Religious Diversity and Nationhood in the Secular West
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To Laura and Bruno

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REGULATING DIFFERENCE

INTRODUCTION

Religious Diversity, Secularism, and Nationhood

In the National Assembly of the Canadian province of Quebec, a large crucifix is placed over the Speaker's seat. For a long time Quebeckers saw it as a remnant of Catholicism's former cultural hegemony and its role in political affairs. The crucifix was largely ignored until 2007, when André Boisclair, leader of the nationalist Parti Québécois, told the media that the crucifix violated Quebec's secularist principles. Subsequently, it became a subject of debate in the so-called Bouchard-Taylor Commission, which was tasked with assessing the state of majority-minority relations in the province.[1] In their final report, Bouchard and Taylor (2008: 152–153) advocated the removal of the crucifix, stating "that the very site where elected representatives deliberate and legislate [should] not be identified with a specific religion" and that this was "in keeping with the notion of the separation of Church and State." Famously, just hours after the release of their report, Quebec's parliament voted unanimously in support of keeping the crucifix in the parliament hall. Prime Minister Charest declared that the crucifix was symbolic of Quebec's religious heritage and culture: "The National Assembly reiterates its desire to promote the language, history, culture and values of the *nation québécoise*, foster the integration of each person into our nation in the spirit of openness and reciprocity, and express its attachment to our religious and historic patrimony represented, among others, by the crucifix in the Blue Room and our coats of arms that adorn our institutions."[2] By contrast, around the same time the government of Spain's region of Catalonia formed an Advisory Council on Religious Diversity with the aim of creating greater recognition and visibility for religious diversity in the public sphere. In 2014, the council published a report titled "Religious Diversity in Open Societies: Criteria for Decision-Making," which the Catalan vice-president opened with the following words: "Catalonia will always be a country of welcome, integration and cohesion. For this reason, we understand religious diversity as an opportunity to augment

the cultural wealth of our country, which is increasingly cosmopolitan. . . . We have to start from the assumption that religion is fundamental to human beings and therefore has great significance for society."

These two observations, both of major national significance, illustrate the puzzling divergence between both nations with regard to the nexus between religion and nationhood. Whereas Quebec's political elite reaffirmed the unique role of Catholicism for national history and the nation-building project in response to what were perceived to be the excessive demands made by religious minorities, Catalonia's vice-president rhetorically celebrated religious diversity as central to the nation. While it would be simple to conclude that Catalans are more tolerant than Quebeckers, in this book I am interested in the configuration of social forces behind these developments. Why did Quebec's national representatives unanimously insist on the importance of a Catholic symbol, despite the often negative views of Catholicism that many Quebeckers hold? How and why, by contrast, did religious diversity turn into a dominant state discourse in Catalonia as reflected in the words of the former vice-president? How do both secularism and Catholicism (as the inherited majority religion) feature in nationalist discourses and imaginaries? And how is religion carved out as a salient aspect of citizenship through political discourses and practices in the first place?

Across the Western world, but also beyond it, religious diversification has produced severe challenges in recent decades for societies and nation-states in ways of accommodating new religious communities into existing institutions and the legal frameworks that define the place of religion in the public sphere. This has led to controversial public debates about questions such as the following: Are Muslim women allowed to wear face veils in public? Do municipalities have the duty to provide land for minority places of worship? To what extent are displays of Christian symbols on the part of state authorities (as in the case of Quebec's National Assembly) or the maintenance of institutional privileges for majority religions discriminatory or exclusionary of religious minorities and atheists, rather than being legitimate ways of maintaining national cultural heritage and producing social cohesion? In dealing with religious diversity, states are forced to revisit institutional arrangements that regulate relationships between the state and religion. In doing so, they are typically caught between rising demands for greater religious freedom or equal treatment from religious minorities and world-societal pressures around human rights on the one hand, and the emergence of nationalist, sometimes xenophobic mobilizations against these demands on the other. Fundamentally, what is at stake here are the ways in which religious identities are promoted or constrained through concepts of citizenship.

In this context, the conventional sociological approach has been to focus on discourses and practices of lawmaking as responses to religious diversity. This book, by contrast, explores how the notion of religious diversity has itself come to inhabit the political and social imaginaries of political actors and ordinary

people, has come to circulate in public discourses around the governance of cultural difference, and has thus become the premise of a wide range of regulatory practices. The notion of religious diversity is turning into an increasingly prominent tool in order to render populations legible for governmental and administrative purposes. The different modalities in which this happens, I suggest, are outcomes of the ways in which national belonging is imagined and enacted, and of how these imaginations and enactments change over time. The question is thus how religion matters for national identity.

Most current work emphasizes that nationalism is at odds with religious diversity. Against this backdrop, the value of comparison lies in illuminating the conditions under which this is the case or not. Quebec and Catalonia share significant similarities: both are nations without states with strong nationalist ambitions in which Catholicism was closely tied to national political life for long historical periods; both societies secularized at a fast pace in recent history while simultaneously becoming more religiously diverse through immigration. Given these similarities, national discourses and practices of regulating religion require examination in order to account for the different trajectories. This book shows how and why religious diversity can, counterintuitively, become central to nationalist projects.

In particular, by analyzing what I call the "religious heritage assemblage," I trace the different ways in which arguments about religious heritage are mobilized for the articulation of political claims around the nexus of religion and the nation-state. Arguing that, through such arguments, religion acquires new meanings for secular people, I define the "religious heritage assemblage" as the totality of heterogeneous discourses, sites, and practices in which claims to religion as a national culture are articulated, authorized, and institutionalized. I suggest that public discourses and practices of "heritage religion," or *religion as heritage*, pinpoint a novel social form of religion that has emerged as a consequence of both *secularization* and *religious diversification*.

Importantly, regulations regarding religion are often premised on certain understandings of secularity, understood here as the distinction between the religious and nonreligious social spaces, that have been historically shaped through specific histories and experiences of modernity. Therefore, religious diversity challenges not only the legal regulation of religion but also the notions of secularity that underlie them and the ways in which ordinary people are morally, politically, and emotionally invested in them. In fact, in recent social mobilizations, the notion of secularism has been invoked to justify multiple ends and political projects. First, it has been used to defend the rights of religious minorities and to curb the state's favoritism toward the religious majority (Verkaaik and Arab 2016). Second, it has been declared the moral basis of modern gender equality and feminism as well as the enemy of non-Western religious feminisms (Mahmood 2011). Third, it has been deployed in nationalist

mobilizations to make claims to cultural superiority, to assert the incompatibility of (non-Western) immigrants' religiosities and cultural norms with Western modernity, and to portray Muslims especially as backward, fanatical, and antidemocratic (Schuh, Burchardt, and Wohlrab-Sahr 2012; Mepschen, Duyvendak, and Tonkens 2010).

Going to the heart of these debates, this book explores how Western nation-states govern religious diversity and asks how ideas of nationhood and secularity influence regulatory practices of religion and are reconfigured in the process. It looks at how religious diversity is understood, negotiated, and defined by national political actors, urban administrations, and ordinary people who actively participate in public contestations. In adopting this focus, I seek to contribute to ongoing sociological and anthropological debates about law, religious freedom, and secularism, while at the same time going beyond existing work to show how religious-secular configurations are shaped *spatially* and *emotionally*. Religious practices and symbols literally *take place*. As a consequence, the presence of diverse religious groups in public spaces becomes contested, whereas state actors' regulatory practices contribute to producing new spatializations of religious diversity. Simultaneously, both religious and secular groups are often deeply emotionally invested in their particular conceptions of public space and society. I am interested in how these sensibilities shape people's activism and views and how regulations regarding religion issued by state actors either authorize or ignore them.

IMMIGRATION AND RELIGION IN QUEBEC AND CATALONIA

In raising a broad set of questions about religious diversity and secularism as administrative and regulatory practices, epistemic categories, and normative discourses that are important for most contemporary Western societies, I employ a northern transatlantic comparison by focusing on two geographical settings: the Spanish region of Catalonia and Canada's Quebec province. While both received continuous flows of immigrants during much of the twentieth century and even before, the bulk of the earlier immigration consisted of Europeans who, with the important exception of Jews, were mostly Christian. As a result, these migrants affected the religious makeup of the populations by adding new confessions and changing the confessional mix, but did not introduce "deep" religious difference.

However, the more recent waves of labor migrants arrived from a culturally much more diverse set of countries of origin. In Quebec, while most of the immigration of earlier periods hailed from Portugal, Greece, Italy, and eastern Europe, today many immigrants are North Africans, Haitians, and South and Southeast Asians (Rousseau 2012). Similarly, in Catalonia, whereas earlier migrants

were mainly Spaniards from other regions of Spain, since the beginning of the twenty-first century the majority of migrants have come from Romania, Bulgaria, Pakistan, India, Morocco, and Nigeria as well as from all over Latin America. Since many of these migrants are not Christians, religious differences have become much more visible. Indeed, as I show throughout the book, these differences are central to negotiations over citizenship, nationhood, and cultural diversity. Even within Christianity, cultural and religious differences have become more pronounced as Christian immigrants belong to a hugely diverse field, ranging from Coptic Christianity and Filipino Catholicism to Romanian Orthodoxy and African Pentecostalism. All of these groups have their own styles of worship, notions of belonging, and ideologies of public presence, and they all differ from the established and inherited versions of Catholicism that have shaped the cultural landscapes of both regions over long periods of history.

However, during the same period the inherited religiosities of original Catholic populations have declined dramatically, giving rise to secular worldviews and new spiritualities. In Quebec, those who participate in the Catholic mass at least once a month fell from 51 percent of the population in 1975 to 24 percent in 2005. Within less than fifty years, Quebec had turned from a "priest-ridden province," as a well-known saying had it, into a hotbed of secularization and a nation with an expressly secular self-understanding. Intriguingly, however, those who considered themselves Catholic fell only from 83.9 percent of the population in 1971 to 83.5 percent in 2001.[3] In Catalonia, practicing Catholics dropped from 33.8 percent of the population in 1980 to 18.7 percent in 2007, while the proportion of those identifying as Catholic went from 68.8 percent in 1996 to 52.1 percent in 2014.[4] Because of the history of Catholic domination and subsequent secularization, which is shared by both Quebeckers and Catalans, Catholicism *and* secularism are cultural elements that are woven, to varying degrees, into the textures of collective memory and national identity among both Catalans and Quebeckers.[5]

More importantly still, because of the shared situation of being *nations without states*,[6] both regions constantly wrestle with the twin pressures of having to defend their sense of national cohesion vis-à-vis a dominant larger state (Canada and Spain) on the one hand, and migrant communities whose allegiance to the Catalan or Quebecker community and to the collective national project appears uncertain to them on the other. There are thus striking typological similarities between both nations that warrant this comparison.[7]

At the same time, however, there is an empirical puzzle that animates this study. While the Quebec and Catalan societies took very similar pathways through modernity from the 1960s to the 1990s, throughout the last two decades their respective understandings of religious diversity have differed dramatically. In Quebec, largely from the 1990s onward, political parties, secular activists, feminists, and other social groups have engaged in numerous institutional

attempts to push religion out of the public sphere and to deepen its secular nature.

One of the last of these attempts crystallized around the so-called Charter of Quebec Values that the nationalist Parti Québécois launched in September 2013 as a central element of its electoral campaign in the run-up to the provincial elections. As two of its key elements, the charter implied the banning of all ostentatious religious symbols for public-sector employees and the introduction of the principle of *laïcité* into the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The proposal for the Charter of Quebec Values sparked a massive public debate not only in the mass media and at numerous street demonstrations and intellectual conferences but also among people in their everyday lives. Family members began to discuss laïcité over breakfast, and groups of friends debated it over drinks in Montreal bars. Colleagues at work, not least at the university, were split over the question of whether the proposal was xenophobic or racist, as those in the "pluralist camp" tended to think, or a solid foundation for a secular and egalitarian public sphere and more suited to Quebec's culture, as "republicans" and "sovereignists" saw it. Even after the Liberal Party government passed the so-called Religious Neutrality Bill, which prohibits face covering when giving or receiving public services, in October 2017, secularism remained a major issue of public debate. This has been especially so since the landslide victory of the Coalition Avenir Québec, a political party that was founded only in 2011, in the general elections of October 2018. According to the party's electoral campaign, the passing of the Charter of Secularism and the banning of religious symbols for all individuals who wield coercive state power are central elements of its political agenda.

In Catalonia as well, religious diversity and secularism were debated and became subject to regulatory practices—but in different ways. Over the past twenty years the Catalan government has successfully claimed greater competences over religious affairs over and against the central government in Madrid. It did so, however, not to create a more neutral and uniform public sphere. On the contrary, the government effectively began to engage in a series of policies geared toward the promotion of religious diversity and the incorporation of religious minorities into the public sphere. In 2000 the government established the Secretariat of Religious Affairs, and in 2005 it signed agreements with religious minorities that officially recognized their presence and positive contribution to Catalan society. In addition, the secretariat developed guidelines for the accommodation of minority practices with regard to religious observances and pastoral care in prisons, hospitals, schools, and cemeteries.[8] While this was in many ways a top-down, elite-driven process, issues of religious diversity played a considerably smaller role in ordinary people's concerns over Catalan nationhood, despite the fact that the project of national independence, known as the Catalan Process, gained massive political and popular traction during the same period. The point

I wish to drive home with these observations is that the nexus between nation building, migration, and religious diversity appeared to acquire an entirely different configuration when compared to Quebec.

Importantly, while in Quebec a referendum on independence has been wiped from the political agenda and Quebeckers' support for separatist nationalism has waned over the years, in Catalonia nationalist politics have led to massive political turmoil especially since 2017. On June 9, 2017, new president Carles Puigdemont announced that an independence referendum would be held on October 1, a plan that the Catalan parliament approved after an eleven-hour session on September 6. While in response to that Spain's constitutional court decided to suspend the Catalan parliament the following day, the Catalan government remained determined to go ahead with its plans. In an increasingly heated political situation, the Spanish government dispatched thousands of police to Catalonia to effectively block any activities linked to the referendum. In this context, the police also arrested fourteen Catalan government officials and seized ten million ballots prepared for the vote. The referendum finally took place. Carles Puigdemont escaped into exile in Belgium on October 29, and nine hundred people were injured through violent attempts to hinder the voting on the part of the police. According to the Catalan government 90 percent of Catalans voted in favor of independence, while turnout was 43 percent. Because of the chaotic political circumstances, the result failed to acquire any international recognition. In 2018 popular support for national independence regained strength and was estimated at 48 percent.[9]

This is not to say that the incorporation of minority religions into Catalonia's social and institutional fabric went completely smoothly. As I will discuss in more detail in subsequent chapters, debates over the establishment of places of worship as well as the Islamic face veil turned into sites of powerful political contestation.[10] But often these contestations resonated with local situations and rarely reached the national level, despite their visible accumulation. When they did, national-level political action usually managed to *quell* such conflicts, whereas in Quebec the spatial and political scaling up of controversies typically has had the effect of *intensifying* conflict dynamics. In 2009 the Catalan government passed a new Law on Centers of Worship, designed expressly as a political response to local conflicts around the construction of mosques and meant to provide a solid legal framework for the establishment of religious places for newly arriving migrant communities and to offer urban administrations clear guidelines for action. Thus the question is, what explains the different ways in which concerns over religion become central to national politics in the age of intensified transnational migration and diversity?

My answer to this question is framed by the concepts of nationhood and secularism. Nationhood is linked to religious diversity in three ways. First, states have often treated religious difference as undermining national unity and cultural

uniformity in processes of nation-state formation. Historically the solutions to this scenario have been enforced religious homogenization or the radical secularist exclusion of religion from political life and nationalism. Second, religious diversity is often viewed as creating conflicting loyalties, especially when the commitments of members of religious minorities to their religious identities are weighed against their loyalty to the nation, and the former supersedes the latter. The submission of Catholics to the Vatican was regarded with suspicion well into the twentieth century in majority Protestant nation-states, just as Muslims' loyalty to Western nations is often called into question today. Third, religious diversity renders problematic the close ties between notions of national belonging and the majority religion as well as the ways in which these ties are enacted through rituals and symbols. In other words, whether or not the symbols and rituals of the nation and of the majority religion are identical or mutually infused affects the scope and modality of religious diversity and may in fact severely circumscribe it.

RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND IMMIGRATION IN STATELESS NATIONS

To approach questions of religious diversity through a comparative analysis of two nations without states, as I do in this book, means analyzing how ongoing nationalist mobilizations intent on defining the *demos* do or do not draw on religion as a cultural marker in the context of diversifying populations. Thus, while this book is animated by debates about religious diversity that are relevant to most contemporary North Atlantic societies, it develops its arguments from empirical material gathered in very particular constellations of nation building.

Stateless nations have one major factor in common: they have no sovereign power either internally or externally. They are thus dependent on the larger nation-states of which they are part and have to ensure that their own policy making conforms with national regulations. Otherwise, they will face severe intervention by the judicial and security apparatus, as happened in 2017 when the Spanish state deployed thousands of police officers in Catalonia in response to the announcement of a referendum on Catalonia's independence, which it deemed unconstitutional, and arrested dozens of high-ranking politicians and civil society leaders. Stateless nations thus lack the wherewithal to fully control the symbolic reproduction of the national community as they see fit. Guibernau (1999: 1) defined stateless nations as "cultural communities sharing a common past, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, and wishing to decide upon their political future which lack a state of their own." For long historical periods, this structural situation has given rise to powerful, widespread, and deeply rooted sentiments of *cultural anxiety*. Grillo (2003: 158) suggested that "neither cultural essentialism nor cultural anxiety are new (19th-century Romanticism and 20th-century

anticolonialism *inter alia* articulated the latter), but they now seem ubiquitous, and take many guises, permeating much contemporary political and media rhetoric in Europe among both 'majority' and 'minority' populations, and across political and religious spectra."

In stateless nations, however, the question of who is the majority and who is a minority is constitutively ambiguous: while, in broad cultural and linguistic terms, Catalans and Quebeckers are majorities within their own region or province, which territorializes nationhood and belonging, they are minorities with respect to the sovereign nation-states of which they are a part, namely Spain and Canada. In stateless nations, concerns over migration-driven religious diversity are therefore inextricably bound up with "the national question," however this is framed by and within different political factions. And if *cultural anxiety*, as Grillo has argued, has animated public sentiment and shaped political practice in *independent* Western nation-states, it seems particularly pertinent to ask what kinds of expressions and degrees it acquires in *dependent* nations in similar situations of religious diversification. Moreover, the very fact that religious diversification does produce cultural anxiety in many Western societies suggests that the cultural significance of religion for concepts of nationhood is greater than secularization theories have conceded and that both evolve in tandem (see also Hervieu-Léger 1993; Bruce 2002).

Finally, the comparison between Quebec and Catalonia is useful since it is apt to unsettle the dominant sociological narrative regarding differences in the perceptions and regulations of religious diversity between North America and Europe. It is a scholarly commonplace that Americans and Canadians are both more religious and more tolerant of religious diversity as a result of the absence of deeply rooted "established" churches and that secularism as a concept lacks cultural resonance in North American societies.[11] However, recent research has shown that U.S. and Canadian religiosities are, on the whole, losing their intensity (Voas and Chaves 2016; Chaves 2017; Hay 2013) and that both organized and nonorganized secularisms are more articulated and culturally rooted than was formerly assumed (Smith 2017; Cragun, Fazzino, and Manning 2017; Blankholm 2014). Comparisons between Quebec and Catalonia add to the blurring of the sharp contrast between North America and Europe by putting at the center a North American society in which secularism is not only politically heavily contested but also a yardstick of national identity as well as a European society that prides itself on religious diversity. The comparison points to the need for a more nuanced understanding of secularism as well as the value of a qualitative, bottom-up approach.

Answering the questions raised above, this book makes two arguments, one theoretical and one empirical-comparative. The theoretical argument is that secularism and secularity do not necessarily curb religious practices but may shape them according to multiple, historically grounded logics that have arisen out of

nationally specific experiences of modernity. I develop this argument in more detail in the next chapter. The empirical-comparative argument is that the impact of concepts of nationhood on the governance of religious diversity depends on the dominant narratives of modernity, the impact of secularization on the religion-nation nexus, and national boundary work. What enabled religious diversity to become a dominant state discourse in Catalonia is the relatively marginal role of Catholicism in contemporary nationalist mobilizations. In Quebec, on the contrary, secularism and Catholicism are both central to the nation-building project, chiefly because both are defined as the majority's cultural heritage. As a result, migration-driven religious diversity is to a much greater extent seen as a threat to the Quebec nation and to secularity modeled as a means to achieve greater national unity, while the legal and political measures proposed to enact this secularity often conflict with the religious commitments of members of minorities. In both cases, the cultural narratives that legitimize regimes of religious diversity reflect the particular historical trajectories of stateless nations and the dominant collective memories of the dominant nation-state's influence on them. Among Quebeckers, this cultural narrative is built around the myths of "survival" and underdevelopment in a colonial situation and of hard-earned liberation and modernity as well as being forced by the Canadian government into the straitjacket of multiculturalism, which degrades Quebec's status as a founding nation and undermines Quebec's national cohesion. Among Catalans, by contrast, the narrative involves the notion of cultural and economic progress and superiority and of having been forced into the straitjacket of conservative Catholic culture through Spanish domination.

Two caveats related to the conceptual frame of this book are particularly important. In conceptualizing Quebec and Catalonia as stateless nations or nation-building projects, I do not intend to downplay, ignore, or dismiss the positions and views of those who do not share in nationalist political aspirations or are, silently or openly, opposed to them. In fact, large segments of the populations of both Quebec and Catalonia do not favor full national sovereignty. In Quebec, public support for separatist agendas has been diminishing more or less continuously over the last decades. In Catalonia, support is on average higher than in Quebec, but here as well nationalist campaigners have struggled to shift the majority opinion toward separatism and have been only partially successful at that. In addition, there is a whole variety of nationalisms in both settings, defined by their social and economic basis, cultural agenda, and political orientation, and the option of national separation is differentially valorized within these various camps. And yet it is surely true that most citizens in both settings are committed to *some kind of* nationalism. Given the internal fragmentation of nationalism and the lack of consensus over separatist agendas, it seems even more intriguing that, as I will show, political contestations around secularism and religious diversity have in fact been dominated to considerable degrees by nationalist mobilizations.

Furthermore, in conceptualizing Quebec and Catalonia as minority nations or stateless nations, I do not intend to treat them as national containers neatly separated from their surrounding national environments. In fact, Quebeckers and Catalans entertain multiple and deeply rooted relationships with Canada and Spain. In political life, in economic and business affairs, and in virtually all other institutional domains, Quebec and Canada are deeply entangled, as are Catalonia and Spain. Many Quebeckers are proud of their Canadian heritage, and many Catalans see Catalonia as a part of Spain. These entanglements cannot be ignored, as in many ways they work to smooth the edges of nationalist boundary constructions. However, given these institutional entanglements, it appears even more interesting, and worthy of explanation, that with regard to the regulation of migration, religious diversity, and secularism, separate institutional pathways did actually develop.

In general, this book focuses on the cultural and legal dynamics of religious diversity and secularism since the 1990s. However, the cultural and narrative resources involved, including the very symbols, tropes, and myths that political actors are able to marshal and mobilize in justifying laws affecting religious diversity, have emerged from the histories of nation building that have developed in particular directions since the mid-nineteenth century. These cultural resources ground the ability of states to authorize particular notions of national history, national belonging, and citizenship and therefore require some elaboration.

In this historical context, anticlericalism played an important role as a feature of modern nation building vis-à-vis Catholic ancien régimes. Extremely close ties between Church and secular authority, as in both caesaropapist and theocratic regimes, often implied that liberal political opposition was anticlerical. This role of anticlericalism has been addressed in some of the literature on secularization (Martin 1978; Kuru 2009), but the impacts of the different national legacies of anticlericalism on contemporary regimes of religious diversity are usually overlooked. Nonetheless they matter in particular immigration societies such as Quebec and Catalonia. In what follows, therefore, I trace the uneven pathways of anticlericalism, declining in Catalonia but rising in Quebec, and their bearing on secularism and religious diversity.

COMPARING HISTORICAL TRAJECTORIES: RELIGIOUS HEGEMONIES, ANTICLERICALISM, AND NATIONALISM

Catholicism is curiously marginalized in currently dominant notions of Catalan nationhood, despite its unquestioned importance in the modern formulation of Catalan nationalism in the nineteenth century and its revival in the decades following the Second World War. But what enabled the rise of the accommodating model of secularity in respect to religious diversity, despite the history of

widespread anticlericalism and the extremely violent clashes between anticlerical and pro-Catholic forces up to and during the Spanish Civil War? How and why, on the contrary, did secularism acquire such far-reaching cultural force and political traction in contemporary Quebec as an element of national identity, despite the relatively marginal position that anticlerical and secularist sentiment occupied in Quebec society until the 1950s and 1960s?

Catalonia

The Birth of a Nation. Catalonia was integrated into the Spanish Bourbon Monarchy in the context of regional power struggles.[12] With the ending of the Spanish War of Succession in 1714, it fell under Spanish rule, as a consequence of which Catalan was abolished as an official language. The war ended with the Siege of Barcelona from March 1713 to September 11, 1714. The violence linked to the siege is stored in Catalan collective memory, September 11 being a national holiday. During the second half of the nineteenth century, however, Catalonia experienced a strong wave of industrialization. In the wake of the general boost to Catalan self-esteem, and inspired by the broader romantic nationalist revival that occurred in Europe during that period, Catalan nationalism was revamped and transformed into a modern intellectual project, later becoming a political project.[13] Works like Valentí Almirall i Llozer's *Lo Catalanisme*, Victor Balaguer's *Historia de Cataluña y de la Corona de Aragón*, and Prat de la Riba's *La nacionalitat catalana* became powerful testaments to this new nationalism, drawing on history to provide evidence for Catalonia's nationalist ambitions. While some authors, such as Prat de la Riba, became proponents of secularist nationalism, some Catalan bishops contributed to the formulation of conservative Catholic nationalism. Torras i Bages's *La tradició catalana*, written in 1892, became an important symbol of this strand. His motto, "Catalonia will be Christian, or it will not be," epitomized the idea of inherent connections between religion and nation.

One major cultural arena in which Catholicism became significant for modern Catalan nationalism was the reasserted use of the Catalan language in religious contexts. During the second half of the nineteenth century important Church documents started to be written in Catalan, and the use of the language by bishops and others in the upper echelons of the Catholic hierarchy especially reinforced the legitimacy of the nationalist project and became a widely acknowledged symbol of Catholic nationalism. The moment that initiated this process was the celebration of the thousand-year history of the monastery of Montserrat in 1880.

Despite the ways in which Catholicism nurtured and supported modern Catalan nationalism during that period, an important distinction can be drawn here from other forms of religious nationalism, especially from ethno-religious nationalist mobilizations (Tambiah 1997; Juergensmeyer 1993; Ukiwo 2003).[14]

In the Catalan case, Catholic nationalism involved the identification of the Church with the nationalist cause, but, unlike post-Reconquista Spain or Polish nationalism (Zubrzycki 2009), it does not equate religious persuasion with national belonging nor render the latter dependent on the former. While it is clear that the strength of Catholic involvement in the national project may have been perceived negatively by religious minorities or dissenters, the kind of religious exclusivism that was a dominant pattern in Europe during the Westphalian "confessional age" was not its main thrust.[15]

As we shall see throughout this book, one major reason for this lies in the structural situation of Spain's definition as a Catholic nation. If the Catalan, as any other, nation-building project was about drawing symbolic boundaries around the national collective subject and demarcating cultural difference, Catholicism could not serve this purpose, as it was the major element in the self-definition of Spain as its opposite. In fact, in the course of the twentieth century, the boundary work that came to define Catalan nationalism developed in the opposite direction, namely by acknowledging but also deriding Spain's claims to its Catholic identity and by postulating Catalonia as a cosmopolitan, secular nation (Guibernau 2004: 4). In organizational terms as well, there were limits to Catholic involvement in Catalan nationalism, chiefly because the Catalan Church was and is part of the Spanish Catholic hierarchy. And since, during much of the nineteenth century and again during Franco's dictatorship, the latter was closely tied to the Spanish state, it is difficult to see how an autonomous Catalan Catholic nationalism could have stabilized. It was this structural situation that favored the consolidation of secular nationalism in the longer run.

Significantly, the contrast between ethno-religious nationalism and the major elements of Catholic nationalism as they developed during the late nineteenth century was reproduced during the period of the revival of Catalan nationalism following the Second World War and again in the contemporary moment. First, while under Franco use of the Catalan language was forcefully suppressed and criminalized, the Church used its comparatively privileged position as a public institution to reintroduce Catalan in religious writings, communications, and church services. It was actually the only institution in which Catalan could be used legally until the 1960s (Dowling 2012: 598). In great part in negotiations with Franco's political authorities, the Catalan clergy emphasized the need to use the Catalan language as a strategy against the increasing secularization of urban populations that was becoming more and more visible. In other words, its use was part of an attempt to stabilize religious participation and to ensure that the more strongly Catholic sections of the population were not being alienated from the Church because of the Spanish language. Second, Montserrat again became a symbol of the Catalanization of Catholicism.

Significantly, in recent years the notion of Catalanization has powerfully reemerged, but now it targets religious minorities. It describes not only campaigns

to improve the linguistic skills of religious leaders and the use of Catalan in minority religious services, but more generally the efforts of state administrations to secure the commitment of religious minorities to the Catalan national project. Catalanization is thus a vital element of what I call the governmentality of religious diversity. Significantly, however, the similarities and conceptual continuities between the historical Catalanizations of Catholicism and those directed at religious minorities in the current era have largely escaped scholarly attention. In order to render these continuities intelligible, it is important to understand how two further elements—anticlericalism and secularization—first fostered but eventually also undermined the role of Catholicism for Catalan nationalism.

The Rise and Fall of Catalan Anticlericalism. During the nineteenth century, Spain witnessed a series of liberal revolutions and subsequent monarchist restorations. Each of these revolutions was tied to expropriations of Church property and some, albeit sometimes only modest, attempts to liberate state authority from Church influences. As a result of successful restorations, Catholicism as the supreme marker of Spanish national identity was affirmed and religious freedom rendered unconstitutional. In the context of these political upheavals, anticlericalism emerged as a bourgeois liberal ideology and a popular, usually violent practice. The clergy were portrayed as lazy and corrupt (Thomas 2013), and democrats, radical progressives, and small groups of Protestants began to demand freedom of religion. For a short period following the revolution of 1868—according to the historian Dittrich an "essentially anticlerical revolution" (2014: 98)—and the establishment of the First Republic, these demands reached the center of political power. Most subsequent projects of legal and constitutional change responded, in one way or another, to the demands of the Church's critics, and anticlericalism began to take root socially beyond the small literary circles that had hitherto characterized it. Anticlericalists were increasingly concerned with reorganizing the relationships between church and state, and they began to work out laicist conceptions of society, taking their inspiration from France. Revolutionary urban councils declared freedom of religion and cultic practices in public spaces, banned Catholic orders, expelled Jesuit groups, introduced civil marriage, and tore down churches and convents (Dittrich 2014: 99). Other currents of anticlericalism, by contrast, worked toward the suppression of religious expressions per se. Especially following the announcement of the Republic in 1873 and ensuing local clashes between anticlericalists and the clergy, local anticlerical forces initiated the closure of religious buildings and imposed general bans on religious worship.

Anticlerical feelings and violence famously climaxed following the proclamation of the Spanish Second Republic in 1931. This began with the burning of eleven convents in Madrid the same year and reached a fever pitch with a right-

wing military coup and the ensuing Civil War during which almost seven thousand nuns, priests, and monks were killed (Thomas 2013: 74). These currents also found tremendous expressions in Catalonia, where Catholic clerics were persecuted, despite the fact that the Catholic Church was sympathetic toward Catalan national emancipation (Delgado 1992: 43). In fact, Catalonia has witnessed the most violent clerical-anticlerical confrontations in modern European history (Dowling 2012; Delgado 1992). The increasing anticlerical mobilizations of the second half of the nineteenth century first culminated in the *setmana tràgica* (Tragic Week) of 1909. Protesting against a conscription campaign by the Spanish army, Barcelona's working classes directed their anger not only against the military and industrialists but also against the Catholic Church, which was seen as their ally. As a part of their protest, insurgents burned convents and profaned sepulchers. In the context of the Spanish Civil War, 30 percent of all Catholic priests in Catalonia were killed, and more than one-third of the approximately seven thousand assassinations of clerics that occurred during the war (Delgado 1992: 36) took place in Catalonia. More than four thousand churches and monasteries were torched, burned, and torn to the ground, and in many cities or city quarters the material heritage of Catholicism was literally eradicated (Dowling 2012: 595).

Catalan anticlericalism did have one major consequence for the dynamics of nationalism, namely feeding into the stereotyping of Catalonia as more secular, progressive, and cosmopolitan—in other words, as more modern. Spain, by contrast, was seen as Catholic, more religious, and more traditional. Importantly, during this period antireligious sentiment and action did not target religious minorities such as Protestants, which can probably be explained by their numerical insignificance. Overall, the tremendous extent to which large sections of the Catalan population were ready, throughout long periods of history, to blame Catholicism and its clergy for all kinds of undesirable events or developments would lead us to expect that, in the democratic period, they would have favored a type of secularity that is radically opposed to the strong presence of religion in the public sphere. In reality, however, during the last three decades there has been a shift from a progressivist discourse on secularity toward secularity for the sake of balancing religious diversity.

Two processes have pushed this development. First, after the Second World War Catalan anticlericalism slowly lost its social power. This was partly because of the more liberal image Catholicism acquired through the reforms of the Second Vatican Council, partly because the Catholic Church had an important interim role in reviving Catalan nationalism during Franco's dictatorship, which softened working-class opposition to Catholicism, and partly because of accelerating processes of secularization. The weakening of the Catholic/anticlerical divide as the major cleavage organizing political and cultural identities in Catalonia was a precondition for the rise of a new national narrative in which religious

diversity easily coexists with, and even highlights, national unity (see also Griera 2012).

Second, while in many societies, including Quebec, historical conflicts around secularism are stored in collective memories and continue to shape contemporary religious politics, this is not the case in Catalonia. The chief reason is that critical engagements with Catalonia's violent past have been discouraged or outlawed in the name of a peaceful transition to democracy. While this is true of both Spain and Catalonia, in the Catalan context the ensuing collective amnesia was especially nurtured by the ambivalent role of the clergy as both the perpetrators and the victims of violence during the Civil War, leading to far-reaching public silence about the role of the Catholic Church during the subsequent Franco dictatorship. There is a distinct dynamic around collective amnesia among Catalonia's Catholic-oriented bourgeoisie. During the Civil War the conservative Catalan bourgeoisie were attacked from two sides: as conservative Catholics by Republican forces and as Catalans by Spanish nationalists. In the absence of unquestionably positive points of reference in history, and in the absence of memories to be mobilized on behalf of projects of secularism, Catalans later oriented themselves toward international society and the models of diversity it authorized.[16] In my interviews, Catholic leaders and policy makers both confirmed this finding that the weakness of the collective memory of Catholicism is part of the explanation for Catholicism's absence from Catalan nationalism. As I show next, this contrasts strongly with the story of Quebec.

Quebec

Like Catalonia's experience of Spain's centralizing domination, Quebec has lived under the tutelage of British imperialism and colonialism since its conquest in 1753, later becoming part of independent Canada. At the time of its conquest, Quebec was essentially a rural society and its elites were numerically insignificant. Up until the middle of the twentieth century, French Canadians were, in economic, political, and cultural terms, second-class citizens.[17] Economic assets and political power were concentrated in the hands of the British. Importantly, from the beginning of French colonialism in North America, there was an extremely close relationship between the Catholic Church and the state, and these ties were reinforced after the conquest and throughout Quebec's history through different types of migration.[18] After the conquest, while most officials of the French state and the commercial middle classes left the colony to return to France, the clergy stayed and guided the remaining population into and through their long existence in British bondage (Guindon 1967: 30). Conversely, there were several waves of movement by clergy from France to Quebec following revolutions in 1789, 1830, and 1848 as well as the passing of the secular laws in France in 1905. French clergy pursued and promoted the idea of Quebec as a pristine Catholic nation and thereby contributed to drawing the ties between

Church and nation even closer. Moreover, throughout the whole of the nineteenth century the Quebec clergy was also very loyal to the British Crown because it had observed the fate of the Catholic Church in France during and following the revolution in 1789. Deployed by British colonialism as an instrument of indirect rule, the Catholic Church was the dominant social institution in rural Quebec.

However, during the early 1800s Quebec elites began to formulate nationalist political visions and, inspired by political ideas from France and the United States, formed the Parti Canadien and the Parti Patriote (Zubrzycki 2016: 39). During the 1830s these elites engaged in political uprisings known as the Patriots' Rebellion,[19] which spanned several years and involved political declarations, acts of civil resistance against British rule, and armed insurrections leading to violent repression by British forces. The patriots pursued a civic form of nationalism, as they involved not only Frenchmen but also Scots and Englishmen (40). Moreover, in their manifestos they expressly promoted their liberationist project in universalist terms, calling for the equal inclusion of citizens "regardless of faith, language, ethnicity or race, [but] explicitly including aboriginals" (42).

While ending as failures, these rebellions constitute a critical juncture in Kuru's sense (2009) and are historically significant in two ways. First, their failure inaugurated a new historical phase in which the Catholic Church became the supreme carrier of the national project, now redefined in purely ethno-religious terms and cleansed of all emancipatory political content. As the Church was among the most ardent opponents of the Patriots' Rebellion, it proved to be a trustworthy client in the eyes of the British rulers and was perfectly positioned to play an even more prominent role in Quebec society. Second, the Patriots' Rebellion, or rather series of rebellions, became historically influential in that they were successively transformed into a central narrative resource routinely mobilized in contemporary secularist discourses.

Ideologically, more than ever before the Church now explicitly idealized a rural, simple, nonpolitical life as the ultimate realization of French Canadians' destiny and preached political subordination to British rule. At the same time, the Catholic Church remained antagonistic to British settlers and all kinds of immigrants who in their view "threatened the very fabric of the traditional rural and Catholic French Canadian society as well as the ability of the francophone professional middle class and clerical leaders to retain effective control over that society" (Behiels 1991: 6). Through this strategy, French Canadians were effectively discursively separated from other ethnic groups, locked away in a path of separate development, or what in the eyes of most contemporary observers in fact appeared to be a lack of any development. For this reason, Zubrzycki (2016: 53) calls the period between the end of the Patriots' Rebellion and the death of Maurice Duplessis (1837–1959) "the long nineteenth century," in which clerical nationalism based on the Catholic faith, language, rural ideology, and natalism

was enshrined in Catholic institutional apparatuses that effectively formed a "crypto-state" (45) and in which nationalism took a fundamentally ethno-religious turn (Breton 1988).

In the early twentieth century, the increasing urbanization, industrialization, and proletarianization of rural French Canadians were paralleled by renewed attempts to liberalize French Canadian society. However, the Church retained its powerful position well into the 1960s. An economic depression in the late 1920s led to the semiauthoritarian Union Nationale regime of Duplessis, which repressed civil and political liberties and defended Catholic traditionalism, both in the name of anticommunism.

It was in this context that Quebec nationalism became the main source and political instrument of emancipation and liberation. The death of Duplessis in 1959 ushered in a process of dramatic modernization, since described as the Quiet Revolution, a notion that occupies a dominant position in Quebec's collective memory today and that has itself turned into a powerful myth (Bouchard 2005, 2013; Létourneau 1997). Significantly, in order to understand the historical significance of the Quiet Revolution, I argue that it must be analyzed as both a critical juncture and a myth.

The Quiet Revolution and the Rise of Anticlericalism. The Quiet Revolution signaled the end of defensive, traditionalist French Canadian society and gave rise to a new set of political and social actors with new ideologies. Following the Quiet Revolution, traditionalist, Catholic ethnic nationalism was replaced by leftist, modern secular nationalism, which became the seedbed of the independence movement. It signaled the end of the ancien régime,[20] the massive acceleration of urbanization and industrialization, the building of a modern bureaucratic welfare state, far-reaching reforms in education, health care, and social welfare, and the nationalization and industrial development of hydroelectric power generation, which became the infrastructural nation-building project par excellence. Significantly, state formation implied the diminishing influence of the Church and clergy, who had hitherto controlled health care and from whose ranks most teachers had been recruited (Guindon 1967). The Quebec state was transformed into a developmental state with a grand vision to transform Quebec into a modern industrial and consumer society and catapult Quebec society into political and cultural modernity.

Two clusters of political reform are particularly important in forming the historical contexts of contemporary concerns over religious diversity: education and immigration. In 1964, for the first time since the curtailing of former church privileges, the government created a Ministry of Education to merge diverse schooling systems into one uniform apparatus. Significantly, this implied the deconfessionalization of schooling, that is, the dismantling of separate Catholic and Protestant structures, which many see as having been one of the most salient

expressions of the Quiet Revolution (Baum 2000; Martínez-Ariño and Lefebvre 2016: 24). Necessitated by the adoption of the Charter of the French Language of 1977, in 1997 school boards began to be organized along linguistic instead of confessional lines, while Bill 118 put an end to all confessional structures in the Ministry of Education as well. Eventually, in the realm of religious education, the introduction of a mandatory course titled "Ethics and Religious Culture" in 2008 replaced the earlier programs of Catholic, Protestant, and moral education that had been in place since 1983. All these policy reforms were inspired by a mixture of nationalist and secularist motives and set Quebec firmly on a secular developmental path, as well as contributing to the shaping of education as a distinctly secularist profession in Quebec society.

Roughly during the same historical period—that is, starting with the Quiet Revolution in 1959—Quebec also developed its own political capacities and legal competences in the realm of immigration. The crafting of immigration policies was construed as a central part of Quebec's nation-building project and reflected efforts on the part of the emerging state bureaucracies to wrest control over migration matters from the federal government (Blad and Couton 2009; Juteau 2002). In 1968 the government created the Quebec Ministry of Immigration with the triple task of encouraging the settlement of immigrants so that they contributed to Quebec's development, adapting immigrants to Quebecois culture, and preserving immigrants' own ethnic cultures (Barker 2010: 20). The main concerns behind these initiatives were fears over the dwindling birth rate and demographic decline among Francophones as well as anxieties that immigrants would tend to integrate into Anglophone rather than Francophone society unless appropriate measures were taken. Central to these measures was the privileging of immigrants from French-speaking societies, for example, in North and West Africa and Haiti. Under the Couture-Cullen Agreement of 1978 and the 1991 Canada-Quebec Accord, Quebec was granted the right to determine immigration selection criteria and to define its own objectives regarding the composition and volume of immigration to Quebec. By the late 1990s more than 40 percent of immigrants already had knowledge of the French language upon arrival and primarily hailed from France, Lebanon, Morocco, Algeria, Haiti, and Romania, this figure rising to 70 percent by 2007 (Barker 2010: 24). While these immigration policies clearly helped to homogenize Quebec linguistically, to strengthen the French language as a marker of national identity and to foster the notion of "*Québécois* citizenship" (Juteau 2002: 447), they also inadvertently contributed to diversifying Quebec society in religious terms, as many immigrants were Muslim or belonged to Christian traditions other than Catholicism.

The Quiet Revolution as Myth and Memory. With hindsight, throughout the 1950s and early 1960s the Duplessis regime was interpreted as the *grande noirceur*, that is, as a historical period defined by social and political repression, foreign control

of the economy, a continuing state-of-siege mentality, and anticommunism. Intensifying industrialization and a trade union backlash against Duplessis's anticommunism measures, especially the infamous Padlock Law of 1937, also explain the leftward turn of nationalist mobilizations during the 1960s. Parts of Quebec's left strongly identified with other modernist nationalist movements that were leading anticolonial struggles for independence.[21] This identification was made possible through the construction of Quebeckers as an essentially colonized if not enslaved people, as powerfully illustrated in Pierre Valliere's controversial pamphlet *Les Nègres blancs d'Amérique* (White Niggers of North America), published in 1968.

The discursive imbrications of colonialism and the need for liberation with notions of Catholic backwardness had already been addressed in the manifesto *Refus Global* (Total Refusal), published on August 9, 1948, by the vanguard art collective Les Automatistes under the leadership of the painter Paul-Emile Borduas. The text is shot through with accusations against the Catholic Church and Catholic culture as chiefly responsible for Quebeckers' repression. In the context of a broad interpretation of Quebec history, it states, "We are a small and humble people clutching the skirts of priests who've become sole guardians of faith, knowledge, truth and our national heritage; and we have been shielded from the perilous evolution of thought going on all around us, as our well-intentioned but misguided educators distorted the great facts of history whenever they found it impractical to keep us totally ignorant" (Borduas 2009 [1948]: 3). Even though the group had contacts with the Christian left and communists in Montreal and participated in political and cultural discourses, its main aims were artistic and intellectual innovation. Since then, however, the *Automatistes* have increasingly been seen as actors in the Quiet Revolution, and in current public debates around secularism and religion in the public sphere *Refus Global* is referenced as the main testimony of cultural liberation. As part of Quebec's collective memory, the manifesto was transformed from an artistic into a secularist document and became another central narrative resource in contemporary secularist discourse.

Historically, these developments all fostered understandings of the *articulation* of laicization and national independence as liberation and set Quebec on a path toward secular progressivism. It is this emphatic notion of secular modernity on which Quebeckers draw when demanding the privatization of religion and a secular public sphere and which circumscribes expressions of religious diversity. In many interviews, secularist activists affirmed that they saw contemporary debates over the Charter of Quebec Values and religious symbols in state institutions not as centered on religious diversity but as renewed contestations between clerical and liberal forces in society and as reflecting both the chance and the need to *complete* the Quiet Revolution.

While Catalans lack collective memories that could serve to sharpen the religious-secular divide and to politicize religious diversity, Quebeckers demon-

strate profound investments in memory. Strikingly, this is true of both the secularist and the Catholic aspects of collective identity. During the hearings of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, secularists presented memoirs drawing widely on the events described above. Similarly, during the electoral campaigns of the Parti Québécois in 2012, the Charter of Quebec Values was generally justified as completing the Quiet Revolution, remaking cultural narratives of secular nationhood. In order to illustrate this point, it is worth quoting at length from the *Declaration of Intellectuals for Secularism*, released in 2010:

> Secularism is part of the history of Quebec. In Quebec, the defense of secular ideals is not new. . . . The idea of separation of state and church was also included in the Declaration of Independence of 1838 proclaimed by the Patriots. . . . Criticism of the religious yoke then found its way to the heart of the manifesto "Refuse Global," which prefigured the Quiet Revolution. In the 1960s, the secular movement promoted the French language claiming secular public schools. In 1975, Quebec adopted the Charter of Rights and Freedoms that recognizes the freedom of conscience and equality of religions, two essentially secular notions. And recently, the deconfessionalization of school structures was completed. If the idea of a secular state is prior to the Patriots, we cannot say that secularism is a defensive reaction to recently immigrated minority communities. The secularization of public institutions is made in the name of freedom of conscience and pluralism. Efforts to put an end to prayers in municipal assemblies and remove crucifixes from courts, municipal halls and the National Assembly are also based on these principles. In no event shall the rights of minorities be threatened by this secularization; on the contrary, many immigrants who fled authoritarian and theocratic regimes are strong advocates of secularism. Secularism is thus part of the Quebec historical landscape and the recent achievements that characterize it. (*Le Devoir* 2010, my translation)

Obviously for secularists, memory matters. However, while secular modernity usually takes the form of a discourse of rupture, here the focus is on *continuity*. Secularists commonly reject the idea that until the 1960s Quebec was steeped in Catholicism and argue instead that the Patriot rebellions during the 1830s, which were aimed at casting off the shackles of British domination, introduced ideas that were both republican *and* secular. In an interview, a former president of the Mouvement Laïque Québécois affirmed that, before the repression that followed the defeat of the Patriots, the republicans had already installed religiously neutral public schools. Of course such arguments not only echo the centrality of secular schools to laïcité but also are meant to corroborate the idea that Quebec's history was fundamentally distorted by British domination, that Quebec's history is actually one of its gradual emancipation from this distortion, and that Quebec's status as a part of Canada is a continuation of colonial domination

by different means. Secularists see the confessional school system as an extreme manifestation of colonially induced abnormalities and its dismantling as another step in Quebec's emancipation from it (McRoberts 1979). The deconfessionalization of the public school system, like the desired implementation of a more rigid form of secularism more broadly, is therefore understood not only as a logical continuation of the Quiet Revolution, but also in terms of Quebec's emancipation from Canada. Notably, the majority of secularists are also sovereigntists, and in the secularists' collective memory, secularist and nationalist arguments feed into one another. Here, anticlericalism invariably doubles as resistance to British colonial domination, organized, as it was, through the instrumental participation of the Catholic clergy in British colonialism.

As suggested above, national narratives of modernity have implications for the modern governance of religion. In Quebec, because of the peculiar historical position of the Catholic Church, viewed by the dominant discourse as the handmaiden first of British colonialism and then of Duplessis's authoritarian rule and traditionalist nationalism, modernity is primarily viewed as liberation from religion and is therefore associated with hardheaded secularism. Since the Catholic Church cultivated national sentiments in (nonindependentist) traditionalist nationalism, modern post-Duplessis nationalism fashioned itself as distinctly secular and identified itself with feminism, anticolonialism, and other liberation movements. It is this secularist self-understanding that currently provides major narrative resources for responses to religious diversity that favor the exclusion of religious symbols of (almost) all kinds from the public sphere. In the Catalan case, by contrast, it was the gradual emergence of the self-image of Catalonia as a cosmopolitan society undergirded by a secular nationalism less dependent on symbols of Catholic heritage that led to the ascent of religious diversity as a state discourse and the enlistment of religious minorities into the national project. The critical juncture that shaped the conditions for the eventual hegemony of secular nationalism was the Spanish Civil War (1931–1936): the regime of religious diversity crystallized only during the early 1990s. How exactly nationalism and secularism shape the current dynamics around religious diversity is the topic of the subsequent chapters.

THEORETICAL RELEVANCE

As intimated above, I draw on existing theories of secularism and diversity, but I also overturn several of their long-standing assumptions. In general, most scholarly writing assumes that nation-states merely respond to new forms of religious diversity and that in different ways secularism forms the premise of these responses and is subsequently foregrounded as an element or symbol of national political identity. In this book, by contrast, I show how religious diversity has transmogrified into a concept that has begun to circulate through the administrative

landscapes of Western nation-states, thereby traversing multiple political scales and social spaces. In fact, I argue that the idea and concept of religious diversity has become a new political technology of governance, one geared toward categorizing citizens on the basis of their religious identities for administrative purposes. The notion that societies need to be religiously diverse and plural in order to be fully democratic is by now legally and politically engrained.

At the same time, while secularity as the social, temporal, and spatial demarcation of religious spheres is a routine feature in the everyday lives of the majority of Western populations, it is increasingly embattled in judicial spheres and torn between divergent interpretations. But what are the consequences of the rise of *governance through diversity*, of religious diversity as a form of liberal governmentality, for people and their human rights and freedoms as well as for forms of sociality that crosscut lines of religious difference? And why is it that this political technology operates in ways vastly different in societies that are otherwise very similarly positioned in the structures of global capitalism and global governance? I will get back to these questions in the concluding chapter.

METHODOLOGY AND MATERIAL

The findings presented in this book are based on empirical material gathered over a period of five years (2012–2017) through a series of fieldwork visits. During these visits, I carried out qualitative, open-ended interviews with key participants in public debates in Catalonia and Quebec. These included human rights activists, legal experts, politicians, bureaucrats working in national or urban administrations, secularists, feminist activists, leaders and members of religious communities, and organizers of interfaith activities. In addition, I collected documents such as legal texts, policy papers, and press articles and conducted participant observation in key events related to the politics of religious diversity, such as public demonstrations, marches and rallies, as well as the meetings of secularist organizations.

In general, my analysis is anchored in the triangulation of the data. Thus, for instance, I interpreted laws and policies in order to understand what type of secularity they manifested, but I also looked at how urban bureaucrats interpreted these laws and policies and at the concrete outcomes these interpretations engendered for local religious groups. I asked secularist activists about their motivations and activities, but I also observed how their stories and identity narratives played out in practice. It was this triangulation of data that allowed me to penetrate the surface of official discourses and to unpack public stereotypes and scholarly commonplaces.

OUTLINE OF THE BOOK

The remainder of this book traces contestations over religious diversity in a comparative fashion through a range of different ethnographic sites at different regulatory scales in five chapters. Each chapter is characterized by its own theoretical emphasis and combination of data.

Chapter 1 develops further the book's broader theoretical framework. I argue that religious diversity, contrary to its descriptive uses, is both a fundamental dimension of cultural difference in Bourdieu's sense *and* a political-epistemic and administrative category through which states observe societies, render populations legible, and contribute to configuring their cultural allegiances. In addition, after critically engaging with mainstream theories of secularism, especially Asad's genealogical approach and Habermas's notion of post-secular society, I suggest that the notion of *multiple secularities* is the most useful theoretical concept for comparative cultural sociology.

In chapter 2 I trace a range of interactions between policy makers, members of religious communities, courts of law, and human rights activist groups, as well the public debates surrounding them, in order to explore how they have changed the regulatory practices that govern religion nationally. The analysis shows how national boundary work and discourses of national distinctiveness shape lawmaking and notions of secularity. It also shows that secularity is not a culturally vacuous modular form, as some have argued (Mahmood 2015), but that there are multiple logics of secularity.

Chapter 3 uses a *spatial* lens in order to demonstrate that religious diversity is not only regulated by law but also shaped by a wide range of different administrative practices and infrastructural formations. Here, I look at how the notion of religious diversity becomes part of a spatial politics in the context of urban planning, decision making around places of worship, and the use of public spaces for religious ceremonies and festivals. I argue that on the urban level states have proceeded to convert the administrative apparatus of licensing and approval that exists around urban planning into a central political technology of the spatial governance of religion. This technology works through the very materiality of urban space and is at the same time constrained by it.

Chapter 4 also explores the dynamics of religious diversity in urban space but focuses on contestations around one specific religious symbol that many see as an extreme form of religious commitment: the face veil (burqa, niqab) worn by Muslim women. Over the last decade the face veil has become the target of intense, often hyperbolic public debate and regulatory effort in many societies. In this chapter I explain the rise of these efforts by focusing on the variety of cultural and political meanings attached to the face veil by diverse actors, the ways in which they acquire resonance and political traction in public discourse, and especially the emotional investments that animate regulatory activism. The

affective dimension of these debates shows that the politicization of the face veil has sparked broader reflections about the unwritten norms that govern uses and regulate appearances in public spaces.

Chapter 5 begins with the observation that references to religion as cultural patrimony have become increasingly common in public culture across Western societies. Such references illustrate how religious diversity and ongoing secularization processes are increasingly stimulating novel ways, among both Christian and post-Christian populations, of identifying with seemingly waning religious traditions as heritage. Asking how and why such identifications have become widespread in Western societies, I analyze the ways in which arguments over religious heritage are mobilized in order to articulate political claims focused on the nexus between religion and the nation-state. Here, I propose the term "religious heritage assemblage" as a way of expressing the totality of the heterogeneous discourses, sites, and practices in which claims to religion as (national) culture are articulated, authorized, and institutionalized. Such claims are chiefly organized around three fields of mobilization. Thus religious heritage is (1) mobilized by ordinary people as an affective politics of belonging; (2) aesthetically and semantically elaborated by cultural institutions such as museums that canonize its status as official national memory; and (3) legally codified and politically institutionalized within power relationships in order to secure cultural hegemonies and as part of a politics of citizenship. In each of these fields, discourses regarding religious heritage are signifying practices in which the meanings of religious heritage for nation-states and their citizens are negotiated, defined, and authorized.

1 • THEORIZING RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND SECULARISM

In this book, I examine how Western nation-states regulate religious diversity and how these regulations are premised upon and reshape certain notions of secularity, that is, distinctions between the religious and nonreligious spheres in society. Religious diversity and secularism have become key themes in sociological and anthropological debates over the last two decades, but they often are treated as the specialist topics of scholars of religion or relegated to specialized subdisciplinary discussions. The approach I propose in this chapter, by contrast, aims to revive issues of religious diversity and insist on their importance for general sociological questions of social order and cultural differences and the ways in which they are shaped through power relations. Chiefly, I suggest that there is considerable merit in going beyond the currently dominant use of religious diversity as a descriptive category that depicts the existence of several different religious traditions in a given territory and that becomes subject to regulatory intervention by state actors such as legislatures, courts, and administrative bodies (Beckford 2003). Rather, I argue that we should explore how religious diversity is itself turned into an epistemic and administrative category through which states observe societies, render populations legible, and contribute to configuring their cultural allegiances.

This not only allows us to understand why religious diversity has become the premise of a whole range of policies, laws, and jurisprudential ideas that shape people's religious and nonreligious identities while seeking to protect them.[1] In line with the theoretical assumptions of the sociology of knowledge (Berger and Luckmann 1966), it also illuminates how concepts and policies promoted in the name of religious diversity produce social reality as they are enacted in diverse social arenas. In other words, religious diversity is not something given but is accomplished through social practices (Garfinkel 1967).

Investigating negotiations and regulations of religious diversity as productive of social reality including particular forms of subjectivity, Foucault's notion of governmentality seems especially useful. Developed by Foucault in the late 1970s,

the term was meant to capture how, as functions of power relations in society, state apparatuses and practices shape subjectivities in realms such as education, health, and security. Following this lead, scholars in the field of governmentality studies have sought to highlight how in neoliberalism state power operates by shaping people's wants, aspirations, and desires in numerous domains but also their bodies and biological aspects of life (Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke 2010). Contrary to that, I use the term "governmentality" in a much more limited way to highlight practices of governing by categorization. I am interested in how discourses, administrative rules, and laws around religious diversity result in categorizations of people, spaces, and objects, and how the enactments of these rules and laws incite people to view themselves and their identities in particular—religious and secular—ways.

As a form of collective belonging and practice, religion is one dimension of the systems of cultural differences that structure societies on the horizontal level. Classical theorists such as Weber as well as more recent sociologists such as Bourdieu (1984), Brubaker (2015), and Tilly (1998) suggest that, next to the vertical dimension of social inequalities and class structures, this horizontal dimension of cultural differences is one of the fundamental axes around which the social world is organized. Both social inequalities and cultural differences are forms of social differentiation. However, while the vertical differentiation of social inequalities places people per se in a hierarchical order, cultural identities, styles, and practices have to be differentially valued in order to be hierarchically ordered and to serve as mechanisms to produce or fix inequalities. The question is thus whether the practices of state actors contribute to shaping the field of religious diversity as a hierarchically ordered system of cultural differences, and in which ways. How do they shape people's various identifications with different religious traditions and communities by regulating religious expressions—religious symbols, practices, and identities—in the public domain? And how are the regulatory practices of state actors underpinned by notions of secularity and perceptions of the significance of a secular public sphere or secular public space for national unity?

In tackling and conceptualizing these questions, in this chapter I engage with two bodies of literature: first, the debate on transnational immigration, religious diversification, and integration; and second, that on secularization, secularism, and secularity. While the first of these bodies of literature helps us to conceptualize the impact of nationhood and nationalism on responses to religious diversity, the second offers tools for understanding the ways in which particular histories of secularization and experiences of modernity shape dominant notions of secularity and the public sphere, and thus the terms on which societies engage with the religions of incoming migrants. In framing a critical response to dominant understandings, I make two central arguments. First, by drawing on the concept of "multiple secularities" (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012), I argue and show

that secularity and secularism do not necessarily curb religious expressions as Asad (2009) and Bader (2007), among others, claim, but that they shape them according to historically grounded logics, which are borne from nationally specific histories of modernity. Second, I argue that regimes of religious diversity are not merely empirically variable responses to an existing social reality of religious plurality, but also forms of governmentality that shape particular kinds of religious and nonreligious subjectivities and foreground the management of religious difference as central to social order. Much of the revitalized presence of religion in public discourses is owed not so much to the alleged crisis of Western secular modernity, but to this refashioning of religion as central to people's subjectivities and identities, if only in vestigial form. In the following sections, I revisit and critically engage with the main arguments of research on religious diversity and secularism separately, showing subsequently how and why both concepts should be used on conjunction.

RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN IMMIGRANT NATIONS

As an empirical fact, religious diversity has always existed to various, if sometimes extremely limited, degrees, but it has played only a minor role so far in most sociological theories of religion. In classical Western secularization theories, religious diversity was chiefly understood against the backdrop of the Protestant Reformation, which gave rise to some confessionally mixed countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, as well as settler societies such as Canada, in which Protestants and Catholics inhabited largely separated institutional worlds (Bramadat and Seljak 2009; Casanova 2009; Blaschke 2000). However, scholars' main preoccupation lay less with issues of religious regulation and coexistence per se than with the question of whether diversity favored or discouraged religious belief and participation. Peter L. Berger (1967) famously suggested that the visible existence of different religions undermined the credibility of all of them in the eyes of the believer. Theorists of religious economies (Stark and Finke 2000), conversely, saw religious diversity in open market situations as a condition of religious vitality.

Subsequently, theories and accounts of new religious movements and spiritualities were primarily interested in the causes and consequences of religious heterodoxy, which they linked to changes in the very institutional form of religion and its far-reaching deinstitutionalization (Luckmann 1967). In public debates, heterodox religious groups were often pejoratively framed as "sects" and suspected of brainwashing and manipulating the minds of their followers. They were therefore often tightly observed, and regulated, by state agents.[2] While public concerns over "sects" have not disappeared, today their significance is widely overshadowed by the rise of immigrant religions that emerged with several waves of transnational labor migration and recent movements of refugees. It

is especially this kind of religious diversity that has raised the specter of widespread public concern over the last two decades, given rise to questions of social cohesion, fed into nationalist mobilizations, and stimulated a new politics of difference and nativism.[3]

One of the major consequences of the increased presence of "world religions" such as Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism in Western societies resulting from migratory movements has been to expose and make visible the often implicit and unspoken ties between culture, majority religion, and national belonging. Manufactured during the post-Reformation religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and consolidated during the Westphalian era and its principle of *cuius region, eius religio* (Casanova 2011), these ties between dominant religion and nationalism never entirely disappeared. However, the rise of secular self-understandings among sections of the European and North American populations as well as the emergence of modern secular nationalism have made them invisible since at least the beginning of the twentieth century, a process aided by the relative religious homogeneity of most Western nation-states around that period. Today, despite shrinking levels of active religious participation, Catholicism continues to be a marker of nationhood in southern European societies and Lutheran Protestantism in the Nordic countries, as religion is transmogrified from being a part of the conduct of life into an element of national self-understanding, a process only gradually revealed as new religions forcefully emerged on the scene.[4] Significantly, one of the reasons for the intensity of current debates around religious diversity is that neither religion nor diversity used to be part of the classical image and self-understanding of the modern nation-state.

However, this situation is changing rapidly. New waves of transnational migration are having dramatic impacts on the demographic makeup and religious composition of national populations. To varying degrees, these changes are experienced as a threat, with nationalist mobilizations and right-wing populism taking up and instrumentalizing such fears for political gains in many Western countries. At the same time, religious diversity has engendered manifold institutional challenges: inherited regimes regulating the relationships between churches and the state need to be revisited and reformed in response to religious minorities' claims to public recognition so as to incorporate them into institutional fabrics. Again, however, efforts to do so have often engendered popular resistance, especially when they are seen to undermine the position of dominant religious traditions, national cultures, or hegemonic notions of national identity.

Against this backdrop, sociologists have developed a number of nuanced arguments and approaches in order to explain similarities and differences in the policies and laws that have been developed to accommodate minority religions. Chiefly, whereas one group of scholars has emphasized the distinctiveness of

national pathways, which they see as the effects of historically grown church-state regimes, others have emphasized processes of convergence across different societies. I briefly discuss each of these approaches.

In their comparative study of France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, Fetzer and Soper (2005) distinguished in ideal-typical fashion between republic-secularist, establishment religion, and "multiple establishment" regimes (exemplified by these countries) and showed how the incorporation of new religions was conditioned by them, including the granting of rights and privileges to individual and collective religious expressions. Focusing especially on the example of Muslims, they argued that the inherited relationships between church and state in each nation "helped to determine the types of religious demands that Muslims have proposed, the response of various actors to those needs, and the public policy that the states have eventually adopted in the area of Muslim religious rights" (Fetzer and Soper 2005: 15). Koenig (2005), by contrast, moved beyond the notion of a historical path dependency underlying their approach by asking how immigration contributed to the institutional *transformation* of the nation-state in the realm of the regulation of religion. Usefully addressing the relationship between national institutional pathways and the transnational dynamics of religious diversity together, Koenig showed how in the postwar period, the diffusion of human rights discourses spawned the successive uncoupling of membership and rights, and membership and identity. This situation gave rise to notions of postnational citizenship in which religion became a legitimate category of identity and around which European nation-state policies appeared to converge (Soysal 1994). More broadly, Koenig and others suggested that, from a neoinstitutionalist perspective, trends toward convergence are outcomes of the diffusion of legal and policy repertoires, which states adopt because of the legitimacy these enjoy in world society.

The notion of "national models" was subsequently criticized for different reasons. For some, it seemed to overemphasize distinctiveness when in fact regulations concerning religion were becoming more similar across Europe. It seems that when viewed in the context of broader sets of immigrant integration policies and citizenship, European countries converged around similar approaches to religion (Joppke 2007; Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel 2012). Confirming this view, in a comparative analysis of ten European countries, Ines Michalowski and I have shown that while the cultural rights of immigrants have been curtailed in the context of what Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010) called the "multiculturalism backlash," their religious rights have actually increased during the same period in most countries (with the exception of Switzerland; Michalowski and Burchardt 2015).

For others, the notion of "national models" seemed not to gloss over similarities but, on the contrary, to overstress their inner coherence and thus to essentialize and reify them. What scholars constructed as "national models" were in

fact messy and contested sets of regulations and practices that were rife with internal inconsistencies that shift over time (Bowen 2007a; Bader 2007b). In fact, the governance of religious diversity is organized not so much by models but by "modeling practices," that is, contested bottom-up processes of emulating and copying (Astor 2014).

In a slightly different vein, sociologists also began to disaggregate and unpack "national models" by exploring how religious diversity is regulated and played out in particular institutional and organizational fields of the state. To what extent, for instance, are members of the police or the military able to engage in religious practices or wear religious symbols on the job? Why and how do city administrations cater to the needs of religious minorities to carry out funerary practices according their own traditions? Whereas studies of national law and policy regulations regarding religious diversity chiefly argue from a macro-sociological angle, sociologists and anthropologists interested in these latter questions moved to consider the situation on the ground and explored how religious diversity works in particular organizational sites through detailed ethnographies. Detailed studies of hospitals, prisons, and the military attest to the fact that in many countries public institutions have been actively diversified.[5] Thus, in most Western countries, prison and military chaplaincies have been opened up to a range of new religions. However, research also shows how, in many cases, majority religions continue to enjoy certain privileges, often simply because they have grown symbiotically with and into state institutions over centuries and therefore display a degree of institutional fit that is not easily matched by newcomer religions. Christian chapels in hospitals are sometimes part of the very architecture of hospital buildings, which is why, even after being opened up to other religious groups, they continue to bear the marks of their religious origin.

Significantly, studies of religious diversity in public institutions assume that the way these institutions approach religious diversity corresponds to their functional mandate. They start from the premise that each institution responds to, and potentially accommodates, religious practices, as dictated by their main organizational goal: guarding inmates, healing patients, training soldiers. Institutions have "relative autonomy" (Bowen et al. 2013: 3) over their activities and their own repertoires of "practical schemas used by actors to orient themselves toward their environment" (14). Similarly, Michalowski (2015) suggests that there are "organizational logics" that shape and circumscribe legitimate expressions of religion in institutional settings. The idea is that it is less a national ideology or "model" than an organizational imperative that shapes responses to religious diversity.

While appreciating these studies, I am less interested in this book in specific organizational fields than in the question of how and why religious diversity becomes a category with which state administrations concern themselves in particular ways. In particular, it seems that in parts of the literature there is an

assumption that because demographics have become more religiously diverse, religious diversity automatically plays a more important role for states and populations as well. By contrast, I suggest that religious diversity is actively produced by social actors on the ground calling upon the state to resolve conflicts and provide pragmatic solutions to issues that stem from religious differences and the desire of states to establish their control. Religious diversity is not something that is already there and to which states and city administrations merely respond. These institutional responses actively shape the understandings of religious diversity that circulate in society and among populations, thereby configuring the very significance of religion for individuals and groups. I thus suggest an approach to religious diversity that is more constructivist, focusing less on how religious diversity is subjectively experienced, collectively negotiated, and politically governed and more on how religious diversity is folded into the genealogical trajectory of neoliberal forms of power and authority through which such experiences, negotiations, and practices of governance are made possible.

This implies that religious diversity is not merely a descriptor on which state administrations naturally draw in response to religious claims making but that the state's mobilization of the notion of religious diversity has particular consequences. I am interested in how religious diversity becomes an epistemic category through which state actors observe and understand populations, how this category becomes itself the premise for a whole range of laws and policies, and how, consequently, regimes of religious diversity construct citizens and authorize notions of personhood and subjectivity in particular ways. I suggest that as claims in the name of religious identities have acquired greater legitimacy in religiously diverse polities, people are increasingly led to understand themselves as religious beings and to construe their participation in society in terms deriving from their religious belonging.[6] Studies of the presence of religion in public institutions demonstrate almost unanimously how religious diversity became a new paradigm through which this presence is organized. Winnifred Sullivan (2005: 7) drives the point home in concluding her study on health care for war veterans: at least in the United States, while the law still regards itself as secular, all citizens are increasingly understood to be universally and "naturally spiritual or religious" and in need of spiritual care. As an administrative category, religious diversity thus incentivizes religious practices and the fashioning of religious identities in public institutions.

In the approach pursued and developed in this book, I construe religious diversity in relation to forms of identification.[7] In his interactionist account of categorization and identity, Jenkins (2000) suggests that, ideal-typically, there are two modalities of identification, self- or group identification, which draw on the terms by which groups identify themselves, and categorization, which refers to the ways we classify and identify others. Inspired by this idea, I assume that religious diversity can be fruitfully conceptualized as an external modality of

identification. As such, however, it is externally shaped not only by the members of different religious communities, but also by state practices. My focus is precisely on the rise of religious diversity as a category of identification and on how state administrations interact with other social actors (including religious communities, legal experts, commissions, and human rights activists) to produce them and to regulate social life through them.

Michel Foucault (1982) captured this modality of power in his concept of "governmentality." The perspective of governmentality suggests that power chiefly operates through practices of classification, naming, and labeling, that is, by tying people to particular predefined social categories. Defined by Foucault (1988: 19) as the contact point between technologies of power and technologies of the self, governmentality refers to practices that govern human behavior through forms of address, which shape subjectivities and identities. While Foucault's main concern was with the classification of people into administrative categories, in the contemporary period these also include identity categories such as religion. I suggest that contemporary regimes of religious diversity have the effect of working and exercising power as practices of promoting identity categories, of classifying people. As states confer rights on citizens as religious practitioners, religion in fact qualifies citizenship (Lehmann 2013). And as the courts especially are increasingly construing religion as an immutable identity, religiosity is assimilated to ethnicity and subjected to groupist logics (Eisenberg 2014; Brubaker 2015). In this book I use the term "governmentality" whenever I wish to highlight the ways in which religious identification operates as an effect of state power.

At the same time, however, religious diversity is much more than a political rationality deployed by state administrations wishing to regulate religious life. Religious diversity is a way of classifying proximate and distant others that is also used by ordinary people in everyday life (Stringer 2013). One important question is how relevant religion is for people in these mundane social contexts. Pierre Bourdieu has cogently shown how states operate to consecrate cultural differences and identities and the categories on which they are based by making these categories appear natural and given. In fact, most phenomenologically oriented social theorists from Max Weber to Alfred Schütz and Thomas Luckmann and macro-phenomenological schools such as neoinstitutionalism as well as structuralist thinkers in the tradition of Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss have emphasized the cognitive functions of social categories—that is, the fact that classification is fundamental for people to acquire practical understandings of the social world, to invest power with legitimacy, and to stabilize the social order.

Following Pierre Bourdieu's notion of "acts of state" (2005), I suggest that it is through state practices of recognizing, promoting, or constraining religious identities that religious diversity acquires public legitimacy. Such practices privilege a vision of populations as made up of Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, and

Jews over other forms of conceiving people, given that their religious allegiances do not endanger social cohesion and national unity. As Hurd argued (2015: 112), foregrounding religion as an identity category for legal purposes "privileges certain forms of expression and ways of life while marginalizing others. . . . Those who would like to speak but prefer not to do so in their capacities as believers, nonbelievers, Muslims, Buddhists, Jews or Christian are rendered inaudible."

At the same time, state practices of regulating religious diversity differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate religious practices, define forms of free versus coerced religious actions, and distinguish sincere from insincere religious expressions. State practices of governing through religious diversity thus have two main functions: they consecrate religious differences as cultural differences and order religious expressions in hierarchies of social value depending on whether or not they contribute to social cohesion and national security (Kaya 2009) and conform to modern principles (Mahmood 2005).

It is impossible to deny that contemporary Western societies have become religiously more diverse. However, it is an open question how these new forms of religious diversity matter for society, how religious diversity becomes a relevant and significant category of self-understanding in these societies, and how the governance of religious diversity shapes the ways in which people are differentiated along lines of cultural difference. In general, one would be inclined to think that, as majority populations are becoming less religious, religious difference also recedes into the background as a form of classification. Investigating two highly secularized societies in which religious differences are of paramount public concern, I show in this study that this is not necessarily the case. I suggest that the governance of religious diversity itself contributes to shaping the relevance of religion as a category of cultural difference.

Similarly, it is hard to deny that Western societies have become more secularized, even though new forms of spirituality and religious commitment have raised deep uncertainties about the linearity and irreversibility of secularization. However, it is a different question what this secularity means for society, how it is conceptualized as an element of social life and interactions, regardless of whether one believes in God or not, how self-conceptualizations of societies as "secular" change once secularity is thrown into question, and how it becomes the premise underlying the governance of religious diversity. I am interested in this conjuncture where secularity is interpreted in different ways as a premise for dealing with diversity, but where claims to secularity simultaneously respond to other experiences and accomplish other goals. As Casanova (2009: 1053) argued, at the current juncture Western societies are becoming at the same time more religious and more secular.

Religious diversity has clearly produced challenges for secular self-understandings and secular governance in Western societies, but the links between religious diversity and secularism have sometimes been construed in rather reductive

ways. Charles Taylor (2011: 36), for instance, has argued, "We think that secularism (or *laïcité*) has to do with the relation of the state and religion; whereas in fact it has to do with the (correct) response of the democratic state to diversity." If we wish to explain how secularism and secularity shape current controversies over religion, this perspective might be too narrow. As I will argue in the following section, the notion of "multiple secularities" is more useful as a way of capturing the variety of ways in which the boundaries between religious and secular spaces in society are redrawn in response to, and through the governance of, religious diversity.

REVISITING SECULARIZATION AND SECULARISM

Secularization

Throughout much of the twentieth century, the theory of secularization, itself a central component of theories of modernization, enjoyed paradigmatic status. Elaborated in its classical variant by Bryan Wilson (1969), Karel Dobbelaere (2002), David Martin (1978), and Steve Bruce (2002), the theory of secularization suggested that the rise of modernity and its key building blocks, such as cultural autonomy, democracy, the market economy, and the rule of law, all lead to the weakening of people's religiosities, the withering of religion's institutional roles, and the gradual displacement of religion from the public to the private domain. In his book *Public Religions in the Modern World* (1994), José Casanova usefully reformulated these different elements as three theses: (1) the thesis of religious decline, (2) the thesis of the functional differentiation of the religious and secular spheres in society, and (3) the thesis of the privatization of religion. Casanova argued that the last was especially problematic, both empirically and normatively.

Since at least the early 1990s, secularization theory has come under severe scholarly attack. Scholars have argued that, contrary to its universalist claims, the secularization paradigm applied only to western Europe. Instead of being a process of religious change on the universal level, it was suggested that secularization was rather contingent upon specific historical circumstances, especially the existence of state churches that many revolutionary and popular movements sought to dismantle. The so-called religious economies approach interpreted such types of state-church relations as highly regulated religious markets that reduced the number of available religious offers and held them responsible for religious decline in western Europe (Stark and Finke 2000). Another group of scholars took issue with the "process theory" underlying the secularization paradigm (Smith 2003). They argued that secularization was not a quasi-automatic, teleological, and abstract process of linear change, but rather an outcome of concrete constellations of conflicts over religious and material interests (Wohlrab-Sahr, Schmidt-Lux, and Karstein 2008; Gorski 2000; McLeod 2000). Critics

also noted that secularization theories were based on a very narrow understanding of church-based religiosity and hence neglected the emergence of new forms of spirituality and religiosity (Heelas, Woodhead, and Seel 2005). Eventually, scholars emphasized the modernist normative bias of the notion of secularization, suggesting that the equation between modernization and secularization was profoundly elitist and Eurocentric, as it necessarily relegated all those societies who did not share Europe's secularizing pathway to the realms of tradition and backwardness.[8] Taken together, the empirical and normative criticisms of secularization were epitomized in Peter Berger's apodictic pronouncement of the "de-secularization of the world" (1999).

While I share many of the criticisms of classical accounts of secularization, notions such as desecularization are equally misleading, as they replace one ill-conceived monolithic narrative by another. Rather, it seems useful to understand secularization as a set of processes that are open-ended, context-specific, and shaped by different cultural and institutional constellations, thus giving rise to different "cultural constructions of the secular" (Koenig 2015a: 294).[9] For example, whereas the post-Catholic societies of Quebec and Catalonia are examples of what David Martin (1979) has described as the Catholic-Latin pathway of secularization, these societies differ strongly with regard to the extent to which Catholicism and the Church were perceived to be obstacles and enemies of modernity, cultural emancipation, and national liberation. These differences in their turn had different impacts on how secularization turned into a modern regime of knowledge through which societies and populations in the West would begin to define their collective identities in terms of "having overcome religion" and having left religion behind as an outdated mode of existence (Casanova 2010). If it is clear that histories of secularization shape societies' dominant notions of the legitimate place of religion in social life and that such notions influence responses to new religious expressions such as those of immigrants, how can we explain different responses to religious diversity in societies that seem equally "secularized"? My argument is that it is only by attending to the different cultural meanings of secularity, borne as they are from different experiences of modernity, that we can make sense of such differences.

Secularism

While questions regarding the presumed decline or vitality of religiosity continue to stimulate scholarly passions, concerns over "secularism" as a philosophical program, worldview, and institutional regime regulating relationships between the state and religion have acquired massive momentum and sociological interest over the last decade. In this context, Talal Asad's (2003) genealogical approach to secularism as liberal governmentality and the debate on "post-secularism" that was initiated by Jürgen Habermas (2006) have been particularly influential. It is as both an appreciation of and a critical response to these

approaches that I suggest the concept of "multiple secularities" as especially useful. Most scholars agree that secularism involves either some degree of separation between church and state or, in Rajeev Bhargava's (2009) words, some "principled distance" between religious communities and the state. In addition, most theorists view this distance to be a normative requirement of liberal democracy and equal citizenship, suggesting that it safeguards the state's neutrality in religious matters, a principle that prohibits the state from identifying itself with any particular religion (Sullivan 2005).

How great this distance is and how exactly it is organized vary considerably between countries. Comparative studies of historical pathways and current regimes of secularism have explored these variations, coming up with an impressive array of findings and typologies. Significantly, while there is a rising interest in transnational and global articulations of secularism,[10] most studies still focus on a small number of cases taken to be exemplary, especially the United States, France, Turkey, and India.[11] In his comparative study of the United States, France, and Turkey, Kuru (2009) explored the question of why secular states pursue considerably different policies toward religion. He suggests that these differences were the outcomes of ideological struggles resulting in either passive or assertive forms of secularism, with the United States exemplifying the former, and Turkey and France embodying the latter. In a slightly different fashion, Modood (2010) distinguishes between moderate and radical secularism, arguing that, contrary to popular perceptions and some scholarly accounts (Bhargava 2009), moderate forms of secularism are much more widespread in the Western world than radical separations as enshrined in U.S. liberal secularism and French Republican secularism. According to Modood (2010: 6), while there are symbolic, institutional, and fiscal links of all kinds between the state and Christianity encapsulating notions of religion as a "public good," "all this is part of the meaning of what secularism is in most West European countries and it is quite clear that this is often lost in the models of secularism deployed by some normative theorists and public intellectuals."

Two points are worth stressing with regard to Modood's argument. First, he draws on an empirically grounded, "emic" European definition of secularism, which leads him to a broader and more inclusive understanding than many other authors employ. In fact, Modood also views those institutional arrangements that include rather strong ties between the majority religion and the state as part of the variety of secularism, while for others they rather express the "varieties of religious establishment" (Sullivan and Beaman 2013), if not double standards that undermine any idea of neutrality or religious equality (Mahmood 2015). While it is surely important to retain a minimal operational definition of secularism for analytical purposes, it is also true that the notion of secularism as a separation between religion and the state has sometimes been misleading. In both an empirical and a logical sense, regulations of religion often bring the state into

direct contact with religious communities or organizations. State bureaucracies and representatives routinely interact with religious communities, as they do with all other organized social groups. The existence of such contacts has prompted many scholars to see secularism as merely a false façade of separation and a discourse that makes state favoritism toward majority religions invisible, obscures the operations of culturally Christian or secular hegemonies, and conceals the discrimination and unequal treatment of religious minorities, especially Muslims. In fact, in some accounts, the bar by which empirical nation-state practices try to live up to the theoretically constructed ideal of the secular state has been raised so high that they can only fail. In this vein, financial support for the Catholic Church by the French state has been suggested as proof that France is not really secular. Against such approaches, I concur with Modood (2010) in pursuing a wider understanding of secularism that, on the one hand, involves minimal standards of neutrality, but on the other hand does not exclude symbolic and institutional links between state and religion.

Second, from a normative perspective, Modood sees moderate secularism as justified in terms of democratic and egalitarian citizenship. Others, by contrast, have argued that secularism was not a requirement of democracy. Political theorist Stepan (2000: 43) suggested that "the separation of church and state ha[s] no inherent affinity with democracy, and indeed can be closely related to nondemocratic forms." In this context Stepan coined the term "twin tolerations," namely the autonomy of the state from (excessive) religious interventions and the autonomy of religions from (excessive) state interference, as well as pinpointing the institutional threshold that qualifies arrangements between the state and religions as democratic. Bader (2007a) goes even further by arguing that secularism, defined as the exclusion of religion from the public sphere, compromised the exercise of democratic rights such as the freedom of religion because of its antireligious bias and its way of discriminating against religious minorities. Specifically, he argued that secularism was discriminatory toward migrant religions such as Islam because its terms of engagement between religion and the state were formulated without their participation. It seems that, because regulations of religion in Western nation-states are a product of several centuries of conflict and rapprochement between state sovereignty and religious claims to power, they almost inevitably bear the imprint of Christianity and, in the case of Protestantism (as Mahmood 2009 forcefully argues), its notions of religious subjectivity as based on privacy, belief, and inwardness.

The ongoing vitality of religion in parts of Western societies as well as normative concerns about the relationships between secularism, democracy, and justice have stimulated a lively debate about the "post-secular." Mostly inspired by Habermas's work (2006), scholars argue that Western societies have become empirically post-secular in that religions play central roles in public life and that, instead of being neatly separated, the religious and secular have become contem-

poraneous and penetrate one another in multiple ways. At the same time, the discourse on "post-secular society" and "post-secularism" also has a strong normative dimension, driven as it is by the claim that secularism, understood as the rigid privatization of religion, is no longer defensible as a guiding principle and that religious discourses have a legitimate place in the public sphere.[12] In order to capture the social dynamics around the "post-secular," Habermas (2006: 4) coined the notion of "complementary learning processes," suggesting that both nonbelievers and believers should draw on their reflective capacities in order to appreciate each other's contributions to controversial themes in public debates. Following up on Habermas, Rosati and Stoeckl (2012) argued that the concept of the post-secular was particularly useful in the context of "multiple modernities" (Eisenstadt 2000). If monolithic and linear theories of modernity often operated with universalist assumptions about modernity being inherently secular, then the intellectual shift that the "multiple modernities" paradigm pinpoints is also one to a post-secular constellation in which civil societies are more pluralistic and public actors more reflective.

While this is a cogent insight, in my view the notion of "post-secularity" suffers from several shortcomings. In general, the prefix "post-" suggests a historical sequencing of secularization and religious revitalization rather than a new configuration, despite its proponents' claims to the contrary. Problematic is also the fact that very diverse scenarios such as post-Sovietization in Russia (Agadjanian 2006; Uzlaner 2014), religious demonopolization in northern Europe (Nynäs, Lassander, and Utriainen 2012), and Turkey's recent authoritarian desecularization (Göle 2012; Rosati 2015) are grouped as presumably constituting a post-secular constellation. The concept is thus plagued with profound inconsistencies. More significantly, it seems that the need for a concept of the "post-secular" in theorizations of modernity arises only if secularism is construed in rigid and uniform ways. A more coherent and promising way of responding to the theoretical challenges that the current political conjunctures of religiously diversifying societies produce is to pluralize the notion of secularity. In other words, the recognition of "multiple modernities" does not stimulate the emergence of a post-secular environment so much as that of "multiple secularities." I will return to this point later in this chapter.

SECULARISM AS LIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITY

Significantly, the critiques of secularization theories as empirically inaccurate and epistemologically Eurocentric have been enmeshed with normative critiques of secularism as oppressive and partial. Especially in anthropology, but also in other disciplines, there is now a dominant perspective that views secularism as an inherently violent aspect of modern statecraft and thus as part of the dark side of modernity more generally. In order to clarify my own

perspective and arguments, it is necessary to outline the origins of this view in some detail.

In his Foucault-inspired genealogical inquiries into secularization and its cognate terms, Asad (2003) has usefully demonstrated the profound European Christian historicity of the notion of secularization. Through an analysis of political, literary, and religious texts, he shows how the term moved out of theological discourse to become the discursive and epistemological premise through which the truth claims of religion would be adjudicated. Asad (25) rightly insists that "the secular is neither continuous with the religious that supposedly preceded it . . . nor a simple break from it" and that the religious and the secular are co-constituted. However, while claiming that religion and the secular are not fixed but rather fluid categories, Asad assumes that henceforth religion is necessarily generated under secularism's purview. Secularism is not only a descriptive term that captures the differentiation of different spheres in society, such as law, the economy, the public, and the private, but also the discursive operation that produces these spheres and delineates their boundaries. In Asad's writings, secularism acquires—as Casanova (2006: 21) put it—"the power to constitute not only its own near-absolute modern hegemony but also the very category of the religious and its circumscribed space within the secular regime."

In order to make sense of Asad's perhaps exaggerated attribution of power to the "secular modern" that seems to run counter to his own project of providing a counter to the "triumphalist history of the secular" (Asad 2003: 25), it is important to understand how he relates secularism to the modern liberal state. In many of his recent writings (Asad 2007, 2009, 2015), he offers complex readings, and often trenchant critiques, of theories and practices of political liberalism, premised as they are on transforming the world according to its own values and credos. This transformative impulse is itself warranted by the tension between liberalism's counterfactual statement that people are born free and equal and the empirical reality in which they are in fact unfree and unequal, as well as the concomitant need to fulfill the promise of correcting the errors of history. In *Formations of the Secular* (2003: 56), Asad takes up the description of liberalism as the making of a "garden in a jungle that is constantly encroaching" and suggests, "This image . . . fixes on (explains and justifies) the violence lying at the heart of a political doctrine that has disavowed violence on principle. . . . For to make an enlightened space, the liberal must continually attack the darkness of the outside world that threatens to overwhelm that space."

This rendition is reminiscent of and inspired by critical accounts of modernity and antimodern critiques that have sought to lay bare the contradictions at the heart of the modern project. Theorists from Theodor W. Adorno through Zygmunt Bauman to Bruno Latour have demonstrated how the modern project of liberating people and society from the constraints of nature, religion, and tradition has itself spawned the emergence of new forms of authority and violence

that have made it possible. Moreover, observers of colonial modernity such as James Scott (1998) and Jean and John Comaroff (1991) have shown how the "gardening" metaphor became especially powerful in reworking nature, cultural lifeworlds, and forms of political authority in the image of modern progress at the colonial frontier. Against this backdrop, Asad's project is to explore how secularism is an intrinsic element of liberal modernity, or liberal statecraft, and to unravel the violent nature of regulations of religion issued by liberal states. In his view, similar to how modernizing state projects seek to eliminate behavior that is deemed backward or traditional, secular state projects seek to eradicate or disempower backward forms of religious authority and practice.

Thus, in many studies of the politics of religion in Europe, Asad and his followers have highlighted the discriminatory nature of the limits placed on minority practices, especially Muslims. Saba Mahmood (2009), for instance, has called attention to how dominant interpretations in Europe of the Islamic headscarf as a political symbol, which underwrite many of the restrictions on its use, are premised on a notion of religion as primarily based on inner belief and a separation of the religious subject from religious objects. According to Mahmood, however, Islamic regimes of piety do not adhere to such separations. As a consequence, Muslim women can experience limitations on the use of the headscarf only as state violence. Mahmood usefully points to the affective and embodied ways in which religious subjects attach themselves to and "cohabit" with religious signs such as icons or images, ones that Protestant and liberal semiotic ideologies may render unintelligible, as they construe relationships between objects and signs through models of representation.

Significantly, Asad and Mahmood treat limitations on religious expression or curtailments of religious freedom not as aberrations of liberalism but as epitomizing its political logic. In an Asadian reading, even the overtly illiberal or anti-liberal regulations of Islam in Europe such as Switzerland's ban on the construction of new minarets or Poland's policy of refugee selection based on religious criteria are essentially articulations of the liberal project, that is, the "continuous attack on the darkness outside," if by violent means, in order to do good. As an element of liberal statecraft, secularism is chiefly geared toward shaping "religious subjectivities, practices and forms of life" (Mahmood 2008: 464). It pivots on the liberal state's regulatory capacities to separate legitimate from illegitimate forms of religion, intent on producing religious sensibilities that are compatible with liberal modernity.

I suggest that there are both advantages and several problems entailed in this approach. I concur with Asad and Mahmood that there is a need to go beyond the minimalist account of secularism as the separation of religion and the state. Secularism does indeed shape, as Mahmood argued, people's subjectivities, practices, and forms of life. There is a need to improve understanding of the ways in which secularism has been transmogrified in contemporary societies into

diverse forms of cultural habitus that are able to mobilize particular emotions, affects, and sensibilities.

However, for several reasons it is misleading to limit the understanding of relations between the secular state and people's religious and nonreligious subjectivities to state violence and coercion. Historically, state sovereignty has rarely implied full control of religion by the modern state, as Casanova (2006), Gorski (2000), and other historical sociologists have forcefully shown. Rather, transitions to modernity usually involved numerous compromises, mutual arrangements, co-optations, and collaborations, as a result of which religious (rather than secular) authority over religious subjectivities and definitions of legitimate religion often remained in place and entrenched. As Casanova argued (2006), one of the immediate but also most enduring legacies of the Peace of Westphalia was not the secular state, as is often assumed, but the confessional state. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the secular state did in fact finally emerge victorious from its struggles with organized religion in the West and remains victorious to the present day, despite religious challenges to its power, of which Joppke (2015) sees Evangelical Christianity in the United States and Islam in Europe as the most veritable examples.

Yet it also seems to be flawed to locate secularism exclusively within the modern state and to view the practices authored in its name as oppressive for that period and the present. To a considerable degree, the rise of secularism was coimplicated with advances in gender equality and sexual citizenship (Frank and McEneaney 1999), the progressive dismantling of institutional privileges of religious majorities (Koenig 2015b), and the expansion of the religious rights of immigrants across most western European nation-states (Burchardt and Michalowski 2015). In many instances, secularism has worked to safeguard the rights of religious minorities against both the expansive demands of religious majorities and those of secularist forces that wish to limit religious expressions to the private domain. Therefore, to equate secularism with oppression alone appears one-sided and also suggests an idealized image of religious communities as sites of freedom that is rarely realistic. In their study of deliberations around Dutch mosque construction projects, Verkaaik and Arab (2016) usefully distinguish between "culturalist" and "constitutional" secularism. While culturalist secularism often underpins nativist campaigns that seek to minimize Muslims' public presence because of Islam's presumed backwardness, the authors describe constitutional secularism as a "discursive practice that draws on the Dutch Constitution, as well as on the dominant notion of secularism as the separation of the state and the church, to defend the right of religious subjects to express their religion publicly as citizens" (254). Contrary to Asad and Mahmood, I suggest that secularism can be, and has been, put to different political uses depending on the historical context, the power relations that are characteristic of it, and the dominant cultural interpretation of the secular. Furthermore, it is not only the

state but also people as citizens and participants in public life who create, contest, and sustain secular spaces on their own or in interaction with state agents. To capture these secular spaces conceptually, the notion of secularity seems more useful than that of secularism.

In addition, there is a tendency in Asadian approaches to secularism (Asad 2003) and conceptualizations of Islam as a discursive tradition (Asad 1986) to view religious subjects as totalities and to predefine them on the basis of the particular religious dogmas and ethics they have to adhere to. As mentioned above, the conceptual polarization of religiosity and secularism leads to the view that religious subjects necessarily experience any regulation of religion, including those that imply compromise and negotiation, as violence. Against this totalization of the religious subject and the polarization of religiosity and secularism, I assume that, in most historical periods and most cultural contexts, human subjectivity is neither fully religious nor fully secular (see also Schielke 2010 and Berger 2014). On the contrary, people's religious commitments are often fluid and change over time. Similar to the ways in which the social and material worlds we inhabit are crisscrossed by multiple lines dividing the religious from the secular—lines that are constantly being drawn, unmade, and redrawn—the subjectivities of ordinary people are usually composed of both religious and secular views, forms of judgment and sentiments. While it is useful to distinguish "religious" and "secular selves" for heuristic purposes, it is dangerous to conflate analytical abstractions with the empirical reality in which most people actually conform to neither of these fixed categories.

Finally, it seems problematic to operate with a monolithic notion of "secular governance" that allegedly works in similar ways across the world regardless of type of political rule (liberal-democratic, authoritarian, etc.), colonial history, or civilizational pathway. Mahmood (2015: 2) defends this monolithic idea of secularism by suggesting that "insomuch as secularism is characterized by a globally shared form of national-political structuration, the regulation of religious difference takes a modular form across geographical boundaries." The idea of bringing both the former colonial powers and former colonies into a "single analytical field," as Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler (1989) argued in an influential article, and to explore how political understandings of secularisms are caught up in entangled histories that produced "entangled modernities" is clearly important. In his book *Imperial Encounters*, for instance, Peter van der Veer (2001) has demonstrated how colonial history affected religious change and secularism in Britain and India in mutual ways. However, this hardly implies that "the regulation of religious difference takes a modular form across geographical boundaries" in places as different as Egypt and Italy, as Mahmood suggests. The construction of a "single analytical field" must not be conflated with the leveling of empirical differences.

MULTIPLE SECULARITIES

In an attempt to overcome these problems and limitations, in this book I draw on the concept of "multiple secularities."[13] Chiefly, I suggest that, for reasons of analytical clarity, it is useful to distinguish secularity from secularism as a subjectively held philosophical worldview and an ideology of modern statecraft that serves to justify certain regulations of religion. By secularity, in contrast, I mean the institutionally, culturally, and symbolically anchored forms through which religious and nonreligious spheres, spaces, practices, and identities are distinguished and differentiated.[14] Secularity refers to the ways in which religion is delimited and in which proper spaces, times, and forms of its expression are negotiated, contested, and authoritatively redefined.

This also implies that secularity is articulated on multiple social levels and in multiple social arenas. Secularity is defined through law and constitutions, institutionalized as a norm of speech in the public sphere and behavior in public spaces, and embodied through people's everyday practices, judgments, and forms of perception. Similarly, Nilüfer Göle (2010: 45) has argued that the state, the public sphere, and the self are three distinct levels on which religious-secular distinctions operate and are confronted and recomposed.

In clear contrast to the monolithic notion of "secular governance," the concept of multiple secularities implies that cultural and political constructions of secularity are hugely different in different societies, though nonetheless emerge from a limited number of political challenges and problems. These differences can be explained by looking at how such constructions of secularity respond to these problems. I assume that modern constructions of secularity are shaped by the histories of religious traditions that have often left deep imprints on the particular cultural pathways of societies. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (2000) has famously suggested that different civilizational histories have influenced the ways in which different societies have interpreted the program of modernity and led to the emergence of "multiple modernities." The idea of "multiple secularities" builds on this assumption. Similar to Danièle Hervieu-Léger's (2003) description of the current era as made up of "multiple religious modernities," each of which is characterized by a dominant religious tradition, in this book I pursue the question of "multiple secular modernities." Significantly, however, I assume not that societies are always characterized by one dominant type of secularity, but rather that, especially in "unsettled periods" of cultural change (Swidler 1986), different notions of secularity vie for hegemony through political and cultural contestations.

Four such historical problems around the management of religion have been particularly widespread in many societies: (1) the problem of individual freedom vis-à-vis the dominant social units, be they particular groups or the state; (2) the problem of religious heterogeneity and the resulting potential or actual degree of conflict; (3) the problem of social or national integration and development; and

(4) the problem of the independent development of institutional domains. It is clear that most of these problems are closely associated with the formation of modern societies and states and the ideas on which they are founded, whereas at least the second also arises in premodern societies.

These four central problems provide motives for institutionalizing distinctions between the religious sphere and other social spheres. As latent motives and social practices, they can certainly coexist, but as overt motifs they may compete with each other. My assumption, however, is that, given certain preconditions, one of them will become dominant at least for a certain period by being aligned with guiding ideas that set the basic terms for distinguishing religious and secular spaces in a given society, thereby pushing other motives, at least at times, to the background. There is no doubt, however, that these motives are often highly contested, especially in "critical junctures" (Kuru 2009) such as political revolutions, leading, for instance, to disestablishment and new "secular settlements" (Mayrl 2016), or cultural changes such as rapid religious diversification. I use the formula "secularity for the sake of . . ." to designate the different stakes and values that secularity is called upon to promote and justify.

In correspondence with the reference problems outlined above, we can distinguish between the following forms of secularity: (1) secularity for the sake of individual rights and liberties; (2) secularity for the sake of balancing or pacifying religious diversity; (3) secularity for the sake of social or national integration and development; and (4) secularity for the sake of the independent development of the functional domains of society. These four basic forms of secularity are associated with different guiding ideas: in the first type (1) it is the idea of freedom and individuality, in the second (2) that of toleration, respect, and noninterference, whereas the third type involves (3) ideas of progress, enlightenment, and modernity. The fourth type, finally, involves (4) the guiding ideas of rationality, efficiency, and autonomy (see Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012).

One major advantage of this framework is that it makes tensions between competing notions of the secular visible and helps us understand how they unfold. Chiefly, I suggest that if one model of secularity becomes dominant because its guiding idea becomes generally accepted, competing notions are pushed into the background. The emphasis on individual religious freedom in U.S. history, for instance, generally curtailed possibilities to define secularity as the road to progress and rendered definitions of secularity as equidistant between the state and religious communities that prevail in India largely irrelevant. In contemporary Canada, by contrast, some proponents of multiculturalism pushed for a greater recognition of collective cultural and religious rights, for instance, in the field of religiously based family law and dispute resolution. There have been periodic tensions between collectivist and individual-liberal versions of multiculturalism, and religion has become more and more important in profiling these two versions against one another, with profound consequences for the ways in which

Quebeckers came to define Quebec's secular public sphere as made up of individual citizens rather than religious communities. By using the notion of the "logic of secularity," I intend to capture such processes whereby the dominance of one particular view of secularity as a solution to a social problem privileges—and leads to—discursive formations and institutional arrangements at the expense of others. Over time, though, secular formations become naturalized whereby their contested origins are rendered invisible, possibly becoming taken for granted and transmogrifying into an aspect of culture and routine.

Moreover, I would argue that the messiness and contradictory orientations that sociologists and anthropologists often find in studies of regulatory practices around religion can be explained as expressions of competing logics of secularity that exist side by side within the same national setting. Such competing logics of secularity inspire different kinds of practices that still cohere around certain guiding ideas such as individual freedom, respect, and functional autonomy.

All of this also implies that, contrary to general descriptions of secularism and secularity as culturally vacuous or homogenized, secularity is in fact profoundly cultural. Secularity implies strong evaluations of notions of personhood, the public sphere, and collective identities. This understanding also suggests a promising sociological way of recasting the vexed question of secularism's presumed "neutrality." Fundamentally, what is at stake in discussions of "political secularism" is whether secularism is indeed a neutral terrain from which religious claims can be assessed and adjudicated in a fair and egalitarian manner, or whether secularism itself, as a worldview with associated interests and value judgments, is party to the competition and can thus never be the neutral arbiter its proponents wish to fashion it as. From a sociological, especially materialist Marxist or Weberian point of view, states are rarely neutral, notwithstanding their presumed bureaucratic and legal impartiality, which is enshrined in equality as a fundamental liberal value. States usually favor one political program over another one, thus promoting certain interests while oppressing others. Importantly, the near impossibility of the neutrality of the state in this abstract sense should not lead us to construe all state policies toward either religion or secularisms as equally partial (Mahmood 2015). To adjudicate such questions is the task of political scientists, which is why I remain agnostic regarding them. What matters from the perspective of a cultural sociology of the secular is that the secular is not culturally neutral but charged with cultural meaning (see Burchardt, Wohlrab-Sahr, and Middell 2015).

2 • CONTESTING RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND SECULARISM

There is a consensus among scholars that many Western nation-states are currently under pressure to adapt their regulations regarding religion to changing social and cultural circumstances and that regulatory frameworks for the governance of religion are highly contested (Joppke 2015; Koenig 2015a; Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012; Bader 2007a). In this chapter, I explore such processes of contestation in Quebec and Catalonia and explain the ways in which they have affected the governmentality of religious diversity.

Contestations around the governance of religion originate from two distinct sources: secularization and migration-driven religious diversification. Over the course of the twentieth century, and especially from the 1960s onward, in both Quebec and Catalonia levels of participation in religious rituals such as the Sunday Mass and of religious belief decreased dramatically among these Catholic-majority populations (Meunier, Laniel, and Demers 2010). As in many other Western countries, people's increasing detachment from traditional religious authorities was accompanied by institutional changes leading toward greater institutional separation between the established churches and state institutions. The notable exception is the United States, where the separation of church and state was already constitutionally enshrined on the basis of political alliances between secularists and religious minorities in the absence of an ancien régime and independently of any process of religious change (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012: 892). In Quebec, by contrast, changing national self-conceptions implying the radical rejection of the inherited role of the Catholic Church and of traditional ways of life became the basis of persistent popular and political demands to secularize state institutions and the public sphere. In Catalonia too, the rejection of the traditional religious authorities and the privileged position of the Catholic Church in state institutions became part and parcel of Catalans' conceptions of modernity and democracy. The end of the Duplessis regime in Quebec in 1959 and Franco's dictatorship in Spain in 1975 are the latest critical junctures

that triggered shifts in the institutional regulation of religion, especially of Catholicism and historical religious minorities.

For around two decades, however, it has been not so much the political power and social role of Catholicism anymore, or of other established religions for that matter, that is at stake in debates about religion as the increasingly visible religiosities of immigrant minorities. The problem space in the governance of religion has thus shifted from issues of church-state relations and institutional secularization to concerns over religious diversity, minority rights, and social integration (see also Göle 2010). This is not to say that secularization does not matter anymore. Rather, I suggest that the meaning and significance of secularization and secularism have also shifted, as they are being renegotiated within changing constellations of actors. In public discourses around religion, majority populations no longer address only their own religions or past religious histories and homegrown religious minorities, but to a great extent the religion of migrant communities.[1] However, they do so on the basis of their own experiences with religion, secularization, and their embracing of modernity. At the same time, immigrant minorities enter the stage and become part of the new actor constellation, as they make claims to equal treatment and demand the right to participate in public life and to be "integrated" into the host society as religious practitioners.[2] Such claims are then often adjudicated in the law courts, leading to a generally much more prominent role for legal mechanisms and actors in the governance of religion (Koenig 2010). New actor constellations thus give rise to new modalities of contestation.

In this chapter I trace the emergence of these modalities of contestation and explain their consequences for the governance of religion. I do so by situating religious governance at the crossroads of secularization history on the one hand, and migration and the governance of religious diversity on the other. This crossroads entwines two different narratives, one describing trajectories to modernity, the other telling stories about becoming plural and "critically diverse." Both narratives have crystallized in recognizable sets of cultural habitus, political positions, and institutional power, and it is only by exploring them in conjunction that we can explain the dynamics around religion in the contemporary West. I begin by describing the core elements of regulatory frameworks in both settings in relation to the broader nation-state and the rise of contestations surrounding these frameworks. I then show how the projects of nation building and current expressions of nationalism shape these contestations in very different ways. Finally, I explore how contestations over the governance of religion are shaped by different interpretations of secularity and rework them in particular ways. Such notions of secularity also guide and inform practices of administering and governing religious diversity in everyday life, which I discuss in chapter 3.

THE RISE OF CONTROVERSIES OVER RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN QUEBEC

Over the last two decades, Quebec has seen some of fiercest battles over laïcité and religious diversity in the history of the modern West. Why did the governance of religious diversity become such a contested issue, and which imaginaries of the nation underpin these contestations? How was laïcité defined in this battle? How and why did a particular notion of laïcité become foundational to contestations of religious diversity as well as to understandings of nationalism and national identity?[3] In what follows I address these questions by exploring a series of contestations over religious diversity that began with the controversies concerning "reasonable accommodation" after 2002. They were continued through the Liberal Party's attempt to regulate face coverings in public space (Bill 94) in 2010 and the debates about the so-called Charter of Quebec Values in 2013 and 2014. They have been restaged through the liberal government's "religious neutrality law" (Bill 62), which was eventually passed on October 19, 2017. The law requires that all people who wish to offer or receive a public service in Quebec must do so with their faces uncovered. This includes educational institutions, public transport, and health care. In addition, the law outlines the circumstances under which authorities should grant accommodation requests based on religious beliefs (Neuman 2017). The Canadian Civil Liberties Union and the National Council of Canadian Muslims appealed against the law in the Quebec Superior Court. In December 2017 and again in July 2018 the court concurred with its arguments suggesting that the law violated citizens' right to freedom of conscience and religion as stipulated in the Canadian and Quebec Charters of Freedom.[4]

Finally, in March 2019 the government presented to the parliament its Bill 21, titled "An Act Respecting the Laicity of the State." The bill affirms the centrality of laicity, which has replaced in its English version the term "secularism" used hitherto, suggesting that laicity is based on four principles: the separation between religions and the state, the religious neutrality of the state, the equality of all citizens, and freedom of conscience and religion. As earlier versions, the bill suggests to ban religious symbols of all kinds for individuals working in positions of authority in the public sector, makes compulsory the receiving of social service with the face uncovered, and includes the notion of state laicity as fundamental to the nation in Quebec's Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Charter of Quebec Values died a quick death after the electoral defeat of the Parti Québécois (PQ) in March 2014. However, there is no question that this was a major event in the history of contestations over the governance of religious diversity in Quebec, as it revealed the dominant fault lines and logics of secularity in particularly clear ways. Because of this, and because of the ways in which many of its elements of it have been taken up again in subsequent debates around Bill 62 and Bill 21 around the Charter of Secularism of the Coalition Avenir Québec's

government voted into office in 2018, it is important to explore the controversy surrounding the PQ's charter in more detail.

The bases of the legal regulation of religion in Quebec are the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, adopted in 1982, and the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms that entered into force in 1976.[5] Starting in 1985, the Canadian courts further developed and gave legal sanction to the concept of reasonable accommodation, which involves the legal obligation of employers and organizations to accommodate people who are disadvantaged by providing exceptions to general rules if these general rules lead to unjust treatment (Beaman 2012: 2).

However, starting in the early 2000s, a series of cases of reasonable accommodation, especially related to religion, became strongly mediatized and initiated far-reaching public debates about diversity, nationalism, and collective identity. In one instance, non-Jewish construction workers at a Jewish hospital were asked to have their non-kosher lunch sandwiches off the hospital premises. In another case, the leadership of a Jewish high school with mostly Hassidic Jewish boys asked the owner of a neighboring gym to blind their windows so that the students would not be exposed to the tightly dressed bodies of female gym users during school breaks. A third instance involved a group of 260 Muslims in a traditional maple sugar cabin in the Montérégie region. After dinner, the group asked the owner for a private space in which to pray. The owner offered them the dance hall, which was being used by another family, and interrupted the music for ten minutes.[6] These instances, and certainly their mediatization, led to the perception among sections of Quebec's population that they "over-accommodated" minority claims, either because of a lack of national self-esteem, or else because Canadian law forced them to do so.

Such perceptions were particularly strong in Quebec's peripheries. Thus, in January 2007 André Drouin, the mayor of the small municipality of Hérouxville, published his infamous and partially racist "Code of Conduct" in which, among other things, he warned prospective immigrants that the burning and stoning of women was not tolerated, an event that quickly turned into a media spectacle. As became evident in a personal interview, Drouin saw negotiations over religious diversity as expressions of a global war between religion and enlightenment. He was also a member of a secularist grouping from the nearby town of Trois-Rivières made up of elderly people who had recanted their Catholicism, not least in response to the pedophilia scandals that had shaken the Catholic Church. Drouin and fellow activists also presented their views in the National Assembly during the civil society hearings of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, where they took a tough antireligious stance. On the occasion of International Women's Day on March 8, 2010, they organized a demonstration in front of Trois-Rivières's Cathedral, where for the first time they demanded a "Charter of Secularism." As I will show later in the chapter, in the autumn of 2013 for the first time their dreams appeared to be on the verge of fulfillment when the governing party embraced this same idea.

RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY BETWEEN QUÉBÉCOIS AND THE CANADIAN COURTS

Public controversies over religion were more or less continuously nurtured by the fact that several cases were heard before the Human Rights Commission, adjudicated in local courts of law, contested in Quebec's Court of Appeal, and finally heard before the Canadian Supreme Court. As a consequence, these cases not only turned into legal sagas that strongly contributed to the judicialization of religious controversies and secularism but also reignited national sentiments, fueled efforts to draw boundaries with Canada, and strongly contributed to the construction of laïcité as a part of Quebec's national identity (Burchardt 2017b).[7]

While the cases mentioned above did not find their way into the courts, others did. The first of them concerned the rather complicated question of whether a group of Orthodox Jews had the right to set up a *succah* on their balcony in order to fulfill their biblically mandated obligation to dwell in small, temporary huts during the nine-day annual Jewish festival of Succot.[8] The group were apartment owners in a building governed by a bylaw prohibiting decoration and constructions on the balconies. On that basis, the board of owners requested the removal of the succahs and suggested the construction of a collective succah in the garden instead as a reasonable accommodation. The group of Orthodox Jews, however, insisted that a communal succah would cause "extreme hardship" and run up against their personal religious beliefs. The court ruled that they did indeed have the right to erect the structure. It also used this opportunity to develop a liberal definition of religious freedom built around the notion that, in order to be protected, religious practices should be based on people's sincere conviction and religious beliefs, that examinations of people's beliefs must be minimally intrusive, and that their changing their religious beliefs over time does not compromise their sincerity.

A few years later, in 2004, a group of Muslim students at Quebec's École de technologie superior approached the university administration with a request to provide a separate space for their daily prayers. Hitherto members of the group had been praying in stairways, which had caused some unease among other students and staff. Together with their request for a more appropriate prayer space, they also demanded that a sign in the bathroom prohibiting the use of sinks for the ritual washing of feet be removed and that the accreditation of religious student associations, which they saw as discriminatory, be scrapped. Following the university administration's refusal to accept these requests under the provision of reasonable accommodation, the student group brought the case to the Human Rights Commission. The commission decided that the university "should accommodate the Muslim students in their need to pray on a regular basis and in conditions that respect their dignity; they suggest that the refusal to accredit a student association

based on religious affiliation is not discriminatory; and also that the signs forbidding the use of sinks to wash feet is not discriminatory."[9]

Around the same period another case also involving questions of religion in an educational setting was widely publicized and discussed.[10] It concerned the question of whether a student who was a member of an orthodox Sikh family had the right wear his traditional sword or *kirpan* in school. When the school board became aware of this practice, they recognized that it violated the school's code of conduct prohibiting the bringing of arms on to the school premises and wrote a letter to the parents offering a reasonable accommodation. The accommodation entailed the obligation to properly seal the kirpan. Later on, however, a higher level school authority rejected the proposed accommodation, after which the case went through several judicial levels to the Canadian Supreme Court. In its judgment of 2006, the court ruled that, by banning the kirpan from the school on grounds of safety, the school commission had violated the student's right to religious freedom and had failed to take Canadian values of multiculturalism into account. Among other things, the judgment was based on the expert opinion of Sikh religious authorities, according to whom the permanent wearing of the kirpan was indeed obligatory for orthodox male Sikhs. However, the expert also emphasized that the Sikh religion preaches pacifism and that the kirpan must not be used as a weapon.

Three observations are particularly significant with a view to understanding the dynamics of contestation. First, controversies over religious diversity are invariably addressed through the mechanism of reasonable accommodation, that is, the exemption of minority groups from general rules if the rules seem unfair to them. In their report to the government, Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor described the "legal route" of reasonable accommodation as "top-down" and recognized that it often led to an antagonistic situation of winners and losers. In response, they advocated "concerted adjustment" that would be "contextual, deliberative and reflexive" (Bouchard and Taylor 2008: 52), instead of court-based adjudication. Nevertheless, I suggest that the principle of reasonable accommodation did clearly reinforce the judicialization of religious diversity. Quebec's controversies over nation building and diversity clearly support Hurd's (2015: 41) suggestion that "powerful forces, including the law, incentivize individuals and groups to articulate demands in the languages of religious freedoms and religious rights." This judicialization is also reflected in the new actor constellation mentioned at the beginning of the chapter. Central to this constellation are not only religious minority communities as claims makers but also public authorities that increasingly appear as parties in courts, and of course the courts themselves, as well as additional actors they enlist such as expert witnesses, and the Human Rights Commission as the first-level tribunal and its advisory service.

The emergence of this constellation has two consequences: On the one hand, it comes along with the predominant framing of religious conflicts in terms of

rights and legal perspectives. On the other hand, this judicialization of religious conflicts has also reinforced their *politicization*; that is, it has raised the political stakes of different actors and deepened political cleavages among them. This finding contradicts social theorists from Niklas Luhmann (1993) to Jean and John Comaroff (2006), who argue that recourse to the law and adjudication by legal means rationalizes and depoliticizes social conflicts as it presumably removes the objects of contestations from the political field and its agonistic logic, forcing the involved parties to adopt neutral perspectives, as well as affording conflict solutions with an aura of objectivity, making them acceptable to all. In the specific situation of the Supreme Court of Canada being perceived by many Quebeckers as a Canadian institution ruling on Quebec issues and doing so by adopting Canadian principles such as multiculturalism, legal mechanisms actually buttressed the politicization of reasonable accommodation practices. This politicization was carried by the mass media and political parties, especially PQ and the newly emerging separatist party Action Démocratique and its leader Mario Dumont. The fact that the court proceedings often took several years facilitated the ways in which these controversies could remain hot issues in the media, were institutionalized as main fault lines in the public sphere, and turned into collective stocks of knowledge. In contemporary Quebec there is a socially accepted canon of cases of reasonable accommodation that almost everyone knows about. Even years after these cases had passed, all of my interlocutors from both the secularist and the multiculturalist camps were able to rehearse the basic facts and legal outcomes, and invariably these were the same five to seven cases.

Second, all of these controversies are characterized by two resolutely distinct understandings of secularism, which over time have crystallized in the concepts of "open secularism" (laïcité ouverte) and strict or closed secularism (laïcité fermée). From the legal point of view, reasonable accommodation is the main mechanism of the governance of religious diversity and of the balancing between individual rights and state neutrality toward religion in a multicultural nation. In political discourse, this conception has been dubbed "open secularism," as it is viewed as opening public institutions to diverse religious expressions but also as promoting the state's neutrality toward religion and religious diversity. "Open secularism" has been embraced and promoted by large sections of the legal profession (for instance, the Quebec Human Rights Commission) and the (self-appointed) "pluralist camp" made up of politicians, business, intellectuals, academics and most of the Anglophone media. However, it has been heavily contested by the (self-appointed) "Republican" camp, which is similarly made up of politicians, intellectuals, and most of the Francophone media. From their point of view, reasonable accommodation is not an expression of secularism but detrimental to it. According to its critics, reasonable accommodation creates special rights and thus undermines the principle of the equal treatment of all citizens

(see also Adelman and Anctil 2011) and articulates religious diversity in the public sphere to an intolerable extent. Yet, significantly, critics perceive reasonable accommodation as a threat to both universal rights and the collective identity of Quebeckers, as it is seen as dismembering Quebec into religious and cultural fragments, weakening social cohesion, jeopardizing immigrant integration, dismantling gender equality, and giving rise to cultural tensions.

Third, taken together, the Canadian Supreme Court judgments on issues of reasonable accommodation have developed a particularly expansive concept of religious freedom, which, combined with the judicial and political emphasis on the value of multiculturalism, protects religion in a very wide sense in both public institutions and private markets (Lefebvre 2008). Importantly, instead of recognizing particular religious traditions or protecting particular sets of beliefs, practices and symbols, it protects all of them under the umbrella term "diversity" to the extent that they are based on sincere convictions and do not conflict with other constitutional values or the rights of others. In addition, jurisprudence increasingly relies on notions of religion as collective identity that incentivizes essentialist and groupist understandings of religious belonging (Eisenberg 2014). "Sincerity of belief," "diversity" and "identity" are thus the basic categories through which Canadian law recognizes religion and renders populations legible in religious terms for both governmental purposes and the citizens themselves.

In spite of these legal protections, political debates in Quebec consistently turned on the notion that public performances or representations of religious diversity and identities imperiled national unity. As we will see, this starkly contrasts with Catalonia where religious diversity was predominantly defined as an asset in the national project and where religious diversity and secularity were not so antagonistic as complementary concepts.

THE RISE OF CONTESTATIONS OVER THE GOVERNANCE OF RELIGION IN CATALONIA

Let us now consider the case of Catalonia, where there has also been a rise of contestations over the governance of religious diversity during the same period, that is, beginning in the late 1990s. However, compared to Quebec these contestations have a lower public profile, although they take place on high political levels and follow different institutional mechanisms. While conflicts over religious accommodation have been curiously absent from public debates, concerns over models of governance and minorities' places of worship were the real issues. The main difference, however, is that, while in Quebec religious diversity is mainly seen as a threat to the national project and as creating tensions between religious diversity and laïcité as epistemic and legal categories, in Catalonia religious diversity has come to be construed as a major element of the nation in the mak-

ing. My overarching theoretical claim is therefore that the Catalan case allows us to appreciate the fact that nation-states not only homogenize national populations, as most sociologists of nationalism would argue, and as the case of Quebec seems to demonstrate, but also diversify populations. Diversity is thus becoming the premise of a new mode of governmentality that is based on the governance of religious identities.

Similar to Quebec, controversies over the governance of religion emerge at the crossroads of migration policy on the one hand and nation building on the other, of governing new forms of religious diversity and simultaneously pushing policy agendas geared toward furthering the prospects of national independence by marking national distinctiveness. Particularly striking evidence in this regard was the formation of the Secretariat of Religious Affairs by the Catalan government in 2000. Initially, a conservative nationalist regional government created this agency with the aim of developing direct relationships between Catalonia and the Vatican and to lobby for the exclusive nomination of Catalan bishops in the region. The underlying logic, however, was to behave like an independent nation-state vis-à-vis the Vatican.

Yet, following the electoral victory of a left coalition involving the Catalan Socialists, the Republican Left, and the Green Party in 2003, the agency acquired a much greater profile, its main tasks being redefined as well.[11] It was charged with promoting religious diversity and monitoring issues related to religion both at the regional level and in concert with the municipal authorities—chiefly, again, in the service of the national project. Moreover, the agency was given the explicit task of developing further the autonomous regulatory capacities of the regional government in religious affairs and the Catalanization of religious leaders. Despite recent budget cuts due to Spain's ongoing economic crisis, this government agency is by now thoroughly established and unique in the Spanish context.[12] While comprising only a few employees, it exerts influence throughout the region by offering regular educational activities for civil servants working on issues of civil participation, migration, and integration in Catalan municipalities and by acting as a broker in religious conflicts. As Griera (2016: 16) observes, the nationalist thrust is evident in the fact that, ever since its inception, and despite electoral changes, the parties in charge of the agency almost always belonged to the nationalist camp. While, as she further suggests, "the very existence of a policy on this area is connected to the project of bolstering Catalonia's level of autonomy," the political efforts invested in religious diversity as well as their direction are striking.

A brief look at the activities of the Secretariat of Religious Affairs reveals that its major aim and underlying logic was to undermine the institutional privileges of the Catholic Church by *pluralizing* the field of recognition. One of the first steps on the diversity agenda was the signing of agreements with religious minorities

in 2004 that officially recognized their presence and positive contribution to Catalan society. Importantly, a similar agreement was signed with the Lliga per la Laicitat (Alliance for Secularism), whereby secularist forces were integrated into governance networks and possible tensions effectively avoided. Conversely, through the agreements, the various religious communities committed themselves to recognizing pluralism and secularism as key values of the public sphere and promoting social cohesion, peaceful coexistence, and the Catalan language.[13] They also made them eligible for small funds to promote religious activities. Importantly, such funds already existed, but were hitherto available only to Catholics. Thus, instead of trying to empty the public sphere in response to religious diversity, as was attempted in Quebec, the main direction taken in Catalonia was to open the public sphere and to make access to it more egalitarian.[14]

In this vein, the agency also undertook an initiative to improve the representation of religious minorities in public television, in which formerly only Catholic celebrations were broadcast. As a result, the Jewish festival of Hanukkah and the Islamic Sacrifice Feast Eid-Al-Adha began to be covered—both in their respective sacred languages, Hebrew and Arabic, and in Catalan. As several directors of the agency and employees told me in interviews time and time again, many activities were geared toward celebrating religious diversity, making the existing religious diversity visible to the Catalan population and presenting Catalonia as a diverse society to the rest of the world. They were thus directed at two different publics. In fashioning Catalonia as a unified nation with a diverse population, they targeted a newly defined national subject. Simultaneously, governmental practices around religion also targeted the international community of nation-states by fashioning Catalonia as a worthy and legitimate member.

Significantly, the agency's activities often involved strong symbolic and ritual elements. The December 16, 2004, signing of the agreements with the religious minority communities was itself organized as a highly festive celebration for which representatives were invited to the Government Palace for the first time in history, and in the eyes of many it was only now that religious minorities moved out of the long shadow of Franco's National Catholicism. In the same spirit, they were now also invited, alongside other civil society organizations, to the annual breakfast at the Government Palace, which is celebrated on the holiday of the Catalan patron saint, Saint Jordi, on April 23. Initiated in 1931, this holiday is a particular expression of modern Catalan ceremonial nationalism, and on the official level its original religious meaning is maintained through a Catholic mass celebrated on this occasion in a chapel inside the palace. However, in the eyes of most Catalans Saint Jordi is a secular holiday, and it is striking how these Catholic practices persist even as Saint Jordi is culturally redefined as a celebration of secular nationalism and religious diversity. On one of the most Catalan days of the year, representatives of Sikhs, Protestants, Muslims, Jews, and others moved

solemnly through the mighty gates of the Government Palace with clear expressions of pride and happiness, as participants recalled. The official recognition of religious minorities, in the name of *laicitat*, as it were, thus went hand in hand with their recruitment to the national project and their movement from the margins to the center of this project.

This contrasts in an interesting way with Geneviève Zubrzycki's (2016: 126) description and analysis of the refashioning of the holiday of Quebec's patron saint, Saint John, as a "sacred secular" national holiday during the 1960s and 1970s. The parades organized on the occasion of this holiday, Zubrzycki (2016: 26) writes, "serve as the sites of both the performance and the subversion of an established national narrative embodied in the saint, providing the stage for the spectacular articulation of new secular national identity in the 1960s." In Catalonia, the articulation of a new national identity involves changes in its relationship with religion. However, instead of officially secularizing the day of the patron saint, as happened in Quebec, the Catalan government diversifies its religious references; it is the change in the composition of those invited to the ceremonial banquet—in other words, a change in those invited to the ceremony—that symbolizes and enacts the new national identity as one involving religious diversity. On the day of Saint Jordi, representatives of religious minorities are made to represent the Catalan nation.

At the same time, representatives of the government began visiting religious minorities in their places of worship, making their speeches partly in the sacred languages (e.g., Arabic and Hebrew). Other lines of activity involved the financial sponsorship of the Catalan Muslim Council, language courses for religious leaders, the granting of scholarships to outstanding representatives of different communities, and even the creation of a special award for achievements in field of secularism and respect for religious diversity called Memorial Cassiá Justo, given to outstanding personalities from the religious arena. I suggest that all these activities are practices of "ceremonial integration" in which religious diversity and religious identities are woven into the fabric of citizenship (see also Burchardt, Griera, and García-Romeral 2015).

The agreements with religious minorities also regulated the accommodation of minority practices in the fields of pastoral care and religious expressions in hospitals, prisons, schools, and cemeteries. In order to allow for the effective implementation of these agreements, the government passed four specific guidelines on the accommodation of religion in each of these fields that had hitherto been developed by the secretariat. Broadly, these guidelines make relatively generous offers to religious practitioners and thus confirm the notion that institutional and political responses to religious diversity lead to processes of demonopolization and diversification (Griera et al. 2015; Griera and Martínez-Ariño 2016), rather than to the banishing of religion from the public sphere.

In a personal interview in 2013, the former vice-president, Josep-Lluís Carod-Rovira, defined the mission of the agency as "to normalize the relationships between the government and the religious communities as well as atheists." In Catalan political discourse, the term "normalization" is normally used in conjunction with linguistic issues, and "linguistic normalization" is understood as the mainstreaming of Catalan as the standard language in all public institutions. Its use in the context of religion again suggests that the de-Catholicization and diversification of the religious field and linguistic homogenization are both seen as part of the same process of creating a modern nation.

On a higher legal level as well, Catalonia expanded its regulatory competences in governing religious issues. A new version of the Statute of Autonomy, the legal framework that determines the scope of regional political activity, was passed in 2006 and claimed jurisdiction over religion for the first time. Article 161 states that "the Generalitat [the government of Catalonia] has exclusive power over religious entities that carry out their activities in Catalonia. This power includes in any case the regulation and establishment of collaboration and cooperation mechanisms" (Griera 2016: 20).

Taken together, all of these regulatory practices and political initiatives have two political aims in common: nation building and religious diversification. Importantly, both aims highlight the desire to fashion and dramatize Catalonia's national distinctiveness and strengthen its symbolic boundaries vis-à-vis Spain. The main issue in explaining the different approaches to religious diversity is not that the Catalan concept of secularism is more generous toward religious minorities but that the context of existing national stereotypes favors it. Put differently, fashioning respect for religious diversity as typically Catalan makes cultural sense in the context of Catalan nationalism. I now briefly describe the Spanish legal framework in order to understand how it provides impulses for Catalan regulatory practices.

THE LEGAL REGULATION OF RELIGION IN SPAIN

The governance of religion in Spain has changed dramatically since the end of Franco's dictatorship in 1975. Following complicated negotiations, a new constitution was passed in 1978 declaring the state to be nonconfessional and neutral toward religion, recognizing the separation of church and state, and guaranteeing liberty of conscience. At the same time, the constitution stipulates that the state should establish cooperative relationships with the Catholic Church and other confessions. Drawing inspiration from other European countries with cooperative church-state relationships such as Italy and Germany, this legal construction is deeply shaped by the desire to compromise for the sake of national reconciliation that was shared across the political spectrum because of historical

memories of the Civil War (Linz 1991; Casanova 1994; Díaz-Salazar 2007; Miley 2015). Significantly, though, agreements on cooperation with the Church were signed just five days after the passing of the constitution. This demonstrates that they were clearly already part of the constitutional negotiations themselves and that they paved the way for the subsequent reinstitutionalization of Catholic privileges in the democratic context. Even more significant for securing Catholic privileges was the continuation of the Concordat between the Franco state and the Vatican signed in 1953 that has the legal status of an international treaty and granted the Church control over religious education, exempted the clergy from taxation, and offered state subsidies for religious personnel (Guia 2014; Astor 2014: 1719).[15]

In the midst of Franco's declining system of National Catholicism, a new Law on Religious Liberty had already been passed in 1967 that allowed non-Catholic associations to be registered. However, the new constitution necessitated this law being amended again, and in 1980 a new Organic Law on Religious Freedom was passed. This law encouraged and authorized the state to establish cooperative relationships with those religious communities that had achieved "deep rootedness" in Spanish society. Following requests from Jews and Protestants to be recognized in these terms, in 1984 the Spanish state declared that these communities had achieved this status, and in 1989 the Muslim Association of Spain petitioned for it as well. These acts of recognition were, in turn, the basis for the signing of official agreements between the Spanish state and the religious communities in 1992 that granted them a number of institutional privileges. Significantly, however, while raising the legal standing of a particular set of religious minorities to a higher level, the law also deepened the already entrenched divide between them and the Catholic Church. Whereas the law demanded that religious communities had to be registered in a special registry to enjoy the status of juridical personality, the Catholic Church was exempted from that demand on the basis of the agreements with the Vatican. During the consultations over the law, Catholic lobbyists successfully insisted that Catholicism constituted a legal reality of its own that was different from those of other religious communities.

The developments in Spain contrast strikingly with those in Canada. First, the historical timeline suggests that the political activism around the legal regulation of religion was not primarily a response to immigration but was instead animated by the impulse to transform Spain into a modern, democratic, and cosmopolitan society (Astor 2012). Part of this impulse was to cast off the stigma of Franco's dictatorship and to improve Spain's international image, which afterward, together with the country's improved economic situation, attracted millions of migrants from Africa, South Asia, and Latin America, who were then able to enjoy a hugely improved situation with regard to practicing their religion upon arrival compared to earlier historical periods.

Second, unlike Canadian law, which recognizes religion as an individual right in the abstract (while adding a more collective spin through policies of multiculturalism), Spanish law recognizes a concrete and specific set of religions, and the state engages in concrete relationships with them. Tying institutional privileges to this type of classification provides incentives not only for citizens but also for religious organizations to fashion themselves in such terms. This was apparent, for instance, in struggles in the Islamic field around questions of representation through umbrella bodies and in the eagerness of other religious communities to be recognized as deeply rooted. The Mormons achieved this status in 2003, the Jehovah's Witnesses in 2006, the Buddhists in 2007, and the Orthodox Church in 2010.

EMPHASIZING DIFFERENCE

How are Catalan practices related to the Spanish situation? Very generally, interviews with Catalan political actors show that they perceive Catholic privileges as a legacy of Spanish political influence over Catalan society. Representatives of the left camp especially viewed them as anachronistic. Such perceptions are clearly not unfounded, and for the general population, they acquire even greater plausibility because of the higher levels of secularization in Catalonia compared to the rest of Spain and, significantly, the self-perception, even among practicing Catholics, of Catalonia as an essentially secularized society. Most political actors shared the view of Catalonia as a secularized nation and specifically associated this with Catalan tendencies toward cosmopolitanism. A member of the Catalan UNESCO association for interreligious dialogue formulated this contrast as follows: "Because Catalans have been a persecuted minority, they respect minorities. But also simply there is much more diversity here. There are 400,000 Muslims. There are some 6,000 Sikhs. In Madrid you don't even find a photo of a Sikh. We have a great number of Jehovah's Witnesses, we have Mormons, we have Buddhists and all kinds of schools within Buddhism, we have New Age, any color of New Age that you can think of. Diversity is part of Catalonia's nature—in Madrid you find nothing like that." However, institutional actors and policy makers not only viewed Catalonia as more tolerant in cultural terms but also felt that the Spanish legal framework on religion was inadequate and restrictive for Catalonia, forcing them into activism while simultaneously constraining their authority. In another interview, a former director of the Secretariat of Religious Affairs argued, "I am convinced that Catalonia has a more open mentality than the rest of Spain. I am sure of that. Catalan people have always been oriented toward Europe, and Catalan culture itself was born from crosscutting cultural influence. We tried to build our 'Catalan model,' but it was only possible to a certain degree because of the Spanish laws that restrict us." We see here how Catalan policy makers are able to insist on the time-honored contrast to Spain, even

though, as we have seen, the Spanish legal framework on religion had already become considerably more pluralistic.

It is clear that, through the promotion of religious diversity, Catalan political actors seek to heighten national distinctiveness, and Catalan practices in governing religion effectively serve that end. Yet, in some ways their regulatory model also represents continuity with Spain. This is especially true with regard to the agreements the Catalan government signed with religious communities. Being inspired by the central state's agreements with Protestants, Jews, and Muslims, these agreements represent a type of governance that addresses people as members of specific religious categories and recognizes sets of particular religions rather than religion as an abstract right, as in Canada. It classifies citizens according to an established list of religious traditions replete with assumptions about members' beliefs, rituals, and spiritual needs. These emerging Catalan practices are therefore ideal-typical instances of what I call the "governmentality of religion." Pointing to a mode of power that rests on people's recruitment into governmental projects and their adherence to predefined social categories, the perspective of governmentality suggests that regimes of religious diversity not only recognize but also govern religious identities. Construing religious diversity as a mode of governmentality means focusing on how the state is actively involved in shaping religious sensibilities and practices.

Importantly, Catalan governmental practices not only entail the guaranteeing of religious rights but also encourage bureaucrats and governmental employees of all kinds to consider new citizens as religious practitioners. The secretariat's training courses for state employees are a good example of this. As the responsible officer told me, "These are not only about the question of religious freedom but really for employees to improve their knowledge about the different religions. So they learn what is a Jew? What is Muslim? What do Protestants believe in? These are theological courses. So that's one thing. The other is training in the management of religious diversity as an everyday challenge." Bureaucratic practices such as those described here imply that religious diversity not only is a property of the population and a way of classifying people but enters the state apparatus itself. The Catalan state offers a whole series of courses to its functionaries, as it considers it necessary for them to have a knowledge of people's religion in order to be able to attend to them properly. A knowledge of religion is thus transformed into a bureaucratic skill that employees should cultivate, as this is seen as helping them manage a population of a diversity of citizens.

This presence of religion in the state apparatus became even more prominent when, after a change of government in 2012, the responsibility for preparing and running the training courses was taken away from the secretariat's employees and outsourced to an external provider, the so-called Permanent Working Group on Religion. This group, however, is not an academic consultancy but consists of representatives of different religions. As a consequence, the training of government

in religious issues is now based on the religious perspectives of theologians, as opposed to the theologically detached approach that academic consultants typically employ.[16] On the municipal level as well, interfaith initiatives have been active in creating mechanisms of governance and in infiltrating the sphere of the state. As Griera and Forteza (2011: 121–122) point out, they have acquired more powerful roles in public bureaucracies by advising local government on religious issues, lobbying for religious rights, disseminating the discourse on religious diversity, and becoming brokers in social conflicts. In addition, the new government of Arturo Mas also formed an Advisory Council on Religious Diversity, this time consisting of university professors, which created yet another avenue of communication between the state and religious traditions and buttressed the presence of religious diversity in the public domain.

In general, the responses to the training courses were very positive, and government employees participating in them did not appear to have objections to such interactions with clerics in their work. Among the secretariat's employees, who used to offer these courses as well, no one felt that there was any reluctance on the part of the participants, not even toward issues related to Islam. While this is already striking in itself, given the widespread European perceptions of Islam as a problem, the growing distance of Catalans themselves from religion, and the fact that almost all state employees are nonimmigrants, the contrast with Quebec is even more fascinating. There are no comparable administrative units charged with the governance of religious diversity in Quebec, and it would seem highly unlikely that similar activities would be appreciated, even if they were legally possible, in the Quebec context.[17] I argue that the basic force behind these divergences is different cultural concepts of secularity that I address in the following section.

Importantly, the activities of Catalonia's Secretariat of Religious Affairs are directed not only at government staff but also at the religious minorities' own communities. As already mentioned, secretariat staff act as brokers in cases of conflict between religious communities and municipalities or other social groups. But they also train, counsel, and coach religious groups on how to register their communities, how to open and manage places of worship in conformity with Catalan law, how to keep records of the community's finances, and how to manage good relationships with neighborhood communities. Catalan bureaucratic practices are thus geared toward shaping religious communities according to legal standards. The financial subsidies to which religious minority communities are entitled on the basis of the governmental agreements are intended to aid this process. In Barcelona, for instance, one source of the tense relationship between Latin American Evangelical congregations and residential communities is noise. Often their places of worship have no license and no noise protection, leading to residents' complaints. After the councilor of one district approached higher political levels, these Evangelical congregations were encouraged to apply

for subsidies to introduce soundproofing in order to guarantee that religious diversity works smoothly in everyday life.

While conflicts over the presence of religious minorities in the urban space were widespread and enduring, concerns over the accommodation of religious minority practices in public institutions that was so pervasive in Quebec were virtually unknown in Catalonia. In my interviews, people on all political and administrative levels—from ministers and state secretaries to secretariat employees and local councilors—agreed that accommodations were largely unproblematic, and they had difficulties recalling and citing cases of conflict. A former director of the secretariat insisted, "No, really, in the schools there is respect for religious diversity, and in hospitals and prisons as well. They offer different types of food and chaplaincy, and there was never any conflict or complaint." Moreover, Catalan politicians and administrative officers were surprised to hear that such issues were controversial in Quebec, as they believed that Canada was way ahead of themselves in solving problems with diversity.

This begs the question of why this was so. One possible answer is that religious minorities in Catalonia simply felt that there was nothing to complain about, as the generous policies toward religious diversity satisfied their needs and desires. Indeed, the accommodation of Protestants, Muslims, and other minorities in prisons and hospitals seems to run very smoothly, and the problem of adapting funeral services to the changed religious landscape has also largely been solved, whereas in Quebec these issues have been fraught with conflict (Griera et al. 2015; Martínez-Ariño et al. 2015; García-Romeral and Martínez-Ariño 2012). In public schools, by contrast, accommodation by and large exists only on paper, as religious education catering for minorities is virtually nonexistent.

Another and probably more important part of the answer is that the presence of religious minorities, especially Muslims and Sikhs, is much more recent in Catalonia than in Quebec. Especially among first-generation immigrants to Catalonia, concerns over establishing a home and making material improvements to their lives seemed to override concern over cultural rights in significance. Catalan religious minorities thus refrained from making complaints about their official recognition during the first period of their residence in the host society. In Quebec, by contrast, minorities had already had more time to acquire the social status, skills, and networks that allowed them to frame and pursue their religious interests more rigorously, as well as an awareness of their rights in the Canadian legal framework.[18] The duration of presence thus seems to have a paradoxical effect. While one may think that, over time, institutional adjustments and immigrant integration would lead to a leveling of religious controversies, in Quebec the opposite was the case. The comparatively generous situation regarding religious rights and the prominent role of legal mechanisms in Canada actually seem to favor higher levels of religious conflict, as they encourage religious groups to make demands on the state. This is especially true because the court

system has proved to be open to minority claims and legal routes are promising avenues, as illustrated earlier in this chapter.

In addition, Catalan nationalist parties have consistently targeted and involved Muslim, Sikh, and Hindu immigrants in their political campaigns and have sought their support, for instance, by promising immediate naturalization in the future independent Catalan nation-state. On numerous occasions, they have highlighted the role of foreign-born politicians as members of parliament and the case of Najat Driouech as the first Muslim woman in the Catalan parliament and the first deputy to wear the Islamic veil. In Quebec, no comparable discourse exists that uses diversity to buttress nationalist claims.

Finally, state-sponsored efforts to settle religious conflicts in Catalonia appear more effective than comparable practices in Quebec. In Catalonia, the state has invested many resources in the development of a wide network of cultural mediators, counselors, and civic associations to identify potential conflicts early on, keep them low-profile, and solve them silently on a case-by-case basis. The Canadian principle of reasonable accommodation, by contrast, while designed to ameliorate situations of conflict, has in many cases worked to harden and exacerbate them.

In the following section, I now turn to the ways in which "secularity" and "secularism" have been defined in contestations over the governance of religious diversity in Quebec and Catalonia. My aim is to show how historically inherited models of secularity became subject to debate and renegotiation, that different models actually competed in both settings, albeit to varying degrees, and that shifts in these models contributed to reorientations in practices of governing religion.

CONSTITUTIONALIZING SECULARITY IN QUEBEC: THE CHARTER OF QUEBEC VALUES

On September 10, 2013, conflicts surrounding the governance of religious diversity reached a new climax when, after several announcements and leaks of information, first informally and later in a near-perfect, spin-doctor-driven fashion, the government of Pauline Marois and her party, PQ, presented its proposal for a Charter of Quebec Values. About a month later, on November 7, Bernhard Drainville, minister of democratic institutions and active citizenship, officially presented the charter under the title "Bill 60: Charter Affirming the Values of State Secularism and Religious Neutrality and of Equality Between Women and Men, and Providing a Framework for Accommodation Requests" in the Quebec parliament. In doing so, he took a major step in fulfilling promises made during the electoral campaign in the run-up to the provincial election in September 2012 to give secularism a more prominent place in Quebec society.

In a policy document titled "Because We Believe in Our Values," which was part of a package of promotional materials published in parallel with the charter

plans, the government justified its plans by arguing that the "accommodation crisis" was not yet over and that there was a need to define clear legal rules on acceptable accommodations and on religious diversity in Quebec's institutions. Significantly, however, while during the electoral campaign the project was still called Charter of Secularism, it had in the meantime been renamed Charter of Quebec Values and now centered on what the PQ considered the triad of core national values: the secular nature of state institutions, equality between women and men, and the primacy of the French language as the means of public communication. In keeping with this framing, the government suggested that while gender equality and the primacy of the French language had already been legally enshrined in Quebec's framework of rights and freedoms (through the Charter of the French Language in 1974 and an amendment to Quebec's Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 2008, respectively), the separation of state and religions remained to be formalized and officially protected. In the document, the secularization of state institutions is described as a necessary step toward achieving state neutrality toward religion, which is in turn portrayed as central to fulfilling the state's obligation to guarantee the right to equality and respect for all citizens. Finally, the secularization of state institutions is depicted as the most effective source of social cohesion in a religiously pluralizing society.

The charter consisted of five proposals, namely to inscribe the value of secularism in the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, to establish a duty of religious neutrality and reserve for state personnel, to limit the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols by state employees, to make it mandatory to have one's face uncovered when providing or receiving government service, and to establish an implementation policy for religious-related accommodations for all government organizations. The most controversial aspect of this package of proposals soon turned out to be the ban on religious symbols for state employees, as this was envisaged to apply to each and every employee, from judges in courts all the way to people working in day care centers, hospitals, schools, and universities, as well as health and social service institutions. With this proposal, the government had shifted the balance strongly between individual freedom of religion and state neutrality toward the latter, arguing that state neutrality implied not so much the neutral treatment by the state of all citizens regardless of their religion as the stripping of religious markers of everybody deemed to represent the state. According to my interviews with members of Quebec's Human Rights Commission, this was a fundamental inversion of the hitherto dominant understanding of religious neutrality in Canadian jurisprudence. In addition, the proposal clearly contravened the respective recommendation of the Bouchard-Taylor Report, which limited the obligation of religiously neutral appearance to employees holding positions of high political and judicial power such as judges.

While the charter sought to restrict the wearing of religious symbols by state employees radically, it simultaneously aimed to protect the visible presence of

what proponents considered the "historic cultural heritage" of Quebec. Central to the debate in this regard was a crucifix placed over the seat of the Speaker at the National Assembly in Quebec City. In 2007 the former leader of the PQ, André Boisclair, had already drawn attention to the crucifix, which he saw as illegitimate. Subsequently, this religious object was also debated during the hearings of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission. In their final report, Bouchard and Taylor (2008: 152–153) advocated the removal of the crucifix, stating "that the very site where elected representatives deliberate and legislate should not be identified with a specific religion" and that this was "in keeping with the notion of the separation of Church and State." Famously, just hours after the release of their report, the Quebec parliament voted unanimously in support of keeping the crucifix in the parliament hall. Prime Minister Charest from the Liberal Party declared that the crucifix was symbolic of Quebec's religious heritage and culture: "The National Assembly reiterates its desire to promote the language, history, culture and values of the *nation québécoise*, foster the integration of each person into our nation in the spirit of openness and reciprocity, and express its attachment to our religious and historic patrimony, represented, among other things, by the crucifix in the Blue Room and our coat of arms, which adorns our institutions."

Given the significance of the crucifix in these earlier debates, it was hardly surprising that it would also become an issue of contestation in the context of the charter discussions. Yet the extent to which the PQ as the political heir of the secularized generation of the Quiet Revolution took up the discourse of religion as cultural heritage was intriguing, as well as disappointing for secularist sections of the population. In the document "Because We Believe in Our Values," the government proposed that the charter "should take into account the existence of iconic and toponymic elements of the cultural heritage of Quebec that reflect its historical pathway," quickly making it clear that this provision also protected the crucifix in the Blue Room. Importantly, it did so by recognizing it not as a *religious* symbol but as a testimony to Quebec's history and culture and thus relied on the secularization of the crucifix's metonymic content. The charter proposal was thus driven by the dual impulse to secularize the public sphere through the banning of personal religious symbols and to secularize Catholic symbols by declaring them to be part of history.[19] Of course, this discursive strategy had unequal effects, as it delegitimized minority symbols and simultaneously sanctified (post-)Catholic-majority symbols, ensuring their continued presence.[20] On another information sheet, the charter even proposed that the "recognition of a common historic heritage" was itself a value that defined Quebec society.[21]

The presentation of the charter under the slogan "We Believe in Our Values" raises a number of intriguing and complex questions: First, of course, who is the "We" that is invoked in this slogan, to defend "Our" values? And who is the constitutive Other of this collectivity? And in what way is the "historic heritage" common

to (all) Quebeckers? The framing of the charter clearly led to an uneasy merging of potentially universal rights (such as gender equality) and particularist markers of a re-ethnicized national identity. For many, this framing not only raised the question of why, or in what way, gender equality was a specifically national "Quebec" value, in other words, a value of a culturally defined, bounded community that is discursively organized around a shared national identity but also had the effect of placing laïcité within this tension between claims to universal rights and claims to particularist collective identities. Was laïcité, within the logic of this discourse, a universal legal precept or, on the contrary, part of Quebec's national identity? And under what conditions could laïcité serve both purposes simultaneously? Moreover, the use of the verb "*croire*/believe" in the slogan seemed to draw a parallel between religious beliefs and one's commitment to political values, but therefore also to contrast the two: as two sets of beliefs that potentially compete over positioning in collectively sanctioned hierarchies of values and beliefs.

This set of questions was further reinforced and given more social traction as, along with its charter plans, the government published a number of visual depictions that could be accessed through its website, circulated through news media and social media, and also posted on large advertising billboards, for instance, in Montreal's subway stations. In one of them, the words "Church, Synagogue, Mosque. These are sacred," "Religious neutrality of the state, equality of men and women. These are also sacred," and "A firm belief in our values" were juxtaposed in columns and set against a background of gray stone (figures 2.1a and 2.1b). The stone itself resembled those used in many church buildings in Quebec, but it also evoked an association with the Ten Commandments written on stone tablets (see also Zubrzycki 2016: 160).

Again, more significant seems the way in which (presumably) secular values such as the religious neutrality of the state and gender equality, on the one hand, and religious places (church, synagogue, mosque), on the other, are juxtaposed as if they existed in competition with one another and as if they had distinct and clearly separable genealogies. Within this conceptualization, these separate genealogies appear to imply that the sacred nature of places of worship can be assumed, while secular values are yet to be sacralized and thus "also" rendered sacred; they have to be affirmed in their dual sacrality as values of secular modernity and of the Québécois nation. This is indeed precisely one of the meanings that one section of the supporters of the charter wished to convey. Understanding how these separations were discursively constructed and accomplished is a major element in explaining the phenomenal rise of laïcité in debates around religious diversity in Quebec and in understanding how laïcité was defined in these contestations.

The construction of the collective subject that is interpellated in the slogan "We Believe in Our Values" was addressed both discursively but also pictorially in another visual depiction that the government produced (figure 2.2). This

FIGURE 2.1a. Informational material from Quebec's government on the Charter of Quebec Values.

consisted of two posters with colored drawings depicting non-ostentatious religious symbols that would be allowed for state employees and also ostentatious symbols that would be forbidden. According to this definition, earrings, rings, and necklaces with small crosses were non-ostentatious, while turbans, yarmulkes, headscarves, and face veils were ostentatious. If the collective subject believes in the national values of Quebec and sacralizes laïcité as one of these values, then those who used ostentatious religious symbols—Sikhs, Muslims, Orthodox Jews, and Christians—and still demand the right to work in a state institution were clearly excluded from the national community.

These observations broadly reverberate with Mahmood's (2015: 23) argument that "the modern secular state is not simply a neutral arbiter of religious differences; it also produces and creates them." It does so by defining and distinguishing legitimate from "exaggerated" religious expressions. Religious studies scholars have argued that the very idea of exaggerated or ostentatious religious objects hinges on the assumption that religion is or, in the first place, should be a private and personal matter of belief—the legally protected *forum internum*—and that it is only from this perspective that the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols becomes tantamount to proselytism (see also the comment by Cuthbertson; *Immanent Frame* 2014). It is this understanding, or misunderstanding, as some would argue, about religion that serves to justify the considerable limitations of religious freedom implied in the charter. On the one hand, the charter was inspired by the demand that the state should not be identified with any religion. On the other hand, however, it also sought to protect and authorize a particular secular sensibility legally, namely the desire not to be confronted with religion.



FIGURE 2.1b. Informational material from Quebec's government on the Charter of Quebec Values.

FIGURE 2.2. Informational material from Quebec's government on the Charter of Quebec Values.

Paradoxically, while secularists typically claim that religion is a private affair, their activism necessarily contributed to turning it into a public issue. In the context of the charter debates, it did so in a particular way. Whereas, as mentioned before, Canadian law does not recognize religion by granting privileges to particular religious traditions, the banning of certain religious symbols clearly identifies particular traditions and effectively classifies people as members of these

communities (and not others). It thus created distinctive subclasses of citizens according to the kind of self-identifying symbols people may display. Paradoxically, secularist campaigns to ban certain religious symbols in Quebec may therefore have the same effect on the governmentality of religious diversity as the explicit recognition of specific religious traditions in Spain's framework of "deep rootedness." They incite people to consider themselves in terms of the religious categories and symbols they are offered and to link these symbols to religion as a part of their "identity." I thus concur with Hurd (2015: 41) that "claims to secularism, religious tolerance or interfaith understanding cannot be disentangled from these specific histories of the construal and management of 'religion' as a matter of difference and governance."

In chapter 1, I distinguished between secularism as a philosophical and ideological program and secularity as the culturally, institutionally, and symbolically anchored forms and arrangements of the differentiation between the religious and nonreligious spheres in society. In addition, I introduced the notion of multiple secularities and argued that cultures of secularity document specific histories of social conflict and the competing influence of different understandings or interpretations of secularity on current arrangements. While the introductory chapter has shown how Quebec's particular pathway of secularization was an outcome of its colonial history, I suggest that contestations over religious diversity in the recent past demonstrate the ultimately discursive dominance of the model of secularity for the sake of national unity. The rise of this model, however, was hotly contested, as can be illustrated by charting the different positions various social and political actors adopted toward the charter.

DEFINING SECULARITY, MARKING NATIONAL BOUNDARIES

Publication of the plans for the Charter of Quebec Values produced an immediate media outcry and massive debates. And, as so often is the case, the Francophone and Anglophone media clearly differed with regard to their evaluation of the proposal, with the Anglophone media generally displaying a much more critical attitude toward it in both coverage and editorial commentary. Politically as well, the contrast between the responses of political parties at the federal level and in Quebec was stark. At the federal level, all political parties clearly rejected the proposal, while in Quebec the political landscape was strongly divided. In addition, this division was further reflected in the levels of support the charter plans garnered among the different population groups in Quebec. According to a poll carried out in January 2014, 60 percent of Quebeckers favored banning the wearing of religious symbols by state employees. However, among the Francophone community, 68 percent supported the proposal, while 67 percent of those with mother tongues other than French were opposed to it, revealing a dramatic

linguistic split (Hamilton 2014). Furthermore, in the rest of Canada popular support for the charter proposal was much lower than in Quebec.

The Charter of Quebec Values thus had two immediate consequences. On the one hand, it served to accentuate the boundaries between Canada and Quebec to mark the fundamental difference between the Canadian and Québécois models of society—Canada as only loosely integrated, Quebec as built on social cohesion—by inscribing Quebec's distinctiveness with regard to its valorization of the secular public sphere in the legal order. On the other hand, it also served to re-ethnicize Quebec nationalism, as shown by the difference in support between Francophones and other mother-tongue speakers.[22] The charter plans were indeed uniquely tailored to the cultural sensibilities of Quebeckers of French ancestry, with their dual emphasis on the Quiet Revolution and laïcité as their historical achievement and Catholicism as *their* cultural heritage.

The charter plans follow up on earlier discussions in Quebec about the negative impact of multiculturalism as an institutional response to immigration and cultural diversity on their society. Quebeckers criticized multiculturalism for denying the recognition of their status as a founding nation and emphasizing differences rather than commonalities and thus felt it to be deeply inappropriate for Quebec. In many conversations with Quebeckers, I heard the proverbial description of multicultural Canada as a hotel in which each different group stays in its own room, whereas Quebeckers endorsed and cherished a shared public sphere with a more integrative form and level of sociality. In order to account for these criticisms of multiculturalism, the Quebec state responded by developing its own immigration and integration policies, passing the Charter of the French Language in 1977 and formulating its own paradigm of interculturalism. This paradigm expressed this greater desire for social integration and combined it with respect for immigrants' culture of origin, but also envisioned "cultural convergence" in the long run (Dupré 2012: 237). In this paradigm, the integrative, "nationalizing" mechanism was the French language, whose dominance in public institutions was justified through the doctrine of "liberal nationalism" and also endorsed by liberal intellectuals such as Charles Taylor. While some academics developed elaborate theories of interculturalism (Bouchard 2012), many observers felt that interculturalism was rather multiculturalism by a different name, though it still fulfilled the function of satisfying the Québécois desire for national distinctiveness. In an interview, a member of the Mouvement Laïque Québécois suggested to me, "Quebeckers say they reject multiculturalism because it's Canadian and what we advocate is interculturalism. But I have studied that. It's two names for exactly the same thing. Remember the Commission, the multiculturalist philosopher Charles Taylor and the interculturalism theorist Gérard Bouchard both signed the same report, so obviously it means the same thing."

In one sense, the charter plans merely rehearsed discussions about immigrant integration and Quebec's national distinctiveness. In another sense, however, they shifted these debates much more strongly toward the governance of religious diversity and secularism. Since the beginning of the "accommodation crisis," it was more and more the governance of religious diversity that became the focus of concerns over social and cultural difference. Anxieties over the extent to which cultural difference could be tolerated without compromising on the notion of national unity focused increasingly on religious difference (Bouchard 2010; Dupré 2012). As a result, political and popular demands around the governance of religious diversity and religious claims as well as the very perceptions of legitimate boundaries between the secular and religious spheres in society were increasingly organized around the notion of secularity for the sake of national unity. In other words, secularity was presumed to be a solution to the problems of defining the nation and demarcating the public sphere as its symbolic and topological center.

Significantly, this also implied a dramatic restaging of the idea that, as a nation without state, Quebec was subject to a dual threat, being exposed to influence from Canada on the one hand and to the impact of immigrants and their claims to citizenship and cultural difference on the other. In fact, within nationalist discourses, both of these threats are construed as mutually reinforcing, as the Canadian influence that undermines Quebec's sovereignty manifests itself precisely in prescribing particular ways of integrating immigrants and of offering them "reasonable accommodations."

In some ways, the general elections of October 2018 have unsettled the time-honored frame of federalist versus separatist nationalism. The landslide victory of the rather new party Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) meant that for the first time since 1966 a party other than the Liberals or the PQ came into power. CAQ describes itself as nationalist and demands more competences from the Canadian state while clearly disavowing the project of full national sovereignty outside the Canadian federation. Simultaneously, the CAQ espouses strongly nationalist tones in immigration debates favoring values and language tests for immigrants and has become the new champion of a Charter of Secularism that should prohibit the wearing of religious symbols by police officers and teachers and reduce the scope for "reasonable accommodations." In other words, while popular and political evaluations of the "sovereignist option" have shifted over the last two decades, the close links between laïcité and nationalism have endured.

QUEBEC'S LAÏCITÉ: INDIGENOUS OR IMPORTED?

The entwining of the discourses on secularism and sovereignist nationalism as ways of reinforcing the boundaries between Quebec and Canada is especially

important in the light of widespread perceptions that Quebec's elites modeled their notion of laïcité on France. In typological terms, there are clear similarities between French laïcité and Quebec's proposal of laïcité. Many of the debates around religious diversity in France and Quebec focus on the same issues and types of problems. In addition, legal terms such as "ostentatious religious symbols" seem to have been directly adopted from discourses in France. In fact, there seems to be a dynamic of cultural and institutional diffusion within Western Francophone countries, which also include Belgium and Switzerland, in which debates are first developed in France and subsequently imported by other Francophone nations.

Such transfers take place through media debates, as well as through the communication networks of intellectuals, politicians, and, significantly, the legal profession and academic elites. Amelie Barras (2012) has shown how secularism as an authoritative discourse that defined acceptable expressions of religion has spread and been appropriated in the legal arenas of the United Nations and the European Court of Human Rights. My interviews with legal experts, secular intellectuals, and academic elites also clearly showed the numerous connections between Quebec and France, whose outcomes are today often expressed through the shared commitment to the political philosophy of republicanism and the republican notion of the public sphere.[23] The very prominence of the notion of Republicanism in contemporary Quebec was born out of critical debates on religious diversity and the perception that the presence of religious markers in the public sphere imperils the concept of shared and universal citizenship.

However, while these typological similarities between France and Quebec, as well as the multiple connections that exist between them, matter for understanding Quebec secularity, they fail to explain the impact and force of laïcité in Quebec as a discourse on national identity. I suggest that the relationship between Canada and Quebec is just as or perhaps more important for this explanation than influences from France. It is the cultural labor invested in marking the cultural and political boundaries with Canada that affords secularism its cultural significance in Quebec and that feeds into the culture of secularity for the sake of national unity.

With regard to the question of how to study secularism in a non-Western context, Nilüfer Göle (2015: 56) argued that one may either postulate that secularism is an alien ideology in non-Western civilizations or decouple the secular and Western civilization, and explore secularism's multiple formations in different historical and religious contexts. In addition, she cautions that both positions are problematic if they do not take into account the ways in which Western secularism travels to different contexts through different forms of cultural and political interaction. I suggest that these observations also bear on the ways in which we conceptualize the governance of religious diversity and secularism in stateless nations such as Quebec and Catalonia as internal peripheries of Western moder-

nity. In both Quebec and Catalonia, cultural and political references to France influence and shape the political prominence of secularism. However, as I also argued in chapter 1, the particular interpretations of secularism are to greater degrees an outcome of troubled histories of state formation and nation building in which the discursive labor of producing and marking cultural difference vis-à-vis the dominant nation-state (Canada and Spain) is a central part of the practices through which secularism acquires distinct meaning and political force.

This formulation raises the question of whether in this context there is a hierarchical relationship between secularism and nationalism—in other words, whether secularism is subordinated to the national cause and deployed rather instrumentally, or whether, conversely, secularists have tacitly accepted that their project of secularization was adopted by independence-minded nationalists and viewed as the price to be paid for achieving their aims. Several observers regarded the Charter of Quebec Values as just one building block in the agenda of reviving the project of national independence in the longer run. Many critics of the charter from the legal profession, especially from law faculties and the Quebec bar, pointed out that the charter violated both the Canadian and the Quebec Charters of Rights and Freedoms and that it would not pass the courts if appealed (see, for instance, the comment by Georges Leroux of the Université du Québec à Montréal; *Immanent Frame* 2014). However, the minister in charge, Bernard Drainville, had already indicated that he was ready to modify the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms if necessary. It is not unlikely that a possible Canadian Supreme Court decision against the charter would have provided a new boost to the project of national independence and that the PQ was ready to sacrifice secularism temporarily in the court to that end.

In postcolonial societies such as India, an important aspect of negotiations over secularism concerns the question of secularism's cultural match. Some argue that secularism is doomed to remain a culturally alien concept because of its Western genealogy (Madan 1998; Nandy 1998). Others (e.g., Bhargava 2010) claim that there is a specifically Indian genealogy of secularism that needs to be recognized. Similarly, in public discourses in Quebec the question of whether secularism has historical roots in Quebec society is turned into an argument over its legitimacy. More specifically, this is typically discussed in terms of the rise of the word laïcité itself. In my interviews, critics of secularism typically claimed that the word was virtually unknown to Quebeckers until the 1990s and acquired any degree of prominence only in the debates about religion in education. While recognizing that use of the concept "exploded" with the "accommodation crisis" and the distinction between "open" and "closed laïcité" that took shape in the context of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission (see, for instance, Lefebvre 2008), critics such as Weinstock (2007: 22) trace this explosion back to the publication of the Stasi Report in France and its reception in Quebec. In general, critics claim that laïcité is poorly adjusted to Quebec's legal landscape.

Supporters of laïcité refuted this argument by suggesting that Quebec's historical development in the twentieth century clearly evinces laïcité as a driving force, even when the word itself was not used.

In her detailed analysis of the use of the words "laïcité," "secularism," and "secularity" in Quebec policy documents, Pauline Côté (2008: 56) shows that laïcité started its conceptual career in a report of Quebec's Council on the Status of Women in 1995 and was defined as an essential condition of pluralism and a prominent value of feminism in 1997. Subsequently the concept was used chiefly in documents regarding public education and immigration, for instance, those of the Council of Intercultural Relations, which had already called for a "governmental declaration on laïcité" in 2004.

Finally, by September 2013 laïcité had become, in the words of the president of Quebec's Council on the Status of Women, "the top of the priorities, because it's in the news." Asked about the significance of laïcité in the work of the council compared to other topics, she told me, "We just have to work on this now, nothing else! You know, everybody is completely obsessed with laïcité now."

TAKING SECULARISM TO THE STREETS: MOBILIZATIONS AND COUNTERMOBILIZATIONS

However, by September 2013 laïcité was not only in the news but also on the streets, as, just a few days after the publication of the charter plans, both supporters and opponents began to organize and mobilize. The first demonstration took place on September 14, when several thousand people gathered in Montreal's Place Émilie-Gamelin and later marched for two kilometers through the city center in order to protest against the plans. It was organized by emerging groupings such as Québec Inclusif as well as umbrella bodies of religious communities. Members of these communities, including many migrants and their families, had intentionally dressed up in religious clothing and were wearing ostentatious religious symbols. On self-designed posters, protesters demanded respect, asked for peaceful coexistence and freedom of expression, and facetiously insisted that "Quebec already has a Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (figure 2.3).

Combining the idea of cultural heritage and the planned prohibition of ostentatious religious symbols, one poster showed images of Jeanne Mance and Émilie Gamelin, two famous female Catholic figures, wearing the traditional Catholic headscarf, claiming that "the hijab is part of Quebec's Heritage!" (figure 2.4). At the end of the demonstration, the philosopher Charles Taylor gave a speech to the protesters in which he denounced the charter plans as ill conceived, divisive, and discriminatory.

Some Jewish organizations criticized the timing of the demonstration, which took place on the day of Yom Kippur, the most important Jewish holiday (Shingler

FIGURE 2.3. Demonstration against the Charter of Quebec Values in downtown Montreal in September 2013. (Photo by the author.)

2013). Thus, ironically the supporters of "reasonable accommodation" had failed to accommodate this significant minority.

On September 22 the charter's supporters also took to the streets, also gathering in Place Émilie-Gamelin. As might have been expected, most participants were white Francophones whose main paraphernalia were Quebec flags, but there were also some members of ethnic minority communities (figure 2.5). An analysis of the posters that demonstrators had prepared and brought to the meeting reveals the shared and dominant views of religion among charter supporters, but also some cleavages. One dominant thrust of the posters was to portray religion in negative terms as radical and retrograde. Thus, posters demanded that regression should not be tolerated ("Regressión, c'est non!"), claimed that "Religion makes people stupid ("la religion abrutit l'être humain"), and stated that "Fundamentalism is not a Quebec Value." Similarly, a small group of migrants of North African origin proclaimed that "North Africans are with you to support progress in Quebec and not to go back [*non le faire reculer*]." Slogans such as "Leave your religions at the doors of the state," "Duty to reserve in BOTH political and religious matters for public employees," "Laïcité unites, religion divides," and "Laïcité for Peace!," by contrast, were more specifically concerned with laïcité, claiming that only a secular public sphere can guarantee harmonious

FIGURE 2.4. Demonstration against the Charter of Quebec Values in downtown Montreal in September 2013. (Photo by the author.)

social coexistence (figure 2.6).[24] All of these expressions reverberate with the notion that Quebec's modernity is chiefly a result of "overcoming religion" and that because this was a historical achievement it was fundamental, as secular Quebeckers never tired of asserting, "not to go back."

Next to the criticism of religion and the praise of laïcité, some expressions made more specific historical references. Protesters demanded, for instance, that "Quebec must stand up instead of being on her knees," that "Quebec has the power to make its choice and to say no!" (figure 2.7), and that "Quebeckers remain the master of their choices and make their values sacred." In addition, one protester asked, "When will we stop excusing ourselves for who we are, to feel guilty about existing? Be yourself in order to be free! Vigilance! Je me souviens!" These expressions draw on and revive the national imaginaries that motivated protagonists of the Quiet Revolution, namely that, because of their history as a colonized people, French Canadians had carried within them a false consciousness, and that it was only through a radical act of self-assertion that they could hope to liberate themselves and, as the famous slogan from the late 1950s proclaimed, become "masters in their own house." These expressions resonate with the image of the "sheep" that Zubrzycki (2016: 143) described as one of the key tropes of the Quiet Revolution: "The sheep is where old fears and national

FIGURE 2.5. Demonstration in favor of the Charter of Quebec Values in downtown Montreal in September 2013. (Photo by the author.)

FIGURE 2.6. Demonstration in favor of the Charter of Quebec Values in downtown Montreal in September 2013. (Photo by the author.)

FIGURE 2.7. Demonstration in favor of the Charter of Quebec Values in downtown Montreal in September 2013. (Photo by the author.)

complexes survive. It is a reminder of 'who we were' and 'who we no longer want to be.'" For the protesters, it is now no longer in relation to the Anglo-Canadians but to new religious immigrants that Quebeckers need to "kill the sheep inside them" in order to assert their liberty.

However, participants were also divided between those who were still inspired by the anticlerical sentiments that accompanied the Quiet Revolution and those who were prepared to defend "heritage Catholicism" as a part of their national identity. One participant held up a poster stating that the "Charter also applies to all Crucifixes," thus implicitly demanding the removal of this vestigial Catholic symbol from the National Assembly.

However, sociologically more significant than the differences between the two camps are two similarities. First, the charter's supporters and opponents both justified their positions by presenting themselves as defenders of the Quebec nation. Although Patriote flags were considerably more numerous in the demonstrations of the charter's supporters, it is highly symbolic that many Muslim girls and women who participated in the anti-charter protest used Quebec flags as hijabs. Second, both supporters and opponents of the charter defended their positions in the name of laïcité, supporters prioritizing what they called "laïcité sans adjectif" and opponents demanding "open laïcité." This very clearly

illustrates once again the ways in which the secular can be mobilized for different, if not mutually opposed, purposes.

HISTORICAL PATHWAYS AND MYTHS: "COMPLETING THE QUIET REVOLUTION"

In the introductory chapter, I have shown how the Quiet Revolution became the critical juncture at which Quebec was set on the pathway of major social transformations and how these transformations are popularly perceived as catapulting people into modernity, thereby turning the Quiet Revolution into the most powerful myth of modern Quebec. Central to this myth are intimate associations between the dismantling of the power of the Catholic Church, social and economic progress and personal liberation, and the firm conviction that the latter two—progress and liberation—were possible only through the secularization of the state, modernity thus being achieved over and against religion.[25]

Significantly, certain logics of secularity become more powerful than others if they resonate with cultural meanings circulating in society and the symbols that express them. I suggest that resonance is, among other things, created through a politics of history, by which I mean the ways in which the retelling of history is skillfully used in political controversy and politically exploited with a view to legitimating certain policies and laws. I register such politics of history in terms of the mobilization of cultural memories that come to life through the retelling of history.

Historical references clearly occupied a central place in the discourse of the supporters of the Charter of Quebec Values and directly motivated some of the government's documents regarding it. In particular, the document "We Believe in Our Values" (Government of Quebec 2013) is shot through with references to Quebec history in which this history itself becomes an argument on how to govern religious diversity. At the very top, it states, "In keeping with the continuity of Quebec's historical trajectory, the government wishes to express this reality of the separation of the state and religions." This reading is guided by an underlying teleology according to which Quebec's history unfolded as a history of liberation and the outcomes of liberation must be secured by legal action. There is thus a parallel desire to seal history on the one hand, but also to make and particularly "fulfill" or ratify history. The latter is illustrated at several places in the text where the government suggests that "it is the first time" that the idea of state neutrality toward religion has become legally enshrined in Quebec and that "the time has come to give the principle of *laïcité* formal recognition, which expresses its veritable importance as a fundamental value at the heart of Quebec's institutions" (Government of Quebec 2013: 12). Punctuating historical time serves to express and convey a sense of urgency and necessity to recognize finally the changes that have already occurred in society by legal means.

In order to show that "the orientations proposed by the government are aimed at continuing the process of separation of religions and the State, begun more than 50 years ago in the wake of the Quiet Revolution," the government engages in a "fly-past" (*survol* in the French original; 7) of the changes in the relationship between the state and religion that have occurred since the 1960s. The document first recalls that the Catholic Church controlled the civil institutions until the 1960s and that its presence has particularly marked the management of the education and health systems as well as exerting a notorious influence on the orientations of the government. This, however, came to an end when, with the Quiet Revolution, Quebec entered modernity (Government of Quebec 2013: 7) and emphasized its distance from religion. According to the document, this detachment was reflected in a long series of laws and events such as, among others, the creation of the Ministry of Education in 1964, the recognition in 1968 in the Civil Code of civil marriage celebrated by a secular officer, the decriminalization of contraception and homosexuality in 1969, recognition in the early 1970s of the legal equality of children in the Civil Code, regardless of the circumstances of their birth, the adoption of the first part of the new Civil Code of Quebec in 1981, which affirms the equality of spouses in marriage, confirming in particular the right of women to retain their name and transmit it to their children, and the 1988 Supreme Court decision that decriminalized abortion.

Through the retelling of this history, the government basically restates the dominant narrative that is today part and parcel of collective memories, especially those of the baby-boomer generation that is the driving generational force behind the charter project. This narrative is also shared and authorized overwhelmingly by the participants in Quebec's secular movements, sexual diversity activists, and feminists. The goal to "complete the Quiet Revolution"—in other words, to finish a project that started more than fifty years ago—was a central element in this discourse and was restated over and over again.

Significantly, the government also stated that it "believes that [the charter] is the best way to respond to religious pluralism in a modern state, . . . in order to weave together, beyond the religious, moral or cultural differences of any person, a strong civic bond." In doing so, it implicitly recognized that its project of laïcité actually responded to and was fashioned as a solution to two contestations that were played out at the same time and were interwoven yet distinct. The first contestation is the story of how Quebeckers went through their journey of secularization and, step by step, came to conceptualize secularism reflexively as a part of their cultural identity. The second contestation is the story of migration-driven religious diversification and the question of how to govern this religious diversity.

The two controversies are inextricably intertwined, but many ordinary Quebeckers, as well as professional observers, try to disentangle them. The political scientist Charles Tessier, for instance, told the news station CBC in an interview that in his study he found that initially the debate was on laïcité and only later that it was

also focused on immigration. He added, "I think the young-educated demographic lost interest in the charter as the debates shifted along more immigrant lines" (Montpetit 2016). In my interviews with secularists and feminists, I found similar concerns about the "real subject" of debates about reasonable accommodation. All of these activists were linked through either personal experiences of or intimate connections with the Quiet Revolution. The understanding of these experiences was often forged through anecdotes in which religion, that is, Catholicism, appeared as oppressive and divisive, irrational and immoral, and was essentially viewed as something belonging to the past. For one of my feminist interlocutors, the debates around secularism were problematic because they linked the "secularism issue" with the "migration issue," which she felt was one of the big mistakes Bouchard and Taylor made during the commission's hearings. "It was not at all about immigration—it was about us!," she remarked. Clearly, secularists tried to disentangle laïcité and migration, as they feel much more familiar on the terrain of the fight against Catholic privilege and confessionalism than in the field of migration debates.

Yet, since many of the cases of reasonable accommodation that had been critically discussed among Quebeckers, in the media and during the hearings of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, involved the religious practices of immigrant communities, the idea that secularism and migration were separate issues was hard to sustain. The ostentatious religious practices and symbols of immigrants remind Quebeckers of their own not so remote religious past, and these reminiscences produce powerful feelings of awkwardness and unease (see also Bilge 2012). In addition, secular Quebeckers felt that their historical victories in terms of gender equality, women's rights, and freedom from religion were being challenged not only by the presence of new immigrants, but also by new alliances between a remaining milieu of conservative Catholics, Orthodox Jews, and religiously conservative immigrant communities. As one board member of the Mouvement Laïque Québécois suggested, "You know, we see that suddenly it is coming back—there are new alliances between the ultra-conservative Catholic hierarchy, those priests and bishops who never gave up, and the reactionary forces in the Jewish and Muslim communities." According to him, a joint committee of these groups wrote an open letter to the government and public media outlets in 2012 demanding stronger state action against blasphemy and the criminalization of criticisms of religion. There is thus a sense in which immigrant communities become part of historical battles over secularization in that they may offer their support to conservative Catholic forces to turn the tide and reverse the history of liberation, or at least bring it to a halt. Importantly, this scenario contains some twists, as minority communities are likely to support only those policy or legal initiatives that promote the rights of all religious communities vis-à-vis the state, as opposed to regulations that foster the privileged position of Catholicism. Yet it is precisely the privileged role of the Catholic Church in Quebec's history, national identity, and public institutions that conservative Catholicism has emphasized and

sought to foster in recent controversies. I discuss the legal and cultural dynamics that result from these contradictions in more detail through an analysis of the *Saguenay* case.

Despite these contradictions and tensions in the discourse on laïcité, I suggest that the model of secularity for the sake of national unity became dominant because of resonances with the broader understandings that were circulating in society and were created through the mobilization of collective memories, and also because it seemed to provide a solution to the twin problems of completing the Quiet Revolution and of religious diversity. However, especially because of its close entanglement with Quebec nationalism, this model was also strongly contested—not only by multiculturalists and religious minority communities, as the demonstrations in Montreal's streets have vividly shown, but also by secularists.

SECULARISTS' UNEASE WITH THE CHARTER OF QUEBEC VALUES

As mentioned above, the entwining of laïcité with a debate on "national values" had the effect of situating secularism within a field of tension between universalist claims to citizenship rights on the one hand, and particularist claims to national and cultural identity on the other. While wholly welcoming the plans to recognize laïcité legally, most members of the secular movement were abhorred by the nationalist discourse that the PQ had attached to it in the meantime. Claude, a long-standing activist of the humanist association, told me, "We thought this Charter would be the Charte de la laïcité, then, okay? But what the PQ brought out was a Charte des valeurs québécoises. Right, so there is sort of redefining in ethnocentric terms, as you see, whereas in fact these values are universal, okay? They are not specifically or anything our Québécois, you know—they are not specifically or exclusively Québécois!"

Another member even lamented, "I find that just the name of that stupid thing is terrible. I find that grotesque, absolutely grotesque, as if we were supposed to be better than some other national entity, you know? This is crazy, it just makes me so ashamed. I find it grotesque. This was supposed to be the 'Charte de la laïcité'!"

The publication of the charter plans created a difficult situation for secularists, torn as they were between triumphalist satisfaction over the fact that many years of rallying for the legal recognition of laïcité seemed to have come to fruition, and their disappointment over the political price to be paid for it. In these conversations, three issues of disagreement turned out to be particularly salient. First, most secularists rejected the change to the project's name. In their view, the PQ had removed the word laïcité because it feared losing the political support of conservative milieus for which Catholicism was part of their cultural and national identity. But for secularists, this was tantamount to

making concessions to groups whom they saw as their primary opponents. Second, secularists rejected outright the PQ's endorsement of keeping the crucifix in the National Assembly, which was a similar concession to Catholicism, albeit reframed in terms of "cultural heritage" and "patrimony" (Joppke 2015). But since they were not prepared to accept the redefinition of religious symbols as expressions of cultural identity, they felt that keeping the crucifix in the National Assembly fundamentally contradicted the spirit of the charter of which it was part.

Third, secularists' negative responses to the government project not only expressed their rejection of combining laïcité with what they perceived as ethnocentrism but also felt that their project had been appropriated for other purposes, having been taken away from them and now placed beyond their control. However, many articulated this response in such strong terms only in private conversations, while still emphasizing what they saw as the positive aspects in public discussions. They were clearly uneasy about being pressed into a confrontation between the PQ's "nationalist" secularism and its multiculturalist opponents, but they also recognized the political risks attached to too strong and open a critique of the charter plans and the defense of a third position. They felt that openly siding with its critics might endanger the charter altogether and mean losing the historical chance to turn laïcité into state law. As a former president of the Mouvement Laïque Québécois, Daniel Baril, put it in an interview, "It's not a full meal, but that's not a reason not to eat it." In the end, the minority of those claiming to be secularists but siding with multiculturalists in their open rejection of the charter plan were mostly academics and university professors who not only were embarrassed by the proposal, but also deemed it unacceptable. One university professor from Quebec City argued, "You can found citizenship on universal values, freedom, equality, but not on Valeurs Québécoises. The only thing that is universal in Québec is the *poutine*.[26] So it's very bad, that strategy is very badly oriented in my opinion. The citizenship Charter is something universal if it is based on justice, equality, neutrality, eh but not Valeurs Québécoises. The French Revolution was based on universal principles, *liberté, égalité, fraternité*, but not les Valeurs Québécoises. . . . This is why I don't agree with this overlapping." The "internal" secularist criticisms of the charter project point to the profoundly ambiguous relationship between laïcité and migration. On the one hand, migration and the revitalized public presence of religion certainly gave new impulses to the secularist project, as it reinvigorated secularists' perceptions, in state both institutions and civil society, of religion as potentially dangerous for social coexistence. On the other hand, however, immigrants' religious expressions also disturbed and thwarted secularist politics, as it was now concerned no longer with Catholicism as the "intimate Other" or "the Other within," but with new religious actors. These new actors complicated secularist politics, introduced new cleavages, and raised the normative stakes of laïcité. Laïcité became harder to justify, in particular because it became increasingly difficult to separate it

from the charge of racism. This occurred in a context in which some more or less openly racist groupings readily adopted laïcité as a way of cloaking their rejection of immigrants, justifying this in the name of a presumably democratic political doctrine (see also Bilge 2012).

While in Quebec by the end of 2013, as the president of the Council on the Status of Women said, "everybody was obsessed with laïcité" and citizens took to the streets to defend different versions of it, in Catalonia discussions over laicitat had a considerably lower profile. Before I turn to the question of why this was so, I first chart the terrain of these discussions and show how they shaped regulatory practices around religion.

DEFINING SECULARITY IN CATALONIA

Similar to Quebec, in Catalonia the vocabulary of secularity (in Catalan, *laicitat* and *laicismo*) acquired a prominent place in political discourse only from the late 1990s. Its elevation to becoming a part of the official state discourse was a result of the ascendency of the tripartite government of the Socialists, Republican Left, and Greens in 2002. Yet significantly, the introduction of the concept of laicitat in policy documents and its promotion in public discourse through conferences, speeches, and publications occurred under the aegis of the Republican Left, which is by a long way the most prominent intellectual heir of historical Catalan anticlericalism in the current political landscape. Against this backdrop, it appears astonishing that the conceptualization of the term does not bear the imprint of this legacy. On the contrary, laicitat came to be defined as "respect for religious diversity." As a former director of the secretariat explained, "Laicitat is a relation of separation, which means laicitat is not a static thing but a way of entertaining a relationship. And so it follows that the government does not identify with any religion, and it does so with the aim of respecting all of them." In my interviews, political actors argued that in the initial period it required a major effort to explain this concept to Catalan audiences, as in the eyes of many it smacked of either bygone anticlericalism or French-type secularism, especially since the promoter was the Republican Left. Promoting the concept necessitated a political pedagogy that freed the term laicitat from associations of persecution, antireligious antagonism, and physical violence.

To define laicitat as respect for religious diversity does, of course, imply a dramatic historical shift among Catalan Republicans. Historically, their response to Spanish influence and Catholic hegemony had predominantly been anticlericalism and anticlerical nationalism. The endorsement of religious diversity and its public visibility breaks with that tradition. However, there is also an important element of continuity here. Similar to anticlericalism until the mid-twentieth century, the contemporary promotion of religious diversity in the name of laicitat is chiefly aimed at fighting against Catholic privilege.

As this combative thrust did not pass unnoticed in Catalonia's political and religious field, during this period the term laicitat turned into the topological center of a broader field of cultural tensions. Among some sections of Catalan Catholic theologians, laicitat started to become an acceptable concept in combination with the adjective "open," as the notion of "open secularity" began to be used in some papal documents and speeches. In the perspective of Republicans, however, such usage appeared to represent an appropriation of the concept by or under the leadership of Catholic hierarchies, which was precisely what the Republicans aimed to prevent. In political discussions, the then-opposition party CiU was also opposed to the term initially and insisted on the concept of aconfessionality, also used in the Spanish Constitution. After a while, however, they also became convinced that laicitat could be rid of its anticlerical meanings if it was qualified as "positive," while the Green Party in turn strongly opposed any qualifiers to laicitat. Finally, the term appeared in the preamble to the agreements with religious minorities, which is officially "based on laicitat, in other words, the respect for all religions, forms of thought and their values, as an integrating principle and framework of coexistence." All parties except the conservative Partido Popular voted in favor. As a consequence, as one official from the secretariat put it, "Laicitat was transformed into the leitmotiv of the state's political action." As already mentioned, the agreements also entitled minorities to financial aid. Critics did not miss out on the opportunity to make the joke that so important was the project of Catalan laicitat for the government that they actually bribed religious communities to get their assent.

However, the concept's official status remained fragile and subject to political intervention. After the ascendency of the center-right CiU-led government in 2010, the term laicitat was removed from official documents—in particular from the agreements with religious minorities in the course of their renewal—and its presence in everyday administrative practices in public bureaucracies also shrank. In these different discursive fields, the term was replaced by "aconfessionality." At the same time, in conversations and interviews I did with CiU politicians, they did use the concept of "positive secularity" and agreed with it, as well as recognizing the strong public role of religious traditions. What allowed them to embrace the concept was to contrast it with *laicismo*, a neologism modeled on the term "secularism," under the banner of which the former Republican Left government presumably sought to privatize religion. In general, however, the reluctance of conservative sections of the Catalan political field to embrace the term contributed to the fact that it remained less contested than in Quebec.

Nor did the new government completely endorse the notion that all religious traditions should necessarily enjoy the same status and recognition in the Catalan nation. CiU politicians certainly did not aim to restore or strengthen Catholic privileges, but they surely expressed the sense that it was easier to accommodate newly arriving Christian communities, such as African Evangelicals or

Romanian Orthodox Christians, than Muslims or Sikhs, and that this was a result of their greater fit with Western culture. These perceptions were condensed in the idea of an "asymmetry" of recognition that emphasized the greater significance of Christian traditions for Catalan culture and collective identity. Significantly, while there were thus important discursive shifts in relation to religion and secularity, legal regulations and bureaucratic practices around religion remained essentially the same.

To some extent, this existence of some kind of consensus around the notion of laicitat is also linked to the particular, if highly ambivalent role of Catalan secularist actors and organizations such as La Liga per la Laicitat (Secular League), the Foundation Ferrer i Guardia, and the Union of Atheists and Freethinkers. In general, the people who are active in these organizations felt that they won the struggle over the hearts and minds of the Catalans. Asked whether it seemed easy to him to explain the idea of secularity in his public activities and talks, one secularist activist from the Foundation Ferrer i Guardia told me,

> Of course, because we have won the fight. If you ask the older generation, 75 percent say they are religious. If you ask the younger people 75 percent say they are not religious. So what you see here is a tremendous generational shift. Just look at the rise of civil weddings. Not a long time ago, this was unheard of. And in fact, we had to invent civil weddings as secular rituals because nobody knew how to actually do a civil wedding. . . . And today most people live together just the way they want. Religious weddings account maybe for 10 percent. Thus, we can really say that in public secular ideas have become hegemonic.

In many other research conversations as well, secularists sought to illustrate the cultural resonance between their ideals and popular attitudes by pointing to secularization as a major cultural trend. At the same time, they also noticed and critically commented upon the increasing political role of religious communities and governmental effort to strengthen their place in civil society, for instance by recruiting religious leaders as cultural brokers and interlocutors who represented sections of society. One well-known secular activist related several stories of how politicians sometimes became embroiled in theological disputes. In the city of Cunit, for instance, a conflict between a Socialist councilor and an imam arose because a female social mediator, employed by the municipality, had created a number of initiatives for the empowerment of Muslim women, which the imam deemed un-Islamic and hence unacceptable. Eventually, the Socialist councilor sided with the imam and dismissed the social mediator. For secularist activists, such occurrences illustrate tendencies toward communitarian governance that challenge the ideals of secular republicanism. Moreover, they are primarily seen as strengthening illiberal versions of religion compared to moderate ones. As the same activist argued, "The Islam that is on the rise here is a backward Islam that

is poorly managed because our governance of religion is blind and is actually promoting radical Islam instead of a moderate, civilized, and European Islam."

Although secularist groups were thus sometimes critical of the new governance of religion carried forth, as it were, in the name of secularity for the sake of promoting religious diversity, they also shared its main tenets, in particular the idea to demonopolize and further disestablish the Catholic Church. In addition, they were also integrated and actively participated in the organizational arenas of religious diversity in that the Secular League signed the above-mentioned agreement with the Catalan state. Secular actors were also routinely invited to interreligious roundtables and dialogues despite the fact that they abhorred the notion that they were simply a community with a particular worldview similar to religious communities. One activist from the Foundation Ferrer i Guardia told me,

> One of us usually gets invited to the interreligious dialogue where our only allies are the Buddhists since they come without God just like us. . . . I was in a public debate in the city hall where I questioned the claims of religion in the public sphere and the spokesperson of the Socialist Party, a Muslim of Maghrebi origin, said I was wrong, that religion needs to have a much more active role in public life. Strangely, only the representative from CiU demanded total separation. When I get invited to participate in interreligious dialogues on TV or the radio, Catholic fundamentalists sometimes say they don't come if we are there. On the one hand, this is bad because it shows their intolerance. On the other hand, it is also good because it shows they take us seriously.

Yet despite these occasional disagreements, definitions of secularity are much less contested in Catalonia than in Quebec and the discourse on secularity for the sake of national unity has much less traction among Catalans than among Quebeckers. Several factors account for this difference. First, as shown in these examples, contemporary secularist groups are relatively well integrated into governance networks of religious diversity. As a result, the antagonism between different notions of secularity (and between their carriers such as "republicans" and "pluralists" in Quebec) is much less pronounced. Second, by adopting the discourse on secularity, the role and symbolic power of the Catalan Catholic Church as well have contributed toward the relatively smooth ascent of secularity as a principle of governance. Although secularists complained that by accepting secularity Catholic actors actually sought to dominate and manipulate definitions according to their interests, they also saw this as a concession. One secularist quipped, "The Catholic lobby has completely taken over this debate. If you search in Google, you find more entries from Catholics than from us."

A third reason has to do with the collective memories of historical secularism and violent anticlericalism. Historical research has widely documented how Franco's dictatorship has eliminated secular forces and groups effectively curtailing

their discourses and disrupting their communicative memory through the suppression of freed speech and association. Subsequently, the transition to democracy as well came along with multiple "pacts of silence," as one activist put it, one of which concerned precisely the violence against secularists under Franco's regime but also the preceding anticlerical violence during the Spanish Civil War. These "pacts of silence" engendered a further disruption and partial annihilation of collective and communicative memories of historical secularisms. It was this rupture of collective memories that provided the space for radical redefinitions of secularity in terms of respect for religious diversity. Conversely, the absence of violent anticlericalism in Quebec history foreclosed any negative associations with assertive republican understandings of secularism, which could therefore easily attract adherents as a national cause across the political spectrum.

SECULARITY AND CATALAN NATIONALISM

While the close connections between the discourse on secularity and Catalan nationalism should have become evident in my discussion of the "ceremonial integration" of religious minorities, they are also revealed in the ways in which Catalan political actors sought to fashion their own "Catalan model of secularity." Also formulated for the first time toward the mid-2000s, this idea became increasingly ingrained in political discourses around religion and nationalism, as those political actors who were most active in the field began to emphasize that the specificities of Catalan history naturally lead to a Catalan model of secularity. In this vein, in speeches and a personal interview, Vice-President Carod-Rovira highlighted the historical presence of religious minorities, especially Protestants, in Catalonia and their contribution to enlightenment and progress, as well as their official recognition by the Republican government in the 1930s (see also Griera 2016).

Against this backdrop, he and others began to conceptualize Catalan secularity in opposition to the French, British, and Spanish models. In one publication, for instance, former director of the Secretariat Montserrat Coll i Calaf (2012) analyzed the differences between these models, and in a personal interview he commented that "the Spanish model is basically a model of discrimination because, despite constitutional provisions towards aconfessionality in practice, there are privileges both for the Catholic Church, but also for the minorities that have signed agreements. How can a government say that the Jewish faith is better than the Bahá'í faith?" While in the discourse on the "Catalan model of secularity" other national models are also viewed as connected to specific national histories, the Spanish model generally receives the most attention as a contrast.

Significantly, during this period scholarly discussions on immigrant integration and citizenship were strongly focused on concerns about "national models" (see Bader 2007b; Bowen 2007a; Astor 2012). In many European countries, such scholarly discussions were transferred into and taken up in policy circles and pub-

lic administrations. Particularly in stateless nations such as Quebec and Catalonia, connections between the policy field and the academy have proved important in shaping political discourses on issues that are central to self-government such as immigration. In addition, there are many political connections and many points of exchange between the intellectual and political elites of both nations on issues of migration, independence, and so on, for example, conferences and symposia. It seems highly likely that the idea of a "national model of secularism" has emerged at this intellectual conjuncture. As Carod-Rovira pointed out, "All of this [policies and discourses on secularity] was necessary and important to show in order to articulate Catalan society as a nationally distinct society." Yet importantly, this "Catalan model of secularism" is never conceptualized as a part of national identity as in Quebec. Despite all political efforts to mark Catalan laicitat as nationally distinct, which to some extent also fashions secularism as a "Catalan value," Catalan discourses do not ethnicize secularity and thus escape the "us-versus-them" rhetoric that characterized the debates about the Charter of Quebec Values. Part of the reason is that Catalan state actors construe religious communities in a much more instrumental fashion than their opposite numbers in Quebec: minority communities are constructed as nation builders. According to Carod-Rovira, "All religious traditions should collaborate with the government in the national construction of Catalonia as a democratic country. And this is a two-way street: we recognize your existence, and you recognize that this is your government, and the government of your country."[27]

CONCLUSIONS

Concepts of nationhood and the way religion forms part of them shape responses to religious diversity in crucial ways. Yet even though there has been a rise of secular nationalism as part of the broader history of secularization in many Western societies, religion continues to figure in images of the nation, which is why there are major differences in how nation-states perceive and act upon the religiosities of their populations and the controversies surrounding them. In Quebec, religious diversity appeared as a threat, and secularism became central to discussions about national identity. As a result, secularism turned into a subject of antagonistic politics and heated discussion in which competing social and political actors agreed on its importance despite their differences regarding its precise formulation. In Catalonia, by contrast, reaching a consensus on the term was comparatively easy, and it was this low degree of conflictuality that actually prevented secularism from becoming a topic of antagonistic politics.

In the preceding chapter, I suggested that distinguishing between secularity as a modality of placing religion in society and secularism as an explicit ideology in the name of which laws and policies is justified. One major consequence of religious diversity has been to make secularity an object of contestation, as a result

of which explicit ideologies of (political) secularism started to play a greater role in regulating religion. However, there are three more specific lessons to be learned about the governance of religious diversity from the perspective of "multiple secularities."

First, in "nations without states," such as Quebec and Catalonia, concerns over national identity seem almost inevitably to give some weight to notions of "secularity for the sake of national unity." Yet, second, the extent to which they do so has to do with entrenched collective constructions of the (national) Other. Notions of secularity for the sake of national unity and conceptions that restricted religious diversity in the public sphere made more sense in Quebec, as they allowed Quebeckers to draw clear boundaries with Canada, whose multicultural regulations are seen to grant too much space to religion in the public sphere. By contrast, notions of "secularity for the sake of balancing religious diversity" had a greater chance to acquire public support in Catalonia, as they allowed Catalans to underline their national distinctiveness toward Spain, which they see as essentially Catholic and too restrictive to religious minorities. As we have seen, such national stereotypes persist even as they become outdated, as their main substrate is the logics of distinctiveness.

Third, the comparison has shown that "secular governance" is decidedly not a culturally vacuous modular form, as Mahmood (2015) has argued. Rather, multiple logics of secularity that are deeply culturally entrenched compete with one another, carried as they are by different actors with different political investments. The Catalan case actually clearly illustrates that while secularism is surely an important mode of the governmentality of religion, religious diversity has itself become a form of governmentality that is premised on the idea that people have religious identities through which they ought to be governed.

3 • SPATIALIZING RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

Urban Administration, Infrastructure, and Emplacement

In July 2013, several hundred Muslims gathered at the *plaça major* in the center of the small town of Mollet del Vallès, located about twenty minutes by train outside Barcelona. Since the beginning of the month of Ramadan, the Al-Huda community had begun assembling right beside the newly erected buildings of the municipal administration to carry out their five daily prayers. Under the irritated gazes of urban officials, the bodies of the worshippers moved rhythmically on small carpets toward Mecca. They did so in order to call public attention to their lack of a place of worship and to protest against a decision of the city administration that interdicted their use of a site they had already purchased as a mosque. Like many other religious migrant groups, over several years the Al-Huda community had used a rented building in the city center as a place of worship. Due to the rapid growth of the community, they began to search for a larger space that would also be centrally located and decided to buy a large abandoned storage room. Yet, as they were about to move in, the city administration informed them that the place did not meet the necessary requirements. While local residents had been critical of Al-Huda's plans to move the mosque, citizens' responses to their public prayers in protest against that decision, particularly those of nearby shopkeepers, were also largely negative, and popular pressure mounted on the city government to take action against them.

Epitomizing conflicts linked to migration as they occurred throughout Catalonia since the early 2000s and other Western societies, this episode illustrates how religious diversity becomes part of the lived experience of citizens through practices that manifest migrants' religious identities in public spaces. It shows how religious practices become a strategy of assertive "place-making" (Garbin 2012; Vásquez and Knott 2014), which imbues religious diversity with public visibility,

challenges cultural definitions of space, and disrupts routine experiences of being in a public space. More broadly, however, it also demonstrates that religious diversity is not only regulated by law but also shaped by a whole range of different administrative practices and infrastructures. In fact, it is only through the practices of a diverse set of local actors and urban bureaucracies that the legal governmentality of religion acquires the power to arrange religious identities and expressions in particular ways.

In order to account for this fact, in this chapter I address two sets of questions. First, how are legal regulations governing religious diversity enacted through administrative practices? What is the role of infrastructural regulations in the way religion is emplaced? And how do administrative practices unfold through the interactions of urban elected officials, bureaucrats, religious communities, and residents? Second, what are the consequences of administrative practices for religious communities? How do emplacements of religion contribute to the symbolic and affective demarcations of public space? My aim is to identify the complex set of regulatory processes that explain the actual presence of religious expressions such as the prayers of Mollet's Muslims, whose very publicity is the reason they are also experienced by others and that renders them especially critical.

Following the call to move beyond the focus on national regulatory models (Bader 2007b), many sociologists have addressed similar questions by studying in bottom-up fashion how legal rules about religion are negotiated and enacted. However, most studies focus on public and state institutions. There is now an elaborate literature that explores how religious diversity is governed in hospitals (Cadge 2012), prisons (Beckford and Gilliat 2005; Becci 2012), the armed forces (Thériault 2014; Michalowski 2015), and educational settings (Schenk, Burchardt, and Wohlrab-Sahr 2015). Most studies conclude that while institutional responses to religious diversity lead to demonopolization and pluralization on the legal level, these changes do not always translate fully into everyday practices (Griera and Clot-Garrell 2015).[1] Simultaneously, however, sociologists have largely ignored how urban authorities and bureaucratic apparatuses have become sites in which the regulation of religious diversity is enacted.[2] One major consequence of this neglect is that the fundamental role of urban space in the microgovernance of religious identities and its implications for the territorialization of religious belonging have been obscured (Hervieu-Léger 2002; Casanova 2013a). This chapter seeks to fill this lacuna.

Therefore, in this chapter I move away from the question of how power is exercised in political and legal contestations over religious diversity and center instead on the spatial logics of power and authority. According to Berking, Steets, and Schwenk (2018), cities are sociospatial forms of sociation characterized by densification and heterogeneity, which is why urban space is central for understanding religious diversity. As a political category, space is indeed fundamental to almost all forms and instances in which urban administrations engage

with religious communities (Burchardt 2017a). Whether with regard to issuing licenses for places of worship or public religious processions, regulating the use of municipal buildings by religious communities, or providing advisory services to religious groups, all of these practices either are directly about the use of public space or have powerful consequences for the distribution of religious groups in urban space and their visibility within it. Bureaucratic practices around religion are thus, in an important sense, spatial practices. Since it is through its spatial presence that people experience religious diversity not only as a phenomenon of public discourse but as a social reality that is material, sensorial, and affective, analyzing the territorialization of religion is crucial. As Astor (2012: 327) argues, the "focus on the 'microcultures of place' is essential for capturing the precise ways in which abstract rights and obligations meaningfully interact with distinctive experiences and understandings of diversity on the ground."

The chapter proceeds as follows. Drawing particularly on the case of the Al-Huda community in Mollet del Vallès, I begin by comparatively exploring the regulation of places of worship by situating them in the context of Catalonia's and Quebec's respective histories of immigration. In the subsequent section, I consider regulations of religious activities in municipal and urban spaces. This contrast allows us to compare contestations around fixed and durable emplacements (places of worship) with rather fluid and ephemeral religious presences. The third section of the chapter explores the legal ambiguities around urban administrative practices, highlighting the contradictions between the stated goal of providing clear and egalitarian rules on the one hand and the productivity of legal uncertainty on the other.

In pursuing these lines of inquiry, this chapter makes two arguments, one general, the other comparative. The general argument is that at the urban level states have advanced in converting the complex administrative apparatus of licensing, permission, authorization, and approval that has formed around questions of planning and zoning into a central political technology of the spatial governance of religious diversity. The comparative argument is that despite the different national models, urban administrations in both Catalonia and Quebec converge around these new techniques of governance. In reworking administrative procedures of urbanism, they have manufactured strategies that effectively turn the state into a broker that flexibly arbitrates, moderates, and interferes in the relationships between religious groups and other citizens according to the power relationships that are at work.

GOVERNING CATALAN PLACES OF WORSHIP

Any analysis of the spatial governance of religious diversity in Catalonia has to begin by recognizing the enormous rapidity of the rise of transnational migration into the region. While in 1996 the number of non-nationals still stood at 1.6 percent,

this figure had risen to only 2.9 percent by 2000 but then increased spectacularly to 16 percent by 2010, lifting Catalonia above average European levels in a period of less than fifteen years (Brugué and González 2013; Rodon and Franco-Guillen 2014). Significantly, and in strong contrast to Quebec, this wave of immigration was not limited to the metropolitan center of greater Barcelona but reached cities and smaller towns across the entire region. In cities such as Manresa, Terrassa, Hospitalet, and Mollet del Vallès, the proportion of people born abroad had reached between 20 and 25 percent by 2007, creating great challenges for urban bureaucracies with regard to integration policies. While religious diversity in Catalonia preceded this wave of immigration (Estruch et al. 2004; Martínez-Ariño 2018), it was now surely deepened, with 27.2 percent of immigrants hailing from Africa, 24 percent from Latin America, 9.9 percent from Asia and Oceania, and 6 percent from Central and North America (Brugué and González 2013).

The arrival of new migrants has been accompanied by the need for new places of worship to be established for the religious communities of which they are part. Thus, between 2004 and 2013, the number of Buddhist temples in Catalonia rose from 28 to 66 and that of Evangelical churches from 341 to 657, while the number of Islamic prayer sites grew from 139 to 231 (see Griera 2016: 23). In Barcelona, more than half of the Protestant churches have come into existence during the last twenty-five years (1992–2017), almost doubling their presence since 1997, while over 60 percent of Catalan mosque communities emerged between 2000 and 2014 (Martínez-Ariño 2017). In fact, the erection of new places of worship is central to the visibility of both migration and religious diversity in the public space (Díez de Velasco 2010), but the precise ways in which they are governed and that account for the changing configuration of urban religious topographies are often not well understood.

Founded in 1996, Al-Huda began as a congregation of around fifty members, though by 2013 more than three hundred people were visiting the mosque on a daily basis, and considerably more for the important Friday prayers. In 2005, a group of local Muslims founded a second mosque called the Islamic Community of Mollet. Initially, its establishment encountered fierce opposition from local residents, which included a signature campaign in the neighborhood. But through a consultative process, which the city government energetically enforced, protests were eventually dissuaded. Following the further influx of Muslim migrants, in 2011 the leaders of both Muslim communities addressed city officials to articulate their need to acquire larger sites for their communities.[3] At the time, urban officials were already rejecting the possibility of these communities moving to other places inside the city center, since the urban zoning plan, which was initially approved in 2004, presumably specified that no new places of worship could be established there—or so city officials told me. Instead, they proposed to both communities that they relocate to some abandoned former factory buildings in an industrial estate located a few kilometers

away on the other side of the railways. The creation of religious places by migrant communities in post-Fordist spaces has been a major factor in the remaking of urban religious topographies in cities across the Western world, reflecting both the peripheralization of migrants' religious practices and their own creativity in devising strategies that suit their spatial needs (Krause 2008; Orsi 1999). Attempting to achieve Muslims' consent, urban officials pointed out the advantages, such as spatial proximity to the city and the fact that the spaces were large enough to carry out regular activities, as well as Islamic festivals such as the end of Ramadan and the Festival of Sacrifice Eid Al-Adha, without creating disturbances for others and having to wrestle with residents' complaints. The Islamic Community of Mollet was in fact convinced by these arguments and bought a former factory floor of 350 square meters with an adjacent courtyard, where they moved in 2011.

However, there was a significant twist to the story. In reality the zoning plan that was in effect at the time prohibited the opening of new places of worship not in the city center but in the very industrial estate to which urban officials wished to relocate Mollet's Muslims. In fact it was only after the city government learned of Muslims' ambitions to acquire larger sites that they passed an amendment to the zoning plan, reversing the earlier regulations (*La Vanguardia* 2017).

Unlike the Islamic Community of Mollet, Al-Huda's leader, Ahmed Balghanch, rejected outright the idea of moving to the periphery and instead resumed his search for a site in the city center. In July 2013, he reached an agreement with the owners of a property located on the ground floor of a residential building. Yet when Balghanch informed the city administration about his plans to purchase the property and solicited the licenses for religious use and construction activities inside it, he was again warned that, precisely because it was located in a residential building, the site was unfit for religious uses. Significantly, in an interview, the Al-Huda leader told me that urban officials were initially supportive of his plans and that he had even signed a written agreement with them, though this remained in the hands of the municipality. Yet in my conversations with municipal officers and the responsible elected councilor, the existence of any such agreement was vehemently denied. Instead, they told me that they continued to offer alternatives and attempted to facilitate the renting of a building located in the same estate to which the other mosque community had meanwhile moved. They also bristled at the fact that Balghanch refused even to visit the building. When, after several rounds of intense debate, no consensus could be reached and the negotiations get bogged down, Al-Huda bought the property it had originally wanted and started renovations, at which time the urban officials again insisted that this had to stop. Following several other rounds of exchanges of opinion, both personally and through the local press, urban officials eventually instructed the police to vacate and seal the property. However, afterward Al-Huda activists again entered and occupied the building unlawfully several times in order to resume their work. In doing so, they emulated the practices of protest against forced evictions that had become

widespread in Spain since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008. Yet the images of police officers carrying Muslims out of the building that subsequently circulated in the media strongly contributed to the securitization of Islam in the public discourse and linked the controversy over the mosque to earlier detentions of some local Muslims by the national police that had been carried out in the city in the context of counterterrorist actions.

The different responses of the two mosque communities to the municipality's suggestion regarding their relocation were followed by their being framed in the public discourse, particularly in the perceptions of urban officials as articulating two radically distinct versions of Islam: whereas the Al-Huda leadership was portrayed as segregationist, refusing integration and opposed to harmonious urban coexistence and compliance with law and order, the Islamic Community of Mollet came to be celebrated by local authorities as a showcase for an Islam that *can* be successfully integrated into the urban fabric. In this vein, in several interviews officers and municipal councilors emphasized that Balghanch's daughters were the only ones in the city to wear headscarves in their age group, that they continually demanded separate prayer spaces in the public high school, and that he refused to talk to female clerks on the phone for religious reasons. In addition, he purportedly even rejected the presence of the president of the Catalan Federation of Islamic Communities, who was called in as a mediator during the negotiations over the new mosque, when it became clear that he did not support Balghanch's tough stance on the issue. Conversely, the Al-Huda leader turned increasingly belligerent toward the city government and never tired of accusing them in interviews, with both me and the mass media, of promoting racism and anti-Muslim discrimination for the sake of electoral gains.

Opposition to planned mosque constructions has been frequent in Catalonia since the 1990s, as in a fifth of all municipalities where mosques have been erected, residents have demonstrated their disagreement (Astor 2016: 96). Often, such disagreement has been an outcome of people's fears of "territorial stigmatization" (Wacquant 2007), as they associated Muslim immigrants with rising crime and consumption of drugs and perceived them as contributing to the degradation of the symbolic and material value of their neighborhoods. As Astor (2016: 107) observed, a high proportion of anti-mosque campaigns took place in areas primarily inhabited by culturally disenfranchised and socially subordinated groups of former internal migrants hailing from poorer regions of Spain. Therefore, he points to the "importance of examining how historical experiences of alienation, pre-existing forms of social and spatial stratification, and entrenched narratives of marginalization and injustice condition local responses to immigration and ethnic diversification" (30). In this sense, Spanish-speaking communities' intentions to defend sharp boundaries in their residential areas have been heightened by their feelings of insecurity, their uncertain place within Catalan society, and their distance from Catalan nationalism.

As a town with a major share of inhabitants hailing from other parts of Spain, Mollet del Vallès perfectly illustrates these dynamics. The neighborhood association that was most outspoken against new mosque constructions in the city center was in fact founded by Spanish migrants, and in my conversations with members they articulated a clear sense that since *they* had made efforts to integrate themselves into Catalan society, newcomers should do so as well and "play by the rules," by which they meant maintaining the current character of the place.

As already mentioned in chapter 2, it was in response to such problems with the opening of migrants' places of worship and the way these problems apparently contradicted Catalan self-images as a cosmopolitan nation that Catalonia's left-wing government had passed a new Law on Centers of Worship in 2009. From the Catalan state's point of view, these problems were linked to the relatively large degree of autonomy of local bureaucracies and the resulting discretionary power of urban politicians, as well as the lack of clear regulations. In fact, until the early 1990s, the requirements that religious minority communities had to comply with were formulated, if at all, only on an ad hoc basis. In response to such cases, in two separate judgments in 1988 and 1992, the Spanish Supreme Court ruled that requiring licenses for places of worship or applying the same regulations to them that guided the establishment of other places of gathering was a violation of the freedom of religion (Astor 2017). Later these decisions were overturned, enabling urban governments to subject places of worship to different regimes of licensing and regulation.

While the Law on Centers of Worship was meant to put an end to this situation, its consequences were rather ambiguous and sometimes paradoxical. With regard to zoning regulations, the law did not bring about the expected homogenization. Whereas some cities such as Hospitalet issued new zoning laws that entailed clear specifications on possible sites for places of worship on city maps, others responded in much less specific ways. The ambiguities of the law were also noted by city councilors, who complained that the law actually allowed for different policies and administrative practices around places of worship. However, they did not really welcome this autonomy, as it continued to provide a space for popular pressure to adopt rather strict attitudes in formulating zoning plans and municipal ordinances. Being obliged to grant permission for places of worship consistently would have absolved them of their responsibility and allowed them to blame the regional government instead.

This brief discussion shows that while higher-level (e.g., national or regional) regulations on religion are often oriented toward "national models" and notions of citizenship, local enactments may transform them into a politics of space. I now turn to discuss how enactments of the legal governmentality of religious diversity play out in relation to places of worship in Quebec.

MIGRATION, RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY, AND PLACES OF WORSHIP IN QUEBEC

As in Catalonia, the rise of transnational immigration in Quebec, especially since the early 1990s, has been accompanied by a radical transformation of its religious landscape, but there are two major differences. First, immigration and cultural diversification occurred at a slower pace and were stretched over longer historical periods. So-called visible minorities accounted for 12.2 percent of Montreal's population in 1996, rising to 13.5 percent in 2001 and to 16.6 percent in 2006 (Germain and Dejean 2013: 37). Second, immigration is spatially concentrated in urban centers to a much greater degree, with more than 76.8 percent of immigrants who arrived in Quebec between 1999 and 2008 having settled in the metropolitan area of Greater Montreal (38). For those who arrived between 2006 and 2011, this figure is as high as 91 percent (Statistics Canada 2014). In 2011, Montreal was home to almost 850,000 people who were born abroad, representing 23 percent of the population (*Canadian Magazine of Immigration* 2016). More generally, Beyer (2005: 168–169) found that "multi-faith religiousness in Canada is overwhelmingly a development that affects the large agglomerations [with] 90% of those who identity with non-Christian world religions [living] in the six largest metropolitans areas." There has been a particularly strong increase in the number of Muslims living in Quebec, having risen by 142 percent between 1991 and 2001 (Fourot 2010: 136). This increase is an outcome of Quebec's preference for French-speaking, highly skilled immigrants from the Muslim-majority societies of North and West Africa.

As a result of this migratory influx, at least since the 1990s requests for the establishment of new places of worship by religious minorities have greatly increased. Thus, although Montreal had only nine mosques in the early 1990s, the number of Islamic prayer places in the metropolitan area (Montreal Island) grew from forty-five in 2002 to over sixty by the end of that decade (Fourot 2010: 137). During the same period, there was also a marked increase in the number of synagogues belonging to Hassidic congregations in the municipality of Outremont and some parts of Montreal that was accompanied by rising public concerns about ethno-religious segregation and ghettoization (Gagnon, Dansereau, and Germain 2004).

In the following section, I explore the impact of zoning regimes on the spatialization of religion. Significantly, whereas the mechanism of reasonable accommodation easily transports local controversies into the national law courts, places of worship are the exclusive domain of municipal and urban governance as part of their autonomy in matters of planning and zoning. Unlike in Catalonia, there is no national law on places of worship, which instead are regulated through urban bylaws and zoning procedures. And yet, as I demonstrate, controversies over places of worship have also become judicialized in contemporary Quebec to a much higher extent that in Catalonia.

Quebec's municipalities have far-reaching competencies and political autonomy in regulating religious activities, which they chiefly do through zoning law (Loi sur l'aménagement et l'urbanisme). This defines legitimate land uses and types of construction, as well as "implementation and architectural integration plans" (Germain and Gagnon 2003: 302) that allow municipalities to control particular aesthetic features of construction projects. In general, there is little uniformity with regard to regulations, as some municipalities treat religion as a specific category in their zoning bylaws, while others subsume religious activities under broader categories such as "institutional facilities."[4]

Significantly, there are different political and administrative procedures involved in zoning decisions. In general in Quebec zoning involves a public consultation mechanism, and citizens may also demand referendums on particular zoning bylaws. Among other things, citizens may use these opportunities to block the construction of places of worship. Planning experts such as Qadeer (1997: 491) actually found that "public hearings on planning regulations have often turned into the tools of NIMBYism and ethno-racism." The city of Montreal, by contrast, is subject to a special law that forecloses the possibility of holding referendums, thereby also limiting citizens' involvement in planning decisions (Fourot 2010).

In addition, in Montreal urban administrations distinguish between "community centers" and "places of worship," each of which is linked to specific permits for "social activities" or "religious activities," respectively (Dejean 2016: 140). I suggest that this distinction has similar effects as that between "cultural activities" and "religious activities" that Catalan urban authorities used in governing their *centros cívicos* in that it deepens the differentiation between religious and nonreligious practices by separating them conceptually and spatially.

Looking at changes in zoning practices over time, Germain and Gagnon (2003) found that during the 1990s urban administrations treated requests for new places of worship rather generously and rarely raised any objections. However, around the late 1990s and early 2000s, urban authorities began to tighten zoning bylaws and placed increasing restrictions on places of worship. Several municipalities rejected requests, and some, such as Saint-Laurent, Dollard-des-Ormeaux, and Longueil, even passed moratoriums on new places of worship. Several concerns motivated these shifts. First, municipalities became more strategic in reserving the remaining plots for economic activities in order to steer local economic growth. At the same time, they also began perceiving places of worship as lost opportunities to generate tax revenues, as under provincial law religious places are exempt from taxation. Paradoxically, tax exemptions led to a situation in which religious communities competed with businesses over access to urban space, to their clear detriment. These developments have intensified in recent years as the tax authorities began to visit places of worship in order to ascertain that only religious activities were being carried out on sites that were officially registered as places of worship.

Thus, in 2015 ministers from the Presbyterian Trinity Church in Montreal's Côte-des-Neiges district received the first bills from the Montreal tax authorities based on the alleged nonreligious uses of the building. Later, city officials made a visit to check how the different rooms in the premises were being used. They also told the clergy that the whole church was not tax-exempt any longer, but only those rooms that are used for religious purposes. If, in this instance, nonreligious uses undermined the officially registered status of the place as a place of worship, in the case of the Islamic Essalam Community Center in Mascouche, which I discuss in a later section of this chapter, it was its religious use that undermined the place's officially registered status as a "community center." While in the eyes of urban officials Presbyterians' activities were not religious enough, Muslims' activities were too religious.

With regard to the variety of ways in which zoning procedures have been turned into political technologies regulating religious diversity, we can distinguish scenarios in which zoning restrictions were imposed, legally contested, and later removed in the name of freedom of religion, thus overturning municipal decisions, and cases in which restrictive zoning bylaws were contested but eventually upheld through procedures of civic participation. I now illustrate both of these dynamics.

AUTHORIZING SYNAGOGUES IN MONTREAL'S MILE END AND OUTREMONT

In 1989, a Hassidic community living in Montreal's Mile End, which has been growing substantially in recent decades, applied for permission to incorporate another building into their religious complex.[5] However, residents began to voice concerns over excessive lighting and noise through religious activities such as chanting, praying, and singing, as well as increased car and bus traffic, a lack of parking space, and crowding, as large numbers of people moved in and out of the building several times a day. While residents argued that these disturbances undermined the residential character of the neighborhood, they also alleged that the buildings and gardens belonging to the Hasidic community were in a state of disrepair and neglect, leading to the depreciation of the real estate values of property on the street. There are striking similarities here between the pervasiveness of the language of business and the market value of real estate in this case and the fears of "territorial stigma" supposedly attached to mosque constructions in the Catalan context (Astor 2016).

Subsequently, synagogue opponents formed the Jeanne Mance Street Committee in order to organize their protests. However, in an act of what I call "state brokerage," the committee, the Jewish community, and the city administration worked out an agreement that included the control of parking activities, the installation of a ventilation system on the rooftop to avoid noise coming through the windows, landscaping to maintain the residential image, and a moratorium

of ten years on further expansions. Precisely ten years later, the Hassidic community did indeed acquire a fourth building in order to meet its spatial needs and applied for permission to use it. After several meetings organized by the Urban Development Commission (UDC), a consultative body that advises the city's executive committee, the UDC voted against the project. Later on, however, the city's executive committee overturned this decision despite a municipal council decision in 1999 opting for a moratorium on places of worship in residential areas. In November 2000, the city granted the project for reasons of "human rights and quality of life and lifestyle" that the UDC was allegedly unable to assess. As a consequence, the Jeanne Mance Street Committee attempted to take legal action against the city council, arguing that it had overstepped its competences, but due to a lack of resources they eventually abandoned their protest and the dispute was settled (Germain and Gagnon 2003: 309).

Whereas in Montreal places of worship are permitted in most commercial areas, in Outremont the municipal zoning ordinance strictly limits them. In accordance with this regulation, in 1988 the urban administration refused to give the Hassidic congregation Amour pour Israël permission to establish a new synagogue on St Viateur Street. While this controversy had already created substantial media debate, public attention became even greater when subsequently the same community established an illegal synagogue on Durocher Street, upon which the city councilor representing the Jewish population in Outremont presented a motion to rezone in order to legalize the site. The motion was withdrawn, however, after citizens who resided in the same building had demanded the closure of the synagogue on several occasions and threatened to take legal action. Finally, an out-of-court settlement similar to that in Mile End was reached, allowing the community to relocate to nearby Van Horne Street. Nonetheless the relationships between the Jewish and other residents continued to be tense because the latter perceived Jews as having received privileged treatment regarding illegal synagogues, parking restrictions during religious holidays, and the establishment of *eruvs*, which I will discuss herein.

Finally, in November 2016 the residents of Outremont voted to uphold a bylaw, first passed by the Outremont community council in May 2015, that banned the establishment of further places of worship on the main streets of their borough (Shingler 2016).[6] Jewish councilors had demanded that demographic studies be carried out before such a bylaw was passed. While the bylaw applied to all religious groups in the same way, Hassidic Jews felt particularly targeted, as it had a particular impact on them as the fastest growing group. Following the passing of the bylaw, Hassidic activists organized a signature campaign, which allowed them to put the bylaw to a referendum. In justifying the measure, city officials argued that the bylaw sought to promote business activities in the area, and residents were also concerned that establishing new places of worship might hinder economic and commercial development.

The Hassidic community, by contrast, argued that there was a real need for more religious buildings, but in fact it was this very need that some wished to forestall. The Hassidic Jews also suggested moving their religious institutions to second-floor premises in commercial buildings, but the city council refused to negotiate. Responding to the referendum, the Hassidic communities' lawyer, Julius Grey, declared that Canadian law allowed for limits on places of worship, but that these must not be too onerous on religious groups, which the bylaw actually was, given the "inability" of ultra-Orthodox Jews to drive to their synagogues on holidays. They also sent a letter to the council stating that they would immediately challenge the bylaw in court. They argued that the sites that were permitted were difficult to access, as they required a walk of between twenty and thirty minutes, ultra-Orthodox Jews not being allowed to use vehicles on religious holidays according to religious law (Wilton 2016).

Despite their different outcomes and the different trajectories of these conflicts—the conflict in Mile End being decided by political authorities, that in Outremont by a popular referendum—both illustrate how zoning decisions are animated by attempts to reproduce existing cultural hierarchies and demographic relations. But they also show that local actors are obliged to express their motivations and concerns through a particular legal idiom, which limits the range of arguments and structures the debate. Compared to Catalonia, it is striking how legitimate economic arguments are in justifying limitations on places of worship. Simultaneously, the cases point to the ways in which practices of zoning and planning, their neutral formulation notwithstanding, inevitably have different effects on different religious communities. One such practice is to shape directly the ways in which religious affiliations are distributed across urban space. Sometimes zoning expressly aims to preserve particular numerical relationships between demographic majorities and minorities. Politicians in Outremont and in Montreal were fully aware that the number of Hassidic Jews was rising in certain parts while declining in others, and they were willing to take measures to attenuate these changes in the name of "social mixing" and the "fight against ghettoization." These goals are in turn linked to and reverberate with cultural conceptions of public space in which religious identities should be subordinated to secular citizenship.

However, emplacements of religion are not only an outcome of the ways in which laws are enacted through urban administrative practices, drawing together religious leaders, neighborhood associations, local brokers, and elected officials into heterogeneous social assemblages but also the outcomes of infrastructural formations and the distinct bodies of norms that govern them, to which I turn next.

RELIGION AS AN INFRASTRUCTURAL PROBLEM

Catalonia's Law on Centers of Worship was meant to secure the availability of places for religious assembly, but also to guarantee that these placed would be "dignified" and adhered to basic standards. However, by defining certain infrastructural standards regarding safety, hygiene, and other material aspects, the law made the precarious legal status of many places of religious minority communities more visible in the first place. By doing so, the law subjected them to much greater public attention and increased the pressure on the part of both urban administrations and the minority congregations themselves to guarantee their compliance with administrative and technical rules. To begin with, many minority places were not even registered as places of worship and, by implication, could not enjoy the legal protection that constitutional rights to freedom of religion or the Law on Centers of Worship provided them with. Unregistered congregations could not officially interact with urban administrations in order to request the use of urban spaces such as streets or squares, or municipal premises such as public gyms, for certain religious festivals, or solicit the financial subsidies that the Catalan state provides for religious communities. Conversely, if unregistered congregations did get in touch with municipalities, these were now obliged to assist them in bringing them into the realm of legality. In the face of the tremendous challenges in doing so, one city councilor from Hospitalet coined the ingenious term "sufficient legality" in order to pinpoint the minimal legal status that all religious groups were supposed to achieve. In strong terms, he described to me what he saw when he first visited one local Muslim community in 2005: "At the time, they met in this building amid abandoned garages. The place was full of rubbish, it looked like a waste dump. And their place was a shack, it was literally falling into pieces. From a technical point of view there was a great risk that the building could fall down, as the ground was not solid and was in danger of collapsing." Following some conversations, it was agreed to demolish the building and to erect a simple new building with prefabricated building materials that the city provided for free. As in many other cities that I visited, urban administrations collaborated with minority communities to yield greater levels of compliance with infrastructural regulations in order to achieve "sufficient legality," though clearly, as the case of Mollet's Muslims shows, such collaborations did not always produce agreement regarding the desired location. One effect of the Law on Centers of Worship was thus that in urban administrations across Catalonia the legality of religious practices and gatherings was increasingly understood to be a function of the intercalating of religious minorities into spatial and infrastructural regimes.

It is therefore clear that the establishment of a legally sound place of worship in urban space marks the end of often protracted and arduous processes of interaction between religious communities and the state. The whole complexity of

these processes is reflected in the following description I received from the director of Barcelona's Office for Religious Affairs:

> Well, it is not like the city has a list of places on offer. First, the community has to go and look for a place that they like. Then they come here, and we look together at the zoning law and check whether the place is okay or not. After that we need to check the question of whether the structure allows for that kind of repurposing, including ceiling heights and the number of doors and exits. And then they have to check whether it is financially attractive. Perhaps they only get a lease for five years, but they would need to spend lots of money for the renovation. In case they go ahead they need to hire an engineer who produces a technical analysis, which then gets approved by the administration. Then they organize the work and in case the place is approved after the final inspection they will receive a certificate with which they can apply to be registered.

This description shows that compliance with infrastructural standards is a fundamental precondition of the ability to organize religious life in legally sound ways. Infrastructural regulations and religion are thus inextricably entwined such that the exercise of one's right to religious freedom is premised upon infrastructural and material mediations. We can distinguish three sets of regulations: (1) administrative standards regarding the filling out of application forms, which imply that religious communities need to subject themselves to certain regimes of written record that the state enforces but that not all of them are used to from their experiences in their countries of origin; (2) regulations about locations that are part of local zoning practices and land-use plans that engender particular territorializations of (registered) religious diversity; and (3) technical standards that are defined in relation to envisaged types of activities, including questions of safety (security exits and fire escapes according to the maximum number of allowed users), hygiene (toilets and lavatories), and the impacts of religious uses that can become sources of nuisance for others, especially residents.[7]

In Catalonia, Muslim communities often had to wrestle with the fact that their desire to assemble as many followers as possible in large, centrally located congregations clashed with the scarcity of space that is a corollary of the sheer density of the built environment in most cities, and with related infrastructural regulations governing crowding, traffic, and parking.[8] Evangelical communities, by contrast, rarely faced such problems, as they are typically much smaller but also much more numerous. Thus, in 2016 Barcelona was home to 155 Protestant congregations, while there were only 28 Islamic places of worship (Martínez-Ariño 2017). However, while Evangelicals and Pentecostal congregations found it easier to establish themselves in residential neighborhoods in many Catalan cities as a result of their smaller size, their presence was sometimes followed by residents' complaints about noise.[9] The majority of these Christian communities

hail from African and Latin American contexts in which keyboards and amplified loudspeakers, which accompany long sessions of singing and praise, are crucial aspects of ritual and worship. In these contexts, energetic sound is itself perceived as manifesting the forceful presence of the Holy Spirit (Burchardt 2017d) and is sometimes strategically deployed in cultural battles over "sonic supremacy" (Oosterbaan 2009; de Witte 2008).

However, most of the sites these communities rented as places of worship upon their arrival in Catalonia did not have proper soundproofing. As could be expected, residents perceived Christian singing and music not as religious sound but as noise and began to complain, especially since Pentecostal practice often involves night vigils whereby disturbances also affected nighttime peace. In almost all of the cities I investigated, urban officials told me that they had to mediate conflicts over noise engendered by Evangelical and Pentecostal congregations and subsequent complaints. Significantly, as residents perceived Christian sounds as similar to disturbances by bars, restaurants, or discotheques, urban administrations initially categorized them using the same criteria. Yet, while mediation processes often involved difficult negotiations with resident associations, urban administrations were also in a relatively convenient position, as they were able to refer Pentecostal communities to the regional government where they could apply for state subsidies to install proper noise protection in their places of worship. Subsidies for noise prevention were in fact a major component of the financial aid to religious minorities that the Catalan state began to provide in the middle of the 2000s.

Catalan practices of administering religious diversity thus engendered two distinct but interlocking processes. On the one hand, administrative practices increasingly construed religion as an infrastructural problem to be solved by technical means. This implied practices of *translation* whereby urban officials related religious expressions to existing urbanist categories and regulatory frameworks, as it was only in this way that religious disturbances could be rendered legible from the administrative point of view and respective urban ordinances applied to them or amended. This implied that religion was treated like any other social activity that had to be regulated as part of the effort to render public space inhabitable for diverse urban populations, as politicians and bureaucrats never tired of emphasizing in my interviews with them.

At the same time, however, there has also been an increase in government frameworks such as a Law on Centers of Worship, as well as urban policies, ordinances, and bylaws that are specifically designed to regulate religion. While the compliance with infrastructural standards turned into a precondition to organize religious life in legal ways, these regulations also obliged state officials and bureaucrats to make efforts to guarantee that citizens were able to exercise their right to religious freedom. When considering their responses to Muslims' prayers at the plaça major, urban officials in Mollet del Vallès were also acutely aware that Muslims were indeed making use, if in the wrong place, of their constitutionally

protected right to exercise their religion. In light of these considerations, the urban authorities instructed the police not to use force in dealing with such illegalities. Instead, police officers treated the prayers as individual regulatory offenses and issued hundreds of fines—one for each prayer—whose processing kept other bureaucratic units busy for the following months. Interestingly, however, as it later became clear that the activity of the prayer itself did not constitute a legal offense, the police officers were left with only the ability to check personal documents and issue fines for those who did not carry personal documents with them. The protracted presence of Mollet's Muslims on the plaça major reflects precisely the legal ambivalence created through the failure to integrate them into the urban infrastructural regime on the one hand, and local politicians' awareness that they were indeed obliged to guarantee their right to religious freedom by facilitating the establishment of mosques on the other.[10] Thus, while abstract notions of rights play a role in urban politics too, more significant is the rise of a set of technical standards, norms, and bylaws and their attendant procedures of implementation in spatializing religious diversity and demarcating urban sites as Evangelical, Muslim, Sikh, and so on. These procedures draw religion into the institutional world of "ordinary urbanism" through which dense space is managed and made inhabitable for diverse groups with diverging interests on the basis of unequal power relations. The following description of infrastructural conflicts around religion in Quebec adds a further element for our understanding of the spatial politics of religious diversity by showing how it involves legal struggles around the very definition of "places of worship," or in other words, local engagements with legal governmentality.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND RELIGIOUS ZONING IN QUEBEC

In 2008, the Badr Islamic Center, located in Montreal's borough of Saint-Leonard, and the urban administration became embroiled in a conflict over infrastructural regulations. Founded in 1999, the center catered to the growing community of Muslims of Maghrebi background in the area. As a result of its growth, in 2004 it started to rent, and later purchased, a larger building on Boulevard Langelier and subsequently submitted an application to the city council to use the site as a "religious center." However, before finally approving the certificate of authorization in 2008, the municipal authorities received an increasing number of complaints from residents who found that the center occupied too many of the available parking spaces and generated problems with traffic during prayer times. In response to these complaints, the urban authorities changed the authorization certificate in a way that prohibited the conducting of religious ceremonies. However, they did so without consulting the center's leadership. In order to provide the legal framework for this decision, they also introduced a new zoning bylaw that limited the establishment of new places of worship to the

area's industrial zones. However, the Muslim community chose to fight the council's decision through legal action.

On January 12, 2017, the Quebec Superior Court ruled that the attempt to shut down the Badr Islamic Center violated Muslims' right to religious freedom.[11] In his judgment, Justice Jean-Yves Lalonde criticized the city council for having taken far too much time to authorize the center's certificate and for passing a zoning bylaw that infringed upon the right to religious freedom and promoted "ghettoization, access problems and [that] appears to be discriminatory compared to the Catholic churches in the borough that are generally found in the residential sector in the City of Montreal" (Millan 2017). He found that because of the restrictions in the relevant zoning bylaws, the existing mosque at Boulevard Langelier was the only place where Muslims could exercise their religion, as all other sites where places of worship were allowed had already been occupied by churches and other holy places. It was therefore practically impossible for the center to move. At the same time, the specification allowing new places of worship to be opened on the industrial estate made little sense for the local Muslim community, as between 80 and 90 percent of their members lived in the residential part of the borough. Therefore, he concluded that "the relevant zoning by-laws at all times are detrimental to the ability of IBC members to conform to their religious beliefs in a significant and more than negligible way" (Cour Supérieure 2017: §70).

Significantly, at stake in this legal controversy was not only the question of whether the city council's way of dividing urban space according to a religious-secular matrix that assigned religious practices to urban peripheries was constitutional, but also what constituted a place of worship in legal terms. In its defense, the city council had argued that practices such as prayers turned the site into a place of worship and that as such it was subject to the new zoning bylaw, which limited such places to the industrial sector. Justice Lalonde, by contrast, argued that religious practices constituted only around 30–40 percent of the center's total activities, which also involve "community activities." As a consequence, he redefined it as a "community center," not a "place of worship." And as such it was not subject to the attendant section of the zoning bylaw.

In a similar controversy, during the month of Ramadan in summer 2016, city officials went to visit the Islamic Essalam Community Center in the suburb of Mascouche in order to take a record of the kinds of activities carried out in the building. After noticing that there were about twenty men conducting prayers, they decided to revoke the center's permit, as the existing permit designated it a "community center" and allowed only "social activities." As a consequence, they declared the site to be an illegal place of worship. The urban authorities argued that the center had failed to observe its responsibility to prevent praying by visitors. After establishing contacts with the same lawyer (Julius Grey), however, the community challenged the borough's decision in the court, where in 2015 it won a reprieve allowing Muslims to continue their prayers. Justice Brian Riordan

justified the decision by arguing that "not prohibiting prayer does not automatically mean the place becomes a religious building" (Hamilton 2017).

While in several recent zoning conflicts politicians have tried to define "places of worship" in relatively narrow terms for several reasons (chiefly in order to limit their number), such definitions clash with the multiple ways in which migrant communities often conceptualize places of worship for themselves, which are often hugely different from those of the Catholic majority. Migrants typically use places of worship in multifunctional ways, making them sites of intense sociality and exchange beyond religious gatherings in the strict sense. Many of the infrastructural concerns around crowding, safety, and parking spaces emerge only as an outcome of this multifunctionality and the strong social significance it affords places of worship for members of minority communities.

At the same time, these infrastructural problems also reflect the fact that migrants' and other religious minorities' places of worship typically gather people from different parts of the city, from which they travel by car. As Dejean has lucidly argued (2016), residents' perceptions of religious minority gatherings as a nuisance are linked to their adherence to the idea of the parish as a particular territorial unit where all worshippers reside in the neighborhood. However, one of the outcomes of transnational migration has been the promotion of the congregational territorial model and the creation of numerous religious communities subdivided along ethnic and linguistic lines and drawing in people from broader metropolitan areas, thereby decoupling residential patterns from religious affiliations. In some cases, municipal authorities even asked religious minority communities to submit lists specifying the names and addresses of members in order to assess the extent to which the community was locally embedded, going on to use such assessments as arguments in their authorization decisions.

GOVERNING RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN CATALAN PUBLIC SPACES

In the case of Mollet del Vallès's Muslims, their presence in the public space articulated the failure to install themselves in a permanent place of worship. However, in many other instances, religious communities routinely make use of urban space, and urban administrations play a major role in shaping these uses.[12] Urban authorities are legally obliged to grant public space for special religious holidays and celebrations and, often as a result of the information and training campaigns organized by the General Directorate of Religious Affairs that I described in the previous chapter, are usually well informed about these duties. Significantly, underlying the administrative practice of granting permissions is an implicit distinction between uses that are permanent and ordinary and those that are ephemeral and extraordinary. Whereas the former, that is, regular worship in the forms of Islamic Friday prayers or Christian Sunday services, are viewed as particularistic, as they

provided benefits only to community members themselves and are therefore generally not authorized, the latter had to be granted chiefly including prominent religious celebrations. As was becoming clear from my conversations with urban officials, through the granting of urban space to such celebrations, religious communities were treated like other social groups, such as civil society organizations or the cultural associations that organize Catalan folklore festivals. The general understanding was that through these activities social groups contribute to the cultural life of the city and foster social cohesion.

In many instances, over the last decade these practices of granting permission and preparations of religious minority celebrations have become increasingly routinized. In many cities, urban bureaucrats regularly offer municipal gyms for the special worship and devotions of Pentecostal congregations, to which they invite well-known evangelists from abroad, block roads for processions on the occasion of the Sikh Baisakhi festival or the veneration of Guru Nanak or the Shiite Ashura, and allow Muslims to use gyms or other large halls for the celebration of the end of Ramadan (Eid-Al-Fitr) or to pitch tents for this purpose in public school yards. The officers working for Barcelona's Office of Religious Affairs, for instance, maintain an annual calendar that specifies the religious holidays of all religious communities with whom they collaborate, as preparing the use of public spaces for these events is one of their major assignments.

However, the management of religious practices in public spaces has not been without its problems either, especially since religious communities have sometimes had to compete with other users. In 2013, for instance, the Islamic fasting period of Ramadan fell in the month of July, and like every year, Mollet's Al-Huda community asked the urban authorities for permission to use municipal spaces for this period, as the celebrations and the prayers that are a central part of them often attracted more than five hundred people. When they submitted their request, however, all the existing municipal spaces of this size had already been given away for league games and other sports competitions that concentrate during the summer months. As an alternative, urban officers suggested that the community set up a large tent in one of the school yards. They also offered to cover the costs of both the tent and the private security firm that was hired to control entry. While Al-Huda's leadership agreed with this solution, it also required negotiations between the urban authorities and the school in order to carefully coordinate the activities related to Ramadan and the school-based holiday activities of students and avoid potential complaints.

While in this instance conflicts were indeed avoided, there were other occasions on which Muslim communities entered into conflicts with urban authorities because of divergent understandings over legitimate uses. Significantly, whereas religious diversity has indeed become a central administrative principle of social classification and urban governmentality, as the emergence of a wide-ranging inventory of policies around religion has shown, its modus operandi is

circumscribed by secular definitions of public space. Such definitions underwrite the regulations that many city governments issued regarding the use of community centers locally called centros cívicos. City governments have the legal competence to define such spaces as secular, and many urban politicians told me that they proscribed religious uses in order to strengthen social cohesion, foster social coexistence, and guarantee universal citizenship.[13]

Across Catalonia, many Muslim communities routinely request permission from urban authorities to use these civic centers for certain activities. Yet in line with the secular definition of the centers, urban officials alert Muslim communities to the fact that they may carry out only cultural activities such as Arabic language classes, which is in fact the most typical use. However, in Mollet urban officials sometimes suspected that Muslims did not adhere to this rule. In an aside, one city councilor commented on this: "Of course, Muslims can use school rooms or civic centers to carry out Arabic courses. But we cannot tolerate this being used as an excuse to do other things there. Civic centers are not for catechism. If the Catholics want to do catechism, they do it in the church. And therefore it's also not okay if Muslims do religious activities in these centers."

Significantly, in many interviews urban officials emphasized that activities such as Arabic language classes were welcome because they were in principle open and beneficial to all citizens and that all other cultural activities organized by religious communities would be permitted as well. Underlying the practice of granting public space to religious communities is thus the distinction between culture and religion that runs in parallel and is mapped onto that between secular and religious definitions of public space. In others words, cultural uses of public space are authorized on a more or less permanent basis, whereas religious uses are viewed as exceptional. Again, despite the fact that many cultural activities carried out in Catalan cities do cater to specific sections of the population, they are perceived to be potentially open to and beneficial for all citizens, while religious practices are construed as intrinsically particularist and communitarian.

Drawing the line between secular-cultural and religious activities is even more complicated in the context of the intercultural festivals that most Catalan cities organize. Serving as publicly staged performances of urban multiculturalism, these festivals are meant to provide different ethnic communities with an opportunity to present themselves to urban societies and as an opportunity to deepen social coexistence. In this context, ethnic associations were invited to prepare stands and activities to show "their culture." In Mollet, this included Andalusians and Galicians, but also Moroccans and Senegalese. However, for many Moroccans and Senegalese Islam is a central part of their culture, and several times the question emerged of whether certain practices carried out during the festival were religious or simply provided information about their religion. Similarly, urban officials were uncertain whether the prayers that groups of charismatic Christians from Latin America and Africa carried out during the festival undermined its secular-cultural nature.

While in this particular instance drawing the line between religion and culture may seem trivial, it could acquire great political significance, because if urban officials tolerated religious practices, they would then need to consider the extent to which these practices aimed to proselytize. While urban officials were aware that as a religious practice proselytism is constitutionally protected by the right to religious freedom, they were often uneasy about it, as they felt that very overt proselytizing practices may have disruptive effects on urban conviviality and public order. In fact, concerns over proselytism epitomize the difficulties urban administrations encounter in balancing the rights to freedom of religion and to public order, thus heightening legal ambiguities. The director of Barcelona's Office of Religious Affairs, for instance, told me in a conversation that in her view there were no clear rules on how to deal with proselytism. According to her, all major Pentecostal events in Barcelona were deeply proselytizing in nature, while public street performances such as Sikh processions were rather about ceremonial assertions of Sikhs' urban citizenship. On one occasion, district officials rejected the request of Jehovah's Witnesses to use the civic center of Barcelona's district of La Barceloneta for a theater play because it was based on a theme from the Bible and therefore deemed proselytizing.[14] It is ironic that whereas in general the orientation and openness of religious events toward the general public was a criterion that qualified them for state support, in the case of proselytism this orientation was highly problematic and seemed to turn state support into a kind of religious favoritism with which urban officials felt uncomfortable because of its presumably shaky legal foundations. In Barcelona, for a certain period the Jehovah's Witnesses even refused to ask permission for their proselytizing campaigns. If their activities were protected by the constitution, they asked, why would they need to ask for permission at all?

Revisiting these findings, two observations regarding the enactments of the legal governmentality of religious diversity through administrative practices are particularly striking: first, the pronounced legal ambiguities that persist despite major efforts to regulate religion; and second, the complex entwining between the homogenization of religious forms on the one hand and the religious diversification of urban populations on the other.

RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN QUEBEC'S URBAN SPACE AND REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS

Interestingly, places of worship did not form a prominent feature during heavily mediatized controversies over reasonable accommodations during the 2000s in Quebec (Germain et al. 2008). However, the legal mechanism of reasonable accommodation does have major implications for the ways in which religious diversity is emplaced and spatially regulated in Quebec, especially regarding religious uses of public space. Significantly, I suggest that the mechanism of reasonable

accommodation creates immediate links between local instances of "place-protective action" (Astor 2016) and national-level debates that have no equivalent in Catalonia. Three brief examples, which are also discussed in the Bouchard-Taylor Commission's report, serve to illustrate these dynamics.

In 1990, the rabbinate of the Hassidic community in Outremont requested the municipality to grant permission to establish an *eruv*, which under Jewish law is "a real or symbolic alteration of a boundary aimed at facilitating observance of the rule that prohibits Orthodox Jews from leaving their homes with certain objects on the Shabbat, e.g. a stroller, a wheelchair or medication, by extending the private domain (the house or dwelling) to the entire area that the eruv circumscribes" (Bouchard and Taylor 2008: 48).

In the present case, the eruv was a thin transparent fishing line that was tied to poles and the buildings of consenting owners at a height of 4.5 meters.[15] In 1990, then, urban officials gave permission for the eruv. In 2000, however, against the backdrop of increasing tensions in the area over the rise of the Hassidic population and the increasing number of synagogues, as well as following residents' complaints against the eruv, the city council ruled that the city could not allow the use of public space for religious purposes, and municipal workers removed the wires. Less than a month later, members of the Hassidic community filed a complaint with the Québec Superior Court with the support of the constitutional lawyer Julius Grey, arguing that through this decision the city had violated their right to religious freedom and neglected its duty of reasonable accommodation. In court, the city and the Mouvement Laïque Québécois, which acted as an intervener, argued that the eruv was not a real religious necessity but a convenience the city was not obliged to support. They also tried to show that the eruv inflicted harm on other residents, arguing that the wires were dangerous to pedestrians and interfered with road traffic. Significantly, they also claimed that the eruv contributed to creating a ghetto within Outremont and that it afforded Hassidic Jews privileged claims on public space and thereby undermined its very public nature.

As Valerie Stoker (2003: 20) found in her study of the controversy, opponents of the eruv felt that it was an offensive territorial marker that had no place in a religiously neutral state and that it symbolized the Hassidic Jews' rejection of the "democratic values of secularism, tolerance and inclusivism." Moreover, opponents understood "secularism as an inviolable end in itself, inextricably linked to the promotion of a common public culture of modern enlightened rationality." However, in its judgment the court rejected all of these arguments and highlighted the obligation to attempt a reasonable accommodation as central to the state's duty of religious neutrality.

These controversies were further fueled by linguistic divisions between the French-speaking majority of Outremont and the Hassidic Jews, the overwhelming majority of whom have no command of the French language. Clearly, culturally entrenched understandings and sentiments of secularism shaped Francophone

residents' sense that the eruv was harmful, as they wished to preserve the spatial order of existing cultural hierarchies. At the same time, the mechanism of reasonable accommodation allowed this local controversy about regimes of public space to be immediately transposed to the national level of adjudication and become an issue of intense debate in the national public sphere and beyond.

A similar development drove the controversy over the frosting of windows at a gym located in the former YMCA building in Montreal's Mile End, a neighborhood nearby Outremont. The gym's large windows overlooked the adjacent synagogue of an ultra-Orthodox Jewish congregation, and the congregation agreed with the gym management that blinds should be installed in order to prevent Jewish boys from seeing women in tight training clothes. In addition, however, some female gym clients had also expressed discomfort at being seen from the outside, thus adding impetus to the suggestion. When in 2005 the blinds became defunct, the management opted for the frosting of the windows as a more durable solution, and the Jewish community paid for both of these works. Later on, however, clients began to mobilize against this decision through a signature campaign. They felt that the management had erred in making concessions to the Jewish congregation's demand, which they saw as based on backward gender conceptions and stereotypes that seemed irreconcilable with post–Quiet Revolution modernity. Finally, the management decided to reinstall the unfrosted windows. Significantly, while Bouchard and Taylor (2008: 70) clarified that this was an informal agreement and not a reasonable accommodation, it has been discussed as such in Quebec's public sphere and media.

In another case from 2005, two non-Jewish ambulance attendants were prevented from bringing their non-kosher brown-bag lunches into the cafeteria of the Montreal General Jewish Hospital. After they had taken a patient to the hospital, they sat down in the cafeteria before being asked to leave by staff and security guards on the grounds that only kosher food was admitted. After filing a complaint with the Human Rights Commission, the commission ruled that they had been unfairly treated, and in an out-of-court settlement they were awarded $7,500 each in compensation (Bouchard and Taylor 2008: 57). However, not only minority practices but also the presence in an urban space of Catholic-majority symbols have come under scrutiny. Thus, in 2002 there was a public outcry when a radio program revealed that Montreal's city administration had decided to rename the Christmas tree in the square next to the city hall "tree of life" (51). This name was abandoned by the incoming administration, which first scrapped the idea of having a tree altogether but then decided to reinstall it in response to public protests. Significantly, no religious minority had been involved in the debate or demanded that the tree be renamed.

What is at stake in all of these cases is the question of where to draw the line between religious practices that are unproblematic expressions of religious freedom and those that conflict with the rights and claims to public space of others

and that appear intolerable because they establish particularistic norms in a space that is presumably universalistic. These lines crisscross urban space and are often invisible, like the religious rules concerning food consumption in urban space, or barely visible like the eruv in Outremont. Again, however, as Outremont's residents' negotiations over the eruv's alleged harmfulness demonstrate the very visibility of these lines, this is not something that is a given but is itself a central part of the debate. Two points are sociologically significant. First, contestations over whether some religious practices can be viewed as a reasonable accommodation seamlessly link local occurrences to national public spheres, thus transforming them into major objects of controversy that presumably depict national cultural cleavages. At stake, then, is not so much whether it is legitimate to place an eruv in a Montreal neighborhood, but Quebec's secular public space, which it is deemed to threaten. Second, most observers have explored practices of and controversies over reasonable accommodation from sociolegal and institutional perspectives and examined their power dynamics and normative implications.[16] However, as a legal mechanism, reasonable accommodation has major consequences for the management of public space and the territorialization of religious diversity. By obliging urban administrations to protect minority practices through the granting of exemptions, it deepens the plurality of public space. Yet, as I argued in chapter 2, this religious plurality of public space does not sit easily with the concepts of secular public space that Quebeckers fashioned in the Quiet Revolution, which forged widespread and heightened sensibilities vis-à-vis cultural expressions that appear to threaten Quebec's national cohesion. The spatial governance of religious diversity is thus closely, and often instrumentally, tied to images of nationhood and the question of whether religious diversity is seen to foster or undermine such images.

As we have seen throughout this chapter, images of nationhood also matter when national frameworks are enacted at the local level in the ways in which urban administrations define the premises of conviviality. In this context, in Catalonia and Quebec state actors officially endorse the notion that laws should allow the uniform treatment of religious communities across the national space. In the last section of this chapter, I return to Catalonia to argue that it was not so much legal uniformity but legal ambiguities that marked the spatial practices of urban actors and the lived experiences of residents, and I explain why this was so.

THE EFFECTS OF LEGAL AMBIGUITY: BROKERAGE AND MEDIATION

As argued throughout this book, the Catalan state has invested major efforts in regulating and promoting religious diversity, especially through the Law on Centers of Worship. For their part, city governments have issued numerous bylaws, ordinances, and policies in order to adapt national and regional laws to

their particular circumstances, always with an eye to balancing their obligation to guarantee the right to religious freedom with protecting the interests of other citizens. Yet, despite these efforts, in the lived experience of urban officials, religious communities, and urban populations, religious diversity continues to be marked by profound legal ambiguities, often leading to very different outcomes in different places. Legal ambiguity manifests itself first in the uncertainty about what regulations are actually in place, and second in inconsistent and irregular procedures, typically as an outcome of patronage and personalism.

No example is better suited to illustrate the uncertainty about regulations than the controversy over Islamic places of worship in Mollet del Vallès. Whereas city officials changed the regulations regarding places of worship only after receiving requests for permission from Muslim communities, in interviews, press statements, and interactions with Muslims themselves, they invariably emphasized that the current zoning law had initially been issued in 2004. In doing so, they avoided misrepresenting the case very obviously and fraudulently, but they also confused and misled the other actors involved. Thus, in several conversations and focus group interviews I conducted with members of the neighborhood association of the city center, people based their rejection of the planned mosque on the zoning law, while actually being ignorant of its real content and the timing of its amendment. In 2012, the board members of the association held a meeting with the Al-Huda leadership in which Muslims tried to garner residents' support for their plans. The residents did offer that support, provided, as they told me, that Al-Huda's plans complied with the law, which at the time they did.

However, when they realized later that, because of the amendment, this was no longer true, they acquired the impression that it was Al-Huda who had misrepresented the case during their meeting, not the city government, and therefore they publicly rejected the plans. The following set of comments, made during a focus group discussion with neighbors and arranged here in chronological order, illustrates how, in negotiating their own position, the notions of "law" and "lawfulness" became crucial: "They [Al-Huda] took the law in their own way"; "They knew that the law did not allow building in that place"; "When they don't respect the laws, this is when it starts annoying me"; "The laws here in Mollet, they are for me and you and for them as well"; "We cannot have one law for them and one for us"; "If they come here, they have to respect the laws." As this sequence shows, the question of the lawfulness of the new mosque was quickly generalized and used to interrogate and question Muslims' ability to abide by the law in abstract terms. Compliance with the law thus became the yardstick by which Muslim practices were measured, while the sequence of events that had rendered the Muslims' request unlawful after the fact was obliterated from the debate.

Nor are urban police and other security forces always aware of existing regulations regarding the use of public spaces for religious purposes. Recorded police responses to Pentecostal practices of street evangelism or the public presence of

Jehovah's Witnesses, for instance, have variously included expulsion from the site with and without fines and the confiscation of religious materials, though most police interventions occur only in response to complaints. Moreover, in 2008 the regional government issued an internal document defining the criteria for religious uses of public space and related practices of giving permission, but these were formulated only as nonbinding recommendations, which further buttressed district or municipal councilors' discretionary power.[17]

But even when urban officials do have legal certainty regarding regulations governing religious diversity, legal ambiguities persist because of the different ways in which these are applied and multiple instances of actors operating outside standard protocols and procedures. When asking permission for religious events in public spaces in Barcelona, for instance, some religious leaders directly address the responsible urban police unit and others approach the district authorities, while yet others begin by mobilizing the support of the Office of Religious Affairs or the city commissioner on religious affairs. Much of this variation can be explained by personalized relationships between religious leaders and representatives of the different state agencies and related patterns of patronage, which lead to high degrees of informality.

Significantly, these legal ambiguities open a space for the emergence of a field of multiple relationships of brokerage and mediation, so much so that on the ground the management of religious diversity becomes deeply shaped by them. Urban administrations mediate controversies between religious communities and residential populations, religious communities and other users of urban space, and religious communities and other administrative units or state actors (such as the police). Some administrative units, such as Barcelona's Office of Religious Affairs, are in fact designed to function as mediators in the religious field, while in smaller cities urban administrations have specialized mediation staff who also cater to religious issues. In addition, in these cities urban bureaucrats have actually worked as lobbyists for migrant concerns, especially in periods of political backlash and anti-immigrant agitation carried out by conservative or right-wing political groups. They often saw themselves as tasked to educate the broader public about living with diversity, were generally very open toward the needs and desires of religious minority communities and migrants in general, and were usually also willing to defend migrants' concerns in interacting with their city councilors as their political superiors, neighborhood associations, and the urban population in general. Many municipalities also actively supported interfaith dialogues, associations, or platforms that also operate as brokers and mediators (Griera 2012), as sometimes did the Catholic Church, for instance, by providing shelter to Orthodox Christian communities of Romanian, Bulgarian, or Serbian background in premises they did not urgently need.

While the prayers of Mollet's Muslims at the plaça major demonstrated the failure of state brokerage in facilitating the establishment of a place of worship, in

most cases brokerage does yield results. Significantly, state brokerage was to some extent already built into the Law on Centers of Worship, the government's claims to provide full legal certainty notwithstanding. The law stipulated that the state "facilitated" access to places of worship, and in many municipalities this strengthened perceptions of their role as brokers. In the city of Santa Coloma de Gramanet, the city councilor responsible for immigration and integration told me, "The hypothesis of our work is pedagogy. Whenever there is a problem between people belonging to different cultural or religious groups, we come in telling them this conflict is not between groups but between individuals, and we give them the tools so that they can put in place a solution for themselves. We strengthen their own autonomy so they can start to self-manage these situations of tensions, be it the noise or crowding that some religious groups produce. We make them responsible. And most of all, we work to improve mutual perceptions."

As this description illustrates, the Catalan state's brokerage and mediation of religious diversity are designed to arrange horizontal relationships between citizens in an enabling rather than prescriptive fashion.[18] As I found from studying instances of state brokerage in the field of religion in cities across Catalonia, the concepts of "complaint and "nuisance" are central to most of them as these are the communicative and social forms through which citizens address the state.[19] As mentioned above, what is religious song for believers may be noise for neighbors. What was a protest prayer for Mollet's Muslims was an intimidating and annoying practice for their neighbors, an unlawful gathering and occupation of public space for the police, and an act of intolerable "blackmail" in the eyes of the city councilor. The idea of nuisance is crucial here because it enables us to articulate the lived experience of religious diversity (and its limits) with the political practices that shape these experiences. From the point of view of the claimant, nuisance is an infringement of the established order of urban life and has strong spatial connotations, as violations of these established orders are typically perceived as intrusions into one's space or violations of spatial arrangements. The central question is, of course, under what conditions religious expressions are perceived as nuisance, are framed in public discourse, and are legally recognized as such. All city councilors and bureaucrats told me that they virtually never heard of any complaint about Catholic processions, festivals, or saint venerations, and that their preparations followed such established patterns that they are routine business for everyone.

Conversely, even after more than a decade of experience, religious minority processions or other minority uses of urban space still pose challenges for administrations and neighbors, and shopkeepers are much more likely to view them as disturbing their business and tranquility. Framing religious and cultural expressions as nuisance may serve to maintain existing spatial orders and urban cultural hierarchies, and they have often contributed to positioning migrants at urban peripheries and other undesirable material locations that reflect their subordinated social status. At the same time, and conversely, members of religious

communities have themselves framed other behaviors, such as nudity for instance, as a nuisance, thereby challenging existing spatial orders (much more so in Quebec than in Catalonia). I suggest that if accusations or charges made in the courts are claims on the legal order, we can construe "complaints" made vis-à-vis urban administrations as claims on the spatial order of urban life.

Significantly, complaints on the part of the majority population became much more widespread after the beginning of Spain's economic crisis in 2008, which led to heightened degrees of ethnicized social envy. Migrants were often falsely suspected of being given preferential treatment in social service departments, receiving baby strollers for free, and generally obtaining a greater share of social benefits than the native population. Urban officials told me that these perceptions, while not related to religion per se, were often mapped onto religious categories such that in public discourse it was Muslims or African Pentecostals who were perceived to deplete public finances because of their (presumably exaggerated) needs for social assistance.

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter my aim has been to show how urban administrative practices turn the governance of religious diversity into a spatial politics and what happens when national legal regulations are enacted and reworked through local constellations of material circumstances, infrastructural norms, and power relations. In this context, I have highlighted that while more abstract legal concepts such as religious freedom and equality play a role in guiding regulatory practices, administrative procedures such as planning and zoning law (authorization, approvals, permissions) have a much more direct impact on how religion is governed and located in urban space. This finding has three theoretical implications that are worth spelling out.

First, whereas at the national level the governance of religious diversity is organized around core values such as secularism, state neutrality, and cultural heritage, as well as images of nationhood in the urban domain, religious diversity is shaped through its own specific spatial logic. This also implies that the relatively clear contrast on the national level between Quebec's emphasis on secularity for the sake of national unity and Catalans' notion of secularity as respect for religious diversity is partly dissipated in city politics and its concrete ethnographic constellations. However, this does not prove that cities are actually laboratories of postnational citizenship and cosmopolitan diversity that have freed themselves from the cultural straitjacket of national homogeneity, as they are often fashioned as being in studies of migration (Schiller 2015). Rather, nationalism informs the motivations, sensibilities, and practical rationalities underlying practices of administering religion by urban authorities in more complex ways. Concerns over religious, subnational, and national belonging are all drawn together in these practices, thereby linking the urban with other regulatory levels. It is especially

through legal claims making and legal mechanisms, as well as through processes of mediatization, that these different multiple spatial scales become interlocked.

Second, the findings of this chapter raise crucial questions about definitions of urban space as religious or secular. In their book *Postsecular Cities*, geographers Beaumont and Baker argued that "the postsecular city is a public space which continues to be shaped by secularization and secularism (as a political and cultural ideology) but that also has to negotiate and make space for the re-emergence of public expressions of religion and spirituality" (Baker and Beaumont 2011: 33). Moreover, they suggested that secular definitions of urban space have lost their former hegemony and that under post-secular conditions, "the dividing lines (and hence roles) between religion and science, faith and reason, tradition and innovation are no longer rigidly enforced (or indeed inforcable), and new relations of possibility are emerging" (Beaumont and Baker 2011: 2). Going beyond these rather timid suggestions, Oosterbaan (2014) proposed that the rise of public religion that Casanova (1994) diagnosed almost twenty-five years ago invalidated theoretical assumptions about the secularity of urban space and unmasked the presumed interdependence of urbanization and secularization as a modernist fantasy.

One major problem of these revisionist approaches is their dichotomous understanding of public space as defined as either secular or religious. As I showed above, such dichotomies rather obscure the fact that authoritative definitions and uses of public space are not uniform, nor encompassing or permanent. On the contrary, legal regulations governing religious diversity and their enactment through administrative practices dissect public space, defining secular and religious zones for distinct purposes and specific times, and thereby forging a spatial regime that is flexible and fluid. They subject public space to complex mapping practices, which inscribe religious expressions into urban life according to their social and cultural desirability and legality. Significantly, both desirability and legality are often subject to shifting assessments that change according to the quality of the relationships between urban administrations and specific religious groups, and the ways in which broader media discourses shape the perceptions of religious communities by local authorities. Authoritative definitions of public space are neither rigid nor stable, but the ways in which they vary are not accidental. On the contrary, local practices of administering religious diversity are shaped by a triple restriction, being constrained by national law, subjected to the pressures of residential populations aiming to reproduce local cultural hierarchies, and also geared toward the needs of religious minority communities and their claims to religious place making as a form of urban citizenship. Significantly, the radical recasting of urban religious topographies over the last twenty-five years provides clear evidence of the existence of new religious visibilities in urban space (Oosterbaan 2014; Garbin 2013), but the fact that these visibilities are highly regulated and constrained by legal imperatives also pinpoints the limits of post-secular vistas.

Third, the findings in this chapter suggest that one outcome of the enactments of legal governmentality in urban administrative practices has been religious minorities' gradual regularization. Part of the reason for this is that state and urban administrations have identified certain aspects of their management as problematic, but also allocated frameworks and financial resources to solve these problems. My argument is that this regularization entails both the progressive religious diversification of urban populations and the organizational homogenization of religious life.

Olivier Roy (2014: 8) captured this process of homogenization in the notion of the "formatting of religion," arguing that "formatting is heightened by the role of institutions, either through legislation or through legal processes that tend to treat all religions in the same way and therefore to mold them in similar categories." As he astutely observed, premised on standardized ideas of what a religious community is, such formatting is not so much a corollary of states' explicit desires to control, assimilate, and homogenize, but is carried out in the name of freedom and equality. In order to take these values into account, Catalan urban administrations have fully embraced state-sponsored, human-rights-driven discourses on religious diversity and, by increasingly catering to migrants' specified religious concerns, have begun to make religiously based categories part of the administrative gaze. One consequence of this is that the state itself has started to act as a broker, adviser, and mediator in religious affairs. This is apparent in the way urban administrations facilitate processes of the legalization of places of worship, which involve advice and consultations of all kinds, but also the ways in which urban administrations mediate conflicts between religious communities and residents or other urban populations.

While the spatial logics of urban governance have involved both the gradual regularization of religious newcomers and the affirmation of urban cultural hierarchies, which are expressed through space, there is also the question of whether new modalities of coexistence emerge from these scenarios. Drawing on Peter Berger (2014: 80–93), Berking, Steets, and Schwenk (2018) have coined the term "urban formulas of peace" in order to capture urban institutional arrangements among religious communities, as well as between them and the state, which may vary depending on the particular local circumstances. While the events in Mollet del Vallès provided rather spectacular evidence of the continued failure to develop such a formula of peace and to integrate Mollet's Muslims into the urban fabric, such formulas have certainly emerged in many other instances. I suggest that practices of brokerage and mediation of all kinds, whereby churches, NGOs, and human rights groups, as well as divisions of urban government or individual urban officials, work through and constantly amend infrastructural regulations and the other elements of "ordinary urbanism" that I described above, are at the core of these urban formulas of peace.

4 • THE LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

Regulating Full-Face Coverings

Over the last decade, many Western societies have become embroiled in heated, sometimes hyperbolic debates about what many see as an extreme form of religious commitment: the full-face veil worn by some Muslim women. These debates have taken numerous forms and have been conducted in mass media, forging an increasing, if not overwhelming, consensus among Western publics that the face veil is culturally alien and oppressive toward women, a symbol of Muslim radicalism and essentially undesirable. At the same time, and often pushed by right-wing populist and other political parties, in many countries demands to regulate or ban face veiling from certain spaces were carried into the political domain, leading to parliamentary deliberation and sometimes voting.[1] However, as the legal grounds for regulation seemed unclear, countries such as France have instituted governmental commissions tasked with investigating the matter and defining legally sound ways of introducing politically expedient regulatory action (de Galembert and Raillard 2014).

Such controversies have also occurred in Catalonia and Quebec and are a central part of the politics of religious diversity. On October 8, 2010, the city council of the Catalan city of Lleida passed a ban that prohibits the use of the Muslim face veil, locally referred to as a burqa,[2] in all municipal spaces such as buildings belonging to the city and public transport, with fines of up to €600 for violations. Following that, no fewer than twelve municipalities passed regulations on the wearing of burqas and niqabs. These regulatory actions were followed by legal countermobilization and a Supreme Court verdict in 2013 that eventually forced the municipalities to suspend or abandon their regulations. Several attempts to pass regional regulations through parliamentary vote that ran in parallel to these urban dynamics failed because of a lack of political consensus.

Across the Atlantic, in Quebec, on March 24, 2010, the government presented the public with a draft law, named Bill 94, according to which anyone wishing to

access state-funded institutions would be obliged to do so with their faces uncovered, and imposing the naked face as a basic condition for all interactions in the field of social services. In the eyes of its initiators this regulation was an attempt to make good on the promise to draw up clear rules for the practices of "reasonable accommodation" that had emerged as the central concern of the governmentally sponsored Bouchard-Taylor Commission. Face veiling had already been an important topic in the commission's hearings and deliberations in 2007–2008. Later on, it was again taken up and defined as a practice in need of state intervention in the context of the heated political discourses surrounding the Charter of Quebec Values in 2013. Following changes in government in 2014, the Liberal Party eventually passed its "religious neutrality law" (Bill 62) on October 19, 2015, with broad public support. The law requires that all people who wish to offer or receive a public service in Quebec must do so with their faces uncovered. This includes educational institutions, public transport, and health care. In addition, the law outlines the circumstances under which authorities should grant accommodation requests based on religious beliefs (Neuman 2017). In Catalonia, face veiling was increasingly portrayed as a symbol of the rise of Salafism, Euro-Arabic jihadism, and terrorism, and also more broadly of the failure of multiculturalism to gauge and tame Islamic practice in ways that are compatible with liberal modernity. Similarly, in Quebec face veiling came to symbolize the limit of legitimate religious diversity and was frequently described as "the line" that must not be passed.

How can we explain the emergence of these controversies over restricting face veils as an aspect of the regulations that govern migration-driven religious diversity, as well as the shape of the discursive contestations that surround them? What is at stake for social and political actors in demanding the banning of face veils and the populations they claim to represent, as well as for the activists who defend Muslim women's right to cover their faces? Most existing studies have viewed bans against face veiling as a new level of secularist onslaught against religious minority practices, in which Western feminism becomes complicit in acts of popular or institutionalized racism and Western liberalism reveals its illiberal face (Selby 2014; Bilge 2012; Fournier 2013). While my material to some extent confirms these arguments, I question their analytical value in explaining why social actors—politicians, civil society groups, and religious representatives—support such bans or mobilize against them and why initiatives to ban face veiling succeed or fail. Therefore, my own approach is different. In this chapter I explain the rise of debates over the face veil in Catalonia and Quebec by focusing on the variety of cultural and political meanings attached to the face veil and the ways they acquire cultural resonance and political traction in public discourse. More specifically, I look at how regimes of religious diversity are shaped by framing and narrating "rights as culture," as well as "culture as rights." I suggest that it was the combination of both the fashioning of the liberal rights to gender equality

and individual freedom as "our culture" and the couching of cultural or "civilizational" arguments in the language of rights that accounts for widespread popular support for bans on face veils.

I develop my argument in three steps. First, by drawing on the Catalan case, I analyze the actions and discourses of three sets of actors—local politicians, migrant and religious associations, and influential individuals acting as "moral entrepreneurs." I demonstrate that those in favor of the ban on face veiling were able to construct a coherent narrative around values of conviviality while simultaneously claiming to defend women's and migrants' rights and that this ability allowed them to influence local media and popular discourse in decisive ways. Arguments against the ban, by contrast, were mostly based on a much narrower rights-based approach that remained abstract and highly difficult to narrate.

Second, by drawing on the Quebec story, I show that the scandalization of face veiling and the support for regulatory action have to do with the ways in which histories and experiences of modernity and emancipation are stored in collective memories, especially those of feminism, and deployed as a means of rallying support against a particular religious practice of newcomers that reminds people of their own past. I agree with Selby (2014: 441, 451) that "in Quebec the covered female body evokes vestiges of oppressive Catholic patriarchal religiosity and patriarchal religious control."

Third, I return to Catalonia in order to demonstrate that these memories entail sensorial and emotional registers that tie burqa controversies to a particular type of affective politics. I suggest that burqa bans might tell us at least as much about the politics of religious diversity as about the contested nature of urban space, notions of decency, access to space, appropriate appearances in that space, and struggles over who has the right to define all these terms.

However, whether anti-burqa mobilizations are also animated by the demand to fashion public space as rigorously secular as possible and by ideas about the neutrality of a secular public sphere is an open question. My comparison of the two settings shows that while in Quebec anti-burqa campaigns were indeed driven by these ideas, in Catalonia the Muslim face veil was rather singled out as a problematic religious practice and symbol—for reasons I explore in detail below—while the majority of participants in these debates viewed the presence of other religious minority symbols and practices in public spaces not as problematic but rather as legitimate expressions of democracy and cultural diversity.

While broadly situated within sociological debates on religious diversity, my approach in this chapter addresses and combines cultural sociology approaches to politics (Gamson 1992) and social movements (Snow and Benford 1992) with a notion of policy making as a complex interplay of knowledge, power, social interests, and agency. In line with the "argumentative turn" in the analysis of public policies, I emphasize the "ways in which particular concepts or story-lines frame what and who is taken into consideration and excluded from policy deliberation"

(Brock, Cornwall, and Gaventa 2001: 5). In this context, I note that "rights talk" (Glendon 1991) becomes increasingly important to both nationalist discourse and religious citizenship debates. With regard to the Netherlands, Uitermark, Duyvendak, and Mepschen (2014: 235) found that "political leaders and public figures have reconfigured what had been values of universal liberal citizenship into national values of cultural distinctiveness: 'Dutch values' versus 'Islamic values,'" suggesting that liberal rights are increasingly framed in the language of culture. Conversely, I am interested in how, in society, debates on cultural values come to be framed in the idiom of rights, and how diverse social groups take rights talk on board.

I begin by outlining the broader Western context of burqa controversies, pointing to some important sociological insights and describing the contours of my own theoretical approach. Next I analyze in detail the discourses around face veiling in Catalonia and Quebec and show how these cases help us to understand the politics surrounding the fragile balance between tolerance, pluralism, and social cohesion.

THE FACE VEIL: WESTERN OBSESSION OR SALAFIST POLITICS?

As already mentioned, since around the middle of the 2000s national governments, lower-level political and administrative bodies, and wider publics have become embroiled in heated and complex debates about Islamic face coverings, leading to public restrictions being imposed in some countries. To date, only Belgium and France have adopted a ban on full-face veils in public spaces at the national level, though there are local bans in Italy, Switzerland, and Russia. The Netherlands approved plans to ban face veiling in government buildings, schools, hospitals, and public transport, while Egypt has prepared a draft bill to ban burqas and niqabs from both public spaces and government institutions.[3] Most recently, Latvia, where reportedly only three women wear the burqa, announced plans to introduce a ban as a preventive measure (Martyn-Hemphill 2016).

While public opinion and political leaders have often approved banning initiatives, they have also faced considerable social and political resistance from human rights groups, activist lawyers, and Muslim associations. At the same time, expert commissions formed to assess the desirability of face coverings have pointed out the legal hurdles against banning. As Joppke (2011) points out in his analysis of the French case, the government's ban was passed against the express opinion of the Conseil d'Etat that a ban would violate fundamental rights. Interestingly, the Conseil d'Etat's opinion was partly based on the widespread consensus, shared by both lawyers and representatives of Muslim associations, that the face veil had no religious basis and that the ban could therefore not be justified in the name of laïcité.

Following regulatory actions by governments in some countries, such legal assessments encouraged opponents of such bans to draw on legal means themselves in order to contest them, thereby gathering additional legal expertise and appealing against anti-burqa regulations in the courts. As a consequence, conflicts around Islamic face veiling turned into new sites of the judicialization of religious minority claims and of the politics of religious diversity more broadly. In 2014, in its decision in *S.A.S. v. France*, the European Court of Human Rights validated the French law, concurring with the French government that limitations of individuals' religious freedom to wear the full-face veil were legitimate to the extent that this practice undermined the values of "living together," while rejecting the claim that it went against the values of gender equality and respect for human dignity.

Thus far, research into these dynamics has been situated at two opposite points. On the one hand, "bottom-up" approaches have addressed face coverings as religious symbols, expressions of piety, and particular forms of spirituality (Parvez 2011; Selby 2014; Brems 2014). Anthropologists and sociologists who have interviewed face veiling women have emphasized that, contrary to public stereotypes, use of the burqa is often self-chosen, an outcome of spiritual journeys that is not limited to migrants but is also used by native converts. In her study on the situation in Netherlands, Moors (2009, 2014) traced the chronology of Dutch debates over the burqa and its ebbs and flows in bottom-up fashion from a local incident in which, in December 2002, three Dutch Moroccan teenage girls came to school wearing face veils and were denied access to the school after several attempts had been made to convince them to abandon the practice. While the girls argued that their right to freedom of religion had been denied, the school justified its action by stating that face coverings hindered identification and communication, posed security threats, and reduced the girls' chances of future employment (Moors 2009: 396). This, as well as the French case, anticipated much of the argumentative apparatus that came to shape subsequent episodes of conflict across the world.

On the other hand, the macro approaches that constitute the bulk of existing work have focused on normative and legal considerations. Legal scholars and sociologists have assessed the arguments and claims against Islamic face coverings as posing a challenge to gender equality, security, and social cohesion and have traced the complex bureaucratic and legal mechanisms surrounding existing or planned prohibitions.[4] The Netherlands was the first country to approve a ban through a majority vote in parliament in 2005.[5] Where bans were successful, as in France, they have been interpreted as outcomes of militant secularism and the ways in which secularism serves as a legal mechanism and political justification to regulate and curtail Muslims' religious expressions (Fournier 2013).

As parts of a broader politics of religious diversity, these legal initiatives have also provoked intensive normative debates in law and political theory. Some

writers have defended the laws (Bruckner 2010), while others have argued that they demonstrate religious intolerance and state paternalism.[6] Some scholars have even argued that political theorists have in fact been influential in shaping the laws against the full-face veil by introducing concepts of reciprocity and visibility into legal vocabulary, notably in France (Baehr and Gordon 2013).

While agreeing with these findings, I suggest that this research has not sufficiently addressed the situated cultural, political, and affective dynamics that constitute full-face veiling as an object of contention "on the ground" in an empirical fashion. In other words, sociologists have left a gap between localized subjective experiences and the macro level of national political and legal responses. I address this gap by asking the following questions: Why precisely has the full-face veil become the center of political debates about Islam? What kinds of experiences and ideas have animated its framing as a practice in need of regulation? What is the very materiality of full-face veiling that is mobilized in discourses in favor of banning?

FRAMING MEANINGS IN DISCOURSE AND NARRATIVE

Thus, much of the sociological literature views emergent forms of religious diversity in relation to changes in church-state relations, human-rights-oriented legal reforms, and citizenship, while bottom-up processes of local framing and meaning making remain understudied. From a socio-constructionist perspective, public controversies are intersubjectively constructed within complex power relations as well as historical, social, and cultural configurations. In these configurations, discourses articulate political and media-based processes of the "problematization" of issues such as the burqa, while also becoming sites of struggle.

This implies that social problems are discursively constructed and located in a frame that "signifies and condenses the world 'out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of actions within one's present or past environment" (Snow and Benford 1992: 137). However, frames and narratives not only are cognitive tools in a world of "meaning seekers" but also operate by "structuring relations, in determining whether groups turn into opponents rather than collaborators, whether a confrontation leads to joint governance or conflict" (Hajer and Laws 2006: 261) and enable "discursive coalitions" whose members gather around common story lines and policy narratives.

Whether discursive coalitions drawing on common "story-lines" are ultimately successful in public discourse and the political field has much to do with their abilities to provide the symbolic resources that help people negotiate meaning. In his book *Talking Politics*, Gamson (1992: 117) suggests that in negotiating meaning, media discourse, experiential knowledge, and popular wisdom are

fundamental resources to draw on. I propose that the success of participants in public discourse depends on their capacities to offer such resources or harmonize with them. Recognizing the fundamentally "storied nature of much political discourse" (Steinberg 1998: 846), I now turn to describing local conflicts around burqa wearing in Catalonia and the way they draw on local collective memories and stocks of knowledge.

CATALONIA

The Lleida Burqa Ban

Lleida is a Catalan municipality and provincial capital with more than 139,000 residents, 21 percent of whom were foreign-born as of 2012. Agriculture, particularly fruit growing, is one of the main economic activities in the area. The demand for low-skilled labor in the agricultural sector helped to turn Lleida into a popular destination for foreign workers, especially from the late 1990s onward. Significant proportions of the foreign-born population come originally from Morocco and Algeria (22 percent) and sub-Saharan Africa (15 percent). While there have also been significant increases in the numbers of migrants originating from Latin America and eastern Europe during this period, the proportion of North Africans, who are overwhelmingly Muslim, is significantly higher in Catalonia than in the rest of Spain (Astor 2012: 335). As a consequence, public perceptions of migration, religious difference, and economic precariousness are mapped more directly onto one another in terms of social otherness in Catalonia than elsewhere on the Iberian Peninsula.

During my interviews with politicians, Muslim leaders, and human rights activists in the city, it quickly became clear that the controversy over the burqa ban was deeply entangled in long-standing contentious local politics around migration, integration, and religious diversity. The most important issues in this regard were the growth of a mosque community with a Salafist leadership, rumors of Saudi funding, and conflicts over a Muslim bookshop and other premises rented by this group. All my interviewees talked at some point about these issues or directly associated the burqa conflict with them. Exemplary in this regard was the statement of one pro-ban activist, who framed the links as follows: "Alright, look, in the city of Lleida there are two mosques. One is Salafist and the other one is not. The Salafist mosque has a fundamentalist imam with direct connections to Saudi Arabia, and since he arrived in the city we find women wearing the face veil. This includes his wife. She is completely covered from head to toe and also wears sunglasses and gloves that cover her hands."

The older mosque, the Omar Islamic Centre, which is located in a discrete building in front of the city hall, opened in 1990 on the initiative of the Senegalese Tijani. The Salafist-oriented Associació Unió i Cooperació Islàmica de

Lleida i Comarca was founded in 1996 and mainly attracts people of Moroccan and Algerian origin. The local identification of face veiling as a problem is thus closely tied to the growing membership of this second community and the idea that it indicates a rise in fundamentalism and in the radicalization of local Muslims.

The long-standing conflict around this mosque began in May 2001, when the Associació Unió i Cooperació Islàmica de Lleida i Comarca purchased an old warehouse and converted it into their official place of worship. When it opened under the name of Ibn Hazn, its neighbors complained that it did not fulfill the required conditions. Seven months after the site opened, the city council closed it on the grounds that the legal requirements had not been met. After addressing these issues, the mosque received official permission to reopen a few months later, creating further discontent in the neighborhood residents' association, which collected signatures for a petition, organized demonstrations, and lobbied the local council to take further action.

In this context, in 2005 the city government created the Municipal Assembly of Religions as a new advisory and consultative body made up of different religious groups present in the city, in line with various attempts to manage migration-driven religious diversity through creative policies in Catalonia (Griera 2012; Astor 2016). The Assemblea Municipal de les Religions was to be a meeting and communication point between the local authorities and the representatives of different religions with the aim of promoting social harmony in the city. However, tensions rose when representatives of the Associació Unió i Cooperació Islàmica de Lleida i Comarca declared that they would participate only on condition that Buddhists and Bahá'ís be excluded. The organizers of the Assemblea concluded that Muslim participation was more important than that of Buddhists and Bahá'ís in terms of its political significance and decided that the latter would instead be represented in the city's network of interfaith dialogue. Shortly afterward, the refusal by Ibn Hazn's imam to be interviewed by a female journalist during the month of Ramadan became public. This first controversy with the local mass media defined the imam's image as a radical Salafist.

The mosque controversy reached a new peak in 2007, when neighborhood protests and subsequent media pressure forced the local authorities to solve the problem by suggesting a new site. After lengthy negotiations, the mosque and local authorities agreed to relocate the mosque to a municipal plot in an industrial park, which again proved highly controversial. Local business owners felt that there should only be commercial entities in a commercial zone and protested. Simultaneously the Ibn Hazn mosque proved unable to raise enough funds to complete the project, and relationships between the imam and the mayor became increasingly strained. In addition, various immigrant organizations accused the imam of mismanaging the community's resources in the

local media. Meanwhile the local business association successfully appealed to the Catalan Court of Justice against the municipality repurposing the plot.

After complaints about noise and traffic congestion, in June 2010 city officials visited the mosque in order to count the number of participants in Friday prayers and found that roughly 1,200 persons were present in the building, which had a maximum approved capacity of 240. As a consequence, the place was shut down while the mosque leadership was pressed to find a permanent solution to avoid permanent closure. In press interviews, the imam voiced doubts about the technical reasons given by the city government and stated that his group felt persecuted (Visa 2010). During this period he was also accused (and later acquitted) of polygamy and the mistreatment and physical abuse of a converted Spanish woman. Some newspapers also published statements by the imam encouraging Muslims to take advantage of Catalan nationalism for the benefit of Islamic communities. In September 2010 city officials definitively closed the mosque for failing to comply with capacity restrictions.

It was in this context that in May 2010 Lleida's mayor stated that the burqa was "denigrating to women and should not be tolerated."[7] The following day a councilor from the opposition party of Catalan nationalists and Christian Democrats (CiU) announced that he would file a motion to ban the burqa in the entire city, including its streets and squares. Given the already heated debates over Muslim radicalism, these statements received widespread coverage in the local and national media. A report prepared by legal advisors on the mayor's behalf rejected this proposal on technical grounds and limited the possible ban to the interiors of municipal buildings, such as libraries, sports centers, and municipal offices. During a council meeting in late May, the CiU passed a motion for a ban that only the Green Party (IVC) voted against, with the Catalan Republican Left (ERC) abstaining.

Two months after the mayor's initial statements, the controversy expanded beyond Lleida. The leader of the Partido Popular, Spain's largest center-right party and the one currently in power, which had already tried unsuccessfully to bring the issue up in a debate in Barcelona's city council in 2007, requested a full-face veil ban during a municipal culture commission. In the Spanish senate too, the Partido Popular presented a motion in favor of a ban. Between June and July 2010, Coín in Andalusia (a region in southern Spain) and seven Catalan municipalities followed in the footsteps of Lleida to ban the wearing of face veils in municipal spaces through municipal bylaws. In addition, Reus and Barcelona adopted bans by mayoral decree without debate. Face veil bans were also debated in five other Catalan municipalities, but the respective proposals were rejected. Rather than being entirely exceptional, therefore, Lleida became a catalyst for developments elsewhere in the region. My argument is therefore that while the local history of urban conflict between Salafists and the city government in Lleida helps to explain the emergence of the burqa ban, its diffusion entails the

disembedding of the issue from concrete geographical contexts and is the result of copying.[8]

In July 2010, the Lleida-based Asociación Watani para la Libertad y la Justicia (Watani Association for Liberty and Justice), a migrant association led by a young Moroccan with no links to the city's Islamic communities, announced that he would appeal against the ban with the help of a Barcelona-based lawyer who had accepted the case pro bono. After suffering defeat in the Catalan Court of Justice in Barcelona,[9] they took the case to the Supreme Court in Madrid, which eventually ruled in their favor in February 2013. The judges stated that only a higher level law (*ley orgánica*) could introduce such a ban and that the city had no jurisdiction to do so. The court also stated that there were no sociological grounds that justified the ban, which it deemed to be contrary to the principle of religious freedom.

Since the closure of their mosque, the Islamic community of Ibn Hazn has been meeting and praying in different public places (car parks, public squares, empty plots, etc.) and in a public exhibition center on special occasions (e.g., Ramadan) and has no permanent place of worship. Meanwhile, in Lleida the burqa debate has been reinvigorated, as the mayor announced that he would check the possibility of a new ban after the European Court of Human Rights defended the legality of France's anti–face veiling law.

Political Constellations and Alliances

Three groups of actors are central to an understanding of the framing of the conflict: local politicians, migrant and religious associations, and influential individuals acting as "moral entrepreneurs." The fact that urban dynamics matter becomes readily evident when considering politicians' positions: the mayor who pushed for the ban was a Social Democrat whose party took a different stance on the issue in the Catalan parliament. Similarly the Republican Left abstained in the local vote, while clearly opposing such policies as part of the Catalan government. These divergences make sense only if we place them in the context of local experiences, which were increasingly being organized according to a story line revolving around the figure of the Salafist imam as the city's main villain. Whether in the conflict around the mosque and the Islamic bookshop, interactions in integration and language classes, or indeed the burqa affair, the Salafist imam and his circle were consistently pitted against the local administration, politicians, the media, and other civic groups.

Interestingly, even though the only women known to wear the burqa were those within his own circle, it was not the imam who appealed against the ban but an aspiring young man who founded a migrant association with little influence and standing among migrant populations. However, the man used the burqa conflict and his association as a platform to gain a higher profile in local civic society. Other Muslim-dominated migrant associations, by contrast, emphasized

their disagreement with the mosque leadership, oscillating in their stance between moral disapproval of burqa wearing and doubt about whether the legal ban is an appropriate response. Thus, the president of a migrant association remarked, "The issue of burqa wearing has to do with someone's mentality or that of the family. I think this is a personal decision or a family decision. But the burqa has nothing to do with the Muslim religion. The Quran says that women should hide the beautiful parts of their body. But this way, where you can only see the eyes and nothing else, is really a bit exaggerated. Though as long as there's no trouble, let everybody wear what they want."

The presence of progressive Muslim-dominated associations who openly favored the ban made it difficult to project the conflict in terms of a polarized dualism between non-Muslim Catalans and Muslims in public debates. Rather, the officially portrayed dualism pitted Salafists against the rest of society. Even more important in this regard is the role of the second, African-dominated mosque community. While virtually absent as an actor in the burqa debates, this mosque community came to be celebrated by local authorities and the media as a showcase for an Islam that can be successfully integrated into the urban fabric. Similar to the case of the controversy over Islamic places of worship in Mollet del Vallès, which I described in chapter 3, instead of a simple antagonism, we observe the emergence of graduated forms of Muslim incorporation into urban society, which eventually resulted in the construction of two images of Islam: on the one hand, an Islam that is compatible not only with Western values but also with local codes of social harmony; and on the other hand, a segregationist Islam that rejects integration. One of the main effects of the burqa debates in Lleida, and probably elsewhere in Europe, is in fact the public profiling of these two images. Burqa controversies therefore illustrate how regimes of religious diversity work by creating and promoting hierarchically ordered sets of religious identities—moderate versus segregationist Muslims—and show how these categories underpin governmentality and definitions of the very limits of "tolerable" religious diversity (see also Brown 2009).

This is not to deny that electoral and mass media logic consistently worked to project the conflict about the burqa in dualistic and obviously starkly misleading terms, in the sense that, if one is against the ban one must be in favor of the face veil, and by implication in favor of patriarchy, women's oppression, religious segregation, and so on. A city councilor from the Catalan Green Party described to us in detail how difficult it was to present the burqa issue from a liberal rights-based perspective to increasingly polarized audiences and that he was repeatedly accused of promoting Muslim radicalism. Similarly, as a result of his judicial activism against the ban, the chairman of Watani was persistently portrayed as a champion of Muslim radicalism. When I interviewed him, he emphasized that he was actually a supporter of the Socialist Party in both Morocco and Catalonia, thus sharing the political orientation with Lleida's mayor. "When I talk person to

person with people in the city," he told me, "there is no problem; they actually support us in many ways. But this case has really divided us."

Again, however, the dualism that appeared to mark the burqa debates from the beginning rather obscures the complexity of the institutional relationships between the migrant, the cultural and religious associations of local civic society, and the city government. In the discussions, Muslim-dominated associations had to straddle the divergent path between demonstrating their commitment to migrants' concerns to their communities (while opinions on what that meant in the burqa conflict obviously varied greatly), maintaining good working relations with the city government, and simultaneously sending signals of strength and autonomy to the Ibn Hazn leadership. In other words, the burqa debates turned into arenas for negotiating claims to authority between different associations that aimed to represent Muslims and for sustaining patronage relationships between migrant civic society and local government.

Importantly, such patronage and concomitant financial dependency had emerged in Catalonia over the previous two decades through diverse proactive policies regarding the management of cultural and religious diversity. More than in other parts of Spain, this involved funding for migrant and religious associations and resulting incentives to maintain good relationships. In the case of Lleida, several religious representatives and left-wing politicians declared in their interviews with me that they saw the Assemblea de les Religions as an instrument for co-opting religious leaders and neutralizing criticism. One interviewee said, "When the leaders of the community are hired by the local administration and get money from them, they will hardly show opposition to the local government." This structural ambivalence was reflected in the inability of these migrant associations to construct a coherent narrative, as often evidenced in a "yes, but . . ." or "no, but . . ." rhetoric. Simple assent was especially difficult because of the presence, albeit marginal, of the xenophobic far-right party Plataforma per Catalunya, which strongly supported the ban.

Moral Entrepreneurs

Besides migrants' cultural and religious associations and local government and politicians, there is a third category of important actors in the burqa debates: local women from the ranks of political and civil society who, at some point in their political lives, decided to dedicate their efforts to migrants' causes and came to act as moral entrepreneurs. Associated with political parties and civil society groups, these women sought contact with Muslim groups, just as Muslim groups sought to enlist their support because of the cultural and social capital they possessed. I ground the notion of moral entrepreneurs in social movement theory (Keck and Sikkink 1998), phenomenological research on moral communication (Luckmann 2002), and particularly Becker's notion of moral entrepreneurs as creators of rules and deviant categories (Becker 1963). I wish to

capture two aspects by using the term. First, these women are *entrepreneurs* in that they promote and market their ideas about Islam and feminism as particular topics to wide audiences. Second, they are moral entrepreneurs because ideas of good and bad are highly salient in their moral proselytism.

These women have acquired particular competences in Islam and issues concerning women in Islam and majority-Muslim societies through academic study, travel, and long-term contact with Muslims and women's groups in North African countries. They have spent longer periods there and have close contact with Muslims or have friends who are Muslims and may act as witnesses of their experiences on their behalf. They have also written books on Islam, feminism, patriarchy, veiling, and full-face veiling. We found female moral entrepreneurs on both sides, that is, entrepreneurs promoting the face veil ban and others fighting against it, which underscores the deep divisions concerning issues of Islam and multiculturalism among feminist scholars found elsewhere (Spohn 2013; Scott 2009; Okin 1999).

I suggest that moral entrepreneurs are important in shaping debates on full-face veiling because they *supply arguments* for other political actors who lack the sophisticated knowledge to sustain their framing efforts. What is more, based on their personal experiences, they offer arguments that are interwoven with *stories* that are validated by their expertise, backed by some, typically "liberal" Muslim constituency and authorized by their standing in Catalan political life. The "order of appearance" (Muslim actors taking a back seat) is important here: neither migrant Muslim women themselves nor Catalan converts can play their roles since either qualification (foreign origin, conversion) would probably disqualify them from doing so. While in this context Muslims are chiefly positioned as expert witnesses regarding the oppressive nature of Salafism or Muslim women's agency respectively, non-Muslim moral entrepreneurs have the privilege of being perceived as personally disinterested campaigners for the common good.[10] Mediating between migrant associations and party politics, these women provide coherent story lines that package events and rumors circulating in the city around the Muslim Salafist community and trade them between different constituencies. Assembling story lines permits audiences to form a sense of what is going on, identify the victims, note the culprits, and adopt a moral stance toward the situation. It is within this complex network of institutional relationships that local burqa debates unfolded and came to crystallize around the discursive nodes I explicate in the following.

Moral Arguments: Liberating Democratic Islam

Chiefly there are three arguments in favor of the burqa ban: culturally it functions as a signal for the promotion of "our values," such as gender equality, individual freedom, and notions of a "folksy sociality"; religiously it erects barriers against Islamic radicalism and helps to promulgate a progressive Islam; and

politically it frees Muslim women from patriarchal pressure to wear it, safeguards human dignity, and allows them to engage in and promote Islam as a moderate religion compatible with Western modernity (see Moors 2009: 400). All of these arguments helped to articulate discourses on cultural values with rights talk, that is, to narrate ideas about shared culture using the language of liberal rights. The stories recounted to underpin these arguments are those of Muslim women who left their countries of origin because they wished to escape the oppression of women wrought by Muslim radicalization. These are powerful stories because they create strong moral pressure on politicians to respond, especially conservatives with predilections for moralistic vocabulary, and because they allow the actors to stand simultaneously against Muslim radicalism and in favor of Muslim migrants, as well as to seem to do so on Muslims' behalf.

Thus, in an interview, a pro-ban moral entrepreneur and former CiU city councilor emphasized that years ago she had written a book on Islam and Catholicism together with a Quranic scholar from Mauritania who had told her, "They won't be able to accuse me of racism because I am black. And they also can't accuse me of being anti-Muslim because I am a Muslim!" Muslim friends are thus extremely important as expert witnesses by virtue of their identity as Muslims, which is believed to authenticate whatever claims are made in their name and to invalidate accusations of racism or Islamophobia. In a similar vein, the city councilor behind the burqa ban initiative explained that many Muslim women congratulated him for fighting for their rights, adding that "most of the Muslim women in the most advanced Arab countries are in favor of banning the burqa and the niqab" (Lleida City Council 2010). Thus pro-ban activism relies on the argument that, whether openly or secretly, Muslim women are also against the full-face veil and grateful to anti-burqa campaigners.

The story line according to which the ban promotes women's liberation was not produced in a historical vacuum but inserted into Spain's historical-cultural matrix of the struggles of women for freedom and against Catholic oppression and the Franco dictatorship. In this regard, one city councilor stated, "The imam warns men that if their women do not wear veils, the next day they will not let them enter the mosque. . . . This is the same type of pressure that Catholic communities also practiced in the past: people who were not going to confession or to the church were marked . . . during Franco's time. The Catholic Church wanted to dominate the people."

Proponents of the ban employed the Spanish narrative of secularization as a template for Muslim women and their path toward modernity. Anchoring the full-face veil controversy in Spanish history "re-evokes cultural memories by assimilating the new within the terrain of the familiar" (Brock, Cornwall, and Gaventa 2001: 7).

In contrast to the coherence of the pro-ban story line, I found that those opposing the ban were not able to construct a coherent and expressive narrative

that might have served as a master frame, leaving anti-ban activism with a set of disparate strands. The central arguments were that the ban violated fundamental rights, went against liberal notions of tolerance, and was based on false assumptions about women's agency. To some extent, arguments against the ban are reminiscent of earlier discussions on Islamic veiling, which suggested that banning in the name of women's freedom cannot but reproduce patriarchy and that burqa-wearing women are not victims of male pressure but modern and autonomous. Anti-ban activists emphasized face-veiling women's free choice, with "choice" morally marking the ban as undemocratic.

Simultaneously opponents of the ban invoked education as the royal road to helping women make *different* choices. As one opponent remarked, "At the heart of all this lies a question of women's education. . . . Forbidding the burqa involves excluding these women from society. Educating means giving tools to these women. But if they are not allowed to go to a library, what kind of education are we giving them?" This illustrates that, to some extent, the discourse of women as victims even pervades and colonizes the argumentative repertoires of the ban's opponents.

Moral entrepreneurs link arguments with anecdotes and rumors. They develop a story line that accounts for the situation, attributes causation, defines the main characters of the story (heroes, villains, and victims), and offers solutions or possible story endings (Snow and Benford 1992). In the pro-ban narrative, the imam of the Ibn Hazn mosque is portrayed as the villain and presented as an authoritarian, poorly educated, and even ridiculous person who has the Muslim community under his control. This control is also wielded through groups of followers whom members of the city's civic rights department described to us as "religious police forces" who patrol the city to enforce Salafist behavioral codes. This corroborates the view that, in urban discourse, burqa debates epitomize deeper competitions between the two versions of Islam. Widely circulated anecdotes about the imam's refusal to shake women's hands, gossip about his love life, and rumors about his connections with rich Saudis contribute to drawing a portrait of the "villain," making the story more expressive and credible. In this narrative, local Muslim women are presented as illiterate, subjugated by men, terrified by the power of the imam, and lacking agency.

In this context, the imam of the Ibn Hazn mosque and his Saudi friends, who are keen on expanding "traditionalist" Islam, are seen as the cause of the confrontation. In contrast, the other mosque, which is frequented mostly by sub-Saharan African Muslims, is often invoked as an example of the central point: it is not Islam itself but Salafism and Ibn Hazn's imam that are the problem. Accordingly the African mosque was generally viewed as exemplary and its imam as a "role model" of integrated and moderate Islam that should be promoted. Taken together, these elements formed a narrative that turned into a "master frame" (Snow and Benford 1992) for local media and populations in the process.

Anti-ban moral entrepreneurs, who mainly belong to the multicultural left, also grounded their narrative in anecdotes, rumors, and images. Illustrating this, they observed that the highest number of face-veiled women in Catalonia is found in Barcelona's most expensive shops on the Passeig de Gràcia, the main high-end shopping street. In this story, the main character is not the poor and illiterate burqa wearer but the rich female tourist from the Emirates. Conversely there was also the idea that burqa wearers are mainly Spanish converts who have gone through a long, individual spiritual pathway, an image that projects maximum authenticity and subjectivity, or in other words, values with which the practice of face veiling can be legitimized.

Besides the question of who the burqa women were was also that of how many existed, which became important in terms of supplying evidence for one's story. People engaged in a politics of numbers of sorts, and counting burqas was the practice to establish them. Pro-ban activists referred to the rising numbers visible in the public space to prove that the problem of radicalization was "real," while anti-ban activists questioned whether there were more than a handful as a way of ridiculing their opponents' perceptions.

Contesting Epistemic Authority on Islam

The controversies over the burqa not only constructed images of tolerable and intolerable forms of Islam respectively but also sought to establish facts about the "true Islam." And since public concerns over face veiling were directly associated with urban memories of conflicts around the Ibn Hazn mosque and its version of Islam, the question of whether face veiling was in fact an Islamic practice acquired great significance. Proponents of the ban went to great lengths to explain that female face covering was neither an obligatory nor an Islamic practice by stating time and again that there is no mention of face veiling in the Islamic scriptures. One CiU councilor explained, "This [the full veil] is not written down anywhere in the Quran—you won't find any surah nor a verse which says that. And that's why as city councilor I am beginning to write articles and opinion pieces and press declarations, and I am absolutely opposed to this person [the imam of the Ibn Hazn mosque]."

Unintentionally complying with Islamic textual methods to establish religious truths, proponents of the ban used this argument to denounce religious claims in favor of wearing the burqa as false. Debating the burqa therefore also raised the question of who is authorized to produce *authentic* knowledge about Islam. The ban's proponents certainly disputed the ability of the Salafist community to produce authoritative knowledge in this regard.

Importantly such disputes over interpretations of Islam drew on examples of burqa wearing and other Muslim-related practices in other countries. People contrasted rules on face veiling in Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria, traced its origins to Afghanistan, and discussed the present-day politics of veiling in Saudi Arabia

and African countries. Concurring that face veiling is evidence of the spread of Saudi Salafist power and of increasing pressure being placed on moderate Muslims, disputants saw the burqa as a symbol of power struggles in faraway places and clashes between civilizations. The upshot of this was that in pro-ban activists' constructions the burqa had simply brought these clashes into their city and their lifeworlds. Thus, Islam's "hypervisibility," wrought from discursive work on face veiling, also reflects the ways in which images and emblems of global civilizational conflict insinuate themselves into local society, and conversely, how local experiences are used to make sense of what is going on in the world.

Likewise I also note that pro-ban actors draw a clear semantic, religious, and political boundary between the full-face veil and the headscarf. While others (e.g., Korteweg 2013) see a continuum between the headscarf and burqa debates, the analysis of the Lleida controversy suggests that the two polemics are noncontiguous. The case of the burqa permits pro-ban local actors to position themselves as promoters of democratic Islam while emphasizing the distinction between "good" (moderate) and "bad" (radical) Islam, with the headscarf framed as part of the "good" Islam.[11] To frame the prohibition in these terms allows local politicians to pull the burqa affair out of the extreme-right discourse and introduce new complexities into the dualism of the "clash of civilizations" narrative. The defense of the legitimacy of the Muslim headscarf by the ban's proponents affords their story line further credibility. The material difference between the two garments also lies, of course, in the visibility of the face.

Lived Social Harmony

As a "universal indicium of civilization" (Fournier 2013: 689), showing one's face marks belonging and renders citizenship a matter of bodily performance. In this sense, my informants articulated the potential disruptiveness of Salafist behavior in three different bodily gestures: seeing one's face, shaking hands, and drinking wine. Many of them mentioned several anecdotes and specific episodes associated with these gestures, which are identified as symbolic gestures marking the boundary between us and them and defining the limits of assimilation. These "disturbances in social harmony" dramatize difference by disrupting the routinized flow of local social life. They signal insufficient deference as the ceremonial means of showing appreciation of codes of social harmony.

This contrasted with explicit actions of deference, as was the case when members of the sub-Saharan African Muslim community from the Omar mosque participated with their children in the traditional Anastasio festival that honors the city's patron saint. Significantly, and to the great joy of the locals, as a local CiU leader vividly recalled, the imam's daughter and son were dressed up in traditional Catalan costumes. Such moments can be construed as acts of ceremonial assimilation in which migrants demonstrate cultural or folkloric "acts of citizenship" (Isin 2008). Leaving their religious affiliation aside enables them to be

recruited into the broader local community and signal to native populations their understanding of the value attached to such seemingly banal folkloric practices. Ceremonial assimilation is contrasted discursively to the "disruptive" behavior of the Salafists and materially to sensations of "emotional" and physical discomfort, which the burqa often seems to engender. "Nobody likes to see a burqa in the street," said one city councilor.

Discourse Coalitions and Discourse Resonance

The highly expressive, vivid, and moralistic tone of the pro-ban story enhanced public support and was easily reproduced by the media. The ban's opponents, on the contrary, emphasized their difficulties in communicating their viewpoints. A former Green Party city councilor said, "I think this topic caught us all off guard . . . and was really difficult to digest. We had a hard time being alone in defending the 'No position' and hearing this nonsense, like, how can it be that a party that always said it was feminist, ecological and on the Left is suddenly in favor of the burqa . . . , and that we are promoting Islamic terrorism."

Moreover there were internal disagreements revealing tensions between feminist and pro–immigrant rights agendas within the political left, as well as the tensions within feminism mentioned earlier, with a major Catalan grouping (Dones en Xarxa, "Networked Women") and a Lleida-based women's association with a president of Algerian origin vigorously favoring the ban. This, together with the ambivalent stances of Muslim-dominated migrant associations, made it difficult to present a unified discourse.

However, similarly detrimental to their campaign was the fact that the rights-based approach remained abstract, disembodied, and, as a consequence, difficult to convert into a narrative. Promoting abstract rights is, by virtue of the absence of real persons around whom to construct a story, inherently anti-narrative. This was especially the case because anti-ban activists had no access to local burqa-wearing women and were thus unable to sustain their arguments in favor of Muslim women's agency. Likewise it was impossible to create a shared notion of common values around a rights-based discourse on tolerance for two reasons. First, there was no interaction, let alone conviviality, between anti-ban activists and the Salafist leadership and mosque community. Second, they clearly opposed the ban from different considerations.

In fact, in interviews I conducted with politicians from the left-wing Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (CUP) party and members of civil rights groups, who were among the most vocal opponents of the ban, they emphasized their secular approach and distance from religion. "But also there was no attempt by the Muslim groups to come closer to us. Of course, this is a deeply religious sphere," one of them remarked, adding, "There are really no secular Maghrebi associations." While on the one hand the burqa ban animated discourses about the regulation, control, and management of public space, these remarks point to a second layer

of discourse that draws on the distinction between religious and secular. By suggesting that their natural counterparts would be secular (*laïc*) migrant associations, activism about the use of public space is rendered a secular activity.

Activists from CUP in the city of Reus formulated this contrast much more fervently. Asked about their relationships with local Muslim communities, they loudly rejected the idea of any possible collaboration with Muslims in opposing the ban: "We didn't sit down with them to draft a joint strategy. And we are not going to do it, because we are also not collaborating with the Easter congregations on the Easter processions. I mean, we are atheists, or at least secularists, and we are not going to talk to either Christians, Jews or Muslims. We are talking to citizens of Reus. . . . On the contrary, in the appeal against the by-law in the Catalan Court of Justice, we said to the Muslim group, you oppose the burqa issue, and we'll do the rest. Mixing these things up doesn't help anyone."

Pro-ban activists, on the other side, were champions in depicting, in dramatic fashion, the case of burqa wearing as the limit of intelligibility and reason, driving home the point of how nearly impossible it was to imagine one would voluntarily cover one's face fully. This was illustrated in a Socialist city councilor's desperate comment, "I just don't understand it, really, I cannot make sense of it, I just can't get my head round it!" when describing her inability to comprehend burqa wearing as free choice, even after serious effort. Suggesting incomprehensibility was a way of not only making claims to universalism from which burqa-wearing women were excluded, but also occupying the ground of common sense, a strategy of intangible means but with coercive effects. Furthermore, depicting the burqa as a prison, as some proponents did, would impart a liberationist tone to their narrative, while anti-ban activists were left to defend abstract rights and practices they did not even endorse. While some of them complained that they should have tried harder to talk personally to burqa-wearing women, others, such as a Green Party councilor, questioned whether one has the right to ask for explanations and justifications: "Do we have the right to ask girls in miniskirts why they wear them?" Clearly the lines of arguments they developed did not draw positively on specific materials from local memories and stocks of knowledge, and therefore could not facilitate alliances.

To summarize, unlike the ban's opponents, its supporters created a master frame that expressed the values of conviviality and liberation in the language of both rights *and* culture, enabling them to build broad alliances in which discursive bridges between feminism and "moderate Islam," skillfully constructed by individuals I called "moral entrepreneurs," were central. Using material from local stocks of knowledge and memories allowed them to frame the conflict in ways that resonated with the sensibilities of both the media and local populations and to occupy the ground of what is locally considered common sense.

However, successful framing not only depends on which stories and narratives actors develop, but also on whether they are able to create narratives at all.

The ban's opponents were eventually unable to create a coherent narrative that could serve to build discursive alliances. Amiraux (2013: 799) suggests that "the lived experience of women underneath the full veils is . . . only being heard when framed as the result of 'free choice'" and that this "illustrates the dead end secular societies face when having to rely on liberal language to make sense . . . of pious citizens." I suggest that framing opposition to the ban through the liberal language of rights alone is precisely the problem, as the rights discourse remained abstract, impersonal, and hence difficult to narrate. Diverse breaches of the values of conviviality by the Salafist leadership could easily turn into the stuff out of which much pro-ban storytelling activism was eventually made. Ceremonial performances carried paramount value and therefore easily fed into local stocks of knowledge and memories.

The question is, of course, how to explain the fact that some narratives acquire resonance with broader public sensibilities while others do not. Gamson's work on *Talking Politics* (1992) suggests that pro-ban activism and its narrative could build on the close entanglements of media discourse, popular wisdom, and experiential knowledge as the three forms of symbolic resources people use to make sense of politics. Significantly, while few people had personal experience of the Salafist imam and no one had experience of burqa-wearing women, city officials' problems with the imam were potentially seen as representing everybody's indignation over his lack of deference. Simultaneously, the cross-fertilizations between media discourse, popular wisdom, and stories about personal experiences helped to create links between the local *burqa* affair and global or civilizational conflicts. As a consequence, the local controversy was projected into understandings of global society, while the global was seen as being played out in front of people's own eyes, which made them feel that their actions mattered.

Yet eventually the proponents of the ban failed in generating political momentum and getting regulations passed concerning the face veil at the national level. I now turn to the analysis of face-veiling debates in Quebec in order to show how and why controversies over the burqa could in fact become part of a wider national debate.

REGULATING FACE VEILING IN QUEBEC

The Face Veil and the Secularity of the Public Sphere

Very similar to the Netherlands but different from the Catalan story, the controversy about face veiling in Quebec emerged out of a local confrontation in an educational setting between a student and the school leadership. In March 2010, Naima Ahmed, a twenty-nine-year-old immigrant from Egypt who was participating in a government-funded French-language course for new immigrants at the CEGEP de Saint-Laurent in the northwest of Montreal, filed a complaint with the Human Rights Commission against the CEGEP's decision to exclude

her from participation in the class.[12] According to one source, Ahmed had been wearing the niqab in the classroom and would give presentations only from the back of the class, which consisted of three men and sixteen other women. In a newspaper interview, she objected to this description, claiming instead that in response to the request to remove her niqab during presentations, she "raised her niqab but turned away from the edge of the U-shaped classroom seating arrangement, where the two [*sic*] men sat" (Akkad 2010). However, by the beginning of the new term the gender balance of the class had evened out. As a consequence, the teacher now considered her request for accommodation excessive, as it had been granted during the earlier term because of the small number of males. In fact, according to the CEGEP's director, the school had made efforts to accommodate Ahmed by, for instance, "allowing her to wear the niqab, giving her the front seat and letting her make her presentations from the rear of the classroom with her back to the class so that male students didn't see her face."[13] However, the school revoked this compromise because of her later refusal to remove the veil during the sessions in the U-shaped room, which were dedicated to conversational skills development. The school rejected Ahmed's request for another accommodation, arguing that her mouth must remain visible for the teacher to assist with proper elocution. "For the teacher, it was more difficult to hear her, and it was more difficult for all the people to hear what she had to say," director Paul Émile-Bourque said in a newspaper interview, adding that her presence created tensions in the class. He also stated that the woman had not worn the niqab when applying for the program nor when meeting school representatives prior to the ten-month class (*CBC News* 2010a).

The CEGEP gave Ahmad an ultimatum requiring her to unveil. In the meantime the case had been politicized and mediatized, inducing the minister of immigration, Yolande James, to support the ultimatum officially and telling niqabi-wearing women that "if you want to integrate into Quebec society, here are our values. We want to see your face" (Kay 2015). Interestingly, and in contrast to the media storms around face veiling that were unleashed in other countries, Ahmed was also both able and willing to express her views through a prominent media outlet. In an interview with the *Globe and Mail*, she insisted that "I'm just like any other person. . . . The only difference is that I am wearing a veil over my face. It doesn't mean that I wear a veil over my mind." She also emphasized that she had no problems in taking off her veil when being photographed for the school's identity card by a female member of staff nor with working in other groups with men. In addition, she declared her willingness to interact: "If I didn't want to interact, I would have stayed at home."[14] And yet, after still refusing to unveil for the French class, she was denied access to the CEGEP in November 2009.

While Ahmed's case was likely to be politicized because of the high profile that questions of religious accommodation had acquired in public debates in

Quebec since the mid-2000s, some specific elements add crucially to explaining its dynamic. One is related to the institutional setting: CEGEPs are characterized by a long tradition of teacher union activism, often with a republican inspiration, and are therefore also mainstays of Quebec secularism. Many of the secularist intellectuals and activists I interviewed were teachers at CEGEPs who regularly held public talks and conferences on issues of religion and laïcité in these schools. It seems likely that this cultural orientation has played into the dynamics of this local case.

At the same time, the situation of a recent immigrant taking French language classes while wearing a face veil carries particular symbolism, as it directly confronts and evokes two of the most hotly debated markers of Quebec identity, language, and religion. While parts of the Québécois public were certainly sympathetic to Ahmed's efforts to learn French, they felt uneasy about the fact that in their view this commitment to integration was coupled, and made dependent upon, the placing of a symbolic boundary that they saw as a barrier to full participation, and that was based on religion. For instance, the constitutional lawyer Julius Grey, who had successfully defended the Sikh community in the Multani case in Ottawa's Supreme Court, argued, "If you put a barrier to the showing of the face, then you don't integrate. I can hardly see how friendships can be made, how social life can go on with someone whose appearance we don't know" (*CBC News* 2010b). Moreover, as the statements made by school officials show, Ahmed's commitment to learning French was seen as already compromised by her religiously motivated dress, as from their perspective this dress made adequate language acquisition impossible. Instead of an effort at integration, many Quebeckers interpreted Ahmed's behavior as illustrating her rejection of both the French language and laïcité as symbols of Quebec identity. According to polling data in 2010, 95 percent of Quebeckers supported the idea of banning the face veil from public institutions (Selby 2014: 443).

The Niqab Saga and Nationalist Politics

In response to the case of Naima Ahmed and the media uproar surrounding it, on March 24, 2010, Minister of Justice Kathleen Weil presented to the National Assembly "Bill 94: An Act to Establish Guidelines Governing Accommodation Requests within the Administration and Certain Institutions."[15] While the bill did not explicitly mention full-face veils, it clearly targeted them and did so specifically through regulations of practices and understandings of "reasonable accommodation" that politicians had been demanding ever since the Bouchard-Taylor Commission and that were seen especially as legal loopholes through which face coverings were viewed as encroaching on Quebec's public sphere and undermining the working of its institutions. In the parliamentary vote, fifty-six members voted in favor, twenty-nine voted against, and two members abstained.

Significantly, the bill was not passed, as, following provincial elections and changes in the government, the new ruling Parti Québécois (PQ) felt that the bill did not go far enough in its secularist ambitions and announced its own plans for legislation that would later become the Charter of Quebec Values.

Bill 94 was supposed to regulate behavior in institutions offering educational services, health care, child care, and social services. For the purposes of the law, an accommodation was defined as "an adaptation of a norm or general practice, dictated by the right to equality, in order to grant different treatment to a person who would otherwise be adversely affected by the application of that norm or practice." The most controversial parts of the text were clauses 4 and 6. Clause 4 stated, "An accommodation must comply with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (R.S.Q., chapter C-12), in particular as concerns the right to gender equality and the principle of religious neutrality of the State whereby the State shows neither favor nor disfavor towards any particular religion or belief." Regarding the visibility of the face, the law stated the following in clause 6: "The practice whereby a personnel member of the Administration or an institution and a person to whom services are being provided by the Administration or the institution show their face during the delivery of services is a general practice. . . . In any accommodation that involves an adaptation of that practice, and reasons of security, communication or identification warrant it, the accommodation must be denied."

While critics argued that this rendition gave public bureaucrats an unjustifiable amount of discretionary power in deciding whether uncovering the face is actually warranted, the scenario considerably changed when the PQ made its plans for a Charter of Laïcité central to its electoral campaign and, after establishing a minority government, in September 2013 presented its proposal for the now renamed Charter of Quebec Values to the public. In the context of the charter, the face veil was now just one among a number of ostentatious religious symbols that all state employees should be forbidden to wear, as doing so would supposedly undermine the religious neutrality of the state. Renowned Quebec human rights lawyers such as Pierre Bosset have called attention to the near-complete inversion of the inherited legal understanding of religious neutrality on which this argument is founded.[16] Whereas hitherto religious neutrality on the part of the state meant that the state must not impose any religious symbol on its citizens, the charter suggested that, if they were to be employed by the state, citizens themselves needed to appear religiously neutral. As I discuss in more detail in chapter 2, the project of the charter needs to be seen as centrally animated by the perceived necessity to "complete" the secularist cultural project of the Quiet Revolution and the desire to secure secular modernity and the liberation that had been won over and against clerical authority as the cultural legacy for Quebec's future. While as a legal project the Charter of Quebec Values

died a relatively quick death after the electoral defeat of the PQ in March 2014, the concern over face veiling has remained on the political agenda and was finally regulated through the Liberal Party's "religious neutrality law" in October 2017.

A particularly useful, concise, and revealing perspective on the cultural and political dynamics around face veiling in Quebec is revealed by looking at the public consultations on Bill 94 that took place in May and October–November 2011 and in January 2012, as fifty-seven individuals and organizations presented their views before the committee. Nineteen of the briefs submitted supported the bill, twenty-four opposed it, and twenty-three refrained from giving a direct opinion but instead contributed either general thoughts or more differentiated legal considerations (Choudhury 2012: 8). While other scholars analyzed the content of these briefs and tried to discern some of their meanings (Conway 2012; Sharify-Funk 2010), as a consequence of their text-based methodology these studies limited themselves to capturing only the institutional meanings of the ban on face veiling. In my own empirical research, by contrast, I also began with an analysis of the briefs, but then moved on to chart the field of the participants in the public consultations sociologically by carrying out in-depth biographical interviews with ten individuals and representatives of organizations involved. This allowed me to situate their Bill 94–and charter-related activism and interpretation of the face veil within their biographical experiences and the cultural narratives through which they interwove personal experience with national history.

Why Quebeckers Supported the Ban

Despite the great popular support for Bill 94 and other proposals to regulate face veiling, it is important to note that, as in other controversies concerning the politics of religious diversity and secularism, civil society groups were deeply divided. While organizations such as the Institut Simone de Beauvoir, Muslim Canadian Federation, Canadian Civil Liberties Association, and Canadian Council on American-Islamic Relations spoke out against the law, other actors, such as the Association féminine d'éducation et d'action sociale, Les Intellectuels pour la laïcité, and the Muslim Canadian Congress, welcomed the bill. In fact, they actively mobilized in favor of regulations against face veiling and acted as moral entrepreneurs in supplying arguments, narratives, and images that politicians would draw on to justify the need for rigorous action.

The overwhelming popular support for regulations concerning the face veil in Quebec is an outcome of the central role that issues of gender equality played during the Quiet Revolution and the ways in which issues concerning women's emancipation acquired a central place in collective memories of the Quiet Revolution. In many interviews about the issue of face veiling, my secularist and feminist interlocutors emphasized the fundamental misogyny that characterized *all religions* in their eyes, the face veil being just the most shocking illustra-

tion and epitome of that fact. In this understanding, Quebec's history of backward Catholic clericalism and female oppression was but one variant of a global pattern of religious patriarchy from which secularization was seen as the only historical exit.

One central intellectual figure in secularist feminism in Quebec told me in an interview,

> Religions are all misogynist and sexist and constantly violate women's rights. History shows that every time religions are gaining ground in public spaces and approach the policy, women's rights regress. It's inevitable! Hence the importance of fighting for secularism, which involves the separation of religion from the state and returns to the private sphere all that concerns religion. The struggle for secularism appears to us as the best way to prevent religions questioning the gains of the feminist revolution of recent decades that are still fragile. That is why we consider gender equality as closely linked to the question of laïcité.

Within feminist and secularist discourse in Quebec, female liberation, gender equality, and secularization are thus substantially entwined. Significantly, many activists who act as moral entrepreneurs embody these entwinings, as they carry their own memories of their Catholic upbringing and anti-Catholic political activism into contemporary controversies about the religious practices of migrants. As argued throughout the preceding chapters, the significance of secularity and its "cultural logic" (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012) changes as the problem space to which it responds shifts from being associated with Catholicism to being concerned with minority practices, especially those of non-Western migrant religions. However, as pro-ban activists mostly imagine secularism to be a universal doctrine and to have stable referents, they deny such shifts. Instead of viewing religious diversity as a challenge to inherited ideas about secularity, they prefer to see diversity as reflecting the continued if not enhanced importance of secularity as means of performing equal citizenship. One of my informants, a former Catholic nun whom I have already introduced in earlier chapters, illustrated this point by focusing on the domain of education in the context of the brief she presented during the Bill 94 hearings: "The burqa is extreme, and for society it is difficult to bring it into balance. I am against the two extremes, because what do you say to the other extreme? The little girl who arrives in a bikini at school, will you accept it? Well, why are we going to accept the other extreme? It seems to me that all students need to be equal. I am a citizen, and at school everybody should be the same."

The comparison she introduces is interesting as it opposes the burqa not to other forms of religious dress but to the bikini, another form of "extreme" dress, or rather a dress that appears extreme outside its proper context. This suggests that while they undoubtedly endorse laïcité, the ban's proponents feel the banning

of the face veil is simultaneously an act of defining and normalizing legitimate appearances in public space. As she implies here, just as people would certainly not be ready to accept a barely dressed girl in school, they should also not accept the fully or "overdressed" female body for the sake of republican equality. Clearly, her understanding of equality is at odds with reasonable accommodations of any kind.

While the constitutive links between feminism and modernity in Quebec are beyond dispute (Zubrzycki 2016), postcolonial critics argue that they started to be remobilized in public discourse in response to the presumably threatening presence of the Islamic "Other," which they helped to construct. Bilge (2012: 311) argues that "religious others" are assigned to premodern temporality where "we were too, not so long ago" and "where we may end up, if we continue capitulating to their abusive demands." This temporal proximity legitimates "nationalist worries about the future of 'lately won' and 'still fragile' secular-and-sexual modernity of Quebec, as well as younger generations of women." Moreover, Selby (2014: 445) has criticized the common rationale underlying anti–face veiling discourses, namely "that the visibility of women's bodies symbolizes their emancipation from traditional religious traditions" and that they successfully dismissed "the latent sexualization of French and Québécoise women." The quote from the Catholic nun cited above calls Selby's interpretation into question and shows that, rather than promoting the public sexualization of women's bodies, anti–face veiling discourses seek to secure particular, especially Western bourgeois codes of decency and respectability. I will return to this point at the end of the chapter.

Drawing Boundaries

As I have argued throughout this book, debates and political practices of regulating religious diversity in Quebec are always related to Canadian practices as their constitutive other. This is also true of the debates around face veiling. Since 2008, the Supreme Court in Ottawa has been caught up in a legal battle over the question of whether a female victim of sexual assault who was wearing a niqab in the courtroom should be obliged to show her face while testifying. Earlier, in *R v. NS* (2012 SCC 72), the Ontario Court of Appeal held that "if the witness' right to religious freedom and the accused's fair trial right were both engaged, and there was no reconciliation possible between these competing rights, the witness may be ordered to remove the *niqab*, depending on the context" (Narain 2015: 42). Following an appeal by the plaintiff, in 2013 the Supreme Court ruled that a witness's face must be bare when testifying. Judge Weisman declared that the niqab "masks her demeanor and blocks both effective cross-examination by counsel for the accused and assessment of her credibility by the trier of fact" (*Global and Mail* 2013). In addition, in 2009, in *Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony*, the Canadian High Court had to decide on the request of the Hutterites not to

be photographed in order to receive a driver's license. In its judgment, the court emphasized that sometimes religious beliefs and practices go too far and that, for the Hutterites, not wanting to be photographed for a driver's license was not a right but a privilege.

As Selby (2014) showed in her analysis of policy documents produced in the context of Bill 94—especially the government-financed report from Quebec's Council for the Status of Women, "Affirming Secularism, a Step toward Real Equality between Men and Women"—the secularist discourse in Quebec is stabilized by means of references to Canadian developments. Paradoxically, such references may include both laudatory commentary, as in the case of the Canadian High Court, pointing to the limits of religious freedom, as well as references that emphasize the boundaries and fundamental differences between distinctly "Canadian" approaches such as multiculturalism and the "Quebec model" of secularism and interculturalism. Thus, the report finds that "a more restrictive interculturalism model better protects the identity and heritage of Quebecois society while at the same time it constructs a citizenship that is enriched by 'foreign cultures' (2011: 81) and promotes an 'inclusive feminism' (2011: 9)" (Selby 2014: 450).

We can clearly see the differences between the Canadian scenario, which involved a strictly circumscribed ban (witnesses in court during cross-examination), and the initiatives in Quebec, which envisaged general bans for both employees and service users in public institutions. Chiefly, in Ontario and Canada in general, bans on face veils have never been justified in the name of the protection of national identity. They could never serve such a purpose because of the tensions between such arguments and the still-dominant national ideology of multiculturalism. In Quebec, by comparison, the labor of boundary work becomes visible when cases such as that involving the female witness are popularly retold as meaning that in Ontario Muslim women even wear niqabs in court and conveying the idea that this must not happen in Quebec.

COMPARING QUEBEC AND CATALONIA

The comparison between the trajectories of discourses surrounding face veils and efforts to regulate them in Quebec and Catalonia reveals both similarities and differences. The most important similarities lie in the ways in which collective memories of Catholic patriarchy and women's liberation from it have been stored and "sedimented" (Berger and Luckmann 1966) in feminism as a shared stock of knowledge, now being mobilized to justify the ban. In both settings, influential actors routinely drew on the notion that face coverings were a thing of the past representing anachronistic and backward gender ideals that had to be understood through analogies between Catholic women's social and cultural subordination in the past and Muslim women's subordination in the present. Strikingly, in this context even male politicians from conservative parties drew

on feminist history in order to present themselves as enlightened individuals and to make the case against the face veil. The very distancing of Québécois and Catalans from the Catholic patriarchy that the liberation narrative depicts engendered the demand that recently arrived migrants should liberate themselves religiously too. Since they construed the dismantling of the Catholic patriarchy as a historical achievement for the *whole society*, religious newcomers were expected to cherish and celebrate women's liberation too if they wanted to be a part of that society. Significantly, however, in both societies the burqa issue turned out to be deeply divisive for feminist movements, with Republican feminists speaking out in favor of the ban and multicultural feminists rallying against it. Both Catalan and Québécois feminists told me in interviews that perhaps no controversy had been as acrimonious as that over the burqa.

At the same time, there are also striking differences. Most importantly, Catalan discourses specifically targeted and singled out the face veil as a practice in need of regulation, while other practices of religious minorities did not provoke major concerns or protests. In Quebec, by contrast, with the Charter of Quebec Values, bans on face veiling became integrated into and to some extent the flagship of the much more encompassing project to institute laïcité as a fundamental value of the Quebec nation. The aim was to turn it into the very cultural and political signature of the Quebec state and to enforce laïcité as the overarching principle of all interactions in the spheres of the state. In Québécois public discourse, the burqa was construed as a symbol that epitomized larger social perceptions of the public presence of religion as problematic. The burqa was just one, albeit the most critical, of a long series of religious symbols and practices that were seen as being in need of regulation and restriction in order to guarantee national unity and social cohesion.

If in Quebec the burqa was viewed as being in continuity with other religious symbols, Catalans mostly drew a line between it and other minority symbols. They did so because there was indeed no fundamental tension between religious diversity and the dominant Catalan concept of nationhood. Rather, it was the discursive availability of the culturally resonant and entrenched notion of *convivencia* and its successful mobilization by wider social alliances across religious, cultural, and political differences that allowed for constructions of a "master frame" that defined face veiling as a problem. While in Quebec face veiling was mainly interpreted through the religious-secular distinction, the master frame that organized Catalan discourses depended on the binary of legitimate and illegitimate religion, the latter being that which denies *convivencia*.

Thus far, I have mainly discussed controversies over face veiling as contestations over the limits of "legitimate religious diversity." However, there is also evidence that banning face veils is provoked by particular understandings of public space. Many of those I interviewed construed face veiling as a practice that disrupts normalized understandings of public space and perceived it as

breaching the ritual organization of social encounters (Goffman 1967: 44). Face veiling therefore reminds us, as Tonkiss (2005: 71) argued, that "the street . . . is not an abstract space of social encounter, but a thicket of social codes and potentially risky contacts." However, the burqa was not simply seen as violating codes of behavior, as responses to it also entailed particular emotions and bodily states that articulate notions of "tolerable" and intolerable" difference in urban encounters.

Following up on these observations, in the final part of this chapter I return to Catalonia and adopt a *spatial perspective* that seeks to understand anti–face veiling discourses and regulations as the exclusionary outcomes of particular conceptions of public or, more concretely, urban space. Here I suggest the notion of *regimes of public space*. Central to this discussion, I highlight the following components: (1) understandings of ideal public space, made up of the notions of ideals users, ideal uses, and ideal appearances in it that qualify access; (2) regimes of urban visibility that qualify the chances and ways in which people become targets of regulation; and (3) emotional regimes that specify desirable and tolerable feelings when being in the urban space. Taken together, these dimensions filter forms of inclusion and exclusion that flow from regulations and feed into graduated forms of urban citizenship.

FACE VEILING, EMOTIONS, AND REGIMES OF URBAN SPACE

On July 18, 2014, the city council of Reus passed an amendment to the municipal bylaw on *civismo* (civility) in order to regulate and ban a series of undesired practices in public space: covering one's face, nudity, and visible forms of prostitution. While the prohibition of face covering also included balaclavas and motorcycle helmets, the conservative politicians who dominated the city council made no secret of the fact that the prohibition of face coverings was chiefly intended to target Islamic full-face veils such as burqas and niqabs. However, placing undesirable Muslim face veils together with public nudity and prostitution within a single policy raises intriguing questions about the social and cultural stakes underpinning it.

To some extent, Reus's ban came about through a diffusion effect following the ban in Lleida that I discussed at the beginning of this chapter. However, the story of this ban also has many different turns, as most political parties were in favor of the ban but disagreed on the precise terms and justifications regarding it. Finally, after a long process of discussion, the plenary approved the so-called Civility Ordinance (Ordenança de civisme) in February 2014, with the conservative vote in the following terms: "The main purpose of this ordinance is to preserve public space as a place of coexistence where all people can freely develop their activities to free movement, leisure, meeting, entertainment and

expression, with full respect for the dignity and the rights of others. . . . The purpose of this ordinance is to maintain a climate of civility, mutual respect and social coexistence that promotes relations of solidarity, tolerance and respect among citizens, determining mechanisms to correct and, if necessary, sanction the anti-social, negligent and irresponsible behavior that impairs the quality of life" (*NacióReus* 2014).

In stark contrast to its ostensibly libertarian tone, the bylaw is a twenty-page document regulating public behavior down to the last detail. Activities such as drinking in the street, begging or playing football in public spaces, and forms of appearance such as nudism are regulated and, mostly, banned. Article 10 of the bylaw on "rules of conduct" specifically prohibits the wearing of "full veil, burqa, niqab, balaclava, helmet (except for general traffic regulations) or other clothing or accessories that prevent or hinder identification."

Goffman (1971: 283) understood public space as the realm of unfocused interactions between strangers, a place governed by the rule of "civil inattention," that is, carefully avoiding direct interaction with co-present others while also showing that we have no hostile intentions. It is this rule of "civil inattention" that permits passers-by in the street to feel "safe and sound to continue on with the activity at hand with only peripheral attention given to checking up on the stability of the environment." Clearly, the ban's proponents felt that burqa wearing breached this rule, as they felt unable to be inattentive. More broadly, polemics against the burqa intersect with what Spencer (1878) identified as the "government of ceremonial observance." The ban's proponents perceived burqa wearing as breaching the ritual organization of social encounters (Goffman 1967: 44) by disrupting the taken-for-granted routines of everyday life.

I suggest that the key to understanding urban contestations around burqa wearing really lies in the fact that it was regulated together with public nudity and publicly visible forms of prostitution in one and the same municipal bylaw. The result is to constitute burqa wearing as part of a wider category of obscene practices that are seen to deny established codes of public conduct and appearance, being either overdressed or underdressed. Central to these codes is the readiness to communicate with others that the burqa is seen to negate. "We are all communicating beings, everybody, that's very important, we need to see each other to communicate, but the burqa is a barrier," one politician argued. Importantly, these codes also include ideas about normal emotions that run along with encounters in urban space as well as emotions that are to intolerable extents undesirable and disturbing. For conservatives, the central emotional import of burqa wearing is embarrassment and shame. Onlookers feel, or are viewed as feeling, ashamed because of the supposedly denigrating nature of hiding—or having to hide, depending on one's view—one's face, a practice that eradicates one's individuality.

In this context, the prison metaphor, which was referred to by numerous people, conveyed a scandalous sense of publicly visible incarceration that is all the more scandalous and ultimately unintelligible for presumably being self-chosen. As a form of self-chosen imprisonment, as they saw it, burqa wearing thus produced the same kind of shame in my local conservative interlocutors as does public confrontation with sexual submission. To understand burqa wearing as a self-imposed form of piety and of humble submission to God, as in the case of the French women Parvez (2011) talked to, does not unsettle but even affirms such emotions, since for the ban's proponents this is just another way of stating the case—a practice incompatible with the existing emotional regime of public space. From the point of view of emotional regimes, to insist, as civil rights activists in my interviews did, that the burqa was not forced upon women by their patriarchal husbands but freely chosen does not so much counter than compound anti-burqa sentiments. At the very least, the notion of gender-based subordination made more sense to local conservatives than the hyperindividualist religious subjectivity, which burqa wearing illustrates to many activists and anthropologists, and which to conservatives appeared irrational in the face of their anxieties and shame.

Interestingly, progressive feminists shared with conservatives the feeling that the burqa was obscene and shameful, if for different reasons. As one feminist pro-ban campaigner told us, "The man puts the burqa on the woman to indicate that she is his property and nobody is supposed to see you because you are beautiful, but only I bought you and have the right to enjoy you." Here, the burqa indexes not so much imprisonment as a modern form of slavery that becomes obscene and produces shame and embarrassment through its visibility in public spaces.

As already mentioned, the bylaw suggests that both fully covering up one's body and nudity produce shame in a comparable if not similar fashion. Frontline anti-burqa activist Alicia from the conservative party corroborated this understanding by pointing to the detrimental effects on children of having to see burqa-wearing women. "You just don't want children to see that," she said, just in the same way that young children should not be exposed to nudity. Banning the practice of burqa wearing from playgrounds or school yards was thus, in this perspective, a way of protecting people's sentiments from emotional damage and harm.

It is in this sense that prohibiting the full-face veil stands in continuity with prohibitions on nudity, drinking in the street, and begging, part of the politics of the "cover[ing]-up of unsightly visual blemishes and . . . improving the aesthetics of public space" (Cook and Whowell 2011: 620). What the "disruptive practices" included in the bylaw have in common is that they are perceived as breaching "normal appearances" (Goffman 1971) and threatening one's sense of security

in the public space. However, this notion of normality is not neutral but is mediated by particular urban memories, aspirations, analogies, and future imaginations and the power of those actors who carry them. As mentioned earlier, people in Reus, as in other Catalan cities, routinely relate their views on the burqa to their memories of veiled Catholic women and clerical authority, to their own history of secularization and modernity, and ultimately to the unexpected "return" of clerical authority over women that they take the burqa to symbolize. Thus, to classify face-covering women with "urban undesirables" (Mitchell 2003) condenses the ideological narratives and metaphors that have come to link migration, Islam, and gender in Reus's urban space.

By way of conclusion, I suggest that the controversies in Reus illustrate how the politicization of the face veil sparked broader reflections on the unwritten norms that govern uses and regulate appearances in public space. Nudity and prostitution, just like helmets and other face-covering accessories, were added after the initial preoccupation with the full-face veil. Therefore, the politics around face covering suggest broader lessons about the consequences of bringing practices that breach taken-for-granted norms to public awareness. Central to this dynamic are processes whereby regional, European, and even global discourses about Islam are linked with concrete urban experiences, thereby constituting face coverings as deviant. Significantly, the dynamics of conflict here are not so much about the general banning of religious minority practices from public space as about defining and authorizing hegemonic notions of tolerable and legitimate religious presences.

By employing a spatial perspective, I have emphasized the processes whereby face veiling becomes a practice that disrupts normalized understandings of public space. Whether its status as a disruptive practice is linked to its perception as a religious symbol and produced by majority populations' secular affect that ties their scope of tolerance to their own experiences and appraisal of secularization is not always clear. In fact, the question of what counts as religion is an ingrained part of the very conflict around religious expressions in public spaces, as the complex debates about whether the full-face veil is a "religious" or a "cultural" practice show.

5 • MAKING CLAIMS TO RELIGION AS CULTURE

The Rise of Heritage Religion

In May 2008, Quebec's National Assembly voted unanimously in favor of a motion that solemnly declared "its desire to promote the language, history, culture and values of the *nation québécoise*" and "its attachment to the nation's religious and cultural patrimony."[1] They did this in order to legitimate the presence of a large crucifix in the hall of the National Assembly to which secularists and pluralists, as well as the report of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, had objected. Similarly, in May 2013 the Quebec Court of Appeal ruled that the mayor of the city of Saguenay was justified in opening meetings of the city council with a prayer. In their verdict, the judges argued that "although there must be a clear separation of church and state, this does not prohibit the government from acknowledging the various sources of Canada's historical heritage—even if they are religious in nature."[2]

Such references to religious heritage have become increasingly common in political discourses, judicial rulings, and public discussions in Western societies in recent decades. Often, observers have been quick to interpret them simplistically as affirmations of cultural hegemony and defensive nationalist responses to religious diversity (Oliphant 2015). However, at least as important is the fact that such references call into question the assumption of classical theories of secularization that through secularization processes religion will gradually lose its significance in defining the identities of nation-states, societies, and individuals and that newly emerging secular self-understandings will supersede and eventually replace those based on religion (Martin 1979; Dobbelaere 2002). Yet, rather than fully falsifying the idea of secularization, it seems that references to religion as heritage are an often overlooked consequence of secularization that does not so much lessen as heighten the role of religion in nation-states. Therefore, in this chapter I explore how secularization processes and the emergence of new forms of migration-driven religious diversity both stimulate novel ways, among both

Christian and post-Christian populations, of identifying with seemingly waning religious traditions as heritage.[3]

Sociologists have shown how the deepening of ethnic and cultural diversity through transnational migration has forced many Western societies to renegotiate their understandings of nationhood and national identity (Brubaker 2012; Joppke 1999). Yet, as in many Western societies religion, in particular Christianity, has been a fundamental part of national identities over long periods of history, migration-driven diversity challenges this nexus of religion and nation-state too. In fact, many of the current controversies over the symbols of Christian majorities, such as the crucifix in Quebec's National Assembly, demonstrate that these connections never fully disappeared but rather lay dormant as a still extant part of the repository of national memory that had intermittently fallen out of use.

However, it seems that the affirmations of migrants' religious identities and their presence in the public sphere enjoin "native" majority populations to reconsider their own cultural identities in religious terms. Fears surrounding Islamic fundamentalism and the social backlash against Europe's and North America's growing Muslim populations have played a particularly significant role in stimulating identitarian debates in which Islam has been framed as incompatible with both the Judeo-Christian and secular heritages of Europe and North America (Casanova 2007; Marranci 2004). The deepening of religious diversity thus brings to the fore intriguing questions about the collective meanings of religion *after secularization*, as it were, as well as the ways in which societies and people that view themselves as secular negotiate and contest these meanings. How and why have discourses on religious heritage become widespread responses to religious diversity? How do such discourses express different concepts of nationhood? Moreover, how is religious heritage related to the tenets of secularism? How do different cultures of secularity prefigure, promote, or constrain heritage discourses? And conversely, how might institutionalizations of religious heritage provoke shifts in the cultural meaning of secularity?

In this chapter, I address these questions through an analysis of the ways in which arguments over religious heritage are mobilized to articulate political claims focused around the nexus of religion and the nation-state. I examine how the notion of religious heritage is mobilized with a view to legitimating the institutional, symbolic, and ceremonial privileges that one or several religious traditions enjoy in the public spheres of the state and civil society because they are seen to *express* the history and values of the national community in especially salient ways. I do so by focusing on three areas in which, in contemporary Quebec and Catalonia, claims on religion as heritage are made, authorized, and contested: first, concerns over Catholic buildings such as churches and monasteries as cultural patrimony; second, concerns over the ways in which religious diversity and national religious heritage are represented in museums of national significance;

and third, the ways in which the notion of religious heritage has become inscribed in legal and institutional frameworks and deployed in the judicial politics surrounding religious diversity.[4] My main argument is that the rise of heritage religion stems from uncertainty about definitions of national identity as it mediates a new politics of belonging. Before moving on to the empirical analysis, however, I situate the notion of religious heritage in current theoretical debates in order to point out its analytical strengths and introduce the idea of the "religious heritage assemblage."

RELIGIOUS HERITAGE AS A SOCIAL FORM AND DISCURSIVE CATEGORY

As mentioned above, public discourses that frame religion as heritage and that serve to articulate the cultural identifications of nation-states and their citizens with religion in a manner that is compatible with liberal modernity are becoming increasingly prevalent. Such discourses have emerged in the context of wider discussions over secularity (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012), the religious identity of the liberal state (Joppke 2015), and religious freedom (Sullivan 2005). However, while sociologists interested in religious change have explored the variety of social domains in which these changes are played out, as well as their effects on public institutions (Koenig 2007), they have paid less attention to the ways in which the notion of religion itself has been reconfigured in these processes. In this chapter, I suggest that public discourses and practices of "heritage religion," or religion as heritage, pinpoint a novel social form of religion that has emerged as a consequence of both secularization and religious diversification.[5]

To explore how religion acquires cultural meaning as heritage for people who do not participate in religious life, do not hold religious beliefs, and view themselves as secular or "culturally Catholic" implies a recognition that the different dimensions of religion such as participation, practice, belonging, and belief are not necessarily related to one another anymore (Laniel 2016: 374). In the British context, Grace Davie (1990) has examined the peculiar parallels between continuously high levels of belief in God and dramatically decreasing levels of participation in religious life through the notion of "believing without belonging." In contrast, in countries with Catholic majorities such as Italy and Spain, scholars have observed deepening disjunctures between declining religious participation and the fact that most people continue to self-identify as Catholic (Garelli 2013; Pérez-Agote 2010). As a consequence, Pérez-Agote (2010: 226) noted, "Spain went from being a Catholic country to a country with a Catholic culture."

In addition, Davie drew attention to the strong support for the public roles of national churches as a form of *vicarious religion*, which she defined as "the notion of religion performed by an active minority but on behalf of a much larger

number, who (implicitly at least) not only understand, but, quite clearly, approve of what the minority is doing" (Davie 2007: 22). In a related theorization, Hervieu-Léger (2000) suggested that Catholicism survived in otherwise secularizing contexts by becoming a marker of national belonging. More generally, she argued that Christianity remains influential in the West not because of the continued power of the historical churches, but "because the symbolic structures they have molded conserve a remarkable power of cultural impregnation that survives the loss of official beliefs and the collapse of observances" (Hervieu-Léger 2005: 337). All of these studies explore the persistence of Christian life in different forms in secularizing contexts emphasizing religious transformations and reorganizations.

More recently, sociologists have also begun to differentiate between religion as tradition and religion as practice. In this vein, Zubrzycki (2012) shows how in Poland progressive segments of the population began to revive Jewish religious traditions and mobilized discourses invoking the country's Jewish heritage as a means of fashioning public images of religious pluralism that would help to undermine Catholicism's hegemony within discourses of national identity and to create more inclusive conceptions of national belonging. More generally, it seems that the discourse on "religion as heritage" has special traction in scenarios characterized by what Zubrzycki (2012) has termed "crises of pluralism." Such crises commonly occur as a consequence of "cultural defense" scenarios resulting from processes of sociodemographic, political change or external political threats, as has been shown in Armenia (Burchardt and Hovhannisyan 2016), Greece (Halikiopoulou 2013), Quebec (Laniel 2016), and Ireland (Martin 1979). Under such circumstances, religion is often recast as culture, facilitating the appeal of religiously inflected identitarian discourses among both the religiously observant and nonobservant segments of the population.

Framed in this way, "religion as heritage" can also be contrasted with "religion as belief and practice." Developing this distinction, Lehmann (2013) has discussed recent political and legal controversies around religious freedom in Europe, the United States, and Brazil in order to point up the stark political implications of the demands of what he calls "conversion-led religious movements." He opposes these to the inherited religious traditions that have dominated the religious scenes in European countries since the period of nation building and state formation following the Peace of Westphalia and that fulfill the role of a "public utility" (Davie 2000: 277; Beckford 2010). Historically, the concept of religion as belief is closely tied to the emergence of universalist religions of salvation and modern ideas regarding freedom of religious belief and practice. Such freedom is commonly enshrined in constitutions as a legally enforceable right and protection, regardless of collective membership. This explains why, in almost all European countries, the religious rights of immigrants have expanded over the last three decades while simultaneously citizenship

laws have been tightened and the political discourse on immigration severely hardened (Burchardt and Michalowski 2015; Joppke 2015; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010).

This chapter goes beyond existing theories in several ways. While scholars working on religious change and secularization have portrayed heritage religion mainly as a set of attitudes that are relatively passive, inert, and defensive, I emphasize its active and, in fact, agentive nature. Religion as heritage involves commitments and practices that people mobilize for valued ends. Relatedly, sociologists of religion have not taken seriously enough the ways in which migration and religious diversity produce new conditions for contestations over national identity and new incentives to link religious heritage to it.[6] The agentive aspect of religious heritage is a product of that. In addition, while sociolegal scholarship (Joppke 2013; Lehmann 2013; Beaman 2013) has explored judicial contestations over religion as heritage, it has largely neglected the wider cultural dynamics that they reflect.

In order to account for these limitations, I propose the concept of the "religious heritage assemblage" as the totality of the heterogeneous discourses, sites, and practices in which claims to religion as (national) culture are articulated, authorized, and institutionalized.[7] Such claims are chiefly organized around three fields of mobilization. Thus religious heritage is (1) mobilized by ordinary people as an affective politics of belonging, (2) aesthetically and semantically elaborated by cultural institutions such as museums that canonize its status as official national memory, and (3) legally codified and politically institutionalized within power relationships in order to secure cultural hegemonies and as part of a politics of citizenship. In each of these fields, discourses regarding religious heritage are signifying practices in which the meanings of religious heritage for nation-states and their citizens are negotiated, defined, and authorized.

The enduring presence of "religion as culture and heritage" is typically something that is "taken for granted." On the cultural level, this taken-for-grantedness is a result of its embeddedness in national self-understandings, while on the institutional level it stems from the fact that heritage regimes are often bureaucratized and guided by established rules and procedures. However, I argue that secularization and religious diversity call this taken-for-grantedness into question, make it visible, and problematize it. In what follows, I show how these problematizations turn heritage religion into a conglomerate of sites of contestations that together form the "religious heritage assemblage."

MATERIAL PATRIMONY AND RELIGIOUS HERITAGE: THE POLITICS OF CONSERVATION IN QUEBEC

Many secular Quebeckers are able to switch between two distinct understandings of religion linked to two distinct registers through which they evaluate religious

objects and practices. This ability to switch allows them to be abhorred by religion on the one hand and to engage simultaneously in practices of religious heritage on the other. In order to appreciate this point, let us consider the following ethnographic vignette.

During a fieldwork trip to some small towns along the Saint Lawrence River in September 2013, at the time of heated debates over the Charter of Quebec Values, I became involved in a conversation with Roger and Sylvie, a couple of around fifty-five years of age, over breakfast in a hotel. Being asked about the purpose of my trip, I told them about my interest in issues of immigration, religion, and diversity. They immediately confirmed that these were certainly contested issues at the moment and used the opportunity to tell me their own story and their views on religion. Both hailed from the northeastern city of Saguenay but now lived in Montreal. Roger began his reflections by telling me that he really believed he was an open-minded person and not at all opposed to immigration, but also clarified that the way religious issues were handled certainly attenuated his support for it. He said, "Religion, you know, it is really bad for us. I think it is really rotten. It should be completely private because when it gets mixed with the public and with politics or with the state it becomes a garbage can and it starts to think." While saying this, his facial expression was one of utter disgust, put on as a way of visually emphasizing the point. However, since the statement itself was not ambivalent in any way and his facial expression certainly spontaneous, I suggest that it illustrated a deeper visceral and emotional register of comportment. This comportment revealed an affective opposition to religion that had been nourished, as later became clear, through his biographical experience of the Quiet Revolution and a particular narrative of secularization. "The Quebeckers have left religion a while ago," he said, and added, "I remember exactly when my father said to us, we don't go to church anymore. And my sister and I were like, what? We said, that's great! But he never explained anything about that. We simply stopped."

While the phrase "Quebeckers have left religion" showed up several times during the conversation, it was his wife who linked this observation to issues of migration. Emphasizing that, especially as someone from Saguenay who was very proud of her French ancestry, the French language, and the beautiful nature of her country, she insisted that immigrants had the moral obligation to assimilate to Québécois ways of respecting gender equality and distancing themselves from religion: "Yesterday I read the conditions of reasonable accommodation in the newspaper, and one of them is gender equality. I think this is very strange—why do we even have to talk about that? This is Quebec, and gender equality is the very basis of what we have. You know, this society has been liberated from religion, so why should we accept now that people bring religion back to us?"

Sylvie clearly drew on the dominant discourse, spelled out in earlier chapters of this book, according to which Quebec's secularization process was inextricably

entwined with the liberation of women from clerical control, thereby associating the breakthrough to modernity with the triumph of feminism. In addition, both of them also revived the trope of the "sheep" (Zubrzycki 2016: 142) by criticizing Quebeckers for being too "smooth" in matters of integration and "too accepting of everything" because of their anxious desires for recognition by others. "But at the bottom of their hearts," Roger added, "they [Quebeckers] want things the way they are here now, and they feel that not all should be accepted." Taken together, in their discourse and affective responses both of them drew on an idea of religion as something that was (1) externally imposed and therefore (2) inauthentic and that, as a consequence, (3) had to be overcome and abandoned, which was all the more clear once one had come to the reflexive understanding that religion was (4) an obstacle to reason and freedom. It is the conjoining of these aspects that produced emotions of being "allergic to religion," as many people, including Sylvie and Roger, put it in numerous conversations. In fact, denoting a strong bodily and visible reaction in response to overexposure to a toxic or otherwise damaging substance, the metaphor of allergy strongly resonated with Roger's earlier expression of disgust. Significantly, perceptions of religion as disgusting had been strongly compounded by newspaper reports about cases of sexual abuse against children committed by Catholic priests appearing at the time.

Curiously, just after Roger had related how he had stopped going to church during his youth, Sylvie took over to state the following: "But we do go to church, we love churches, we love religion. Especially here in Quebec, there are many beautiful churches. Churches are places of art. Art works, that's what they really are, and they should be preserved!" While the earlier part of the conversation had centered on the notion of religion as belief and practice, she very abruptly switched the register to refocus the conversation on "religion as heritage." While, as mentioned before, in her account religion as practice was construed as retrograde and imposed, she opened a new perspective in which churches now appeared as temples of aesthetic experience that had a distinct artistic value, superseding their historical and now outdated role as places of religious worship. Interestingly, while it was only their prior religious use that afforded church buildings their sacrality and aura and that enabled people to appreciate the aesthetic value of church buildings and experience their grandeur and sublimity, Sylvie insisted that this religious past must now be rejected. Clearly, for Sylvie and Roger the value of religion, if it had any, needed to be construed in homology with art. As a consequence, churches were to be rendered a particular kind of museum, nothing more, but also nothing less.

However, why did Sylvie suddenly change the topic of the conversation to talk about her appreciation of the artistic value of churches? I argue that she did so not so much to flag her cultural capital and sophistication and ensure its recognition on my part, but to elaborate and provide evidence of her national pride. Whereas

the binary of "religion as belief and practice" versus "religion as heritage" tore the two parts of the conversation apart, it was a specific articulation of national imaginary and heritage religion that served to bridge them. For her, Catholic church buildings, like Quebec's mighty nature with its landscapes, mountains, and rivers, were elements of the self-same national imaginary that imbued them with a transhistorical significance, beyond these churches' narrowly conceived religious significance. What allowed her to appreciate churches as parts of a modern national imaginary was the fact that they had already been removed from the religious sphere and thus been secularized and patrimonialized.

Significantly, though, such binary constructions of heritage religion as linked to either religion *or* national identity are just one among many empirical possibilities. Other nonpracticing post-Catholic Quebeckers I talked to expressed a sense of the *religious* value of church buildings. Daan Beekers (2016: 39) suggests that such expressions are related to a *sacred residue* that "can be described as that quality of a religious site, that—in the perception or feeling of beholders—persists after the site has lost its original religious function." Sacred residues of former uses stimulate people's memories and feelings, but are also "enclosed in material forms that index the previous identity of a building."

Sylvie and Roger's understandings of religious heritage had also motivated them to join a neighborhood initiative in Montreal's district of Rosemont, where they lived, which was mobilizing support to protect a local parish church building against its impending partial destruction and transformation into condominiums. In this context, Roger insisted that "Quebeckers don't appreciate their religious heritage enough. So many churches become condominiums, but that is a sacrilege! The state should put much more money into that." Again, by declaring the repurposing of church buildings a "sacrilege," he was drawing on a theological concept but at the same time used it in a secularized fashion. For him, the repurposing of church buildings was not so much sacrilegious because it eliminated and denied their religious significance, but because it denied their cultural value, in other words, their value and status as cultural patrimony and national heritage.

Indeed, since at least the 1980s, numerous historical churches have fallen into disuse and disrepair as a result of demographic changes and dwindling congregations. Some have been repurposed as community centers, libraries, factories, gyms, concert halls, or social housing projects. In 2009, a church that was on offer for one dollar and still could not find a buyer became national news through a story in the *Toronto Star* (Chung 2009). Against this backdrop, already in 1995 the Quebec state had decided to merge preexisting, mostly church-based religious heritage initiatives to launch the Québec Religious Heritage Foundation. Renamed the Québec Religious Heritage Council in 2007, this organization is responsible for the conservation and enhancement of Quebec's religious heritage, including buildings, objects, artworks, and monuments that are designated as

having patrimonial value, and bringing together the Quebec government, local authorities, religious leaders, and experts. The principles of preservation describe the importance of religion in stark terms: "Religious heritage is . . . the most universal, the most diversified, and the richest component of our entire cultural heritage. It's also the most visible one and the one most spread out over our territory. It represents a major expression of Quebec's culture and an important element of our identity, expressing the social, ethical, and philosophical values of our society" (Conseil du patrimoine religieux du Québec 2017). Since the formation of the council, the Quebec government has invested more than $300 million in the restoration of religious heritage, while the contributions of other partners amount to another $135 million.

In fact, civil participation is often a central feature of political discourses on religious heritage. The formation of local civil society organizations dedicated to religious heritage is actively encouraged, and co-funding that puts the financial burden of restoration on both private and public shoulders is a central element of heritage policy. In addition, church buildings that have been restored with Heritage Council funding often carry large posters that specify the amount of money spent on the building and justify such expenditure by stating that "Our Religious Patrimony is Sacred!" (figure 5.1).

One section of the principles of preservation is specifically dedicated to participation and states, "Preservation should include consultations with people and groups for whom the site evokes special relationships and meanings" (see Conseil du patrimoine religieux du Québec 2017, principle 5) I suggest that these discourses and the visual imagery that was disseminated and promoted by actors such as the council do more than simply raise awareness of religious heritage and foster people's identification with it. They also institutionalize religious heritage as a social form and discursive category whereby religion, or more specifically Roman Catholicism and to a minor degree Anglicanism and (reformed) Judaism, survives processes of secularization and acquires a heightened, revitalized status in the official inventory of national memory in the context of diversity.

The neighborhood group to which Sylvie and Roger belong was among those that had solicited funds from Quebec's Religious Heritage Council. However, while they certainly did have a "special relationship" with the parish church, in its response the council told them that their church lacked unique features, that there were many churches with the same architectural characteristics, and that as a consequence it had to decline the group's request. Disappointed about the decision, they and other church activists decided to try to mobilize private sources in order to prevent the church's ultimate closure.

While Roger, Sylvie, and many other voluntary heritage activists were certainly motivated by their aesthetic appreciation of Quebec's religious art traditions and concerns over their preservation, their activism was to a considerable degree also shaped by the increased visibility of religious diversity in urban space

FIGURE 5.1. "Our religious patrimony is sacred!" Public information poster on a Quebec church building sponsored by the Council of Religious Patrimony of Quebec and the Ministry of Culture and Communication. (Photo by the author.)

and their perceptions thereof. "Just really close to where we live in Rosemont," Sylvie explained to me, "there is a place called Petit Maghreb, and it is full of veiled women, that drives us crazy sometimes, and the men there drink tea like they do in their countries." In a sense, it is the public presence not just of religious markers (the Islamic veil) but also of cultural practices (men drinking tea)

through which changes in urban space are indexed in Sylvie's perception. Against this backdrop, her and Roger's engagement with Quebec's religious heritage is a response to their desire to affirm the importance of the preservation of churches as publicly visible testimonies of inherited national culture and to mobilize in support of it. Moreover, it is a response to their desire to keep public space as culturally homogeneous as possible, as the disparaging and stigmatizing comments on migrant practices reveal. As a consequence, the only way for Roger to think positively about migration was in terms of assimilation: "I am an optimist; I think in two or three generations they will become like us."

Significantly, in many instances the practices of framing religion as heritage are caught in a latent tension between "religion" and "culture" as competing discourses.[8] Thus, initially one criterion of eligibility for funding from the council was that applicants had to commit to the original purposes of buildings or heritage objects in carrying out restoration. In 2014, however, these regulations were changed to allow the reuse and recycling of heritage buildings. In other words, whereas formerly funding religious heritage was itself dependent upon the continuation of "religion as practice" and actually incentivized and fostered this, it has been opened up and expanded to secular uses. New and creative uses are now being promoted as primary ways to save churches from demolition. Thus, on the one hand there are tendencies to valorize religious heritage as religion, even if often as a musealized "cultural religion" (Lemieux 1990). On the other hand, however, in order to be redefined as heritage, religious objects are secularized, stripped of their original religious meanings, drawn more in line with the ideology inherited from the Quiet Revolution, and subsequently resacralized as totems of the Quebec nation (Zubrzycki 2016: 164). Both constructions of religion as heritage should be seen as responses to migration-driven diversity and as shaped by Quebec's trajectory into modernity.

THE ART OF SELLING A CHURCH

While demolition and costly renovation are two mutually opposed ways of dealing with religious buildings in the context of secularization and the rise of discourses over official heritage, there is a third scenario, located between these two, that has generated an equal amount of public debate in Quebec in recent years: the selling of churches. According to the Heritage Council, for instance, ninety-two churches were sold in 2014 alone. In the late 2000s, a parish priest called Jean from Montreal's Plateau district was also faced with making a decision regarding one of his parish churches. The active church community had shrunk to around thirty elderly people, while the building, with a capacity of around five hundred worshippers, was in dire need of repairs, especially to the roof, that were likely to cost several million dollars. After the bishop had signaled his agreement to take action because the building had become a massive financial

liability, Jean began to discuss the matter with this active group of congregants, including the possibility of applying for a loan through a Catholic pooling mechanism whereby wealthier dioceses lend money to those in financial need. However, the community decided that it was more meaningful to give up the building, merge with another parish community, and use the available money, time, and effort for what they saw as the real Christian project of evangelization, instead of accumulating debts.

However, when the plans to sell the church were published in the Montreal press, the protests against it were massive. As Jean told me, "There were all these people whom I had never seen in my life telling me that we cannot sell the church. And so I realized that in the heart of the community the church was very important. So I said, why didn't you come before? It was in your hands to keep this church open! And then they told me that they didn't come anymore because they were against this or that position of the Catholic Church. And I said, well, but if you don't come here to talk to us, we cannot hear you." The fact that the church building also housed a welfare organization that carried out social programs for drug addicts and other vulnerable groups added another twist to the story. Many people complained that, in their view, the selling of the building by the church community was motivated by financial considerations and that the needs of these socially disadvantaged groups were being disregarded.

However, the strongest criticisms were clearly linked to the symbolic significance of the building. Like Sylvie and Roger, most of those who criticized the plans to sell the church in Montreal's Plateau district did so on the basis of a more or less vague understanding of "heritage religion" and the identification of the church with the national cultural patrimony. As became apparent during subsequent debates about potential buyers and the question of the future use of the building, these identifications also involved, and were in some ways premised upon, the resacralization of this site as heritage. Basically, the community had to decide whether to sell the church at current market prices, thus treating it like any other piece of real estate, or to take public concerns over its future use into consideration. The community had a financially attractive offer, for instance, to turn the church into a supermarket, but it seemed clear that this would arouse another round of emotionally charged media debates and reflect very negatively on the church's image. After considering all options, they decided to sell the church to a Guatemalan Protestant congregation, even though this implied selling the building for $1.3 million, which according to Jean was even below the value of the land on which the building stood. What mattered most was that the Guatemalans would continue to use it as a church. As Jean recalled, "They felt better knowing that it would remain a Christian community. I think if we had sold this church to a private investor that had nothing to do with religion, the resistance would have been tremendous."

One of the reasons residents were opposed to the proposal to turn the church into a supermarket was that this would affect its aesthetic appearance and architectural features. On a deeper level, however, residents' antagonism toward these changes also expressed the ways in which they recognized and actively endorsed the building's aura and sacred nature. Residents' resistance led to the site being resacralized and consecrated as a symbol of collective life that reached beyond and transcended their own religious use of it as a church, as they claimed ownership of it as a monument to their own collective history. Yet simultaneously, they cared about and promoted its continued use as a place of Christian worship, despite the fact that the new users were not Catholics but Evangelical Protestants and that they were an ethnic minority, not "Québécois de souche" of French ancestry. By taking over the church building, the new Guatemalan Protestant landlords began to perform a new kind of "vicarious religion" for post-Catholic residents who had crossed the confessional divide. I suggest that it is this dual ambition—the recognition of the heritage value of religious sites as *religious* on the one hand, and their secular resacralization on the other—that is typical of practices of religious heritage in contemporary Quebec. After "leaving religion behind," as Roger put it, Quebeckers engaged in practices of crafting and authorizing new sacralities as symbolic centers of the nation, which they have always seen as endangered. Contemporary Québécois national identity and its relationship to religious heritage and diversity is thus premised on a paradox: it is being projected on the same material sites, architectural expressions, and aesthetic signs that also symbolize the Catholic past that Quebeckers fought so hard to leave behind and on the debris of which they built their modern nation.

Significantly, among those who do not share this commitment to religion as heritage are organized secularists who feel that the national imagery should be free from religious symbols in a secular and religiously diverse society, but also active Catholics such as Jean. For him, religion that was not based on faith and commitment was not meaningful at all and—as a concept—actually difficult to grasp: "Well, there are symbols and signs. But in reality the essential question is how do you put your faith in a lived experience that helps you to live better in your daily life. That is at the heart of things. You must live the faith first, and your identity comes from there. Like with language, it is because you speak French that you identify with it. It cannot be decreed by law."

Contrary to secular proponents of heritage religion, for Jean, as for many other practicing Catholics, religious belonging mainly flows from "lived religion" (McGuire 2008), or in other words, religion as practice. Simultaneously, however, it was certainly also tied to national identity, as his comparison between language and religion shows. In fact, to some extent practicing Christians and secular Quebeckers shared the diagnosis that religious diversity puts national identity and existing cultural hegemonies under pressure, but they differed in their responses to this fact. Jean, for instance, told me that he had been disquieted

after some interfaith activities in which Muslim participants communicated their view that human rights were a specifically Christian idea to which they did not feel particularly committed. As a consequence, he grew critical of what he saw as the general Canadian tendency "to try and be nice to everyone"—a phrase I heard repeated in countless conversations. In his view, diversity could be guaranteed only by the commitment to one's values, but these had to be anchored in faith. "So I believe," he concluded, "that the best answer is to take hold of your own faith and to live and rediscover it, and to live it not only formally on paper, but to live it for real." Like secular constructions of religion as heritage, Jean's answer too entails the notion of "going back to one's roots" as a form of self-reflection that helps to anchor subjecthood and agency in cultural identity. But whereas secularists emphasize that religious heritage is only legitimate inasmuch as it is secularized, he felt that this position lacked authenticity and was empty.

In 1990 the bishops of Quebec formed a commission to investigate the causes of the increasing acceleration of secularization, to acquire a sense of Catholic life on the ground in parishes across the country, and to formulate a vision for the future. Chaired by the Dominican priest Jean-Louis Larochelle, after whom it was named, the commission drafted a report that came to the radical conclusion, as Baum (2000: 159) put it in his study, "that the Catholic Church in Quebec is dying," as it documented the continuing decline of membership, the almost complete disaffection of the young, the gradual disappearance of congregations, and the "shattered self-image of the parishes overwhelmed by a feeling of powerlessness." More radical than the assessment, however, were the recommendations. While the great church buildings were certainly beautiful and impressive, they should be given up and sold because they were too expensive to maintain, "misrepresented the historical reality of today's Church," and simply confused parishioners, preventing them "from accepting who they are, a small religious community in a secular society" (116). Furthermore, the report suggested that the Church should reject the idea of cultural Catholicism and refuse baptisms, weddings, and funerals to anyone who is not an active member. While at the time responses to the Larochelle Report were overwhelmingly critical, fifteen years later they began to resonate again with Catholics "on the ground" such as Jean.

A CATALAN PARADOX: SECULAR NATIONALISM AND CATHOLIC PLACE-KEEPING STRATEGIES

Taking secularization and religious diversity as the main contextual factors that promote and configure the "religious heritage assemblage" into account, it would seem more than justified to assume that in Catalonia Catholic places of worship would become the subject of similar concerns over heritage and national identity. While in 1998 a solid 83.5 percent of the Catalan population declared themselves to be Catholic, this figure dropped to 73 percent in 2013 and to 52 percent

in 2014, with more than 65 percent never taking part in regular religious services (Idescat, Estadística oficial de Catalunya 2015). Conversely, migration-driven religious diversity has grown enormously, and religious minorities such as Latin American and African Pentecostals, North African Muslims, and Indian Hindus and Sikhs are becoming increasingly visible by opening more and more places of worship (Martínez-Ariño et al. 2015).

However, in Catalonia discourses on heritage religion, while certainly playing an important role in public debates, operate very differently. In my research conversations and interviews, notions of heritage religion struck a chord only with conservative Catholics and had little or no meaning for secular nationalists, nor do they have the same broad cultural resonance as in Quebec. Whereas many Catalan churches remain empty most of the time, and the clergy still frequently complains about Catalans' lax religious commitments, these complaints rarely express existential anxieties. In addition, church buildings are generally in good shape and not subject to the same pressures as churches in Quebec. In Catalonia, at least until the period of my research, not a single church had been sold or demolished as a consequence of financial pressures. Therefore, Catholic places of worship do not fulfill the same role in visualizing Catholicism's decline as in Quebec.

Part of the reason is the climate: the maintenance of churches is easier in Catalonia, as church buildings need no heating, whereas in Quebec the cost incurred by heating is often a critical factor for congregations based in historic buildings (Baum 2000: 161). Much more important, of course, is the fact that religious patrimony is differently managed, administered, and financed and that the strategies of church and state lead to a different configuration of the "religious heritage assemblage." In general, the resources allocated to the preservation of religious heritage by both the state and the Church are vastly greater than in Quebec, and the Church has a much greater influence on state-driven heritage regimes.[9]

In order to explain the different mechanisms that configured Catalonia's and Quebec's respective religious heritage assemblages, the notion of "religious place-keeping strategies" (Becci, Burchardt, and Giorda 2017) seems particularly apposite. By this I mean religious investments aimed to preserve the public and urban presence of religion across changing political and cultural conditions and to reproduce symbolic power. Whereas the Church in Quebec has proved almost incapable of engaging in place-keeping strategies, the Catalan Church has actually crafted a whole series of elaborate strategies of this sort. One important element has been active collaboration with and integration into the state's cultural heritage regime. In September 1993, the Catalan parliament passed the so-called Law on Catalan Cultural Heritage, which opens by stating that "cultural heritage is a fundamental witness to history and a collective national identity. The assets that comprise it are an irreplaceable heritage, to be transmitted in the best condition to future generations. The protection, conservation, accretion,

research and knowledge dissemination of cultural heritage is one of the fundamental obligations of public authorities."[10]

Importantly, several sections mention the special role of Catholicism within the heritage regime. Thus, the opening section states, "Given the importance of the heritage of the Catholic Church, it [the law] makes explicit reference to the duties of this institution and the framework in which to anchor the collaboration between government administrations and the Church, which have been called to comply with this act."[11] In addition, the law's Article 4 is particularly dedicated to collaboration on the part of the Catholic Church, stating that "(1) the Catholic Church, as a holder of a significant part of the Catalan cultural heritage, should ensure the protection, preservation and dissemination of this heritage and, to this end, shall collaborate with the various public administrations of Catalonia; and (2) a joint committee between the Government Administration and the Catholic Church establishes the framework of cooperation and coordination between the two institutions and makes them up."[12]

Based on this legal framework, the commission mentioned in the law meets annually to evaluate the need for intervention and investment in the Catholic Church's patrimony, such as buildings and art objects. As the director of the state's Heritage Department, Joan Pluma, explained in a personal interview, "There are very established and settled mechanisms and habitualized relationships between the dioceses and the government; this works very smoothly." Every bishopric has its own heritage officer and its own heritage experts and technical personnel, who are constantly in touch with all the parishes that have protected buildings or objects in order to establish their needs. To emphasize the point, Pluma added, "My impression is that the Church is the perfect partner, technically skilled and financially solvent. The church has technicians in all the dioceses who are perfectly conscious of what needs to be done." In addition, the state's heritage department also collaborates with the different Catholic orders, such as the Benedictines, in order to manage the patrimony belonging to them.

Equally significant is the fact that the Catholic Church has itself begun to seek to foster its own relevance as a social institution and its legitimacy by fashioning itself as the guardian of Catalonia's cultural heritage. As Pluma explained, "It was interesting to follow this process of change, to see how you would have a church that is open for worship and has its liturgical needs, but then also takes up the conservationists who come with their own agendas of heritage preservation and dissemination and wish to promote the place to visitors. . . . After a lot of dialogue, the Church has also understood that patrimony is not only about preservation [of Catholic sites], but that it also needs legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. I feel the Church is very open to work with this logic now." Simultaneously, however, Catholic actors also began to engage in strategies to promote, in a more individualized postmodern fashion, its heritage to religious tourists and spiritual seekers.[13]

In 2012, the Catalan Church created the label "Sacred Catalonia" to that end.[14] Claiming that the richness of Catalonia's Catholic heritage is the result of the "2000 years of connection between Christianity, culture, identity and the spirituality of the country,"[15] collaborating partners created a complete catalogue of Catholic heritage sites of the region and launched numerous cultural and religious activities in order to promote them. The cardinal of Barcelona, Martínez Sistach, commented on this initiative by saying that "the dissemination of an architectural and religious patrimony is also a good instrument of evangelization" (*Periódico* 2012, my translation). Altogether, the project powerfully reflects the Catholic Church's claims to define and represent the sacred topography of the nation, as its very name suggests.

In addition, whereas in Quebec the Catholic Church often aims to get rid of its places of worship, in Catalonia (and Spain as a whole), in the last two decades, the Church has invested deeply in strategies to secure its ownership titles over places of worship and other sites. Central to these strategies has been a practice called "immatriculation." Following legal changes in the field of church property implemented under the conservative government of Aznar in 1998, the Church was allowed to register material sites such as churches, monasteries, and seminaries and thereby secure its titles to ownership. Significantly, the law provided special mechanisms to suspend the protocols of state control and accountability that usually apply to such processes. Following the amendment, the Church used the procedure to claim official ownership of thousands of properties, though its actions went largely unnoticed by the broader public until the late 2000s.[16] Having been publicized, these practices have not gone uncontested and have led to popular protest in several parts of Spain.[17] Yet, the important point is that the Catholic Church views church buildings not as a liability but rather as an economic, cultural, and religious asset that can be exploited as such.

However, such considerations, and related Catholic strategies of place keeping, predate current concerns over increasing religious diversity and can be traced back to struggles over symbolic power, especially in Barcelona, in the late nineteenth century, marked by the beginning of the construction of the Basilica of the Sagrada Família by the world-renowned architect Antoni Gaudí in 1894. Widely viewed as intended to demonstrate the reinvigorated power of the Catholic sections of the Catalan bourgeoisie in times of rising working-class absenteeism from religious life, this church covers a vast terrain in the central neighborhood of Eixample. It is visible from any point in the city and became a UNESCO World Heritage site in 2005. Consecrated by Pope Benedict XVI on November 7, 2010, in front of an audience of sixty-five hundred inside and more than fifty thousand followers outside the church, the building has become the most powerful symbol of Barcelona's cultural identity across the globe. I suggest that the long period of construction contributed to conveying to urban populations a strong sense of Catholicism's ongoing and self-transforming presence in

the public space across periods of violent anticlericalism, Franco's national Catholicism, continuing secularization, and the current period of diversification.

Importantly, in line with its self-image as the owner and guardian of the "Catalan sacred," the Catholic Church continues to understand itself as a "distinct sociological reality" and in certain circumstances defines itself as placed outside the field of religious diversity. This became apparent during the public and parliamentary debates about a new Law on Centers of Worship. The law was initially proposed in 2007 by the Republican Left Party (ERC), which at the time was heading Catalonia's Directorate General of Religious Affairs. The law was developed as a response to the high degree of conflict surrounding mosques and Evangelical churches in the region (Astor 2016). The purported aim of the law was to minimize misunderstandings and disputes over centers of worship by clarifying and harmonizing municipal licensing requirements. Church officials vehemently opposed the initiative, arguing that Catholic churches should not be subjected to the same regulations as centers of worship catering to other religions, given the centrality of Catholicism to Catalan heritage and culture. Joan Enric Vives, the secretary of the Tarragona Episcopal Conference and spokesman for Catalan bishops, criticized the draft bill for using "the same law to regulate the very diverse realities of churches, synagogues, mosques and other centers." He later clarified the Church's position on the initiative, stating, "It will probably always be inappropriate to use the same legislation to regulate centers of worship and gathering that vary so much by religious confession and that have such an asymmetric presence in Catalan society."

In lobbying against the law, Church officials and conservative politicians sought to preserve the status quo in which Catholic churches operated, by and large, without explicit licenses permitting their use for purposes of worship. In interviews, local priests and Church officials commonly expressed dismay at the idea that Catholic establishments should be at the mercy of municipal clerks. Their comments revealed that in some measure they construed the Church as placed above or beyond state authorities, especially those affiliated to what they perceived as an essentially hostile leftist government. Other centers of worship, by contrast, run the risk of being closed down if they lack proper licensing. From the point of view of Church officials, however, the lack of uniformity in regulations for different types of centers of worship is justified, given Catholicism's deeply rooted heritage in Catalonia.

Despite the objections of the Church, the Catalan Parliament approved the law in 2009. However, provisions were included to ensure that the new requirements for centers of worship would not apply retroactively to long-standing religious establishments. A year after the law's passage, CiU won Catalonia's general election and proposed several modifications to the law, including a qualification to the provision of equal and nondiscriminatory treatment stating that licensing decisions should be made in accordance with "the degree of

implantation and rootedness of each of the churches, confessions and religious communities."[18]

Interestingly, even Catholics who were actively engaged in campaigns for the rights of religious minorities shared this emphasis on heritage religion. Thus, a priest who opposed an anti-mosque campaign in Badalona in 2007 said in an interview,

> There is a diversity of religions. This is undeniable. But there are some religions that are more rooted than others. And so not all of them should be treated by the same measuring stick. And I am talking concretely about the Law on Centers of Worship. . . . It is premised on an egalitarianism that does not respond to reality. Here, there is a religion that is much more rooted—the Catholic religion. It is not that we are asking for preferential treatment, but we are [asking for] a certain recognition of [Catholicism's] antiquity and implantation. . . . All religions are equally dignified, agreed. But their implantation is different.[19]

However, the initial proponents of the law from the Republican Left were largely opposed to the idea of religion as heritage and to claims of privileged treatment grounded in heritage discourse. Rather, they felt that heritage discourse was a way of cloaking unjustified and undemocratic privileges. One ERC politician told me in an interview, "We wanted one law for all communities, but they wanted a separate law." And former vice-president Carod-Rovira stated, "In response to this law, we encountered the full collaboration and support of all other religious communities but open hostility from the Catholic Church. To put Catholicism on the same level as all the other religions meant putting an end to the Catholic monopoly. That was a huge problem." Conversely, in my interviews with politicians from the center-right parties, they routinely defended the more pronounced status of Catholicism in Catalan society and institutions through recourse to heritage discourse. The commissioner of religious affairs of Barcelona, from Convergencia i Unió, for instance, argued very bluntly, "We believe that there has to be a certain asymmetry between the Catholic Church, which is our culture and civilization, and the other religious traditions."

These divergent views point to some broader patterns with regard to the links between nationalism and heritage religion. In Catalonia, discourses on Catholicism as part of national heritage are typically the domain of political conservatives, who cultivate these discourses as part of their political identities, without, however, making them central to their definition of the Catalan nation. This implies that by and large these discourses remain contained within the conservative milieu and do not permeate Catalan society as a whole. The Catalan Church is strongly invested in practices and discourses of religious heritage and vies for hegemony in the field of cultural heritage; but because of the disconnections between nationalism and Catholicism, wrought not least from secularization,

the cultural resonance of its efforts among secular segments of the population remains limited. As a consequence, most Catalans valorize heritage religion in aesthetic rather than political terms and sever their aesthetic appreciation of churches from nationalist politics. In Quebec, by contrast, heritage religion is central to nationalist politics and has specific cultural traction among secular sections of the population, as the example of secular heritage activism has vividly illustrated.

One of the main cultural dynamics that lie behind concerns over church buildings in Quebec and that stimulate discourses and practices of religion as heritage is that their destruction and disappearance confronts Quebeckers with the (presumably real) possibility of Catholicism's imminent disappearance, especially because its decline has occurred so fast. Church demolitions and their bulldozing symbolize and visualize Catholicism fading away in an immediate, even violent way. More dramatically still, since, through their commitment to heritage religion—despite the Quiet Revolution—many Quebeckers continue to tie their sense of national identity to (secularized) Catholicism, its demise also seems to symbolize the possibility of their own disappearance as a nation. As mentioned earlier, survival has always been a central myth around which Quebec's idea of nationhood has been built. And whereas biopolitical concerns over dropping fertility and birth rates have served to reanimate anxieties over national survival since at least the 1990s, they are now also tied to perceptions of religious diversity as a threat.

"THERE IS A VOID DEEP INSIDE": CULTURAL EMPTINESS

Discourses of religious heritage are also linked to a pervasive sense of nostalgia that the visible, material decay and gradual disappearance of Catholic churches and monasteries produces. This sense of nostalgia is greatly captured by the documentary film *Fortunate Shipwreck*, which the young Quebecois filmmaker Guillaume Tremblay released in 2014. The film opens with historical images of Quebec from the 1960s that depict a country torn between Catholicism, tradition, consumerism, and modernity. What follows is a series of excerpts from interviews with Québécois philosophers, artists, theologians, and other intellectuals. The metaphor used in the title was adopted from the French philosopher Gilles Lipovetsky, widely known for his book *L'Ère du vide (The Era of Emptiness)* (1983), in which he criticizes modern consumerism and hyperindividualism.

Following his lead, the documentary is premised on the image that in the 1960s Quebeckers left the ship of Christianity shipwrecked and were subsequently left to themselves without orientation and sense of direction. The main narrative suggests that this state of existence still dominates Quebeckers' lives today, but that there is a newly awaking quest for answers and a new search for

spiritual guidance that motivates people to reconnect with their religious pasts. Most of the interview excerpts describe this situation (and propose remedies), suggesting that the Quiet Revolution led to a "vacuum in values" and a spiritual emptiness that produced a "deep void." In the opening statement, one feminist journalist declared that "there has to be a minimum of common collective values," while a curator suggested that "in the past there was the family, then the church, but now there is nothing." While this narrative strongly resonates with earlier conservative critiques of the Quiet Revolution, few of the interviewees were actually cultural conservatives. Rather, in their statements, many of them linked their expressions of nostalgia to critical comments on neoliberalism and consumerism, which rehearsed many of the arguments popularized by the Catholic left since the Second Vatican Council and during the 1970s (Seljak 2000).

At some point the eminent theologian Benoit Lacroix declares, "We went too fast, too far, we shipwrecked," and apodictically asks, "How do we get out of this emptiness?" Subsequently, he is seconded by the equally celebrated theologian Jacques Grand'Maison, who succinctly observes, "Quebeckers are lost; they need guidance." In a related scene, viewers see an animated picture of a typical Quebec village church drawn in black on a white background that is hidden in the fog and eventually disappears into it. Again, while this imagery seems to express conservative, antimodern, fin de siècle–style elegies over the loss of a coherent cosmos, the protagonists' discourse actually endorses modernity while calling for recognition of its Christian roots—a key theme of the discourse on religion as heritage. Thus, protagonists argue that "all the values that marked our culture such as justice, thoughtfulness, charity and generosity were in fact Christian values."

Significantly, none of these intellectuals actually called for a return to traditional religion, or "religion as practice." Rather, they placed their narrative of modern values as distinctly Christian within their diagnosis of a spiritual crisis, suggesting that acknowledging Quebec's religious roots, even if from a secular perspective, allowed reconciliation with their own religious past; in other words, it permitted a new compromise between that Catholic past and the Quiet Revolution. Such an acknowledgment is portrayed as offering ethical guidance, spiritual orientation, and a balm for the wounds of modernity. Conversely, however, in the final animated picture we see a lonely young man walking through a heavy storm and finding shelter in a dilapidated church, where he falls on his knees and begins to pray.

Both themes—the rediscovery of religious heritage and of personal faith—reverberate with Tremblay's biography. Having grown up in the wake of the Quiet Revolution, with his parents rebelling against the overwhelming power of the Catholic Church, he left religion as a teenager and restored his faith only as an adult in a Baptist Church. In an interview with the newspaper *La Croix* he explained, "There is a lack, the need for a spiritual renewal, but no one dares to

say it. . . . My generation feels the limits of the baby-boomers' dream—a car, a beautiful house, a dog" (Hoyeau 2015).

However, that the movie and the cultural nostalgia it documents cannot be disconnected from concerns over migration and religious diversity becomes clear from the way Adele, a member of the team that envisioned the movie, framed their ambition in an interview with me. Adele, a young charismatic Christian, felt that the Quiet Revolution had not only produced a spiritual vacuum in Quebeckers, especially in the generation of her parents, but also driven them into a kind of cultural relativism. For her, this cultural relativism was the source of their (presumed) inability to define clear rules for social coexistence, as the seemingly endless debates about reasonable accommodation appeared to show. It is this context that actually forced them to return to their religious roots and to recognize the Christian origins of their values. As Adele put it, "We Quebeckers accept everybody. And Muslims, for instance, know exactly what they want and where they are going. But we don't know, and that's strange! We need to know who we are and where we come from, otherwise others come here and slowly put *their* values here. I think only with this pride are we able to say, we accept this, but we don't accept that." Perceptions of spiritual or religious emptiness are part of a narrative of modernization in which a deep sense of nostalgia for an imagined past characterized by moral affirmation and unity is central. As Duyvendak (2011: 2) has argued, such feelings of nostalgia often emerge from framings of the nation as the "home" that has been lost, or even "stolen" by newcomers. They are linked to a "primordial reasoning" where places are owned by native groups who enjoy specific rights (prominent among them the right to feel at home)." While it seems fair to say, pace Duyvendak, that such primordial reasoning is universal and a condition for state formation of all sorts, his observations nicely capture how the presence of newcomers *activates* this nostalgia, thus directly resonating with Adele's account.

In *Fortunate Shipwreck*, both "heritage religion" and "religion as practice" are projected as solutions to the problem of spiritual emptiness for which the empty church building has become the most potent metaphor and a negative icon. Certainly, many parish priests in Quebec have long been used to empty pews. Some, such as Jean, would argue that only revitalized evangelism offers a way out of the problem that the empty pews symbolize. While he agreed with the diagnosis of spiritual emptiness, he disagreed with the idea that heritage religion might be a solution. "You know, people find the church beautiful, but they wouldn't go there," he told me, and added, "That's a real problem, that our church is a museum, but I don't feel like a museum guard!" Jean articulated a sense that heritage religion was founded on people's detachment from religion, similar to the ways in which audiences are disengaged from displays in the context of museums as outside or above them.[20] In other words, for him heritage religion separated people from faith, just as museums separated people from the objects of

contemplation by transforming them from cultural practitioners into visitors to their national history and culture.

While churches have indeed been transmogrified into musealized places of collective and national memory, another sociological question is how religion figures in the narratives on display in real museums, especially those that carry the status of national museums. In the following section, I explore how religion shapes national narratives and becomes consecrated as heritage, showing how religious diversity is represented and challenges canonized stories of nationhood.

MUSEALIZING RELIGION: HERITAGE AND DIVERSITY IN NATIONAL MUSEUMS

In recent decades, museums in the West have been increasingly confronted by their political legacies and called to engage with them (Breckenridge 1989). They have been subjected "to a critique of their unexamined narratives of the nation, empire and colonialism implicit in their collections and continued in representational displays" (Dewdney 2017: 7). As with other official collective "memoryscapes" (Bender 1993: 3), museums always privilege particular narratives and representations while excluding others, thereby contributing to the forging of canonical accounts of nation-state histories. Only recently, however, have sociologists such as Peggy Levitt (2015) begun to link museums more explicitly to questions of migration and cultural diversity and to explore national museums as sites where new national imaginaries emerging in response to diversity are staged and negotiated. In her book *Artifacts and Allegiances: How Museums Put the Nation and the World on Display* (2015: 139), Levitt explores how museums define and enact images of national culture, cosmopolitanism, and diversity. Developing the notion of "global museum assemblages," Levitt examines how evolving norms of museum display "interact with national and urban cultural politics to produce certain kinds of museum practices" (139). Moreover, she argues, "Where a country is in the arc of its nation-building and global claims-staking projects, and the kinds of citizens it believes it needs in order to reach its goals, also influence what museums put on display" (3–4).

As argued above, in Quebec and Catalonia religion and nationalism have been closely, albeit differently, intertwined in ways that have subsequently been challenged through secularization and migration. While many sociologists have studied secularization and religious diversity, they have largely ignored the question of how religion actually figures in how national history is displayed and narrated in museums of national importance. In what follows, I pursue this question through an analysis of the Museum of the History of Catalonia in Barcelona and the Museum of Civilization in Quebec City. Shifting Levitt's concern over cultural diversity to the theme of religious diversity, I am interested in how Catholicism

as the majority religion and other religious traditions are woven into the national narrative and its display. Deviating from Levitt's theoretical lead, I situate these museums not in a "global museum assemblage," but rather in what I call the "religious heritage assemblage" in which museums are playing increasingly central roles. However, as we shall see, museums do not trigger shifts from "religion as practice" to heritage religion through agentive identity-driven mobilizations so much as through the very practice of putting religion as heritage on display, which defines them.

RELIGION AND DIVERSITY IN THE MUSEUM OF THE HISTORY OF CATALONIA

According to the mission statement published on its webpage, the Museum of the History of Catalonia aims to further scientific knowledge about Catalan history and to promote the dissemination of Catalonia's cultural heritage. Founded in 1996 by means of a government resolution, in its self-portrayal it describes itself, "in contradistinction to other museums," as having emerged from the necessity and will to disseminate the country's heritage (Museu d'História de Catalunya 2017). Significantly, in addition it claims to seek to preserve and showcase the history of Catalonia *as* collective heritage and to strengthen the identification of its citizens with national history (Museu d'História de Catalunya 2017). Thus, it is pertinent to explore how the links between this nation, with which citizens are called to identify, and religion are displayed.

The narrative of the religion-nation nexus is made up of three distinct plots: the first focuses on the rise of Catholicism as the dominant religion, the second on the external relationships with Islamic Iberia, the so-called *Al-Andalus*, and the third on the presence, and disappearance, of Jews and Protestants as "internal others." The earliest origins of Catalan history are traced to the final period of the Roman Empire, during which the "church became a pillar of society."[21] The eighth century then eventually saw the birth of the Catalan nation, whose "sovereignty and territorial expansion was consolidated through newly emerging Catholic orders." It was further fortified by the independence of the Catalan Church from neighboring Narbonne in 1002, while by the thirteenth century a society had been established that was founded upon the dominance of the twin authorities of the nobility and the Church. At the same time, this period is depicted as characterized by ambivalent relationships with Islamic Al-Andalus as a military and cultural enemy on the one hand, and an important source of technological and economic innovation on the other.[22]

The period between the eleventh and seventeenth centuries is portrayed as one of rising religious diversity, with the arrival of Jewish traders and Muslims, as well as activities linked to the Protestant Reformation. Subsequently, however, these minorities, while always socially marginalized, then disappeared as a

consequence of anti-Jewish riots in 1391, the Spanish Inquisition starting in 1487, the Counter-Reformation, and the expulsion of the *moriscos* or Islamic converts to Christianity in 1610 due to their lack of allegiance to the new faith.

Up until the nineteenth century, Catalan history is thus depicted as not only shaped by but actually *constituted* through religion and interreligious encounters. However, in the museum's narrative, the significance of religion also ends there, as it plays no role at all in the entire part of the exhibition dedicated to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In fact, it seems as if, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the cast of agents driving national history is completely replaced. The scene is now dominated by the bourgeoisie, trade unions, and the working classes. Catholicism fully disappears from this scene. In the museum's narrative, Catalan modernity has no place for religion. This is a modernity of artistic innovation and rising class conflicts, not of religious power or religious innovation. Religion is mentioned only twice in this period, namely in the context of emerging modern nationalism and the related demands that bishops should be Catalan, as well as Tragic Week, where it is merely noted in the display that "religious buildings were attacked."[23]

Finally, at the very end of the exhibition, Catalonia presents itself to the visitors as a quintessentially modern cosmopolitan society. Four large, electrically illuminated show cabinets are placed next to one another, displaying life-sized photographic images of a lesbian couple, a gay couple, a black man, and a Muslim woman. In the photographs of the homosexual couples, the partners are holding each other, showing affectionate gestures and touches, while one of the lesbian women is apparently pregnant. The Muslim woman is wearing a headscarf in a very casual way, and the rendition of the photo closely resembles mainstream ideas of "liberal Islam."

What is the cultural meaning of this visualization of diversity? Apparently, it draws together the three axes of racial, sexual, and religious difference in an attempt to redress historical modes of social exclusion that were central to the formation of the nation-state, premised, as it was, on the construction of a homogeneous national subject (Brubaker 1992; Nagel 1998; Mosse 1985). The modern Catalan nation displayed in the museum thus actively differentiates itself from these historical forms of exclusion and, in fact, claims to be founded on the recognition of diversity. In addition, I suggest that the display also invokes the notion of Catalans as a national minority in Spain and the idea that this minority status creates a natural elective affinity toward other kinds of minorities and a propensity to identify with their claims to recognition. It seems that it is only through this reading of the Catalan nation as founded upon human rights writ large that we can make sense of the visual juxtaposition of sexual, religious, and ethnic differences. Through this arrangement, the national remains present while being visually absent.

The gap between past religious exclusions and the present as a national space that is normatively distinct produces an absence of references and positive

evaluations of religion as heritage. This absence is all the more peculiar given the strong importance and value attached to religion in government heritage policies regarding religious buildings. Let us see how this musealization of religion compares to the Quebec case.

RELIGION AND DIVERSITY IN QUEBEC'S MUSEUM OF CIVILIZATION

The official mandate of the Museum of Civilization, opened in 1988, is, according to its website, "to make known the history and the various cultural elements of our civilization, particularly the social and material aspects of the cultures of the occupants of the territory of Québec and the cultures that have contributed to the enrichment of those cultures" (Musée de la civilisation 2017). The current permanent exhibition titled "People of Quebec . . . Then and Now" is, according to the website, "a journey into the heart of Quebec's history and rich culture. Contemporary Québécois society reflects the dreams and undertakings of all those who have lived here and helped to create its fabric." Again, this description raises questions about the role of religion in forging these cultures.[24]

The narrative begins with the arrival of the first Quebeckers of French origin in Quebec territory and their encounters with Native Americans. From these very beginnings all the way to the present, the story of Quebeckers is presented as shaped by religion not only as the collective identity that holds them together and supports their sense of belonging, but also as the organizational scaffolding within which Quebeckers' lives unfolded. This importance of religion is portrayed as acquiring an especially salient status through conquest in 1760 by the British, who initially refused to recognize the Catholic Church but later accommodated it in a system of "divergent identities." Consequently, British colonial masters and people of French ancestry are represented, in the words of one of the curators I interviewed, as inhabiting "two parallel worlds," characterized by two different Christian traditions. Thus, religious difference is portrayed as having marked the country from early on, while the obvious power imbalance between the British and French Canadians served to naturalize the hierarchical ordering of religious identities. In the exhibition's narrative, it is in this context of political subjugation that the nature of French Canadians as "a people with a special destiny" came to the fore, "a people rooted in the soil, pious, loyal to the Empire, but faithful to their origins." From early on, the national narrative is thus explicitly grounded in a transcendental theme that sacralizes the bond between individual Quebeckers and the collective.

The portrayal and display of subsequent historical periods such as the phase following the Patriots' Rebellion is also centered on Catholic actors, especially the clergy, whose "zeal" allowed them to take and expand their control over education, hospitals, and social services. A section titled "The Church at Work in the

City" shows how religion remained a powerful social and cultural force during and across processes of urbanization, industrialization, and early modernization. It is this historical period and the conceptual conjuncture of modernity where the contrast with the national narrative of the Catalan museum is most striking. Whereas the Catalan story rests on a deep, if unmentioned and unexamined, rupture between national history and religion arising from modernity, in Quebec's narrative, religion remains equally important throughout the twentieth century and into the present.

This becomes especially evident through the ways in which the history of secularization is narrated as a central part of Quebeckers' modernization, and explicitly linked to their national "distinctness." Thus, under the heading "Modernization and Secularization after the Second World War," the Quiet Revolution becomes the organizing theme of modern Québécois identity and is itself chiefly interpreted through the lens of secularization, next to the overriding concern with independent statehood. The Quiet Revolution is thereby rendered an object of contemplation, a historical achievement to be looked at and appreciated as it is arranged through materials, texts, and objects "with all the apparatus of provenance and expert knowledge" (Macdonald 2003: 3), in other words, as historiographically objectified and naturalized.

As I walked on through the exhibition, I found myself surrounded by photographs of rock concerts in Montreal, radios and TV sets from the 1960s, and images of women demonstrating for the right to abortion and contraception and demanding new family roles. All of these objects formed and re-created the ideational world of the Quiet Revolution, with its "cultural effervescence," its "questioning of the moral values of the church," its "liberalization of attitudes and the end of clerical domination," and Quebeckers' "desire to open up to the world." Being Quebecker was thus showcased to mean that people had gone through the school of enlightenment and become morally autonomous and modern citizens. Interestingly, in ways similar to the Museum of the History of Catalonia, the last room that bridges museum space and ordinary space and marks reentry into the present is dedicated to issues of diversity and migration. In a documentary film, recent migrants tell their story of how they came to Quebec, how they integrated into Quebec society, and what allowed them to identify with the Quebec nation.[25]

As cultural institutions that "collect and assemble fragments of the past and carefully re-contextualize them into a narrative of the present," museums play a crucial role in the construction of national identities and its boundaries (Kal 2008: 1; see also Yeoh 2017). However, they do so by drawing on and arranging specific materials and consecrating them as heritage. In the Museum of Civilization, the most important of these materials is religion: its rise and its fall. The exhibition does not resolve the uneasy relationship between the secularization of the (post-)Catholic-majority population and the arrival of immigrants who

remain committed to their faith and religious lives (Meintel 2016; Meintel and Mossière 2013), which the documentary emphasizes. And while it clearly presents religious heritage as central to national history and identity, it leaves it to the visitors to define their ways of identifying with that heritage, be they religious or secular.

In fact, long-standing curators told me that "Memories," the first permanent exhibition presented between 1988 and 2000, had a much more "polite" approach toward the Catholic Church and British Canada as Quebeckers' main opponents during the Quiet Revolution. They felt that, for many people at the time, it still seemed difficult to fully disengage from the past. In addition, concerns over immigration were fully absent from "Memories," while diversity still chiefly meant the British and the French. Curators also felt that the way immigrants were represented in "The Times of the Quebeckers" was already very outdated and far too limited when compared to its social relevance. Thus, for them migration and diversity were indeed among the most pressing issues curatorial practices had to confront in their efforts to put national narratives on display.

Another interesting perspective on the museum as a space that imposes its own norms of secularity and its own regime of diversity is yielded through an analysis of cultural activities and the kind of museum-based "identity work" (Macdonald 2003) they entail. During the early 2010s, the museum organized a series of lectures on what are considered to be the world religions (Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam). The idea was that it should not be academic experts but ordinary religious practitioners who presented their beliefs and practices to a wider audience. While the museum space was thereby opened up to religious perspectives and fashioned as a stage for religious diversity, the curators also defined certain limits. As one program director told me, "We clearly had to be careful not to invite religious extremists, and it was strictly forbidden to use that opportunity for proselytizing. So we have limits in what we can accept."

These limits also showed up in curatorial decisions in a temporary exhibition on the concept of God in different religious traditions. As some curators considered certain religions to be "sects," debates about adequate terminologies ensued. Furthermore, in 2009 the museum hosted a public panel discussion on the Islamic headscarf to which they invited the well-known pro-secularism activist Djemila Benhabib and a headscarf-wearing woman. Clearly, the directors and curators did not shy away from opening up the museum space to contentious religious issues. Interestingly, when I asked them how they felt about the "climate" of these debates compared to similar discussions in the media or other social situations, they highlighted the "civilized" nature of museum-based conversations. It thus seems that, despite the occasional presence at the museum of "religion as practice," the museum space produced some level of religious detachment.

In conclusion, I suggest that, as cultural institutions that elaborate the semantics and aesthetics of national religious heritage, national museums play an ambivalent role in the politics of religious diversity. On the one hand, both cases demonstrate that national museums are beginning to confront issues of migration and diversity and to revisit how they display national identities. On the other hand, however, they also tend reproduce the dominant national narratives and the role accorded to religion within them.

This is apparent in the way Catalonia's self-image as a pioneer of secular modernity is reflected in the nearly complete absence of any traces of modern religion in the museum's display. This absence epitomizes the much larger story of the far-reaching eradication of collective memories of Catholicism's political role in twentieth century Catalonia, itself a consequence of the ways in which the democratic consolidation following the end of Franco's dictatorship in 1975 was seen to require the collective forgetting of, and silence about, atrocities in which Catholics were both perpetrators and victims.[26] The resulting collective amnesia has materialized in the absence of religion from the narrative of modern Catalonia. As a consequence, historical religious heritage seems to carry no particular meaning for the present in that Catholicism is neither becoming part of the panorama of contemporary religious diversity nor feeding into contemporary nationalism.

Tendencies to reproduce dominant national narratives are also evident in the way the story of Quebec as a quasi-theocracy and its subsequent secularization qua liberation is presented as fundamental to national identity. If the "empty church" has become the negative icon of that story, the Quiet Revolution as secularization is the myth that, as Zubrzycki (2016: 168) has rightly emphasized, ties even secular and atheist Quebeckers to Catholicism. The comparative view presented by the museum displays thus reveals Catalans' collective amnesia as much as it illustrates Quebec's obsession with collective memory. But it also points to the need to distinguish active from more passive renderings of religious heritage,[27] or more precisely between heritage as enshrined in the past and heritage as critical to forging present and future identities. While consecrating particular narratives of religious history as official memory and "authorized heritage discourse" (Smith 2006: 168), museums tend to enshrine religious heritage in the past as something "whose value in the present lies only in its capacity to transmit [Quebec's] past." Discourses and practices such as the activism in favor of church preservation, by contrast, highlight the critical role of the "religious heritage assemblage" in engineering national identity, particularly during periods of uncertainty.

Religious heritage acquires similarly critical roles by being embedded in legal frameworks and being deployed in the judicial politics surrounding religious diversity. In the following section, I explore such legal dynamics and show how they are accompanied by contested redefinitions of religion as culture and new

legal protections accruing from them. By redefining the legal meaning of religion as "cultural heritage," courts may play critical roles in enabling the continued hegemony of the religious symbols of the majority in public culture, though their role has not been without its limits.

THE JUDICIAL DYNAMICS OF RELIGIOUS HERITAGE

The legal implications of the distinction between religion as heritage and as belief became drastically clear with the rulings on the *Lautsi* case in the European Court of Human Rights. Following a complaint from an atheist citizen, the court had to decide whether the presence of crucifixes in public school classrooms in Italy was discriminatory or not. Although the court's first ruling in 2009 demanded that the Italian state remove the crucifixes, it subsequently reversed its decision in 2011 following intense political polemics and an ensuing legal appeal. The final ruling that the presence of crucifixes in public schools did not violate students' rights hinged on an interpretation of the crucifix as a "passive" symbol of Italian cultural heritage, as opposed to a potential source of religious indoctrination (Joppke 2013). The first ruling was based on the framing of religion as belief, whereas the second was based on its framing as heritage. For Lori Beaman (2013), these dynamics illustrate the "cultural transformation of religious symbols," which in her view "allows for the preservation of a majority religious hegemony in the name of culture." In my discussion, I use the Quebec and Catalan cases to refute this argument in two regards. First, the dynamics in Quebec show that the judicial controversies over religious heritage do not so much preserve religion as promote its secularization. Second, the Catalan case shows that the juridification of religious heritage not only preserves a *majority* religious hegemony but has actually reshaped the entire religious field, including religious *minorities*.

Two issues have been central to legal conflicts around religious heritage in Quebec: the presence of religious objects and symbols in public buildings, and Christian prayers in political assemblies. These issues have been prominently addressed in a court case, briefly mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, that pitted Jean Tremblay, the mayor of the northern city of Saguenay, against atheist resident Alain Simoneau, who drew on the support of the Mouvement Laïque Québécois (MLQ). Tremblay routinely opened meetings of the city council by reciting a twenty-five-second prayer, which he began by making the sign of the cross with his hands accompanied by the words "In the Name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit." The council's meetings take place in a number of different locations, one of them being adorned with a statue of the Sacred Heart, while another one is decorated with a large crucifix. In December 2006, Simoneau publicly stated during a city council meeting that he felt discriminated

against. After noting the persistence of the recitations in subsequent meetings, he established contact with the MLQ and in March 2007 filed a complaint, first with Quebec's Commission des droits de la personne et droits de la jeunesse, then with the Human Rights Tribunal, demanding the ceasing of the prayer, the removal of all religious symbols from the council chambers, and fifty thousand dollars in moral and punitive damages against the defendant.

The complaint marked the beginning of a legal saga that lasted almost nine years and ended only with a Supreme Court judgment in April 2015. In its initial ruling in February 2011, the Human Rights Tribunal argued that the prayer violated Simoneau's freedom of conscience as an atheist. It also found that the crucifix and the Sacred Heart statue served to enhance the religious atmosphere, which, together with the prayer, demonstrated favoritism toward one religion at the expense of others, as well as atheists, and thus undermined the state's duty to refrain from displaying religious preferences. After Tremblay lodged an appeal, however, in 2013 the Quebec Court of Appeal overruled the tribunal chiefly by reevaluating the state's duty to observe religious neutrality. Suggesting the concept of "benevolent neutrality," the judges insisted that the state should not be obliged to "complete secularity" or to refrain from recognizing Quebec's historical heritage and its importance for the population. Eventually, Canada's Supreme Court ruled that the prayer was illegitimate because it did indeed infringe upon the state's duty to observe religious neutrality. In one sentence of the unanimous judgment that was widely cited in the Quebec and Canadian media, the judges argued that "the state's duty to protect every person's freedom of conscience and religion means that it may not use its powers in such a way as to promote the participation of certain believers or non-believers in public life to the detriment of others."[28]

One of the reasons the case acquired legal momentum and great publicity is that it emerged in the wake of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, in the context of which Quebeckers' revitalized identifications with their religious past in response to minority claims had already been articulated and legally evaluated. In their report, Bouchard and Taylor demanded that, for the sake of the separation of church and state and state neutrality, the reciting of prayers at council meetings should be abandoned. They also commented on the crucifix in the National Assembly, finding that the fact that it had been installed under Maurice Duplessis's state-church regime delegitimized it. The authors urged Quebeckers to "avoid maintaining practices that in point of fact identify the State with religion, usually that of the majority, simply because they now seem to have *only* heritage value."

Legally speaking, at stake was the question of whether Jean Tremblay and the City Council were right to claim that their recitation of the prayer was an expression of *their* freedom of religion and belief, or whether, conversely, Alain

Simoneau's right to freedom of conscience and belief were violated, as his witnessing of the prayer went directly against his own atheist convictions. In keeping with Canada's "sincerity of belief" principle, this necessitated an assessment of whether Simoneau's atheist beliefs were indeed sincere, but also whether the resulting exclusion was substantial. The heart of the matter, however, was whether the prayer and symbols infringed upon the state's obligation to observe religious neutrality. It is in this context that the legal debate shifted toward concerns over religion as heritage, which translated into four questions: Was the prayer in fact a religious practice or, rather, a manifestation of a cultural tradition? Was its interpretation as culture, heritage, or tradition a legitimate reason for its continuation? Was the recognition of religion as cultural heritage a legitimate ground to limit the scope of the state's duty to observe religious neutrality? And who was considered to speak authoritatively to these questions as expert witness? The wording of the prayer that Simoneau initially objected to was as follows:

> O God, eternal and almighty, from Whom all power and wisdom flow, we are assembled here in Your presence to ensure the good of our city and its prosperity. We beseech You to grant us the enlightenment and energy necessary for our deliberations to promote the honor and glory of Your holy name and the spiritual and material happiness of our city.
>
> Amen.

In response to Simoneau's first complaint to the Commission des droits de la personne et droits de la jeunesse, and four months after the Human Rights Tribunal's acceptance of the case, Saguenay city council decided to pass a municipal bylaw to regulate the prayer. This bylaw spells out in great detail how heritage religion was politically imagined in relation to freedom of religion, and it is therefore worth citing at length. The bylaw stated:

> WHEREAS there exists within the City of Saguenay a tradition to the effect that Council meetings [are preceded by] the recitation of a prayer;
>
> WHEREAS the purpose of this tradition is to ensure decorum and highlight the importance of the work of the councilors;
>
> WHEREAS the members of Council, unanimously, want this tradition to continue and wish to pursue it on the basis of their individual rights and freedoms, in particular their rights to freedom of expression, conscience and religion;
>
> WHEREAS it is important to specify that the Council members and the public are in no way obligated to recite this prayer or attend its recitation;

> WHEREAS it is important to ensure that members of the Council and of the public who do not wish to attend the recitation of this prayer may nevertheless attend the Council session in its entirety.[29]

Significantly, the bylaw specified that, after the recitation, there had to be a pause of two minutes allowing those who had wanted to leave the room during the recitation to return. In addition, the bylaw also, and for the first time, regulated the wording of the prayer itself, which now went as follows:

> Almighty God, we thank You for the many favors that You have granted Saguenay and its citizens, including freedom, opportunities for development and peace. Guide us in our deliberations as members of the municipal council and help us to be well aware of our duties and responsibilities. Grant us the wisdom, knowledge and understanding that will enable us to preserve the advantages that our city enjoys, so that everyone can benefit from them, and we can make wise decisions.

Explaining the motivation behind the law, Tremblay emphasized that it was meant to provide a "reasonable accommodation" for Simoneau. This is indeed apparent in the way the law stipulates that no one is obliged to join the prayer and is still free to participate in the council meeting. From a sociological perspective, however, the most important consequence of Simoneau's way of problematizing the taken-for-granted recitation of prayers is that it became legally enshrined as "a tradition," and subsequently as "religious heritage" and "historical heritage," and that these terms were thereby made to shoulder the burden of establishing constitutional and public legitimacy. The example thus illustrates clearly how the legal contestation of religion in the public sphere engenders processes whereby hitherto implicit rules and norms governing heritage religion are made explicit, legally codified, and fixed.

However, the bylaw also reveals the tensions between "religion as heritage" and "religion as practice," and between "religious heritage as religion" and "religious heritage as culture," which provided the grammar for subsequent legal debates. It sought to defend the prayer as a tradition, but simultaneously also as a manifestation of individual religious freedom. For Jean Tremblay as a devout Catholic, however, these dimensions were not separate. Asked whether he could say when the statue of the Sacred Heart was placed in the chamber, he responded, "The old folks have always seen it there." And, in another comment before the Human Rights Tribunal, he explained the council's decision to continue with the prayer by arguing that "the tradition [of reciting the prayer] was considered an important one, underpinning the foundations of the city, the values to be upheld and the development of families." In addition, he also rejected the idea of conducting the prayer in a separate location before the council meeting by arguing that "reciting the prayer was a very *old tradition*, and that all the councilors

wanted to recite it." Thus, he was deeply invested in tradition for its own sake, as his references to conservative commonplaces such as time-honoredness, the family, and values show.

At the same time, however, in his eyes defending religion as heritage did not deprive practices such as prayer of their religious nature. Thus, he stated before the tribunal, "The prayer is a serious thing; it gives us a moment of intense reflection and makes us take our work seriously." The fact that for him the prayer was not at all a vestigial remnant of presecularization Catholic culture or a folkloric expression of "Banal Catholicism" (Griera and Clot-Garrell 2015) but a deeply personal affair must have become clear to all observers when in February 2010 he told the press: "I'm in this battle because I worship Christ. When I get to the hereafter, I'm going to be able to be a little proud. I'll be able to say to Him: 'I fought for You; I even went to trial for You.' There's no better argument. It's extraordinary. I'm in this fight because I worship Christ. I want to go to heaven, and it is the most noble fight of my entire life."[30] In the tribunal he later confirmed having made this statement, repeated it before the jury, and commented on it as follows: "I said those things. It's true we place much emphasis on that because we have faith. And because we want to show it. The entire municipal council is behind me. Of course, it isn't a strictly personal fight. It's the whole municipal council. I am mandated. Because I have faith and, in my opinion, that's the most important value of all those I can have."[31] These statements have been widely publicized in the Canadian and Quebec press and were certainly influential in reconnecting public understandings of "heritage religion" with personal faith. But they also influenced the legal course of the conflict, as they were later taken up by the Supreme Court, which took them as evidence that the prayer was indeed discriminatory.

While for Tremblay heritage religion and personal faith were inseparable, it was ironically his own noble "battle" that served to advance discourses on religious heritage as *secular* as the case moved from the tribunal to the Court of Appeal. Concretely, in order for the prayer not to collide with the state's duty to observe religious neutrality, its close relationship to Catholicism as one particular religion had to be dismantled, or at least loosened. Expert witness Solange Lefebvre had already developed this reasoning during her appearance before the tribunal. Lefebvre placed the controversy in the broader context of different approaches to secularism. She argued that characteristic for Canada and most other modern states was a tradition of modern theism, or "theist modernity," evident, for instance, in religious symbols in coats of arms, oaths and Quebec's flag, which showed that secularism was able to accommodate "collective rights of a patrimonial and historical nature." Furthermore, as the prayer made reference to a superior being that was seen as the symbolic foundation of states, the prayer was not only suitable for Christians. While mentioning the importance of preserving certain traditions stemming from religious particularisms, she downplayed

the real effects of these particularities by insisting that the prayer played "a metaphorical role that allows each individual to draw from it what he or she wishes" and that it was therefore not relevant to examine its text in detail. Moreover, she emphasized that the purpose of the prayer was "to solemnize the opening of the meeting, to recall the values that underpin governance and to maintain a tradition."

While this description of the prayer's purpose was in line with Tremblay's own view, to construe the prayer as "metaphorical" was surely inconsistent with his comments on his own deep faith. Insisting on the prayer as nondenominational disembeds and uproots it from its original Catholic context in order to universalize its meaning and to claim its potential resonance and acceptability even for members of other religious communities and nonbelievers. Moreover, likening the prayer to other ceremonial religious references as in flags and coats of arms means culturalizing it. This reasoning copies the prayer into the catalogue of ritual affirmations of the nation, and since these presumably address each citizen regardless of his or her religious identity, it also inscribes them in a culturalizing logic.

The judges of the Quebec Court of Appeal followed Lefebvre's account in that their judgment not only culturalized the prayer, but also secularized it. The judges argued that the prayer "expressed universal values and could not be identified with any particular religion," adding that "the principle of the religious neutrality of the state is intended to promote tolerance and openness, not to exclude from a society's reality all references to its religious history." They also emphasized that the idea of state neutrality must be applied in a way that is consistent with society's heritage and traditions and the state's duty to preserve its history. Significantly, they also linked religious heritage to the vexed issue of diversity, suggesting that the "protection of the diversity of beliefs must be reconciled with the cultural reality of society, which includes its religious heritage."

The tribunal applied a similarly strict, inquisitive examination to the question of religious symbols. In order to establish whether the crucifix and the statue of the Sacred Heart were indeed elements of "cultural heritage," the tribunal took the duration of their presence—in other words, their time-honoredness—as well as their status as *religious* symbols as the main criteria. And it spared no effort to find this out. Marc Potvin, former assistant secretary-treasurer in Bagotville (part of Saguenay), had to appear before the court and declared that the current crucifix was not the same one that was there in 1972. Michel Bergeron, former municipal councilor for sixteen years beginning in 1980, testified that at the beginning of his term he found the crucifix to be defective, suggested replacing it, and asked local sculptor Victor Dallaire to produce a new one. Dallaire too appeared before the court. Explaining the details of his "work of art" to the jury, he pointed out that he did not put nails in the hands and instead opened the

hands to the room to convey the sense that "Christ is speaking to the mayor and the councilors." He also recalled that the crucifix was blessed at the time. Similar investigations took place in order to establish the history of the statue of the Sacred Heart. According to the testimony of Marcel Caron, a former police officer, it had been placed in the police station "to prevent accidents at the site of fires," as local beliefs suggested. Asked about the meaning of the statue, he stated, "The Sacred Heart is religious."

It is striking how, in its subsequent assessment, the Court of Appeal completely reversed the understanding established by the tribunal. Selectively drawing on Dallaire and his perspective as the sculptor, the judgment explained that "the Sacred Heart statue and the crucifix were 'works of art' that were devoid of religious connotation and did not affect the state's neutrality," and that the resulting interference with Simoneau's freedom, if any, was trivial or insubstantial. Significantly, the cultural and legal effect of this full reversal was not to question but to elaborate and deepen the interpretation of these objects as religious heritage and, by denying their religious connotations, to secularize "heritage religion."

If these objects were now declared to have no religious meaning anymore, they would certainly be acceptable to Sylvie and Roger and most other secular Quebeckers. At the same time, the secularized version of "heritage religion" that the Court had fashioned seemed much less convincing and insincere to conservative and devout Catholics, such as Jean Tremblay, in whose very defense it had been launched. This became evident when, during the Supreme Court hearings, Tremblay conceded that a nondenominational prayer was in fact still religious. The shifts in the constellation of the actors involved, including expert witnesses, attorneys and judges, that accompanied the judicialization of the Saguenay controversy thus foregrounded more pronounced differentiations between "heritage religion" and "religion as practice." The question is, of course, whether this conclusion is also valid for the Supreme Court judgment. So how did the Quebec Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court differ in this regard?

Generally speaking, in their judgment the Supreme Court judges largely followed the Human Rights Tribunal's reasoning. They found that the prayer was religious in nature, that the council members were clearly fulfilling state functions during the prayer, and that they thereby violated the state's duty to observe neutrality by favoring one particular religion to the exclusion of all others. Adding insult to injury, they even claimed that the two-minute break between the end of the prayer and the beginning of council meeting that the bylaw had provided for did not limit the religious character of the prayer but actually accentuated it and highlighted its exclusive effect. In the final analysis, this amounted to discrimination. One of the reasons for their disagreement with the Quebec Court of Appeal was that they did not share its view that benevolent neutrality justified legal leniency toward Catholic symbols and practices as those of the majority religion. Curiously, however, the Supreme Court did not reject the Quebec

Court of Appeal's emphasis on the legitimacy of religious heritage. The judges concurred with the notion that neutrality allows the state to celebrate and preserve the nation's religious heritage and merely ruled that such celebrations must not be discriminatory, which they felt had happened in Saguenay. This begs the important question of which nondiscriminatory celebrations of religious heritage are actually thinkable. In a way, the Supreme Court suggested that the prayer was still "religion," still too Catholic and not neutral enough, while simultaneously expressly rejecting the idea that neutrality required complete secularity. Yet since from a sociological perspective there is no religious expression that is, or can be, fully disembedded from a specific religious tradition, the judgment effectively forces all forms of heritage religion into a secular logic. In other words, if practices of religious heritage have a religious meaning, it is always specific; if they are to be neutral, they must dispel such meanings and become cultural and secular. The Supreme Court's claim that "if the state adheres to a form of religious expression under the guise of cultural or historical reality or heritage, it breaches its duty of neutrality" inevitably raises the question of how any expression of religious heritage could not take such a form. Contrary to general intuitions, the Supreme Court judgment therefore did not disrupt the cultural force of heritage religion, but deepened, entrenched, and secularized it. Thus, despite their mutually opposed rulings, both the Quebec Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court judgments championed secular renditions of religious heritage.

Moreover, I also want to suggest that a central yet unrecognized distinction driving this legal controversy was that between religious heritage as passive and enshrined in the past, which characterizes museum spaces, and religious heritage as actively shaping identities in the present, such as those of heritage volunteers and their audiences. The Quebec Court of Appeal, for instance, used the phrases "society's historical points of reference" and "historical manifestations of the religious dimension of Quebec society" to define religious heritage and classify the prayer. While they drew on such notions of passive heritage and the bygone past to justify the prayer, the Supreme Court, by contrast, rejected this reasoning by citing Bouchard and Taylor's plea to "avoid maintaining practices . . . simply because they are now seen to have *only* heritage value."[32] By pointing to the exclusionary effects of heritage, the judges emphasized the agentive elements of religious heritage. The question was thus also whether and how religious history can, or ever should, be put to rest.

THE AUTHORITY TO SPEAK IN COURT

Equally contested was the question of the authority to speak on these questions. The Human Rights Tribunal had reviewed the evidence of numerous witnesses and had also heard the opinion of three experts. Solange Lefebvre and Gilles Bibeau, both professors at the Université de Montréal, spoke on behalf of Jean

Tremblay, while Daniel Baril, a trained anthropologist and member of the administrative staff of the same university, responded on the behalf of the plaintiff. However, the Quebec Court of Appeal claimed that the Human Rights Tribunal had failed to assess Baril's credibility properly as an expert. In the eyes of the judges, his status as an "advocate of the secularization of the state" and as a member and former president of the MLQ disqualified him, as it presumably undermined his objectivity and impartiality, which are the established requirements for expert witnesses. They even declared that "[a] well-informed person, aware of the duty of impartiality that must animate any expert called to appear before a court, would easily agree that the witness Baril lacked the necessary [distance] to act in this case." While the Supreme Court disagreed with this assessment, it is astonishing that neither court felt obliged to assess the credibility of the other two experts. While as a trained anthropologist Bibeau was certainly a typical nominee and unsuspicious, Lefebvre's credentials as someone with a bachelor's, a master's, and a doctoral degree in Catholic theology might as well have led "a well-informed person" to doubt that she had the necessary distance from the case. Moreover, Lefebvre has a clearly articulated public position as a critic of the secularization of the state, which would seem to make a similar assessment of her credibility as an expert even more compelling. But none of these striking similarities between Baril and Lefebvre have drawn the courts' attention.

These issues are especially important because the judgments were fundamentally based on the experts' views. Thus, the experts wielded considerable legal power by leveraging their conceptualizations and theories. Curiously, while they spilled much ink on the well-established concepts of secularism, as well as theories of religion and ritual, none of them provided a clear definition of religious heritage. Baril, for instance, deployed the anthropological trope of the validity of "the informant's point of the view" to convince the jury that Tremblay's religious motives rendered the prayer religious. But none of the experts tackled the much more critical question of what was required for objects or practices of heritage to acquire new meaning when the initial (religious) motives had become a thing of the past.

LEGISLATING AND ADJUDICATING RELIGIOUS HERITAGE IN CATALONIA

In comparison to the intensity of Quebec's legal controversies over religious heritage, the Catalan story looks relatively pale. While there were a few instances in which the issue of religious heritage was contested in political debates and addressed in judicial rulings, these instances did not acquire the same significance in public discourse as in Quebec, and their role in configuring the "religious heritage assemblage" was relatively limited. I briefly analyze these instances

before turning to the more interesting question of why the legal dynamics remained marginal in the Catalan case.

One important instance in which claims to religious heritage had been voiced were the debates around the Law on Centers of Worship that I discussed earlier in this chapter. The Republican initiators of the law were explicitly motivated by the idea of using the law as an instrument to abolish Catholic privileges they saw as anachronistic and illegitimate in a secularized and diverse society. For them, religious heritage was a similarly unconvincing argument as it was for the Mouvement Laïque Québécois, or rather, it was a descriptive term that bore no legitimating force. Eventually, however, with the rise to power of a coalition led by the center-right party Convergencia i Unió in 2009, the law was amended to specify that decisions regarding places of worship had to take into account "the degree of implantation and rootedness of each of the churches, confessions and religious communities" (*Periódico* 2012)

The idea of "rootedness" itself originates from debates surrounding Spain's Law on Religious Freedom from 1980 (see chapter 3). Encapsulating multiple understandings of religion as heritage, this term marks the politically and legally most influential genealogy of religious heritage discourse in Spain. The law stipulated that the state must develop cooperative arrangements only with those "churches, confessions and religious communities" that are "deeply rooted" in the country. The law thus consecrated the language of heritage as the primary foundation for the awarding of special rights of accommodation to religious minorities.

The term "deeply rooted," as applied to religious communities, is legally ambiguous and consequently has been the object of multiple debates and controversies (Motilla 1985; Fernández-Coronado 1995; Jiménez-Aybar 2004). The state's Advisory Commission on Religious Freedom is the public entity that has the capacity to grant such recognition to religious groups. The commission stated that it would grant special status to religious communities that fulfilled the better part of the following criteria: having a sufficient number of members and places of worship, carrying out social and cultural activities, and having historical roots in the country (Fernández Coronado 1995). After granting the status of deep rootedness to Protestants, Jews (both in 1984), and Muslims (in 1989), the Spanish state signed official agreements with these communities in 1992. It is important to note that making these agreements was not the outcome of major social struggles or controversies surrounding religious diversity. Muslim and Jewish communities were quite small at the time and had not been particularly active in campaigning for more extensive group rights. Rather, the agreements were timed so as to coincide with a series of events commemorating the fifth centenary of Columbus's discovery of the Americas, the expulsion of the Jews during the Spanish Inquisition and the conquest of Granada. Thus, the granting of rights to religious minority communities was framed as an act of historical

restorative justice. The logics of heritage have thus been central to the establishment of special rights of accommodation for Muslim, Jewish, and Protestant minorities in Spain. The historical presence of these confessions within the Iberian Peninsula made possible and legitimated the 1992 agreements. The agreements, in turn, fostered the incorporation of heritage discourse within the cultural repertoires that were available to religious minorities in making claims upon the state.

While Spain thus presents an interesting case in which heritage discourse is used to preserve or foster the rights not only of the majority religion but also of selected minority traditions, this logic also informed the agreements that the Catalan state signed with several other minority traditions in 2005. The logic of religion as heritage was thus decoupled from majority favoritism and deployed for the purpose of managing the growing field of religious diversity.

While there were no instances of court cases in which discourses of religious heritage were used to justify religious privileges, in the important legal controversy over Islamic face veils, cultural arguments played a prominent role.[33] In a judgment on the legitimacy of a local ban on face veils in spaces belonging to the municipality, the judges of the Catalan Court of Justice stated the following: "In our Occidental culture, hiding one's face in quotidian activities disturbs the tranquility of others because it implies the lack of visibility of an element that is essential in terms of identification, which is the face of the person who is hiding it. For various reasons, the same effect of disturbance is not produced in other situations, as in the exercise of certain professions, hygiene and security at the workplace, public festivities or climate-related practices." Rather than elevate one religion to the status of being foundational to culture and thus above the others, it declared that a particular religious minority practice collided with mainstream culture and exploited this collision with "public order" as a reason to ban it.

CONCLUSIONS

At the beginning of this chapter, I suggested that the notion of the "religious heritage assemblage" might be able to capture the heterogeneous and contradictory ways in which heritage religion operates in contemporary Western societies. I use this term to pinpoint the variety of sites involved (heritage activism, museums, courts) as well as the attendant logics whereby heritage religion is shaped and becomes socially influential (as collective identification, discourse and representation, and legal argument). And while all of the discourses and practices analyzed in this chapter coalesce around a new social form of religion that is conceptually opposed to "religion as practice," divergent dynamics unfold *behind* this surface trend.

First, heritage religion overlaps with and partially draws upon the social traction of different principles such as tradition, culture, and art. Each of them can

act as a secularizing force on "religion as practice" and thus contribute to the transformational thrust that is characteristic of heritage religion. Tradition can be seen as becoming an empty shell with no substantive content and commitment, and similarly, "cultural religion" is typically construed as passive and as a residual form of religion. By contrast, I suggest that heritage religion thrives on *new practices*, as the discussion of both heritage activism and the judicial labor and legal creativity involved in defining it has demonstrated. There is also an important contrast between heritage and art. Heritage marks practices and material objects as incontestably rooted in a communal past, and it derives its legitimacy from the authenticity of this historicity. Art, on the contrary, privileges aesthetic over religious or ethical criteria. Thus, to foreground churches or religious objects, such as the crucifixes in Saguenay, as *aesthetic* objects introduces a perspective concerning them that is entirely different from that of the practicing believer, namely one that privileges contemplation over theological definition, religious detachment, and aesthetic reattachment over religious devotion, but that does so through active investment rather than passive disengagement.

Second, there are competing dynamics with regard to how actors conceptualize heritage religion in relation to religious diversity. On the one hand, there are tendencies to insist on the supreme significance of Catholicism, or other majority traditions for that matter, for past national history and contemporary national identity as a way of claiming cultural hegemony. The clergy's protests against Catalonia's Law on Centers of Worship are a case in point. Conversely, such discourses can be driven by secular nationalists, as in Quebec. On the other hand, heritage religion is also conceptualized as a deep texture of social cohesion that describes or characterizes a national lineage that was initiated by the majority but into which immigrant communities are gradually integrated as they subscribe to its myths and symbols. The idea is that, despite its particularistic origins, heritage religion stands above and transcends the divergent religious affiliations of national populations and becomes a unifying national symbol. This second tendency makes heritage religion sometimes appear similar to "civil religion" (Laniel 2016).

While I suggest that these are the major political and cultural dynamics of heritage religion in many Western societies, the question remains, what are the social processes and forces that drive them? Why do secular societies also remain attached to religion as heritage? Chiefly, I argue that the cultural and political traction that heritage religion enjoys in Catalonia and Quebec, as in many other North American and European societies, is explained by the fact that it galvanizes states' and citizens' nation-building efforts in contexts marked by cultural diversity in which questions about legitimate markers of nationhood and cultural citizenship have been reopened. In the context of official discourses involving, for example, the law and museums, "secularized" heritage religion provides

the cultural stuff to construct national lineages and to represent them. For secular sections of the population, heritage religion offers ways to affirm their national identity. It enables secular people to make claims to the unique nexus between their religious tradition and national history and identity, as well as to their own cultural hegemony, and allows them to appreciate religious patrimony while remaining faithful to their secular commitments. In the final analysis, for secular individuals, heritage religion rests on a paradox: religion has to be secularized in order to be resacralized because only in secularized form can it become the source of new collective identifications. Heritage religion becomes significant to the extent that it resignifies and resacralizes religious objects, church buildings and symbols as totems of the national collective, especially when the boundaries of the national collective are notoriously unclear.

It is exactly this role of heritage religion in galvanizing, both inclusively and exclusively, nation-building efforts that reveals the similarities and differences between Catalonia and Quebec. While both cases have in common the challenge of having to define the meaning of Catholicism (as the majority religion) for nationhood *after secularization*, as it were, one major structural difference again becomes evident: the different dominant religious traditions in Canada and Spain, respectively. Simply put, both Catholicism and secularism serve as markers of the national distinctiveness of the Québécois from Anglo-Protestant, multicultural Canada. By contrast, Catalans' national distinctiveness from Spain cannot be established and affirmed on the ground of Catholicism in the same way. As a result, in the Catalan case heritage religion is less politicized than in Quebec. Moreover, its politicization is mainly about its cultural meaning for secular sections of the Catalan population and less about the concept of nationhood itself, which, as I have shown, dispenses with references to Catholicism.

Finally, the divergent configuration of the religious heritage assemblage in both settings also reflects the differences in their respective dominant models of secularity. In Catalonia, secularity is predominantly understood in relation to the reference problem of (respect for) religious diversity, which sets limits to defining or practicing heritage religion in an identitarian nationalist fashion. One consequence is that heritage religion is characterized by a stronger emphasis on the artistic and aesthetic aspects, as, for instance, the tourist campaign "Sacred Catalonia" shows. In Quebec, the predominant concept of secularity for the sake of national unity also leaves deep imprints on heritage religion. The widely shared emphasis on laïcité as central to national cohesion inevitably contributed to turning heritage religion into a new site for projecting a *uniquely secular nation* with *uniquely Catholic roots*.

CONCLUSION

Religion, Law, and Belonging

Thus far, in scholarly debates, most sociologists of religion have focused on how state authorities and bureaucracies have responded to religious diversity as one of several possible outcomes of migration (Koenig 2005; Madeley 2003). While lauding this scholarship for its insights into the dynamics that drive institutional change in the fields of law and policy around religion, in this book my aim has been quite different. I have sought to show how the concept of diversity has itself migrated into the political and social imaginaries of state and civil society actors. In doing so, religious diversity has come to serve as a concept whereby states can steer the governance of religion in new directions. As a consequence, state practices have themselves coproduced religious diversity by relying on the idea that people have religious identities. In other words, I was interested in how the concept has itself reshaped the ways in which citizens are able to draw on religion as a marker of difference in ordinary practices of classification and categorization (Jenkins 2000).

Although questioning how diversity became a concept that has helped to reshape social hierarchies and justify particular policies is relatively novel in research on religion, this concern has already been addressed in urban studies (Fainstein 2005), political theory (Vormann 2015), and the study of nationalism (Yücel 2016). Scholars have noted how diversity became a policy buzzword, how it turned from a means to turn political goals or values such as justice into an end in itself, and how diversity changed policy makers' perceptions. In Germany, for instance, Rodatz (2012: 70) observed that municipal authorities began to "view migrant districts as productive sites of 'diversity' featuring resources for the 'local economy' and 'civil society.'"

At the same time, scholars note the depoliticizing effects of diversity discourse on the field of discrimination, difference, and equality. While antidiscrimination laws and policies generally address practices of exclusion, diversity discourses often focus on the positive effects of cultural differences and sometimes tend to aestheticize them. Lentin and Titley (2011: 9) therefore see diversity

as a "cost-free form of politics attuned to the need of late capitalist consumer societies." More generally, Yücel (2016: 1) criticized the fact that "most of the authors who have dealt critically with the topic have stressed the plasticity and ubiquity of diversity, considered at times as discourse, at others as practice or policy, and sometimes as both." In another recent intervention, Matejskova and Antonsich (2015) cogently described the social force of diversity discourses in Foucauldian terms. However, by arguing that the main problem of diversity is merely its tendency to individuate difference, they also misconstrue its deeper political effects. While diversity discourses problematize how membership in ethnic and religious groups is tied to class position and proposes as a remedy some measure of social uplift for those who are at the bottom of society for reasons of group-related discrimination, its real political consequence is that they fundamentally accept and fail to raise questions about the very nature of social hierarchies in capitalist society.

There are two broad opposing tendencies that characterize the politics of belonging in the current age of advanced globalization. On the one hand, globalized markets involve the increased circulation of capital, technologies, ideas and human bodies. Globalized capitalism, with its incessant radicalization of competition between the sites where it requires labor, produces poverty in some places and affluence in others, thereby providing incentives for people to migrate. Thus, in globalized and increasingly deregulated labor markets in which human mobility and transnational migration provide national economies and companies with the opportunity to draw from global pools of human capital in order to optimize their demand for labor, the term "diversity" has turned into the new paradigm of living with heterogeneity and economic development (Vormann 2015; Reuschke, Salzbrunn, and Schönhärl 2013; Matejskova and Antonsich 2015). As capitalism and the mobilities it incites disembed people from their social lives and historically grown cultural formations, we have seen the emergence of diasporic forms of belonging and socialities, often aided by new communication technologies, as one major response to this situation.

On the other hand, there are revitalized nationalist mobilizations that have emerged in response to globalization, immigration, the transnationalization of labor markets and, more recently, large-scale movements of people from war-torn and poverty-stricken parts of sub-Saharan African, the Middle East, and Central America to the affluent North, despite the tremendous securitization and militarization of national and regional borders both at sea and on land. This nationalism feeds on cultural anxieties about the loss of cultural identity that immigration presumably engenders, and it has produced new kinds of racism in which cultural differences between natives and immigrants become the basis for far-reaching exclusions and discriminations. As nationalist discourses are becoming more and more widespread in public debates on immigration, political rhe-

toric demanding cultural assimilation from migrants who are already residents and the effective closure against new migrants are gaining ground (Brubaker 2001; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Joppke 2017).

Religion and diversity are placed at the center of these two processes. Since, through migration, people become disembedded from their societies of origin but nonetheless migrate with their religious identities, symbols, and practices, there is a need to re-embed them to some extent in the places where they settle. Diversity, integration, and diasporic belonging are all different—partly complementary, partly contradictory—forms and concepts that describe this re-embedding. As I have shown, religion plays a central role in the ensuing dynamics of belonging. To varying degrees, religion underwrites affirmations of national belonging on the part of majority populations, just as it informs the social lives and cultural identifications of newcomers. However, why do these dynamics of religious belonging and the ways in which they are governed differ in other nations that are similarly integrated into the legal textures of the world society and the economic processes of global capitalism? How and why does secularity serve as a means to promote, if not enforce, cultural homogeneity in some nations, but enable pluralist convivialities in others?

National belonging and religious diversity shape one another. Religious diversity challenges images of nationhood to the extent that these involve religious symbols and identities. Conversely, images of nationhood impinge upon perceptions, evaluations, and regulations of religious diversity. In these concluding reflections, I spell out three broader sociological lessons that the material and my analysis of it in the preceding chapters has unearthed.

THE RELATIONALITY OF REGIMES OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

First, what accounts for the differences between nations in how secularity and religious diversity are conceptualized and governed are *constitutive opposites*—Spain for Catalonia, Canada for Quebec—against which cultural boundaries are drawn and coded as boundaries of *national* culture. This matters for a proper appreciation of the findings. Much of the material seems to indicate that Catalans are more tolerant and appreciative of religious diversity than Quebeckers. Recognizing that any nation is a form with a constitutive outside, it appears that Quebec's political preference for a more secularized and homogeneous public sphere is mainly an outcome of the fact that mobilizing this model emphasizes Quebec's national distinctiveness vis-à-vis multicultural Canada. Catalans' celebration of cosmopolitan nationalism and religious diversity, by contrast, is fundamentally aided by the fact that they have tended for a long time to view Spain as deeply Catholic, parochial, and isolationist, as well as the fact that Catalans

also *are* more secular than Spaniards. Catalans' embracing of religious diversity is to some extent a function of the wide circulation and reproduction of these national images. There is, in other words, nothing inherent or substantive about the empirical form the nexus between nation and religion acquires in contemporary contestations. Rather, the way national belonging is religiously striated is *relational* and context-dependent. This is also evident in other cases. The role of Catholicism in Polish nationalism shifts with the points with reference to which it is envisaged and formulated. As Zubrzycki (2012) showed, Western-oriented cosmopolitan Poles often seek to highlight Poland's legacy of religious diversity. Yet, for the conservative sections of the Polish population, progressive "European" values of pluralism and democracy are salient only when Polish national identity is fashioned vis-à-vis Russia.

RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND SPATIAL POLITICS

Second, the relationships between nationalism and religious diversity are in an important sense mediated through a *spatial politics* in which the materiality of urban forms and religious symbols becomes central. Almost all of the contestations and controversies I have analyzed in this book—those over the siting of places of worship, the use of urban public space for religious ceremonies and processions, the preservation of religious patrimony, and the wearing of the burqa in public—are about definitions, practices, and access to public space. More precisely, they are about whether and what kinds of cultural and political hierarchies inform the presence of religious communities in urban space.

The enactments of the legal governmentality of religion by urban administrations, which form part of broader urban assemblages, including other actors, materialities, and the media, have three major consequences: they distribute religious diversity across urban space; they shape, as a consequence, the very perceptibility and visibility of religion in citizens' everyday lives; and they write law and policy into the very materiality of social life and urban worlds, which shape our movements and mobilities, store our collective memories, and affect our sense of belonging. It is because of the potentiality to augment and amplify memories, senses of belonging, and notions of ownership of place that contestations over religion usually arise in relation to concrete material sites and spaces. And it is also because of this potentiality that such contestations typically involve, and are exacerbated by, dynamic affective and emotional investments. While anthropologists and sociologists have for long a time emphasized the affective force of national and religious belonging, we are just beginning to understand the ways in which the secular too acquires such affective force (see, for instance, Burchardt and Griera 2018).

THE DISEMBEDDING OF RELIGION

Significantly, however, the rise of religious diversity, both as a description of people's multiplying religious affiliations and as a problem of governmentality, is intimately tied to what Monika Wohlrab-Sahr (2019) has cogently called the "disembedding of religion." Drawing on Karl Polanyi's (1944) idea that modern capitalism was enabled through the severing of economic practices from their social moorings, Wohlrab-Sahr argues that something similar is currently happening with religion. With the notion of "disembedded religion," she refers to expressions of religion that are torn apart from local orders of interaction and from their spatial and temporal anchorings. There is a whole new set of expressions of religiosity that no longer adhere to the way established religious authorities define what religion is. In the field of spiritualities, the individual believer herself is the ultimate authority over religious truths and experiences. In Western Islam too, there has been an erosion of inherited religious authority, which, among other things, has aided the rise of Salafism as an Islamist youth movement guided in many cases by the sermons and verdicts of transnationally active teachers whose messages adherents follow through YouTube and Twitter. At the same time, we see the rise of public discourses on national religious heritage whose main protagonists are not religious leaders but (nonreligious) public intellectuals and politicians. As Wohlrab-Sahr (2019) astutely observed, these phenomena reflect the self-empowerment of new actors to define what religion is and lead to the multiplication of religious references in public discourses. One major consequence is that it is increasingly difficult to establish culturally shared definitions of tolerance and discrimination. And it is this situation of "religion unbound" that provokes questions about the social configuration and legal contestation of secularity that are at the heart of this book.

In a way, the rise of the burqa controversy and of "heritage religion" are expressions of the growing religious diversity, and they simultaneously point to its limits, if in opposed ways. On the one hand, they reflect religious diversity by adding two forms of religiosity to an existing typology of religion in society. On the other hand, they point to religious diversity's limits in that there are powerful social actors who believe that these expressions *endanger* religious diversity or are opposed to it. Opponents of the face veil argue that it is an extreme form of a foreign religion that is too culturally alien to the West to be tolerated there. But commonly, they also argue that it is not a religious expression at all but a political symbol of the rejection of Western values. Both arguments place the face veil at the limits of "acceptable" religious diversity. Heritage religion, as I defined and analyzed it in chapter 5, is not merely another type of religion but actually an attempt to link religion to national culture in a way that takes precedence over the kind of particular faiths that are captured in the notion of religious diversity. Heritage religion operates by drawing a distinction between religion as culture

and religion as belief and practice. And while, according to the logic of heritage religion, religious diversity means a multiplicity of religious *beliefs*, not all of them are rooted in national history and can, or should, be rendered as national heritage.

So what are the implications of these lessons for the future of religious diversity and secularity in Western societies?

THE FUTURE OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND SECULARITY

It seems clear that, as an epistemic and legal category and an administrative practice, as well as a political project and narrative of collective identity, the social significance of religious diversity will continue to rise in the foreseeable future. In all the institutional spheres in which issues around religion are managed, such as policy making, urban administration, and courts of law, there is an ongoing proliferation of problems, projects, and cases. The governmentality of religious diversity is thus becoming more entrenched. However, this does not at all mean that the majority of national populations see religious diversity in their societies as desirable or as informing an ideology of governance. On the contrary, there is also an ongoing proliferation of attempts to define hierarchies of national belonging and to safeguard cultural hegemonies.

All these contestations raise questions concerning the boundaries of religion, in other words, questions of secularity. However, the important point is that religious diversity is just one problem space against which secularity is defined and construed as a possible solution. There are other, historically older fault lines, such as those between religion and anticlericalism, or modernist definitions of secularity for the sake of national progress, or the autonomy of the state, law, and education from religious interference or domination. These notions of secularity have maintained their existence as part of societies' cultural and collective memories. In fact, they are revamped and refashioned in contemporary debates, as I showed with regard to the activism of secularist and humanist associations.

One dilemma linked to the governmentality of religious diversity that we are just beginning to see, but that will doubtlessly become more and more urgent, is the status of the rising number of people who hold neither religious nor secular worldviews but who are simply religiously indifferent. While secular individuals and their convictions and interests can be represented by secular and humanist associations to a satisfactory degree, the religiously indifferent cannot. If states increasingly use religious diversity as a concept to render populations legible, what happens to those who remain outside this realm? As a phenomenon that is essentially an absence, religious indifference escapes any form of representation. It thwarts the logic of membership, as the failure of secular associations to become mass organizations shows, it thwarts the logic of belonging, and it even thwarts the logic of identity in the widest possible sense. What, then, does it

mean for democracy, and especially for inherited understandings of freedom of religion, equality, and nondiscrimination if a historical form of consciousness, with its worldview and criteria of social inclusion, drifts into a negativity that can no longer be represented?

This brings us back to the question of what religious neutrality means and whether and how it can be achieved. There are two basic criticisms against the idea that secularity enhances the state's neutrality toward religion. One line of argument is that Western secular states pretend to be neutral, but that they are not because they are not really secular. Thus, France's laïcité is seen as false because the French state maintains church buildings. The implication is that laïcité is a pretext to favor Christianity and discriminate against Muslims. Others see Canada's secularism as compromised by its pervasive ceremonial deism, the fact that God is invoked in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Another line of argument is that secular states are not neutral because they *are* secular, or too secular. Here, the idea is that differentiating between the secular and religious spheres cannot constitute secularity as a ground of neutrality because secularity is inevitably secular*ism* and thus itself a quasi-religious ideology that pretends to be above particularistic religious standpoints. In Foucault-inspired genealogical inquiries into secularism especially, the conclusion has been that the powers of secularism are so pervasive across different contexts that its effects are essentially identical. Thus, Mahmood (2015) has suggested that the suffering of religious minorities in the West and the Middle East is basically the same. While such claims must surely be addressed on an empirical level, there is also a need for a theoretical shift in order to escape the incongruities inherent in this view. Whereas attention to power relations remains essential to the study of religious diversity, there is a need to recognize "degrees of unfreedom," as Laidlaw (2013) put it. Such degrees of freedom and unfreedom are produced in power relationships through law, policy, urban administrations, and the ways in which public discourses inform the grammar on the basis of which people encounter one another in daily life. Significantly, in this context religion is just an element of human subjectivity whose real significance is produced in the same realm of power.

APPENDIX: LIST OF CASES AND LAWS

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NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Social science analyses of the commission's work include Sharify-Funk (2010), Adelman and Anctil (2011), Milot (2009), Lefebvre and Beaman (2012), and Beaman (2012).
2. National Assembly of Québec (2008).
3. See Meunier, Laniel, and Demers (2010: 89). For further data and authoritative analyses of secularization processes in Quebec, see Bibby (1987), Lemieux and Montminy (2000), Meunier and Wilkins-Laflamme (2011), and Nault and Meunier (2017); for an excellent collection of references to studies of Catholicism and secularization in Quebec, see Christiano (2007).
4. These data are taken from Negre and Garcia Jorba (1998: 849); Nagel (2014); and Idescat, Estadística oficial de Catalunya (2015).
5. On the relationships between religion, national identity, and modernity in Quebec, see the excellent and monumental volume edited by Mager and Cantin (2010), especially the chapter by Rousseau (2010), as well as Rousseau (2005).
6. I use the phrases "nations without states" and "stateless nations" in this book because of their wide use. However, the notion is misleading, as it suggests that nations such as Quebeckers and Catalans have no state. While currently these groups have no sovereign state of their own, the building up of state structures is in fact a central element of their respective nationalist projects, which is especially true of issues around immigration and cultural diversity.
7. Sub-state nationalisms is an established field of study in political science, and several scholars have compared Quebec and Catalonia, together with other national groups that live in larger nation-states with regard to language politics, constructions of ethnicity, and immigration (see, e.g., Jeram 2014; Zapata-Barrero 2009; Franco-Guillén and Zapata-Barrero 2014). However, they have rarely adopted a sociological perspective on the role of religion in the dynamics surrounding immigration and nation building.
8. See Griera (2016), Griera and Martínez-Ariño (2016), Griera et al. (2015), and Nagel (2014).
9. See www.catalannews.com/politics/item/support-for-independence-in-catalonia-up-to-48-says-new-poll.
10. On mosque controversies in Catalonia, see Astor (2012, 2016); on the politics of burqa bans, see Burchardt, Griera, and García-Romeral (2015) and Griera and Burchardt (2016).
11. For nuanced comparative analyses, see, for instance, Casanova (2007), Berger, Davie, and Fokas (2008) and Joppke and Torpey (2013).
12. In the following sections, I largely rely on the work of historians, in particular Dowling (2012, 2013), and on anticlericalism Dittrich (2014) and Thomas (2013).
13. For general accounts of Catalan nationalism, see Medrano (1994), Hargreaves (2000), Guibernau (2004), and Llobera (2005).
14. See Brubaker (2012) for a detailed analysis of the different ways in which religion and nationalism can be related to one another.
15. See Estruch et al. (2007) for a very detailed account of religious minorities in Catalonia.
16. Astor (2014) makes this argument for Spain, but I suggest it also holds for Catalonia.

17. On the intricate history of the terminology of *canadien*, "French-Canadian," and "Quebec," see Zubrzycki (2013). I use "French-Canadian" for the era until roughly 1960 and "Quebec" for the following periods.
18. See also Dumont (1986).
19. For a more extensive analysis, see Bernard (1983).
20. Guindon (1967) argued that the idea of Quebec having had an ancien régime is itself an invention.
21. See the important analyses of Bouchard (2005) and Turgeon (2013).

CHAPTER 1 THEORIZING RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND SECULARISM

1. Eisenberg (2014), for instance, has shown how Canadian jurisprudence has moved from an approach that construes religion as a choice to one that views it as an identity.
2. See the classical study by Wilson (1970), Beckford's work on the Jehovah's Witnesses (1975), Barker's studies of the Moonies (1984, 1986), and Palmer's explorations of French political discourses on sects (2011).
3. These different understandings of religious diversity can also be construed in terms of particular genealogies. See Burchardt (2017a, 2018).
4. On the southern European cases, see Pérez-Agote (2010) on Spain, Garelli (2007) on Italy, and Vilaça (2014) on Portugal; on the Nordic countries in general, see Mouritsen (2006) and, on Norway, Furseth (1994).
5. On police forces, see Thériault (2015); on the military, see Michalowski (2015); on prisons, see Beckford and Gilliat (2005), Becci (2012), and Griera and Clot-Garrell (2015); on hospitals, see Cadge (2012) and Martínez-Ariño and Griera (2016).
6. Similarly, Eisenberg (2014: 8) argued that, in the Canadian legal system, "religious groups have an incentive to self-essentialize when advancing their claims by establishing stable and clear rules of membership and a stable sense of group orthodoxy—i.e. who counts as in and who counts as out of the group."
7. In general, I prefer to use the term "identification" over "identity" in order to highlight identity's nature as fabricated over time, as opposed to the outcomes of such processes of fabrication ("identity"). See Brubaker and Cooper (2000).
8. For useful summaries of critiques of secularization theories, see Gorski and Altinordu (2008) and Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt (2012).
9. Koenig (2015a: 294) suggests that there are metanarratives of secularization involving issues of state sovereignty, definitions of the public and the private, and nostalgic versus utopian concepts of the secular, all of which influence "cultural constructions of the secular."
10. Sociological research on secularism did not evolve from a focus on Western societies to one on non-Western societies as it sometimes appears. Studies of Indian and Turkish secularism as postcolonial and postimperial variants respectively have been constitutive of sociological and anthropological work in the field. What is new is rather the attempt to explore formations of secularity in societies that are not characterized by an avowed secular(ist) political or legal doctrine. See the edited volumes by Berman, Bhargava, and Laliberté (2013), Burchardt, Wohlrab-Sahr, and Middell (2015), Bilgrami (2016), and Künkler, Madeley, and Shankar (2018).
11. On the United States, see Jacoby (2004), Wenger (2010), Sullivan (2010), and Witte and Nichols (2011); on France, see Baubérot (2004), Willaime (1996), and Bowen (2007b); on Turkey, see Göle (1997), Navaro-Yashin (2005), and Özyürek (2006); on India, see Bhargava (1998), Bajpai (2015), and Burchardt and Wohlrab-Sahr (2013). For a useful comparative view of these cases, see also Cady and Hurd (2010).

12. See, for instance, Gorski (2012), Calhoun, Mendieta, and VanAntwerpen (2013), and Casanova (2013b). Parmaksiz (2016) has explored the genealogy of the "post-secular" in theology and social theory. For a critical account, see Beckford (2012).
13. The concept was initially developed in a research project under the leadership of Monika Wohlrab-Sahr at the University of Leipzig from 2010 to 2012 and has resulted in a series of publications (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012; Schuh, Burchardt, and Wohlrab-Sahr 2012; Burchardt, Wohlrab-Sahr, and Wegert 2013; Schenk, Burchardt, and Wohlrab-Sahr 2015; Burchardt 2015). Since 2016, Monika Wohlrab-Sahr and Christoph Kleine have been the directors of the Human Center of Advanced Studies Multiple Secularities: Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities, funded by the German Science Foundation, at the same university. My description of the concept of multiple secularities largely draws on Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt (2012).
14. This use of the term "secularity" differs from the conceptualization of Charles Taylor, who identifies secularity with unbelief, exclusive humanism, and lacking religion (Taylor 2007).

CHAPTER 2 CONTESTING RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND SECULARISM

1. By "home-grown religious minorities," I mean groups such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and Scientology. Their presence in Quebec and Catalonia is owed to the transnational dynamics of missionary activities rather than labor migration, as in the cases of Islam and Hinduism, for instance.
2. Importantly, minority demands to religious participation sometimes also involve claims to "special treatment." Koenig (2010), Maussen (2015: 85), and others have usefully distinguished between parity claims, which target the extension of existing rights to newcomer groups, and exception claims, which involve the demand to be exempted from general laws, demands justified in the name of liberal freedoms.
3. An important earlier account on this question is offered by Milot (2005).
4. In January 2019 the final decision on the constitutionality of the law was still pending.
5. On the historical development of the legal recognition of diversity in Canada, see Sheppard (2005).
6. These are just a few examples. A fairly complete list of controversies over religious diversity that occurred in Quebec between 1985 and 2008 can be found in the report of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, "Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation" (2008).
7. I provide only a short description of these cases here, as they have been discussed and analyzed in great detail by other scholars (Lefebvre 2008; Koussens 2009; Beaman 2017).
8. Supreme Court of Canada, Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem (published June 30, 2004), 2 SCR 551 (2004), https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/2161/index.do.
9. Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse, Quebec, Resolution COM-510–5.2.1 (extracted March 20, 2006), www.cdpdj.qc.ca/Documents/ETS_resolution.pdf.
10. Supreme Court of Canada, Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys (published February 3, 2006), 1 SCR 256 (2006), https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/15/index.do.
11. Note that the unit was "downgraded" within the institutional hierarchy from a secretariat to a "dirección general." However, despite this downgrading, it became much more active and influential on different political levels.
12. At the national level, the foundation "pluralismo y convivencia" (pluralism and coexistence) plays a similar role, but no other regional government has developed an administrative unit uniquely dedicated to governing religion.

13. For a more detailed analysis of the agreements, see Griera (2016). Strikingly, the Catholic Church did not declare a comparable commitment to secularism.
14. Juan Esquivel (2017) captured comparable developments in Argentina between 2006 and 2012 under the term "pluri-confessionality."
15. Officially, the term "Concordat" has been replaced by "Agreement between the Spanish State and the Holy See."
16. In the meantime, other organizations, such as the UNESCO Association for Interreligious Dialogue, which is also made up of theologians, also implement these courses.
17. Importantly, a governmental Committee on Religious Affairs was established in Quebec in 2000. However, its mandate was limited to advising and commenting on government policies concerning religion in schools, especially the new mandatory course called "Ethics and Religious Culture" introduced in 2008, and was created following the adoption of Bill 118 ("An Act to Amend Various Legislative Provisions Respecting Education as Regards Confessional Matters").
18. In their study of Muslim claims making in European countries, Carol and Koopmans (2013: 167) distinguish claims with regard to their degrees of "obtrusiveness," which they define as their potential for conflict. Among other things, they suggest that claims for religious rights within public institutions are more obtrusive than claims to rights outside public institutions. While this is a helpful perspective, it does not immediately aid in explaining the differences between Quebec and Catalonia, as in both cases religious rights within public institutions were at issue.
19. In general, the Bouchard-Taylor Report agreed with this line of argument by stating that religious symbols are compatible with the secular principle "when it is a historic reminder rather than a sign of religious identification of the public institution" (see also Maclure and Taylor 2011: 50).
20. To an extent, the nature of the proposal forced the government to include such a provision. As it did not go as far as aiming to "legislate history out of existence" (Joppke 2015), it had to protect it explicitly. I provide a more detailed discussion of the politics of religious heritage and cultural patrimony in chapter 5.
21. See the information sheet "The Government's Goal" on page 69 (figure 2.1b).
22. Dupré (2012: 237) has well emphasized recent trends to re-ethnicize Quebec nationalism and traces the beginnings of that trend to the responses to the referendum on national independence from Canada in 1995, which the pro-independence campaign lost by only a very few votes. In a comment following the defeat, Premier Jacques Parizeau famously attributed the defeat to "money and ethnic votes," which many understood to refer to ethnic minorities.
23. Koussens (2011: 4) as well noted that "essentially, in Quebec, a passion for 'laicité à la Francaise' can be detected over the last few years among intellectual and political groups and a very republican secular model is regularly invoked such as that which Quebec should take for example."
24. Maclure (2014) has argued that, despite his ultimate ethical disagreement, the demand for the equal treatment of political and religious reserve for state employees is one of the most serious arguments against the public display of religious symbols for personnel of the state.
25. On this point, see also Beauchemin, Bourque, and Duchastel (1991) as well as Baum (1991).
26. Poutine is a dish of french fries topped with cheese curds and gravy, a typical Québécois fast-food specialty.
27. Taken from a personal interview.

CHAPTER 3 SPATIALIZING RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

1. Significantly, some sociologists such as Michalowski (2015) have argued that these regulatory processes are actually the products not only of country-specific religion-state relations but also of "organization-specific arguments" and organizational logics. In her lucid comparative study of the spread of Muslim military chaplaincy, she demonstrates the point with regard to France, which has achieved very high levels of Muslim accommodation in military chaplaincy that provides a major contrast to its rigorous exclusion of religion from the sphere of education.

2. Importantly, social geographers have started to explore urban regulations around religion; see, e.g., Germain and Dejean (2013), Dejean (2016), and Gale and Naylor (2002).

3. With "city officials" or "urban officials," which I use interchangeably, I refer to both elected officials such as city councilors and administrative staff (in Catalan *tècnics*) working for units dealing with the issues of immigration and integration, civic participation, and citizenship.

4. Koussens and Dejean (2013) also note the marked discrepancies in regulations between different boroughs.

5. Gagnon, Dansereau, and Germain (2004) have analyzed this case in great detail.

6. In all, 1,561 residents voted in favor, 1,202 against upholding the bylaw.

7. Astor (2017) categorized existing requirements into "urban licenses" that refer to the construction or modification of urban structures and "activity licenses" that regulate the practices or function of certain spaces.

8. On urban planning, religion, and traffic in the United Kingdom, see Gale and Naylor (2002); for the Quebec context, see Gagnon, Dansereau, and Germain (2004); and on British Columbia, see Dwyer, Tse, and Ley (2016).

9. Next to immigrants, gypsies form an important part of the Catalan Pentecostal landscape, and they have also been accused of noise-related disturbances.

10. While the conflict in Mollet del Vallès did end up in court, this was an untypical development in Catalonia, where only a handful of conflicts around noncompliance with infrastructural norms were brought before a judge. This was the case in Arenys de Munt, Lleida, Prat de Llobregat, and Mollet del Vallès.

11. See Quebec, Canada: Cour Supérieure (2017).

12. In the writing of this section, I have greatly benefited from my participation in the "Religious Expressions in Urban Space in Madrid and Barcelona" research project at the Center for Investigations in the Sociology of Religion (ISOR) at the Autonomous University Barcelona. I kindly thank Mar Griera and Monica Cornejo for the invitation to participate and contribute to it.

13. In some especially densely populated areas, such as Barcelona's old town, local officials issued bans on religious uses simply because of the enormous number of requests they received. Significantly, over recent years city councils have tended to provide more generous guidelines for religious uses of civic centers.

14. This, as well as some of the subsequent information, is taken from another recorded interview with the director of Barcelona's Office of Religious Affairs carried out by Avi Astor and Mar Griera, September 9, 2015. I thank them for sharing this material.

15. As Pinch (2009: 80) argued, "'Religious functionality' require[d] its own non-trivial material alignment," as the religious infrastructure of the eruv was erected on top of an existing older infrastructure.

16. See the outstanding collection of chapters in Beaman (2012).

17. Information taken from an interview conducted by Mar Griera and Avi Astor with the director of Barcelona's Office of Religious Affairs in 2016.

18. Recent studies of "network governance" in the field of religion (Martikainen 2013; Duemmler and Nagel 2013) make similar theoretical suggestions.
19. See also Stefan Höhne's pioneering study of letters of complaint by passengers on New York's subway to the Metropolitan Transport Corporation (Höhne 2017).

CHAPTER 4 THE LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

Parts of chapter 4 are reproduced with kind permission of Taylor and Francis, Abingdon, from the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (7), "Narrating Liberal Rights and Culture: Muslim Face Veiling, Urban Coexistence and Contention in Spain" (2015): 1068–1087.
1. In Spain in 2010 the parliament was asked to decide whether the government should prepare legislation on the issue or not. The proposal was rejected by a Socialist majority vote. In the Netherlands in 2005 the parliamentary majority voted in favor of banning face veiling from all public spaces.
2. I am fully aware of the differences among the diverse forms of face covering used by Muslim women. In this chapter I employ the vernacular term "burqa" as *used*, or rather misused, in political and legal discourses. As Moors (2009) suggests, the preference in much political discourse for "burqa," as opposed to "niqab," has to do with the aim of conjuring up images of the Taliban regime and its barbarism as the real opponent in the controversy.
3. For earlier overviews of regulations and associated debates, see Shah and Grillo (2012), Koussens and Roy (2014), and Ferrari and Pastorelli (2013).
4. On France, see Joppke and Torpey (2013) and de Galembert (2014); on Belgium, see Brems (2014), Delgrange (2014), and Ouald Chaib and Brems (2013); for an overview, see Ferrari and Pastorelli (2013) and Shah and Grillo (2012).
5. The ban was not implemented as a result of a diverging decision by the cabinet.
6. See Hunter-Henin (2012), Laborde (2012), Nussbaum (2012), and Ouald Chaib and Brems (2013).
7. See *El País*, June 16, 2010.
8. In fact, following the developments in Lleida, the idea of banning face coverings was promoted through the association of Catalan municipalities and was then variously adopted in other municipalities and cities.
9. After this defeat, the ban became effective in the city. On the legal trajectory of Catalan burqa bans, see Burchardt, Yanasmayan, and Koenig (2019).
10. Importantly, this contrasts with the cases of progressive, emancipated, or secularized Muslim women (e.g., Necla Kelek in Germany, Ayan Hirsi Ali in the Netherlands, and Djemila Benhabib in Quebec) who have become icons of media debate and expert witnesses themselves.
11. Evaluations of Islamic symbols are often relational. In Western debates about the Islamic headscarf, there is typically a moral preference in mainstream discourse for abandoning the headscarf. In burqa debates, the headscarf turns into a tolerable symbol, as the face veil is vilified.
12. CEGEPs (colléges d'enseignement général et professionelle) are postsecondary, preuniversity colleges and are an important part of Quebec's educational system.
13. *Times of India* (2010), cited in Selby (2014: 444).
14. See Akkad (2010).
15. All documents related to Bill 94 can be accessed through www.assnat.qc.ca/en/travaux-parlementaires/projets-loi/projet-loi-94-39-1.html.
16. Information taken from a personal interview in September 2013.

CHAPTER 5 MAKING CLAIMS TO RELIGION AS CULTURE

1. National Assembly of Québec (2008).
2. The Canadian Supreme Court overruled this judgment in April 2015. I discuss the case in detail in the final part of this chapter.
3. My approach is thus somewhat different from that taken by Fornerod (2015: 4), who suggests that "religious heritage illustrates the potential tensions between secular and religious values, and therefore constitutes a relevant tool for investigating the question of the legitimacy of state support for religions in secularized societies."
4. In a recent article, together with Avi Astor and Maria del Mar Griera I have explored how the notion of religious heritage has played an important role in critical moments of national self-reflection such as the drafting of new constitutions in Spain and has been inscribed in Spanish legal frameworks (Astor, Burchardt, and Griera 2017). This section of the chapter takes inspiration from this article. In another recent project, we have focused on the debates around the Mosque-Cathedral of Cordoba to examine how and why notions of national heritage and culture become politicized and have the capacity to polarize society (Astor, Burchardt, and Griera 2019; Griera, Burchardt, and Astor 2019).
5. In this chapter I use the terms "heritage" and "patrimony" as synonyms. By "religious heritage" I mean sets of religious practices, symbols, and objects that societies inherit from preceding generations. By contrast, by "religion as heritage" and "heritage religion," which I also use interchangeably, I mean the active engagement with elements of inherited religion that affords it new meaning. Finally, I distinguish these terms from the notion of a "religious heritage assemblage," which I define below.
6. There are notable exceptions, such as Wohlrab-Sahr (2003).
7. In formulating this term, I take inspiration from Deleuzian theorizations of assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari 1988; DeLanda 2006; Sassen 2008) that emphasize the nature of assemblages as made up of heterogeneous elements that have internal inconsistencies and unexpected consequences.
8. Beaman (2013) and Joppke (2015) have shown how this tension plays out in judicial dynamics and pointed to the fact that typically in Western societies, Christian majority religions are redefined as cultures, minority practices as religions.
9. Spain's Catholic Church is in a comparatively comfortable financial position, commanding a budget of upward of €250 million, much of which comes from individual tax assignments and direct public subsidies.
10. See http://portaljuridic.gencat.cat/ca/pjur_ocults/pjur_resultats_fitxa/?action=fitxa&documentId=92717 (translation mine).
11. See Deleuze and Guattari (1988), DeLanda (2006), and Sassen (2008).
12. See http://portaljuridic.gencat.cat/ca/pjur_ocults/pjur_resultats_fitxa/?action=fitxa&documentId=92717.
13. In Quebec, tourism plays a role in motivating heritage funding as well, but to a lesser degree.
14. The church has also created a special website for this program; see Catalonia Sacra (2015a).
15. See Catalonia Sacra (2015b).
16. We have analyzed conflicts over immatriculation and Catholic property as contestations over religious heritage regimes in a recent article. See Astor, Burchardt, and Griera (2017).
17. The first coalition mobilized around this issue was the Coalition for the Defense of Navarran Patrimony, which was formed in 2007 and continues to be highly active in opposing Church immatriculations in Navarre and other Spanish regions. In Aragon, the Movement

toward a Secular State (MHUEL) has similarly opposed Church immatriculations by collecting documentation highlighting the extent of the phenomenon and pressing the regional government to take legislative action against it.

18. The proposed reforms to the law may be accessed through the Catalan Parliament's website: www.parlament.cat/web/activitat-parlamentaria/siap.

19. Personal interview with Avi Astor in February 2008.

20. As Macdonald notes (2003: 3), the museum inaugurates a way of seeing that "entailed a detachment of the viewer—thinking of themselves as outside or above that which was represented."

21. This and all the other quotes in this section are taken from the text on display.

22. On the memory of Islam in the Iberian Peninsula, see Hertel (2015) and Hirschkind (2016).

23. For further details on "Tragic Week," see the introduction.

24. The first permanent exhibition to be inaugurated together with the museum was called "Memories" and was replaced by "The Times of the Quebeckers" in 2000. It was renewed and reopened under the name "People of Quebec . . . Now and Then" in 2014. My description and analysis is based on my visit to "The Times of the Quebeckers."

25. The documentary also includes interviews with academic experts such as Gérard Bouchard, co-chair together with Charles Taylor of the well-known Bouchard-Taylor Commission.

26. On the sources and consequences of collective amnesia in Spain, see Resina (2000).

27. I take this distinction from the legal discussion of active and passive religious symbols that emerged in the context of the controversies over the acceptability of Christian crucifixes and Muslims headscarves in European schools (Joppke 2013).

28. See Supreme Court of Canada (2015).

29. See Supreme Court of Canada (2015: 18).

30. Supreme Court of Canada (2015: 56–57).

31. Supreme Court of Canada (2015: 56–57).

32. Emphasis added.

33. I mention this case here only in passing since chapter 4 discusses burqa bans in detail.

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