more positive assessment of interwar Czechoslovakia, western historians continue to characterize Slovaks as an increasingly disgruntled minority within a Czech-dominated and overly centralized state.³ Anglo-American studies of interwar Czechoslovakia invariably maintain that, although ethnic Slovaks welcomed the creation of the Czechoslovak First Republic in 1918 and derived some benefits from being, along with the Czechs, a "state-forming nation" (Czech: *stá-totvorný národ*; Slovak: *štátotvorný národ*), they were unable to play a constructive role within the political system, were unfairly represented at all levels of government, could not shape decision-making, and had minimal autonomy because ultimate authority always resided with the central government in Prague, which was the seat of the president, the cabinet, the National Assembly, and almost all of the ministries of state and national institutions, such as the armed forces, the state railways, and the post office. Many also fault the supposed centralization of power in Prague and Czechs' domination of the new state for the nationalist backlash of Slovaks and the state's other minorities. Along with the economic crisis of the 1930s and the malign influence of Czechoslovakia's neighbors, many analysts blame government policies for exacerbating Slovak discontent and contributing to the dismantling of Czechoslovakia in 1938–1939

² Lorman, *The Making of the Slovak People's Party*, 1–15.

³ See, for example, Bugge's sharp assessment of the shifts in the historiography of interwar Czechoslovakia in his "Czech Democracy, 1918–1938," 3–6.

that resulted in an independent Slovak state. Mary Heimann, in her history of Czechoslovakia wrote, for example, of a “Prague-centered and Czech dominated government” that was “rigidly centralist,” while Joseph Rothschild, in his influential study of interwar Central Europe, blamed, among other things, the “gratuitous political blunders” of the “Czech political elite” for the state’s difficulties. Likewise, Piotr Wandycz reiterated the assessment of much recent scholarship on Czechoslovakia when he lambasted the “often unimaginative and insensitive” policies of the central government as a prime cause of Czechoslovakia’s destruction in 1938–1939.⁴

Slovak Marxist historians also denounced the Czechoslovak interwar political system, although they wrapped their quasi-nationalist arguments in class-based analysis. In 1969, the Slovak Academy of Science declared that the Czechs had constituted the “governing nation” in the republic and that the “Slovaks had not been granted the political rights which belonged to them as a nation,” even though they qualified their assertion by pointing out that the “system of centralized power and administration” actually served the interests of “the Czech bourgeois.”⁵ An identical assessment appeared in the Slovak Academy of Science’s six-volume official history of Slovakia that appeared two decades later and again explained that interwar Czechoslovakia was a centralist state that reflected “the interests of the Czech bourgeois.”⁶

The more recent works of Slovak historians generally have jettisoned the class-based rhetoric but continue to argue that the republic was a centralist state under the control of Czechs. An updated history of Slovakia that a group of leading Slovak historians published at the turn of the millennium stated that “the republic was, from the beginning, constructed as a unitary, centralized state,” while “the traditional political structures of Slovakia... gradually were liquidated.”⁷ Other contemporary historians have reiterated these conclusions.

4 Heimann, *Czechoslovakia*, 68 (see 68–70); Joseph Rothschild, *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1974), 135; and Piotr Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present*, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 218–19.

5 Zdenka Holotíková, “Slovenská otázka a KSČ za predmníchovskej republiky,” in Július Mésároš ed., *Slováci a ich národný vývin: Sborník materiálov z V. sjazdu slovenských historikov v Banskej Bystrici* (Bratislava: Vydavateľstvo Slovenskej akadémie vied, 1969), 247.

6 M. Kropilák, ed., *Dejiny Slovenska, 1918–1945*, *Dejiny Slovenska*, vol. 5 (Bratislava: VEDA, Vydavateľstvo Slovenskej akadémie vied, 1985), 25 and 50. This six-volume study began publication with vol. 5 in 1985. Only vol. 3, *Dejiny Slovenska, od roku 1848 do konca 19. storočia* (1992), edited by Milan Podrimavský, appeared after the fall of communism.

7 Ľubomír Lipták, “Slovensko medzi dvoma vojnami,” in Dušan Čaplovič et al., *Dejiny Slovenska* (Bratislava: Academic Electronic Press, 2000), 226.

According to Dušan Kováč, the Czechoslovak First Republic remained essentially “centralized and unitary.”⁸ Lubomír Lipták termed it a “unified, centralist state,” Natália Krajčovičová called it a “centralist method of administration,” and Carol Skalník Leff asserted that “the cabinet [in Prague] was the only level of entry into regional as well as statewide power.”⁹

Some Slovak historians have challenged this consensus with caution. Milan Zemko recognized the increased political influence that Slovaks obtained in the Czechoslovak First Republic, writing that, “until 1918, Slovaks never had been represented in the highest or higher state organs [of the Kingdom of Hungary] to the extent that they were in the Czechoslovak state.” Nevertheless, Zemko still insisted that, due to the predominance of Czechs in the leading positions of the republic, “it is possible to assert that Czechoslovakia was established as ... a new Czechoslovak state and simultaneously as a reestablished [Slovak: *obnovený*] Czech national state.”¹⁰ With the establishment of the new Czechoslovak state in 1918, according to Alena Bartlová, “the Slovaks gained the opportunity to enter the important organs, institutions, and functions of the common Czechoslovak state and because of this assumed... the shared responsibility for the mutual development and destiny of the republic.” Nevertheless, she still endorsed the view that the clash over what she terms “state rights” [Slovak: *štátne právo*], that is, the contest between proponents and opponents of centralization, dominated and embittered Czech and Slovak relations in the interwar period.¹¹ Her conclusion that the struggle between state centralism and the demand for Slovak autonomy led to the breakup of the republic informs the work of other contemporary Slovak historians and western scholars.¹²

8 Dušan Kováč, *Dějiny Slovenska*, trans. Emil Charous, *Dějiny států* (Prague: Nakladatelství lidové noviny, 1998), 187.

9 Lubomír Lipták, “Slovakia in the Twentieth Century,” in *A Concise History of Slovakia*, ed. Elena Mannová, trans. Martin C. Styan and David P. Daniel (Bratislava: Historický ústav SAV, 2000), 246–52; Natália Krajčovičová, “Slovakia in Czechoslovakia, 1918–1938,” in *Slovakia in History*, 139–41; and Carol Skalník Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918–1987* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 78.

10 Milan Zemko, “Politický systém a politické strany,” in *V medzivojnovom Československu, 1918–1939*, ed. Bohumila Ferenčuhová and Milan Zemko, *Slovensko v 20. storočí*, vol. 3 (Bratislava: VEDA, Vydavateľstvo Slovenskej akadémie vied: Bratislava, 2012), 244.

11 Alena Bartlová, “Slovenská otázka a slovenské štátoprávne snahy v rokoch 1918–1938,” in *Československo, 1918–1938: Osudy demokracie ve střední Evropě*, ed. Jaroslav Valenta, Emil Voráček, Jozef Harna, 2 vols. (Prague: Historický ústav Akademie věd České republiky, 1999), vol. 1, 170–78.

12 For Slovak scholars, see, for example, Lipták, “Slovensko medzi dvoma vojnami,” 227. Western scholars include Edward Wynot, *Cauldron of Conflict: Eastern Europe, 1918–1945* (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1999), 32–33; and James Felak, *At the Price of the Republic: Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, 1929–1938* (Pittsburgh and London: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994), 17–20.

A raft of policies that the central government enacted supposedly heightened Slovak frustration.¹³ Notable examples included the preamble to the constitution of 1920, which declared that Slovaks belonged to the single Czechoslovak nation (Slovak and Czech: *národ československý*), the language law of 1920, which stated that only “the Czechoslovak language is the state, official language of Czechoslovakia,” and the census forms, which lumped together the Slovak and Czech languages as *Czechoslovak*.¹⁴ The stubborn refusal of the central government to describe Slovaks as a separate nationality with a separate language reflected the view of the governing elite that Czechs and Slovaks spoke a common language, shared a common culture, and had a common history in the Habsburg Monarchy and the Great Moravian Empire, the first Slavonic state in Central Europe that endured from approximately 830 to 900 CE.

Some Slovaks agreed. In 1898, one small group of reform-minded intellectuals, known as the Hlasists, had launched the journal *Hlas* (Voice) to promote both social reform and the idea of Slovak membership in a Czechoslovak nation. As noted in the previous chapter, the Hlasists also recognized, as did politically astute Czechs that, if the Czechs and Slovaks were enumerated as two distinct nations, then the German-speaking minority, which was far more numerous than the Slovaks, would have to receive the same prominence as the state-creating Czechs and Slovaks. That would mean Czechoslovakia would not conform to the European model of a modern nation-state in which one nation was dominant over minority ethnicities, but would have awkwardly recreated the old multiethnic Habsburg Monarchy in miniature. Slovak nationalists complained, however, that all talk of a Czechoslovak nation was fictitious and denounced those Slovaks who endorsed the ideas as traitors. The idea of a single Czechoslovak nation, they claimed, reflected Czech cultural arrogance and political dom-

¹³ For a summary of the Slovak grievances in interwar Czechoslovakia, see Joseph A. Mikuš, *Slovakia: A Political History, 1918–1950*, trans. Kathryn Day Wyatt and Joseph A. Mikuš (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1963), 6–43. See also the cogent analysis of Slovak grievances in Jan Rychlík, *Češi a Slováci ve 20. století: Česko-slovenské vztahy 1914–1945* (Bratislava: Academic Electronic Press; Bratislava: Ústav T. G. Masaryka, 1997), 75–135; and R. W. Seton-Watson's exhaustive discussion of the same topic in *The New Slovakia* (Prague: Nakladatelství Fr. Borový, 1924).

¹⁴ “Ústava Československej republiky (29. februára 1920),” in *Dokumenty slovenskej národnej identity a štátnosti*, vol. 2, ed. Ján Beňko, et al. (Bratislava: Národné literárne centrum: Dom slovenskej literatúry 1998), 110. See also Stanislav Kirschbaum, *A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival* (New York Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995), 169–72; Natália Krajčovičová, “Slovakia in Czechoslovakia, 1918–1938,” in *Slovakia in History*, 141–142; and SÚS, *Seitání lidu v Republice Československé ze dne 15 února, 1921*, vol. 1, *Československá statistika*, vol. 9, book 1 (Prague: Státní úřad statistický, 1924), 13.

ination and had the practical effect of permitting Czech to become the working language of the state administration and public institutions in Slovakia.¹⁵

Another cause of Slovak disquiet was the arrival in Slovakia, in 1918–1919, of a large number of Czech soldiers, civil servants, and state employees, such as teachers and railway workers, who assisted in the postwar reconstruction of Slovakia. Many qualified Hungarians had fled the country in 1918, and most of those who remained, along with some Slovak critics of the government and a smattering of Bolsheviks, lost their positions as a result of their presumed unreliability. As there were too few qualified Slovaks to fill these vacancies, so Czech migrants took many of the new administrative, professional, and technical positions. Slovak critics insisted, however, that Czech officials expropriated jobs that could have gone to native-born Slovaks within a few years. They also claimed that these transplants imposed their native Czech language upon Slovaks and behaved tactlessly. For example, they unceremoniously stripped crucifixes from public buildings on the grounds that there now was a separation between Church and state.¹⁶

The central government also angered some Slovaks with the 1918 appointment of its own favored candidate, Vavro Šrobár, as the first head of the Ministry with Full Power for the Administration of Slovakia. Šrobár had been a leading figure in the prewar Slovak nationalist movement, but he was also a lapsed Catholic, a pugnacious vegetarian, and a staunch proponent of the idea that Slovaks and Czechs formed a single nation that should have a single state. He proceeded to integrate Slovakia into the new Czechoslovak state in an authoritarian manner, fully exploiting the fact that, as Krajčovičová stated, “the ability to issue decrees, as well as executive powers, was concentrated in his office.”¹⁷ He promptly abolished autonomous Slovak institutions, such as the Slovak national councils that had emerged across Slovakia in the autumn of 1918. Then, in response to the Hungarian Bolsheviks’ invasion of Slovakia in the spring of

15 For a perceptive discussion of Czech attitudes toward the Slovaks in the interwar period, see Peter Haslinger, “Hungarian Motifs in the Emergence and the Decline of a Czechoslovak National Narrative, 1890–1930,” in *Creating the Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe*, ed. Nancy M. Wingfield (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books; 2003), 172–78. See also James Felak’s concise and compelling discussion of Czechoslovakism and its Slovak critics in “Slovak Considerations of the Slovak Question: The Ludak, Agrarian, Socialist and Communist Views in Interwar Czechoslovakia” in *The Czech and Slovak Experience: Selected Papers from the Fourth World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies, Harrogate, 1990*, ed. John Morison (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 136–62.

16 Seton-Watson, *The New Slovakia*, 36–37; and Felak, “At the Price of the Republic,” 20.

17 Krajčovičová, “Slovakia in Czechoslovakia, 1918–1938,” 141. For a more nuanced assessment of Šrobár’s ministry, see Baer, *A Life Dedicated to the Republic*, 73–108.

1919, he temporarily imposed martial law. In the words of Stanislav Kirschbaum, Šrobár introduced “an iron centralism in Slovakia.”¹⁸ Even though Šrobár left office in 1920, some Slovaks accused his successors of working in his spirit when, for example, they oversaw the amalgamation and abolition of the historic counties of Slovakia, which had provided a degree of self-governance and local autonomy for centuries and had fostered local identities and regional patriotism.

The government’s cultural and economic policies also angered Slovaks. The state assumed control of and secularized a number of schools that had been under the direction of various religious faiths, and there was the occasional desecration of religious symbols and monuments.¹⁹ As part of the land reform, the state expropriated, with some compensation, a sizeable proportion of the agricultural estates in the hands of the Catholic Church in Slovakia, a measure that imposed serious financial constraints upon the clergy, who became increasingly dependent on state subsidies and the *congrua* state salary. Also arousing considerable ire in Slovakia was Prague’s insistence that Slovakia contribute a share of its revenue that roughly corresponded to the proportion of its population in the state. As a result, even though economic output in Slovakia was lower than in the Bohemian Lands, with Slovakia and Ruthenia together contributing only about 15 percent to the national income, Slovaks allegedly paid higher income tax rates, higher duties on alcohol, and higher taxes on railroad freight than Czechs. Critics also insisted that Slovaks received lower agricultural subsidies and less generous pensions than those in the Bohemian Lands, in spite of government claims to the contrary.²⁰

The central government’s occasionally heavy-handed treatment of Slovak critics of the new regime also attracted considerable attention. Slovak politicians and priests as well as nationalist and socialist agitators faced imprisonment. Authorities censored or suspended newspapers. The police occasionally manhandled or opened fire on strikers and other protesters, killing five people in 1920, four people in 1921, one person in 1922, one person in 1924, one person in 1928, and seven people in the early 1930s.²¹ Such occurrences also took

¹⁸ Kirschbaum, *A History of Slovakia*, 160.

¹⁹ Felak, “*At the Price of the Republic*,” 21–23.

²⁰ Zora Pryor, “Czechoslovak Economic Development in the Interwar Period,” in *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic*, 213; Felak, “*At the Price of the Republic*,” 24; Rychlík, *Češi a Slováci ve 20. století*, 96; and Milan Hodža, “Speech Delivered before the Budgetary Committee of the Chamber of Deputies on the 17th of November 1937,” in *Nationality Policy in Czechoslovakia*, 27–28; and Jaromír Nečas, “Social Relief from the Angle of Nationality,” in *Nationality Policy in Czechoslovakia*, 73.

²¹ Milan Ďurica, *Dejiny Slovenska a Slovákov* (Košice: Pressko, 1995), 121–142; and Kropilák, ed., *1918–1945*, 60–64.

place in the Bohemian Lands, but in Slovakia, it was tempting to view them through the lens of ethnic oppression.

Yet another source of tension concerned the government's inability or unwillingness to fulfill promises that Czech politicians had made during the war. As Kirschbaum noted, the Cleveland Agreement of October 1915, which resident American Czech and Slovak politicians had signed, promised that Czechoslovakia was to be a federal state, that Slovakia was to have its own parliament, government, and administration, and that Slovak was to be the sole official language in Slovakia. The Pittsburgh Agreement of May 1918, which representatives of American Slovaks in Pittsburgh signed, alongside Masaryk and his associates, included almost identical promises.²² The Pittsburgh Agreement, in particular, became the Slovak nationalists' totemic expression of the central government's betrayal of the Slovak nation. When its existence first became known in Slovakia in 1919, Slovak nationalists were outraged to discover that the framers of the state discarded earlier promises to grant Slovakia wide-ranging autonomy. The actual document arrived in Slovakia in 1938, and when a visiting delegation of Slovak-Americans paraded it through the streets of Bratislava, the inhabitants greeted it with a reverence normally associated with religious icons.²³

Slovak dissatisfaction was already evident in the first weeks following the establishment of the republic and crystalized with the relaunch of the Slovak People's Party on December 19, 1918. Before the republic's creation, the party maintained that it had shielded the Slovaks against the demands of Budapest, and now it claimed to defend the Slovaks against the orders from Prague. Ultranationalist, explicitly Catholic, instinctively authoritarian, and replete with a fascist wing that grew in influence throughout the interwar period, it rapidly became the most popular party in Slovakia. It rejected claims that Czechs and Slovaks were one ethnic group, and it condemned the liberal ethos of the new regime in Prague, including the secularization of the Slovak school system, the expropriation of ecclesiastical estates, the behavior of Czech soldiers and officials in Slovakia, the restrictions on freedom of speech and association, and the assault on Slovakia's traditional county system.²⁴ In 1922, the Slovak People's Party (after 1925 the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, also referred to here as the Slovak Populists) drew up plans for an autonomous Slovakia that, in one

²² Kirschbaum, *A History of Slovakia*, 150–151.

²³ For the text of the Pittsburgh agreement, see Jan Galandauer, *Vznik Československé republiky 1918: Programy, projekty, předpoklady* (Prague: Svoboda, 1988), 299–300.

²⁴ Felak, "At the Price of the Republic," 18–34; and Lorman, *The Making of the Slovak People's Party*, 161–73.

form or another, became the centerpiece of every program it put to the electorate afterward.²⁵

The increasingly strident demands of the Slovak Populists' for Slovak autonomy received the endorsement of the Slovak National Party, the Communist Party, and a multiparty group of young Slovak intellectuals.²⁶ Even the various Hungarian minority parties supported the call for autonomy on the sensible grounds that they would have greater influence on an autonomous Slovak government than they could expect to exert on the central government in Prague. Some Hungarians also hoped that Slovak autonomy would be the first step toward dismantling the Czechoslovak state and ultimately reincorporating Slovakia into the Kingdom of Hungary.²⁷

In October 1938, following Germany's annexation of the Sudetenland, the demoralized government in Prague made a desperate attempt to shore up the rump state by granting Slovakia extensive autonomy in the renamed Second Czecho-Slovak Republic. Six months later, Prague placed Slovakia under martial law. Aware that Germany was intent on invasion, many Slovaks shrugged off both the bribes and threats from Prague to place their faith in Berlin. On March 14, 1939, Slovakia declared its independence, thereby nullifying the international guarantees of the republic's sovereignty that the great powers had issued. The following day, the German army occupied Prague and transformed the Bohemian Lands into a German protectorate. Slovakia gained its independence, but it spent the rest of the war as a client state of Germany, and in 1945, Czechoslovakia reincorporated it.

Although the Slovak autonomist and independence movement ultimately triumphed, other parties in interwar Slovakia rejected the notion that Slovakia either deserved or would benefit from autonomy. For example, both the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, which had been the most popular party in Slovakia until the local elections of 1923, and the Republican Party, which emerged from every election as the second most popular party in Slovakia, opposed any radical overhaul of the centralist regime. Politicians in both parties

25 Natália Rolková, "Smerovanie Slovenskej ľudovej strany v rokoch 1905–1939 na podklade jej programových dokumentov," in *Slovenská ľudová strana v dejinách, 1905–1945*, ed. Róbert Letz, Peter Mulík, and Alena Bartlová (Martin: Matica slovenská, 2006), 172–76.

26 For an account of the young Slovak intellectuals' support for autonomy, see James Felak, "The Congress of the Young Slovak Intelligentsia, June 1932: Its Context, Course, and Consequences," in *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 21, special issue 2 (Fall 1993): 107–127. For a clear account of the Communist Party's embrace of Slovak nationalism, see Yeshuah Jelinek, *The Lust for Power: Nationalism, Slovakia, and the Communists, 1918–1948* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1983), 7–24.

27 Felak, "At the Price of the Republic," 89–91.

were wary that calls for Slovak autonomy were only the first steps toward dismantling Czechoslovakia and reincorporating Slovakia in Hungary. In 1929, their suspicions appeared to be confirmed when Vojtech Tuka (1880–1946), in the leadership of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, was exposed as a Hungarian spy. As a result of this enduring and closely fought clash between the autonomist and centralist parties, interwar Slovak politics supposedly were stagnant and acrimonious, as Matej Hanula described. He asserted that “the controversies over autonomy became a permanent part of life in the parliament.... The argument did not change at all between 1920 and 1938. The autonomists were always traitors ... [but] for them autonomy was the solution to all the problems of the country.”²⁸ Krajčovičová went even further, arguing that the acrimony between the two sides actually increased during the interwar period. She wrote, “the Slovak political scene became ever more fragmented,” and “there was an increase in mutual accusations instead of cooperation in the interests of Slovakia.”²⁹

Certainly, no pre-1938 Czechoslovak government was prepared to formally grant autonomy to Slovakia. The 1920 constitution, which remained in effect throughout the duration of the republic, declared that Czechoslovakia “shall form a united and indivisible unit.”³⁰ Leading Czech politicians repeatedly dismissed the idea of Slovak autonomy as a ploy to undermine and then break up the state, while Slovak members of the Republican Party and Social Democratic Party regarded the demand for autonomy as “unfortunate, senseless and impracticable.”³¹ In 1919, after having traveled to Paris on a Polish passport to convince the peacemakers of Slovakia's right to self-government, Andrej Hlinka, the iconic leader of the Slovak autonomist movement and the Slovak Populists, faced seven months' imprisonment. The authorities drove some of his more outspoken supporters into exile, occasionally broke up or prohibited his party's meetings, banned the party's paramilitary force, the Rodobrana, and censored or briefly suspended his party's newspaper. In short, the lengthy struggle between the governing centralists, on the one hand, and the Slovak as well as German, Hungarian, Polish, and Rusyn nationalists, on the other, appears to affirm Heimann's contention that “what mattered most in the

²⁸ Matej Hanula, “Slovaks in the Prague Parliament, 1918–1939,” *Parliaments, Estates and Representation*, 26 (November 2006), 165.

²⁹ Krajčovičová, “Slovakia in Czechoslovakia, 1918–1938,” 147.

³⁰ *Sb. z. a n.*, no. 21, Law of February 29, 1920, Section 1, §3.

³¹ Hanula, “Slovaks in the Prague Parliament, 1918–1939,” 164. See also Ladislav Deák, “Miesto Slovenska v československom štáte v rokoch 1918–1938 z medzinárodného hľadiska,” in *Slovensko v Československu (1918–1939)*, ed. Milan Zemko and Valerián Bystrický (Bratislava: VEDA, 2004), 29–30.

Czechoslovak First Republic was not political affiliation, but ethnicity or ‘nationality,’” and that it was this clash of nationalities that undermined and ultimately destroyed the state.³²

Some scholars’ critiques of Czechoslovak politics, including those of Heimann and Krajčovičová, also correspond to the views of British diplomats in interwar Prague. Unlike their American colleagues, who regarded Czechoslovakia favorably, British diplomats came to view the Czechoslovak political system as oppressive and the clashes between the central government and the various nationalist movements and parties as a consequence of that oppression.³³ Sir Joseph Addison (1879–1953), the British minister to Prague in the first half of the 1930s, was an unusually blunt and entertaining critic, who, in one exceptionally caustic missive to London, described Czechoslovakia as “a fictitious country founded on several injustices and maintained by the continuation of injustice and the apparent impossibility of putting an end to it without a convulsion which it is in the general interest to avoid.”³⁴

Even Addison, however, initially found little to complain about in his reports on relations between Czechs and Slovaks and argued that Slovaks indeed had obtained “important” concessions from the central government.³⁵ In his annual report on developments in Czechoslovakia in 1931, the same year that he described Czechoslovakia as “a fictitious country,” Addison also informed London that Slovaks had come to “accept” Czechoslovakia’s existence and that “it is no longer possible to raise up Slovakia against Czechoslovakia.”³⁶ It took until 1934, with the Czechoslovak economy mired in the Great Depression, for Addison to change his mind, notifying London that Slovaks “are in a serious state of discontent,” adding, two years later, that Slovaks were “a discontented and sullen minority” and “opponents of Czech rule.”³⁷

That Addison, an exceptionally harsh critic of Czechoslovakia who lost his position because of his hostility toward Czechoslovak officialdom, only belatedly concluded that Czech and Slovak relations were irreparable suggests that claims about Slovakia’s subservient position within the Czechoslovak First Re-

³² Heimann, *Czechoslovakia*, 54.

³³ Gábor Bátonyi, *Britain and Central Europe, 1918–1939* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 185–221. See also Lindsay W. Michie, *Portrait of an Appeaser: Robert Hadow, First Secretary in the British Foreign Office, 1931–1939* (Westport, CT, and London: Praeger Publishers 1996), 63–64. On the American diplomats, see Chapter 3.

³⁴ London, National Archives (NA) of Great Britain, Foreign Office (FO), 371 (Political Department, General Correspondence)/15180, 94–104 (from 1931).

³⁵ London, NA, FO 371/12094, 157–61 and 214–16.

³⁶ London, NA, FO 371/15900, 97–113.

³⁷ London, NA, FO 371/18390, 33–59, and 20375, 99.

public are wide of the mark. Slovakia did not have parity with the Bohemian Lands that were almost four times more populous. Likewise, Slovak speakers did not have parity with their Czech counterparts, who were more than three times as numerous. In a vigorous democracy like Czechoslovakia, these demographic imbalances mattered. Nevertheless, the Slovaks benefitted from the four key characteristics that define a consociational regime: they were included in every coalition that governed Czechoslovakia throughout the interwar period; they profited from new and increasingly powerful political institutions that emerged within Slovakia and obtained multiparty support and earned a reputation for effective governance; they enjoyed proportionality by having representation in the National Assembly in numbers befitting their share of the population; and they wielded an informal minority veto to block, amend, or reverse policy. A focus on the inequality between Czechs and Slovaks as well as the clash between centralists and autonomists thus overlooks the fruitful cooperation between Czech and Slovak parties and politicians both in statewide and autonomous Slovak institutions. The productive collaboration both among Slovaks and between Slovaks and Czechs was the direct result of a consociational political system that treated the Slovaks as a distinct segment of the population and granted them both substantial influence and genuine autonomy.

The Favorable Conditions for Consociational Democracy in Slovakia

At first glance, interwar Slovakia met only two of Lijphart's nine conditions that facilitate the successful establishment of consociational democracy. It had a small population, its segmental groups were concentrated geographically, and it confronted a series of "external dangers" that promoted internal unity. Its deviations from Lijphart's model were, however, largely illusory. It appeared to have a unified majority (the ethnic Czechoslovaks), but that was the result of statistical manipulation. There were large socioeconomic disparities between the various ethnic groups, but these disparities actually favored the ethnic minorities. It lacked an obvious single overarching loyalty, such as the allegiance the peoples of the Habsburg Monarchy often exhibited toward their ruling dynasty, but it possessed a powerful foundation myth, which ensured that ethnic Slovaks felt an overarching loyalty to the republic and to each other, and Masaryk won the respect of most Slovaks. Finally, it appeared to lack the "traditions of compromise and autonomy" that the Austrian part of the Habsburg Monarchy had fostered, but Slovaks had learned to work together to defend their national interests against Hungarian chauvinism. In reality, Slovakia failed to meet only

two of Lijphart's nine favorable conditions. It did not possess a small number of groups, and these groups were not roughly the same size. Both of these deviations from Lijphart's model were, however, favorable for the growth of consociational politics.

Lijphart argued that one of the most important conditions for the establishment of a successful consociational political system was that there must not be a single unified majority, usually a dominant ethnic group. Official statistics, compiled as a result of the 1921 and 1930 statewide censuses, indicate that Slovakia did not meet this condition. They record that ethnic Czechoslovaks in Slovakia made up 68 percent of the population in 1921 and 72 percent in 1930. In reality, these statistics were artificial and misleading, and no ethnic group formed a clear majority in interwar Slovakia. The census designation *Czechoslovak* included both Slovaks and at least 71,733 Czechs, most of whom had migrated to Slovakia after 1918 but had little in common with native-born Slovaks, apart from their mutually comprehensible mother tongues.³⁸ It also blurred together those Slovaks who regarded themselves as part of a single "Czechoslovak nation" and those Slovaks who considered themselves as belonging to a separate Slovak nation.

The Czechoslovak census designation also included significant numbers of so-called quiet or Magyarone Slovaks, who, prior to 1918, had registered themselves as Hungarians. Comparing the Hungarian census of 1910 with the Czechoslovak census of 1921, it is evident that close to 300,000 persons, who formerly had categorized themselves as of Hungarian "mother tongue," now declared their "nationality" or "mother tongue" (Czech: *národnost/mateřský jazyk*) as "Czechoslovak."³⁹ These people had made a pragmatic decision to change their national identity after 1918, but many of them remained wedded to the Hungarian language and culture, and there is no guarantee that their new national identity influenced their political affiliation. Thus, the Hungarian National Christian Social Party established a Slovak Section that had some success in attracting Slovak-speaking voters and enabling prominent Slovak nationalists to switch their allegiance to Hungarian irredentism.⁴⁰ After excluding these Mag-

³⁸ SÚS, *Štítání lidu v Republice Československé ze dne 15 února, 1921*, vol. 1, 11.

³⁹ Xénia Šuchová, comp., "Přílohy I–Obyvatelstvo," in *Slovensko v Československu, 1918–1938*, 494–96; and SÚS, *Štítání lidu v Republice Československé ze dne 15 února, 1921*, vol. 1, 11. The increase in the number of "Czechoslovak" speakers between 1910 and 1921 was actually more than 330,735, but that also included the 71,733 persons who had moved from the Bohemian Lands after 1918 (15,660 persons had moved in the opposite direction).

⁴⁰ See Béla Angyal, *Érdekvédelem és önszerveződés: Fejezetek a csehszlovákiai magyar pártpolitika történetéből 1918–1938* (Galánta and Dunaszerdahely: Fórum Intézet and Lilium Aurum Könyvki-

yarones and Czech immigrants from the 1921 statistical data, Slovaks made up fewer than 55 percent of the population of Slovakia in 1921.⁴¹ Even the estimate that 55 percent of the population was unambiguously Slovak probably is overstated because the officials who compiled these censuses were eager to legitimize the establishment of the Czechoslovak state and thus inflated the number of Czechoslovaks in Slovakia, a task that the inability of substantial numbers of those questioned to give a clear definition of their own nationality facilitated. Thus, as Derek Sayer pointed out, the enumerators of the census “ended up ascribing a nationality to their respondents.”⁴²

Moreover, not only were there sizeable minorities, but they were, with the exception of the Jews and Roma, generally concentrated in particular areas of the country. Even the official censuses conceded that almost 22 percent of the population of Slovakia declared themselves to be Hungarian, and almost all of them resided in the southern part of Slovakia along the border with Hungary. Those who identified as German comprised at least 5 percent of the population and were concentrated in the larger cities and in one part of the Spiš region in eastern Slovakia. Ukrainians and Rusyns were 3 percent of the population and lived in the far eastern part of Slovakia. A further 2 percent of the population listed their nationality as Jewish, but they were spread across Slovakia, residing in the largest cities and throughout the countryside.⁴³ There was also a sizeable Roma minority in Slovakia that tended to reside in the countryside and were numerous in eastern Slovakia. They were not permitted to identify themselves as such in the census, but they numbered approximately 80,000 persons, or about 3 percent of the population, and it is possible that the enumerators also ascribed the Czechoslovak nationality to them.⁴⁴

adó, 2002), 65–66 and 204; and Thomas A. Lorman, “For God and Which Nation?: The Ideology of František Jehlička, Priest, Politician and Pariah of the Slovak National Movement,” *Slavonic and East European Review* 96, no. 3 (July 2018): 507–540.

41 Šuchová, comp., “Prílohy I–Obyvateľstvo,” 494–96.

42 Derek Sayer, “The Language of Nationality and the Nationality of Language: Prague, 1780–1920,” *Past and Present* 153 (November 1996): 180–81; Tara Zahra, “The ‘Minority Problem’ and National Classification in the French and Czechoslovak Borderlands,” *Contemporary European History*, 17, no. 2 (May 2008): 158–63; and the extended discussion of census manipulation in Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*, 118–26. See also Gyula Popely, *Ellenszélben: A felvidéki magyar kisebbség első évei a Csehszlovák Köztársaságban (1918–1925)*, (Pozsony: Pesti Kalligram Kft., 1995), 150–57; and Pieter C. van Duin, *Central European Crossroads: Social Democracy and National Revolution in Bratislava (Pressburg)* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 306–309.

43 Šuchová, comp., “Prílohy I–Obyvateľstvo,” 494.

44 Milena Hübschmannová, “Pronásledování Romů za nacismu (historický nástin), in “*Po židoch cigáni*”: *Svědectví Romů ze Slovenska, 1939–1945*, ed. Milena Hübschmannová, vol. 1 (Prague: Triáda, 2005), 11.

In short, the ethnodemographic situation in Slovakia was not ideal for the growth of consociational politics as Slovaks made up at least half of the entire population. Nevertheless, the minorities were substantial, and legacies of bilingualism and assimilation as well as the attraction of alternative identities, such as Hungarian, Czech, or Czechoslovak, fragmented the Slovaks. Certainly, throughout the interwar period, no more than half the population of Slovakia possessed an unambiguous sense of their own Slovak national identity. Moreover, economic and religious segmentation further undermined the dominance of ethnic Slovaks.

The second important condition, according to Lijphart, that facilitates consociational politics is the absence of large socioeconomic disparities between the various segments. In Slovakia, these disparities existed, but they were diminishing, and they actually favored ethnic minorities. They also helped level the playing field because the minorities' economic advantages counterbalanced ethnic Slovaks' demographic superiority.

Slovakia remained an agrarian society throughout the interwar period. About 60 per cent of the population was employed in agriculture, forestry, and fishing, and only 17.4 percent in industry, rising to 19.4 percent on the eve of the Great Depression.⁴⁵ Agricultural wealth traditionally was in the hands of the Hungarian large estate owners, while Hungarian, German, and Jewish industrialists, merchants, and financiers generally controlled the manufacturing and mercantile portion of the economy. The land reform, enacted during the Czechoslovak First Republic, weakened but did not destroy the economic power of the Hungarian landed classes, and it did not diminish the agricultural laborers' deference toward the estate owners. Moreover, Hungarian farmers also tended to have larger incomes than their Slovak counterparts because they were concentrated in the fertile and easily farmed lowland regions of southern Slovakia. At most, internal migration, colonization, and agricultural innovations reduced but did not eliminate this disparity. After 1918, the overwhelmingly German, Hungarian, and Jewish business class also faced strong competition from Czech businesses and a growing Slovak bourgeoisie, but they still retained substantial wealth and influence. According to one estimate, in the middle of the 1920s, minorities still owned more than 80 percent of Slovak industry, and Ľubomír Lipták noted that, in Bratislava, Slovakia's largest city, not a single Slovak was appointed to the head of a large business throughout the

45 Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, 13–14; and Kirschbaum, *A History of Slovakia*, 173.

interwar period.⁴⁶ Hungarians, Germans, and Jews, therefore, continued to be disproportionately represented in the wealthier occupations, while the economically disadvantaged ethnic Slovaks largely resided in the less urbanized and generally impoverished hilly regions and were poorly represented in the professions and the leading positions in trade and industry.⁴⁷

Lijphart also argued that “traditions of compromise and accommodation” helped foster consociational politics. Superficially, Slovakia did not possess such a heritage. The Habsburg consociational legacy was most apparent in the Bohemian Lands, which had been a part of Cisleithenia.⁴⁸ In Hungary from the 1870s until 1918, a single government party enjoyed almost unbroken dominance in parliament, and it used its control of the administration to discriminate against opponents, both real and imagined. Nevertheless, ethnic Slovak politicians learned to cooperate against the dominant Hungarian regime prior to 1918; therefore, they developed their own traditions of compromise and accommodation.

Due to the small size of the Slovak population and because so many educated Slovaks had assimilated into the dominant Hungarian culture, the prewar Slovak political elite was minute. Some estimated that only about 1,000 Slovaks were politically active in the years before the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy.⁴⁹ They belonged to separate parties and factions, and they occasionally had bitter public disputes.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, they all made the decision to affirm their Slovak national identity, rather than seeking success by assimilating into the Hungarian nation, and they knew each other intimately since they frequently worked together, supported each other’s candidacies, and shared the experience of resisting the Hungarian state’s efforts to turn Slovaks into Hungarian patriots, the so-called process of Magyarization.⁵¹ This policy, the product of a chauvinistic contempt for Slovak culture and a liberal conviction that minority languages impeded social advancement, accelerated after the 1867 *Ausgleich*,

46 Seton-Watson, *The New Slovakia*, 94; and Lubomír Lipták, *Slovensko v 20. storočí: Najdiskutovanejšia historická esej o Slovensku* (Bratislava: Pesti Kalligram Kft. and Partizánské: Expresprint, spol. s r.o., 1998), 137–38.

47 Simon, *The Hungarians of Slovakia in 1939*, 28.

48 See Chapter 2.

49 Seton-Watson, *The New Slovakia*, 13–14.

50 For example, between 1912 and 1913, *Slovenské ľudové noviny* and *Slovenský týždenník* engaged in protracted polemics.

51 Etienne Boissérie, “The Formation of a New Administrative and Political Apparatus in Slovakia, 1918–1920: Backgrounds and Networks,” in *Postwar Continuity and New Challenges in Central Europe, 1918–1923: The War That Never Ended*, ed. Tomasz Pudlocki and Kamil Ruzsala (New York and Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2022), ch. 13.

when Hungary obtained a substantial measure of self-government within the Habsburg Monarchy. Hungarian became the sole official language of the government, parliament, local administration, judiciary, state firms, and most large businesses. The list of parishes where Hungarian was the sole language of worship substantially increased. The number of schools that taught through the medium of Slovak dramatically declined. Illiteracy in Slovakia was staggeringly high, and Slovak still was developing as a literary language, so many educated Slovaks assimilated into the Hungarian nation. Slovak critics of Magyarization faced fines and imprisonment, and they often went into exile.

In response, leading Slovak activists generally downplayed their ideological differences and cooperated to resist Magyarization. They gathered under the auspices of the prewar Slovak National Party (Slovak: Slovenská národná strana, SNS, also referred to here as Slovak Nationalists), they all sat in one common so-called nationalities faction in the Hungarian Parliament, and they all participated in or endorsed the Slovak National Council that emerged in October 1918 and formally proclaimed that the Slovaks would separate from Hungary to join the new Czechoslovak state. During the Dual Monarchy, the Hungarian authorities saw little difference between the various Slovak politicians, whom they listed formally as belonging to a nonexistent Slovak Nationality Party (Hungarian: Szlovák nemzetiségi párt) and described in internal government reports as “Slovak nationalists” (Hungarian: Tót nemzetiségi) or part of the Pan-Slav movement (Hungarian: pánszláv mozgalom). Some Slovak nationalists even concurred. Šrobár, when asked under oath, in 1906, to explain the difference between the various Slovak political parties, responded that the difference existed “only in words, not in substance.”⁵²

Lijphart also posited that a consociational democracy benefitted from the existence of overarching loyalties to the new state. With the end of the Habsburg Monarchy, many of the previous overarching loyalties dissolved, including the loyalty to the ruling dynasty, an admiration for the Imperial army, and a *Hungarus* sense of belonging to the Kingdom of Hungary, which had been the homeland of Slovakia’s population for centuries. The Catholic Church survived the collapse of the monarchy, but it could not attract the loyalty of the quarter of the Slovak population that adhered to other religions, and its earlier support for Magyarization repelled some nationalist Slovaks. The 1919 expulsion of five of

⁵² *The Political Criminal Trial against the Rev. Father Andrew Hlinka, the Rev. Father Joseph Tomik, Dr. Srobar, and others in Ruzomberok, Lipto v. Comitatus, Hungary, Nov. 26th to Dec. 6th in the Year of our Lord One Thousand Nine Hundred and Six* (New York: American Slovak Association of Journalists of the United States of America, 1907), 21.

the six bishops whose episcopal sees were located in Slovakia also undermined its authority. Their replacements, who were only appointed in 1921, took time to build up their authority and gradually purge the local church hierarchy of its pro-Hungarian tendencies.

The single figure who commanded the greatest loyalty from the Slovak population in the interwar period was Masaryk. His popularity was, as Andrea Orzoff persuasively argued, partially the result of a deliberate attempt to create a cult of leadership that echoed the idealization of the penultimate Habsburg Monarch, Franz Joseph, who had ruled over both Czechs and Slovaks from 1848 to 1916. Thus, Masaryk's image "adorned stores, homes, schools and [all] government buildings," and various streets, squares, and schools across the country bore his name.⁵³ Slovak textbooks described Masaryk as the "dear father," while his affection for Slovakia and his own description of being half Slovak generated additional enthusiasm.⁵⁴ According to the British Foreign Office, his state visits to Slovakia "clearly demonstrated that he was admired by the entire population regardless of political opinion or nationality," and even the Hungarian minority regarded him as the least chauvinistic of all the senior Czechoslovak politicians.⁵⁵ One of the first acts of the Slovak Provincial Assembly (Slovak: *Krajinské zastupiteľstvo*) in 1928 was to congratulate Masaryk on his tenth anniversary as the head of state. Furthermore, the decision of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party to oppose his reelection as president, in 1935, sent shockwaves through the political establishment, partly because observers had not expected it. Nevertheless, Masaryk's reputation among the Slovaks took time to flourish. In 1918, he was not known widely in Slovakia. Moreover, many viewed him as a Czech, even though Masaryk's father identified as Slovak, and while he always took an annual holiday in Slovakia, he lived and governed in Prague. His Czech identity and his public refusal to recognize that Slovaks constituted a separate nation limited his capacity to articulate a vision for the republic that was compatible with Slovak nationalist aspirations.

One politician who could have helped to bind Slovaks to Czechoslovakia was Milan Rastislav Štefánik (1880–1919), a dashing adventurer and the only Slovak who had been prominent during the First World War in establishing a Czechoslovak state. His death in a flying accident in 1919 resulted in his becoming a cult figure who remained unblemished by political quarrels. Never-

53 Orzoff, "The Husbandman," 127.

54 Elisabeth Bakke, *Doomed to Failure? The Czechoslovak Nation Project and the Slovak Autonomist Reaction, 1918–1938*, (Oslo: Unipub forlag Akademia, 1999), 219.

55 London, NA, FO 371/15179, 141–146.

theless, his death also highlighted the tensions in Czech and Slovak relations because entirely unsubstantiated rumors abounded that Czech soldiers had shot down Štefánik's plane to prevent him from leading the fledgling nationalist movement for Slovak autonomy.⁵⁶

Other Slovak politicians were so closely associated with specific political parties that they were incapable of fostering widespread affection across the political spectrum. Hlinka, for example, was popular as a hero of the prewar struggle for Slovak independence, and in the assessment of British diplomats, he remained a cult figure among the uneducated Slovak masses. He was so intimately bound to Slovak Populist ideology that, in 1925, the party even added his name to its official title. Slovak rivals frequently denounced Hlinka as a bombastic hypocrite and a dyed-in-the-wool sectarian, while his appeal to Slovakia's minorities was negligible.⁵⁷ Although other noted Slovak party politicians, such as the Republicans Šrobár and Hodža and the Social Democrats Dérer or Ivan Markovič (1888–1944), both onetime Hlasists, may not have been as dogmatic as Hlinka, they still could not attract a following outside their parties.

In place of individuals, myth-making became the basis for an overarching loyalty that bound Slovaks to the new Czechoslovak state. One myth promoted the cult of the legions formed from the Czechs and Slovaks who had volunteered to fight with the Allies against the Central Powers during the First World War. Many claimed their heroic sacrifices and victories made the creation of Czechoslovakia possible. For the most part, these volunteers were Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war who had been captured on the Russian front and then switched sides. There also were legions in Italy and France. Although they actually had seen little combat against the Central Powers, the common perception was that their contribution to the Allied war effort, particularly their conflicts with the Red Army in Russia after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk earned Slovaks and Czechs the right to form an independent state. The myth-making that surrounded their activities obscured the fact that most Czech and Slovak soldiers had fought conscientiously and many of them had died in defense of the Habsburg Monarchy. The legions, furthermore, had been comprised largely of Czech soldiers rather than Slovaks. Subsequently, Slovaks lionized their wartime exploits with less

⁵⁶ Peter Macho, "Milan Rastislav Štefánik—bohater a mučeník," in *Myty naše Slovenské*, ed. Eduard Krekovič, Elena Mannová, and Eva Krekičová (Bratislava: Academic Electronic Press, 2005), 163–73; and Michal Kšíňan, *Milan Rastislav Štefánik: Slovak National Hero and Co-Founder of Czechoslovakia* (London and New York: Routledge, 2021).

⁵⁷ See, for example, London, NA, FO 371/13580, 97–122 (1929); and Robert Letz, *Andrej Hlinka vo svetle dokumentov* (Bratislava: Vydavateľstvo Post Scriptum, s.r.o., 2014), 228–39.

fervor than Czechs. Moreover, legionnaires further antagonized Slovak Catholics because they modeled themselves on the fifteenth century Hussite army, and many of them joined the new Czechoslovak Hussite Church, which had separated from the Catholic Church.⁵⁸

Just the same, ethnic Slovaks created a founding myth that successfully avoided historical realities. It postulated that, for a thousand years, the Kingdom of Hungary had oppressed Slovaks; however, as the Habsburg Monarchy collapsed in 1918, multiparty support for the creation of Czechoslovakia forged a new Slovak political consensus. A key component of this myth was the assertion that the Hungarian government's Magyarization policy was an attempt to assimilate and eliminate the Slovak nation. Magyarization became the scapegoat for Slovak economic and cultural backwardness as well as mass emigration. Some Slovak writers and historians went further to argue that Magyarization was only one episode in the "one thousand years of oppressions" that dated to the founding of the Kingdom of Hungary, in the year 1000. They described the Hungarians as warlike Asians and uncultured nomads who had destroyed the glorious Christian Great Moravian Empire, which had a short and obscure existence in the ninth century, thus breaking Czechs and Slovaks into separate nations.⁵⁹ As Miroslav Michela noted, "the essence of the image of the Hungarians in the Czechoslovak First Republic was that they represented the 'perpetual enemy' and 'oppressor' of the Slovaks." He added that "the emphasis placed upon 'national oppression' played a significant role in the legitimization of the Czechoslovak republic's existence."⁶⁰

58 For a sharply worded critique of the cult of the Czechoslovak legions, see Robert Pynsent, "The Literary Representation of the Czechoslovak 'Legions' in Russia," in *Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe*, 63–88. Of the many primary and secondary sources on the Czechoslovak legionnaires, one study that focuses on the day-to-day existence of the soldiers is Dalibor Vácha, "Tepluskas and Eshelons: Czechoslovak Legionaries on Their Journey across Russia," *Czech Journal of Contemporary History* 1 (2013): 20–53. The article begins with a discussion of archival and published primary sources before turning to the major secondary sources. References to the some of the legionnaires' adoption of Hussite symbolism appear on p. 33. A profusely illustrated secondary source is Edmund Orián, ed., *Československá legie v Rusku, 1914–1920* (Prague: Nakladatelství Epoque 1900 and Naše vojsko, 2014). An indispensable study on the legionnaires in Russia is the four-volume work of Victor Miroslav Fic, *Československé legie v Rusku a boj za vznik Československa 1914–1918*, ed. Pavel Paleček, trans. Jiřina Barnettová, 4 vols. (Prague: Nakladatelství Academia–Středisko společných činností AV ČR [vol. 1]; and Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR; Brno: Stilus Press, s.r.o. [vols. 2–4], 2006–2014).

59 See, for example, Andrej Findor, "Tisícročná poroba," in *Myty naše Slovenské*, 75.

60 Miroslav Michela, "Functions of the Myth of 'National Oppression' in Slovak Master Narrative," in *A Multiethnic Region and Nation-State in East-Central Europe: Studies in the History of Upper Hungary and Slovakia from the 1600s to the Present*, ed. László Szarka (Budapest: Balassi Institute; Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs; Highland Lakes, NJ: Atlantic Research and Publications, Inc., 2011), 260–68. See also Miroslav Michela, "A Home Should Be a Home to All Its

A second key component in the myth was the assertion that, in 1918, the Slovaks had liberated themselves from Hungarian oppression with a broad-based national uprising. The spark that Slovaks venerated as having ignited this uprising was the meeting of the self-appointed Slovak National Council that had gathered in the small northern Slovak town of Martin (formerly Turčiansky Svätý Martin; Hungarian: Turócszentmárton; German: Turz-Sankt Martin), on October 30 and 31, 1918, to proclaim Slovakia's secession from Hungary. Photostats of the famous Martin Declaration, which heralded the separation from the Crown of St. Stephen, became iconic, while the location of the meeting, a provincial bank, became a site of secular national pilgrimage. Slovaks also lauded the hundreds of local Slovak national councils that sprang up, in the wake of the Martin Declaration, to facilitate Slovakia's liberation from Hungary and incorporation into Czechoslovakia.

In his four-volume *Slovenský prevrat* (The Slovak Revolution), published in 1930–1931, Karol Medvecký (1875–1937) provided an account of Slovakia's break with the Kingdom of Hungary that recounted the heroic deeds of the national councils. Medvecký's book provides a clear indication of the Slovak political elite's multiparty reverence for these Slovak national councils since it contained contributions by Slovak politicians from across the political spectrum: leading Republicans and Social Democrats, as well as noted Slovak Populists, such as the editor of the party's daily newspaper, Karol Sidor (1901–1953), the former deputy president of the party, Jozef Buday (1877–1939), and one of the party's former general secretaries, Jozef Hamaj (1894–1935). All reminisced, in glowing terms, about their own contributions to the cause of liberating Slovakia from Hungarian rule.⁶¹

The broad-based nature, popularity, and importance of all these national councils are debatable. The summer of 1918 witnessed a series of calls by a small group of Slovak politicians for the establishment of a national council (Slovak: národná rada), inspired by the July 13, 1918, creation of a Czechoslovak National Committee (Czech: Národní výbor československý). Their Slovak National Council explicitly sought to incorporate all the ideological strands within the Slovak camp in a common forum to effectively defend the nation's interests. On August 31, 1918, *Národné noviny*, the newspaper of the prewar Slovak National Party, explained that such a council was to “unite all the strengths of the

Sons: Cultural Representations of Saint Stephen in Slovakia during the Interwar Period,” in *Overcoming the Old Borders: Beyond the Paradigm of Slovak National History*, ed. Adam Hudek, (Bratislava: Institute of History, Slovak Academy of Sciences in Prodam, 2013), 110.

61 Karol Medvecký, *Slovenský prevrat*, 4 vols. (Trnava: Spolok sv. Vojtecha, 1930–1931), vol. 2.

(Slovak) nation in one aim and all of our political parties and hues of parties in one national league.”⁶² The newspaper of the prewar clerical Slovak Populists, *Slovenské ľudové Noviny*, concurred, declaring, on September 6, 1918, that “the hour has struck, so we must extinguish in ourselves personal, ideological, regional, political, and religious differences, and on the sole basis that we are Slovaks...[and] we must establish our Slovak governing body, which will be a national council.”⁶³ The first effort to form such a group occurred on September 12, 1918, when a meeting of the Slovak National Party’s leadership in Budapest proclaimed the founding of a twelve-member national council. Yet, none of the party leaders actually attended the meeting, which appears to have achieved nothing, apart from the drafting of the regulations governing the membership of the council. Moreover, none of the Hungarian political parties, which repeatedly had won the vast majority of the elected seats in Slovakia, received invitations to attend.⁶⁴

The second, and much larger meeting of this national council, which occurred in Martin at the end of October, possessed greater import since this gathering drew up the Martin Declaration. The Slovaks who came together in Martin on October 30–31, 1918, again formed a self-appointed body, composed almost entirely of middle-class Slovaks from north-central Slovakia, along with a smattering of clergymen and one farmer but no factory workers.⁶⁵ With the exception of Ferdiš Juriga (1874–1950), who at least possessed a seat in parliament, they also lacked any form of electoral legitimacy and again deliberately excluded all Slovaks who were loyal to the Hungarian state as well as representatives of any other nationality.

The almost 400 local Slovak national councils that sprung up across Slovakia in the wake of the Martin Declaration and that assumed control of Slovakia through the winter of 1918 were more representative than the meeting at Martin, possessed a degree of multiparty support, and mobilized at least a portion of the population in the struggle to create a new Czechoslovak state. These councils represented a reasonably accurate cross section of the population, with one estimate claiming that farmers comprised 62.5 percent of the membership; factory workers, 23.0 percent; industrialists, 6.0 percent; and the

62 Marián Hronský, *Slovensko na rázcestí: Slovenské národné rady a gardy v roku 1918* (Bratislava: Východoslovenské vydavateľstvo, 1976), 29.

63 Hronský, *Slovensko na rázcestí*, 29.

64 Hronský, *Slovensko na rázcestí*, 29–37.

65 For the full list of occupations of the attendees, see Šuchová, comp., “Prílohy II–Politický systém,” 547–548.

intelligentsia, 8.5 percent. Furthermore, they frequently drew members from different parts of the ideological and political spectrum.⁶⁶ In the Bratislava region, a number of Catholic priests, Protestant pastors, and anti-clericals around the journal *Hlas* worked together to establish the Slovak National Council. Behind the national council in the Trnava (Hungarian: Nagyszombat; German: Tyrnau) region were prominent Social Democrats and Hlasists. In Holíč (Hungarian: Holics; German: Weißkirchen an der March or Holitsch), the local Catholic priest and Protestant pastor jointly maintained order and established a national council. In Nitra County (Slovak: Nitrianska župa; Hungarian: Nyitra vármegye; German: Komitat Neutra), the 23-member local national council included four Catholic priests and four Protestant pastors. In the region of Trenčín (Hungarian: Trencsén; German: Trentschin), the prominent Catholic priest and Slovak Populist, Buday, worked closely with a prominent Protestant pastor to ensure the representation of a broad range of views when establishing the local national council of 50 members. In Brezno (Hungarian: Breznóbánya; German: Bries or Briesen), the local national council began with a mass meeting that featured four key speakers who represented the Slovak National Party, the Slovak People's Party, the Social Democratic Party, and Slovak soldiers who had fought in the war.⁶⁷

Not all of these national councils sought the incorporation of Slovakia into the new Czechoslovak state. A number of them involved Hungarians and Slovaks who appeared to have cooperated primarily to preserve law and order and to maintain some form of functioning local government in the power vacuum that had resulted from the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy and direct rule from Budapest. In Brezno, the council initially consisted of all those who formerly had sat on the local council, Hungarians and Slovaks alike. When the Czechoslovak army entered Nitra, several members of the Hungarian National Council promptly joined the new Slovak National Council. In Zvolen, the local leadership first called itself a Hungarian National Council and then severed its links with the authorities in Budapest, whereas in Trenčín, hostility to Slovak nationalism, on the part of the local Slovak National Council, required the appointment of an entirely new council.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Hronský, *Slovensko na rázcestí*, 210.

⁶⁷ Medvecký, *Slovenský prevrat*, 3:81–83; 4:71–83, 114–115, and 354; and Hronský, *Slovensko na rázcestí*, 215.

⁶⁸ See Medvecký, *Slovenský prevrat*, 2:17; and James Ward, *Priest, Politician, Collaborator: Jozef Tiso and the Making of Modern Slovakia* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 2013), 45; See also James Ward, “Black Monks: Jozef Tiso and Anti-Semitism,” *Kosmas: Czechoslovak and Central European Journal* 14 (Fall 2000): 29–54; and Hronský, *Slovensko na rázcestí*, 215.

The cult of the Slovak national councils also hid the fact that other national councils specifically opposed Slovakia's incorporation into Czechoslovakia. In a number of towns, Hungarians formed their own national councils (Hungarian: *nemzeti tanács*); the Polish minority established at least two national councils (Polish: *Rada Narodowa Orawska* and *Rada Narodowa Spiska*); and a short lived independent Eastern Slovak Republic appeared in the town of Prešov. The communist and trade union movement also was active in Slovakia at the end of 1918, establishing their own workers' guards (Slovak: *robotnícka garda*) and workers' councils (Slovak: *robotnícka rada*), one of which effectively assumed control of Bratislava by the end of December 1918.

The town of Martin, the home base of the Slovak National Council, best illustrated the confusing environment in which these various councils operated. It took almost a month for the national council to establish local branches that could put a stop to outbreaks of looting of Jewish businesses. It was forced to compete and at times cooperate with a local Hungarian national council that employed Slovak nationalist rhetoric and included a workers' council, with its own workers' guard, located in the neighboring town of Vrútky, some of whose leaders later absconded to Hungary.⁶⁹ Moreover, as Ismo Nurmi convincingly demonstrated, a significant proportion of the population remained uncertain about or ambivalent toward all of these various councils and the new Czechoslovak state.⁷⁰

The existence of all of these councils was remarkably brief. On January 23, 1919, the Czechoslovak government in Prague demanded the immediate dissolution of all Slovak national councils and transferred all authority to the new Ministry with Full Power for the Administration of Slovakia. All Slovak representatives in parliament supported the abolition of the national councils as a necessary measure to prevent Slovakia's reincorporation into Hungary and to hasten its integration into Czechoslovakia.⁷¹ Jan Rychlík correctly pointed out that the abolition of the national councils also demonstrated that "Slovakia was indeed liberated by the Czech army, [and] as a consequence the new rule was imposed from above."⁷² Even though there was a range of competing coun-

69 Lucia Segľová, "Samosprávne revolučné orgány v Turci v roku 1918: Mikrohistorická perspektíva," *Historický časopis* 60, no. 2 (2012): 271–99.

70 Ismo Nurmi, *Slovakia, a Playground for Nationalism and National Identity: Manifestations of the National Identity of the Slovaks, 1918–1920* (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1999), 72–107. See also Marcel Jesenský, *Between Realpolitik and Idealism: The Slovak-Polish Border, 1918–1947*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Ottawa, 2012, 66–68.

71 Ladislav Lipscher, *K vývinu politickej správy na Slovensku v rokoch 1918–1939* (Bratislava: Vydavateľstvo Slovenskej akadémie vied, 1966), 24–25.

72 Jan Rychlík, "Czech-Slovak Relations, 1918–1939," in *Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe*, 19.

cils in the winter of 1918, the vast majority of the population played no part in them. The Prague government essentially ignored and then abolished them, and their actual authority was negligible. No interwar Slovak politician was willing to call attention to such facts. To have done so would have cast doubt on the irresistible delusion that the Slovaks had actually liberated themselves.

By insisting that the inclusion of Slovakia into Czechoslovakia was the result of the activities of the national councils and that Slovakia's incorporation into Czechoslovakia was the result of a popular revolution from below, rather than a military or political conquest from above, Slovak nationalists affirmed the legitimacy of Czechoslovakia's establishment and the First Republic's existence.⁷³ As Ján Mlynárik pointed out, even the nationalist Hlinka Slovak People's Party "always put their demands within a Czechoslovak framework; they never sought to destroy the country or achieve autonomy under the aegis of a foreign power."⁷⁴

The most radical of the Slovak Populist ideologues, Tuka, who had maintained in 1928 that "secret clauses" in the Martin Declaration limited Slovakia's integration into Czechoslovakia to ten years, implicitly affirmed that this incorporation had been legitimate and felt compelled to assert that "the whole nation" had supported this development.⁷⁵ His fellow party member, Juriga, was even more direct in coupling his opposition to centralization with his loyalty to Czechoslovakia. "We will fight against Czechs if they try to make Czechs out of us," he declared in the National Assembly, but "when the time comes to be against Hungarians and Germans," he continued, "we die together with the Czechs."⁷⁶ Reflecting on such rhetoric, Juraj Benko offered an innovative analysis of the Slovak Populists' central purpose, which he asserts was not to undermine or break up Czechoslovakia but to combat the "image of 'political unripeness and immaturity' of Slovaks after the formation of the republic" and to offer, in its place, "an authentic, conservative political tradition."⁷⁷ In short, the

73 For a clear overview of the military dimension of Slovakia's separation from Hungary, see Marián Hronský and Martin C. Styan, *The Struggle for Slovakia and the Treaty of Trianon* (Bratislava: VEDA, Vydavateľstvo Slovenskej akadémie vied, 2001), 131–203.

74 Ján Mlynárik, "The Nationality Question in Czechoslovakia and the 1938 Munich Agreement," in *Czechoslovakia: Crossroads and Crises, 1918–1988*, ed. Norman Stone and Eduard Strouhal (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: Macmillan and the BBC World Service, 1989), 92. See also the detailed summary of interwar political programs of the Slovak National Party and the Hlinka Slovak People's Party in Lubomír Lipták, *Politické strany na Slovensku, 1860–1989* (Bratislava: Archa, 1992), 105–121.

75 Vojtech Tuka, *V desiatom roku Martinskej deklarácie* (Trenčín: Ivan Štelcer, n.d.), 7.

76 Hanula, "Slovaks in the Prague Parliament, 1918–1939," 164.

77 Juraj Benko, "The State and Its People: The Political Socialization of the Slovak Population after the Creation of the Czechoslovak Republic," in *Overcoming the Old Borders*, 74–75.

foundation myths of popular uprising, national liberation, and voluntary incorporation into the Czechoslovak First Republic, having overturned a millennium of Hungarian oppression, ensured that even the nationalist Slovak parties publicly subscribed to the consensus that Czechoslovakia was a legitimate state and the rightful home of the Slovak people. Notably, the interwar Slovak political elite ostracized those Slovaks who rejected this consensus. They roundly denounced Viktor Dvortsák (1878–1943), who had founded the short-lived Eastern Slovak Republic in 1918, as a Hungarian stooge, while the members of the Slovak People's Party shunned František Jehlička (1879–1939), after their former colleague had gone into exile in 1919 and proceeded to denounce what he considered the Czech military occupation of Slovakia.⁷⁸

Interwar Slovakia also clearly fulfilled two additional conditions that Lijphart argued would be favorable for the growth of consociational politics. He posited that consociational democracies are most likely to form in countries with small populations, and this applies to Czechoslovakia as a whole as well as Slovakia. There were less than three million residents of Slovakia in 1921, and by 1930, the population had risen to only 3,239,793. When it achieved full independence in 1939 and again in 1993, it became one of the smallest states in Europe, with a population roughly half the size of such classic consociational states as the Netherlands and Belgium.⁷⁹

Lijphart also posited that “external dangers” promoted internal unity, and Slovaks faced threats throughout the interwar period that were similar to those of Czechs.⁸⁰ Furthermore, Slovakia's endemic weaknesses, including a fractured sense of national identity, exacerbated these threats. Hungary, which had possessed all of Slovakia's territory before 1918, forcibly sought to prevent Czechs and Slovaks from forming a common state, invaded Slovakia in 1919, and then, in 1938–1939, took portions of Slovakia. Although the Hungarian government signed the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, which formally recognized the establishment of Czechoslovakia, in reality all shades of political opinion in Hungary disputed the new country's legitimacy and agreed that a greater Hungary should reincorporate Slovakia.⁸¹ Relations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia were ap-

78 Balázs Ablonczy, *Nyombiztosítás. Letűnt magyarok: kisebbség- és művelődéstörténeti tanulmányok* (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2011), 76–77.

79 Šuchová, comp., “Prílohy I–Obyvateľstvo,” 494.

80 See Chapter 3.

81 When trying to regularize diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia, István Bethlen (1874–1946) faced constant opposition from parliamentarians of all stripes who maintained that Slovakia was rightfully Hungarian territory. See, for example, Andrej Tóth, *Maďarsko ve dvacátých letech 20. století: “Bethlenovská” konsolidace nového státu a československo-maďarské hospodářsko-*

palling throughout the interwar period. According to the British minister in Prague, his long-serving Hungarian counterpart, Szilárd Masirevich (1879–1944), made “no secret of his dislike of the Czechs,” whom he regarded as “inferior to the Kroomen of Liberia.”⁸² Perversely, as Michela pointed out, Hungary’s unrelenting hostility to Czechoslovakia also bolstered support for the republic in Slovakia as it appeared to confirm that the Hungarians were “warmongers and the continual ‘source of tension’ in the region” that “contributed to the increasing acceptance of the status quo.”⁸³

Even Poland and the Soviet Union eyed Czechoslovak and specifically Slovak territory. Poland claimed small chunks of land in northern Slovakia, which it finally annexed in 1938, while the Soviet Union refused to ratify the postwar peace treaties that confirmed the creation of Czechoslovakia. Its failed invasion of Poland in 1920 also demonstrated that the Soviets had unfulfilled territorial ambitions in Central Europe. Austria, in contrast, had no claims on any Slovak territory, but fears of a possible Habsburg restoration or a joint Austrian-Hungarian attempt to recreate the Habsburg Monarchy occasionally alarmed the Slovak public. In 1921, when the last Habsburg emperor, Karl, made a futile attempt at a *coup d’état* in Budapest, Czechoslovakia ordered a full-scale mobilization and demanded the House of Habsburg’s immediate dethronement.

These multiple threats encouraged even Slovak nationalists to regard incorporation into Czechoslovakia as the only possible alternative to Hungarian rule, territorial dismemberment, or Bolshevism. As R. W. Seton-Watson (1879–1951), a British expert on Czechoslovakia, noted in his 1924 review of the situation in *The New Slovakia*, “it is admitted on all sides... what indeed no sane man could deny—that the Slovaks could not unaided provide Slovakia with a government and administration capable of maintaining itself against the Magyars, and that only the Czechs can supply the gaps in personnel [sic] and equipment.”⁸⁴

Slovakia’s endemic weaknesses in 1918 did not merely consist of a shortage of personnel and equipment. An awareness of the fragility and fragmentation of Slovak national identity that the Slovak national awakening had begun to address at the end of the eighteenth century facilitated Slovakia’s reliance on the

politické vzťahy (Prague: Nakladatelství Oeconomica, 2015). See also Lorman, *Counter-Revolutionary Hungary*.

82 London, NA, FO 371/14328, 87, and 371, 16659, 178. The Kroonen (Krumen, Kroumen) are an ethnic minority in West Africa who became notorious in the interwar period due to the discrimination they encountered from other black Africans. In 1930, the League of Nations condemned their plight.

83 Miroslav Michela, “Functions of the Myth of ‘National Oppression,’” 260.

84 Seton-Watson, *The New Slovakia*, 8.

Czechs and its inclusion into Czechoslovakia. While the history of Bohemia, before the ascendancy of the Habsburgs, fostered a distinct Czech identity, Slovaks had not possessed their own state since the Great Moravian Empire of the early Middle Ages. Following the Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian Basin at the end of the ninth century, Slovakia had no territorial privilege, and the Hungarian nobility, which alone formed the nation (*natio hungarica*), largely absorbed the nobility in Slovakia. As Ewa Kowalská stated, “at first glance, the situation in which the Slovaks found themselves at the beginning of the modern era provided little evidence that they might possess the requisite attributes to be an ethnic group: a common language, a collective memory of a shared history, or an institutionally anchored territory,” although some historians nevertheless insist that a distinct Slovak national identity existed in medieval Hungary.⁸⁵ Following the Ottoman conquest of the southern half of the Kingdom of Hungary, after their decisive victory at the Battle of Mohács in 1526, the Habsburg Monarchy incorporated the territory of modern-day Slovakia, and the Hungarian diet transferred itself to Slovakia’s later capital, Bratislava. The Habsburgs continued to regard the Kingdom of Hungary as a distinct territory that they fully brought under their rule after the expulsion of the Ottomans at the end of the seventeenth century. The era of absolutist Habsburg rule, the efforts to extend the Counter-Reformation into Hungary, and the influence of the Enlightenment combined to inspire nationalist awakenings in the eighteenth century among the various peoples of Central Europe.

In the nineteenth century, a new generation of intellectuals claimed that the Slovaks were a separate nation from the Hungarians because they spoke a different language and had preserved their own culture. This national awakening eventually produced a codified Slovak language, a national identity grounded in the use of that language, and ultimately the first calls for autonomy for the Slovak-populated regions of northern Hungary. Protracted debates about Slovak, Czech, and Slavic identity, persistent efforts of the authorities in Budapest to foster a sense of loyalty to the Hungarian state, and significant dialectical differences among Slovak speakers muddled the definition of Slovak national identity. Alexander Maxwell pointed to the five separate dialects, with their own distinct orthographic systems, that thrived in Slovakia through the nineteenth century. He cited this situation as evidence of the fragmented sense of national

85 Ewa Kowalská, “The Enlightenment and the Beginnings of the Modern Slovak Nation,” in *Slovakia in History*, 87. See also Ivan Mrva and David Daniel, “Slovakia during the Early Modern Era 1526–1711,” in *A Concise History of Slovakia*, 143–46.

identity, which he termed *schizoglossia*, although he conceded that, by 1914, Slovaks “had, almost, reached a consensus on their orthography.”⁸⁶

Legacies of cooperation notwithstanding, differing responses to Magyarization and the belated and incomplete construction of Slovak national identity repeatedly fractured Slovak politics before 1918. The foremost Slovak party was the Slovak National Party, which was under the leadership of an intrinsically conservative, elitist, and apathetic Russophile Protestant clique. Expecting liberation from a Russian army, the Slovak National Party proved unwilling to seek salvation at the ballot box and instead embarked on a protracted electoral boycott that it only partially suspended in 1905. Beneath the party’s umbrella existed a number of pressure groups. The Hlasists believed in the common identity of Czechs and Slovaks and were committed to mobilizing the population against Magyarization. Hodža’s agrarian faction sought to put the interests of the peasantry at the forefront of Slovak nationalist thinking, while the Slovak People’s Party, which had established itself as an independent party in 1905, had rejoined the Slovak National Party and then had reclaimed its independence in 1913. It sought to mobilize the Catholic populace in opposition to the government’s so-called liberal policies of Magyarization, anticlericalism, and industrialization. The Slovak Nationalists lauded the unique qualities of Slovaks and occasionally flirted with the notion that Slovaks and Czechs were one nation.

Detached from the Slovak National Party but frequently cooperating with it was the Slovak Social Democratic Party (Slovak: Slovenská sociálnodemokratická strana) that began in 1905 as an offshoot from the Hungarian Social Democratic Party (Hungarian: Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Párt). Like its peers in the Second International, it primarily sought to defend the interests of the urban industrial workforce.⁸⁷ Also distinct from the Slovak National Party but occasionally cooperating with it, particularly in the first years after its establishment in 1895, was the Catholic People’s Party (Hungarian: Katholikus Néppárt), which attracted considerable support among Slovak Catholics by becoming the first Hungarian-led party to appeal directly to the national minorities as part of its struggle against the government’s anticlerical policies. Finally, there were always some Slovaks who supported the governing liberal parties, which favored rapid industrialization, free trade, abolition of all forms of religious discrimination, and promotion of Hungarian language and culture.⁸⁸

86 Maxwell, *Choosing Slovakia*, 152–64. See also Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, 18–19.

87 Among the Slovak Social Democrats were a smattering of Slovak communists and anarchists.

88 For the finest study of prewar Slovak politics, see Imre Polányi, *A szlovák társadalom és polgári nemzeti mozgalom a századfordulón, 1895–1905* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1987). See also Mi-

Before 1918, the bulk of the Slovak population was disengaged from politics and from the struggle to defend national identity due to the narrow franchise, open ballot, widespread corruption, and vote rigging. Leff summed up the apathy, impotence, and political fragmentation of prewar Slovak politics when she wrote that “the Slovak political vision was inchoate, devoid of effective political form, [and] still struggling with an unfocussed political agenda. Linkages within the community occurred on an ad hoc basis, unsystematized and unharnessed to significant political power.”⁸⁹ Slovak political identity, like its corresponding national identity, was exceedingly fragile, with politicians flitting between rival parties and with personal relationships mattering as much as ideology in shaping affiliations and alliances. Slovakia’s incorporation into Czechoslovakia, therefore, not only provided the ultimate protection against Hungarian efforts to eliminate Slovak consciousness but also ushered in a new opportunity to consolidate and invigorate Slovakia’s own sense of national and political identity.⁹⁰

Although Slovakia actually met most of Lijphart’s favorable conditions for the growth of consociational democracy, there were two conditions that Slovakia clearly failed to meet. Slovakia did not possess a small number of groups, and these groups were not roughly the same size. This was the result of strong religious segmentation that cut across ethnic lines. In 1921 throughout Slovakia, 78 percent of the population claimed Roman Catholicism as their religion. Ethnic divisions, however, fragmented this potential voting bloc as the majority of ethnic Slovaks, Hungarians, Roma, and a substantial number of ethnic Germans were affiliated with the Church of Rome.⁹¹ Moreover, prior to 1918, the Slovak Catholic clergy had received its education in Hungarian-language schools and seminaries, and many of them had absorbed a pro-Hungarian attitude and had the reputation of being crypto-Hungarian Magyarones. As a result, parts of the Catholic clergy before 1918 hindered the formation of a distinct party for Slovak Catholics. In 1918, when Hlinka, the founder of the Slovak Populists established a Slovak clerical council to oversee the reform of the Church in Slovakia, he identified fewer than a hundred priests who were reliable Slovak patriots.⁹²

Ian Podrimavský and Ľudovít Holotík, *Slovenská Národná strana v druhej polovici XIX. storočia* (Bratislava: VEDA, Vydavateľstvo Slovenskej akadémie vied, 1983); and Lorman, *The Making of the Slovak People’s Party*, 51–61.

⁸⁹ Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, 26.

⁹⁰ Ján Rychlík, “Czech-Slovak Relations in Czechoslovakia, 1918–1939,” in *Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe*, 18.

⁹¹ Šuchová, comp., “Prílohy I–Obyvateľstvo,” 497.

⁹² Thomas Lorman, “The Making and Breaking of the Slovak Clerical Council,” *Central Europe* 11 (May 2013): 46–66.

Protestants, with 18 percent of the population, formed the next largest religious denomination in Slovakia, but they were divided between Lutherans, who tended to identify as Slovak and German, and Calvinists, who largely identified as Hungarian. As James Felak noted, while the Slovak Lutherans were a minority, they had “traditionally played a role in Slovak political, economic, and cultural life far out of proportion to [their] numbers.” This was in part “because the Lutheran clergy were not bound by celibacy vows and strongly valued education, [and therefore] the Slovak intelligentsia was disproportionately drawn from its children.”⁹³ Another sizeable denomination in Slovakia was the 4 percent of the population that belonged to the various branches of the Jewish faith, which was heavily represented in the professions, business, and commerce. There were also small numbers of Greek-Catholic Uniates, nonbelievers, agnostics, members of various sects, and a small group of Slovaks who joined the breakaway Czechoslovak Church.⁹⁴

These religious affiliations generally ran deep. Slovak Catholics, in particular, were renowned for their religious devotion, which manifested itself not only in the intensity of their worship and an abundance of Catholic parochial associations but also in their loyalty to the clergy, who acted not only as spiritual shepherds but also as social organizers and political leaders. Slovakia’s Calvinists also exhibited that devotion to their faith commonly found among adherents of the reformed church, while a substantial portion of Slovak Jewry belonged to the most conservative branches of the Jewish faith.

As a result of these cross-cutting religious, economic, and ethnic cleavages, Slovakia was a fragmented society that deviated from Lijphart’s model, according to which a small number of clearly defined segments is a favorable condition for consociational politics. In Slovakia, ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic cleavages all were important and manifested themselves in aggressive nationalist, sectarian, and class-based parties. Nevertheless, the fact that Slovakia was a fragmented society was not fatal for consociationalism. Indeed, shared ethnic identity, religious affiliation, or economic interest provided bases for political cooperation between parties that formally appealed to different segments of Slovak society.

Moreover, although this complex cross-segmentation means that Slovakia did not meet perfectly Lijphart’s definition of an ideal environment for consociational politics to flourish, it prevented the domination of any particular seg-

⁹³ Felak, “*At the Price of the Republic*,” 22.

⁹⁴ Šuchová, comp., “*Prílohy I–Obyvateľstvo*,” 497.

ment or political party. For example, a number of diverse parties appealed to different segments of the ethnic Slovak electorate: the ČSD attracted urban dwellers, industrial workers, and landless agricultural laborers; the Republican Party had the backing of farmers and prosperous agroindustrialists; the Communist Party obtained the bulk of its support from industrial workers and the poorest of the farming communities; the Slovak Populists appealed to Catholics; the Slovak Nationalists served the Protestant constituents; and an array of Slovak and Czech parties sought the support of the middle classes. Nevertheless, none of these parties could claim to represent a majority of the Slovak electorate. The Czechoslovak Social Democrats never again matched the 38.05 percent of the vote they had gained in the 1920 elections to the Revolutionary National Assembly, the Slovak Populists' support peaked at 34.31 percent in the 1925 elections to the National Assembly and the Republican Party obtained its best result in the 1928 elections to the Slovak Provincial Assembly, when it received 20.54 percent of the votes.⁹⁵ As in the Czechoslovak National Assembly and in Slovakia's elected forums, the fractured electorate guaranteed that no party was dominant and that coalitions were the norm.⁹⁶

Furthermore, the fact that these groups were not all approximately the same size helped foster cooperation between the various groups. For example, because ethnic Slovaks comprised a much larger group than any of the other minorities, the Hungarian and German ethnic minorities formed common parties to help redress the electoral balance. Likewise, the Jewish minority formed a broad coalition party, the League of Slovak Jewry, because its small size rendered the creation of multiple Jewish parties unfeasible. The overwhelmingly Catholic Hlinka Slovak People's Party repeatedly trumpeted the support of Slovak Protestants, which reinforced its image as a party with wide appeal in Slovakia, and from 1933 onwards, it entered into a short-lived coalition with the largely Protestant Slovak Nationalist Party as well as a dwarf Polish Party, the *Polské strany v Československu* (Polish Parties in Czechoslovakia), and a Rusyn Party, the *Autonómny poľnohospodársky zväz* (Autonomous Agricultural League), in order to maximize its chances of electoral success and political influence.⁹⁷ Because the parties were not the same size, the smallest felt compelled to cooperate to maximize their political representation and influence.

95 Xénia Šuchová, comp., "Prílohy II–Politický systém," in *Slovensko v Československu*, 560.

96 On the Czechoslovak National Assembly, see Chapter 3.

97 Xénia Šuchová, comp., "Prílohy II–Politický systém," in *Slovensko v Československu*, 569.

The Benefits of Participation

In addition to meeting the majority of Lijphart's conditions, the widespread advantages that most people in Slovakia obtained from their incorporation into Czechoslovakia and their continuing participation in the political process also aided consociational politics there. Consociational politics succeeded in Slovakia despite a succession of economic crises that bedeviled the republic. These disruptions included the turbulence that resulted from the breakup of the Habsburg Monarchy, the new beggar-my-neighbor tariffs on international trade, the threat of hyperinflation in the early 1920s, which forced the government to enact austerity measures, and the agricultural crisis and Great Depression that spread across Central Europe in the late 1920s. All these crises hit Slovakia, which was economically underdeveloped, especially hard, compared to the Bohemian Lands.⁹⁸ The economic difficulties notwithstanding, the inhabitants of Slovakia derived tangible rewards from the introduction of plural politics, the secret ballot, universal suffrage, proportional representation, and more.

Before 1918, in the former Kingdom of Hungary, only 8 percent of the population was qualified to vote, and there were significant variations in the size of parliamentary constituencies. The bureaucrats who oversaw the elections were thoroughly politicized, and open-ballot voting proved susceptible to widespread corruption. In contrast, Czechoslovakia's electoral system granted the entire adult population, including women, an equal voice and a stake in the governing of the county for the first time. Universal suffrage and generally free and fair elections helped foster Slovak support for Czechoslovakia and lessened nostalgia for Hungary. On the occasion of every election, even the opposition parties in Slovakia lauded universal suffrage and participation in the electoral process, and they frenetically encouraged their supporters to go to the polls. Opposition parties also were imbued with optimism that each forthcoming election would result in a political breakthrough that would bring about the realization of their political objectives. They were aware that no such possibility had existed for Slovak opposition parties in prewar Hungary or for opposition parties in postwar Central-European states that suffered from such afflictions as limited suffrage, immense corruption, emasculated parliaments, and autocratic regimes. Trust

98 For a solid overview of the economic crises' impact on Slovakia, see Rothschild, *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars*, 87–123; and Roman Holec's sharply worded discussion of the Slovak impoverishment in his chapter "Hospodársky vývoj Slovenska bezprostredne po vzniku ČSR v kontexte česko-slovenských vzťahov," in *Osudy demokracie ve střední Evropě*, vol. 1, 273–78.

in the electoral process in Czechoslovakia naturally bolstered a broader confidence in and loyalty toward the Czechoslovak First Republic.⁹⁹

Ethnic Slovaks profited from their inclusion in the Czechoslovak First Republic in other ways. Slovaks were one of the “state-forming nations,” and the republic incorporated Slovakia into its official name and included Slovak national symbols in the state flag and coat of arms. The patriotic Slovak song, “Nad Tatrou sa blýska” (Lightning over the Tatras) became one of the country’s two national anthems.¹⁰⁰ On a more practical level, the new Czechoslovak authorities immediately launched the Slovakization (Slovak: *poslovenčenie*) of Slovakia that dramatically reversed the prewar policy of Magyarization. In street signs, government offices, courts, theaters, and railways, the Slovak language replaced Hungarian. The Slovakization of schooling was swift and brutal. For example, the government *referent* (commissar) in charge of Slovak education and, later, minister of education, Anton Štefánek (1877–1964), crisscrossed Slovakia in the winter of 1918, visiting many of the 59 high schools which, to that point, had used Hungarian as the language of instruction. Insistent that “teaching in all schools be in the Slovak language and spirit,” he demanded that the teachers swear an oath of loyalty to the new Czechoslovak government and prove that they could and would use Slovak as the language of instruction. Those teachers who were unable to fulfill these demands faced immediate dismissal and even deportation to rump Hungary. The authorities closed nine high schools, established new Slovak-language institutions in their wake, and permitted only seven high schools, mostly in the southern part of Slovakia, to continue their instruction in Hungarian.¹⁰¹

The results were dramatic. Whereas, before 1918, only 7 percent of Slovak school children studied in Slovak, within a decade of the republic’s establish-

99 Felak, “*At the Price of the Republic*,” 15–16.

100 Even Ruthenia had something of a national anthem. In the 1920s, inhabitants of Ruthenia sometimes sang “Sub-Carpathian Rusyns, Arise from Your Deep Slumber” (*Podkarpatskii rusyný, ostav'te hlubokii son*) before the Czech and Slovak anthems. On January 18, 1929, the Ruthenian Provincial Administration decreed that, if those at an event wanted to sing the Ruthenian song (the decree spoke of it as an “ordinary song,” or *zvýchaina písnia*, not an anthem), they had to do so after the Czech and Slovak anthems. In 1937, the Provincial Administration regularized the playing of the song at official events after the Czech and Slovak anthems. *Uriadový vístnyk Shkol'noho referatu kraievoho uriadu Podkarpatskoj Rusy*, IX, 1–2 (Uzhhorod, 1929), decree 23.052/28, published on 6 February 1929, p. 50; and Paul Robert Magocsi and Ivan Pop, eds., *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture* (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2002), s.v. “Anthems, Rusyn national.” The authors wish to thank Paul Robert Magocsi for helping to clarify the details about the Ruthenian song and supplying the reference for the decree.

101 Owen Johnson, “Anton Štefánek and the Development of Secondary Education in Slovakia,” *Bohemia: Jahrbuch des Collegium Carolinum* 18 (1977): 269–74 (quotation on p. 270).

ment about 80 percent of the schools in Slovakia used Slovak as the primary language of instruction. Not only did Slovakization make officialdom, the judiciary, signage, and education fully comprehensible to speakers of Slovak, it also ensured that there was a glut of new opportunities for educated Slovaks to displace Hungarians in government offices, state firms, and educational institutions. Slovakization and the deleterious impact it had on the Hungarian minority were incompatible with consociationalism; however, they provided a clear reward to Slovaks for joining the republic and participating in the political system. Indeed, the significant advantages Slovakization brought to Slovaks were sufficient to obscure the fact that it was, in many ways, identical to the policy of Magyarization, which the Slovak national movement prior to 1918 had resisted furiously.¹⁰²

Increased government funding for education reinforced Slovakization. Throughout the interwar period, schools in Slovakia multiplied dramatically, increasing access to education and providing additional employment for educated Slovaks. Between 1920 and 1938, the number of students enrolled in schools in Slovakia increased from 396,340 to 635,126, while gymnasiums (Slovak and Czech singular: *gymnázium*) increased from 44 to 57. The number of students who annually enrolled in Comenius University (Slovak and Czech: *Univerzita Komenského*) in Bratislava, which the government established in 1919, rose from 247 to 2,483.¹⁰³

The government's efforts to expand and Slovakize schooling in Slovakia benefitted from the assistance of the Slovak League, which obtained contributions from America and sought to Slovakize areas with sizeable minority populations by teaching Slovak to Hungarian-language speakers and by turning bilingual Slovak-Hungarian speakers into monolingual Slovaks. Throughout the interwar period, the Slovak League succeeded in establishing almost 300 new Slovak-language schools in areas with ethnic Hungarian majorities.¹⁰⁴ The central government's efforts, along with the work of the Slovak League and other local associations, enabled Slovakia, which, in 1918, had a population that was largely illiterate even in its own language, to achieve a gradua-

¹⁰² For a detailed examination of the Slovakization process in the Bratislava region, see Tamás Filep Gusztáv, *Főhatalomváltás Pozsonyban, 1918–1920: Események, történések egy hírlap közlemé-nyeinek tükrében* (Pozsony: Pesti Kalligram Kft., 2010), 126–40.

¹⁰³ Ľubica Kázmerová, "K vývinu štruktúry školstva na Slovensku v rokoch 1918–1938," in *Slovensko v Československu*, 417–40. For statistics on prewar teaching through the medium of Slovak, see Seton-Watson, *The New Slovakia*, 151.

¹⁰⁴ See Róbert Letz, "Prínos Slovenskej ligy k vybudovaniu slovenského školstva (1920–1948)," *Historický zborník* 6 (1996): 48–59.

tion rate, by the end of the 1920s, that was, as Alexander Maxwell noted, “on a par with the Czech Lands.”¹⁰⁵

Although Slovak speakers alone prospered from Slovakization and the new opportunity to study and teach at all levels of the educational system in their own language, all the inhabitants of Slovakia had the opportunity to freely develop their own organizations, associations, and publishing houses. Modern political organizations were essentially nonexistent in Hungary before the First World War, and legal restrictions that forced Slovak parties to jump through numerous hoops simply to hold public meetings thwarted the establishment of organizational networks.¹⁰⁶ This changed after 1918. Although the authorities occasionally disbanded a party organization or broke up a meeting for suspected subversion, in general, the various political parties and cultural organs freely developed mass organizations. For example, in spite of the government’s occasionally heavy-handed treatment of the Hlinka Slovak People’s Party, membership in the party steadily rose from 2,115 members in 1918 to 45,728 members by 1937, and the party oversaw the publication of both a daily paper and a number of periodicals that appealed to specific trades and industries.¹⁰⁷ Other parties proved equally adept at broadening their constituency. The Republican Party possessed more than 3,000 affiliated associations, the Social Democrats had branches in every town and city in Slovakia, and the Hungarian, German, and Communist parties all developed a network of branches throughout their electoral strongholds.

One of the central characteristics of all Slovak political parties in the interwar period was the emphasis they placed on organizing their supporters and mobilizing the population. Combined with universal suffrage and the secret ballot, these political freedoms persuaded citizens to remain engaged in Czechoslovak politics and to adopt moderate ideological positions to maximize their popularity. Whereas the Slovak National Party, the foremost pre-war Slovak Party, had spent the years between 1875 and 1905 boycotting all elections on both the parliamentary and local level, no party, throughout the entire interwar period, ever boycotted an election in Slovakia. This continued involvement of each party in the electoral process indicated that its adherents tacitly accepted the legitimacy of the state and were prepared to cooperate with rival parties.

105 Alexander Maxwell, *Choosing Slovakia: Slavic Hungary, the Czechoslovak Language and Accidental Nationalism* (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2009), 180–81.

106 Polányi, *A szlovák társadalom*, 95–96.

107 Róbert Letz, “Príloha” in *Slovenská ľudová strana v dejinách*, 374–75.

Moreover, the relaxed attitude of the Czechoslovak authorities toward the establishment of organizations enabled not only political parties but also cultural associations to flourish. According to one set of records, only 17 explicitly Slovak cultural associations existed in Slovakia prior to 1918.¹⁰⁸ Following the creation of Czechoslovakia, by contrast, the growth in the number and size of such associations was dramatic. Mannová estimated that, during the life of the republic, some 16,000 associations came into existence.¹⁰⁹ The Matica Slovenská, which the Hungarian authorities had closed in 1875, reemerged in 1918 and became the premier Slovak cultural organization, overseeing conferences, publications, exhibitions, performances, and the collation of materials that later formed the Slovak National Library.

Even though it accepted central government subsidies, the Matica Slovenská was free of government control. Representatives of opposition parties sat on its executive board and ensured that it adopted a combative and independent identity. For example, it firmly rejected the notion that Slovak was merely a dialect of the Czechoslovak language. The establishment of the Slovak National Theater in Bratislava, the East Slovak Theater in Košice, the Slovak National Museum, two major orchestras in Bratislava and Košice, a Slovak press agency, a distinct Slovak radio broadcasting service, subsidies for Slovak newspapers, and legislation permitting greater access to public libraries and increased participation in civics courses also enhanced cultural life during the republic.¹¹⁰ All of these Slovak cultural forums, as Juraj Benko noted, served to integrate the “previously culturally and politically marginalized [Slovak] people” into Czechoslovak public life.¹¹¹ They also helped to promote a distinct Slovak national identity, further rebutting allegations that the central government was intent on Czechifying the Slovaks.

On the local level, Slovakia witnessed both the spread of pan-Czechoslovak associations and the creation of parallel networks of distinctly Slovak and Hungarian associations. For example, the Czechoslovak Sokol gymnastics association established a network of branches across Slovakia, but the distinctly Catholic Slovak Orol gymnastics associations challenged the Sokols’ popularity. There were, in addition, expressly Czechoslovak, Slovak, and Hungarian trade

¹⁰⁸ Edit Pór, ed., *A magyarországi egyesületek címtára: A reformkortól 1945-ig*, 3 vols. (Budapest: Művelődéskutató Intézet, 1988), vol.1.

¹⁰⁹ Elena Mannová, “Spolky a ich miesto v živote spoločnosti na Slovensku v 19. a 20. storočí: Stav a problém výskumu,” *Historický časopis* 38, no. 1 (1990): 15–16.

¹¹⁰ Benko, “The State and Its People,” 78–79.

¹¹¹ Benko, “The State and Its People,” 82.

unions, associations of artists and intellectuals, youth groups, and religious organizations. Even local choirs were associated with particular political parties.¹¹²

Reviewing the activities of these associations, Lipták, one of Slovakia's leading twentieth-century scholars, concluded that "their activity, although they often had only limited authority, created, stabilized, and made more obvious the fact of the existence of Slovakia [as] a separate entity."¹¹³ He also termed the growth of Slovak political activism, language use, educational opportunities, organizational life, and culture a "national renaissance," while Jozef Lettrich, in a work that provides sharp criticism of the interwar Czechoslovak regime, conceded that "within the [First] Czechoslovak Republic, Slovakia grew from a neglected, backward and spiritually and economically oppressed land into a modern highly developed area."¹¹⁴ The growth of all of these organizations and associations thereby served to "increase the plural nature of an already plural society," as Lijphart characterized developments within other consociational democracies, and they tangibly affirmed the benefit ethnic Slovaks received from their incorporation and integration into the Czechoslovak First Republic.¹¹⁵

Slovak women advanced from the republic's enlightened gender policies. As Melissa Feinberg noted, as well as obtaining the same voting rights as men, women also were permitted to enter all university departments and academies, except for those that taught theology. For the first time, married women were able to serve in the bureaucracy, and the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920 formally enshrined gender equality. In response, all political parties in Slovakia endeavored to obtain the support of women voters, and they shaped their rhetoric and their policies to that end. The Catholic, conservative Hlinka Slovak People's Party, for example, made the enfranchisement of women one of the central points of its founding manifesto in 1918, and both the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party included Slovak women among their candidates in both statewide and regional elections, although only two women from Slovakia won election to the National Assembly in the entire interwar period.¹¹⁶

¹¹² Anna Magdolenová, "Some Problems of the Development of the Slovak Culture During the Period between the World Wars (1918–1939)," *Slovak Historical Studies* 17 (1990): 242; Vavro Šrobár, "Cultural Progress in Slovakia," in *Slovakia Then and Now: A Political Survey*, ed. R. W. Seton-Watson (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.; Prague: Orbis Publishing Co., 1931), 9–11.

¹¹³ Lipták, "Slovakia in the Twentieth Century," 252.

¹¹⁴ Lipták, *Slovensko v 20. storočí*, 107; and Jozef Lettrich, *History of Modern Slovakia*, Books That Matter (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), 66.

¹¹⁵ Lijphart, *Consociational Democracy*, 42.

¹¹⁶ Melissa Feinberg, "The New 'Woman Question': Gender, Nation, and Citizenship in the First Czechoslovak Republic," in *Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe*, 47–49. See also Natália Rolková, "Smerovanie Slovenskej ľudovej strany v rokoch 1905–1939 na podklade jej

Slovaks benefitted from the government's social welfare policies that, as Iván T. Berend noted, surpassed those of any other country in Central and Eastern Europe. Among the most prominent of the rapidly introduced measures were the eight-hour working day, a universal pension scheme that the government subsidized, paid leave, an unemployment system that was substantially more generous than that offered by Great Britain, France, and Germany, and a government-sponsored house building program that meant "more new homes were built in the 1920s than in the course of the preceding forty years."¹¹⁷

While the Czechoslovak First Republic dramatically enhanced the position of ethnic Slovaks and women, the impact this had on ethnic minorities was more ambiguous. Hungarian historiography, for example, continues to portray the creation of Czechoslovakia in 1918 as a catastrophe for ethnic Hungarians. Like all of the ethnic minorities in Slovakia, Hungarians were not part of the so-called "state-forming nation." Authorities purged them, in large numbers, from all levels of the administration and other official institutions across Slovakia, usually on the grounds that they had not sworn an oath of loyalty to the new republic. A number of Hungarian associations, publications, and all of their political parties initially had to close. As a result, approximately 200,000 Hungarians sought refuge in rump Hungary. Some of those who remained were victims of suspicion, harassment, and discrimination, and they were the primary targets of the policy of Slovakization.¹¹⁸

Nevertheless, the Hungarians and the other minorities also derived certain gains from their incorporation into the Czechoslovak state. They benefited from the introduction of universal suffrage, land reform, and from 1920 onwards, a tolerant attitude toward freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. Although the Slovakization of a number of Hungarian-language schools was detrimental to the Hungarian minority, the state belatedly increased funding, in the 1930s, for Hungarian language education. It also planned a second Hungarian Teacher Training Institute and a lectureship in Hungarian legal terminology at Comenius University in Bratislava.¹¹⁹ In addition, by 1937, state-funded radio stations in Bratislava, Banská Bystrica (Hungarian: Besztercebánya; Ger-

programových dokumentov," in *Slovenská ľudová strana v dejinách*, 168; Attila Simon, "Maďarská (politická) elita v medzivojnovom Československu—náčrt témy," *Forum Historiae* 12, no. 1 (2018): 119–20; and Šuchová, comp., "Prílohy II—Politický systém," 553–87.

¹¹⁷ Berend, *Decades of Crisis*, 168.

¹¹⁸ See, for example, Gyula Popély, *Felvidék 1918–1928: Az első évtized csehszlovák uralom alatt* (Budapest: Kárpátia Stúdió, 2014), 147–220.

¹¹⁹ Emil Franke, "The Schools and Education from the Angle of Nationality" in *Nationality Policy in Czechoslovakia*, 44–60.

man: Neusohl), and Košice had a permanent staff of Hungarians, who provided programming in the Hungarian language and occasionally invited intellectuals from Budapest to participate in broadcasts, while some Hungarian cultural organizations received substantial state support and Hungarian-language publications flourished. Furthermore, in 1937 the government introduced bilingual signage in railways and post offices in areas with the highest concentration of Hungarians in southern Slovakia, and it finally granted citizenship to those Hungarians who had moved to Slovakia before 1918. The following year, the government began drafting legislation, never enacted, that would have guaranteed every minority in Czechoslovakia, including the Hungarians, equal status with the Czechs and Slovaks.¹²⁰

As the defenders of the Czechoslovak regime never tired of pointing out, the position of the Hungarian minority in the Czechoslovak First Republic was better than the conditions of the Slovak minority in pre-1918 Hungary and those of the Slovak minority that remained in interwar Hungary. Eric Beckett Weaver persuasively argued that, although the Hungarian minority in Slovakia faced discrimination, “social conditions were comparatively worse in Hungary” than they were in Czechoslovakia, where politics was significantly more democratic and censorship considerably milder. Some leftist and communist Hungarians emigrated to Czechoslovakia from Hungary due to the greater freedoms they enjoyed there, and perceptive conservative Hungarians recognized that “some Hungarians in Czechoslovakia were thriving.”¹²¹

R. J. W. Evans, in a sensitively argued article about relations among Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks in the interwar period, also emphasized the range of ethnic Hungarians’ positive responses to their incorporation into the Czechoslovak First Republic. While Evans recognized that “it is hard to assess the mood among local Magyars,” he also noted that “there is significant evidence of an attraction to certain attributes of the new state,” including relative economic prosperity and the “Masarykian principles” of tolerance and secularism.¹²² Certainly, as Béla Angyal noted, one of the two major Hungarian parties in interwar Czechoslovakia, the Magyar National Party, “considered it important that

¹²⁰ Jaroslav Potůček, *Ročenka československého rozhlasu 1938* (Prague: Československý rozhlas, 1938), 156–57; and Simon, *The Hungarians of Slovakia in 1939*, 39–40, 43–46, 106–108, and 159–82.

¹²¹ Eric Beckett Weaver, “More Hungarian Hungarians, More Human Humans: Social and National Discourse on Hungarian Minorities in the Interwar Period,” in *Re-Contextualizing East Central European History*, ed. Robert Pyrah and Marius Turda (Oxford: Legenda, an imprint of the Modern Humanities Research Association and Maney Publishing, 2010), 43–48.

¹²² R. J. W. Evans, “Hungarians, Czechs and Slovaks, 1900–1950,” *Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe*, 113–19.

the Hungarians find their success in the new state” and on occasion “tried to implement government-supporting policies” and even “had discussions on joining the government.”¹²³

Other minorities also enjoyed new opportunities for association, organization, and cultural expression. Slovak Jewry’s position in interwar Czechoslovakia was far more favorable than in any of the neighboring states. Anti-Semitic rhetoric and the looting of Jewish businesses burst forth across Slovakia in the chaos that accompanied the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy. Nevertheless, following the new Czechoslovak government’s reestablishment of order in 1919, anti-Semitism declined, almost to the point of invisibility. Éva Kovács overstated the case when she claimed that “until the middle of the 1930s, we cannot talk about political anti-Semitism in Czechoslovakia” as several parties, including the Hlinka Slovak People’s Party, emphasized their Christian, that is, their non-Jewish character, and some of their leading figures employed vicious anti-Semitic rhetoric.¹²⁴ Eduard Nižňanský correctly asserted that, in interwar Czechoslovakia, the Jews “had the same constitutional rights as the other peoples. Their economic, cultural and also religious life was guaranteed.”¹²⁵ The experience of the Jews in Czechoslovakia was in sharp contrast to the conditions of their coreligionists in Hungary, where Jews faced legal discrimination, in the form of the first anti-Semitic law of the twentieth century, the 1920 *numerus clausus* that briefly limited Jews’ access to higher education, and baiting from explicitly anti-Semitic parties, such as the Hungarian Race-Defending Party (Hungarian: Magyar Fajvédő Párt). As Miloslav Szabó noted, however, “anti-Semitism gradually gained prominence” in Slovakia in the 1930s, and in 1936, anti-Semitic disturbances temporarily paralyzed Bratislava.¹²⁶

Government officials entertained private and occasionally public concerns about the loyalty of some sections of the Jewish community in Slovakia. Jews who had been enthusiastic proponents of Magyarization before 1918 and continued to use the Hungarian and German languages after the war’s end evoked

¹²³ Angyal, *Érdekvédelem és önszerveződés*, 345. See Michela’s astute comments on the Hungarian responses to Czechoslovakia’s creation in “A Home Should Be a Home to All Its Sons,” 102–103.

¹²⁴ Éva Kovács, *Felemás asszimiláció: A kassai zsidóság a két világháború között (1918–1938)* (Somorja-Samorin and Dunaszerdahely: Fórum Kisebbségkutató Intézet, 2004), 17–18; Felak, “*At the Price of the Republic*,” 44–45.

¹²⁵ Eduard Nižňanský, *Zidovská komunita na Slovensku medzi československou parlamentnou demokraciou a slovenským štátom v stredoeurópskom kontexte* (Prešov: Universum, 1999), 14.

¹²⁶ Miloslav Szabó, “From Protests to the Ban: Demonstrations against the ‘Jewish’ Films in Interwar Vienna and Bratislava,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 54, no. 1 (January 2019): 21–24 (quotation on p. 21). In 1928, Hungary eliminated its *numerus clausus* law, but the country adopted much stricter anti-Semitic laws beginning in 1938.



Figure 7a. Unique to the Czechoslovak First Republic were its two national anthems in two different languages. The Czech hymn *Kde domov můj?* (Where Is My Home?), in a major key, came first, with the Slovak hymn, *Nad Tatrou sa blýska* (Lightning over the Tatras), in a minor key, performed immediately afterward. The dual hymns returned after the Second World War, and they remained the country's national anthems until the dissolution of Czechoslovakia on January 1, 1993. The Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic retained their respective anthems. The two images of the Czechoslovak national anthem are postcards from the Slovak painter and illustrator Štefan Leonard Kostelníček (1900–1949, born Kostelníček), who was from the small town of Spišská Stará Ves in the Zamaurie region near the Polish border. He studied at a Franciscan monastery, which is where he took the name Leonard, but he then turned to art.




Figure 7b. Kostelníček elevated Slovak folk motifs to an art form, and his illustrated post-cards were popular from the time of the First Republic until his death. His ornamentation also appeared on ceramics, furniture, and other objects, and he published ten volumes on ornamentation. Kostelníček opened a studio in Košice. Then, after living in Prague, he had a studio in Brno and later Bratislava. It was in Brno, in 1932, that he published *Kamarád* (Comrade), the short-lived periodical (only one issue) that advocated gay causes, including the decriminalization of homosexuality, a law the courts twice used to imprison Kostelníček when he lived in Moravia.

PhDr. Gabriela Čiasnohová of the Etnografické muzeum Humno, in Košice, kindly provided the images of Kostelníček's works from her collection. She curated the exhibition in 2020 on *Slovenský ornament majstra Kostelníčka* (The Slovak Ornamentation of Master Kostelníček).

particular suspicion. Those fears were largely without foundation. The occasional police investigation into the political affiliations of Slovakia's Jewish community found scant evidence of collaboration with the Hungarian government or even within the Jewish community that remained in rump Hungary after 1918.¹²⁷ In reality, Jews in Slovakia were not unified but expressed a range of political opinions and cooperated with different segments of Slovakia's minorities. An example of someone active in the Hungarian Jewish community of Slovakia was Ödön Tarján (1882–1946), an engineer, businessman, and politician. Tarján strove to build links with Slovakia's Jewish business community and helped finance the *Prágai Magyar Hírlap* (Prague Hungarian Newspaper), although, in 1934, fearing political persecution, he fled to Hungary.¹²⁸ A significant number of Jewish voters gravitated to parties that supported the creation of Czechoslovakia, and proponents of assimilation established the League of Slovak Jews (Slovak: *Zväz slovenských židov*). Furthermore, about one-third of the Jewish population listed their nationality as Czechoslovak, rather than Jewish or Hungarian, in each census.¹²⁹

Slovakia's German minority also derived significant dividends from Czechoslovak citizenship. In Bratislava, for example, where the German minority made up about 40 percent of the total population of Slovakia's largest city, there was not a single school that taught exclusively in German before the end of the First World War. By the 1930s, however, there were ten lower elementary schools, two higher elementary schools, one grammar school, and thirteen secondary vocational schools that instructed in German. Such tangible discernible improvements did not dissuade significant numbers of Germans from hoping for their reincorporation into the Kingdom of Hungary and voting for Hungarian parties. Nevertheless, a decade after Czechoslovakia's creation, German diplomats noted that in "German-conscious circles," increasing numbers were "against the return to Hungary and prefer the Czechoslovak state union as less evil," while British diplomats described the German minority in Slovakia as "a loyal and industrious minority" albeit with "grievances ... [that] appear to be usually well

127 Rebekah Klein-Pejšová, "Abandon Your Roles as Exponents of the Magyars: Contested Jewish Loyalty in Interwar (Czecho)Slovakia," *AJS Review: Journal of the Association of Jewish Studies* 33 (November 2009): 341–62.

128 Stefan Gaučík, "Ödön Tarján–politik, podnikateľ a slobodomurár," *Forum Historiae* 12, no. 1 (2018): 84–98; and Simon, *The Hungarians of Slovakia in 1939*, 53–54.

129 Ivan Kamenec, *Po stopách tragédie* (Bratislava: Archa, 1991), 12–14; Kovács, *Felemás asszimiláció*, 98–99. See also the bleaker assessment of the Jewish position in interwar Czechoslovakia in Fred Hahn, "The Dilemma of the Jews in the Historic Lands of Czechoslovakia, 1918–1938," *East Central Europe* 10, nos. 1–2 (1983): 24–39.

founded.”¹³⁰ Even the Rusyn minority, which was one of the principal targets of Slovakization efforts, enjoyed “a gradual improvement in the realm of culture,” with the establishment of 59 new elementary schools and one new gymnasium in Slovakia that taught in Rusyn and produced a new generation of local intelligentsia.¹³¹

The rewards that the minorities derived from their incorporation into the Czechoslovak First Republic explain why even the Hungarian and German parties in Slovakia, which did not subscribe to ethnic Slovaks’ foundation myths, never formally challenged the new state’s right to exist. As Attila Simon noted, although the leading Hungarian parties in Slovakia privately viewed border revision as desirable, they continued to play an active role in national and local politics and concentrated on urging each successive government to fulfill the promise of the new state and protect the interests of all its minorities.¹³²

The conditions for consociationalism in Slovakia were mixed, but they were, on the whole, favorable. Slovakia had extreme segmentation and substantial socioeconomic disparities, and it did not have segments that were approximately the same size. Nevertheless, mitigating circumstances enabled Slovakia’s social divisions to support consociational practices. Furthermore, apart from Masaryk, Slovakia lacked an overarching figure who could command widespread support, but it had a foundation myth that served as a basis for overarching loyalty. Otherwise, Slovakia fulfilled all of the other favorable conditions Lijphart identified: a small population, the geographic concentration of groups, a legacy of cooperation, the absence of a dominant ethnic group, and substantial external threats. In the end, the endemic fragilities of Slovakia, along with the tangible benefits that all groups obtained from participating in the political process, encouraged multiparty cooperation and facilitated consociational politics within Slovakia even though it was not a separate state. As Chapter 1 demonstrated, consociationalism can be successful at both the national and regional levels.

¹³⁰ Michal Schvarc, “Finis Pressburg: Germans in Bratislava 1918–1948,” in *Overcoming the Old Borders*, 111–117; and London, NA, FO 371/14329, 160–163.

¹³¹ Paul Robert Magocsi, *The Rusyns of Slovakia: An Historical Survey* (New York: East European Monographs, 1993), 77–78.

¹³² Attila Simon, “Zabudnutí aktivisti: Príspevok k dejinám maďarských politických strán v medzivojnovom období,” *Historický časopis* 57, no. 3 (2009): 522. See also “Vyhláška krajinského prezidenta zo dňa 15. júna 1929, čís. 28.882. o uverejnení zápisnice Krajinského zastupiteľstva zo dňa 29. a 30. apríla 1929,” *Krajinský vestník pre Slovensko* 2, no. 18 (20 June 1929): 317–34.

The Components of Consociational Democracy in Slovakia

Proportionality

The favorable conditions for the development of consociationalism in interwar Slovakia would have been for naught if the central authorities had not adopted a series of practices and policies to integrate Slovakia into the various political structures of the First Republic. Proportionality ensured accommodation. Slovaks had adequate representation in the leading political parties and the National Assembly, increased their staffing of the bureaucracy throughout the period, and participated in each of the coalitions that governed the republic (see Table 11). In addition, Slovakia had a measure of autonomy that fostered further interparty cooperation and effective governance.

During the First World War and the chaos that accompanied the dismantling of the Habsburg Monarchy, all political parties in Slovakia ceased functioning. Beginning in late 1918, Slovak parties went through a restructuring, and, in preparation for the first national elections in 1920, all the Slovak parties that had supported the creation of Czechoslovakia formed electoral coalitions with Czech parties. The Slovaks in the Republican Party and Social Democratic Party remained in these statewide Czechoslovak parties throughout the interwar period, as did a part of the Slovak Nationalist Party. These coalitions embedded Slovak politics within a broader Czechoslovak context, but they also enabled Slovak politicians to carve out a degree of autonomy within these statewide parties. The Slovak branch of the Republican Party, although formally subservient to the party leadership in Prague, actually managed its own affairs, through the Executive Committee of the Slovak Peasant Union (Slovak: Výkonný výbor Slovenskej roľníckej jednoty). The Social Democratic Party established a Regional Executive Committee (Slovak: Krajinský výkonný výbor) in Bratislava to oversee the party's affairs in Slovakia, but in spite of having more than 10 percent of its membership in Slovakia, the party only included one Slovak on its Central Committee. The Slovak Nationalist Party always preserved its own entirely autonomous organizational structure in Slovakia and even drafted its own manifestos, within the framework of the Czechoslovak National Democratic Party.¹³³

Other parties that had existed previously only in the Bohemian Lands expanded into Slovakia, and they afforded their Slovak branches a degree of political autonomy. From 1918 onwards, the Czechoslovak Business and Commerce Party had an autonomous Provincial Committee (Slovak and Czech: Zemský

¹³³ Lipták, *Politické strany na Slovensku*, 105–197.

výbor) in Slovakia that organized its own conventions and published a separate Slovak-language newspaper. In 1922, the Czechoslovak National Democrats set up a Slovak branch to draft policy proposals and to control the party's organizational, financial, and publishing activities in Slovakia. By 1927, the Czechoslovak People's Party had its own twenty-four-member Slovak Regional Committee (Slovak: *Krajinský výbor*) and eight-member Presidency (Czech: *Předsednictvo*; Slovak: *Predsedníctvo*) to oversee all of the party's activities in Slovakia. It also founded several Slovak-language publications to attract disillusioned supporters of the Slovak Populists and managed to secure the election of one Slovak member to their parliamentary caucus in the National Assembly and one to their caucus in the Senate.¹³⁴ Likewise, in 1929 the Czechoslovak National Socialists established a Provincial Secretariat (Slovak and Czech: *Zemský sekretariát*) to manage the party's affairs in Slovakia. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which spent the 1920s seeking to maintain centralized control over its party organization, reversed course in 1930 and established a single regional party organization for Slovakia and even formally endorsed Slovaks' right to self-determination, which it understood as support for decentralization but not Slovak independence.¹³⁵

As well as establishing separate Slovak sections in their organizations, all these pan-Czechoslovak parties ensured that their candidates for election in Slovakia invariably identified as Slovaks. As a result, these parties maximized their support in Slovakia, ensuring that a significant bloc of Slovak deputies always was present in the National Assembly, and they were defending Slovak interests at both the party and the national level. Several of these parties also provided Slovaks with important party leadership positions. From 1920 onwards, the Social Democratic, Republican, and Czechoslovak People's parties appointed Slovaks to serve as the deputy chairmen (Czech: *podpředsedové*) of their parliamentary factions. Most strikingly of all, between 1935 and 1938, the Republican Party leadership included Hodža, who also served as prime minister of Czechoslovakia.

Slovak participation in the National Assembly also was comparable to Slovakia's share of the total population. The Revolutionary National Assembly that served until 1920 consisted of 256 appointed deputies, 54 of whom represented

¹³⁴ Michal Pehr, "Československá strana lidová na Slovensku (1925–1938) a Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana," in *Slovenská ľudová strana v dejinách*, 236–237.

¹³⁵ Zdenek Suda, *Zealots and Rebels: A History of the Ruling Communist Party of Czechoslovakia* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1980), 129; Lipták, *Politické strany na Slovensku*, 105–197; and Jelinek, *The Lust for Power*, 7–24.

Slovaks. Initially, there were only 40 members representing Slovaks, and there were additional complaints that not all of the members of this faction were Slovaks (the government claimed that the Czechs who had received appointments were perfectly capable of representing Slovak interests) and that Catholics were underrepresented. The government then increased that number to ensure that the proportion of Slovaks in the assembly (21 percent) better reflected the number of Slovaks in the entire population (22.12 percent, according to the 1921 census). These Slovak representatives formed their own Club of Slovak Deputies (*Klub slovenských poslancov*), which comprised the second largest faction within the assembly, and they rented a set of rooms in which to hold their own separate meetings.¹³⁶ The Slovaks actually were overrepresented on the oversight and legislation-drafting committees the Revolutionary National Assembly had established, occupying 169 of the 599 seats (28 percent), including 15 of the 18 seats and the chairmanship of the committee that was responsible for overseeing developments in Slovakia.¹³⁷

The electoral system enabled Slovaks to have 21.35 percent of the seats in the 1920 elections to the National Assembly, 18.66 percent of the seats in the 1925 elections, 18 percent of the seats in the 1929 elections, and 19.66 percent of the seats in the 1935 elections. Although Slovakia's representation in the National Assembly was slightly lower than its share of the total population would appear to justify (22.12 percent in 1921, rising to 22.47 percent in 1930), Elisabeth Bakke showed that demographic differences explain this discrepancy. Slovakia "had a younger population" than the Bohemian Lands, and a larger percentage of its population was not franchised because it was too young to vote.¹³⁸ After 1920, the Slovak deputies did not formally incorporate themselves into a single voting bloc, but they occasionally coalesced to advance Slovak interests. For example, in 1933, in response to a new international campaign for the re-incorporation of Slovak territory into Hungary, Slovak National Assembly deputies, including those who supported the government and those in opposition, signed a joint declaration affirming their support for the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia.¹³⁹ Slovak members of parties that supported the government also occasionally held their own meetings to discuss Slovak issues and to promote multiparty cooperation.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁶ Erik Dulovič, "Slovenský miestopis v Prahe (1918–1935)," *Historický časopis*, 64, no. 1 (2016): 129.

¹³⁷ See Šuchová, comp., "Přílohy II–Politický systém," 550–552.

¹³⁸ Bakke, *Doomed to Failure*, 446–447.

¹³⁹ Felak, *At the Price of the Republic*, 112.

¹⁴⁰ See, for example, Rychlík, *Češi a Slováci ve 20. století*, 305–312.

The political system also made Slovak politics more consociational by encouraging statewide parties to obtain the support of the Hungarian and other minorities. The Republican Party established an organization for Hungarian farmers in 1923, which in 1925 became the Republican Hungarian Farmers Party (Slovak: Republikánska maďarská roľnícka strana; Hungarian: Köztársasági Magyar Földműves Párt). This sister organization of the Republican Party published its own newspapers, formulated its own electoral program, and nominated Hungarian candidates to stand for election.¹⁴¹ In 1926, the ČSD founded a Hungarian section of the party, which had 83 local associations by 1930, and by 1938, it had representation in more than 300 Slovak communities. This section also published its own newspaper, *Népszava* (People's Voice), later titled *Csehszlovákiai Népszava*. In 1934, the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party also opened a branch for ethnic Hungarians, but it attracted negligible support.

These efforts paid off at the polls. The Republican Party and the Czechoslovak Social Democrats obtained the support of roughly 15 percent of the ethnic Hungarian electorate. In return, they ensured that eight Hungarians were in their National Assembly groupings. The Communist Party garnered roughly 20–25 percent of the ethnic Hungarian vote and included four Hungarians in its faction in the National Assembly.¹⁴² Along with the various Hungarian parties' factions in the legislature, the Hungarian representatives of these statewide parties ensured that the Hungarian minority, which was 21.5 percent of the population of Slovakia in 1921 and 17.6 percent in 1930, obtained 20 percent of the seats in Slovakia in the 1920 elections, 19.6 percent of the seats in the 1925 elections, and 20.3 percent of the seats in the 1929 and 1935 elections. Also represented in the National Assembly were German, Polish, and Rusyn deputies from Slovakia, including the Germans Paul Wittich (1877–1957) and Samuel (Samu) Mayer (1882–?), who won election in 1920, Andor Nitsch (1883–1976), who was elected in 1925, 1929, and 1935, and Franz Karmasin (1901–1970),

¹⁴¹ For a scathing assessment of the Hungarian section of the Republican Party, see Popély, *Felvidék, 1918–1928*, 130–43.

¹⁴² Gábor Steiner (1888–1939 or 1942) and István Major (1887–1963) both represented the Communist Party in the National Assembly in 1925 and 1929, as did István Kosik (1896–1943) and Viliam Široký (1902–1971) in 1935. Štefan Stunda (1891–1945) and Štefan Csomor (1886–1950) won election as Republican Party deputies in 1929 and 1935, respectively. Vincze Mikle received an appointment to the Republican Party faction in 1924, as did Andrej Kocsis (1867–?) and Andrej Tóth (1890–1972) in 1928. Lajos Surányi (1885–1969) and Gejza Borovszký (1884–1955) were deputies for the Social Democratic Party in 1920, and Ignác Schulz represented the Social Democrats in 1935. See Simon, “Zabudnutí aktivisti,” 25–35, Attila Simon, “Maďarská (politická) elita,” 119; and Suchová, comp., “Průlomy II–Politický systém,” 553–575.

who was elected in 1935, as well as a Pole, Leon Wolf (1883–1968), and a Rusyn, Peter Židovský (1890–1947), who both won election in 1935.¹⁴³

The assertion, in the previous chapter, that “the Czech politicians could not manipulate the levers of state unless they had the consent of their Slovak counterparts” applies not only to the National Assembly but also to the bureaucracy.¹⁴⁴ Individual ministries had to establish specific departments dealing with Slovak affairs due to the distinct conditions and legal norms in Slovakia, and these departments naturally required the employment of Slovak bureaucrats or Czechs who possessed experience of and sensitivity toward Slovak interests. For example, the Ministry of Education and the State Land Office (Slovak: Štátny pozemkový úrad) established specific sections to deal with the provinces of Slovakia and Ruthenia, and both institutions established regional offices in Bratislava as well as in Uzhhorod. There were three levels of courts in Slovakia, including two high courts in Bratislava and Košice, which, among other things, reviewed the judgements of the lower courts. Moreover, although the Supreme Constitutional Court sat in the Moravian city of Brno, it generally included at least one Slovak judge, and from 1931 to 1939, a Slovak, Vladimír Fajnor (1875–1952), presided over it.¹⁴⁵

The proportion of ethnic Slovaks in the bureaucracy increased throughout the interwar period, as ever more qualified Slovaks graduated from the new universities and technical colleges. Even in the central administration in Prague, there was always a smattering of Slovaks, such as Czechoslovakia’s long-serving representative to the League of Nations, Štefan Osuský (1889–1973). In the 1930s, however, the number of Slovaks in the senior levels of the state bureaucracy increased dramatically, from 16 individuals in 1930 to 153 in 1938, although Slovaks still accounted for less than 2 percent of all central administration employees.¹⁴⁶ It was also during the 1930s that Slovaks became dominant in the administration in Slovakia. By 1934, more than 60 percent of the government officials in Slovakia were ethnic Slovaks, and a further 10 percent were ethnic Hungarians and Germans. In addition, from 1935 until 1938, the government in Prague made serious efforts to increase the employment of Slovaks in the bureaucracy, issuing a decree demanding that only Slovaks

¹⁴³ Šuchová, comp., “Prílohy II–Politický systém,” 494–575.

¹⁴⁴ See p. 163.

¹⁴⁵ Peter Kerecman and Rudolf Manik, *História advokácie na Slovensku* (Bratislava: Eurokódex s.r.o., 2011), 331–332. See also Owen Johnson, *Slovakia, 1918–1938: Education and the Making of a Nation*, East European Monographs, no. 180 (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1985), 88–90; and Mičura, “Judicial Problems in Slovakia,” 243–251.

¹⁴⁶ Bakke, *Doomed to Failure*, 425–426.

be appointed to government positions in Slovakia and establishing an inter-ministerial committee to increase the numbers of Slovak officials in the various government ministries.¹⁴⁷

Owen Johnson persuasively argued against the parallel accusation that, due to clientelism and corruption, only pro-government Slovaks could obtain senior positions in the bureaucracy. He pointed out that, even if promotion was not always on merit, with governing parties funneling jobs to their own supporters, adherents of opposition parties still could secure prominent positions within the bureaucracy more systematically than in many other democracies. For example, he noted that Slovak Populist adherents “succeeded in occupying the employment offices in many of the [provincial administration’s] departments, and maintained those positions even after the party left the cabinet in Prague” in 1929.¹⁴⁸ Summing up these developments, in 1937, C. A. Macartney, the British historian, concluded that humanitarian reasons, stemming from an unwillingness to expel people from their positions, rather than politics, largely explained why significant numbers of Czechs continued to be employed in the Slovak administration. In reality, the bureaucracy’s tenure policy, which secured one’s employment until retirement, was the real reason why Czechs in Slovakia stayed in their positions, but, as Macartney also noted, by the 1930s, “in practice...vacancies nearly always [were] filled by Slovaks.”¹⁴⁹

The consociational characteristic of grand coalitions was a feature of Slovak politics. Slovaks were included in every one of the 15 governing coalitions that existed during the Czechoslovak First Republic. The ruling parties had the support of 36 Slovak deputies following the 1920 elections; 37 Slovak deputies after the 1925 elections; 22 Slovak deputies subsequent to the 1929 elections; and 23 Slovak deputies after the 1935 elections. Between 1925 and 1929 and again following the 1935 elections, these Slovak deputies held the balance of power in the National Assembly. For example, when in 1929 the Hlinka Slovak People’s Party withdrew from the governing coalition, the prime minister felt compelled to call new elections.¹⁵⁰ Leff noted that, although the governing coalitions of the 1920s had the support of more than 55 percent of Slovak voters following the 1929 elections, the ruling coalition’s support among Slovak

¹⁴⁷ Xénia Šuchová, “Podiel Slovákov v ústredných štátnych orgánoch v čase Hodžovho premiérstva” in *Historický časopis* 48, no. 4 (2000): 626–34. See also Rychlík, *Češi a Slováci ve 20. století*, 84–89; and Johnson, *Slovakia*, 303–304.

¹⁴⁸ Johnson, *Slovakia*, 300–301.

¹⁴⁹ C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences, 1919–1937* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1937), 133.

¹⁵⁰ Felak, “*At the Price of the Republic*,” 57–58.

voters fell to 35.6 percent, and that number decreased to 33.5 percent after the 1935 elections.¹⁵¹ She concluded that the bulk of the Slovak electorate from 1929 until the end of the republic consistently voted for parties that the power brokers of Prague found unacceptable.¹⁵² These numbers are misleading. Considering the popularity among Slovak voters of those parties that participated in the governing coalition after each set of nationwide elections, the government had the support of 56 percent of the entire Slovak electorate after the 1920 elections and 55 percent of this electorate after the 1925 elections.

Moreover, even in the 1930s, the governing coalitions in Prague always commanded the support of around half of ethnic Czech and Slovak voters in Slovakia. Assuming that, by the 1930s, Czechs and Slovaks made up 72 percent of the population of Slovakia and that they also made up the same proportion of the electorate, then they cast 1,028,185 votes in the 1929 elections and 1,170,401 votes in the 1935 elections. In these same elections in Slovakia, all the parties that subsequently joined the governing coalition obtained 583,704 votes in 1929 and 633,468 votes in 1935. Since these parties likely attracted most of their voters from among the ethnic Czech and Slovak population, the governing coalition had the backing of close to 57 percent of this voting block after the 1929 elections and 54 percent after the 1935 elections.¹⁵³

Slovak support for the government ensured that at least two cabinet posts always went to Slovak deputies throughout the interwar period. Of the 91 men who held cabinet posts during the First Republic, 14 were Slovaks (15 percent, which was exactly equivalent to the proportion of ethnic Slovaks in the total population), including the highly significant posts of defense minister (1919–1920), interior minister (1929–1932), justice minister (1934–1938), foreign minister (1935–1936), health minister (1919–1920 and 1927–1929), agriculture minister (1922–1925 and 1932–1935), education minister (1921–1922, 1924–1925, and 1926–1932), minister of supplies (1919–1920), and minister for the unification of laws (1920–1929). James Peterson also drew attention to the fact that, in the 1920s, “the Slovak proportion of ministries in the executive branch was always higher than the proportion of Slovaks in the population,” and he concluded that

¹⁵¹ Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, 52–55. Authorities in Slovakia either deprived a portion of the populace of their right to vote or these individuals chose to boycott the elections in opposition to the new state’s creation. Their numbers are uncertain.

¹⁵² Regional parties, representing Slovak, Hungarian, German, Jewish, Polish, and Rusyn nationalities in Slovakia as well as the Communist Party, obtained the support of 72 percent of the Slovak electorate in the 1925 elections, 59.5 percent in the 1929 elections, and 61.3 percent in the 1935 elections. See Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, 71–85.

¹⁵³ For the voting statistics, see Šuchová, comp., “Prílohy II–Politický systém,” 565–70.

this “strengthen[s] the argument that Slovaks were able to find relatively open access to the political system.”¹⁵⁴

Karen Henderson criticized the fact that “60 percent of the ministerial portfolios occupied by Slovaks [were] ... held by three men.” She argued that the real power and patronage that emanated from these ministerial appointments was, therefore, in the hands of a small clique of Slovak politicians.¹⁵⁵ In fact, between November 1918 and September 1938, 14 Slovaks received cabinet appointments, including members of the Republican Party, the Social Democratic Party, the People’s Party, and the Hlinka Slovak People’s Party, as well as experts with no specific party affiliation. Indeed, the longest serving Slovak ministers all represented different parties and interests. Hodža and Dérer, who were appointed to 11 separate cabinets, were from the Republican Party and the Social Democratic Party, respectively, while Šrobár, who occupied six portfolios, was a Republican.¹⁵⁶ The staying power of these ministers was not surprising since governments often recycled Czech ministers. The length of time these men stayed in the cabinet enabled them to build up a reservoir of experience and trust that enhanced their ability to reach agreements with rivals, maintain the support of their respective segments, and bolster the consociational system.¹⁵⁷

Occasionally, the government went to extraordinary lengths to ensure adequate Slovak participation in the governing coalition. For example, following the 1925 elections in which the opposition Hlinka Slovak People’s Party became the most popular party in Slovakia, the government introduced a raft of policies designed to appeal to Slovak agrarian and clerical interests. It boosted the state salaries of priests to the same level as that of high school teachers, thereby substantially ameliorating the conditions of the junior ranks of the clergy, who had seen their salaries decline, in relative terms, for a generation. It authorized substantial funds for the electrification of rural communities throughout Slovakia, a long-term project that produced enormous dividends in terms of improved quality of life and economic output.¹⁵⁸ It authorized a significant rise in

¹⁵⁴ James W. Peterson, “Representation of Ethnic Groups within the Czechoslovak Political System, 1918–1982,” *East Central Europe* 10, no. 1/2 (1983): 101.

¹⁵⁵ Karen Henderson, *Slovakia: The Escape from Invisibility, Postcommunist States and Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 9.

¹⁵⁶ Šuchová, comp., “Prílohy II–Politický systém,” 598–606. See also Johnson, *Slovakia*, 71.

¹⁵⁷ Hodža was in the cabinet from 1919 to 1920, from 1922 to 1929, and then continuously from 1932 to 1938, while Dérer first received a government post in 1920, took another in 1925–1926, and served continuously from 1929 to 1938. This information is compiled from the list of Slovak ministers in Šuchová, comp., “Prílohy II–Politický systém,” 555–75.

¹⁵⁸ For a general introduction to electrification in interwar Slovakia, see Miroslav Sabol, *Elektrifikácia v hospodárskom a spoločenskom živote Slovenska, 1938–1948* (Bratislava: Historický ústav

duties on agricultural products, which protected Slovak and Czech farming interests but handicapped Czech industry for the remainder of the interwar period. The government then passed a decree that not only formally recognized the Slovak language as distinct from Czech, but it also ordered all government bureaucrats in Slovakia to learn Slovak, even if they already spoke Czech. It also arranged a bailout of ten million crowns of the People's Bank in Ružomberok (Slovak: Ružomerská ľudová banka), whose founder happened to be Hlinka, the leader of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, and it promised an administrative reform that established the autonomous Provincial Administration in Slovakia. As a result of these policy concessions, the HSLS proceeded to join a new governing coalition in 1927.¹⁵⁹

Slovaks had significant representation in the bureaucracy and National Assembly, and they were in every leading political party, governing coalition, and cabinet throughout the life of the Czechoslovak First Republic. The ethnic minorities also were represented in several governing parties and governing coalitions, through their representatives in the Social Democratic and Republican parties. Moreover, during the 1920s, the governing coalitions included parties that always represented the majority of the ethnic Slovak voting bloc and the majority of the entire electorate in Slovakia. Thus, the people of Slovakia, in general, and ethnic Slovaks, in particular, enjoyed proportional representation in the National Assembly and played a key role in every governing coalition. They thereby possessed the ability to shape policy making, defend Slovak interests, and extract concessions.

The Slovak Minority Veto

Formally, Slovak parties and politicians were a minority in the parliament, and officials in Slovakia could not veto the decisions of the government in Prague.

Slovenskej akadémie vied, 2010), 38–42. For the Bohemian Lands and the republic as a whole, see Pavel Dufek and Gabriela Nováková, “Regionální zájmy, agrárnícká politika a elektrifikace,” in *Regionální zvláštnosti politiky agrární strany v období první Československé republiky*, ed. Josef Harna and Blanka Rašticová (Uherské Hradiště: Slovácké muzeum, 2012), 107–116.

¹⁵⁹ “Elektrizácia slovenského vidieka,” *Slovák*, July 13, 1926, 3; “Kto vymohol učiteľskú paritu?” *Slovák*, July 27, 1926, 1; and “Krok k uskutočneniu programu, že na Slovensku má byť úradnou rečou slovenčina,” *Slovák*, October 27, 1926, 1. On the passing of the *congrua*, see Alena Bartlova, “Česko-Slovenský štát–katolícka cirkev–HSLS,” in *Slovenská ľudová strana v dejinách*, 145–46. On the bailout of the People's Bank, see Marián Tkáč, “The Ľudová Banka in Ružomberok,” *Biatic* 13, no. 10 (2005): 28–29; and Baer, *A Life Dedicated to the Republic*, 117–19. On the establishment of the Provincial Administration, see Xénia Suchová, *Idea československého štátu na Slovensku, 1918–1939: Protagonisti, nositelia, oponenti*, Edícia Slovenská historiografia (Bratislava: Vydavateľstvo Prodamo–Historický ústav SAV, 2011), 145–146; and Lipscher, *K vývinu politickej správy na Slovensku*, 145–165.

Informally, however, Slovak parties and Slovak public opinion either dissuaded the government from adopting policies or ensured the reversal of policies that a substantial part of the Slovak population opposed. As a result, Slovaks repeatedly made use of a de facto minority veto that is characteristic of consociational political systems.

Slovak politicians vetoed several aspects of the 1919 land reform. Acting in concert, the Club of Slovak Deputies, along with Czech deputies who represented conservative agricultural interests, used its membership on the committee tasked with drawing up the reform to ensure that estates with 500 hectares of land or less were exempt from parcelization. Moreover, a special branch of the State Land Office existed in Slovakia and acted in accordance with Slovak as opposed to Czech legal principles. In addition, representatives of all the leading parties in Slovakia sat on the administrative committee overseeing the work of the State Land Office, and they ensured that certain land owners, such as the Catholic Church, received special concessions in the land-redistribution process.¹⁶⁰ Slovak concerns also forced a change in the State Land Office's policy of colonization to provide Czechs and Slovaks with new farmland and to create new villages from portions of the great estates. These colonies usually emerged in areas where minorities predominated, such as the largely Hungarian-populated region of southern Slovakia. The Hlinka Slovak People's Party vigorously condemned the policy of colonization, which, as they correctly asserted, encouraged Czech immigration into Slovakia. In response to the HSLS's persistent criticism, the State Land Office modified its colonization policy, and in 1925, the president of the State Land Office formally instructed his officials that "there is a need to ensure that the Slovaks enjoy an advantage when selecting colonists. Only in exceptional cases should Czechs be selected" as colonists in Slovakia. Further pressure from the HSLS and the Communist Party persuaded the central government to first reduce and then, after 1930, abandon further attempts to establish new colonies in Slovakia.¹⁶¹

Slovak opposition also scuttled several efforts of the central government to impose the formal separation of church and state. The level of popular hostility in Slovakia and parts of Moravia to such policies as removing Catholic Church control over secondary education, reducing the number of official religious hol-

¹⁶⁰ Ľubomír Lipták, "Slovensko medzi dvoma vojnami," 233; and Natália Krajčovičová, "Začiatky pozemkovej reformy na Slovensku v dvadsiatych rokoch," *Historický časopis* 32, no. 4 (1984): 576–77.

¹⁶¹ Attila Simon, *Telepesek és telepese falvak Dél-Szlovákiában a két világháború között* (Somorja: Fórum Kisebbségkutató Intézet, 2008), 153–56.

idays, and commemorating the Czech heretic Hus dissuaded the government from further anticlerical measures. Instead, in 1928, it signed a *modus vivendi* with the Vatican that regulated relations between the Catholic Church and the state. Furthermore, in 1935, it returned to the Catholic Church in Slovakia those ecclesiastical estates that had been sequestered by the land reform in the 1920s.¹⁶²

In 1921, Slovak resistance forced the Czechoslovak State Railways to begin using the Slovak names of localities, rather than the Czech versions of these names, in its signage in Slovakia.¹⁶³ Fierce opposition in 1927 from Slovaks across the political spectrum, including government and opposition politicians, also persuaded the authorities to withdraw a proposal to close down the minting of currency in the Slovak town of Kremnica (Hungarian: Körmöcbánya; German: Kremnitz) and to transfer its operations to a new mint in Prague.¹⁶⁴ A further example of Slovaks vetoing a government proposal came in 1931, when the minister for education, Dérer, himself a Slovak, established a subcommittee of the Matica Slovenská to devise a new spelling guide for the Slovak language. The head of this subcommittee and a number of its members were Czech scholars, and when it published its first draft proposal, Slovaks from across the political spectrum condemned it as a Czech effort to undermine the distinctiveness of the Slovak language. The Hlinka Slovak People's Party, Communist Party, Society of Saint Vojtech (Slovak: Spolok svätého Vojtecha), which was a leading Slovak Catholic organization, and a group of 130 Slovak writers, journalists, and publicists denounced it as another effort at Czechification. Their resistance resulted in the death of the proposal. Exploiting this success, Slovak nationalists flooded the next general assembly of Matica Slovenská and took control of the board of directors. The Czech members of the subcommittee resigned, and Dérer abandoned any further efforts to establish a new spelling guide for the Slovak language.¹⁶⁵

Having halted Dérer's spelling reform with the help of Slovakia's Communists and others, the Slovak Populists then joined with the Hungarian and German minority parties in 1932 to block Dérer's plan for the administrative reorganization of Slovak schools. This reform would have turned all Slovak teachers into state employees, including teachers at denominational schools. Those opposing the reform denounced it as a secularizing policy that also ignored the exceptional challenges teachers faced in Slovak schools. By the end

162 František Vnuk, "Križa vo vzťahoch Praha-Vatikán v roku 1925," *Historický zborník* 9 (1999): 59–71. See also London, NA, FO 371/19495, 136–37.

163 Rychlík, *Češi a Slováci ve 20. století*, 82.

164 Bakke, *Doomed to Failure*, 397–98.

165 Maxwell, *Choosing Slovakia*, 178–79; and Felak, "At the Price of the Republic," 88.

of 1932, the strength of Slovak opposition to Dérer's plan had persuaded the Czechoslovak government that the reform should be, as the British foreign office put it, "shelved."¹⁶⁶

The Prague central government also perpetually was frustrated in its ambition to unify the separate law codes of the Bohemian Crown Lands and Slovakia. Vienna had administered the Bohemian Crown Lands until 1918, while Budapest governed Slovakia, and both provinces retained the separate legal codes of their former overlords. The simple extension of the Austrian legal code to Slovakia would have facilitated substantially closer economic cooperation among the different regions of Czechoslovakia, but the Club of Slovak Deputies fiercely resisted such a move, instead demanding that a Ministry for the Unification of Laws reconcile the two legal systems. The nature of this ministry's work was so sensitive, and the need to avoid the impression that Prague was imposing the Czech legal system on Slovakia was so great, that nine of the ten ministers appointed to oversee this process were Slovaks. Unifying the laws proved cumbersome and fraught with disagreements to such an extent that, by 1931, the ministry had achieved little more than establishing uniform laws for bills of exchange and copyright protection. It was not until 1950 that the reconciliation of Czech and Slovak law was complete.¹⁶⁷

Zdeněk Kühn rightly pointed out that, in spite of the separate legal traditions in the Bohemian Crown Lands and Slovakia, "the Czech legal culture was dominant in Czechoslovakia ... because most Hungarian experts had left Slovakia for the rump Hungary and had been replaced by Czech judges." He added that, initially, "there were only a few Slovak lawyers, many educated in Austrian law at the Czech university in Prague."¹⁶⁸ This extraordinary state of affairs, however, diminished with time as the number of Slovak lawyers and judges steadily increased. In 1921, there were 925 lawyers registered in Slovakia, but that number rose to 1,379 by 1937, with a further 563 persons receiving training in the law.¹⁶⁹ Moreover, the central government was sensitive to Slovak concerns about the Czechification of the Slovak legal system. It made sure, for example, that

¹⁶⁶ London, NA, FO 371/16660, 127–46. See also Béla Angyal, "A csehszlovákiai magyar pártok viszonya a prágai kormányzatokhoz és a szlovák autonomista törekvésekhez," in *Integrációs stratégiák a magyar kisebbségek történetében*, ed. Nándor Bárdi and Attila Simon (Somorja-Šamorín: Fórum Kisebbségkutató Intézet, 2006), 340.

¹⁶⁷ For an examination of the process of legal unification, see Katarína Zavacká, "Právne systémy a tradície na Slovensku v období vzniku ČSR," *Historický časopis* 42, no. 2 (1994): 215–25; and Martin Mičura, "Judicial Problems in Slovakia," in *Slovakia, Then and Now*, 251.

¹⁶⁸ Zdeněk Kühn, *The Judiciary in Central and Eastern Europe: Mechanical Jurisprudence in Transformation?* (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), 7.

¹⁶⁹ Kerecman and Manik, *História advokácie na Slovensku*, 607–610.

all of the Slovak lawyers appointed to leading positions in the Provincial Office (Slovak: Krajinský úrad) in Bratislava had received their legal training in Hungarian universities, including both presidents of the Provincial Office and two of its three vice presidents.¹⁷⁰

At the height of the economic depression in the 1930s, Slovak nationalists and agrarians in the Republican Party worked closely with Czech agrarians and the Sudeten German parties to forestall government proposals to impose price controls on agricultural products. As a result of their informal veto, prices for Czechoslovak agricultural products were the highest in Central Europe, and the farmer in Czechoslovakia remained, according to British diplomats, “a pampered child of the government.”¹⁷¹ In addition, while Slovaks of all political stripes (and the Hungarian and German minorities) welcomed the massive program of state-funded railway expansion that continued throughout the interwar period, they objected to the high number of “foreign” workers used to modernize the Slovak railway network. As a result of their protests, by the 1930s the vast majority of the workers employed in Slovak railway projects came from the region where the work took place or elsewhere in Slovakia.¹⁷²

The need to placate Slovak public opinion also placed constraints on Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy. For example, Czechoslovakia had an obvious interest in improving relations with its neighbors, including Hungary. Doing so, however, would have required handing back a portion of Slovak territory and some Slovaks to Hungary. No such deal was possible, partly due to the scale of Hungary’s territorial ambitions but also to Masaryk’s awareness that relinquishing a significant amount of Slovak territory would generate immense public hostility in Slovakia.¹⁷³ As Matej Hanula noted in 1930, “when some Czech politicians tried to be polite about the Hungarian demands” for border revisions, nationalist Slovaks responded with fury and threatened to reestablish a Slovak National Council to defend Slovakia’s territorial integrity.¹⁷⁴ There was also fierce opposition in the early 1930s in Slovakia to Prague’s ef-

170 The third vice president, Igor Dula (1878–1951), received his medical education at the University of Budapest. See Jozef Pocisk, “Funkcia krajinského prezidenta a krátke medailónky osobností úradu,” in *80. výročie uzákonenia krajinského zriadenia na Slovensku*, ed. Monika Pékova (Bratislava: Slovenský národný archív, 2008, CD-ROM), 4–8.

171 London, NA, FO 371/19495, 11–32, and 20373.

172 Felix Jeschke, *Iron Landscapes: National Space and the Railways in Interwar Czechoslovakia* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2021), 44–48.

173 Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors*, 141.

174 Hanula, “Slovaks in the Prague Parliament,” 169.

forts to foster closer relations with Moscow. Whereas President Masaryk's successor, Beneš, and the Social Democratic Party were amenable to a rapprochement with the Soviets, the Slovak Populists and other Slovak politicians joined conservative Czechs in fiercely resisting such a move. They prevented a recalibration of Czechoslovak foreign policy toward Moscow that lasted until 1934–1935, when Czechoslovakia recognized the Soviet Union and the two countries signed a treaty of friendship.

To suggest that Slovak pressure alone led to all of these policy delays and reversals clearly would be wide of the mark. Czech conservative and Catholic interests also cooperated with Slovak politicians in vetoing various government proposals. Nevertheless, the fact that the central government repeatedly responded to Slovak concerns suggests that Slovaks exerted an influence on policy not only as individual politicians and political parties but also as one segment of the broader Czechoslovak body politic. Interparty cooperation occurred, therefore, not only between Czechs and Slovaks but also among Slovaks themselves. As Bakke noted, in their defense of Slovak interests or what she termed "spatial issues concerning Slovakia," nationalist parties, such as the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, "found allies among other Slovak politicians. In fact, the latter were often as active as the former."¹⁷⁵

Strikingly, threats to leave the governing coalitions and bring down the government did not underpin Slovaks' ability to wield a minority veto. On only one occasion, in 1929, did Slovak Populist deputies warn that they would bring down the governing coalition if it continued with its plans to prosecute their colleague, Tuka, for treason. The government proceeded to try Tuka, who received a prison sentence for treason, even though fresh elections were then necessary to form a new coalition.¹⁷⁶ The events of 1929 demonstrated that the Slovak minority veto was only effective if it possessed multiparty support in Slovakia and if it did not directly threaten the stability of the governing coalitions.

Grand Coalitions and Segmental Autonomy—Slovak Self-Government

Throughout the interwar period, Slovakia possessed a degree of self-government that conformed to the consociational model because it ensured Slovaks control over matters that they deemed to be in their specific interest. This com-

¹⁷⁵ Bakke, *Doomed to Failure*, 519.

¹⁷⁶ Robert Letz, "Hlinkova Slovenská ľudová strana (Pokus o syntetický pohľad)," *Slovenská ľudová strana v dejinách, 1905–1945*, 46–50.

plemented the principle of proportionality, grand coalitions, and the minority veto by guaranteeing Slovak involvement in the exercise of executive power. In 1918, Slovakia became a distinct province in the center of the new state under a Slovak National Council (Slovenská národná rada). A short-lived Czechoslovak Temporary Government for Slovakia (Dočasná vláda pre Slovensko) then administered the parts of Slovakia freed from Hungarian rule. From 1918 to 1927, local government in Slovakia was formally in the hands of the Minister with Full Power for the Administration of Slovakia, who was a member of the cabinet and who had his offices in Bratislava.

The Ministry with Full Power for Slovakia played an important but underappreciated role in ensuring that Slovakia possessed segmental autonomy. It was a distinct government ministry that had the assistance of 15 *referents* (there were a few more over the years) to supervise various areas of policy. The minister also appointed the prefects or sheriffs (Slovak singular: *župan*) who oversaw each county.¹⁷⁷ Although it was responsible for the completion of Slovakia's incorporation into Czechoslovakia, which indelibly associated it with the centralizing tendencies in Czechoslovak politics, paradoxically, the ministry also served as a bulwark against excessive centralization. The fact that this ministry was based in Bratislava, Slovakia's largest city, and was under the control of Slovaks encouraged Seton-Watson to describe it as "a kind of Slovak 'sub-Cabinet.'" He concluded that "as only Slovaks were appointed as *referents*, and also as *župans* of the Slovak counties, it could not be alleged that the system adopted was one of Czechisation."¹⁷⁸

The Ministry with Full Power for the Administration of Slovakia also adopted policies that were crucial in preserving Slovakia's uniqueness within Czechoslovakia. Of particular importance was its support of a distinct educational system in Slovakia. Among the first decisions of the new ministry was a determination to use a reformed version of the Hungarian curriculum and examination system, rather than adopting the Austro-Bohemian model. Apparently, many Slovaks saw the maintenance of some Hungarian legacies, which preserved continuity with the past, as more desirable than the threat of succumbing to Czech influence. In addition, the ministry encouraged schools to teach, wherever pos-

¹⁷⁷ Boissérie, "The Formation of a New Administrative and Political Apparatus in Slovakia, 1918–1920," ch. 13.

¹⁷⁸ Seton-Watson, *The New Slovakia*, 25. Šrobár appointed 17 *referents* to assist him in governing Slovakia. Only six *referents* continued to operate after 1922, and only the *referent* for education remained throughout the interwar period. See Johnson, "Anton Štefánek and the Development of Secondary Education in Slovakia," 285.

sible, in Slovak rather than Czech, and even some of the Czech teachers who came to Slovakia began to use Slovak in their instruction.¹⁷⁹

Even after the Education Ministry in Prague assumed responsibility for overseeing Slovakia's school system, it proved unwilling or unable to depart from the template for a separate Slovak school system that the Ministry with Full Power for the Administration of Slovakia had set. Thus, as Maxwell noted, Slovak students "sat different examinations than their colleagues in the Czech Lands since Slovak students were tested on their mastery of Hattalovčina [a Slovak dialect], not their mastery of Czech." As a result, the educational system in Slovakia, which the first head of the Ministry with Full Power for the Administration of Slovakia, Šrobár, and his colleagues created, fostered "the emergence of a distinctly Slovak script community" and, arguably, a distinctly Slovak as opposed to a Czechoslovak linguistic identity.¹⁸⁰ Moreover, Štefánek conceded that the ministry's control of Slovakia's schools, especially its denominational schools, often remained "illusory in practice, owing to the resistance of the local clergy and the higher Church authorities." Denominational schools, Štefánek explained in an article he published in Great Britain in 1923, "can appoint a teacher for life, they prescribe schoolbooks and the school program, [and] they possess disciplinary rights over the teachers, and the government in exercising its right of control can only act through the church authorities. The local priest or his substitute is always chairman of the local school committee, and at the same time director of the school."¹⁸¹

The consolidation of the new statewide structures of government served as a restraint on the Ministry with Full Power for the Administration of Slovakia. The Czechoslovak constitution constrained its authority, for example, by ending martial law in Slovakia, while the establishment of separate Slovak departments of finance, justice, and railways, along with local departments of the relevant ministries, gradually chipped away at its remaining areas of competence. Czech specialists working in Slovakia and even Slovak officials increasingly bypassed the ministry in Bratislava and communicated directly with the central government in Prague, further diminishing its usefulness.¹⁸² Nevertheless, many viewed the continued existence of the Ministry with Full Power for the Administration of Slovakia as a "corrective to centrifugal tendencies."¹⁸³ Even

¹⁷⁹ Maxwell, *Choosing Slovakia*, 180–182.

¹⁸⁰ Maxwell, *Choosing Slovakia*, 180–182.

¹⁸¹ Anton Štefánek, "Education in Slovakia," *The Slavonic Review* 2, no. 5 (December 1923): 315–16.

¹⁸² Seton-Watson, *The New Slovakia*, 25–28.

¹⁸³ Jozef Kallay, "The Period of Transition," in *Slovakia Then and Now*, 223–25 (quotation on p. 225).

the vitriolic critic of the Czechs, Jehlička, wrote that “centralism proper began only in 1927,” with the provincial reform, and that the former “Slovak minister was a factor with rights equal to those of the Czech ministers.”¹⁸⁴

The Ministry with Full Power for the Administration of Slovakia maintained the old Hungarian county administration, which continued until its abolition, despite reforms, in 1927. It ensured that a system of local government existed in Slovakia that was distinct from the Bohemian Lands, which had two provincial assemblies in Bohemia and in Moravia-Silesia.¹⁸⁵ Moreover, the prefects appointed to head the local administration in Slovakia were not simply political hacks of the central government. For example, even though Šrobár was a pronounced anticlerical, among his first 17 appointees to the position of prefect were two Catholic priests (he appointed a third later), a Protestant pastor, and one of the new leaders of the relaunched and staunchly clerical Slovak People's Party, Martin Mičura (1883–1946). Six other appointees had not been active in Slovak politics prior to 1918, and they apparently received their positions due to their technical expertise and local connections.¹⁸⁶ Moreover, the temporary committees that these prefects appointed to assist them in the task of overseeing each county included a range of Slovak politicians from across the political spectrum. For example, in Nitra County, the new committee included Tiso, who had been a member of the Hungarian Catholic People's Party and then had joined the Slovak People's Party.¹⁸⁷

The appointment of these prefects was an especially sensitive matter in Slovakia because of the way the county system had evolved prior to 1918 in Hungary. Many Slovak counties had histories that stretched back to the medieval period and had fostered distinct cultural identities and local patriotism. The counties, which possessed their own assemblies and limited legislative powers, also had a reputation for checking the absolutist tendencies of the Habsburg monarchs. Following the 1867 *Ausgleich*, however, the county prefects became political appointees of the Interior Ministry (Hungarian: Belügyminisztérium)

¹⁸⁴ Franz Rudolf Jehlicska [František Jehlička], *Reply to Mr. R. W. Seton-Watson's Slovakia Then and Now* (Vienna: n.p., 1932), 9.

¹⁸⁵ With the administrative reform of 1927, which actually took effect in 1928, Moravia and Silesia united to form the new province of Moravia-Silesia.

¹⁸⁶ Šuchová, *Idea československého státu na Slovensku*, 40–42. See also, Michal Slávik, *Slovenskí národovci do 30. októbra 1918* (Trenčín: Vojtech Čelko, 1945), 348–350. For a list of Slovaks in the Hungarian administration in what was to become Slovakia, see Vavro Šrobár, *Osvobodené Slovensko: Pamäti z rokov 1918–1920*, vol. 1 (Prague: Čin, tiskové a nakladatelské družstvo československých legionářů, 1928), 161–81.

¹⁸⁷ Ivan Kamenec, *Tragédia politika, kníaza a človeka: Dr. Jozef Tiso, 1887–1947* (Bratislava: Archa, 1998), 29.

in Budapest, and Slovak nationalists came to regard the office of prefect as the local embodiment of Hungarian chauvinism and chief proponents of the government's Magyarization policy. The new prefects, appointed after 1918, were under considerable pressure to prove that they genuinely could serve the interests of their constituents, rather than merely being instruments of the central government. The work of historians, such as Karol Janas, indicated that some prefects adopted a pragmatic approach to governing their respective counties. For example, in his study of local government in the interwar period in the Považská County, Janas noted that the local prefect repeatedly intervened to remove his own appointed officials if they proved to be unable to work effectively with the elected politicians, even if those politicians were members of the opposition Slovak People's Party.¹⁸⁸

An administrative reorganization of the county system, prepared in 1920 but not enacted until 1923, broke the traditional bonds between the county administrations and the local population by reducing the number of counties to six.¹⁸⁹ The existence of a number of rump counties in Slovakia, which resulted from the creation of the new border between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, partially justified the changes. There were also hopes that abolishing the old counties would result in Slovaks losing their local allegiances and developing a new attachment to the Czechoslovak state.¹⁹⁰ A tangible result of creating the six super-sized Slovak counties was to permit an increased level of local oversight by new, democratically elected county assemblies (Slovak: *Županské zastupiteľstvo*), which theoretically ensured that the prefects were not simply officials of the Ministry of the Interior in Prague but also were accountable and responsive to the needs of the local population. Prior to 1918, one-half of all the members of the old county assemblies had received their appointments on the sole grounds that they had paid the highest rates of tax, while the other half stood for election, based on a limited franchise, using an open ballot. As a result, a small group of wealthy families that tended to be allies of the local prefect monopolized county governments.¹⁹¹ Elections

¹⁸⁸ Karol Janas, "K činnosti Slovenskej ľudovej strany v regióne na príklade Považskej Bystrice," in *Slovenská ľudová strana v dejinách*, 326–35.

¹⁸⁹ The names of the six new counties were eponymous with their administrative capitals aside from two: Bratislavská župa, Košická župa, Podtatranská župa (administrative capital in Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš), Považská (administrative capital in Turčiansky Svätý Martin), Nitrianska župa, and Zvolenská župa.

¹⁹⁰ Bakke, *Doomed to Failure*, 461.

¹⁹¹ Scott M. Eddie, "The Changing Pattern of Landownership in Hungary, 1867–1914," *Economic History Review*, n.s., 20 (August 1967): 299.

in 1923 to the new county assemblies, in contrast, were on the basis of universal suffrage and the secret ballot, and the assemblies were far more reflective of Slovak society and local opinion than their prewar counterparts even though the Prague government appointed some of the members. The diversity of the assemblies was apparent when one considers that, among the 278 members of all six county assemblies, there were 41 clergymen, 47 farmers, and 15 factory workers.¹⁹²

These new assemblies had the task of scrutinizing the work of the local prefects and proposing policies, although the local prefect could ignore these recommendations, and the minister of the interior in Prague could veto them. The hope that forbidding the county assemblies from discussing political topics would circumvent ideological divisions and focus their attention on technocratic solutions may have proved unrealistic, but the assemblies still served as a check on the powers of the prefects and were a first step toward the establishment of an autonomous and democratic political system in interwar Slovakia.¹⁹³

The framers of the legislation creating the new super-sized counties deliberately constructed them to cut across the ethnic segments in Slovakia. Five of the six counties extended from the north to the south of Slovakia and incorporated large numbers of voters from the northern Slovak heartlands and the southern, predominantly Hungarian-populated regions. Each of the counties also contained major towns and cities, with sizeable populations of Hungarians, Jews, Germans, industrial workers, and middle-class voters.

In the local elections of 1923, no party won an absolute majority of the vote in the five counties that stretched from the north to the south of Slovakia. The geographic exception, Považská County, was also the electoral exception, as the Slovak Peoples Party there won a majority of the popular vote and 20 of the 35 seats on the county assembly. The government, however, appointed an additional 11 representatives to the assembly so that, even in Považská County, interparty cooperation remained essential to form a majority.¹⁹⁴ In total, the government appointed 67 of the 278 members of the county assemblies, the justification for which, as Eduard Táborský (1910–1996) noted, was to “secure inclusion ...of people with expert knowledge for whom the political parties could not find a place

192 Lipscher, *K vývinu politickej správy na Slovensku*, 116.

193 Xénia Šuchová, “Problémy organizácie politickej správy na Slovensko v predmníchovskej republike,” in *Slovensko v Československu*, 103–107.

194 Lipscher, *K vývinu politickej správy na Slovensku*, 114.

on their list of candidates.”¹⁹⁵ Táborický also recognized that, while a number of the appointees were technocrats, rather than politicians, their presence on the oversight committees was “also a handy weapon to hold in check disloyal groups.”¹⁹⁶ For example, in 1923, all but one of the 67 appointees came from the Republican Party and Social Democratic Party, both of which were, at that time, part of the governing coalition in Prague.¹⁹⁷

Even with the assistance of the government appointees, the Republicans, Social Democrats, and National Socialists, all of whom were members of the ruling coalition in 1923, succeeded in forming a slim majority in only two of the six counties, and only if all three parties were prepared to work together in an informal coalition. In the other four counties, parties in opposition to the central government had at least half of the seats in each assembly. Thus, in Bratislava County, the Slovak People's Party, the Communist Party, and the various Hungarian parties had 24 of the 48 members of the assembly. In Nitra County, the same three parties had 24 of the 46 seats; while in Považská County, the Slovak Populists and the Communists had 24 of the 46 seats. In Podtatranská County, the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, the Communist Party, and a German-Hungarian coalition party held 24 of the 46 seats. The government's powers of appointment, therefore, did not fundamentally empower one party at the expense of the others, the opposition parties still held at least half of the seats in four of the six assemblies, and multiparty cooperation remained a prerequisite if the politicians were to cobble together a majority in any of the county assemblies.¹⁹⁸ Ethnic minorities in Slovakia also obtained substantial representation in five of these six new counties, with the various German-Hungarian parties obtaining nine of the 36 elected seats in Bratislava County, nine of the 35 seats in Nitra County, seven of the 35 seats in Zvolen County, seven of the 35 seats in Košice County, and six of the 35 seats in Podtatranská County, with Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš (German: Liptau-Sankt-Nikolaus) as its major town. Hungarians, Germans, and Rusyns also won elections to these county assemblies as representatives of the Communist Party and the Republican Party.¹⁹⁹

195 Eduard Táborický, “Local Government in Czechoslovakia, 1918–1948,” *American Slavic and East European Review* 10 (October 1951): 207. Between 1939 and 1945, Táborický was the personal secretary of Beneš, and between 1949 and 1990, he taught political science at the University of Texas at Austin.

196 Táborický, “Local Government in Czechoslovakia,” 207.

197 The exception was a local Rusyn party member who received an appointment to the county assembly of Košice.

198 Lipscher, *K vývinu politickej správy na Slovensku*, 114.

199 Popély, *Felvidék, 1918–1928*, 243–45.

Rather than breeding political paralysis, the governing structures in the counties produced impressive results. Ján Sekáč (1882–1964), who became prefect of Podtatranská County in 1923, received praise for overseeing rapid economic growth in one of Slovakia's poorest regions. Ján Rumann (1876–1925), as prefect of Spiš County between 1919 and 1922, built a new hospital in Levoča (Hungarian: Lőcse; Rusyn: Левоча).²⁰⁰ Then, as prefect of Košice County from 1922 until his death, Rumann built a new student dormitory in Košice. Both Sekáč and Rumann breathed new life into the economy and sporting activities in eastern Slovakia.²⁰¹

Grand Coalitions and Segmental Autonomy—The Slovak Provincial Office

In 1927, as a consequence of the inclusion of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party in the governing coalition, the entire county system in Slovakia and Ruthenia gave way to provinces in Bratislava and Uzhhorod, each replete with a president, Provincial Assembly, various subcommittees, and a sizeable civil service. This put Slovakia and Ruthenia on the same legislative and administrative footing as the Bohemian Lands, which earlier had instituted their own provincial offices and assemblies to replace their traditional diets. The new administrative mechanism fell short of establishing genuine self-government for Slovakia. As with the former county administrations, the president and almost one-third of each provisional assembly were appointees of the central government. The appointed president had considerable powers. He summoned the assembly, drew up the programs for its sessions, oversaw all meetings, and had veto power over any resolution that emerged from the Provincial Assembly, while the central government also maintained the right to veto any decisions of the Provincial Office that encroached on the national interest. Moreover, large areas of policy making, such as foreign policy, defense, law and order, levels of taxation, and education, remained under the direct control of the relevant ministries in Prague.²⁰² In his assessment of the creation of a Slovak province to replace the counties, Ferdinand Peroutka (1895–1978), the contemporary Czech commentator, cynically dismissed the new institution as moving "the autonomist slogans into the harmless riverbed of merely administrative provincial autonomy."²⁰³ The Hlinka

200 In 1923, Spiš County became part of Podtatranska County.

201 *Slovenský biografický slovník (od roku 833 do roku 1990)*, ed. Štefan Valentovič (vols. 1–3) and Augustín Maťovčík (vols. 4–6), (Martin: Matica Slovenská, 1986–1992), s.v., "Rumann, Ján," and "Sekáč, Ján."

202 Táborský, "Local Government in Czechoslovakia," 206–207.

203 Peroutka, *Budování státu*, vol. 3: *Rok 1920* (Prague: Fr. Borový, 1936), 1597. In his chapter, Peroutka considered events in 1920, but since he published a decade and a half later, he had the advantage of hindsight.

Slovak People's Party, which made the establishment of the Provincial Office in Slovakia a condition for joining the governing coalition in 1927, conceded in its party newspaper, *Slovák*, that it was "but the skeleton on which the full autonomy of Slovakia will be built in time."²⁰⁴

Historians have downplayed the importance of the Slovak Provincial Office. During the Czechoslovak Communist Era, Zlata Kalousková, in her introduction to the inventory of the Provincial Office's holdings, clearly summarized the official interpretation when she declared that "it was neither an autonomous nor a federal institution but an organ of the central government."²⁰⁵ The Slovak Academy of Sciences's 1985 history of Slovakia continued to downplay the significance of the establishment of Slovakia's Provincial Office as, at most, "a departure from the practice of centralism and a step toward establishing self-government for Slovakia."²⁰⁶ Nationalist Slovak historians in exile, normally eager to laud any development that pointed toward full independence for Slovakia, conceded that the creation of the Slovak provincial government was a "step in the right direction" that ensured that "Slovakia became at least a bureaucratic unit," but they, too, concluded that the republic was a "centralized nation-state," which forced Slovaks into "a struggle for survival."²⁰⁷

More recent Slovak historiography largely echoes this assessment. Felak, in his seminal study of Slovak nationalism in the interwar period, asserted that "although the law [which established the Slovak Provincial Office] provided ... the framework within which autonomy could someday be realized," it still "allowed for considerable centralist control."²⁰⁸ Similarly, Leff noted that, because "appointment and budgetary decision-making power still rested in Prague ... [even] from a nationalist perspective, it could only be billed as a first step."²⁰⁹ Other recent scholarship has been even blunter. Summarizing the consensus among Slovak historians, Ľubomír Lipták flatly stated that the Provincial Office "lacked real political power."²¹⁰

²⁰⁴ *Slovák*, no. 146 (29 June 1928):1, as quoted in Bakke, *Doomed to Failure*, 463.

²⁰⁵ Zlata Kalousková, *Krajinský úrad v Bratislave*, part 1: *Prezídium, (1920) 1928–1938 (1939)*. *Inventár* (Bratislava: Štátny ústredný archív SSR, 1969), 2.

²⁰⁶ *Dejiny Slovenska, 1918–1945*, 143.

²⁰⁷ Stanislav Kirschbaum, "The Slovak People's Party: The Politics of Opposition, 1918–1938," in *Slovak Politics: Essays on Slovak History in Honour of Joseph M. Kirschbaum*, ed. Stanislav Kirschbaum (Cleveland, OH; Rome, Italy: Slovak Institute, 1983), 178 (first quotation); Mikluš, *Slovakia*, 20–21 (second quotation); and Kirschbaum, *A History of Slovakia*, 160 (third and fourth quotations).

²⁰⁸ Felak, *At the Price of the Republic*, 35.

²⁰⁹ Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, 79.

²¹⁰ Lipták, "Slovensko medzi dvoma vojnami," 227.

A few Slovak scholars lauded the establishment of Slovak self-government as, in the words of Alena Bartlová and Ivan Thurzo, a development of historical importance, since Slovakia had “become a country, which, for the first time in its history, had clearly defined borders and a pan-Slovak institution—the Provincial Office.” Elsewhere, Bartlová argued that “the existence of this institution provoked the Slovak elite into greater activity” and that Slovakia had thereby reached a “new political level” of activity and influence.²¹¹ Róbert Letz, in his 2010 history of interwar Slovakia, also concluded that, although the Provincial Office’s establishment was deeply controversial and took place just as the Great Depression engulfed Czechoslovakia, the politicians who oversaw its work embarked on a “consensual effort to assist the economic and cultural development of Slovakia regardless of their political persuasion.”²¹²

These last authors’ willingness to positively reappraise the Provincial Office did not go far enough. Closer examination of its leaders and the function of its various institutions reveals that the Provincial Office in Bratislava acted as a genuinely effective body in addressing Slovak interests within Czechoslovakia. Two men, generally viewed as technocrats rather than party hacks, occupied the important post of president, and they rapidly gained the confidence of the Provincial Assembly through their impartiality and their respect for its deliberations. The first president to receive an appointment from the Ministry of the Interior as provincial president was a provincial judge, Ján Drobný (1881–1948), who officially was a Slovak Populist, but, as British diplomats noted, had “never played an active part in politics and lived a quiet life ... spending most of his time fishing.”²¹³ In 1929, after his party had resigned from the government coalition, Drobný’s replacement was his former provincial vice president, Jozef Országh (1883–1949), who served in the post until 1938.

Országh was another sensible choice to run the Provincial Office. He was a member of the Republican Party, which was the largest party in the Provincial Assembly and part of the governing coalition in Prague. He had been active in the Slovak nationalist movement prior to 1918, but he then quietly served in the local administration in Slovakia, first as a district administrator

211 Alena Bartlová and Ivan Thurzo, *Slovenský Perikles: Náčrt životnej cesty Milana Hodžu, prvého slovenského predsedu vlády ČSR* (Bratislava: Vydavateľstvo Spolku slovenských spisovateľov, 2008), 189–90 (first quotation); and Alena Bartlová, “Niektoré nové prvky v politickom systéme ČSR a v politickom živote Slovenska na prelome 20. a 30. rokov,” *Studia Historica Nitriensia* 3 (1995): 107 (second quotation).

212 Róbert Letz, *Slovenské dejiny*, vol. 4: 1914–1938 (Bratislava: Literárne informačné centrum, 2010), 180.

213 London, NA, FO 371/13580, 219–227.

and then prefect, without attracting any significant criticism from his political opponents. He was one of the few prefects to maintain his post after the dramatic reduction of Slovak counties in 1923, and Jozef Pocisk appears correct in his assertion that Országh's "experience and administrative skills" were the reasons for his appointment as president.²¹⁴ He appealed to Slovakia's Hungarian minority because he spoke fluent Hungarian, happily socialized with Hungarians, and even insisted on writing his family name according to the rules of Hungarian rather than Slovak orthography (that is, he used *sz* instead of *s*).²¹⁵ There is no indication that, during his eight-year presidency, his political opponents accused him of abusing his authority or of favoring his Republican Party colleagues. In fact, Országh appears to have fostered good relations with all the members of the Provincial Assembly. He promptly summoned the meetings of the Provincial Assembly, and he provided plenty time for debate, so all parties in the Assembly had ample opportunity to present their full range of views. Typically, four meetings of the Provincial Assembly that lasted for several days or even weeks occurred each year in Bratislava. Following the traditional Hungarian practice, Országh allowed assembly members to raise almost any issue in the annual debate over the Provincial Office's budget, granted sufficient time so that all the assembly members could contribute to the debate if they wished, and on only the rarest of occasions required a speaker to cease his speech prematurely or retract an allegation. At times, he also served as an intermediary between the government and the HSLS, whose party leaders regarded Országh as someone who could broker deals and reduce tensions between the central government in Prague and the Slovak nationalists.²¹⁶ The Hungarian minority also valued him as someone who, at the very least, took their complaints seriously.²¹⁷

The president of the Provincial Office in Bratislava also assumed significant control over the 77 districts (Czech and Slovak singular: *okres*) that formed the highest layer of local government in Slovakia, along with the self-governing cities of Bratislava and Košice. These district governments dealt with such issues as public health, road maintenance, unemployment relief distribution, marriage licenses, and passports. Although each district head (Slovak: *okresný náčelník*)

²¹⁴ Pocisk, "Funkcia krajinského prezidenta a krátke medailónky osobností úradu," 4–5. See also London, NA, FO 371/15179, 193 (of 1931).

²¹⁵ –Spectator–, "Hát ilyen is volt!" *Új Szó*, February 4, 1991, 4.

²¹⁶ Felak, "At the Price of the Republic," 110.

²¹⁷ Felak, "At the Price of the Republic," 110; and Lajos Turczel, "A magyar szakos tanárképzés helyzete Pozsonyban és Prágában 1922 és 1959 között," *Irodalmi Szemle* 45, no. 9 (2002): 43.

was an appointee of the minister of the interior in Prague, following the 1927 provincial reform, the responsibility for supervising the work of these officials came under the auspices of the Provincial Office president. Each district also possessed an oversight assembly of 18–36 members, and the provincial presidents appointed one-third of each local assembly's members.²¹⁸ The Provincial Assembly constrained the powers of the president because it not only scrutinized and debated his decisions but also possessed the authority to amend or even reject the Provincial Office's annual budget. Moreover, unlike the county assemblies it replaced, the government permitted the Provisional Assembly to debate not only technocratic but also political matters, a provision which ensured that it served as a forum for broad and vigorous debate.²¹⁹ In spite of the fact that one-third of the members of the Provincial Assembly were appointees of the Prague government, it remained a genuinely representative body. To pass the annual budget, the president of the Provincial Office required the support of the majority of the assembly, and since two-thirds of its delegates held their seats as a result of direct elections, based on universal suffrage and secret ballot, he could not rely upon the support of the appointed members.²²⁰

Even the appointed members were not necessarily pawns of the central government. At least five of the 18 appointed delegates, for example, always came from the ranks of the HSLS, which was in opposition to the central government from 1929 onwards. A sizeable number of the appointees also received their positions because of their valuable skills and experience. Among the 34 persons who received appointments to the Provincial Assembly during its ten-year existence, were eight secretaries and administrators of various institutions and associations, four bankers, four university professors, three businessmen, three notaries, and a judge. The appointees also improved the representation of minorities in the Provincial Assembly. Following the 1928 elections, when no members of the Rusyn minority were elected to the Provincial Assembly, two Rusyns received appointments. Following the 1935 elections, when no Jews were elected to the Provincial Assembly, a member of the Jewish community secured an appointment to join the Social Democratic Party faction.²²¹ Even the British legation, which was unstinting in its criticism of Prague's chauvinistic policies, reported

218 Veronika Nováková, "Kompetencia okresných úradov z hľadiska krajinského úradu," in *80. výročie uzákonenia krajinského zriadenia na Slovensku*, 1–2.

219 London, NA, FO 371/12094, 157–161.

220 For a detailed summary of the powers of the Provincial Office, see Xénia Šuchová, "Zavedenie krajinského zriadenia na Slovensku roku 1928: Kompetencie a prvé rozpočty," in *Historický časopis* 45, no. 3 (1997): 487–96.

221 Šuchová, comp., "Prílohy II–Politický systém," 581–88.

to London that “the choice of the nominated members . . . [is] devoid of all political significance, the nominations being confined to experts and specialists.”²²² Another report added that “the general opinion was that the minorities could have little to complain of, and all parties except the ‘irreconcilables’ (presumably Hungarians who were not included among the appointees) showed themselves to be reasonably satisfied with the nominations.”²²³

The appointment of one-third of the Provincial Assembly’s members also ensured that the parties supporting the central government and those in opposition were evenly balanced within the Provincial Assembly. Opposition politicians, from the Slovak nationalist, Communist, and minority parties, obtained 21 of the 36 elected seats in the 1928 elections, and 20 of the 36 elected seats in the 1935 elections. The use of appointments, however, meant that government party supporters became Provincial Assembly members and that the opposition parties possessed 27 of the 54 seats in the assembly.²²⁴ The presence of the appointed members in the Provincial Assembly also may have contributed to the persistently high quality of its debates. Provincial Assembly members generally refrained from making partisan attacks or from criticizing their fellow members, and Bartlová remarked that they “endeavored to solve actual and concrete problems” by making practical suggestions about improving the work of the Provincial Office.²²⁵

The consensual atmosphere of the Provincial Assembly also was evident in the Provincial Committee (Slovak: *Krajinský výbor*) that drafted and scrutinized legislation, oversaw appointments, supervised committees and commissions that dealt with various areas of policy that came under the provincial government’s purview, and amended draft policies that came to the Provincial Assembly for final approval.²²⁶ The Provincial Committee included only members of the Provincial Assembly, but the membership structure once again ensured that no single party held a majority. Precisely half of the appointees came from parties that supported the government in Prague, and half were from the opposition parties. For example, following the first elections to the Provincial Assembly, parties that supported the government received six committee memberships, including three representatives of the Republican Party and one membership each to the Social Democratic Party, National Democratic Party, and Czechoslo-

²²² London, FO, 371, 13579, 1929, 156–58.

²²³ London, FO, 371, 13580, 1929, 97–122.

²²⁴ Šuchová, comp., “Prílohy II–Politický systém,” 581–88.

²²⁵ Bartlová, “Niektoré nové prvky v politickom systéme ČSR,” 102.

²²⁶ Lipscher, *K vývinu politickej správy na Slovensku*, 176.

vak People's Party. The other six memberships went to the opposition parties, including three to the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, two to the ethnic Hungarian parties, and one to the Communist Party.²²⁷ Following the 1935 elections, the parties that supported the government once again obtained six committee memberships, with four of these going to the Republican Party, two to the Social Democratic Party, and six to the opposition parties, including four to the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, one to the Hungarian minority party, and one to the Communist Party.²²⁸

Since the process of drafting and amending legislation in the Provincial Committee required the support of a majority of its members, the government and opposition parties had to cooperate to ensure the smooth functioning of the Provincial Office. Although Prague ultimately determined the size of the Provincial Office's budget, the officials of the Provincial Office, working directly under the guidance of the president, drew up the first draft of the budget. The Provincial Committee then amended the budget behind closed doors, after which a series of negotiations began with the Interior and Finance Ministries in Prague to determine the precise amount of funding that the Provincial Office in Bratislava actually was to receive. Once the haggling with the central government concluded, the proposed budget again went to the Provincial Committee for further discussion and possible redrafting. Allocating ten areas of policy to separate members of the committee, with another member from a separate party serving as an assistant, further fostered multiparty cooperation. Only when these small working groups had reached agreement and the entire committee had approved the budget did it advance to a full meeting of the Provincial Assembly.²²⁹ Operating outside the public's gaze, the Provincial Committee repeatedly reached a consensus on the contents of the budget and was able to speak with one voice in its negotiations with the central government in Prague. In December 1929, it was precisely this interparty cooperation that so impressed Országh, then the provincial vice president under Drobný, when he thanked all the Provincial Assembly members "for their patient and selfless work demonstrated during the lengthy deliberations of the assembly."²³⁰ Over the years, Országh frequently praised the delegates for their cooperative nature.

²²⁷ Šuchová, comp., "Prílohy II–Politický systém," 583.

²²⁸ Šuchová, comp., "Prílohy II–Politický systém," 588; and Lipscher, *K vývinu politickej správy na Slovensku*, 175.

²²⁹ Šuchová, *Idea československého štátu na Slovensku*, 155–165; and Lipscher, *K vývinu politickej správy na Slovensku*, 175–76.

²³⁰ "Zápisnica III. zasadnutia krajinského zastupiteľstva Krajiny Slovenskej," *Krajinský vestník pre Slovensko*, 2, no. 5 (20 December 1929): Priloha, 88.

While the size of the annual budget diminished, in real terms, during the economic depression that engulfed Czechoslovakia in the 1930s, the Provincial Office still obtained more funding than the various Slovak counties had obtained prior to their abolition and more funding than the central government in Prague initially was willing to provide.²³¹ For example, in 1929 both the Provincial Committee and the Provincial Assembly unanimously rejected the central government's attempt to cut Slovakia's annual expenditure by more than 20 percent (55 million crowns) and thereby ensured that eventually Prague endorsed the draft budget of the Provincial Office.²³² Thanks to the quality of the personnel in the Provincial Office and the subcommittees' diligent oversight, Slovakia tended to disburse this substantial pot of money in a sensible manner. A minimal amount of the annual budget went to the operating expenditures of the Provincial Office, whereas almost three-quarters of the annual budget supported the key policy areas of healthcare, transportation, and the development of commerce and agriculture.²³³

The Provincial Office in Bratislava not only wielded its power over the budget but also assumed responsibility for controlling transport, culture, public health, utilities, student affairs, hospitals, and tourism. It served as an intermediary between the Ministry of the Interior in Prague and the district offices (Slovak singular: *okresný úrad*) in Slovakia.²³⁴ As Táborský observed, in all these matters, the central government tended to give the Provincial Office in Bratislava "a considerable amount of unhampered discretion."²³⁵ Indeed, although the Slovak Provincial Office possessed the right to appeal to the Constitutional Court if it believed that the central government was encroaching on its right to manage purely local affairs in Slovakia, it never deemed it necessary to adopt that course of action, a rare example of a minority veto whose application never was necessary.²³⁶

The Provincial Office also possessed the same right to issue decrees as any other government ministry to implement and thereby constrict or expand (but not overturn) existing legislation. Its ability to draw not only upon the laws the

²³¹ Letz, *Slovenské dejiny*, vol. 4, 180–81.

²³² Šuchová, *Idea československého štátu na Slovensku*, 154–60.

²³³ "Zápisnica III. zasadnutia krajinského zastupiteľstva Krajiny Slovenskej," 55. A discussion of the provincial budget in Slovakia in 1929 and 1930 appears in Šuchová, "Zavedenie krajinského zriadenia na Slovensku roku 1928," 496–508.

²³⁴ For a detailed discussion of the Provincial Office's involvement in religious and cultural life, see Libuša Hrubá, "Agenda kultúry, školstva a cirkevných záležitostí v písomnostiach 6. Oddelenia Krajinského úradu," in *80. výročie uzákonenia krajinského zriadenia na Slovensku*.

²³⁵ Táborský, "Local Government in Czechoslovakia," 207.

²³⁶ Táborský, "Local Government in Czechoslovakia," 208.

National Assembly had passed but also upon the pre-1918 laws and decrees of the Kingdom of Hungary further enhanced its authority. For example, in February 1936, the Provincial Office issued a decree on sweeping chimneys that asserted legal precedents not only from Czechoslovak legislation issued in 1924 and 1927 but also from Law XXII of 1886 which the Hungarian Parliament passed, and the 1888 decrees of Hungary's Interior Ministry.²³⁷ Moreover, the Provincial Office frequently issued decrees, in conjunction with other administrative departments and institutions, such as police chiefs and district courts, enabling it to encroach on such areas as law and order that formally were beyond its purview.²³⁸ It was precisely the decree-issuing powers of the Provincial Office that led Dérer, one of Slovakia's most prominent centralist politicians and minister of justice from 1934 to 1938, to insist that Slovakia possessed self-government that "an administrative and economic diet with limited legislative powers" embodied.²³⁹

The establishment of the Provincial Office also ushered in a new era of transparency. All the decrees of the Slovak Provincial Office, the deliberations of its Provincial Assembly, and the various official announcements were in a circular that usually appeared biweekly, the *Krajinské noviny pre Slovensko* (Provincial News for Slovakia), renamed in 1928 the *Krajinský vestník pre Slovensko* (Provincial Bulletin for Slovakia). When the policies and pronouncements of the Provincial Office specifically affected one of Slovakia's minorities, the information appeared in the relevant minority language.

The Provincial Office's systematic effort to collect detailed information on conditions in Slovakia complemented this new era of transparency. Up to this point, no institution had been willing or able to collate information pertaining specifically to Slovakia, which partially obscured the sharp differences between conditions in the western and eastern parts of the country. In 1919, the central government founded an Economic Office for Slovakia (Slovak: Hospodársky úrad pre Slovensko) that was supposed to provide information about the economy to the Ministry with Full Power for the Administration of Slovakia. This office's activities appear to have been neither systematic nor comprehensive and

²³⁷ "56. Oběžník krajinského úradu v Bratislave zo dňa 18. januára 1936, číslo 9199/8/1936, o zamýšľanom vydaní nariadenia o vymetaní komínov," *Krajinský vestník pre Slovensko* 9, no. 5 (February 1, 1936): 69–72. See also Lipscher, *K vývinu politickej správy na Slovensku*, 176.

²³⁸ For example, see "272. vyhláška Krajinského úradu v Bratislave zo dňa 12. októbra 1938, číslo 65.216/1938, prez." *Krajinský vestník pre Slovensko*, 11, no. 35 (12 October 1938): 585–586. The decree appears in both Slovak and Hungarian.

²³⁹ Ivan Dérer, *The Unity of the Czechs and Slovaks: Has the Pittsburgh Declaration Been Carried Out?* (Prague: Orbis Publishing Company, 1938), 67–68.

largely consisted of recording the problems and complaints of various localities in Slovakia.²⁴⁰ Thus, the Slovak Provincial Office's ability to collate and publish the first accurate data, for example, on the unemployment and inflation rates in Slovakia, proved invaluable in determining the focus of its policies, in drawing up long-term plans for the development of Slovakia, in educating the electorate, and in using the information to extract additional concessions from the central government.²⁴¹ Along with the collation and publication of information, the Provincial Office drafted its own long-term plans for the development of Slovakia. One particular area of interest for officials was the establishment of new sources of energy to accelerate Slovakia's economic growth. Therefore, as well as overseeing the construction of Slovakia's first ever major hydroelectric project, the Provincial Office outlined ambitious plans for further hydroelectric projects that became reality during the Second World War and the subsequent communist dictatorship.²⁴²

The formal scope and size of the Provincial Office grew throughout the 1930s. The increasing number of civil servants who worked for the Slovak Provincial Office enhanced its effectiveness. By 1937, it employed 1,185 officials and 168 subordinate clerks divided among more than 30 separate departments, each with a specific area of responsibility. Of these officials, 343 were Czechs who had transferred to Slovakia to assist the administration, but 64 percent were Slovaks, including 69 percent of the officials ranked at service class one, the most senior officials working for the Provincial Office.²⁴³ As its bureaucracy grew, the Provincial Office assumed more responsibility. It oversaw the activities of Slovakia's elected mayors, whom it could remove from their posts. It took control of the network of quasi-official associations, such as the Agricultural Council (Czech: *Zemědělská rada*; Slovak: *Zemedelská rada* or *Pôdohospodárska rada*), which represented agricultural interests. It oversaw the content and distribution of school textbooks and gradually increased subsidies for schools and universities. The Provincial Office formally established the Economic Institute of Slovakia and Ruthenia (Slovak: *Národohospodársky ústav Slovenska a Podkarpatskej Rusi, NÁRUS*) to serve as a research body on economic issues and transformed it into a nonpartisan organization. "At its sittings," Hanula explained, "members of all important political parties took part and all Slovak

²⁴⁰ See František Bielik and Zlata Kalousková, *Hospodársky úrad pre Slovensko, 1918–1928, Katalóg* (Bratislava: Slovenský Národný Archív, 1974), 1.

²⁴¹ Bartlová, "Niektoré nové prvky v politickom systéme ČSR," 102–103.

²⁴² Bartlová, "Niektoré nové prvky v politickom systéme ČSR," 102.

²⁴³ Dérer, *The Unity of the Czechs and Slovaks*, 59–60.

daily newspapers were satisfied with its work.”²⁴⁴ The Provincial Office also established various associations of professionals and state employees, and it continuously expanded its network of local offices, establishing a branch office in the Eastern Slovak town of Košice and a further 24 smaller offices across Slovakia.²⁴⁵ Prime Minister Hodža was also eager, in his words, to “extend the self-government of Slovakia” and drew up plans in 1937 to grant the Provincial Office new powers to oversee the educational system in Slovakia.²⁴⁶

A further testament to the Slovak Provincial Office’s effectiveness was its increasing multiparty support. When its Provincial Assembly first convened in 1929, a number of delegates from the Social Democratic and National Socialist parties denounced the formation of the Provincial Office, which, they argued, would add a new and superfluous level of bureaucracy and empower enemies of the state.²⁴⁷ By 1935, however, following the second elections to the Provincial Assembly, all of the political parties, with the exception of the Communist Party, expressed their support for its continued functioning. Indeed, the Hungarian and German delegates, as well as those from the Hlinka Slovak People’s Party, the Slovak National Party, and the Republican Party, who together comprised more than two-thirds of the representatives in the Provincial Assembly, continued calling for expanding its powers until its dissolution.²⁴⁸

In the aftermath of the 1935 elections, leading members of both the government and the opposition parties also voiced their strong support for the Provincial Office. For example, on 9 May 1935, Országh, who was not only the head of the Provincial Office but also one of the most prominent members of the Republican Party in Slovakia, gave an address to his senior officials in which he reviewed the achievements of the Provincial Office during the previous six years. Revealingly, Országh chose not to make partisan political points, he avoided any reference to the central government in Prague, and he made no effort even to laud his own successes. Instead, he focused solely on what his officials had achieved, noting that they had produced realistic budgets; had supervised the

²⁴⁴ Hanula, “Slovaks in the Prague Parliament 1918–1939,” 168.

²⁴⁵ “Országos hivatali rendeltséget kap Kassa, de a fontosabb ügyek jóváhagyás végett föltérjesztendő a pozsonyi országos elnökhöz,” *Prágai Magyar Hírlap*, July 22, 1936, 4. See also Johnson, *Slovakia 1918–1939*, 441; Lipscher, *K vývinu politickej správy na Slovensku*, 172–73; and Bartlová and Thurzo, *Slovenský Perikles*, 216–17.

²⁴⁶ Hodža, “Nationality Policy,” in *Nationality Policy in Czechoslovakia*, 28.

²⁴⁷ The debate appears in “229. vyhláška krajinského prezidenta zo dňa 15. júna 1929, čís. 28.882. o uverejnení zápisnice krajinského zastupiteľstva zo dňa 29. a 30. apríla 1929,” *Krajinský vestník pre Slovensko* 2, no. 18 (June 20, 2029): 17–47.

²⁴⁸ For example, see “Szlovákia autonómiáját követelték a szlovák és a magyar szónokok az országos képviselőtestület ülésén,” *Prágai Magyar Hírlap*, July 14, 1938, 3.

operations of 17 hospitals; had reconstructed 74 bridges; had more than doubled the length of paved roads; had launched a major program of river regulation and flood control; had invested 32 million crowns in agriculture; had improved public health; had provided funding for schools, dormitories, and cultural organizations; had restored historic buildings; had erected monuments; had funded exhibitions; and had promoted tourism. These achievements proved, Országh confidently asserted, that “after the initial, natural, organizational challenges, regional self-government, in today’s Slovakia, is firmly consolidated.”²⁴⁹

Four days prior to Országh’s speech, Eugen Filkorn (1881–1974), the head of the Slovak Populists’ faction in the Provincial Assembly, offered his own assessment of the achievements of the Provincial Office on the front page of his party’s leading newspaper, *Slovák*. Like Országh, Filkorn also studiously refrained from attacking any other political party, although he did berate the central government’s unwillingness to cooperate properly with Slovakia’s elected representatives. Instead, the main focus of Filkorn’s article was on what the Provincial Office had achieved in the past six years and what agenda it should have after the forthcoming elections. He reminded his readers that, when the Provincial Office had begun its work in 1929, Slovakia possessed “only three orphanages, a single dormitory [for students], a few government buildings, and two small museums.” From these meager foundations, Slovakia, “with great élan,” had created a network of public clinics, invested millions in schools, produced real improvements in the road system, and carried out “noteworthy work” to regulate rivers and to assist agriculture, business, and industry. Moreover, after the elections, he expected the Provincial Office to assume greater control over Slovak schools and augment funding for the national theater, museums, scientific research, historic preservation, and more. In spite of the abundance of work that remained, Filkorn still insisted that the past six years were “the first years of a new life for Slovakia. History has begun to be made, [and] the foundations of Slovak self-government have been laid.”²⁵⁰ In spite of the fact that Országh and Filkorn stood at opposite ends of the political spectrum, both men’s assessments of Slovakia’s Provincial Government were remarkably consistent. Both refrained from denouncing rival political parties, both focused on the actual achievements of the Provincial Office, and both concluded that Slovakia possessed genuine and effective self-government.

²⁴⁹ “Zpráva krajinského prezidenta Jozefa Országha o zasadnutí krajinského výboru slovenského dňa 9. mája o činnosti krajinskej samosprávy ze prvé volebné obdobie 1928–1934,” *Krajinský vestník pre Slovensko*, 8, no. 26 (1935): Príloha k číslu 26/1935, 1–8 (quotation from p. 1).

²⁵⁰ Eugen Filkorn, “Pred voľbami do krajinského zastupiteľstva,” *Slovák*, May 5, 1935, 1.

The Hlinka Slovak People's Party, like the smaller Slovak Nationalist Party and other parties, was determined to ensure the success of this first experiment in autonomous Slovak government. Neither the HSLs nor the SNS, for example, ever voted against the passage of the Provincial Office's annual budget. They had, after all, supported the establishment of the Provincial Office and its attendant organs, and both parties recognized that, if they sabotaged their smooth functioning, they would run the risk of proving that Slovakia was not yet ready for autonomous government. Furthermore, the HSLs's Catholic supporters reaped lasting dividends from the establishment of the Provincial Office, which authorized significant funding for the construction and renovation of Catholic schools, churches, and other ecclesiastical buildings. It also provided a generous grant to the premier Slovak Catholic society, the Society of Saint Vojtech, funding that continued throughout the 1930s, in spite of the economic depression that gripped Czechoslovakia at that time.²⁵¹

On only one occasion did the HSLs threaten to block the workings of the Slovak Provincial Office by withdrawing its support for the annual budget. That exceptional case occurred in 1933 in the aftermath of a scandal over events in the Slovak city of Nitra during the official celebration of the 1,100th anniversary of the construction of the first Christian church in the region. Initially, only members of the central government and the head of the Provincial Assembly received invitations to give speeches at this celebration, but, on the day itself, a group of Slovak nationalists forced the organizers to allow the Hlinka Slovak People's Party leader, Hlinka, to address the assembled gathering. The government then arrested 114 Slovaks who were involved in the disorder, 30 of whom it subsequently put on trial. It also temporarily banned the Slovak Populists' newspaper and prevented the party from holding public meetings, although it took no action against Hlinka. In response, the Slovak Populists abstained from voting on the Provincial Assembly's budget.²⁵² Nevertheless, the budget comfortably passed, with 26 votes in favor, only eight votes against and 12 abstaining, which suggests that the boycott was merely a symbolic maneuver, rather than a serious attempt to render the Provincial Office unworkable.²⁵³

²⁵¹ Anton Kompánek, "The Catholic Church in Slovakia," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 12 (April 1934): 619.

²⁵² Felak, "At the Price of the Republic," 101–111; and Peter Zmátló, "Pribinove slávnosti v Nitre v auguste 1933: Skúška československého režimu a štátnosti," *Historica Olomucensia*, vol. 44, Sborník prací historických, vol. 32, ed. Ivana Koucká (Olomouc: Univerzita Palackého v Olomouci, 2013), 133–58.

²⁵³ *Krajinský vestník pre Slovensko*, 6, no. 35 (20 November 1933): Priloha k 35. čis. zo dňa 20. novembra 1933, 16.

Moreover, the Slovak Populists' temporary withdrawal of support from the Provincial Office also extracted concessions from Prague. As the British legation in Prague noted, the government recognized that it would be more sensible to sweep the Nitra affair quietly under the carpet. The authorities postponed and then abandoned the trial of the arrested Slovak nationalists. At the end of 1933, they released one of the ringleaders, Ľudovít Bazovský (1872–1958), on the spurious grounds of ill health, and in 1935, they granted a general amnesty. Meanwhile, by the end of 1933, the government lifted the ban on the HSLS's public meetings and permitted *Slovák* to resume publication.²⁵⁴ The affair demonstrated the strength of Czechoslovak democracy. While the central authorities misused their power to punish the political dissenters, the opposition retained enough power to frustrate the government's efforts. Furthermore, the consequences against the HSLS were minor in comparison to actions against dissenters in neighboring states.

As a consequence of these judicious concessions, the Hlinka Slovak People's Party once again resumed its support for the Provincial Assembly's annual budgets. While the party expressed its continued dissatisfaction with the limitations imposed on the Provincial Office, it continued to support "constructive cooperation in the Provincial Assembly" and vowed not to sabotage it by voting against the budget. Only in 1938, during the debate on that year's annual budget, did the Slovak Populists again threaten to abandon their policy of constructive cooperation. They denounced the Provincial Assembly as "merely an organ of the Ministry of the Interior" and declared that this would be the last budget the party would support, unless Prague agreed to increase the powers of the Slovak Provincial Office dramatically.²⁵⁵

It is unclear whether this threat was anything more than a negotiating tactic as this was the last budget the Provincial Assembly debated before Czechoslovakia was engulfed in turmoil in the autumn of 1938, when the Great Powers agreed to hand over substantial strips of Czech and Slovak territory to Germany, Hungary, and Poland. As a result, the central government in Prague resigned, and its replacement was a regime that was both authoritarian and hapless. Exploiting the situation, the Hlinka Slovak People's Party promptly seized power in Slovakia, on October 6, 1938, and Prague gave it almost complete control of local decision making, eliminated all rival political parties, shut down

²⁵⁴ London, FO, 371, 19495, 1935, 11–32.

²⁵⁵ "Szlovákia autonómiáját követelték a szlovák és a magyar szónokok az országos képviselőtestület ülésén," 3.

the Provincial Office, and rigged the elections to a new Slovak Parliament (Slovak: Slovenský snem).²⁵⁶

Prior to the coup, even the smallest parties obtained some advantage from participating in the Provincial Assembly and its various subcommittees. Tolerance toward minorities was already evident at the very first meeting of the Provincial Assembly, when all of its delegates took their oath of office in the language of their choice, and eleven of them chose a language other than Slovak. Although the leading Hungarian parties initially opposed the establishment of the Provincial Office, they fully participated in and benefitted from the elections to the Provincial Assembly.²⁵⁷ The fact that ethnic Hungarians comprised at least 22 percent of Slovakia's population, as opposed to only 4 percent of the entire republic's population, guaranteed that ethnic Hungarian parties obtained a much larger proportion of the seats in the Provincial Assembly than they did in the Czechoslovak National Assembly.

In each of the statewide elections to the Czechoslovak National Assembly, specifically Hungarian parties never obtained more than 12 (or 4 percent) of the seats, a figure roughly proportional to their share of the overall population. In contrast, ethnic Hungarians occupied almost 17 percent of the seats in the first Provincial Assembly and almost 10 percent of the seats in the second Provincial Assembly. Parties that specifically represented the Hungarian minority ran poor campaigns, undercutting each other's chances, but they still managed to win six of the 36 elected seats in the 1928 elections and five of 36 delegates in the 1935 elections. The size of the Hungarian electorate also ensured that Communists and Republicans fielded ethnic Hungarian candidates for the Provincial Assembly, three of whom (two Communists and one Republican) were successful at the polls.²⁵⁸

The Hungarian delegates to the Provincial Assembly exploited their newfound strength. They were frequent contributors to debates, seizing the opportunity not only to offer wide-ranging criticisms of state policies but also to raise specific concerns on behalf of their constituents. On occasion, they also secured amendments to the budget, ensured that the Provincial Office investigated allegations of minority discrimination, and obtained additional funding for their communities. The primary opportunity for the Hungarian assembly

²⁵⁶ Valerián Bystrický, "Slovakia from the Munich Conference to the Declaration of Independence," in *Slovakia in History*, 159–70.

²⁵⁷ Popély, *Felvidék 1918–1928*, 396–404 and 417–423.

²⁵⁸ Included in the totals for the first Provincial Assembly for ethnic Hungarians are Štefan Csomor, who was a representative of the Republican Party, as well as Ondrej Major and Matej Fehé, who were representatives of the Communist Party. Šuchová, comp., "Prílohy II–Politický systém," 581–88; and Popély, *Felvidék 1918–1928*, 423–24.

members to display their muscle came with the annual debate on the Provincial Office's budget. In 1929, in the first flush of enthusiasm that the Provincial Assembly's establishment generated, they voted to pass the budget in its entirety. Subsequently, as a point of principle, they voted against every budget to indicate their broader dissatisfaction with the Czechoslovak state, whose creation had reduced them to minority status.²⁵⁹ Nevertheless, the voting system in the Provincial Assembly allowed the venting of such grievances while providing the opportunity for a further series of votes on the actual content of each policy area the budget covered. Therefore, whenever the budget came before the assembly, the president permitted a broad-ranging debate and an initial vote, at which time the Hungarian, German, and Communist deputies took the opportunity to register their dissatisfaction and preserve their status as vigorous opponents of the Czechoslovak governing regime. Afterward, there were debates and votes on each section of the budget that dealt with a particular policy area as well as other amendments. In these subsequent votes, the Hungarian, German, and Communist deputies usually either voted in favor of the budget or offered only token opposition.

In the debates concerning the 1938 budget, speakers from the Hungarian faction in the Provincial Assembly declared that they would oppose the budget on the grounds that Prague had allocated insufficient funds for the Provincial Office and had discriminated against Hungarians. Nevertheless, one representative praised the committee tasked with preparing the budget for "the great work done in the interest of Slovakia."²⁶⁰ When Jozef Kállay (1881–1939), the primary official tasked with overseeing the drafting of the budget, resigned in 1937, even the leading Hungarian opposition newspaper, *Prágai Magyar Hírlap*, praised him as a "specialist administrator of the old school ... whose practical experience was absolutely indispensable."²⁶¹ Moreover, behind closed doors, the Hungarian deputies provided constructive participation in the various committees, where they normally had one or two of the 12 memberships. This is why the president of the Provincial Office specifically lauded the "open" and "loyal" work of the Hungarian faction's leader, Gyula Alapy (1872–1936).²⁶²

²⁵⁹ For example, see "A magyarság képviselői tárgyalagos kritikában részesítették szlovenszko első költségvetését," *Prágai Magyar Hírlap*, 30 April 1929, 3; and "Szlovenszko 1930. évi költségvetése pártjaink tartományi képviselőinek mélyenszántó bírálatában," *Prágai Magyar Hírlap*, 14 December 1929, 5.

²⁶⁰ "A magyarság költségvetési részesedésének kérdése Szlovenszko tartománygyűlése előtt," *Prágai Magyar Hírlap*, November 26, 1937, 4.

²⁶¹ "A magyarság költségvetési részesedésének kérdése Szlovenszko tartománygyűlése előtt," 4.

²⁶² *Krajinský vestník pre Slovensko*, 9, no. 5 (February 1, 1936): 65.

Conclusion

In the interwar period, Slovakia did not conform fully to the consociational model that Lijphart described, but it was moving in that direction. The maltreatment of its minorities in general and the policy of Slovakization, in particular, were abuses of power. That, however, is unsurprising. Slovak society was politically immature, fragile, and both nationalist and sectarian tensions polarized its politics. It is remarkable, however, that this highly divided society generated a political system that largely conformed to Lijphart's model.

At the statewide level, the Slovaks were an influential segment within Czechoslovakia. They obtained proportional representation in the National Assembly, participated in the leading statewide parties, and had seats in every cabinet throughout the interwar period. They also had a growing presence and authority within the bureaucracy. Slovaks exerted a powerful influence on government policy by extracting concessions and wielding an informal but often effective minority veto. Conversely, ethnic minorities in Slovakia largely remained outside the government, but they obtained proportional representation in the National Assembly and had a presence in several statewide governing parties.

Local government in Slovakia also broadly conformed to Lijphart's consociational model. Prior to the establishment of the Provincial Office, interparty cooperation was already a feature of local governance, and the Provincial Office built on this tradition. Its framers carefully constructed it to ensure that parties supporting the government as well as the opposition essentially obtained an equal share of the seats in the Provincial Assembly and all subcommittees, that the minorities had representation in the Provincial Assembly and its various subcommittees, that the drafting of all legislation took place carefully, systematically, and in a multipartisan manner, and that the heads of the Provincial Office stood above narrow party interests.

In the interwar period, Slovaks' control of their own local government institutions not only guaranteed them—and to a lesser degree the province's minorities—segmental autonomy but also bolstered their loyalty to the republic. Furthermore, it enabled them to preserve essential differences between Slovakia and the Bohemian Lands. In the area of education, Slovak, rather than Czech, became the usual language of instruction. In the field of law, Slovakia used law codes fundamentally distinct from those of the Bohemian Lands. In the realm of local government, a separate system of county administration remained in place until 1927, when Slovakia obtained an enhanced degree of self-government, through the creation of the Slovak Provincial Office and Provincial Assembly.

Slovakia largely confirms consociational theory because it possessed most of the favorable conditions that make consociational politics likely to succeed. Slovakia was small and had a minuscule political elite whose members were on intimate terms with each other. Furthermore, their struggle against Magyarization and the chauvinistic policies of the Kingdom of Hungary provided them with a common background. Slovakia was divided ethnically, with ethnic Slovaks comprising about half the population, while the other half of the population included various ethnic minorities and individuals whose national identity was ambiguous. Slovakia was divided along religious and class lines, but these differences did not neatly correlate with ethnicity and provided additional opportunities for multiparty cooperation. It possessed no single charismatic figure who could match Masaryk's ability to forge consensus and bridge segmental divisions, but ethnic Slovaks shared a foundation myth of national oppression and then national liberation that underpinned their loyalty to the republic. They also regarded Czechoslovakia as a guarantor against the real threat of invasion and territorial dismemberment that existed throughout the interwar period. Even the ultra-nationalist Hlinka Slovak People's Party fully participated in Slovak and Czechoslovak politics because the political system made involvement and interparty cooperation attractive on many levels. Thus, even separatist Slovaks learned from Czech and German politicians the practices and the value of consociational politics through their involvement in state-wide organizations, such as the cabinet and the National Assembly, even if they rejected some of the same politicians' Czechoslovakism, which insisted that Slovaks and Czechs formed one single nation.

Applying the consociational model to Slovakia between 1918 and 1938 demonstrates the necessity of reevaluating the narratives that concentrate on the conflicts between Czech and Slovak politicians in interwar Czechoslovakia. The consociational model provides a more plausible description of Slovakia's position in the Czechoslovak First Republic than alternative accounts because it reveals how intelligent policy making and the careful construction of new political structures successfully accommodated the competing interests of Czechs and Slovaks and engendered a period of remarkably fruitful cooperation. Consociationalism explains why Slovaks from across the ideological spectrum worked in tandem with the authorities in Prague to support Czechoslovakia's creation, ensure the viability of the state, participate in its governments and its bureaucracy, and defend its legitimacy. The consociational model also explains why successive governments in Prague supported the reinvigoration of Slovak social, cultural, and political life, shaped public policy to appeal to Slovak voters,

and granted Slovakia a degree of cultural, legal, and political autonomy. This support for the betterment of Slovakia, in turn, fostered cooperation between both centralist and nationalist Slovak parties and between ethnic Slovak parties and parties representing Slovakia's ethnic minorities. It is striking that the increasingly authoritarian Hlinka Slovak People's Party, which frequently tested the tolerance of the central government, still participated in the democratic process because of the opportunities that the consociational system provided to influence policy making at both the national and local level. It was only in the wake of the Munich Agreement, when an authoritarian government replaced genuinely democratic politics at the national level, that the Slovak Populists decided to seize power for itself, ban all rival parties, and eliminate the last vestiges of the consociational system. Up until that point, Lijphart's model is, as described in Chapter 3, "the most appropriate tool" for describing Slovakia's position in the Czechoslovak First Republic.²⁶³

In addition, the few ways in which interwar Slovakia deviated from standard consociational theory suggest possible refinements to the model. Although Lijphart claimed that a small number of clearly defined segments was a favorable condition for consociational politics, Slovakia was highly fragmented by profound ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic cleavages that manifested themselves in aggressive nationalist, sectarian, and class-based parties. Nevertheless, the situation prevented any party from becoming dominant and ensured that coalitions were the norm. Shared ethnic identities, religious affiliations, and economic interests also transcended party divisions and encouraged rival parties to cooperate.

Lijphart also claimed that segments of the same size favored the growth of consociational politics. This also was not the case in interwar Slovakia, where there was some disparity in size among the segments. Nevertheless, the smaller groups recognized that they were at a disadvantage and formed coalitions to enhance their political influence. Similarly, Slovaks cooperated with Czechs and others in the National Assembly and the central government. As a result, coalition politics became the norm at all levels of Slovak and Czechoslovak politics. Furthermore, the fact that most parties were, in reality, coalitions encouraged their entry into provincial and national coalitions. The Czechoslovak and Slovak cases demonstrate how an excessive number of small segments can in fact become the basis of successful consociation.

²⁶³ See p. 154.

Finally, specialists working with consociationalism should calculate among the favorable conditions of the model the advantages a small segment derives from belonging to a larger state. Ethnic Slovaks benefitted enormously from their inclusion into the new Czechoslovak Republic and displayed minimal nostalgia for Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy. The enthusiasm that many Slovaks felt for the Czechoslovak Republic was an important reason why Slovaks fully participated in interwar Czechoslovak politics and helped make the consociational system thrive. Conversely, the experience of the other minorities in Slovakia was mixed, with the Hungarians, in particular, facing maltreatment in the first years of Czechoslovakia's existence. The Hungarians' difficulties may explain why those political parties that represented the Hungarian minority in Slovakia did not join various governing coalitions, aside from one brief instance. Nevertheless, because even the Hungarian minority derived some advantages from its inclusion in a relatively tolerant, prosperous, and democratic state, its political parties participated in elections and in the decision-making process, for example, when they were on the Provincial Committee of the Provincial Office in Bratislava.

Conclusion

Although Lijphart's consociational model has inspired a vast body of valuable work, applying it to real-world polities remains nearly the exclusive domain of political scientists. As the body of consociational literature has grown, almost every study has concentrated on political systems from the last few decades. This is unsurprising. Lijphart worked in political science, and that discipline focuses almost exclusively on postwar political systems. Only in a few instances have earlier political systems been the subject of analysis through the lens of consociational theory. Furthermore, political scientists who study consociationalism have largely ignored Central and Eastern Europe, with the exceptions of post-Communist Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's successor states, where attempts to prevent further disintegration, most notably in Bosnia and Herzegovina, led to the implementation of a consociational solution.¹ Meanwhile, most historians know little or nothing about the consociational literature. The aim of this volume, therefore, is to convince political scientists to pay more attention to the past while enlightening historians about a useful conceptual framework for examining democratic development.

The erroneous perception that, for most of the twentieth century, Central Europe was in the grip of ruthless dictatorships or riven by intractable ethnic tensions helps explain the failure to appreciate the role of consociational politics in the region. Many have assumed incorrectly that the communist regimes governing Central Europe between 1944 and 1989 possessed no consociational features whatsoever. The local communist parties that took control in the region after the Second World War appeared to possess absolute power, as did the war-

1 An overview of studies employing the consociational model appears in notes 21–24 of chapter 1.

time fascist parties that had preceded them. Even earlier, in the interwar period, Central Europe was largely in the grip of authoritarian regimes. The exception was democratic Czechoslovakia, but many have blamed its 1938–1939 dismantlement on unresolved ethnic rivalries. Czechoslovakia's circumstances paralleled the end of the First World War, when observers of Central Europe similarly described the Habsburg Monarchy as having suffered destruction at the behest of competing nationalities. In both the Habsburg Monarchy and Czechoslovakia, ethnic rivalries appeared to have resulted in the exclusion of some groups from power and influence, resulting in political systems that seemed to be exact opposites of consociationalism.

Hindsight's proverbially perfect vision notwithstanding, both the Habsburg Monarchy and the Czechoslovak First Republic appeared to contemporaries as stable polities. Until the last year of the First World War, no political parties or politicians, in either Austria or Hungary, openly called for the destruction of the Habsburg Monarchy, aside from the Czech National Democrats, whose leadership hoped that a reformed Russia might rule over the Kingdom of Bohemia, and the few individuals around Tomáš G. Masaryk, who went into exile early in the war and whose arguments for Bohemian and then Czechoslovak independence took some time to gain traction back home. Similarly, until 1938, no political party in Czechoslovakia demanded the breakup of the state. Moreover, both states collapsed only after having experienced overwhelming external pressure. The last Habsburg emperor, Karl I/IV, lacked the creativity necessary to satisfy the minorities, and the November 1918 collapse of the monarchy was the direct result of economic, social, and financial pressures that the war had massively amplified, culminating in defeat on the battlefield, the abdication of the emperor, and declarations of independence by almost all of the nationalities, including the Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians and Ruthenians. As Mark Cornwall asserted, "it is unquestionable that the war . . . was a watershed, disastrous for the monarchy's potential survival."² Similarly, the October 1938 resignations of President Beneš and Prime Minister Hodža and the downfall of the Czechoslovak First Republic were outcomes of the German occupation of the Sudetenland. Nazi Germany's annexation of one-third of Czechoslovakia's territory understandably produced panic and led to the establishment of the Czecho-Slovak Second Republic (Czech: Druhá Česko-Slovenská republika; Slovak: Druhá Česko-Slovenská republika) that destroyed the consociational system. Up to that point, however, as Cornwall also noted regarding the Sudeten

2 Mark Cornwall, "Introduction," in *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary*, 7.

German parties in interwar Czechoslovakia, “it would be difficult... [until late 1937] to use the adjective ‘irredentist’ for the Henlein movement,” whose “minimum goal [in 1934] was full territorial autonomy,” not outright independence.³ The same applied to Czechoslovakia’s other minority parties as is apparent in the fourth chapter of this study.

It therefore would be erroneous to conclude, as have some critics, that the end of the Habsburg Monarchy and of the Czechoslovak First Republic undercuts claims about consociationalism’s benefits. Apart from the fact that external forces drove these failures, one should not overlook the successes these two countries had in the meantime. Much the same might be said of contemporary consociational democracies. One could imagine, for example, that Belgium, one of Lijphart’s original models of consociational democracy, might cease to exist as a unified state. Even should that long-speculated breakup occur, Belgium could claim more than 70 years of continuous democracy in a deeply divided society, a commendable record by any standard. Similarly, one cannot deny that modern Bosnia and Herzegovina also suffers endemic fragilities, despite efforts to engender consociational practices there. Nevertheless, even scholars criticizing so-called “imposed consociation” fail to offer an alternative to a consociational solution.⁴

What is striking about both the Habsburg Monarchy and the Czechoslovak First Republic is not that they eventually failed but that they endured and, in many ways, flourished prior to their dismantlement. This is especially apparent in the case of Czechoslovakia, where both democracy and consociationalism developed more thoroughly. The authors of this study, therefore, do not interpret continued ethnic rivalries as evidence of deformities inherent in either state’s system of governance. Instead, the ability to manage these rivalries, as well as a range of other potential segmental conflicts, reflected those states’ consociational character. All modern states possess some degree of ethnic heterogeneity. Even Japan, frequently touted as the world’s most ethnically homogeneous country, contains a large number of Korean migrants and other smaller groups, including the indigenous Ainu and Ryukyuan minorities. That fact underscores the importance of politicians finding ways to work with those divisions to resolve or at least minimize tensions. The consociational model pro-

3 Cornwall and Evans, *Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe*, 134 (first quotation) and 140 (second quotation).

4 Merdzanovic, *Democracy by Decree*. Although much work continues to be done in this area, Merdzanovic’s book remains the most extensive treatment of externally imposed consociationalism to date.

vides a compelling way of doing so as well as numerous insights into how to improve its chances of success.

Evidence of Consociationalism in Central Europe

Historians, following in the footsteps of caustic observers such as Mark Twain, often presented Imperial Austrian political developments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as an exercise in political paralysis. In contrast, the authors of this volume show that the Austrian half of the Monarchy, despite its many flaws, was heading in the right direction in many respects. It can best be described as a semi-democratic, proto-consociational political system. Although never fully democratic, it had adopted many features of representative democracy, such as universal manhood suffrage and a bill of rights. Although never truly consociational, it governed its highly heterogeneous society using means that successful consociational democracies were to adopt throughout the remainder of the twentieth century: government cabinets that, though not true Lijphartian grand coalitions, nevertheless consistently included ideologically diverse members of the largest linguistic groups and were effectively dependent on legislative super-majorities; a *de facto* minority veto that, although admittedly overused, prevented significant policy changes to the detriment of even very small minorities; the increasingly proportional distribution over time of legislative mandates, public sector employment, and education funding; and a growing capacity for the officially designated nationalities to manage their own affairs in such areas as education and language. Simultaneously, the 1905 Moravian and the 1910 Bukovina Compromises created regional political systems that were semi-democratic, due to unequal suffrage, but largely conformed to consociational principles. These, along with the unfinished 1914 České Budějovice and Galician Compromises, suggest that developments in an even more consociational direction were underway, but World War I and the end of the monarchy interrupted them. None of these reforms resolved all of Imperial Austria's political problems, and certainly not those of Austria-Hungary as a whole. Nonetheless, they introduced institutions and practices that later states in the region and elsewhere successfully and constructively employed to address their own social divisions.

Each segment of the Austrian electorate derived some advantage from participating in parliamentary politics, while disputes, though commonplace, were not inevitably paralyzing. The Hungarian half of the Monarchy is an instructive counterexample. A single group, the ethnic Hungarian aristocracy and gentry,

dominated politics there, confirming Lijphart's claim that groups of unequal size can threaten both consociationalism and democracy. Overrepresentation in the government, parliament, and bureaucracy magnified the Magyars' demographic preponderance, thereby violating the consociational principle of proportionality. Furthermore, a single party controlled the levers of power, apart from the years between 1906 and 1910, and it generally treated the opposition with contempt. The resulting alienation of much of the population led to electoral boycotts and the governing elite's refusal to even consider widening the franchise.

Interwar Czechoslovakia built on the Imperial Austrian consociational experience. Ethnicity, ideology, and religion fragmented the electorate, yet the competing segments operated on the bases of proportionality, coalition-building, segmental autonomy, and informal vetoes. As in the western half of the Habsburg Monarchy, the Czechoslovak First Republic's carefully constructed political system provided both opportunities and incentives for participants to become engaged in the electoral process, while the largest segments of the population, whether ethnic, religious, or ideological, achieved some form of representation in the government, the national and local assemblies, and the bureaucracy.

States that adopt consociationalism do not always do so perfectly, and interwar Czechoslovakia was no exception. The fact that the First Republic's Germans, Hungarians, and other minorities did not experience all the benefits they might have derived from an even more mature consociational state, however, does not negate the country's efforts and plans to accommodate minority interests. Furthermore, in comparison with its neighbors, Czechoslovakia's record in the treatment of minorities is admirable. In many respects, the toleration of ethnic minorities in Czechoslovakia, including Jews, was one of the positive legacies of the Habsburg Monarchy, a legacy that other successor states applied with considerably less success. One possibility worth further investigation is that the balance of the ethnic groups of the monarchy, along with other factors, facilitated an acceptance of ethnic diversity that most of the postwar nation-states, even those with significant minorities, could not sustain.

An important issue to consider, in this context, is the relationship between consociationalism and the Czechoslovak project, that is, the effort to construct a single Czechoslovak identity, with Czech and Slovak branches, as opposed to promoting separate national identities. Before 1914, Czechoslovakism was a way of placing the Slovaks of Hungary under the Czech cultural umbrella to aid them in their struggle against Magyarization. During the First World War, it was a justification for plans to create a Czechoslovak state. Beginning in 1918, the Czechoslovak notion was an effort to construct an artificial overarching loy-

alty, one that anticipated ethnic competition between Czechs and Slovaks, on the one hand, and among minorities, particularly Germans and Hungarians, on the other. Czechoslovakism offered the country a majority intended to minimize minorities' interference in the affairs of state. In this form, Czechoslovakism appealed to some but failed as an overarching loyalty because it did not succeed in attracting most Czechs and Slovaks, and it alienated ethnic minorities.⁵

The initial interwar version of Czechoslovakism had little traction from the beginning. The Slovak and Czech politicians who drafted the 1920 constitution were dismayed at this artificial construct that Švehla, Masaryk, and a few party leaders had negotiated with the intent of creating a Slavic majority to dominate an otherwise multinational state.⁶ Afterward, only a few Slovaks and Czechs maintained the illusion of a Czechoslovak nation with two branches. Alexander Maxwell explained that, while Czechoslovakism had few Slovak adherents, it actually helped solidify a distinct Slovak national identity by, for example, encouraging the teaching of the Slovak language rather than Czech in Slovakia in the mistaken belief that the two languages were identical.⁷ Likewise, most Czechs did not embrace a Czechoslovak identity, although some Czech politicians continued to find it a useful justification for Slovak and Czech domination in the First Republic. To determine why Czechs and Slovaks cooperated during the First Republic, one must look elsewhere.

While Czechoslovakism failed as an ethnic concept, the country did begin to develop a nascent form of civic nationalism, much like the idea of Yugoslavism that finally took hold after the Second World War. Among those first drawn to the idea of a Czechoslovak civic nationalism were Slovak politicians who admired the progressive tendencies evident in Czech political culture. Also adopting this position were certain Czech Catholic politicians, whom the founders of the state had marginalized in the early days of the republic because of the

5 In addition to the sources that appear in the discussion of Czechoslovakism in Chapter 3, see Josette Baer, "The Genesis of Czechoslovakism: An Interdisciplinary Inquiry into the Influence of Rousseau's *Réligion Civile*," in *East European Faces of Law and Society: Values and Practices*, ed. William B. Simons (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2014), 307–345; Baer, *A Life Dedicated to the Republic*; and Nadya Nedelsky, *Defining the Sovereign Community: The Czech and Slovak Republics* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).

6 Prague, Archiv Federálního shromáždění České a Slovenské Federativní Republiky (now Archiv Poslanecké sněmovny), Revolučního Národního shromáždění, Těsnopisecké zápisy schůzí ústavního výboru, Těsnopisecký zápis 114. schůze, jednající o jazykovém zákonu, January 15, 1920, Carton 31, Folder 1238, and Těsnopisecký zápis 116. schůze, jednající o jazykovém zákonu, January 16, 1920, Carton 31, Folder 1240, as quoted in Eva Broková, *První československá ústava: Diskuse v ústavním výboru v lednu a únoru 1920* (Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny ČAV, 1992), 71–83.

7 Maxwell, *Choosing Slovakia*, ch. 9.

Church's support for the Habsburgs. The Catholics' shift from loyalism under the monarchy to Czechoslovak civic nationalism during the First Republic is noteworthy. Furthermore, the activist Germans and some Hungarian politicians later began to cooperate with Slovaks and Czechs and even joined governing coalitions. That sense of allegiance to the Czechoslovak First Republic is what prompted Spina, the Bund der Landwirte deputy and later minister, to declare that "this state is also our state."⁸ Even though many Slovaks and Czechs did not find Czechoslovakism a convincing ideology, it is hard to deny that Czech-, German-, Slovak-, and Polish-, as well as Ukrainian- and Rusyn-speakers, adhered to a brand of civic nationalism that helped legitimize the First Republic. All ethnicities in the country enjoyed the freedoms of speech and assembly along with the relative prosperity of the new state. They also had representatives at various levels of government, some even in the cabinet, albeit without a guarantee of parity, and the minority politicians proved adept at gaining concessions and wielding an informal veto.

The integration of minorities admittedly remained less than perfect at the statewide level. While it is evident that Czechoslovakia could have done more to integrate Germans into the political system at an earlier date, the argument is even more pertinent to Hungarian and Polish speakers as well as the inhabitants of Ruthenia. The Roma, too, faced exclusion, but since their political consciousness was in its infancy, they could do little to combat discrimination and unofficial persecution.⁹ Czechoslovak consociationalism was incomplete in this regard. Czechoslovakia was nonetheless more consociational than not and was moving further in that direction, which the 1937 concessions to the Germans and Ruthenians demonstrated.

Czechoslovakia fell because its allies abandoned it at the precise moment that it confronted the might of Nazi Germany. Internal problems provided merely a partial justification for this betrayal, aggression, and dismemberment. Many exaggerate the importance of Hungarian irredentism. As the proceedings of the Slovak Provincial Assembly demonstrate, Hungarian politicians were able and willing to work with their Slovak counterparts and even supported Slovak demands for autonomy. Although Bohemian Germans had balked at their separation from German Austria, by the middle of the 1920s, most came to accept their

8 "Spinas Rede bei der Křepek-Feier," *Prager Tagblatt*, January 16, 1930, 1.

9 Zuzana Kollárová, "The Roma during the First Czechoslovak Republic, the Second Czechoslovak Republic, and the First Slovak State," in *Čačipen pal o Roma: A Global Report on Roma in Slovakia*, ed. Michal Vašečka, Martina Jurásková, and Tom Nicholson, trans. Marcel Hlbočan and Katarína Kollárová (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2003), 35–37.

new state. Widespread German discontent reemerged only with the economic pressures of the Great Depression. In the second half of the 1930s, the antisystem SdP, benefitting from Nazi Germany's covert advice and financial support, wreaked havoc with consociational democracy in Czechoslovakia. When the republic lost its territorial integrity as a result of the Munich Agreement, Slovaks and Rusyns, who had been developing genuine institutions of self-government, demanded greater autonomy. In the end, through its interference in Czechoslovak affairs, Nazi Germany destroyed the state. Nazi propaganda created the image abroad that Czechoslovakia was crumbling from within, and when demanding the country's partition, Hitler banked on the unwillingness of the British, French, and Soviets to support Czechoslovakia militarily. It is implausible that, had the First Czechoslovak Republic adopted any other form of democratic system, it would have curbed Nazi Germany's territorial ambitions. The flaws in the consociational system merely provided an excuse for Munich, not an explanation.

In the meantime, Slovaks had successfully integrated into different levels of the Czechoslovak political system. They did not achieve the parity that some Slovak nationalists expected as one of the two peoples who had established the new republic, but they obtained proportionality in the executive and legislative branches of government, played a greater role at the countrywide level than historians and social scientists have recognized, increased their representation and influence in statewide parties and the bureaucracy, and influenced policy making by wielding a *de facto* veto. Slovakia also obtained significant cultural and political autonomy that reached its fullest extent with the 1928 provincial reform. With the establishment and subsequent expansion of the Provincial Office in Bratislava, consociational politics in Slovakia was on a firm footing. Slovaks relied on interparty cooperation and consensus building to ensure that distinctly Slovak institutions, like their statewide counterparts, were both multipartisan and effective.

If politics in the Slovak Provincial Assembly was consociational, then historians must ask themselves why they misread the situation for so many years. One answer lies in the success Slovakia's political actors had in securing a historical legacy to their liking. Although Slovak nationalists consistently profited from lambasting the central government, Slovaks had all the makings of an autonomous group within Czechoslovakia, especially after the 1928 provincial reforms. Their *de facto* autonomy enabled Slovaks to cultivate a sense of distinctiveness from Czechs. Once they had achieved national sovereignty, Slovaks, who were secure in their identity as a result of their interwar experiences, started telling their own history, part of which they framed as their eventual liberation from

Czech oppression. Such an interpretation legitimized the 1939 emergence of the Slovak state, bolstered the communist regime's critique of the interwar democracy, and contributed to the nationalist mythos surrounding the 1993 re-emergence of an independent Slovakia. Ironically, the very cultural and political opportunities Slovaks had in interwar Czechoslovakia eventually helped put them in a position to overlook the actual character of their former wartime state. In this context, historians have had difficulties interpreting the Slovak interwar experience because of a skewed and politicized historiography, the enduring appeal of nationalism, and a reluctance to challenge convention and deeply ingrained views.

Contributions to Consociational Theory

The evidence from three cases—Imperial Austria, the Czechoslovak First Republic, and interwar Slovakia—confirms Lijphart's account of consociationalism. As the penultimate section of Chapter 1 emphasized, this finding in itself benefits political science. The fact that Imperial Austria only partially met Lijphart's favorable conditions and was incompletely consociational, while interwar Czechoslovakia largely met those conditions and was, on balance, a successful consociational democracy, indicates that these are theory-confirming case studies.¹⁰ In other words, they yield greater confidence that Lijphart's model is generally valid.

As noted in Chapter 1, case studies can be useful for generating new hypotheses and for refining a theory. One important outcome of this historical consideration of Imperial Austria and Czechoslovakia is to dispel the notion that consociational arrangements emerged as a reaction to fascist rule and Allied occupation in the case of Austria and of Communist Party rule in the instance of Czechoslovakia. Both countries' experiences reveal roots that are much deeper in the past. Imperial Austria's consociational legacy led to the Austrian First Republic's half-hearted attempt at consociational democracy, an effort that swiftly deteriorated in the 1920s. Austrian consociationalism reemerged in 1945, after the country's experience with fascism and foreign occupation, and the Second Republic became a core example of the consociational model. Similarly, consociational features reemerged in Czechoslovakia, subsequent to the 1989 Velvet Revolution, after a long period of authoritarianism: Nazi domination, a brief

¹⁰ See Lijphart's discussion of the six different types of case study and their respective benefits in "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," 691–93.

democratic interlude, and more than four decades of Communist rule. Complicating matters was the post-1945 expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and the incomplete Hungarian-Slovak population exchange that made Czechoslovakia more ethnically homogeneous. In many respects, however, consociational arrangements continue to be a part of politics of Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The Imperial Austrian and interwar Czechoslovak cases, therefore, reveal that consociational practices can leave a powerful legacy that years of authoritarian rule do not eradicate. Consociationalism, either in its infancy or in its mature state, can become deeply embedded into a political culture.

Imperial Austria, Czechoslovakia, and interwar Slovakia provide numerous additional opportunities for refining the consociational model. First, this study suggests novel approaches toward understanding the dynamics among segments. Imperial Austria and Czechoslovakia, with their varied ideological, class, religious, and ethnic divisions, underscore Lijphart's contention that, although a small number of segments may be ideal for the emergence and maintenance of consociational arrangements, it is by no means necessary.¹¹ These cases also show how consociationalism can successfully incorporate segments of different sizes, even though roughly equal segments would better favor success. One way in which consociational arrangements can accommodate segments of different sizes is evident in the cooperation among numerous small minorities to counteract the predominance of a large segmental group. Activist German parties cooperated in the Gentlemen's Coalition and the Wide Coalition to win concessions for Sudeten Germans, and Hungarian parties worked together to advance their interests in the Slovak Provincial Assembly. Furthermore, the experiences of the Slovaks and the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia demonstrate how a small segment may profit from membership in a larger consociational state, which, in turn, is willing to involve the small segment in different levels of decision making.

Second, the Czechoslovak Republican Party and the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, like India's Congress Party, provide examples of how large parties that incorporate multiple social segments can contribute to consociational democracy, thereby adding to an emerging literature on consociational parties in such countries as Canada, Fiji, India, Kenya, Malaysia, South Africa, and Yugoslavia.¹² Third, Czechoslovakia greatly expands the list of possible bases for over-

¹¹ India provides another such example. See Lijphart, "The Puzzle," 263.

¹² Bogaards, *Democracy and Social Peace*. This work stems from Lijphart's analysis of the Congress Party in "The Puzzle," 259–60.

arching loyalty beyond those that Lijphart originally described. Several factors can encourage politicians and ordinary citizens to embrace consociationalism: civic nationalism; economic, social, or cultural advancement; deliberate myth making; charismatic politicians, like Masaryk and Švehla; ethnic, religious, or ideological bonds that transcend other divisions, such as Roman Catholicism, socialism, or agrarianism; common institutions, from legislatures to social organizations; and democratic failure in neighboring states. Additionally, although certain overarching loyalties may bind together only portions of a society, they still can serve as reinforcing fibers for the polity as a whole. In Czechoslovakia, for example, certain political ideologies helped forge bonds that, to some degree, transcended ethnic divisions: agrarianism facilitated cooperation between the Republican Party and the Bund der Landwirte; Catholicism helped forge alliances among the Czech, German, and Slovak populists; and socialism allied like-minded Ruthenians, Hungarians, Slovaks, Czechs, and others.

Fourth, the experience of Imperial Austria's Reichsrat reinforces the notion that minority vetoes are best if used infrequently, while Czechoslovakia teaches that logrolling can help avoid exercising the veto. Fifth, Imperial Austria's Budweiser, Bukovina, Galician, and Moravian Compromises add to recent research into both consociationalism at the local and municipal levels and semi-democratic consociationalism. Simultaneously, the problems created through regional attempts to objectively define ethnic group membership confirm the current consensus among consociational scholars that, all else being equal, liberal consociationalism in which individuals have great leeway in choosing their group affiliations is preferable to corporate consociationalism in which group categories are officially predefined. Sixth, Czechoslovakia provides additional support for Lijphart's contention that consociational states are peaceful. The First Republic did not claim the territory of its neighbors, even though its relations with Poland, in the wake of the Těšínsko incident, and Hungary, after the Treaty of Trianon, often were strained. Furthermore, its foreign alliances, including its ties to the Little Entente, were defensive, and Czechoslovakia was very supportive of and active in the League of Nations.

Seventh, the Imperial Austrian and interwar Czechoslovak cases expand on consociational theory's notions of elite interaction in several respects. The Austrian Reichsrat's Obmännerkonferenz and Czechoslovakia's Pětka, Šestka, and Osmička support the Lijphartian idea that extraparlimentary institutions, even informal ones, can serve to preserve, rather than bypass, democratic politics. Furthermore, political friendships enable elites to transcend the din of day-to-day politics, regardless of its level of vitriol. Long political careers, while per-

haps hindering the cultivation of a younger generation of leaders, allow established politicians to build their political capital and cultivate political friendships with members of opposing parties. Secret negotiations, which appear to be undemocratic, allow elites to forge bargains without pressure from their constituents, who may fear that their leaders' willingness to compromise is tantamount to capitulation. Strong party discipline enables elites to negotiate in good faith because they can ensure the passage of measures in the legislature and guarantee that legislators will justify the party line to their constituents. In interwar Czechoslovakia, all of these features facilitated consociational arrangements among political parties. They also influenced the interactions of cultural, business, and religious elites. Moreover, the Imperial Austrian and Czechoslovak experiences demonstrate that parties' continued monopolies over ministries, the regular use of bureaucratic and mixed cabinets, and the frequent reliance on minority and caretaker governments all can play positive roles in deeply divided polities. Specifically, they add to the negotiation tool bag available to elites, allowing them to fashion more creative compromises or to buy time to alleviate tensions.

Nonconsociational systems occasionally apply these remedies as well, the difference being that they are far more prevalent in consociational systems. In the case of interwar Czechoslovakia, mixed cabinets even acquired a degree of permanence. As Hloušek and Kopeček concluded, "the tradition of nonpartisan and semi-political governments in the [post-Communist] Czech political system has shown a surprising durability despite the twentieth century's democratic discontinuity."¹³ The reason is evident: the Czech Republic, since 1993, has maintained consociational practices that it inherited from Imperial Austria and the First Republic.

A final theoretical contribution this study makes is the notion of broadening and deepening the consociational experience. Examples of this include the increasingly proportional and inclusive character of Imperial Austrian politics over time and the steady spread of consociational institutions and practices on the regional level. Similarly, the situation in the Bohemian Lands demonstrates that, once consociationalism begins to take hold, as it did in the Habsburg Monarchy, it can intensify, which was what occurred in the Czechoslovak First Republic. Czechoslovak consociationalism encompassed an increasing number of official and civic institutions as consociational practices became ingrained in the everyday workings of offices throughout the government and administra-

¹³ Hloušek and Kopeček, "Caretaker Governments," 1346.

tion. In addition to deepening, consociationalism broadened during the interwar years to include Slovakia, where the impulse toward consociational practices at the time of Austria-Hungary's breakup was much weaker but already evident. Driven by their need to accommodate ethnic minorities, particularly Hungarians, and their desire to contend with their own deep religious, ideological, and other divisions, Slovaks discovered that they could adopt consociational practices that had developed earlier in the Bohemian Lands to conditions in Slovakia. In doing so, they significantly improved Slovakia's position within the larger Czechoslovak state. Further research can determine the extent to which consociational arrangements were developing in Ruthenia.

Consociationalism, History, and Habsburg Legacies

The lessons of accommodation that emerged in the Habsburg Monarchy were essential in generating the mature consociational system of interwar Czechoslovakia. This conclusion about the antecedents of consociationalism is the result of combining historical approaches with the findings of political science. Because historical legacies play an important role in establishing viable consociational democracies, social scientists need to delve more deeply into the past. For their part, historians should be more venturesome in adopting the concepts, methods, and findings of social scientists.

Some scholars indeed have mentioned in passing that the Habsburg Monarchy possessed consociational features that explain how it managed ethnic tensions. Dominic Lieven, for example, asserted that "the 'Austrian' half of the Habsburg Monarchy after 1867 pioneered many of the ideas and policies which later fed into what came to be called 'consociational democracy,'" while other scholars have stressed the continuities between the political system that came to fruition during the last decades of the Habsburg Monarchy and Austria's development of a successful consociational system after 1945.¹⁴ This study, however, is the first to examine the historical development of consociationalism in Imperial Austria in depth.

As argued in Chapter 1, even historians without any interest in testing hypotheses or in generalizable models can benefit from interpreting Central European political history in a new light.¹⁵ Viewed through the lens of consociational

¹⁴ Lieven, "Empire, History and Contemporary Global Order," 147; and Luther and Müller, "Consociationalism and the Austrian Political System."

¹⁵ See Lijphart's discussion of "interpretive case studies" in "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," 692.

theory, Imperial Austria underwent several positive political developments, ones that foreshadowed important future political innovations. The consociational literature also provides historians with a vocabulary and conceptual apparatus for debates in which they already are engaged. As elaborated in Chapter 2, classifying Imperial Austria's regional compromises as cases of semi-democratic consociationalism allows one to evaluate their successes, failures, and potential from a broader comparative perspective, drawing on existing knowledge about the great variety of institutions and practices found in twentieth-century democracies. Such a reevaluation has several additional implications: it invites historians to engage more deeply with debates that are already taking place within the political science literature, such as those about the respective merits of liberal and corporate consociationalism; it encourages a more nuanced consideration of the nature, perils, and benefits of institutionalizing ethnicity; and it suggests more fruitful directions for future constructivist research into ethnic and national flexibility. Similarly, the consociational approach taken in Chapters 3 and 4 leads to a greater appreciation of interwar Czechoslovakia's actual accomplishments while directly challenging prevailing views on centralization, Czechification, and the political history of interwar Slovakia.

A historical approach has much to offer our understanding of consociationalism more generally. Lijphart emphasized that the presence of most or even all of the favorable conditions does not guarantee the emergence of a consociational democracy. In the end, politicians must do the hard work of promoting democratic institutions and practices. Borrowing a phrase from Almond and Mundt, Lijphart acknowledged that the insight that individual politicians' choices can determine whether consociationalism succeeds "may be disappointing for 'political *science*, but for political problem solving there may be cause for satisfaction."¹⁶ The chapters of this book provide further evidence that political agency is crucial for successful consociational democracy. They give a detailed account of the personalities, bargaining, compromises, myth making, and ad hoc measures that underpin consociational systems, factors that frequently are absent in the political science literature. They show that democracy often is unruly and that consociational democracy can be a particularly messy business.

Another observation that emerges from a historical approach is that consociational institutions may exist in an immature form. None of the three cases this volume examines—the Habsburg Monarchy, interwar Czechoslovakia, and

16 Lijphart, *Democracy*, 55, quoting Almond and Mundt, "Crisis, Choice and Change," 649.

Slovakia—perfectly met every criterion that Lijphart ascribed to consociational politics. Moreover, to the disadvantage of some segments, the accommodation of competing segmental interests was often only partial. These difficulties do not negate the success of consociational arrangements in Central Europe before the Second World War. In fact, they suggest two more areas of investigation. The first is the Austrian First Republic's abortive attempts at consociationalism that occurred between the demise of Austria-Hungary and the February 1934 civil war. That failure is particularly intriguing, given that the Austrian and Czechoslovak First Republics shared a Habsburg political legacy.¹⁷ The second is the degree to which Czechoslovak democracy displayed consociational features between 1945 and 1948, that is, between the end of the Second World War and the dawn of Communist rule.

Specialists in both the humanities and social sciences must reconsider their conclusions about the development of democracy in Central Europe, as a whole, in light of the consociational model.¹⁸ Based on the experiences of Imperial Austria and interwar Czechoslovakia, it is very likely that aspects of the consociational model apply to other Central European states. Still, much work remains to flesh out the specifics. The geographical reach of Central European consociational solutions is yet undetermined. In light of the Austrian and Czechoslovak cases, it appears that further research is necessary to determine whether local consociational arrangements evolved in other post-Habsburg states and even, at the local level, in the Kingdom of Hungary. When and how often consociationalism emerged are critical concerns. It had its roots in Imperial Austria during its gradual expansion of the suffrage. After the suspension of parliamentary politics in Austria-Hungary during the First World War, consociational practice reappeared weakly in Austria after 1918 and more vigorously after 1945. Nevertheless, existing work on the Austrian First Republic as a failed consociational state is minimal.¹⁹ By contrast,

17 Philip J. Howe has begun to pursue this set of issues as a separate project. See also Howe, Lorman, and Miller, "Continuity and Discontinuity in Legislative Representation."

18 Börries Kuzmany currently is investigating nonterritorial autonomy for minorities in Europe after 1848. See *Nationalities Papers*, 50, no. 5 (September 2022), which is a "Special Issue on Accommodating National Diversity within States." Börries Kuzmany, Matthias Battis, and Oskar Mulej wrote an introduction to the volume titled "Accommodating National Diversity Within States: Territorial and Non-Territorial Approaches Since the Late 19th Century" (pp. 850–56).

19 The most extensive works to date on this still understudied topic are Alfred Diamant, "Austria: The Three *Lager* and the First Republic," in *Consociational Democracy*, 150–56; Luther and Müller, "Consociationalism and the Austrian Political System"; and Rudolf Steininger, *Polarisierung und Integration: Eine vergleichende Untersuchung der strukturellen Versäulung der Gesellschaft in den Niederlanden und in Österreich* (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1975).

Czechoslovakia after the First World War was consociational, and consociational features there expanded after the consolidation of the state, the rapprochement between the Germans and the Allies in the middle of the 1920s, and the heightening of ethnic tensions of the 1930s. Furthermore, in the absence of democracy, consociationalism apparently can lie dormant. That was the case in the Habsburg Monarchy during the First World War, during the Austrian First Republic in the late 1920s and certainly after the February 1934 civil war, during post-*Anschluß* Austria, and throughout the Allied occupation. In Czechoslovakia, consociationalism was in hibernation not only during Nazi rule but also in the communist era, although certain Czechoslovak institutions and practices in Czechoslovakia between 1948 and 1989 reveal elements of consociationalism, such as the National Front, which included noncommunist parties in certain governing coalitions, even though these were mere window dressing and certainly not democratic. More studies of latent consociationalism are necessary to better understand not only the rebirth of consociational practices but also the circumstances favorable to consociationalism as a prescription for conflict avoidance in deeply divided societies.

Consociationalism is more than a model for describing contemporary democracies, a possible democratic solution for deeply divided societies, and a means of analyzing the past. It also provides a normative standard for evaluating democratic success and failure. It is, of course, not the only such standard—so-called Westminster democracy is an obvious alternative—but consociationalism is especially suited to deeply divided societies. Having an ideal type for a specific kind of democracy allows one to consider the degree to which a given country's institutions and practices align with that standard. Furthermore, political systems change over time. The fact that a country qualifies as democratic or, for that matter, as consociational at one point in time is no guarantee that it will continue to be so. For example, the authors of this volume established that interwar Czechoslovakia was, on balance, a consociational democracy and used Lijphart's model as a standard for evaluating the First Republic's shortcomings, such as its failure to fully integrate Slovaks, Germans, and other minorities into its political structure. Viewed in this light, the Czechoslovak case does not prove the failure of consociationalism but rather the inability of Czechoslovak politicians to better implement consociational principles. If historians and social scientists are going to condemn Imperial Austria for being undemocratic and the First Republic as a failed democracy, they at least should do so using an appropriate standard. Consociational theory as well as the related literature on consensus democracy reveal the wide range of possible forms that democracy can

take. Scholars would benefit from applying these ideas to other current and historical democracies as a means of assessing their virtues and faults.

The authors of this book do not intend that it should serve as a definitive examination of consociationalism in Imperial Austria and the Czechoslovak First Republic. Instead, as a foray into these areas, it hopefully will generate further interest in applying the consociational model to historical cases in the region, spark debate over the assessment of Imperial Austrian and Czechoslovak democratic institutions, and expand consociational theory. Numerous questions remain, but they are beyond the scope of the present project and provide opportunities for further research. For example, there is no discussion of the consociational aspects of the *Ausgleich* and the 1868 *Nagodba* with Croatia. Furthermore, aside from a few references, this study has dealt little with the Ruthenian experience in interwar Czechoslovakia. There are indications that consociational practices made inroads in Ruthenia, which had the same type of provincial administration after 1928 as Slovakia and received a governor in 1937 as a step toward full autonomy. Such developments suggest that a thorough investigation of political practices in Ruthenia through the lens of Lijphart's theory is warranted.²⁰ There is also room for further exploration of the consociational legacy of Imperial Austria and its other successor states, beyond the case of the Austrian First Republic, such as in the parts of Italy, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia that had been under Habsburg rule. Aside from expanding their geographical scope, consociational studies also would profit from drawing more on gender and environmental studies.

The historical application of the consociational model to Imperial Austrian, Czechoslovak, and Slovak politics shows how fruitful interdisciplinary dialogue between history and political science can be. It also reveals the need for a more nuanced view of several aspects of the consociational model. Historians and social scientists must reexamine their thinking about the seemingly boisterous politics of Imperial Austria, the apparent divisiveness of the Czechoslovak First Republic, and the perceived centrality of the autonomy question in interwar Slovakia. The authors of this volume hope that their work spawns a new genre of literature that draws on consociational ideas to expand research into the Central European past, including the extent and scope of multiparty cooperation

20 Although he neither discusses the provincial administrative reform of 1928 nor refers to consociational theory, Paul Robert Magocsi, in his volume *With Their Backs to the Mountains: A History of the Carpathian Rus' and Carpatho-Rusyns* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2015), 191–231, presents basic evidence that applies to the principle of segmental autonomy.

Conclusion

and the many examples of interethnic cooperation. Given that ethnic politics and democracy continue to be significant and growing concerns for both historians and political scientists, the authors hope that their work will engender a broader exchange between the two disciplines and that their historical approach to consociationalism will inspire similar studies in geographic areas beyond Central Europe.

Bibliography

In this bibliography, archives and periodicals (Sections I and II) apply to all chapters. The items listed as official and other published primary sources (Section III) as well as secondary sources (Section IV) are by chapter. In Sections III and IV, sources are listed in order of appearance, so an entry in one chapter bibliography will not repeat in subsequent chapter bibliographies.

I. Archives and Archival Collections

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D. Czechoslovakia as a Consociational Democracy (Chapter 3)

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E. The Consociational Model and Interwar Slovakia (Chapter 4)

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F. Conclusion

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Together, Howe, Lorman, and Miller published “The Creation of the Conditions for Consociational Democracy and Its Development in Interwar Czechoslovakia” in *Bohemia: Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur der böhmischen Länder/ A Journal of History and Civilisation in East Central Europe* (2016). They also coauthored “Continuity and Discontinuity in Legislative Representation from Austria-Hungary to the Austrian and Czechoslovak First Republics,” which appeared in *Das Erbe der Habsburgermonarchie in den Nachfolgestaaten: Brüche und Kontinuitäten* (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2025), the final volume of *Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848-1918* (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1973-2025).

Index

- absence of a unified majority, 32, 38, 46–47, 48
and Austria-Hungary, 95, 124
and Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 160, 199, 280, 281, 313, 322
See also conditions favorable to consociationalism
- absolutism, 51–52, 75, 83, 83n4, 102, 214n221, 330
- activist parties. *See* German parties and politicians in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), activist
- Agrarian or Agricultural League (German Agrarians in Czechoslovakia). *See* Bund der Landwirte (German Agrarians in Czechoslovakia)
- agrarianism, 90, 145n4, 163, 175, 177n106, 182, 194–96, 194n168, 228, 297, 321, 325, 365
See also Bund der Landwirte (German Agrarians in Czechoslovakia); Republican Party of Agriculturalists and Small Farmers (Czechoslovak Agrarians/Czechoslovak Republicans)
- agricultural development
in Austria-Hungary, 95, 96, 283
in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 164, 185–86, 206–207, 275, 283, 321–22, 326
See also economy; industrial development; infrastructure development; landowners
- Anschluß* (1938), 167, 184
- anti-Semitism, 78 fig. 1, 133n179, 173, 309, 309n126
- aristocracy. *See* nobles
- Armenians, 92n32, 97, 124, 127, 155
- Ausgleich* (1867), 14n2, 16–17, 16n9, 16n10, 79, 83, 85, 330–31, 371
- Austria (Imperial), I, 26, 75–76, 82, 85–87, 97, 137–38
cabinets and minister-presidents, 104–7, 111–12, 105 tab. 7
censuses, 61n126, 92–93, 127
centralized governance and decentralization, 15–16, 27–28, 129
constitution and constitutional changes, 15, 16, 88
democratization of, 26–27, 87, 89, 103, 358
diversity in government, 13–14, 91, 104–9, 111–12, 116 tab. 8, 117 tab. 9, 121, 138, 358
economy, 95–97
ethnicity and language in, 13, 17, 91–94, 92 tab. 4, 95–96, 98 tab. 6, 99, 116 tab. 8, 117n108, 119–20, 118 tab. 10, 127, 132, 133n179, 137
and nationalism, 17, 79, 92–93, 94n36, 97, 119, 124, 132, 137
officials as appointed or elected, 16, 19 map 2, 21, 87, 104
Austria (First Republic, 1918–1934), 18, 167, 218, 295, 363, 369, 370
Austria (Ständestaat, 1934–1938), 167, 218, 370
See also Germany (Third Reich)
Austria (Second Republic, post-1945), 33–34, 41, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 50n82, 51–52, 251, 363, 367, 369, 370
Austria-Hungary, I, 16, 17, 18, 59, 83, 102n64, 296, 356
dualism, 16, 83–87, 100, 102
ethnicity and language in, 10–11 map 1, 59, 61, 61n126, 61n127, 64, 134, 137
geography, 83n5, 85–87, 102n64
legacy of governance, 22, 82, 102, 103, 138–40, 170–71, 170n73, 189, 252, 253, 255–56, 275, 284, 325–26, 328, 330–31, 359
loyalty to, 100–102, 182
political system, 21–22, 82, 87–88, 301, 304, 358–59, 367
See also socioeconomic status and social elites in Austria-Hungary
Austrian Imperial Council. *See* Reichsrat (Imperial Austria)
Austro-Hungarian Compromise. *See* *Ausgleich* (1867)
Austro-Prussian War (1866), 16
authoritarianism, 21–22, 81n3, 347, 352, 355–56, 364
See also dictatorship; nondemocratic states
- Badeni, Kasimir (1846–1909), 14, 78 fig. 1, 111
Badeni language decree (1897), 14

Index

- Belgium, 33–34, 41, 43, 44, 45, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 233
- Beneš, Edvard (1884–1948), 144–46, 181–82, 205, 214, 214n220, 246–47, 247n304, 250, 255–256, 257
- domestic affairs, 181, 181n117, 214, 239, 246–47, 247n304, 254
- as foreign minister and international affairs, 144, 156, 168, 181–82, 191, 205, 220, 228, 229, 232, 254n326, 327
- and minorities, 168, 172n81, 181–82, 239–40
- as president, 176n101, 181, 181n117, 216n226, 223 fig. 5, 327, 356
- as prime minister, 144–46, 146n7, 190, 191–92, 202, 205, 210, 212, 215
- See also* Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), governments and cabinets
- Benton, J. Webb (1892–1947), 159, 159n50
- Bohemian Lands (Bohemia), 16–17, 25, 89, 129, 164, 165, 185, 241, 255, 280, 296, 330, 334, 350
- ethnicity and language in 14, 98 tab. 6, 122, 160, 167, 181n118, 225–27, 356, 366–67
- Bohemians, 15, 21, 98, 131, 187–88
- Reichsrat deputies, 16–17, 139–40
- See also* Czech language and Czech speakers; Czechs; German language and German speakers; Germans
- border disputes and revisions, 18, 88n18, 156, 165, 165n65, 167–68, 189, 201, 256, 257, 263n7, 294–95, 313, 316, 326, 347, 351, 356, 365
- See also* Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), land reform; federalism, territoriality
- borderlands, 65, 88n18, 165–66, 165n65, 171n77, 257, 282, 323, 331
- Bosna and Herzegovina (Bosnia-Herzegovina), 52–53, 54, 84, 86–87, 355
- Bratislava and Bratislava County/region, 276, 283, 292, 296, 303, 305, 309, 312, 318, 328, 333, 334, 337
- Brno, 123, 237, 318
- Bukovina, 25, 93, 98, 124
- Bukovina Compromise (1910), 97n51, 98, 115n105, 122, 124–26, 358
- See also* regional compromises
- Bund der Landwirte (German Agrarians in Czechoslovakia), 181, 182, 194–95, 204, 208, 228, 365
- See also* agrarianism; German parties and politicians in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938); Spina, Franz (1868–1938)
- bureaucracy, employment in. *See* public employment
- businessmen and business class, 17, 123, 125, 127, 163, 178, 183–84, 198, 283
- See also* socioeconomic status and social elites
- Čapek, Karel (1890–1938), 148n15, 171, 172n78
- Carpatho-Rusyns. *See* Ruthenians
- Catholicism and Catholics, 95n37, 102
- in Austria-Hungary, 94–95, 102, 170, 285–86, 360–61
- in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 162–63, 169, 173, 173n89, 178n107, 196–98, 197n176, 198n180, 235–36, 237, 275, 285, 288, 298, 299, 323–24, 346, 360–61, 365
- divisions among, 94–95, 173n89, 196–98
- education, 43, 298, 323, 329, 346
- government policy and church, 88, 275, 321
- political and politicians, 13, 15, 163, 196–97, 204, 209, 276, 297, 300, 360–61
- See also* religion; separation of church and state
- Central and Eastern Europe, I, 18, 22–23, 25, 28, 75–76, 296, 355–56, 367–69, 371–72
- Černý, Jan (1874–1959), 145, 254, 254n326
- as prime minister, 145, 202, 209–210, 210n206
- See also* Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), governments and cabinets
- České Budějovice, 65, 126–27, 131n165, 171n77, 226
- České Budějovice (Budweis) Compromise (1914), 26, 122, 126–27, 135, 358
- Chandra, Kanchan, 54–55, 62, 63, 64
- children, 43, 130–33, 160
- child capture (*Kinderfang*), 132
- child exchange (*Kinderwechsel/Kinder-tausch*), 131, 131n165
- See also* education and educational system
- Christian Socialists in Austria-Hungary, 13
- Cisleithania. *See* Austria (Imperial)

- cities, 37, 165, 227, 240, 282, 332
See also countryside
- Civic Coalition (Oběanská koalice). *See* coalitions, Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), Gentlemen's Coalition (Panská koalice)
- civic nationalism. *See* transnational identity
- civil society organizations, 32–33, 89, 90, 133, 186, 187, 197–98, 241, 305–306, 307, 343, 344
See also cultural organizations; education and educational system; professional associations; sport organizations and sports; trade unions
- Clemens, Samuel L. (1835–1910), 13–15, 17–18, 79, 110 fig. 2
- clerical parties and clericals, 13, 15, 163, 196–97, 204, 209, 276, 297, 300, 360–61
- Cleveland Agreement (1915), 276
See also Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), establishment and associated foundation myths
- coalitions, 66, 68, 146, 147n10, 205, 209, 247n304, 248, 254, 257
 diachronic, 42
 electoral or party, 300, 314
 minimal (minimum) winning, 39, 39n31, 40n33, 67 tab. 2, 199, 209
 minority, 147, 201
 oversized, 39, 67, 147, 199, 202, 204, 204n192, 206
- coalitions, Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 20, 146–47, 146n7, 153, 174, 189, 191, 194, 200–202, 204–205, 208, 210–11, 219, 227, 248, 258–65 tab. 11, 327, 352
- All-National Coalition, 146, 192, 200, 202, 211
- bureaucratic cabinet—first under Černý, 145, 209–210, 218
- bureaucratic cabinet—second under Černý, 202, 246
- bureaucratic cabinet—under Syrový, 254
- Gentlemen's Coalition (Panská koalice), 192, 192n165, 194, 195, 195n171, 196–97, 203, 206, 206n193, 211, 211n213, 222, 252, 254, 364
- Red-Green Coalition, 201, 205, 228, 252
- unnamed coalition under Beneš, 190, 192, 202, 205, 212, 215
- unnamed coalition under Kramář, 201–202, 205
- Wide Coalition, 203–204, 205, 206, 208–209, 215, 220, 228, 364
See also Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), governments and cabinets; grand coalitions
- collaboration. *See* cooperation
- Communist Party and communists
 in Czechoslovakia (Communist, 1948–1989), 150, 151
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 145, 163, 192, 194, 192n162, 205, 210, 214, 247n304, 252, 308, 315
 in Slovakia (1918–1939), 277, 277n26, 292, 300, 315, 317, 323, 333, 348, 349
See also Hungary (1918–1945), First Hungarian Soviet Republic
- comparative history, 74–77, 74n168
- comparative politics, 74–77, 81
- concentration. *See* geographic concentration, of groups (segments)
- conditions favorable to consociationalism, 38, 46–48
 in Austria (Imperial), 82, 91, 103
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 76, 160, 199, 245, 248
 in Slovakia (1918–1939), 280–81, 294, 298, 313, 351
See also absence of a unified majority; external dangers and internal unity; geographic concentration; group (segment) and population size; groups (segments), number of; overarching loyalties; small states; socioeconomic disparities; traditions of compromise and accommodation
- congrua* and tariff-*congrua* negotiations, 178n107, 194, 195n171, 197, 198, 222, 275
See also Catholicism and Catholics
- consensus democracy. *See* democracy and democratization, consensus
- consociationalism, 18, 22–24, 26, 28, 38, 45–46, 52, 57, 72–73, 90, 251, 257, 355, 364–66
 in Austria (Imperial), 18, 22, 123, 357, 358, 371
 corporate, 53–54, 58, 365
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 18, 22, 150–54, 217, 248–49, 270, 279, 299–300, 350, 351–53, 357, 358, 370
 definition, 29, 30–31, 38 tab. 1, 58, 128–29, 370–71

- liberal, 53–54, 58, 365
- in local and city government, 36–37
- and oligarchies, 37, 90, 90n31
- of political parties, 37
- proto-consociationalism, 82, 90–91, 103
- constructivism (nationalism studies), 23–24, 26, 63–64, 65n145
- cooperation, 21, 22, 59, 167
 - economic, 182–84, 325
 - elite, 22, 102, 151, 189–92, 216, 217, 219, 234, 248–51, 251, 280, 365–66
 - multiparty, 194, 208, 251, 299, 300, 313, 316, 327, 332, 333, 340, 350, 351–52, 362, 371
 - and logrolling, 220–21, 222, 224, 241, 365
 - See also* coalitions
- corruption, 17, 96, 247, 298, 301, 319
- countryside, 125, 164, 227, 282, 321
 - See also* cities
- Crane, Richard T., II (1882–1938), 155, 194, 195, 197, 253
- Croatia, 15n7, 21, 86, 121, 256, 371
- Croatian language and Croatian speakers, 91, 93–94, 95, 96
- Croatians/Croats, 16, 21, 93–94, 95, 121
 - See also* Serbs
- cultural autonomy. *See* segmental autonomy
- cultural organizations
 - in Austria (Imperial), 90
 - in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 240–41, 305–306, 307–308, 345
 - See also* civil society organizations; education and educational system; professional associations; sport organizations and sports
- curial system. *See* elections and electoral system
- Cyprus, 42, 43, 45, 47
- Czech Agrarian Party (Česká strana agrární). *See* Republican Party of Agriculturalists and Small Farmers (Czechoslovak Agrarians/Czechoslovak Republicans)
- Czech identity. *See* Czechs
- Czech Lands. *See* Bohemian Lands (Bohemia)
- Czech language and Czech speakers
 - in Austria (Imperial), 14, 17, 21, 89–90, 96, 98, 99, 118, 120, 126
 - in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 17, 160–61, 163, 164–65, 196, 234, 322
 - See also* Bohemians; Czechoslovakism; Czechs
- Czech Maffia, 154n35, 250, 255
 - See also* Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), establishment and associated foundation myths
- Czech Republic (1993–), 143–44, 146, 146n8, 150, 252, 253–54, 256–57, 366
- Czechoslovak Business and Commerce Party of the Middle Class (Tradesmen's Party), 182, 202, 203, 211, 222, 228, 314–15
- Czechoslovak Communists. *See* Communist Party and communists
- Czechoslovak legionnaires, 287–88, 288n58
 - as a foundation myth, 287
 - See also* Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), establishment and associated foundation myths
- Czechoslovak National Democratic Party, 153, 153n31, 173, 181, 195n171, 203, 219, 220, 232, 241, 246, 250, 314, 315
 - See also* Young Czechs
- Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, 145, 145n5, 153, 192, 201, 205, 214n220, 217, 219, 249–50, 315, 317
- Czechoslovak People's Party (Czechoslovak Clericals/Czechoslovak Populists), 145, 196, 197, 202, 210, 315
 - See also* clerical parties and clericals; Slovak People's Party (Slovak Populists or Ludáks); Šrámek, Jan (1870–1956)
- Czechoslovak Republicans (Czechoslovak Agrarians). *See* Republican Party of Agriculturalists and Small Farmers (Czechoslovak Agrarians/Czechoslovak Republicans)
- Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party of Workers (Czechoslovak Social Democrats), 191, 192, 194, 220, 250, 277, 287, 314
 - See also* Social Democrats
- Czechoslovak state-creating (state-forming) parties, 180, 192, 246
- Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 1, 17–18, 19 map 2, 20–21, 27, 269–70, 277, 355–57
 - censuses, 25, 273, 281–82, 282n42
 - centralized governance and decentralization, 77, 156, 233, 270–72, 275, 277–78, 315, 328, 334–35, 342

- county system and provincial administration, 219, 241–42, 242n290, 243, 275, 276, 319, 322, 330–32, 331n189, 334
- diversity in government, 27, 172, 201, 204–205, 207, 225, 229, 232, 317–18, 322, 350, 359
- establishment and associated foundation myths, 162, 250, 255, 270, 273, 276, 280, 285, 287–89, 290–94, 296, 310 fig. 7a, 311 fig. 7b, 351
- ethnicity and language in, 17, 27, 164, 227, 230–31, 233, 234, 243, 282, 307–309, 312–13, 317, 342, 350, 357, 359, 361
- foreign policy and international affairs, 167–69, 191, 326–27, 365
- governments and cabinets, 147, 201–204, 258–65 tab. 11, 265 tab. 12
- in historiography, 146n9, 270–72, 335–36
- industrialization and modernization, 185, 195, 206, 238–39, 297, 321, 326, 344–45
- informal groupings (*see also* elite cooperation), 209–218, 248–49, 365
- land reform, 179, 211, 217, 217n229, 219, 275, 283, 307, 323, 324
- legal system, 318, 325–26, 350
- loyalty to, 209, 275–76, 307, 309, 312, 350
- National Assembly, 146–47, 211, 225, 234, 249n306, 300, 315–16
- political stability, 169, 187, 198, 246, 251, 356
- political system, 17, 18, 21, 148–50, 148n15, 192, 214–15, 227, 245–46, 257, 357
- press and media in, 148n15, 170, 176n101, 214, 233, 275, 278, 305, 308, 346
- and tariffs, 182–83, 182n119, 186, 186n133, 195, 195n170, 198, 202, 203n191, 206, 221–24, 238, 301
- tariff-*congrua* negotiations, 178n107, 194, 195n171, 198, 222
- technocrats in government, 252–53, 254–55
- tenure in government, 251, 319, 321, 366
- See also* coalitions, Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), Gentlemen's Coalition (Panská koalice); Osmička (Committee of Eight); Pětka (Committee of Five); Political Committees in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938); Šestka (Committee of Six); Slovakia (1918–1939)
- Czechoslovakia (Second Republic, 1938–1939), 277, 356
- Czechoslovakia (Third Republic, 1945–1948), 247n304, 364
- Czechoslovakia (Communist, 1948–1989), 150–51, 257, 370
- Czechoslovakia (post-Communist, 1989–1992), 43, 45, 150, 150n20, 151, 249n306, 355, 363
- Czechoslovakism, 160–62, 182, 234, 273–74, 280, 281, 282, 305, 329, 351, 359–61
- Czechs
- in Austria-Hungary, 16, 21, 64–65, 89–90, 97, 160
 - in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 160, 163, 165, 166n66, 169, 242, 270, 360
 - parties and politicians, 60–61, 99, 138–40, 161, 189, 201n189, 276, 278, 318
 - in Slovakia, 274, 276, 282, 319, 323, 325–26, 328–29, 343
 - See also* Bohemians; Czech language and Czech speakers; Czechoslovakism
- Czedik, Alois Freiherr von (1830–1924), 104–105
- Danube, 55n106, 269
- decision-makers in government. *See* elite cooperation
- democracy and democratization, 18, 67 tab. 2, 70 tab. 3, 355, 368, 369, 370–71, 372
- Anglo-American, 33
- in Austria-Hungary, 87, 89, 91, 357, 358, 359
- consensus, 26, 29, 64–73, 152
- consociational, 23, 37, 66, 72–73, 357 (*see also* consociationalism)
- Continental European, 33
- in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 19–21, 148–50, 216–17, 218–19, 245, 257, 308, 352, 356, 357, 362, 365
- majoritarian (Westminster; *see also* multiparty systems), 29, 33, 39–40, 64–72, 81, 247n304, 256n331, 370
- managed, 148, 148n15
- democratic corporatism, 41, 41n40, 68, 68n154
- See also* grand coalitions

Index

- Dérér, Ivan (1884–1973), 162, 175–76, 243, 250, 287, 321, 324, 342
dictatorship, 20, 218, 343, 355
diets. *See* provincial diets
Drobný, Ján (1881–1948), 336, 340
- ecclesiastics. *See* Catholicism and Catholics, government policy and church
economic crisis of 1930s. *See* Great Depression
economic disparities. *See* socioeconomic disparities
economy
 in Austria-Hungary, 17, 86, 95–97
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 163, 164, 182–86, 198, 221–22, 224, 248, 275, 301
 in Slovakia (1918–1939), 185–86, 238, 283, 321–22, 342, 343, 344–45
See also agricultural development; Great Depression; industrial development; infrastructure development
education and educational system, 43, 57
 in Austria-Hungary, 21, 116, 117–19, 117n108, 118 tab. 10, 120–21, 123, 126, 130, 131, 132, 133n179, 285, 302, 312, 328
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 188, 231, 233, 236–37, 238, 275, 298, 299, 302–304, 307, 312–13, 318, 321, 324–25, 328–29, 345
elementary, 117–19
 higher, 120–21, 170n74, 237, 237n277, 307, 318, 325–26, 345
 institutions, 117, 117n108, 118 tab. 10, 120, 126, 275, 307, 312, 345
 language of instruction, 117–19, 118 tab. 10, 121, 131, 188, 231, 233, 298, 302–304, 307, 312–13, 324, 329
 policy, 57, 116, 117–19, 120, 123, 130, 131, 132, 133n179, 285, 302, 321
 and religion, 298, 324, 329
 secondary, 117n108, 302, 324
See also children; civil society organizations; segmental autonomy
Einstein, Lewis D. (1877–1967), 17–18, 27, 154–59, 174, 189–190, 193 fig. 4, 207–209, 220, 241, 245–46
elections and electoral system, 43–44, 44n52
 Austria-Hungary, 21, 26, 59n118, 60, 79, 114–16, 119, 123–24, 125, 127–28, 129, 298, 301, 331, 359
 corruption, fraud, and intimidation, 17, 96, 205, 298, 301
 Czech Republic (1993–), 143–44, 146
 Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 146, 201–202, 225–27, 231, 232, 266 tab. 13, 266–67 tab. 14, 300, 301–302, 304, 317–18, 359
 districts, 44, 60, 119, 123, 127, 225–27, 232, 266–67 tab. 14
 Slovakia (1918–1939), 319–20, 339, 340, 344, 348
See also suffrage
electrification. *See* infrastructure development
elite cooperation, 251
 in Austria-Hungary, 22, 102, 365–66
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 151, 189–92, 216, 217, 219, 234, 248–51, 280, 365–66
See also conditions favorable to consociationalism; Masaryk, Tomáš G. (1850–1937), as power broker
elites. *See* elite cooperation; socioeconomic status and social elites
Engliš, Karel (1880–1961), 175, 177, 179, 218, 219, 228
Esman, Milton J., 62–63, 64
estate owners. *See* Catholicism and Catholics, church and government policy; landowners; nobles
ethnicity, 24, 56–57, 58, 63–65, 269n1, 137
 ascribed, 132, 133n179, 134, 135–36, 137, 282
 as real and objective, 23–24, 55, 56, 62–63
See also Austria (Imperial), ethnicity and language in; Austria-Hungary, ethnicity and language in; constructivism (nationalism studies); Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), ethnicity and language in; nationality; Slovakia (1918–1939), ethnicity and language in
ethnolinguistic groups (segments). *See* ethnicity
ethno-nationalism. *See* nationalism
Europe (post-1945), I, 40, 150, 169
European Union, 23, 28, 36, 151
external dangers and internal unity, 49, 100, 167–68, 169n72, 243–44, 280, 294–95, 313
See also conditions favorable to consociationalism

- familles spirituelles*. *See* segmental cleavages
- farmers. *See* landowners; peasants and farm laborers
- fascism, 41n40, 49, 202, 202n190, 208n200, 246, 249, 276, 356, 363
See also National Socialism (Nazism)
- favorable conditions. *See* conditions favorable to consociationalism
- federalism, 15, 16, 43, 51, 69–70, 69n155, 87, 99, 121, 276
 territoriality, 43, 51, 99, 119, 136, 244
See also segmental autonomy
- franchise expansion. *See* suffrage
- Franz Joseph (1830–1916), 15, 16, 83, 83n5, 104, 111, 113, 122, 170, 170n73, 171n77, 172, 286
- Fundamental Laws (1867), 88
- Galicia, Austrian, 15, 20, 25, 93, 96, 107, 115, 127
- Galician Compromise (1914), 26, 96, 115n105, 122, 126, 127–28, 135, 358
- gender. *See* women's rights
- Gentlemen's Coalition (Panská koalice).
See coalitions, Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), Gentlemen's Coalition (Panská koalice).
- geographic concentration,
 of groups (segments), 38, 44, 46, 50–51, 98 tab. 6, 97–99, 165, 199, 234, 280, 313
 of minorities, 43, 44, 50–51, 98 tab. 6, 165–66, 282, 283, 308
See also conditions favorable to consociationalism
- German Agrarians in Czechoslovakia. *See* Bund der Landwirte (German Agrarians in Czechoslovakia)
- German Christian Socialists in Czechoslovakia (Deutsche Christlich-Soziale Volkspartei), 174n90, 182, 191, 194, 195, 197, 203, 204, 208, 222
See also German parties and politicians in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), activist
- German identity. *See* Germans
- German language and German speakers,
 in Austria-Hungary, 14, 17, 64–65, 95, 97–98, 99, 118, 122–23, 124, 125, 127
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 161, 164, 165, 166n66, 167n67, 172, 172n81, 196, 234, 243–44, 273
See also Germans
- German National Socialism. *See* National Socialism (Nazism)
- German parties and politicians in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 20, 147–48, 172–73, 173n83, 174, 182, 194, 195n171, 197–98, 200, 201, 201n189, 210, 244, 300, 313, 326
 activist, 147–48, 152, 165, 169, 169n72, 171n77, 181, 183, 186, 188, 195, 204, 204n192, 208, 224, 230, 361, 364
 negativist, 147–48, 165, 190, 204, 208
See also Bund der Landwirte (German Agrarians in Czechoslovakia); Henlein, Konrad (1898–1945); Spina, Franz (1868–1938); Sudeten German Party (SdP)
- German Social Democrats in Czechoslovakia (Deutsche sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei), 182, 194, 201n189
See also German parties and politicians in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), activist; Social Democrats.
- Germans
 in Austria-Hungary, 15, 21–22, 60, 64–65, 99, 113, 113n91, 122–23, 125, 128–31, 160
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 147, 162, 164, 165, 167, 167n67, 171n77, 186–88, 197–98, 225, 226, 229–30, 240–41, 241n287, 273, 361–62
 and economy, 163, 182–84
 in Slovakia (1918–1939), 269, 282, 283–84, 312–13
See also German language and German speakers; German parties and politicians in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938); Sudeten Germans
- Germany (Second Empire), 18, 21
- Germany (Weimar Republic), 21, 183n123, 187, 198
- Germany (Third Reich), 21, 167, 167n68, 181–82, 184, 218, 231–32, 244, 277, 361–62, 370
- Germany (post-1945), 39, 68
- Gittings, John S. (1888–1961), 157–58, 159, 174
- government employment. *See* public employment
- grand coalitions, 38–42, 52, 199–200, 203–204, 206, 265n2
 in Austria (Imperial), 82, 104, 107, 111, 123, 358

- in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 27, 200–201, 209, 211, 245, 319
- Great Depression, 21, 183, 187, 207, 270, 279, 326, 336, 341, 362
- Great Moravian Empire, 273, 288, 296
See also Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), establishment and associated foundation myths
- group (segment) and population size, 38, 46, 48, 49, 91, 97, 119, 160, 199, 229n249, 281, 294, 298, 313, 332, 352, 364
See also conditions favorable to consociationalism
- groups (segments), number of, 38, 46, 48, 160, 280, 281, 298, 299, 352, 364
See also conditions favorable to consociationalism
- groups (segments) that are roughly the same size. *See* group (segment) and population size
- Habsburg Monarchy. *See* Austria-Hungary
- Hall, Barton (1881–1951), 158, 158n48
- Havel, Václav (1936–2011), 143, 143n2
- Havlíček, Karel (1821–1856), 21
- healthcare and public health, 230, 238, 239, 337, 341, 345
See also infrastructure development
- Henlein, Konrad (1898–1945), 167n68, 264n18, 244
- historians and history. *See* Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), in historiography; interdisciplinary research
- Hlasists, 273, 287, 291, 297
See also Czechoslovakism; Slovak parties and politicians
- Hlinka, Andrej (1863–1938), 162, 209, 235n269, 268 fig. 6, 278, 287, 298, 322, 346
See also clerical parties and clericals; Slovak People's Party (Slovak Populists or *Ludáks*)
- Hlinka Slovak People's Party. *See* Slovak People's Party (Slovak Populists or *Ludáks*)
- Hodža, Milan (1878–1944), 181n117, 205, 210n208, 222, 222n240, 250, 287, 297, 315, 321, 321n157
as prime minister, 204n192, 212n215, 216n226, 242, 268 fig. 6, 315, 344, 356
See also Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), governments and cabinets; Republican Party of Agricul-
- riculturalists and Small Farmers (Czechoslovak Agrarians/Czechoslovak Republicans)
- Holocaust, 132, 133n179, 134, 215n224
- homogeneity and heterogeneity. *See* geographic concentration, of groups (segments)
- Horowitz, Donald L., 53
- Hrad (Castle), 170, 170n73, 176, 191, 191n157, 202, 205, 206, 214, 215n222, 227, 228, 232, 254, 254n326
See also Masaryk, Tomáš G. (1850–1937)
- Hungarian Bolsheviks. *See* Hungary (1918–1945), First Hungarian Soviet Republic
- Hungarian Diet, 15n7, 16n10, 296
- Hungarian language and Hungarian speakers
in Austria-Hungary, 95, 97, 101n61, 116, 119, 281, 298
in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 161, 165–66, 166n66, 172, 172n81, 188, 226, 234, 237, 281, 302–303, 308, 323, 325–26, 361
See also Hungarians
- Hungarian National Christian Socialists in Czechoslovakia, 196–97, 203, 203n191, 281
- Hungarian Nationalists in Czechoslovakia, 195, 203n191, 211n213, 308–309
- Hungarian Parliament (Kingdom of Hungary). *See* Hungary (Kingdom, pre-1918), Parliament
- Hungarian parties and politicians in Austria-Hungary, 15, 16, 21, 84, 290, 291, 292, 358–59
See also Hungarians, in Austria-Hungary
- Hungarian parties and politicians in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 152, 194, 195, 203, 203n191, 208, 277, 300, 308–309, 312, 313, 317, 333, 348–49, 353, 361, 364
Christian Socialists, 203, 222
Social Democrats, 194
- Hungarians, 257, 364
in Austria-Hungary, 21, 92n32, 124, 290, 291, 292, 358–59
in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 161, 161n53, 172, 188–89, 195–96, 225, 226–27, 237, 237n277, 238, 307–309, 312, 325–26, 353, 364
in Slovakia (1918–1939), 269, 281, 282, 283–84, 298, 299, 303, 317, 318, 323, 325–26, 337, 348–49

- See also* Hungarian language and Hungarian speakers; Magyarization
Hungarus. *See* Hungary (Kingdom, pre-1918), loyalty to; transnational identity
 Hungary (Kingdom, pre-1918), 16, 100, 256, 269, 277, 285, 288, 301, 312, 351, 369
 Parliament, 16, 16n10, 17, 21, 84, 285, 341–42
 pre-1867, 15, 296
 post-1867, 16, 17, 21, 100, 290, 330–31
 See also Austria (Imperial); Austria-Hungary
 Hungary (1918–1945), 20, 167n69, 237, 278, 308, 312, 326
 First Hungarian Soviet Republic, 167
 Horthy regime, 167–68, 294–95
 invasion of Slovakia (1919), 167, 274–75, 294
 Hungary (Royal, pre-1918). *See* Hungary (Kingdom, pre-1918)
 Hus, Jan (c. 1372–1415) and Hussites, 61, 165, 165n64, 288, 288n58
 commemoration of, 235, 235n269, 236n270, 236n272, 237, 324
 See also Czechoslovak legionnaires; religion, in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938)
 Imperial Austria. *See* Austria (Imperial)
 Imperial Council. *See* Reichsrat (Imperial Austria)
 India, 37, 43, 44, 45, 47–48, 49, 51, 52, 54–55, 115
 Congress Party, 37n25, 42, 200, 209, 364
 industrial development, 95–97, 164, 182–86, 206–207, 238, 321–22
 See also agricultural development; economy; infrastructure development
 influence in government. *See* elite cooperation
 infrastructure development, 185, 195, 206–207, 239, 321, 326, 343, 345
 See also Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), industrialization and modernization; healthcare and public health
 interdisciplinary research. I, 74–77, 81–82, 368–69, 371–72
 international organizations, 53
 See also civil society organizations; League of Nations
 interwar Czechoslovakia. *See* Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938)
 Italian independence, wars of, 15
 Italian language, Italian speakers, and Italians, 25, 43, 91, 96, 97, 99, 100, 112, 115, 116, 117n108, 118
 Jews and Jewish organizations, 133n179
 anti-Jewish violence, 292, 309
 in Austria (Imperial), 17, 93, 97, 97n51, 98, 115, 115n105, 124, 125, 125n134, 127, 359
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 161, 161n53, 163, 165, 166n66, 173, 186, 226, 269, 282, 283–84, 299, 309, 312, 312n129, 332, 338, 359
 in Hungary (1918–1945), 309, 309n126, 312
 in Hungary (Kingdom, pre-1918), 17, 309, 312
 language of, 93, 127, 166n66, 309
 as a nationality, 97n51, 124, 125, 125n134, 132, 133n179, 161, 312
 parties and politicians, 97n51, 115n105, 125n134, 126, 166n66, 215n224, 300, 312, 320n152, 338
 See also anti-Semitism; Holocaust; Yiddish language and Yiddish speakers; Zionism
 journalists. *See* Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), press and media
 Judson, Pieter, 59–60, 65
kaisertreu. *See* Austria-Hungary, loyalty to; transnational identity
 Karl I/IV (1887–1922), 83, 83n5, 295, 356
 Klaus, Václav (1941–), 143, 253, 257
 Košice/ Košice County, 226–27, 305, 308, 318, 333, 334, 337, 344
 Kramář, Karel (1860–1937), 100n57, 173, 177, 179, 220, 246, 250
 as prime minister, 201–202, 204n192, 205
 See also Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), governments and cabinets
 lack of socioeconomic disparities. *See* socioeconomic disparities
 landowners
 ecclesiastical (church estates), 123, 127, 275, 323, 324

Index

- large, 96, 108, 114, 123, 124, 125, 127, 129–30, 182, 283, 323
small, 195–96, 194n168, 198
See also nobles
- language
bilingualism, 65, 101n61, 126, 131, 134, 137, 283, 303
official and major, 14, 17, 43, 45, 48, 98, 101n61, 117n107, 119, 126, 233–34, 234n265, 243, 273, 276, 285, 302–303, 307–308, 322, 358, 360
See also Austria (Imperial), ethnicity and language in; Austria-Hungary, ethnicity and language in; Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), ethnicity and language in; education and educational system, language of
law and law code. *See* Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), legal system
League of Nations, 156, 295n82, 318, 365
Lebanon, 42, 43, 56
Lecher, Otto (1861–1939), 14, 14n2
Lee, Frank C. (1891–1963), 158–59, 159n49
legacy of governance. *See* Austria-Hungary, legacy of governance
Lerner, Hanna, 54–55, 120n111
lex Pereki, 57–58, 131, 135
See also Moravian Compromise (1905)
liberals, 13, 15, 21, 100n57, 104, 107, 111, 113n91, 297
Lijphart, Arend, 22, 30, 32, 33, 38n27, 56–57
linguistic divisions. *See* Austria (Imperial), ethnicity and language in; Austria-Hungary, ethnicity and language in; Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), ethnicity and language in; education and educational system, language of; language; Slovakia (1918–1939), ethnicity and language in
local compromises. *See* regional compromises
Lower Austria, 86, 86n12, 97, 97n46
- Magenta, Battle of, 15
Magyarization, 17, 238, 280, 284–85, 288, 297, 302–303, 309, 330–31, 351, 359
See also Hungary (Kingdom, pre-1918), loyalty to
Magyarones, 281–82, 298
See also Hungarian language and Hungarian speakers
Magyars. *See* Hungarian language and Hungarian speakers; Hungarians
- majority. *See* absence of a unified majority
Malypetr, Jan (1873–1947), 203–204, 204n192
See also Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), governments and cabinets
Martin (Turčiansky Sv. Martin), 223 fig. 5, 227, 289, 290, 292, 331n189
Martin Declaration (1918), 238n279, 289, 290, 293
See also Slovaks, in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938)
Masaryk, Tomáš G. (1850–1937), 30n5, 139, 142 fig. 3, 170–73, 170n74, 179, 191n158, 250, 256n331, 356, 360, 365
cult of personality, 170, 171n77, 286, 351, 365
and government cabinets, 144, 214, 253
and Jews, 173, 173n85, 173n88
and minorities, 156, 171–73, 171n77, 172n78, 172n81, 233, 236–37
as power broker, 148n15, 149–50, 156, 191
and religion, 173, 173n89, 235–36, 235n269
and Slovaks, 172, 172n81
See also Hrad (Castle)
- McGarry, John, 53–54, 58
military, employment in. *See* public employment
Ministry with Full Power for Slovakia, 205, 263n11, 274, 292, 328, 329–30, 342
See also Slovakia (1918–1939), and central government
minorities. *See* geographic concentration, of minorities
minority veto, 44–45, 82–83, 112, 113, 138, 219, 222, 322–23, 341, 365
See also consensus, political
Moravia, 25, 59, 87n17, 115, 119, 129, 132, 242n290, 318, 323
See also Silesia
Moravia-Silesia, 25, 166, 241, 242n290, 330, 330n185
Moravian Compromise (1905), 26, 57–58, 122–24, 128, 129–31, 243, 244, 255, 358
See also regional compromises
Moravian Diet, 122–24, 129, 255
multiparty systems, 33–34, 66, 146, 208, 246, 280, 313, 316, 333, 340, 351, 371–72
See also democracy and democratization
Munich Agreement (1938), 157n43, 167, 176, 256, 347, 352, 362
mutual or minority veto. *See* minority veto
Nagodba (1869), 21, 371

- See also* Croatia
natio Hungarica. *See* nobles
 national councils. *See* Slovak national councils
 national flexibility, 24, 25, 55, 64–65, 130, 133
 national indifference, 24, 55, 61n127, 64–65, 130
 National Socialism (Nazism), 20, 22, 133, 134, 167, 247n304
 nationalism, 23–24, 28, 50, 55, 61n127, 65n145, 269n1, 356, 363
 in Austria-Hungary, 59–61, 89, 92, 94, 100, 101n61, 119, 122, 131–34, 131n165, 296–97
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 171, 186, 242, 248, 270, 275–79, 277n26, 293, 295, 297, 299, 350, 352, 362–63
 See also constructivism (nationalism studies); nationality; overarching loyalties; transnational identity
 nationality, 24, 55, 58, 64, 92, 99, 119–20, 125n134, 131–33, 243, 281–82
 See also Austria (Imperial), ethnicity and language in; Austria-Hungary, ethnicity and language in; constructivism (nationalism studies); Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), ethnicity and language in; ethnicity; nationalism; Slovakia (1918–1939), ethnicity and language in
 Nazi Germany. *See* Germany (Third Reich)
 Netherlands, 32, 33–34, 41, 43, 44, 45, 49, 50, 51–52, 57, 147n10
 Nitra/Nitra County, 291, 330, 333, 346–47
 nobles, 15, 16, 21, 61n127, 87n17, 100, 101, 128, 129, 296
 in government, 87, 102, 104, 123, 124, 358–59
 See also landowners; peasants and farm laborers; socioeconomic status and social elites
 nondemocratic states, 37, 90, 370

 O'Donoghue, Sidney E. (1895–1964), 158, 158n47
 Olomouc, 122, 237
 organizational segregation and identity, 33, 89, 121, 126, 133–34, 304, 359–60
 See also civil society organizations; education and educational system

 Országgyűlés. *See* Hungarian Parliament (interwar); Hungary (Kingdom, pre-1918), Parliament
 Országh, Jozef (1883–1949), 223 fig. 5, 268 fig. 6, 336–37, 340, 344–45
 Osmička (Committee of Eight), 209n205, 211, 211n213, 212, 214, 215, 215n222, 216, 216n226, 265 tab. 12, 365
 See also coalitions, Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), Gentlemen's Coalition (Panská koalice); Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), governments and cabinets; Pětka (Committee of Five); Political Committees in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938); Šestka (Committee of Six)
 Ottoman Empire, 18, 37, 86, 155, 296
 overarching loyalties, 38, 50, 59
 in Austria (Imperial), 59, 100–102, 129, 280, 285–86, 296
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 169–70, 174, 189, 196–97, 199, 248, 280, 285–86, 287, 313, 359–60, 364–65
 See also conditions favorable to consociationalism; nationalism; transnational identity

 Pan-Slavism, 100, 100n57, 285
 See also Russophiles
 Pátečníci (Friday Men), 148n15
 See also Masaryk, Tomáš G. (1850–1937)
 Pearson, Frederick F. A. (1888–1958), 158, 158n46
 peasants and farm laborers, 16, 21, 95, 96, 176, 194n168, 195–96, 221, 283, 300, 323
 See also agrarianism; landowners; nobles; workers and working class
 Peroutka, Ferdinand (1895–1978), 176, 176n101, 201n189, 218–19, 334, 334n203
 personality principle, 1, 169–70, 174–75, 249
 See also elite cooperation
 Pětka (Committee of Five), 41n40, 145–46, 190, 192, 205, 209–212, 210n206, 210n207, 210n208, 211n212, 214n221, 241, 253, 265 tab. 12
 Pětka and its successors (as a group), 152, 209n205, 211–15, 215n222, 216–18, 219, 247n304, 256n331, 248–49, 365
 See also coalitions, Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), Gen-

- tlemen's Coalition (Panská koalice); Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), governments and cabinets; Osmička (Committee of Eight); Political Committees in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938); Šestka (Committee of Six)
- pillars. *See* segmental cleavages
- Pittsburgh Agreement (1918), 276
See also Slovaks, in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938)
- plural societies, 22, 32–34, 42, 58, 89, 121, 133–34, 135, 306
See also geographic concentration
- Podtatranská County, 331n189, 333, 334, 334n200
- Poland (1918–1939), 18, 20, 127, 168, 187, 295, 347, 365
- Poles
 in Austria-Hungary, 16, 24, 95, 96, 97, 107, 108, 109n81, 112, 115, 115n105, 125, 127, 292
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 292, 300, 317, 361
See also Polish language and Polish speakers
- Polish Central Electoral Committee (Austrian Galicia), 96
- Polish language and Polish speakers
 in Austria-Hungary, 17, 96, 98, 99, 107, 116, 119, 124, 125, 127
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 161, 165, 166, 196, 234, 300, 361
See also Poles
- Political Committees in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 209n205, 215–16, 216n226, 218, 230, 249
See also coalitions, Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), Gentlemen's Coalition (Panská koalice); Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938); Osmička (Committee of Eight); Pětka (Committee of Five); Šestka (Committee of Six)
- political elites. *See* elite cooperation
- political parties
 in Austria-Hungary, 13–14, 145n4, 145n5, 153, 301, 304, 314, 356
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 163, 192, 194–96, 210n210, 300, 301, 304, 314–18, 356
 mass, 21, 102, 102n65, 105, 124, 127
See also Czechs, parties and politicians; German parties and politicians in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938); Hungarian parties and politicians in Austria-Hungary; Hungarian parties and politicians in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938); Jews and Jewish organizations, parties and politicians; multiparty systems; Slovak parties and politicians
- political power brokers. *See* elite cooperation
See also Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), informal groupings; personality principle
- political science and political scientists. *See* interdisciplinary research
- population size. *See* group (segment) and population size
- postwar Europe. *See* Europe (post-1945)
- Považská County, 331, 331n189, 332, 333
See also Martin (Turčiansky Sv. Martin)
- power sharing, 23n14, 72
See also consociationalism
- Prague, 166n66, 225, 226, 227
- presidential powers and presidents, 39, 42, 50, 50n82, 150, 253
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 149, 170, 170n73, 253
 in United States, 39–40, 39n30, 155, 156, 157, 253
- Prešov, 225n245, 292
- press. *See* Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), press and media
- professional associations, 184, 305–306
See also civil society organizations
- proportionality, 43, 44n52, 114, 136, 138, 189, 224–25, 227, 229, 230, 231, 232–33, 314
 electoral, 114–116
 and proportional representation (PR) mechanisms, 43–44, 135
- Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (1939–1945), 132, 256–57, 277, 370
- Protestantism and Protestants
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 162–63, 164–65
 in Slovakia, 297, 299, 300
See also religion
- proto-consociationalism, 82, 90–91, 103
- provincial diets, 15, 15n7, 21, 114, 124, 129
See also Hungarian Diet; Moravian Diet
- Prussia, 16

- See also* Germany (Second Empire)
 public employment, 26, 116–17, 119, 274, 306, 318–19, 322, 343, 350
 race, 24, 32, 71, 88, 133, 134, 309
See also ethnicity
 railway infrastructure. *See* infrastructure development
 Rašín, Alois (1867–1923), 189–90, 218, 250
 regional compromises, 81, 83, 122, 128–131, 134, 137, 138, 358, 365
 Reichsrat (Imperial Austria), 13, 13n1, 15, 16, 84, 87, 104, 104n67, 105 tab. 7, 109, 110 fig. 2, 114, 365
 Abgeordnetenhaus (House of Deputies), 16, 87, 104, 107–108, 107n76, 111, 114, 121, 124, 139
 Czech members and Czech Club, 139–40, 189, 256n331
 deputies, 13–14, 14n2, 16, 79, 250
 Herrenhaus (House of Lords), 16, 87
 Leadership Conference (Obmännerkonferenz/Senioren-Konvent), 109, 111, 365
 operations and procedure, 15, 15n6, 21, 80–81, 84, 107, 111–13, 113n94, 256
 Presidium (Präsidium), 107–108, 107n76, 109
 relatively small number of groups. *See* groups (segments), number of
 relatively small population. *See* group (segment) and population size
 religion
 accommodations to, 43, 57, 321
 in Austria-Hungary, 94–95, 94 tab. 5, 285, 360
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 162–63, 164–65, 165n64, 196–98, 233–34, 234–36, 238, 275, 309, 323–24
 diversity and divisions, 32–33, 47, 94–95, 162–63, 165n64, 196, 288
 nonbelievers and agnostics, 163, 299
 in Slovakia (1918–1939), 283, 298–99, 300, 341n234, 346, 351, 352
 See also Catholicism and Catholics; Protestantism and Protestants; secularism and secularization; segmental cleavages; separation of church and state
 Renner, Karl (1870–1950), I, 30, 30n5
 Republican Party of Agriculturalists and Small Farmers (Czechoslovak Agrarians/Czechoslovak Republicans), 144, 145n4, 173, 175, 194–95, 194n168, 221, 228, 364
 Slovak politics and politicians, 228, 228n248, 287, 297, 304, 314, 315, 317–18, 326, 344
See also agrarianism; Hodža, Milan (1878–1944); Šrobár, Vavro (1867–1950); Švehla, Antonín (1870–1933)
 Roma/Gypsies, 28, 166, 245, 269, 282, 298, 361
 Romania, 18, 20, 167, 169, 371
See also Bukovina
 Romanian language, Romanian speakers, and Romanians, 91, 95, 97, 99, 115, 124, 125
See also Bukovina; Bukovina Compromise (1910)
 rural areas. *See* countryside
 Russia (Imperial), 18, 86, 100, 220, 287, 288n58, 297, 356
See also Pan-Slavism; Russophiles; Soviet Union
 Russian (Little Russian) as a category. *See* Rusyn language and Rusyn speakers; Ukrainian language and Ukrainian speakers
 Russophiles, 25, 100, 100n57, 220, 297
See also Pan-Slavism
 Rusyn language, Rusyn speakers, and Rusyns, 25, 28
 in Austria-Hungary, 94–95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 107, 115, 124, 127–28
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 161, 164, 165, 201, 204, 231, 234, 269, 282, 313, 361
 See also Bukovina; Galicia, Austrian; Ruthenians; Ukrainian language, Ukrainian speakers, and Ukrainians
 Ruthenia, 20, 25, 27, 156, 166, 167–68, 182, 184–86, 185n130, 239–40, 241–243, 244, 256, 275, 302n100, 361, 367, 371
 and Czechoslovak institutions, 225, 231, 237, 241, 318, 334, 343
 Ruthenians, 25, 96n40, 97n51, 115, 115n105, 125, 127, 148, 156, 161n53, 164, 361
See also Rusyn language, Rusyn speakers, and Rusyns; Ukrainian language, Ukrainian speakers, and Ukrainians
 Schieszl, Josef (1876–1970), 191n158, 202, 202n190
 schools. *See* education and educational system
 secularism and secularization, 165, 275, 276, 308, 324

- See also* religion; separation of church and state
- segmental autonomy, 26, 30n5, 42–43, 51, 58, 135
- in Austria (Imperial), 119, 121, 138, 244
- in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 27, 233, 233, 234–35, 244, 245, 328, 334, 350
- segmental cleavages, 32, 32n12, 47, 89, 135, 164–65, 248, 299, 352
- segmental isolation. *See* concentration, geographic
- separation of church and state, 88, 170, 235n269, 274, 323–24
- See also* Catholicism and Catholics; religion
- Serbian language and Serbian speakers, 93–94, 95, 96
- Serbo-Croatians/Serbo-Croats, 93–94, 97, 97n51, 115
- Serbs, 93–94, 95
- See also* Croats/Croats
- Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Kingdom of, 18, 20
- See also* Yugoslavia
- Šestka (Committee of Six), 209n205, 211–212, 265 tab. 12
- See also* coalitions, Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), Gentlemen's Coalition (Panská koalice); Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), governments and cabinets; Osmička (Committee of Eight); Pětka (Committee of Five); Political Committees in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938)
- Seven Weeks' War (1866), 16
- shared identity. *See* overarching loyalties
- Silesia, 25, 85, 90, 97, 99, 241, 242n290
- See also* Moravia
- Slavs, 20, 60–61, 79, 100, 100n57, 162, 165, 169, 188, 273, 296, 360
- See also* Pan-Slavism
- Slovak language and Slovak speakers, 161, 164–65, 234, 234n263, 273, 276, 303, 322, 360
- dialects and language codification, 296–97, 305, 324
- See also* Czechoslovakism; Magyarization; Slovaks
- Slovak national councils, 274, 285, 289–93, 328
- Slovak Nationalists (party), 277, 285, 289–90, 297, 304, 314
- Slovak parties and politicians
- in Austria-Hungary, 284–85, 297, 304, 314
- in Czechoslovakia, 152–53, 192, 196, 275, 278, 299–300, 304, 314–17
- Slovak People's Party (Slovak Populists or Ludáks), 196, 201, 203, 241, 276–77, 278, 286, 287, 289, 290, 293, 300, 304, 319, 321, 327, 334–35, 345, 346–48, 351, 352, 364
- Rodobrana (paramilitary force), 278
- See also* Czechoslovak People's Party (Czechoslovak Clericals/Czechoslovak Populists)
- Slovak State (1939–1945), 256–57, 270, 277, 363
- Slovakia (1918–1939), 20, 27–28, 184–86, 238–39, 244, 269–70, 277, 279–80, 289, 301, 302, 306, 332, 350
- and autonomist politics, 162, 182, 272, 276–78, 334–35, 351, 362–63
- and central government, 314, 315–19, 320–22, 324, 327–28, 329, 335, 340, 341, 347, 353, 362
- civil society organizations, 344
- counties, 275, 276, 330–34, 341
- electoral districts and local administration, 274, 324, 330–34, 336, 337–38, 344, 350, 362
- ethnicity and language in, 269, 281–84, 295–98, 300, 305–306, 307–309, 312–13, 332, 333, 338, 342, 348–49, 350
- invaded by Hungarian Bolsheviks (1919), 274–75
- Ministry with Full Power for Slovakia, 205, 263n11, 274, 292, 328, 329–30, 342
- political parties in (*see also* Slovak parties and politicians), 314–15, 319–20, 327, 344, 346
- Provincial Assembly, 28, 300, 334, 336–39, 340, 341, 344–49, 350, 362
- Provincial Committee, 339–40, 341
- Provincial Office, 27–28, 326, 334–38, 339, 340, 341–49, 350, 362
- Slovakia (1993–), 146, 251, 252, 256–57
- Slovakization, 302–304, 307, 313, 350
- See also* Czechoslovakism; Magyarization
- Slovaks, 295–98, 331, 353
- in Austria-Hungary, 270, 284, 288, 296–98

- in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 269–70, 276, 279–80, 283–84, 287, 288, 298, 302, 314, 318, 322, 331, 350–51, 353, 360
See also Slovak language and Slovak speakers
- small states, 33–34, 48–50, 160, 199, 294
See also conditions favorable to consociationalism
- Social Democrats
 in Austria-Hungary, 59n118, 90, 107, 124, 125n134, 126, 297
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 191, 192–194
See also Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party of Workers (Czechoslovak Social Democrats); German Social Democrats in Czechoslovakia (Deutsche sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei); Hungarian parties and politicians in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), Social Democrats
- socioeconomic disparities, 46, 47–48, 95, 160, 280, 283, 313
See also conditions favorable to consociationalism
- socioeconomic status and social elites
 in Austria-Hungary, 15, 17, 115, 117n108, 119, 124, 125, 127, 128, 129, 331, 358–59
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 164, 182–83, 198, 283–84
See also businessmen and business class; elite cooperation; landowners; nobles
- Solferino, Battle of, 15
- South Africa, 52–53, 57, 135
- Soviet Union, 220, 237n275, 295, 327, 362
See also Russia (Imperial)
- Spina, Franz (1868–1938), 181, 181n117, 188, 188n145, 195n170, 219, 251, 361
See also Bund der Landwirte (German Agrarians in Czechoslovakia)
- Spiš County/region, 282, 334, 334n200
- sport organizations and sports, 90, 186–87, 240, 305, 334
See also civil society organizations
- Šrámek, Jan (1870–1956), 145, 145n6, 177, 179–80, 196n173, 207n196, 250
See also clerical parties and clericals; Czechoslovak People's Party (Czechoslovak Clericals/Czechoslovak Populists)
- Šrobár, Vavro (1867–1950), 228, 238, 238n280, 250, 274–75, 285, 287, 321, 328n178, 329, 330
See also Republican Party of Agriculturalists and Small Farmers (Czechoslovak Agrarians/Czechoslovak Republicans)
- Štefánek, Anton (1887–1964), 302, 329
- Štefánik, Milan Rastislav (1880–1919), 286–87
- Subcarpathian Ruthenia. *See* Ruthenia
- Sudeten German Party (SdP), 147–48, 167, 167n68, 183, 204, 231, 244, 244n296, 357, 362
See also German parties and politicians in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), negativist; Henlein, Konrad (1898–1945)
- Sudeten Germans, 25, 148, 198n180, 207, 257, 326, 357, 364
See also Germans
- Sudetenland, 181–82, 184, 241, 243
 annexation (1938), 244, 277, 356
- suffrage, 88
 in Austria-Hungary, 13, 21, 26, 60, 87, 89, 87n17, 88, 95, 96, 102, 106, 108, 112, 114–15, 115n105, 123–24, 125, 125n134, 127, 129, 130, 139, 358, 369
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 148, 200, 301, 304, 306, 307, 332, 338
 female, 87, 87n17, 88, 114, 148, 306
 limited, 87, 301
 universal, 87, 88n20, 123, 301, 304, 306, 307, 332, 338
 universal manhood, 13, 21, 26, 60, 87, 88, 96, 106, 108, 112, 114–15, 115n105, 124, 125, 127, 139, 358
- Švehla, Antonín (1870–1933), 156, 162, 174–80, 176n100, 176n101, 177n106, 178n108, 180, 189, 190, 213–14, 235, 235n269, 247, 249–50
 as prime minister, 144, 146, 146n7, 162, 174, 180, 190, 202–203, 205–206, 207–208, 210, 213–14, 221, 253
See also Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), governments and cabinets
- Switzerland, 33–34, 41, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51–52, 68, 233
- Syrový, Jan (1888–1970), 254, 254n326
See also Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), governments and cabinets

Index

- tariffs. *See* Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), and tariffs
 Těšínsko, 168, 365
 trade unions, 133, 184, 197–98, 197n178, 292, 305–306
 Tradesmen's Party. *See* Czechoslovak Business and Commerce Party of the Middle Class
 traditions of compromise and accommodation, 38, 46, 51–52
 in Austria-Hungary, 22, 130, 137–38, 280, 284
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 20–21, 199, 208, 215, 218, 280, 284
 See also Austria-Hungary, legacy of governance; conditions favorable to consociationalism
 Transcarpathian Ruthenia. *See* Ruthenia
 Transleithania. *See* Hungary (Kingdom, pre-1918)
 transnational identity, 100–102, 169, 182, 186, 248, 270, 280, 285–86, 360–61
 See also Czechoslovakism; overarching loyalties
 Transylvania, 15n7, 20, 86, 238
 Trenčín/Trenčín region, 291
 Trianon, Treaty of (1920), 269, 294, 365
 Tuka, Vojtech (1880–1946), 278, 293, 327
 See also Slovak People's Party (Slovak Populists or *Ludáks*)
 Tusar, Vlastimil (1880–1924), 205, 228, 252
 See also Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), governments and cabinets
 Twain, Mark. *See* Clemens, Samuel L. (1835–1910)
 Udržal, František (1866–1938), 203, 204n192, 206, 208–209, 214, 215, 220
 See also Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), governments and cabinets
 Uherské Hradiště, 225, 227
 Ukraine, 18, 25, 85, 86, 237n277, 371
 Ukrainian language, Ukrainian speakers, and Ukrainians, 25
 in Austria-Hungary, 17, 91, 94–95, 96, 109n81, 120, 124, 127
 in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 161, 161n53, 226, 234, 234n265, 237, 237n277, 248, 282, 361
 See also Rusyn language, Rusyn speakers, and Rusyns
 United Kingdom, 33, 39, 39n28, 44n52, 68, 69–70, 69n155, 70 tab. 3, 150
 diplomats in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 279, 287, 312, 326, 336
 United States, 33, 39–40, 39n28, 44n52, 70, 70 tab. 3, 88, 156, 167n67, 238n280, 257
 diplomats in Czechoslovakia (First Republic, 1918–1938), 154–59, 245, 279
 presidents, 39–40, 39n30, 155, 156, 157, 253
 universal manhood suffrage, 13, 21, 26, 60, 87, 88, 96, 106, 108, 112, 114–15, 115n105, 124, 125, 127, 139, 358
 See also suffrage
 universities. *See* education and educational system, higher
 Upper and Lower Silesia. *See* Silesia
 urban centers. *See* cities
 urban government. *See* cities
 Uzhhorod, 225n245, 226, 242, 318, 334
 Vienna, 13, 84, 86n12, 110 fig. 2, 172n81, 237n275, 269
Volksstämme. *See* nationality
 voting rights. *See* suffrage
 Weimar Republic. *See* Germany (Weimar Republic)
 Winans, Charles S. (1863–1935), 158, 158n45
 Wilson, Woodrow (1856–1924), 155, 156
 women's rights, 71, 87, 87n17, 88, 148, 301, 306
 See also suffrage, female
 workers and working class, 61n127, 162, 164, 176, 197n176, 290, 292, 300, 332
 World War I, 49, 109, 126, 128, 156, 314, 356, 369, 370
 aftermath, 156, 185, 238, 274
 World War II, 39, 343
 Yiddish language and Yiddish speakers, 93, 127
 See also Jews and Jewish organizations
 Young Czechs, 13, 60–61, 100n57, 106
 See also Czechoslovak National Democratic Party
 Yugoslavia, 18, 20, 23, 37, 86, 169, 355, 371
 See also Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Kingdom of

Zakarpatska oblast. *See* Ruthenia
Zeman, Miloš (1944–), 143, 146, 257

Zionism, 93, 115n105, 125n134, 166n66
Znojmo, 171n77, 244