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# Four Years in Izumi

Village Japan in the  
Early Sixteenth Century

Lee Butler



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Four Years in Izumi

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# Four Years in Izumi

*Village Japan in the Early Sixteenth Century*

Lee Butler

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## Acknowledgments

The manuscript for this book was half written more than a decade ago, when it seems either the gods turned against me or my sins from a previous existence caught up with me. Or perhaps I was cursed by the spirits of the Izumi military governors, who decided my descriptions of them lacked respect. At any rate, I was plagued with a relative of long Covid following a viral infection, which meant years of slow progress and significant interruptions. Having finally gotten to this point, I'm pleased to acknowledge and thank those who assisted and supported my efforts.

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## Maps

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## A Note on Conventions

Decisions to include or exclude foreign terms in a study like this are never simple. Much depends on one's expected audience, as well as the author's level of comfort with translated equivalents. My approach here is to provide Japanese terms in two ways. First, when a term I deem significant appears in a given section (but not thereafter or infrequently), I note the Japanese and give a translation or description. As a nod to scholars, I also occasionally furnish the original characters of terms and brief phrases to clarify the meanings or nuances of a word or phrase. Second, I provide Japanese for a limited number of terms that I use extensively, and either exclusive of English translations or in tandem with them. These terms are central to my discussion and are either unique in meaning or better understood, if explicated carefully, than a poor English equivalent. Two are tax related: *nengu* or "annual tax" (the fundamental tax imposed on peasants; it had been collected for centuries, whether by public or private authorities according to their rights to landed income); and *tansen* or "acreage tax"—based on the area of a *tan*, approximately one thousand square meters.

Three terms for individuals that appear regularly are *shugo* (military governor); *bantō* (division head within a village; appointed by the proprietor); and *hyakushō* (tax-paying cultivator). *Shugo* can refer either to one or both of the Izumi military governors, and its use in that manner is appropriate since that often reflects the text (as well as Japanese linguistic practice that does not distinguish between singular and plural forms). More problematic are other terms in the diary that delineate those associated with the military governors or their men. Most common are *kuni* (which I translate as province), as in "the activities of the province," *kuni-shū* ("men of the prov-

ince” or “provincial force”) and *kunigata* (“provincial side”), used in a similar manner. The difficulty in choosing, as I do, not to pepper the text with the Japanese terms is that the easy fix is to substitute *shugo* (or military governor) in such cases. But to do so—as too many scholars do (whether writing in Japanese or English)—suggests for the two *shugo* a level of personal activity, decision making, and engagement in managing (and intruding in) affairs in the province that is not supported by evidence. In short, it gives the Izumi *shugo* too much power and control, both over the province as a whole and over the men under them, whether direct retainers or those nominally affiliated. I work to avoid this, with terms and phrases in English that are a bit clumsy at times but more accurate in what they represent.

I refer in English to residents of Hineno and Iriyamada as villagers (and occasionally as peasants), to Buddhist clerics as monks, to those who served or petitioned the native gods as *kami* ritualists or practitioners, and, with hesitation (and only when necessary), local strongmen and retainers of the *shugo* as warriors. In chapter 5, I discuss my reticence in defining the last group as warriors, but I will just note here that there is little evidence for the existence of a class (let alone a large class) of individuals we can categorize as warriors in Izumi Province at the turn of the sixteenth century. Those who fought came from all groups in society; whether any are best defined as warriors is another question. Finally, I refer to each individual who appears in the diary by one name, usually the family and personal name, regardless of what titles or other designations are used in a given source.

One other convention I follow: In quoted selections, brackets [ ] signify either implied terms or my clarification, whereas parentheses ( ) are original to the quote, parenthetical notes by the speaker or writer.

## Abbreviations

MKT Chūsei Kuge Nikki Kenkyūkai, ed. *Masamoto-kō tabihikitsuke*  
 ISS Izumisano-shi shi Hensan Iinkai, ed. *Shinshū Izumisano-shi shi*

## Currency and Measures

### Currency

1 *kan* = 100 *hiki* or 1000 *mon*<sup>1</sup>

1 *hiki* = 10 *mon*

The value of currency, of course, fluctuated significantly over time, but five *mon* was a slight amount of money, worth perhaps food for a day for a commoner. Forty *kan*, on the other hand, was enough to construct a modest home for a member of the elite.

### Area

1 *chō* = 9917 square meters

1 *tan* = 360 *bu* or 991 square meters

1 *bu* = 2.75 square meters

### Volume

1 *koku* = 180 liters

1 *to* = 18 liters

1 *shō* = 1.8 liters

1 *gō* = .18 liters

1 *shaku* = 1/10 of a *gō*



## Prologue

Murder is never pleasant and rarely justified, except to certain perpetrators of the act. It is justified, they claim, because in their particular cases it is necessary, the only means to right a wrong or fix an intractable problem. This, in essence, was the argument Kujō Masamoto made in the days and weeks after he and his son Hisatsune had Karahashi Arikazu killed at their Kyoto residence early in the first month of 1496.<sup>1</sup> And the facts suggest that Masamoto had a point. Arikazu had become a problem that could be solved only through extreme measures, of which murder was the most efficient.

Japan in the late fifteenth century was a violent place. The Muromachi government, which had ruled from the early fourteenth century, was a shadow of its former self, having lost control over much of the country nearly fifty years previous. The regime still enjoyed a modicum of prestige and authority in the land, as well as significant power in the five Home Provinces around the capital. But the shogun, Ashikaga Yoshizumi, was a puppet; power was wielded by Hosokawa Masamoto, whose child heir was the birth son of Kujō Masamoto.

At the time of Karahashi Arikazu's death, Kujō Masamoto was fifty-two and head of one of the most prestigious families in the country. Masamoto himself had served as chancellor at the imperial court two decades previous. However, prestige at this time meant far less than it had in earlier centuries, when courtier families like the Kujō were part of a tiny ruling elite, sustained by the wealth of vast estates throughout the country. By this time, Kujō estates were few in number and the family was burdened with debt, developments directly linked to the death of Karahashi Arikazu.<sup>2</sup>

Described by one historian as the estate steward of Masamoto, and by

another as his servant,<sup>3</sup> Arikazu is well defined by neither term; he was no servant to Masamoto, and his status and position extended well beyond that of estate steward. Like Masamoto, Karahashi Arikazu was a courtier. In this they shared a common history. They also shared a common genealogy: they were cousins, having the same Karahashi grandfather—a daughter of whom became Masamoto's mother, a son of whom became Arikazu's father. The links were close, but there was considerable distance between these two men, separated as they were by a large gap in status.<sup>4</sup>

The Karahashi were known as house officials, courtiers from families of the middle and lower echelons who served in the private administrations of the great court families. Though the numbers of families supplying these officials had shrunk with the loss of estates and decline in income, we get an idea of their importance from a list of attendants—that is, house officials—who accompanied Kujō Hisatsune at a New Year's ceremony in 1502. There were eleven individuals, including the distinguished poet Sanjōnishi Sane-taka and members of the Kanroji, Nakamikado, Reizei, and Shirakawa families.<sup>5</sup>

The problems between Masamoto and Arikazu can be traced in part to the former's ambitions and the demands of his elevated status. Masamoto's drive for high court office and a prominent place in Kyoto society came only at considerable monetary expense, which he obtained through borrowing funds. It was not that the Kujō lacked income, depleted in number though their lands were, but that extraordinary expenses could require far more money than the family had on hand; and like many courtiers the Kujō were overly optimistic in their ability to garner income to pay their debts. Thus it was that early in 1472 Masamoto borrowed the vast sum of 180 *kan* (an amount sufficient to construct a very fine mansion) to fund the *Daijōe Gosechi*, festivities of singing and dancing that were part of the post-enthronement ceremonies for the emperor (held seven years late).<sup>6</sup> Masamoto very likely volunteered to cover these expenses, with the expectation that in due course he would be appointed chancellor, as indeed he was. In any event, he turned to his house official Arikazu for the loan (which the latter probably put together from a number of sources, not just his own funds). Whatever plans Masamoto had for repaying the debt appeared almost immediately to be fruitless, for within months he had approached Arikazu about an alternate path to reconciling it. The result was the following contract, prepared the last day of 1472.

Regarding Iriyamada village in Hineno Estate,<sup>7</sup> Izumi Province:  
Because of the necessity [of funds for] the *Daijōe Gosechi*, and with

me now residing in Sakamoto, the borrowed sum with principal and interest had already swelled to 20,000 *hiki* [i.e., 200 *kan*]. In light of this, [the Karahashi] have dismissed the debt. As compensation, that village's annual tax—for the two generations spanning the lives of me and my heir and, on the private side, extending through the generation of Arikazu—in short, for the two generations of “lord and subject” (*kōshi* 公私) they are granted full proprietary rights. After the two generations of “lord and subject” have passed, the land is to be returned to the main family. In order that there be no misunderstandings, this is clearly put forth.<sup>8</sup>

Though crafted so there would be, in Masamoto's words, “no misunderstandings,” the contract is not without seeming ambiguities (as well as being rather awkwardly written). For example, to cede the annual tax was one thing, whereas to “grant full proprietary rights” (*chigyō o mattō seraru beshi* 可被全知行) is generally recognized as something quite different. In the late medieval era, the term *chigyō* was used to define lands over which an overlord—whether courtier, warrior, or temple—held complete, usually direct, control. Though individual parcels were the property of cultivators, the overlord was master of the whole. For an up-and-coming warrior, *chigyō* was his economic base, small or large, and claims over land inevitably included that term. Was Masamoto's understanding of *chigyō* more limited than that? And what were the implications of this transfer of rights if Karahashi Arikazu's actions put the control and welfare of the village itself in jeopardy? After all, there is little question that ownership of Iriyamada ultimately remained with the Kujō.

In any event, a well managed estate provided regular income in the form of the annual tax, and the Karahashi's rights to that in Iriyamada appear to have been unassailable. It is possible that Arikazu enjoyed more than a few years of solid tax income from Iriyamada; after all, he and his father held the village for nearly twenty-five years. But at some point the situation deteriorated, as underscored by loans he acquired from monks at Negoroji, a Buddhist temple in neighboring Kii Province. The original principal for these was 2000 *hiki* or 20 *kan*.<sup>9</sup> Though a slight sum in contrast to that which Masamoto had borrowed for the *Daijōe Gosechi*, 20 *kan* was not an insignificant amount of money; and since Arikazu subsequently failed to keep up with payments, the total debt grew rapidly—not surprising when one considers that annual interest rates were commonly in the forty-eight to seventy-two percent range. The loans also provided the monks leverage to be appointed estate deputies, a position they held in the 1490s.<sup>10</sup>

While there is little question that Arikazu's mismanagement of Iriyamada

was one factor in his deadly confrontation at the Kujō residence, it received no special mention in the letters Masamoto wrote to associates justifying his actions. As a Kujō house official, Arikazu's duties were many, and none was more important from an economic standpoint than that of deputy of several Kujō estates. According to Masamoto, Arikazu's transgressions numbered more than ten, the extent of which were "difficult to put into words." They began as early as 1481, he contended, and included Arikazu's repeated assertions of crops lost to damage, resulting in no tax income whatsoever for five years. Masamoto also accused Arikazu of advocating for a change in the family headship (meaning the removal of Masamoto) and of "bringing disorder to the state."<sup>11</sup>

How Arikazu viewed the situation is unclear, but there is little question that tensions between the two parties reached a peak late in 1495. In the tenth month, Masamoto gave notice to Arikazu that he would refuse all requests for meetings; and he provided a list of grievances to which he expected a response. None was forthcoming. This is how things stood when on the evening of 1/7 of 1496, Arikazu called at the Kujō residence and, according to Sanjōnishi Sanetaka, "forced himself inside."<sup>12</sup> He was killed by a Kujō servant sometime in the hours that followed.

The incident sent shock waves through court society. For members of one of the five regental families to murder a ranking associate, and do so in their own home, was unprecedented. Not only was Karahashi Arikazu a member of a respected family, but he was a favorite of Emperor Go-Tsuchimikado. As a branch of the Sugawara—the illustrious clan whose distant ancestor Michizane was revered for his fidelity to the emperor, as well as for his probity and scholarship—the Karahashi were known for their learning and service to the court (including document production and collection). Arikazu's personal ties to the emperor were a result of his activities as a member of the "inner guards," who along with the outer guards took turns performing light duties within the palace, lending their presence and being available for assistance as needed.<sup>13</sup> Evidence of the favor Arikazu enjoyed of the emperor is seen in his assignment to lecture at a palace poetry gathering. Though he initially refused on grounds of limited ability, Arikazu had no choice but to accept the invitation after Go-Tsuchimikado exhorted him to reconsider.<sup>14</sup>

For the better part of two months following Arikazu's murder, the court carried out an investigation into the incident, followed by a trial of Masamoto and Hisatsune (as was customary, neither was in attendance). It was a lengthy undertaking, evidence of how seriously the matter was viewed. In the process, scholars were employed to search for precedents (without success) and statements were acquired from the Karahashi and Kujō. As

seen in courtiers' diaries, the question of punishment was much discussed and debated. Penalties commonly imposed by the court on its offending members included imperial censure, prohibitions against calling at court, the stripping of rank or office (or both) and, rarely, exile.

For Masamoto and Hisatsune, imperial censure was almost assured, a step that would restrict them from appearing at court. But to strip the office of men of their stature was a more serious matter. Without office, the Kujō would be cut off from the group of regental families, a possibility that led the chancellor at the time, Konoe Hisamichi, to wonder in dismay what the result would be.<sup>15</sup> In the end, despite the fact that the court officials in charge of the trial recommended that Hisatsune be removed from office (Masamoto held no office, having retired and taken the tonsure in 1498) no such step was taken when the final decision was rendered. It is likely that Go-Tsuchimikado, upset though he was over the murder, refused to accept their advice.<sup>16</sup> As it was, the physical turmoil of the late fifteenth century presented emperor and court with unheard of challenges. This was not the time to question the institution's internal stability through altering a fundamental component of its rule.

According to the court genealogy *Kugyō bunin*, an imperial pardon was issued for Hisatsune in 1498, but nothing is mentioned of Masamoto (who appears as “former chancellor” and “without rank”—having retired).<sup>17</sup> Perhaps this was a chronicler's oversight, but there is little question that relations between the Kujō and the emperor were still strained. This may not have mattered to Masamoto except that Hisatsune was in line to be made chancellor, and without the emperor's approval he would be passed over. With this in mind, Masamoto made plans to appease the emperor through an act of penance, self-imposed exile—a practice with a long and storied history.<sup>18</sup> His destination was Hine Estate in Izumi Province, home to the village (Iriyamada, and its neighbor, Hineno) that Karahashi Arikazu had mismanaged. Residing there would allow Masamoto to administer the estate directly, fixing the problems Arikazu had caused and strengthening the Kujō hold on the land. Though Masamoto noted in a letter in the eleventh month of 1501, just eight months after his arrival in Izumi, that he expected to be back in the capital early the following year, he remained in Izumi for nearly four years.<sup>19</sup> And for the whole of that period he kept a diary, *Tabihikitsuke*, the principal source for the history that follows.



## Introduction

At nearly 350 pages in printed form, Kujō Masamoto's diary of his stay in Izumi is a substantial record.<sup>1</sup> Though sparse entries and days with nothing more than a note on the weather appear occasionally, daily jottings are the norm and many are of considerable length. At the same time, the *sengoku* world (1467-1568) depicted therein is narrow in time and space, limited to four years and one province (with a concentration upon two villages in that province). And in this lies one measure—the primary one, in my mind—of the diary's value. Though change over time is never far from the historian's mind (and often the driving force in analysis), *Tabihikitsuke* invites us to suspend our interest in change and instead focus on the immediate world of the region's inhabitants, portrayed in unparalleled richness.

The prosaic title Masamoto gave his diary, *Tabihikitsuke*, or “Trip Record,” provides one reason he was assiduous in his chronicling: *hikitsuke* referred to a document kept as evidence for legal purposes, suggesting that Masamoto intended to use his record in support of claims for the estate once he returned to the capital.<sup>2</sup> The result was a diary that put the estate, its workings, and the conflicts and negotiations surrounding it front and center, with Masamoto's personal life occupying little of the writing.<sup>3</sup> What soon becomes clear to the reader of *Tabihikitsuke*, however, is that Masamoto's interest in the villages and villagers of Hineno and Iriyamada, and the world that encompassed them, extended well beyond matters of legal importance. To our benefit, he chose to write of those things.

Some may assume that *Tabihikitsuke*, as a diary, offers just one view of things, a view both singular and subjective, shaped by an author who was far removed in status and perspective from the villagers he resided among.

Though there is no doubt some truth to that argument (a villager's diary, assuming it existed, would obviously differ from Masamoto's, even in describing the same events), the strengths of *Tabihikitsuke* are undeniable. To begin with, Masamoto's perspective is valuable. As the record of an outsider, to whom the ways of commoners were unusual and thus worth noting, *Tabihikitsuke* includes details and insights about everyday life that the villagers themselves would have surely ignored as unremarkable. In this regard, Masamoto's subjective position is a boon to historians. The same can be said of his observations of villagers' cultural and religious practices, particularly where they diverged from, or unexpectedly resembled, those of the elite.

Just as significant, *Tabihikitsuke* does not speak with a single voice. This is reflected in two practices Masamoto followed. One was that of copying much of the correspondence he sent and received. The important place this occupies in the diary is reflected in the number of letters and other documents he included—nearly two hundred in all—and in the individuals whose letters appear there. Most prominent were his communications with the province's two military governors (*shugo*), Negoroji monks, and village leaders of Hineno and Iriyamada, but he also included letters from individuals of whom we would know almost nothing otherwise. Perhaps what is most notable about Masamoto's record-keeping was his inclusion in *Tabihikitsuke* of documents, primarily letters, that were neither produced nor received by him or his men. Confined though he was to his residence, it appears that little that occurred in the region, and little that was written there, failed to reach him. Written demands sent to villagers of Hineno and Iriyamada inevitably ended up in Masamoto's hands, as did correspondence from the deputy shogun's officials that was directed to the *shugo* or to the villagers of Hine Estate. The same was true of correspondence the villagers sent to their neighbors about disputed lands or activities, or to Negoroji as petitions. In this manner, the diary opens up the world of early sixteenth-century Izumi in compelling fashion.

A second practice Masamoto followed was to record verbal messages he received, often in considerable detail, and sometimes as quoted conversations. These appear frequently and in selections of varying length, and they end in characteristic fashion with the phrase *to unnun*, meaning "thus it was related" or "so I was told," and less commonly denoting a direct quote. Though this is hardly proof that Masamoto recorded or paraphrased perfectly or without bias, evidence suggests that he took pains to be accurate and thorough. Yata Toshifumi's close examination of several examples of *to unnun* point to this, as do details surrounding an incident of thievery in which Masamoto provided his diary as evidence for what had occurred at the time.<sup>4</sup>

Despite the obvious importance of *Tabihikitsuke* to this study, the diary does not stand alone. Of particular significance are records kept by the Kujō family, which provide both context and corroboration to what Masamoto wrote. Included are an extensive collection of letters sent and received, tax documents, shogunal decrees, and other materials that confirm, expand upon, and add depth to what appears in *Tabihikitsuke*. These are numerous both for the years that Masamoto was in residence as well as for earlier centuries and decades, the latter providing an important basis for understanding the estate's economic and political background. Considered along with *Tabihikitsuke*, the extant sources provide one of the country's richest collections for a region during the middle decades of the *sengoku* era.<sup>5</sup>

Having been kept within Kujō family archives until after World War II (and generally unknown outside the family), *Tabihikitsuke* was a late addition to medieval Japanese historiography. The appearance of the first printed edition in 1961 opened the door to scholarship, which continues to this day. A few studies have dealt broadly with the diary, but the majority, appearing as articles and book chapters, have centered on narrower issues, common to the particular and accumulative approach of much Japanese scholarship. Among the many themes that have been addressed during the past sixty years are the following: village self-rule; the workings and meanings of community; religion and society; the late *shōen* system; direct rule by proprietors; the daily life of peasants; regional commerce; local culture; farming practices; famine; conflict and warfare. Much early scholarship was straightforward and not particularly critical, and the challenges of reading and analyzing the diary meant that more than a few early interpretations have been dismissed or overturned.

The most significant interpretations that emerged from analysis of *Tabihikitsuke* were the following. One, Katsumata Shizuo's argument that the villages of Hineno and Iriyamada reflected the full workings of "receipt by villagers" (*jigeuke*), whereby villages contracted with their proprietors to collect and pay the annual tax based on an unchanging, mutually determined, rate. As is generally accepted, this (and a number of related developments) were critical to the establishment of the independent late medieval village, and according to Katsumata, the villages of Hine Estate were prototypical.<sup>6</sup> Two, a number of scholars examined Masamoto's efforts at direct rule of the estate, discussing the strengths and weaknesses of that. The general conclusion was that he failed, both to collect the taxes he desired and ultimately to maintain control of the estate.<sup>7</sup> In many ways, this interpretation admitted the inevitability of warrior dominance and did little to question the trajectory of the period. Three, Fujiki Hisashi and others contended that

*Tabihikitsuke* revealed the important place of community and village leagues in rural people's efforts to protect themselves and maintain independence.<sup>8</sup>

In the last two decades, new work of importance has taken several forms. The first is characterized by rigorous and innovative analysis of *Tabihikitsuke*. For example, Yata Toshifumi has stressed the importance of regional politics and economics, and the need to understand developments in Izumi in light of these larger "controlling factors." Taken in isolation, through the lens of *Tabihikitsuke* alone and without drawing on regional developments seen in other sources, our understanding is limited, he argues.<sup>9</sup> Following a very different approach is Sakai Kimi, whose work on medieval communications puts language—in particular, Masamoto's use of it—to the fore, revealing much about Masamoto's views of himself, Hine Estate villagers, and regional power holders such as the *shugo*. Among other things, she argues that Masamoto's language provides evidence of the strong ties that bound him to the villagers of the estate.<sup>10</sup>

A second form of new scholarship has looked beyond *Tabihikitsuke* to examine individuals, groups, and institutions in Izumi, usually over a longer time period than the few years represented in the diary. Much good work has been done, for example, on Negoroji as a regional power holder, the unique workings of the Izumi *shugo* system, the history of estate deputies (*daikan*) on Hine Estate, and the lives and activities of Kujō family house officials and retainers. Hirota Kōji's excellent scholarship is representative of this work.<sup>11</sup>

A third type of scholarship has critically examined the text of *Tabihikitsuke* with increased rigor, whether focused upon the original hand-written manuscript or upon particular practices or incidents portrayed in the diary. Shiga Setsuko's scholarship, which is representative of this approach, has forced scholars to reconsider, for example, Katsumata Shizuo's argument about the extent of *jigeuke* (tax receipt by villagers) in Hineno and Iriyamada. The system, Shiga reveals, was not nearly so straightforward as Katsumata contended.<sup>12</sup> The platform for Shiga's article is *Shibin*, a minor journal of particular significance for *Tabihikitsuke* and Hine Estate studies over the past two decades (which I reference frequently in my notes). Articles published in *Shibin* are narrowly focused and critical, presenting a level of analysis of the diary—whether of linguistic usages, patterns of behavior, the timing and development of particular incidents, or complementary sources—that far exceeds that of early scholarship.<sup>13</sup>

*Tabihikitsuke* has received little attention in English-language scholarship. The most extensive work appears in a 1978 Columbia University dissertation of Carole Ann Ryavec. There the author uses it as one source in an effort to claim that shifts in *sengoku* power and authority evolved within

existing government systems rather than outside them. The evidence, she claims, is seen in the increased authority that many *shugo*, as appointees of the shogunate, attained during *sengoku*. The broader argument has its merits (problematic though it is in many respects), but her claims about the Izumi *shugo* are sharply at odds with the evidence presented in *Tabihikitsuke*. The work is marred as well by numerous misreadings of the diary.<sup>14</sup>

A second study in English in which *Tabihikitsuke* is discussed is William Wayne Farris's *Japan's Medieval Population*. Farris uses the diary in one section to bolster his claims of the roadblocks to demographic growth during *sengoku*, while in a second section he presents evidence from it to reveal that positive signs, and the likelihood of population growth, did exist. As in Ryavec's study, misreadings plague the argument, distorting the diary and making the case for demographic decline greater than what is presented.<sup>15</sup>

Far narrower in scope is Hirota Kōji's recent contribution to *Land, Power, and the Sacred*, which examines the physical structures—landscapes, geography, and village layout—of Hine Estate, based on archeological work. It is particularly valuable for someone familiar with the estate's history, as the names and places can be matched, for example, with incidents or people in Kujō Masamoto's diary. Hirota also provides a detailed chronology of the estate from the early thirteenth to late sixteenth centuries.<sup>16</sup>

More important, and in many respects more relevant, than either Ryavec's or Farris's work that directly discuss *Tabihikitsuke* (and much broader than Hirota's) are studies of independent villages of the late medieval era by Hitomi Tonomura, Kristina Kade Troost, and, in German, Markus Rüttermann. Tonomura's monograph from 1992 draws on the rich document collection produced by villagers in Tokuchin-ho, Ōmi Province, as she examines the workings of local communities, corporate groups that practiced collective ownership and administration. Critical to the workings of these groups was the shrine association, made up of most adult males, and believed to be an organization common to many independent villages at the time.<sup>17</sup>

Suganoura was another independent village in Ōmi Province and the focus of Markus Rüttermann's study (1996). Rüttermann takes a comprehensive approach, carefully examining the villages' origins, economy, tax obligations, and conflicts with local and regional neighbors and warriors, in addition to community. He puts particular emphasis on the critical examination of village documents—which, like those of Tokuchin-hō, were produced over several centuries. He concludes that the central region of Japan during this late medieval period was a time of growing social and cultural complexity.<sup>18</sup>

Troost's study, a Harvard dissertation from 1990, nicely complements

Tonomura's and Rüttermann's by taking a broader approach, both in providing background to demographic and economic shifts that were critical to the emergence of independent villages, and in examining the workings of five late medieval villages in the central region. In contrast to work produced in Japanese, both Tonomura and Troost stress the generally positive, and productive, relationships between proprietors and villagers in the shift that occurred in independent villages of central Japan.<sup>19</sup>

I undertook research on *Tabihikitsuke* with the intention of producing a study of village life, of commoners and the community that shaped them. My initial acquaintance with the diary suggested that it was a work to be scrutinized, rich enough to demand careful reading and interpretation. I have not been disappointed. However, I was not far into my research before I realized that the world being depicted was broader than the two villages that made up Hine Estate and more socially diverse than defined by the term villagers. To concentrate solely on them would leave out much of the picture. It would mean cutting out people and institutions that were integral to local society, in all its aspects. Accordingly, though this is very much a study of commoners, it is also much more than that. It is a regional study, with a distinct center at the two villages of Hineno and Iriyamada, and a less well-defined perimeter, occasionally brought into focus in the words and actions of the Izumi military governors and Negoroji monks, among others. Furthermore, the picture includes those both within and beyond the village communities, from monks and warriors to temporary intruders, foremost of whom were Kujō Masamoto and his men. This is the world depicted in *Tabihikitsuke*, given life both in what its author described and in what he recorded from the writings of others. What emerges is a notably full picture of life in one Japanese province in the middle of the *sengoku* era.

I have been fortunate to draw upon the excellent work of Japanese scholars in producing this book and owe a heavy debt to them. At the same time, I enjoy one advantage over them: I work within a historiographic tradition that gives as much weight to the monograph as to the scholarly article. In Japan, serious scholarship takes the shape of the *ronbun*, which is, with few exceptions, a narrowly argued scholarly paper. As evidence of this, one need look no further than the historiography of *Tabihikitsuke*. Since the publication of the diary in 1961, it has been the focus of just one scholarly monograph, *Sengoku no mura no hibi*, by Suitō Makoto, published in 1999.<sup>20</sup> The book is well regarded for two significant contributions it makes to the narrower historiography, but otherwise lacks depth, and fails to recognize several critical scholarly reinterpretations of the diary. I am convinced that the

best way to explicate *Tabihikitsuke* is to consider it and its world broadly, examining both the narrower themes within it and the connections between those themes.

Given my discussion of historiography above, it should be clear that I do not intend to present one primary thesis, contending, for example, that *Tabihikitsuke* is a reflection of village economic progress, the strength of community, the inevitability of warrior success, or a similarly inclusive claim. Instead my arguments will be numerous, some more definitive and emphatic than others, but they will not come together tightly in a single claim—the ground Masamoto covered in his brief time in Izumi was far too broad for that. Here are the major themes of the book, suggestive of the paths and arguments that will follow: 1. Economic disruption and vitality; 2. struggle; 3. constrained conflict; 4. continuities: in government and society; 5. community: its strengths and limitations; 6. class: social and economic; 7. religion: pervasive, influential, defining.

Taken together, these point to two larger arguments: first, that at the turn of the sixteenth century, Izumi was closer to 1450 (and probably 1400) than to 1550 in terms of politics and power (meaning that evidence of the Muromachi government's ultimate demise and the emergence of powerful warriors in a reshaped world was still distant), but in other respects (social, economic, communal, and religious) Izumi was more reflective of the later date and, in some respects, the initial decades of the early modern period.<sup>21</sup> And, second, that warfare during this historical era known by the name *sengoku* ("The Country at War") did not define life in Izumi Province at the time; more specifically, it did not define the lives of the villagers of Hine Estate. It was part but by no means all of their existence.

In analyzing *Tabihikitsuke* and the world it depicted, three terms, three concepts, are critical to bear in mind. These are time, place, and people. By time, I mean time period, specifically the several years at the turn of the sixteenth century covered in *Tabihikitsuke*. By place, I mean the two villages of Hineno and Iriyamada, not far distant from the capital on central Japan's east side, one on the plains, the other in the mountains. By people, I mean those living in Izumi (including temporary interlopers) who appear in *Tabihikitsuke* and are given voice and actions by Masamoto. The three are critical to bear in mind because they mattered; they provided the context for what Masamoto chronicled. And while *Tabihikitsuke* clearly has much to tell us about patterns of life and society during *sengoku*, broadly understood, it is important that we not forget the specific context, and the effects these three had in shaping what Masamoto depicted.

## First Encounters

As suggested by the simple title *Tabihikitsuke* (“Trip Record”), Masamoto’s diary is a self-contained document, distinct from other diaries he may have kept, and focused fully on matters in the province. The earliest entries, in which Masamoto related his decision to reside in the country, his departure and journey to Izumi, and his first days on the estate, provide a useful introduction both to the diary and to the subjects within it (brief though it is on Masamoto’s interactions with the villagers). The bulk of the entries that follow are full translations, with only the dates of the sexagenary cycle omitted. The few exceptions are noted. The diary begins with an undated entry:<sup>22</sup>

Regarding Hineno Estate in Izumi Province: last year from the time the province was embroiled in fighting, the military governors [Hosokawa Masahisa, Hosokawa Mototsune] lawlessly intruded in affairs. Though on several occasions petitions and arguments were submitted, no judgment was issued, so the matter remained unresolved. Last year, having finally received straight answers from the *shugo*—and with conditions [on the estate], if anything, only getting worse—I came up with a plan to travel to the estate myself. Last winter’s reply from the *shugo* was as follows.

Hosokawa Masahisa’s letter:

Regarding the matter of Kujō family land, his lordship kindly sent a letter, which I humbly acknowledge. Having received the particulars of his message, I offer a detailed response. I politely entrust to you the task of presenting my views on this and will be pleased if you do this. Respectfully.

[1500] 10/23 [From:] Masahisa  
[To:] Karahashi dono<sup>23</sup>

Shinomoto Motonobu’s letter: [Motonobu was a retainer of Masahisa]

I presented the letter from his lordship [Masamoto]. And he graciously sent a horse. This was kindly received, and in thanks [Masahisa] offers a horse in return. [Masamoto] wrote in particular about his family lands. [Masahisa] has given orders to put a stop throughout the region to this confiscation of properties, not

just of his lordship's. The situation is as follows: because the lower Izumi estates have chosen to conspire with Negoroji, that temple has repeatedly acted on this or that pretext where matters of this province are concerned. Its actions are outrageous. Nonetheless, as for Kujō family lands, we will respect his lordship's wishes now and in the future without change, as he desires. I entrust you to present this to him. Respectfully noted.

[1500] 10/22      [From:]      Motonobu  
    [To:]            Those of Karahashi dono's group

[remainder omitted]

Irrespective of their content (which I turn to shortly), these letters provide a window into Japan's late medieval communications and correspondence practices, which are well represented in *Tabihikitsuke*. As seen in the first letter, Hosokawa Masahisa did not respond directly to Masamoto but instead addressed his letter to one of the latter's officials (Karahashi Arikazu's son); moreover, the meat of Masahisa's reply was left to his retainer Shinomoto Motonobu to convey in the accompanying message. As described by João Rodriguez in his "Treatise on Epistolary Style" (*Tratado do estilo da escritura das cartas*), published in the first decade of the seventeenth century, Japanese letters were of two basic types at this time. The first, *jikisatsu*, were "direct letters," from one individual to another. The second, *hirōjō*, were "presented letters," in which correspondence was delivered indirectly, to a subordinate or intermediary, whose responsibility was to relay or "present" the message. The use of these two types was governed by the relative statuses of the correspondents, with *jikisatsu* being letters addressed to "equals, inferiors, or to people of a slightly superior rank," while *hirōjō* were the means for those of lower status to address their social superiors, since it was unacceptable to approach them directly.<sup>24</sup> This is what we see in the letters above, both of which include the request to present the message to Masamoto. In terms of the level of politeness within the letters themselves, as Rodriguez pointed out, this was based on the intermediary to whom the letter was addressed, not to the higher-up it was ultimately intended for.

Given Kujō Masamoto's highly elevated status, he received no *jikisatsu* while in Izumi. And though he was in a position to write *jikisatsu* to any and all parties, he rarely did so. To do so was, in a sense, to lower himself, so it was something he refrained from doing.<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, both he and the Izumi *shugo*, as heads of their respective groups, ostensibly left practical

matters—whether running the estate or debating its legal and proprietary status—to managers and officials. The result was that nearly all correspondence within *Tabihikitsuke* appears in the form of “presented letters,” carried out primarily by Masamoto’s top officials, on one hand, and deputy *shugo* and other officials from the military governors’ administration, when it was involved, on the other. The same pattern was followed with other parties, such as Negoroji.

Though there is no question that Masamoto directed the writing of letters sent by his officials, only occasionally did he make that explicit. Much more commonly he wrote “[We] sent a letter to . . .,” or “Nagamori wrote a letter. . . .” Several times during these four years, however, one of his men drafted and sent a letter apparently on his own, in support of estate policies, which Masamoto noted as “private” or “hidden.”<sup>26</sup>

Letters were of course not the only form of written communication that were produced and delivered. The protocol for these many types of documents was complex, shaped not just by the type of message but also by the status group (courtier, warrior, or commoner) involved. Though those complexities are not a primary concern here, a related issue is: the mere physical delivery of written documentation—be it a letter, a pronouncement, or a decree from a government source—did not complete the message’s conveyance. It was necessary as well that the sender provide an explanation or report by word of mouth as a supplement to the document. With limited literacy and few clerks of ability in the provinces, this was particularly important. Thus the common *origami* or “folded paper” letter form was inevitably accompanied by the deliverer’s spoken explanation; it was expected. In this manner, a written document and a verbal message were “delivered.” From this description, it follows that the bulk of the correspondence during the era, whether public or private, was mediated by attendants or messengers who were privy to the details, and in fact often provided explanations that were omitted in the letters or documents, which could be cryptic (as seen in preceding examples). Not only that, but since these messengers needed to be able to read and explain the contents of their material, their understanding of it was critical.<sup>27</sup>

As for the contents of the letters from Hosokawa Masahisa and his attendant, two points stand out. First, the military governors admitted no wrongdoing. Whatever actions they had taken were defensive, carried out in response to collaboration between the estates of southern Izumi (of which Hine Estate was a part) and Negoroji. Second, despite clearly including Hine Estate among the parties that colluded with Negoroji, the *shugo* refrained from direct criticism. Moreover, the tone of both letters is overwhelmingly

cordial, appropriate to two parties that had exchanged gifts of horses. And of course ultimately they professed their intentions of being accommodating to Masamoto. It appears they took this position without knowing that Masamoto intended to journey to Izumi—nothing suggests he had told them of that at this juncture. But there were other factors that influenced their decision to “respect his wishes.” One lay in the immediate historical context.

Members of the Hosokawa clan had filled the two posts of Izumi *shugo* since early in the fifteenth century, but Masahisa and Mototsune were very recent appointees. In fact, it appears that Mototsune had yet to arrive in the province late in 1500 when Kujō Masamoto sought answers to the military governors’ activities there. The region had been in particular upheaval since late 1495, when Hatakeyama Hisanobu, a claimant to the high government post of deputy shogun, had departed the capital with his army for Izumi, wreaking havoc along the way. He soon formed a base in neighboring Kawachi and Kii provinces, to the immediate east and south of Izumi. The two Izumi *shugo* at that time were Hosokawa Motoari and Hosokawa Mototsune (same pronunciation, different characters of his successor), both of whom had been in that position for more than a decade. For several years they sided with Hatakeyama Hisanobu, against Hosokawa Masamoto, though they returned their allegiance sometime before the turn of the century. Then in the autumn of 1500, Hatakeyama Hisanobu led his troops from Kii once more into Izumi. Accompanying them were several thousand Negoroji men. The two Izumi *shugo* resisted them in central Izumi at Kōno’odera, a Buddhist temple, but were badly outmanned. Three hundred of their men were killed in battle, and Motoari and Mototsune committed suicide, along with their close retainers. The head of the Muromachi regime, Hosokawa Masamoto, sent no reinforcements, perhaps as payback for their betrayal several years previous.<sup>28</sup>

The region was thus in considerable upheaval at the time Kujō Masamoto made plans to travel there. The two military governors had just been appointed, and though they were part of the larger Hosokawa clan, they were outsiders, new to the area. They knew of the “outrageous” actions of Negoroji that had contributed to the previous military governors’ deaths, but they came by their knowledge of the region secondhand. New to the province as they were, and confronting a region that had seen considerable upheaval in recent years, Hosokawa Masahisa and Mototsune no doubt had bigger concerns than the fate of a single estate in southern Izumi. To inform Masamoto that they had no interest in acknowledging his claims seemed pointless and unseemly, particularly since he was the birth father of the dep-

uty shogun's son. And so they promised to “respect his wishes,” something it appears they came to regret.

Concluding the undated entry that begins *Tabihikitsuke* is the following letter, this from deputy shogun Hosokawa Masamoto's representative, Yasutomi Motoie. Written just days before Kujō Masamoto departed the capital, the letter is evidence of the strong verbal support the de facto head of the Muromachi regime was willing to offer his shirttail relative. Whether this would translate into physical action was another question. But his backing was significant, and Masamoto was glad to have it. Now his “journey to the countryside” had the blessings of the authorities, from both the center and the locale.

Regarding Kujō dono's holdings of Hineno and Iriyamada, we are shocked to learn that they are still being encroached upon without cease. These villages are not to be mixed in with other lands. Put bluntly [by the deputy shogun], because there is no evidence of misbehavior on this side, behavior of the sort seen here is indeed improper. About this matter, Kujō dono himself will be traveling to the estate. It would be deplorable if this situation were to continue. But if you halt the interference immediately as a result of these orders, we will be pleased. Were this rude treatment to continue when his lordship arrives at the estate, what would we make of it? Thus, I urge this from the depths of my heart.

Respectfully.

3/22            [From:]    Motoie  
                     [To:]        Saitō Katsuzane

[remainder omitted]

The Saitō to whom this was addressed was a deputy *shugo* of Hosokawa Masahisa. Masamoto noted that copies of this letter were sent to close attendants of Masahisa and his counterpart, Mototsune.

Late in the third month of 1501, Masamoto departed.

[1501] 3/28, The heavens were bright and clear. At the crowing of the cock, I took a cold bath, then went to Shingūsha—this in preparation for traveling to Izumi. At the shrine head, I offered prayers. After returning home, I gave orders that we prepare to leave, and before daybreak we departed the gate (Because the 21st was an auspicious day, \_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_ [illegible]). Shirakawa Tomihide, Shinanokōji

Nagamori, and Ishii Aritoshi were on horseback. Palanquin bearers numbered over ten. All public matters will be addressed by the Minister of the Right [Masamoto's son, Hisatsune]. After all, it is not uncommon, either anciently or more recently, for one like me to reside on family lands in his old age. Since we were taking the Kawachi Road, we were to pass checkpoints and crossings controlled by officials along the “seventeen places.” Accordingly, we informed Akazawa Tomotsune [a general under Hosokawa Masamoto] of this, and completed our crossing. We lodged this night at Sumiyoshi, and I recited the following poem before the shrine:

手にむすぶ泉の水をにこすなよその名もことにすみよしの神

Te ni musubu	Please don't muddy
Izumi no mizu o	the waters of Izumi
nigosu na yo	I scoop up in my hands,
sono na mo koto ni	especially since your name,
Sumiyoshi no kami	God of Sumiyoshi, is clarity.

In this entry Masamoto provided an idea of the number of men who accompanied him (though he made no mention of women, of whom there was at least one—a consort who bore him a daughter in 1503). Shirakawa Tomihide, Shinanokōji Nagamori, and Ishii Aritoshi, as Kujō family house officials, he noted by name; the rest he grouped together as “palanquin bearers.” Numbering perhaps fifteen, the men who joined him in Izumi were of middling status, and lower. The three retainers were his *bugyō*, his top officials or commissioners (though Shirakawa left within a month). They were joined by Aoki Tosa Nyūdō, who was already in residence, and a few months later by Takehara Sadao. These were the figures who carried out policy on the estate, men with whom Masamoto met regularly. It may be a stretch to say that he was a friend to any of them—his difference in status from theirs probably precluded that—but he sought their opinion on most issues and acknowledged his reliance on them, both to manage affairs and provide him companionship.<sup>29</sup> His close association with these men on matters beyond daily administration of the estate is well revealed in an incident he described in autumn 1501:

[Ishii] Aritoshi desired to send a fan to a dear one (*ōgi o hito no kata e* 扇を人の方へ), but since it was not the appropriate season, he sought my help in preparing a poem to send along with it. So in his place I composed the following:

おもひすてぬ心とハ見よ手にふれしそのおり過る扇なれとも

Omoisutenu	Look upon my heart
kokoro towa miyo	that I cannot divide in thought from you.
te ni fureshi	Here is a fan
sono ori sugiru	that I have held,
ōgi naretomo	though it represents a time now past. <sup>30</sup>

Though he described the low-level attendants as “palanquin bearers” in this early entry, they soon came to be identified by name in *Tabibikitsuke*, and the roles they played as messengers, enforcers of policies, and armed defenders of the estate (in support of villagers) were significant. One among this group was Ohara Kamonnosuke, the individual who carried out the murder of Karahashi Arikazu, according to Sanjōnishi Sanetaka.<sup>31</sup>

The following day’s entry:

3/29, Clear. We left lodgings at Sumiyoshi early and arrived in Sakai. Concerning my decision to reside on the estate, I stopped the palanquin at the headquarters of the two *shugo* (since last year, from the time of upheaval in the province, both have resided in Sakai), but was told that all were sick. The aide to the upper *shugo* is Nakazawa Shigesada; the aide to the lower is Nishimura Michimune. Each responded politely to my queries. [Nishimura stated that] the lower *shugo*, Hosokawa Masahisa, thought it a fine thing for me to come [to the province], and that my present visit was particularly gracious. He noted that although the *shugo* should see me in person, for the past four or five days they have been terribly sick, making it impossible. By all means, during this period while I reside on the estate, they will call on me—such was their polite response.

At the lesser hour of the monkey [5:00 p.m.] we arrived at Muhenkōin [in Hineno village]. Widely dispersed in recent days, the division heads [*bantō*] and cultivators [*hyakushō*] gathered here to welcome me. It was considerate of them.

Despite the upheaval that marked the age, in Masamoto’s eyes the Muro-machi shogunate continued to represent the legal authority of the land. Accordingly, he considered it only proper that he, as the proprietor of a local estate, announce his arrival to the province’s military governors. Their sickness elicited no comment from Masamoto at this time, but one cannot

help but wonder if it was feigned, a ploy to avoid Masamoto. If that were the case, which seems likely, what does this suggest about the *shugo* and the way they viewed their positions of authority and power? Did they avoid Masamoto knowing that their relationship with him in coming days was likely to be marked by tension and conflict? And was this evidence that they lacked confidence? Their refusal, after all, seems like a cowardly act.

As seen in this entry, Masamoto typically wrote of the two military governors as the “upper *shugo*” and “lower *shugo*.” Many historians have assumed this meant the former governed the northern half of Izumi and the latter the southern half and have referred to them accordingly.<sup>32</sup> Under the dual *shugo* system that the Muromachi regime implemented throughout the archipelago, administrative duties in a province were typically divided along counties, resulting frequently in a split more or less east to west or north to south; thus historians assumed the same approach was followed in Izumi. But Izumi was different. The shogunate treated it as a single unit and the two *shugo* ruled it jointly. When they issued public instructions or provided affirmations of land holdings, they did so in tandem. As argued by Imatani Akira, the reason lay in Sakai, a critical port and commercial center. It was simply too important a city for the Muromachi government to place in the hands of one individual. And so the whole of the province was put under two men, who resided side by side in Sakai, making joint decisions about its governance and the province of which it was a part.<sup>33</sup>

Nothing suggests that Hine Estate’s position was made more difficult, or Kujō Masamoto’s efforts rendered less effective, because of joint rule by the Izumi *shugo*. Had the military governors been at odds with one another, Masamoto may have actually experienced less resistance from Sakai, but the fact is that the two men presented a decidedly united front. The first sign of it appears in the *Tabihikitsuke* entry quoted above, when both men claimed to be too sick to meet with Masamoto. It was a pattern that continued unchanged as the months passed. Masamoto’s assessment of them a few months after this would be just as fitting three years later: “The stories of the upper and lower [*shugo*] are the same—prepared beforehand in tandem, are they not? They match down to the last word.”<sup>34</sup> Perhaps for this reason, Masamoto often wrote in his diary of “the *shugo*” without specifying which of the military governors he meant, just as villagers sent word of the intrusions of “provincial forces,” not the retainers of one *shugo* or the other.

Though a casual reading of *Tabihikitsuke* might lead one to think that the Izumi military governors made regular physical appearances throughout the province, leading armies and intruding in local affairs, that is an illusion;

in nearly all cases, the references are to their representatives or retainers, as careful reading reveals. In any event, what we actually learn from *Tabihikitsuke* about Hosokawa Mototsune and Hosokawa Masahisa—the two Izumi *shugo*—is almost nothing. They appear only as presented in word and deed by their retainers: bereft of personality, characterless, and indistinguishable from each other. Not surprisingly, in the years ahead neither *shugo* made the journey to Hine Estate to call on Masamoto, despite their promise to do so.

Traveling on to Hineno, Masamoto's contingent was welcomed there much more warmly than in Sakai. As he noted, the villagers came from here and there to greet him, something he much appreciated. The two groups he specifically mentioned were *bantō* and *hyakushō*. The former, which I leave untranslated, referred to heads of village sections or divisions known as *ban*. They were inevitably well-to-do and influential members of the villages, and often filled important village duties simultaneously with their estate duties (primary of which was ensuring that taxes were gathered on time), but as *bantō* they were appointed by the estate proprietor and could be dismissed by him at will. Estate *bantō* numbered three in Hineno East Side, seven in Hineno West Side, and six in Iriyamada. *Hyakushō*, which I translate as cultivators, were generally recognized by historians to consist of stable, tax-paying households, most of whom were farmers, but the group was not exclusive to them. They were the core of the village. Letters from the villages to Masamoto were often drafted and signed "*bantō*, cultivator group."

One other village social group that appears frequently in *Tabihikitsuke* were the "young men" (*wakashu*), whom we will encounter primarily as military defenders of the villages, though they no doubt also provided labor for irrigation works and other infrastructure needs. Beneath these three groups was an underclass which held little or no land, worked for others as tenant farmers, and suffered the most when drought or pestilence struck. Masamoto wrote little about them. In fact, they go unmentioned as a group, but their existence was undeniable. They appear in *Tabihikitsuke* primarily at times of crisis, for example, as bracken thieves during a season of drought, beaten down by hunger and existing on the economic margins.

The next day Masamoto was introduced to the estate:

3/30, Clear. This estate's West Side and East Side *bantō* and cultivators brought [as gifts] barrels of *sake* and other items. I said it was very commendable. But [I learned that] West Side *bantō* and others had recently conspired with the *shugo*'s men, a serious transgression. Nonetheless, Toshimichi's deputy, Aoki Nyūdō, recently gave his

opinion that the two commissioners [Ishii Aritoshi and Shinanokōji Nagamori] should meet with them and then send them on their way, so that is what they planned to do, I was told. I said that since I was ignorant of such matters, the issue should be entrusted to Aoki's judgment.

In other matters, nuns from Rengeji came quietly to offer their respects. Nagamori met with them.

Today was the last day of the month. I composed this verse:

われもたつ都をよその旅衣春の行末はいつくなるらむ

Ware mo tatsu	I, too, have departed
miyako o yoso no	the capital,
tabigoromo	clothed in my travel wear.
haru no yukue wa	Where, I wonder,
izuku naru ramu	is the spring now?

Though the village leadership's welcome was a warm one, news that West Side *bantō* had been in collusion with the *shugo*'s representatives was disconcerting. It was a matter Masamoto would be forced to address in the days ahead. On this occasion, he followed the advice of Aoki Tosa Nyūdō, deputy to Tominokōji Toshimichi, the associate of Masamoto who two decades previous had received a land grant of half of Hineno and half of Iriyamada. The two men remained on close terms, and though Toshimichi stayed in the capital during this time, he sent men with Masamoto to assist him, and the two corresponded regularly in the four years that followed. In time, Toshimichi delegated most responsibilities on his land to Masamoto and his men. As we shall see, Masamoto considered all of Hine Estate to be Kujō land and worked to strengthen control over its entirety.<sup>35</sup>

In the poem that concludes this entry, Masamoto wondered if he, like the spring whose whereabouts were shortly to be unknown (4/1 marked the beginning of summer), would find himself likewise departed and unsure of where he stood. Just as in his earlier poem when he asked the deity Sumiyoshi to "not muddy the water of Izumi," here too Masamoto expressed his insecurity in verse. Given his lack of practical experience and unfamiliarity with local affairs, Masamoto's misgivings were understandable. Jottings within the front and back covers of the first volume of his diary reveal both his ignorance of such matters and his determination to overcome that. Among his notes are the following: two lists of measures, one of volume ("10 *satsu* equal

1 *shaku*; 10 *shaku* equal 1 *gō*; 10 *gō* equal 1 *shō*; 10 *shō* equal 1 *tō*; 10 *tō* equal 1 *koku*”—with amounts from less than a spoonful to 180 liters), and a second of lengths and area, with the essential information of the size of the *tan*, a unit used for taxation; a handful of regional place names, written in Chinese characters with phonetic glosses (all of which were uncommon, irregular readings for those characters); the names of prominent shrines within the estate; the names of the six *bantō* serving in Iriyamada.<sup>36</sup>

In his diary entry of 4/1, to paraphrase, Masamoto noted the visits of local officials and priests from Ōizeki Shrine, recorded his decision to move his headquarters and residence from Muhenkōin in Hineno to Chōfukuji, a temple in Ōgi hamlet, Iriyamada village, which he undertook “for reasons of safety”; and mentioned that he gave instructions for several building projects, probably involving the expansion of Chōfukuji.

If his first two full days on the estate had presented Masamoto with worrisome news—that of Hineno West Side’s links to the *shugo*, and the realization that he was unlikely to be safe if he made his residence in Hineno—the next three day’s events were surely more disconcerting.

4/2, Clear. Since the first month of this year, the lower *shugo*’s retainer Satake has held captive an Iriyamada cultivator in Sakai. What, I wonder, are the circumstances? Accordingly, today I sent the two commissioners, Nagamori and Aritoshi, to inquire about the matter. I sent Aoki Nyūdō along as a guide to the province. Also, I had Aoki convey the “horse equivalent” gifts I promised on 3/29.

4/3, Clear. A report came from Sakai. [My men] were told that the two deputy *shugo* were away, as was Satake. Nonetheless, they will present the petition and then return. Therefore, they asked that funds be sent immediately to support them during their stay in Sakai, I was told. [remainder omitted]

4/4, Clear. The two messengers [Aritoshi and Nagamori] returned from Sakai. They said they presented the “horse equivalent” gifts to the two *shugo*, but neither accepted them. What rude treatment! If during the time that I reside here on this estate, those individuals refuse, as the military governors, to accept polite offerings, what will be the result? This is wholly unexpected, beyond comprehension. Also, regarding the abducted cultivator, Satake is a house retainer (*fudai hikan* 普代被官) (sic) [of the *shugo*].<sup>37</sup> [remainder omitted].

The bad news continued unabated. Not only was a retainer of one *shugo* holding captive a villager from the Kujō estate—probably as a means to extort tax payments or other concessions—but both *shugo* refused to accept Masamoto's gifts, part of the social protocol that governed civil relations. As Masamoto suggested, such a refusal fell little short of open conflict. Dealings with the *shugo*, whose support he naively thought he had attained prior to traveling to Izumi, were clearly to be fraught with tension. Worrisome as well was the information that Satake, the fellow who had seized an Iriyamada cultivator, was a house retainer of Hosokawa Masahisa. In other words, he was not merely a local elite or strongman who had recently formed ties with Masahisa when the latter arrived in the province, but had served Masahisa for a lengthy time, meaning he may have acted under Masahisa's orders.

Much of the following two days' *Tabihikitsuke* entries deal with continuing disputes and correspondence with the *shugo*, but in the concluding section of 4/6, Masamoto offered an early, if partial, view of his expectations for estate management.

As a means to curtail lawlessness, we posted the following regulations at the Hineno administrative office and the rear seating area of this temple [Chōfukujū].

#### Edict Board

Item: Concerning the villagers, his lordship's honorable retainers [*gohikannin*] are not to deal with them as they please, making inappropriate demands of them.

Item: In cases of robbery involving more than three coins, even if the culprit is one of his lordship's retainers, if the crime is plainly observed, the thief can be cut down on the spot, without need to present evidence [to the authorities].

Item: Among his lordship's retainers, none are to violate the women or female servants of the village elite or cultivators.

The preceding articles are hereby decreed

Bunki 1/4/ Ishii Aritoshi  
Shinanokōji Nagamori  
Tominokōji Toshimichi<sup>38</sup>

With this, Masamoto publicly declared his determination to rule the estate justly and to proscribe, as necessary, the actions of his men. In short, it was a symbol of good will and good intentions on his part, one means of gaining the villagers' trust. As we shall see in the pages ahead, Masamoto could be severe and unbending, but he could also be understanding and merciful, and he firmly believed that his family, the Kujō, and the peasants of the estate were bound together over generations. As he told them on several occasions, he expected them to be loyal to him, and they in turn had hopes that they could remain the family's "honorable cultivators."<sup>39</sup>

If his first few days in Izumi were any indication, Masamoto's stay in the province was bound to be difficult. We might wonder how he lasted four years. But he did, and during that time he actively managed the estate, setting policy, collecting taxes, negotiating with recalcitrant villagers, coordinating armed resistance against outside forces, and dealing with a range of crises of both natural and human origin. It seems unlikely that this is what Masamoto anticipated when he noted prior to departure that it was "not uncommon . . . for someone like me to reside on family lands in his old age." In any event, there is little question that Masamoto intended to personally manage Hine Estate.

At the same time, because of the social protocols and restrictions that accompanied his lofty status, Masamoto remained largely behind the scenes, hidden from view at his Chōfukuji residence and relying on his men to carry out policies and relay information to him. The fact is that few residents of the estate, and indeed the larger region, actually met Masamoto. And it appears that few would have had a chance to see him, except from a distance, because there is only one record of him leaving the temple compound (and surrounding grounds) where he resided—this when he fled to the mountain fastness of Shippōryūji in the midst of a rebellion against the provincial governors in the autumn of 1502.<sup>40</sup> No warriors or villagers were invited into his presence, nor were any monks from Negoroji. The select few were limited to members of Masamoto's accompanying contingent and local clerics of note. Added to this handful was one consort, a baby born to her and Masamoto in the spring of 1503, and probably a wet nurse for the infant.<sup>41</sup> The circle of individuals around Masamoto was tight, numbering perhaps twenty in all. As Hirota Kōji notes, Masamoto conducted "direct estate rule from the shadows."<sup>42</sup>

Not surprisingly, this appears to have been both recognized and accepted by the villagers of Hineno and Iriyamada, well aware as they no doubt were of the social distinctions in their society. And so although Masamoto was

largely out of sight, cloistered away in his residence most of the time, they recognized the immediacy of his presence. Accordingly, they directed conversations and correspondence to him (even if addressed on the surface to his retainers), called on him to offer their respects (if from a distance and behind walls), and carried out theatrical performances for him to see. This was the world in which he and they would interact over the next four years.



PART I

## Hine Estate at the Center



## Place

In the Introduction, I laid out the human context to the political and social world of Izumi upon Kujō Masamoto's arrival there in the spring of 1501. Here, I briefly describe the physical context—geographic and agricultural, in particular. In many respects, this was a new world for Kujō Masamoto. There is no evidence that he had ever visited Hine Estate prior to taking up residence there, and the same was probably true for most of his men. They soon learned what the local inhabitants knew: that the physical context had a profound impact upon the two villages.

### Geography


Kujō Masamoto's destination, Izumi Province, was neither remote nor backward in 1500, nor had it been for much of the millennium previous. It was one of the five Home Provinces, with highly developed lands, well traveled roads, and easy access to the capital and many major temples and shrines. As one of Japan's more urbanized provinces, it was home to the major transshipment port of Sakai at its northern end; Ōtsu, a much smaller port half-way between Sakai and Hine Estate; and the market town of Sano, bordering Hinenō village to the northwest.<sup>1</sup>

Despite the proximity of these urban centers, day-to-day life for most villagers in Izumi was profoundly local and rural, and in that sense similar to life elsewhere on the archipelago. But for temporary Izumi residents, like Kujō Masamoto and his men, or for those with tenuous ties to specific localities, like the Hosokawa military governors in Sakai, the proximity of



Map 1. Japan, Izumi Province. Map created by Lee Butler.

the capital mattered a good deal. Less than 100 kilometers from Hine Estate, Kyoto could be reached in two days travel, and couriers regularly journeyed between Kujō family headquarters in south Kyoto and Masamoto's residence on Hine Estate. Most of Masamoto's close attendants made at least one trip to the capital during their four-year residence in Izumi. And the capital was close enough that Masamoto could ask messengers to bring items such as mosquito nets on their return to Izumi, or he could dismiss attendants or laborers who he became displeased with and send them back to Kyoto, replaced by others or merely dispensed with.<sup>2</sup> Nonetheless there were significant transportation costs involved, something that limited the number and frequency of these trips. Masamoto himself only traveled back to Kyoto once, at the end of his four-year stay.



Map 2. Izumi Province, 1501. Map created by Lee Butler.

More significant than these issues of proximity as convenience was that of proximity and power. Simply put, as headquarters of the Muromachi shogunate, Kyoto's nearness to Izumi Province had a profound influence on political and military developments there. Though its coercive strength and reach were limited, the shogunate in 1500 was still the dominant force in the Home Provinces; and local powers at the periphery of this region, like the two Izumi *shugo*, could not reject the shogunate's demands without risk of retribution. For Kujō Masamoto, who enjoyed personal ties to the deputy shogun, Hine Estate's proximity to Kyoto was one key to his activities there. In a more distant region, far from shogunal backing, Masamoto may have had little hope of directly administering a family estate.


Map 2, "Izumi Province, 1501" provides an outline of the primary region portrayed in Masamoto's diary. All locations noted appear by name in the diary. Distances in this region were slight. Sakai, the provincial headquar-

ters at the northern extreme, was only thirty kilometers from Hineno. To the south, and just over the border in Kii Province, was Negorōji, less than fifteen kilometers from Iriyamada. Though separated from the estate by a narrow range of modest but steep mountains, monks from the monastery could easily traverse the distance to Hine Estate in a day.

Of particular local significance were the differences in topography that separated estates and villages on the plains (such as Hineno) from those in the mountains (like Iriyamada). Map 3, a topographical rendering of the mountainous region encompassing the four hamlets of Iriyamada, reveals the steep terrain there. Iriyamada (入山田), the village of “paddies within the mountains,” consisted of a narrow valley extending from the foothills of Tsuchimaru hamlet just beyond Hineno through the hamlets of Ōgi and Shōbu to Funabuchi at the upper extent. Excepting the limited flat lands at the bottom of the valley, there were few sections in which agriculture could be practiced. The largest of the four hamlets, Tsuchimaru, covered less than three-quarters of a square kilometer and the smallest, Funabuchi, perhaps one-eighth that much. Increasing arable was not a possibility for the residents, though the mountains did provide other products (such as firewood, mushrooms, and tea) that could bring in income.<sup>3</sup>

Also important was the fact that the mountains offered security and protection that was denied villages on the plains. As we saw, Kujō Masamoto realized this just days after his arrival in Izumi, when he decided to make his home within the mountain valley of Iriyamada. Villagers on the plains likewise recognized Iriyamada as a safe haven, both for goods and persons. When villagers absconded in the face of threats or overwhelming demands for taxes, they invariably headed to higher ground. And when Hineno villagers feared attacks on property, they entrusted goods with Tsuchimaru or another upland village rather than risk loss by fire or looting. On one occasion, Masamoto even argued that villages that had sent goods to the safeholds of Iriyamada should help with expenses the mountain villagers had incurred during the ensuing turmoil.<sup>4</sup>

The natural defenses of the mountains surrounding Iriyamada made both Masamoto and the local villagers more inclined than their counterparts on the plains to resist attacks with force. Whereas Hineno villagers repeatedly stated that their only recourse was to flee in the face of pressure or attack, Iriyamada villagers readily took up arms. And Masamoto and his men backed them in this. The successes of the mountain hamlets in resisting attacks made the *shugo*'s forces hesitant to invade. Though they might occasionally enter and patrol the regions of Hineno, rarely did they attempt to do likewise in Iriyamada, as the villagers there, with but a brief forewarning, were able to wait in readiness for invaders.<sup>5</sup>



Map 3. Iriyamada Valley. Courtesy of Geospatial Information Authority of Japan.

Just as important as the local topography in distinguishing Iriyamada and Hineno was that of proximity to regional powers. For the simple reason that the West Side section of Hineno (separately administered, both internally and externally, from the East Side) was physically closer to the two *shugo* (and in particular their subordinates in the *shugo* outpost of Sano) than either Hineno East Side or Iriyamada, it was more susceptible to *shugo* pressure and intrusion. West Side villagers would periodically frustrate Masamoto by bending to *shugo* demands rather than follow his instructions.



Map 4a. Hineno Village, 1316. Courtesy of Imperial Household Agency of Japan.



As for Iriyamada, the regional power closest to it was Negoroji, whose influence was clearly greater upon it than upon Hineno.

For Hineno, extant maps from the medieval and early modern eras provide numerous details about its layout. The most important of these is Map 4a, which dates to 1316 (redrawn and modified with translations as Map 4b).<sup>6</sup> Though produced nearly two centuries prior to Masamoto's arrival in Izumi, this map reveals basic elements of the village that were common in 1500, including land use patterns and important temples and shrines (nine in number), the majority of which still existed at the later date. Foremost among the religious edifices were Muhenkōin and Ōizeki. The first was a Buddhist temple that had previously served as Hine Estate's headquarters, and from 1501–1504 functioned as the Hineno East Side administrative office. The second was the tutelary shrine of the estate and one of the “five grand shrines” of Izumi Province.<sup>7</sup>

Given that the 1316 map was prepared for the Kujō family by their officials as a means of assessing the estate's agricultural conditions, the emphasis on geography and land use is to be expected. With detailed information at hand, the Kujō would be able to make plans to raise production and increase arable. The existence of holding ponds in the hills to the north, bordering Kumatori, as well as several more centrally located to the south, is evidence of the considerable work that had already been put into the estate. The cross-hatched areas near the ponds, particularly on the north side, reveal the existence of “old paddies,” long cultivated. Other parcels include smaller sections of “public land” and “temple land,” besides the considerable portion of “rough fields” or unreclaimed land that was a principal object of the survey. By 1501, Hineno had been divided into two sections, as noted (East Side and West Side), and new residential areas had been developed (one that appears in *Tabihikitsuke* is Tsujibana, a hamlet at the western extreme, near Sano village). Population had clearly been growing. Moreover, all evidence suggests that by this time there were no “rough fields,” no unreclaimed lands, in Hineno or Iriyamada.

Of the maps noted, few give clear indications of boundaries between estates or between estates and villages. The 1316 map suggests that the road running along the south side of the estate separated Hineno village from Kaminogō village and Nagataki Estate, and that the Kumano Great Road was a boundary between Hineno and Ibara village to the west, but matters are less clear where hills or mountains are involved, as on the east and north sides. Map 2, my simplified rendering of Izumi Province, is even less precise, as estate names in particular are provided in a general region, with no effort to delineate boundaries. This imprecision is frustrating, but reflects both

historians' ignorance of where boundaries lay and, of more significance, the reality of the situation in 1500, when many boundaries were unwritten and unspecified, especially in open regions, community fields and woods, and mountains. In simplest terms, the main reason for the absence of clear boundaries was the lack of a need for them. With land more abundant than labor in Japan's ancient and early medieval eras, there was limited reason to contest one's neighbors over rights to property and resources in bordering regions. There were of course exceptions to this, especially in mountainous areas, but when even estates within the Home Provinces had unreclaimed land like that portrayed on the 1316 Hineno map, disputes were apt to be rare. In such situations, a proprietor's (and villagers') first efforts would naturally be toward bringing that land into cultivation. By the time Kujō Masamoto had arrived in Izumi there was no longer unreclaimed land in Hine Estate, and Iriyamada, with its limited arable and reliance on timber and other resources in the mountains, saw more frequent conflicts with neighbors over the boundaries dividing them.<sup>8</sup>

The maps of Iriyamada and Hineno offer visible proof of the two villages' differences based on location and topography. The image of a string of hamlets running down the narrow mountain valley of Iriyamada, surrounded by steep peaks, is very different from that of the broad expanse of Hineno, with copious rice fields, numerous holding ponds, and a large population of residents. The most conspicuous similarity between the two villages was the prominent place of temples and shrines, influential centers of each village. Yet despite being similar in type, the religious institutions did not tie the villages together, with the exception of Ōizeki, which served as the tutelary shrine for the whole estate. All other temples and shrines were distinct to each village, separate in structure and focus.

In light of the numerous differences between Iriyamada and Hineno, it is not surprising that many of their concerns differed. But two things forced them together. One was geographic: the simple fact that they were immediate neighbors, which meant that of necessity they dealt with one another. Like neighboring villages elsewhere at the time, they turned to each other for help when needed and occasionally confronted each other as disputes arose, but they had little choice except to maintain relations. The second factor that kept them together was artificial: their common status as members of Hine Estate. Accordingly, they faced many of the same issues in dealing with their overlord, the Kujō, and their overlord's enemies. Furthermore, outside powers realized that the two villages were linked and took this into consideration when dealing with them—usually to the villages' detriment.

## The Agricultural Background

Located in the central provinces as it was, Hine Estate was part of the “agriculturally advanced” region of Japan in the late medieval era. And indeed the term fits it nicely, though the path that led to that point for it and the rest of the region was long and difficult, strewn with impediments. The 1316 Hineno village map, with its depiction of a row of substantial holding ponds, on one hand, and the existence of large areas of unreclaimed land—comprising over one-third of the whole—on the other, is enlightening in this regard. Clearly, the work needed to reclaim the land, to clear it of trees and shrubs and roots and then form paddies or dry fields, and to dig canals and holding ponds for irrigation, required countless months of labor, spread over decades. By 1316, the process was well underway, but much remained to be done.

Several factors had contributed to the slow transformation of agriculture in Japan that eventually resulted in higher yields in the late medieval era. These included double cropping, the spread of iron tools, improved irrigation systems, and the introduction of new rice strains.<sup>9</sup>

Double cropping was the practice of growing two crops in succession on the same plot of land each year. The result was potentially twice the annual yield. Mention of the practice on the archipelago appears as early as the eleventh century, and by the thirteenth century it had spread broadly, though it was particularly common in dry fields. In the fifteenth century, double cropping became more sophisticated, and it was in this form that the villagers practiced it on Hine Estate.<sup>10</sup> The process there was as follows: late fourth month, transplanting of rice to the paddies; late ninth month, harvesting of rice; early tenth month, draining of paddies and planting of wheat (or barley); late fourth month, harvesting of wheat. At that point the cycle began again. In fact, however, there was greater variation, since Hine Estate villagers also planted rice of “early paddies” (*wasasada* 早田), making use of varieties (probably Champa) that were transplanted as early as the second month and harvested in the seventh. The variation this provided in terms of harvest period and peak labor requirements was an additional boon to the villagers.<sup>11</sup>

Double cropping offered potential benefits in productivity, biological diversity (protecting against crop failure of one type), and planting and harvesting variation, but implementing it was far from simple. To begin with, it was labor intensive. Though growing a second crop on a plot of land was no doubt easier than reclaiming forested terrain and preparing that for

agriculture, the labor required annually for double cropping was invariably twice that of a single crop. Besides being labor intensive, double cropping of rice and wheat as done in Hineno required irrigation systems that allowed paddies to be drained once the rice was harvested, and then filled again after the wheat was brought in. On top of that, intensive cultivation depleted the soil of nutrients at a correspondingly fast rate, if not faster, since fields were no longer left fallow even for a season (moreover, wheat and barley required more fertilizer than wet rice crops). Unless steps were taken to rectify that, a field's fertility would soon drop and the resulting crops would be poor. Thus the collection and application of fertilizers—green manures from leaves and other vegetation, animal excrement, and ashes—was another task that doubled in size.<sup>12</sup>

Double cropping also required increased speed at various stages of the process, particularly planting and harvest. If these tasks were not completed quickly, the cycle would be disrupted, with no hope of robust harvests. More laborers was one means of dealing with this. Another was better tools and technology, foremost of which was the increased use of iron cutting and digging tools. They allowed for faster and deeper cultivation of fields, more efficient harvesting, and greater speed in procuring green manures and improving irrigation. As iron tools became more readily available and less expensive, they were widely adopted. Of course, human muscles remained the primary force behind these tools, though some villagers were able to make use of animal power, a significant means of saving labor and raising productivity. Evidence of their use on Hineno West Side appears early in the tenth month of 1501. The main rice crop had recently been harvested and the villagers were beginning to prepare the fields, now drained, for planting wheat. However, as a result of a dispute with Masamoto over the annual tax, which they were withholding, the villagers absconded, departing for the nearby mountains. In order to protect the empty village from theft and vandalism, Masamoto sent men to patrol it, beginning on 9/26 and continuing for two weeks. They soon discovered that the villagers were returning during the day to plant wheat, something unacceptable according to the unwritten laws of absconding. On the first day that they encountered villagers at work, Masamoto's men chased them off the land; on the second, they took from them their hoes; and on the third, 10/6, they confiscated a "Chinese plow," an implement pulled by oxen.<sup>13</sup>

Several other references to draft animals in *Tabihikitsuke* suggest their prevalence on the estate and in surrounding villages. When word of an impending attack by provincial forces reached Iriyamada on 1501/9/5, the

villagers removed their personal property to safer locations. As described by Masamoto, the village was in an uproar, a result of “the constant going and coming of cattle and horses.”<sup>14</sup> Similarly, cattle and horses were among the goods that neighboring villages entrusted to Iriyamada during Izumi Province’s battle-scarred autumn of 1502. And finally, the plunder acquired by Negoroji forces following their attacks on Kaminogō, Yasumatsu, and other nearby villages in the seventh month of 1504 (and which they temporarily removed to Anrakuji on Hineno West Side), included two oxen.<sup>15</sup> Though keeping a horse or an ox was expensive—they consumed feed at costs several times what was needed to keep a man alive—their value in reclaiming land, plowing fields, moving material, and performing other work requiring sustained force was great. Not only did they free villagers for other tasks, but by completing work such as plowing in a fraction of the time it took human laborers, they could play a key role in villagers’ efforts to maintain the tight schedule of double cropping. While historians have generally downplayed the importance (and prevalence) of draft animals in villages of the era, in Hineno and Iriyamada these beasts of burden appear to have been a well-integrated component of the work force. Their use may have been limited to the paddies and fields of the largest landholders, or perhaps they were owned and used communally by those within the stable class of villagers, the *hyakushō*.

Fundamental to the adoption of practices outlined above and to the concomitant rise in agricultural productivity was population growth in the archipelago. Though economic change and progress was possible without that growth, it was unlikely. Too much held it back, beginning with the elite’s land management practices and tax policies, neither of which allowed or promoted the level of capital input and physical support of the peasants necessary to foster increased production. When change came, it originated mainly in the villages, with the peasants, and a primary factor in that appears to have been an expanding population. As described by William Wayne Farris, the ancient and early medieval eras were marked by a stagnant population, the result of unrelenting famine, disease, and warfare. Relief came at last late in the thirteenth century, followed by more than a century of population growth, which was solid but not spectacular, and probably uneven across the land.<sup>16</sup> With this, positive agricultural changes began to be implemented, particularly in villages like Hineno and Iriyamada, with well-developed lands and irrigation systems already in place, incomplete and imperfect though they might have been.

Finally, it is important to note that for villages like Hineno and Iriyamada, being “agriculturally advanced” was not without limitations. It guar-

anted neither a good year's harvest nor the protection of crops against drought or pests, let alone the demands of outside forces. Instead it meant that as a result of the considerable input of capital and labor in previous centuries and decades, and the on-going work and careful management of the land, high crop yields were an annual possibility, barring natural or man-made calamities.

## An Economic Scramble

わせとかれ日根野につく入山田

Early rice and ripe wheat—  
From Hineno it extends  
to Iriyamada Kujō Masamoto 1501/4/28

*Tabihikitsuke* is a diary that draws one into its world. On one hand, it chronicles the rhythms of daily life and seasonal festivals, as well as the cycle of planting and harvest that characterized farming villages; while on the other, it provides vivid depictions of numerous incidents: cases of theft and the workings of law that followed, battles with invading forces, heated debates over taxes and debt, and so on. Its pages are full of human actors, many with distinct characters, and most given a voice by Masamoto as he liberally quoted or paraphrased their words. Though in many ways the consummate courtier (never mind the murder of Karahashi Arikazu), Masamoto embraced life in rural Izumi, making it the center of his diary. References to happenings in the capital or in Nara show up very rarely and only about matters of particular significance, such as the appointment of Masamoto's son as chancellor or word of rebellion against the ruling Hosokawa house. Quite simply, from the perspective of *Tabihikitsuke*, little of importance occurred outside Izumi Province. And at the center of the province, and the center of the diary, was Hine Estate.

In one sense it is a distorted view, typical of the often singular perspective of diaries. Yet there is good reason to think that in many respects Masamoto was correct, that Hine Estate was at the center of this world, not an absolute center but a representative one. The reason lay in economics, and can be traced to two fundamental realities of the era: first, that at the turn of the sixteenth century, Japan's economy consisted of one primary set of producers,

the villagers; and second, a logical corollary, that those outside this group saw their routes to economic prosperity (and in some cases, power), running through the villages. In short, despite the small but real rumblings of a nascent commercial economy, the archipelago's wealth at this time lay in the villages to an overwhelming extent. This meant that to control the villages, or at least the wealth they produced, was the key to grasping economic and political power.<sup>1</sup>

This situation was a reflection of an economy that in many respects was still rudimentary, based in rural agriculture and other regional products, the bulk of which, though labor-intensive, required limited capital or labor input beyond initial production, whether in growing crops, catching fish, or turning timber into charcoal. Those who were able to tax the products and labors of the villages—whether as proprietors, provincial officials, or regional and local elite—enjoyed positions of influence. There was nothing new about this general pattern; it stretched back to ancient times. But with increasing productivity of the land, a growing population, and the breakdown of centralized rule, there were new pressures placed upon the villages and new opportunities to gather and extract wealth and exploit the producers. The villages were with good reason the focus of attention.<sup>2</sup>

In this sense, Masamoto's depiction of Hineno and Iriyamada at the center was accurate: the eyes of the regional powers were concentrated upon them, and competition for the products of their labors was intense. Of course, in this they were not unique. Neighboring villages likewise experienced economic growth and the tensions that came with that, as well as an increase in external pressures. They too were subject to the machinations of the Izumi *shugo* and Negoroji (among others). Some villages were no doubt less independent than Hineno and Iriyamada, being subject, for example, to the firm control of a resident warrior. However, in the central region of the country of which Izumi was a part, these were fewer in number than in distant areas like the Kantō. There were various reasons for this, but a primary one was the strength of elite proprietors, primarily the court nobility and prominent temples.<sup>3</sup> In addition, there is no question that regional powers were less interested in exercising direct control over a village (something relatively easy to achieve, but often difficult to maintain) than they were in acquiring its surplus income.

Of the themes that run through *Tabihikitsuke*, this one—of the economics of products and wealth and producers and overseers—is primary. It was this that brought Masamoto to Izumi and it was this that occupied his attention while there. Fortunately for us, he did not restrict his daily writing to economic matters; what he saw and what he found interesting in “this

mountain valley” and its neighbor on the plain, he recorded, thereby providing a broad view of life on the estate and in the region. But behind it all was an overriding concern with the economics of the estate, and accordingly it is this that occupies the principal place in the diary. Other themes come and go with the seasons or with the events of the day, but few weeks pass without reference to crops, taxes, estate expenses, debts, or outside claims for portions of the estate’s economic pie.

Several factors (besides the abundant historical sources) make Hine Estate a particularly compelling subject for understanding this economic world. One was the estate’s location, physically centered between Negoroji and the Izumi *shugo*’s headquarters in Sakai; another was the topographical disparity between Hineno and Iriyamada, revealing distinctive insights about each; a third was the presence of Masamoto as proprietor, something that brought an immediacy to the task of running the estate and negotiating terms, a very different process than what would have occurred had Masamoto been in the capital.

In this and the two chapters that follow, I analyze the economic world, broadly defined, of early sixteenth-century Izumi. The evidence is rich, described in detail by Masamoto in *Tabihikitsuke* and recorded in letters and accounting documents. Information is particularly abundant on matters at the forefront of Masamoto’s concerns: the health and outlook of the year’s crops; the collection of taxes and competition for those; and the place and effects of lending and debt. Insights on other issues, such as the villagers’ material culture, are less readily grasped, but can be teased out from the sources. In addition, the sources speak to the question of economic surplus and where that went. Evidence for this appears in bits and pieces, here and there, and incomplete though it is, reveals that the surplus produced on Hine Estate at the time was spread broadly, reflective of the intense struggles for it among the groups that held interests there. Finally, as will become apparent, the figures and facts of this local economy—in other words, the hard data in the sources—did not exist in a vacuum. They were created and shaped within the social and political context of the time, and many of the richest insights to this world are seen in the convergence of factors that met and contended in the economic sphere.

### **Proprietor and Peasants: Output and Taxes**

Within a century of the creation of the village map of 1316, the bulk of the reclamation work in Hineno—the clearing of native vegetation and form-

ing of paddies and dry fields—appears to have been completed. As seen in Kujō documents of the second decade of the 1420s, total arable (comprising what was later divided into East and West sides) equaled 53 *chō* 5 *tan* or approximately 130 acres. Of this amount, 19 *chō* were tax-free, primarily temple and shrine income property but also including “well and pond land.” And 4 *chō* were held by the Hineno, a non-farming family of local influence. The resulting taxed paddy was just under 30 *chō* or nearly 75 acres.<sup>4</sup> Eighty-five years later, when Masamoto was on the estate, Hineno East Side and West Side lands consisted of 21 *chō* each, 42 *chō* in all.<sup>5</sup> Village paddy and fields had shrunk. And the reason is not clear. But because Kujō records of estate acreage were comprehensive, inclusive for example of tax-free land and exceptional holdings such as that held by the Hineno family, it seems clear that the missing land had been lost to an outside power. At any rate, it was gone, no longer part of the arable available to Kujō taxation. In contrast, the acreage of the four hamlets of Iriyamada, much smaller in area than Hineno, remained largely as it was a century earlier, at just over 17 *chō* or approximately 42 acres.<sup>6</sup>

Despite the numerous accounting registers produced during the four years Masamoto resided in Izumi, no record exists of the total annual production of crops, whether in type, volume, or cash value, for any of the three village units or the estate as a whole. A simple way to approximate the rice output is to multiply the area of paddy by the yield. According to William Wayne Farris, in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, rice yield in Japan ranged from .5 *koku* (90 liters) per *tan* (991 square meters) in poor paddies to 1.9 *koku* (342 liters) per *tan* in superior paddies, though scholars have suggested that yields in the best paddies within the Kinai may have reached 2.6 *koku* per *tan*.<sup>7</sup> It is likely that Hine Estate lands, as a whole, were on the upper end of productivity, though the ratio of poor to middle to superior paddies on the estate can only be surmised, and questions remain as to whether Hineno lands were more productive than those of Iriyamada. Add to that the question of the size of measure used (the *koku* had been growing in volume over the centuries, though whether it had reached the Tokugawa standard by this time is unclear), and we are left with a good deal of guess work. Nonetheless, the figures provide an approximation. In terms of total productivity (tax-free land included), the 420 *tan* (42 *chō*) of Hineno and the 170 *tan* (17 *chō*) of Iriyamada provided an annual yield, calculated across paddy types assumed to be of varying quality at an average of 1.4 *koku* per *tan* (my arbitrary estimate), of 588 *koku* and 238 *koku*, respectively, for a total of 826 *koku*, or nearly 150,000 liters.

Besides being an approximation, easily adjusted up or down 10 or 20 per-

cent (or more), this sum of 826 *koku* only represented the rice harvest (with early rice, *wase*, potentially adding to the total). Other crops and products produced on the estate included wheat and barley, tea, mushrooms, and ash. The non-grain crops were particularly important to the residents of Iriyamada, with their limited acreage of flat land. As a rough estimate, perhaps one-quarter of estate income came from sources other than rice.

What, then, was Masamoto's cut of this bounty? According to many interpreters of *Tabihikitsuke* (especially the early ones), tax income acquired by Masamoto while in Izumi was slight. For example, writing in 1965, Sugiyama Hiroshi contended that revenue was limited to the spring and autumn acreage tax (*tansen*) in the two villages; other taxes, including the long-standing annual tax (*nengu*), simply were not levied or collected during these years.<sup>8</sup> And according to Carole Ann Ryavec, Masamoto collected but little tax income because the bulk of it ended up in the hands of the two *shugo*. Masamoto's inability to extract revenue was reflected, she maintained, in the fact that the first *tansen* payment was made in the sixth month of 1502, more than a year after his arrival.<sup>9</sup>

Despite this dismal, and mistaken, picture (which, if correct, meant Masamoto's four-year sojourn was an expensive, money-sapping endeavor), the possibility of obtaining sizable revenue from the estate is clear, as seen in records from earlier decades. A useful benchmark is a 1432 tax document, which is particularly valuable since it covers both Hineno and Iriyamada, and does so for the full year. Among extant records of the fifteenth century, it is the most thorough and comprehensive, allowing us to see both the types of taxes levied, as well as their value (with taxes on grains still being paid in kind). Moreover, it clearly depicts a year of good harvests, and is thus representative of the potential income available to the Kujō.<sup>10</sup> Here are the data.

Annual tax ( <i>nengu</i> )	86.4 <i>koku</i> , sold in the capital for 144 <i>kan</i> (after shipping costs of 14 <i>koku</i> )
Summer wheat tax	8 <i>koku</i> , or 14 <i>kan</i> 200 <i>mon</i>
Labor tax (in cash)	18 <i>kan</i>
Equinox tax	7 <i>kan</i> 800 <i>mon</i>
Total income: approximately	187 <i>kan</i>

Though references to taxes in *Tabihikitsuke* are ubiquitous, and extant accounting documents from the turn of the century are plentiful, no single record like that of 1432 provides a clear overview of any single year's taxes. In fact, much of the data and detail are hidden or obscure—the reason many historians have assumed that revenue was incomplete or insignificant. But it

was not; and each tax that appears on the 1432 record is still noted, in one form or another, in 1501, as I describe below. Furthermore, to this list was added a tax that was unavailable to the Kujō in 1432—the *tansen*—which was now a regular impost. Yearly revenue on the estate, laid out like the 1432 data (and now largely collected in cash) was as follows.<sup>11</sup>

Annual tax ( <i>nengu</i> )	No data, but collected at full value most years in both villages (potential revenue from Hineno was approximately 20 percent less than in 1432 because of its reduced acreage)
Acreage tax ( <i>tansen</i> )	40 <i>kan</i>
Summer wheat tax	12 <i>koku</i>
Labor tax	No data, but collected at full value
Equinox tax	7 <i>kan</i> 800 <i>mon</i> <sup>12</sup>
Total estimated income: between 180 and 200 <i>kan</i> annually	

The evidence is as follows. First, the lesser taxes: wheat, labor, and equinox. For the equinox tax, there are two pieces of evidence: a) Masamoto's descriptions in *Tabihikitsuke* of efforts to collect the tax from Hineno East Side in spring 1501—confirmed in an accounting document of that year; and b) a request by East Side villagers to have the tax pardoned for both spring and autumn of 1504 following drought of the previous year. Assuming that all three village units paid the same amount that the East Side did in 1501 (1 *kan* 300 *mon*), and did so for the two annual equinoxes, the total would equal the 7 *kan* 800 *mon* paid in 1432.<sup>13</sup>

Though no data exist for the labor tax, Masamoto's discussions of it are few but unmistakable, and they follow a pattern common to other imposts: when unpaid or under dispute by the villagers, he noted that in his diary, with their eventual collection often appearing in documents of accounting. Otherwise they merited no more than a brief note that they were collected or, like the labor tax, do not show up at all. Evidence of the labor tax appears in a) Masamoto's note after his arrival on the estate that the tax had not been paid for the first and second months of the year, followed soon thereafter with his decision to send an official to Hineno to collect it; and b) a request by East Side villagers in late 1502 that three months of the labor tax be pardoned because of upheaval in the province. In less tumultuous months the tax was apparently paid without dispute.<sup>14</sup>

For the summer wheat tax, evidence of its payment is significantly better. While in some years Masamoto failed to note that it was collected in all village units (Hineno East Side, Hineno West Side, and Iriyamada), it shows up in his reckonings for each of the three in one year or another.<sup>15</sup> We can

assume that the tax was collected annually. The one document of accounting that exists for the wheat tax, for the West Side in 1502, gives some idea of its weight, while supporting my point that detailed information (whether in *Tabihikitsuke* or documents of accounting) appears most commonly when taxes were under dispute. A statement accompanying the 1502 figures notes that West Side villagers strongly petitioned Masamoto for a reduction of the tax following repeated incursions by the *shugo*'s men from their outpost at Sano. Masamoto accepted their pleas and halved the tax, resulting in a payment of just over 2 *koku* of wheat, collected in kind.<sup>16</sup> Assuming the East Side and Iriyamada were assessed levies of similar weight, the total in a normal year would have been 12 *koku*, an increase from the 8 *koku* of 1432, a reflection perhaps of increased wheat production from additional double cropping.<sup>17</sup>

The two weighty taxes at the head of the list were the annual tax and seasonal *tansen*. In the pages of *Tabihikitsuke*, the latter, issued twice yearly, received a huge proportion of the ink, leading some historians to assume that Masamoto had no luck whatsoever in collecting the annual tax. They were clearly mistaken, but the discrepancy between the two taxes in the diary is striking, and requires explanation. First, however, the *tansen*.

*Tansen* was a tax unique to the medieval era. Rather than being based on productivity like the annual tax (and varying yearly according to assessments at harvest), the *tansen* was defined by area alone—the *tan*, equivalent to one-tenth of a *chō*, or approximately 1000 square meters. For each *tan* under cultivation, villagers were required to pay a set tax, typically 100 *mon*. Moreover, no land was excluded, meaning property traditionally set aside as tax-free (primarily that held by temples and shrines) did not escape the *tansen*. Appearing first near the end of the Kamakura era, the *tansen* was levied irregularly and infrequently, often with decades between its imposition. Much about the *tansen* at that time is unclear, but it may have originated with the imperial court, something reflected in its stated purpose on each occasion; for example, “for construction on the imperial palace,” or “for repairs of Ise Shrine.” The tax was also invariably imposed at the provincial level, and province-wide (and usually limited to one or several provinces at a time). As the management of provinces shifted fully to the Muromachi shogunate when it came to power, the tax fell under the warriors' purview. Now it was they who imposed and collected the *tansen*, though as before for the benefit of the court or influential temples and shrines.<sup>18</sup>

The shogunate initially sent officials to the provinces being taxed to gather the *tansen*, but the logistics were challenging. Given that the *shugo*, the regime's duly appointed military governors, presented the greatest threat

to its power, the shogunate had no desire to entrust the collection of the tax to them. So the shoguns turned to powerful temples and influential courtiers—with their officials in the provinces—to act as revenue agents, in an effort to skirt the *shugo*.<sup>19</sup> Despite these precautions, in the early decades of the fifteenth century, the Muromachi regime began to see its hold over the tax weaken. For one thing, proprietors and military governors began to press the shogunate for permission to exact *tansen* for themselves, on lands under their control, and the shogunate had little choice but to acquiesce to these requests. Then a big shift occurred when the shogunate began to unravel following the assassination of Ashikaga Yoshinori in 1441. Not long after that, we see the establishment of “private *tansen*” by the *shugo* (a practice soon copied by courtier and religious proprietors), which not only were levied without the regime’s permission, but by the turn of the sixteenth century (decades earlier in some regions) had become a regular tax, and as seen on Hine Estate, imposed twice yearly.

Evidence that *tansen* exactions were becoming more common on Hine Estate appear early in the fifteenth century. In 1430, for example, the shogunate imposed a *tansen* on Hineno and Iriyamada as part of its effort to raise funds for construction at the Outer Shrine at Ise.<sup>20</sup> As for the Kujō, they sent requests to the shogunate for *tansen* on three occasions—1425, 1431, and 1448—each time in support of repairs for their Kyoto residence. The first and last were filled, but that of 1431 was denied, the reason being that the shogunate had already granted to the Izumi *shugo* the privilege of exacting *tansen* from Hine Estate that year.<sup>21</sup>

At the time Kujō Masamoto arrived on Hine Estate the *tansen* was a common (if contested) component of the tax system. As such, it was 1) levied and collected by the Kujō, the shogunate having dropped out of the picture; 2) regular (imposed annually, if possible); and 3) “two-season,” levied both summer and autumn.<sup>22</sup> Masamoto’s interpretation of the estate *tansen* is laid out in a diary entry early in the sixth month of 1501, two months after his arrival. This was his response to an Iriyamada petition that the summer *tansen* be remitted for the year.

The request cannot be granted. From far in the past, an acreage tax [*tansen*] has been levied on this estate. The withdrawal of the *shugo* [from the estate] took place in the first year of Bunshō [1466]. Because *shugo tansen* had been excessive, the cultivators suffered repeatedly; thus we have limited the *tansen* to just two seasons, with no other exactions.<sup>23</sup>

Masamoto was clearly overstating the case for the *tansen*. There is no evidence that it was levied at an excessive rate by the Izumi *shugo*, that they had imposed it more than (or even) twice a year, as suggested here, or that Kujō deputies had been able to collect the tax with regularity twice annually once they took over. In fact, the first record of collection by Kujō deputies dates to 1482. And the first evidence that both a summer and autumn *tansen* were collected on the estate dates to 1496.<sup>24</sup> In sum, it seems clear that Kujō deputies, while making considerable progress toward consistent collection of the *tansen* in the decades prior to Masamoto's arrival, had been unable to levy and collect it year-in and year-out both summer and autumn. Too much points to the difficulty of implementing that practice, hampered as it was by competing powers, and often contested by the villagers. It is hardly surprising that evidence of an annual two-season *tansen* in Hineno and Iriyamada, with no breaks, is thin.<sup>25</sup>

Details about the *tansen* abound in *Tabihikitsuke*, and since it was collected twice yearly, it was never far removed from sight. Besides copying *tansen* notices in his diary—issued in the fifth and ninth months—Masamoto often noted special circumstances surrounding it. Here is the first notice issued after his arrival, prefaced by the following comments.

As for the season's acreage tax, since the 13th was an auspicious day, we distributed assessments. Previously we had delivered a single letter addressed to the Hineno and Iriyamada *bantō* and cultivators. However, at present the two villages are not only separated in distance, but Hineno is also divided into an East Side and West Side. Accordingly, we distributed notices to each of the three.

The notice itself followed.

Regarding this season's acreage tax: for each *tan* of land, you are assessed 100 *mon*. The payment of this is to be completed by the 10th of next month. If there are individuals who fail to pay, we will respond with sharp rebukes.<sup>26</sup>

Bunki 1/5/13

[From:] Aritoshi, Nagamori

[To:] Hineno West Side and East Side *bantō* and cultivator groups<sup>27</sup>

Notices for the autumn *tansen* were the same, excepting the tax rate, which was set at 120 *mon* per *tan*. At those rates—100 *mon* in the summer and 120 *mon* in the autumn—the *tansen* had the potential of bringing in annual revenues of 130 *kan* for the whole estate, close to the amount of the annual tax (judging by records from the fifteenth century). But revenue actually fell far short of that, the primary reason being that the true rate on Hine Estate during these years was 50 *mon* each season, rather than the summer and autumn rates of 100 and 120 *mon*, respectively. Instead of 130 *kan* revenue, Masamoto was to receive, at best, only 59 *kan* annually (one *kan* for each of the 59 *chō* on the estate: 21 each for the two Hineno units and 17 for Iriyamada—assuming there were no other reductions).<sup>28</sup>

The 50 *mon* rate for the *tansen* was a concession the villagers attained soon after Masamoto's arrival. Based on what they termed their "desperate plight" during several years of upheaval prior to the turn of the century, the villagers petitioned Masamoto for a reduction. Apparently confident in his ability to increase revenue now that he was on the estate, and seemingly moved by the villagers' pleadings, Masamoto agreed to lower the tax to 50 *mon* per *tan* each season for five years. It was a detail he excluded from his diary at the time, an uncomfortable fact he appears not to have wanted to admit. Indeed, the matter becomes clear in *Tabihikitsuke* only in its last pages, as Hineno East Side villagers pressed Masamoto on the issue after learning that the 50 *mon* rate might not be maintained following Negorōji monks' appointments as estate deputies.<sup>29</sup>

Instead of 59 *kan* annually, Masamoto received between 35 and 45 *kan* from the two-season *tansen*. Seventeen of a potential twenty-four documents of accounting exist (two per year for each of the three village units), and most lacunae can be filled in with references in *Tabihikitsuke*, noting, for example, days for collection or the likelihood of a shortfall. Though a few questions remain, the general outline is clear, with income averaging 40 *kan* a year, well short of the 59 *kan* that Masamoto was expecting.<sup>30</sup> Why the discrepancy? It was a result of three factors: first, the existence of land that was "non-producing year-in and year-out." In other words, these were paddies that were taken off the tax table every year, and the records reflect it: for example, rather than bringing in 10.5 *kan* per season, the East Side *tansen* invariably garnered just over 9 *kan*, a result of approximately 18 *chō* of productive arable instead of the 21 *chō* listed.<sup>31</sup> A second factor was pressure from outside forces, typically the *shugo* and typically involving the West Side, something that resulted in partial payment more than once (only three

of eight accounting records exist for the West Side). A third factor was turmoil from warfare, leading to lost productivity or the need to buy off invading forces, resulting, in either case, in lower revenue.

*Nengu*, or the annual tax, had long been the primary means of taxing lands, public and private, throughout Japan's premodern era, stretching from ancient times into the Tokugawa period. It was imposed by estate proprietors (of whatever class or status) upon their direct holdings. Though the tax varied by time and place, at its most basic it was a levy on economic output—primarily the rice harvest—and directed either at individuals or villages, and collected yearly.

Dwarfed as it is by references to the *tansen* in the pages of *Tabihikitsuke* (and completely missing from documents of accounting for these years), the annual tax is readily overlooked. Moreover, some of the most important references to it in the diary are hidden, brought to light only after one understands the terminology Masamoto used to note it. Accordingly, it is easy to assume that demands by the *shugo* to the villagers to pay them the annual tax, or exhortations by Masamoto to “faithfully pay the annual tax and other duties” were just empty words, more often than not ignored or dismissed.<sup>32</sup> Even the long-running feud between Masamoto and Hineno West Side over the 1501 annual tax—a tax the villagers eventually paid (though at what rate is unknown)—appears to be an outlier, an exception among more common (and unmentioned) failures.<sup>33</sup> After all, if the annual tax were as important to Masamoto as the *tansen*, where are the assessments, the evidence of collection, and the documents of accounting?

The contrast to the *tansen* in *Tabihikitsuke* is striking. Consider the *tansen*. Twice in 1501 and once in 1504, Masamoto recorded the full *tansen* notices his men delivered to the villages. When he chose not to do that, he usually recorded the dates that notices were sent out.<sup>34</sup> And in the days and weeks that followed, every year and every summer and fall, he inevitably described the work involved in obtaining the *tansen*, whether in issuing reminders (and threats) to pay or dealing with village petitions for reductions, and eventually seeing his men collect the tax, village by village or, in Iriyamada, hamlet by hamlet. The detail is remarkable, and since the tax was levied and collected twice a year, these many references occupy a prominent place in the diary. Add to that the numerous extant documents of accounting that delineate *tansen* revenue and its allocation from each village unit, and one cannot help but see the tax as critical to Masamoto's journey and possibly the weightiest of the taxes he collected. The annual tax appears to pale in significance.

But the appearance is deceiving. To begin with, there is good reason to think that the annual tax brought in more revenue than the *tansen*, probably much more. The evidence is found in documents from the fifteenth century. They reveal that *nengu* revenue for the Kujō at the time (when it was not being confiscated by the Izumi *shugo* or siphoned off by creditors) was much greater than what Masamoto would collect as *tansen* at the turn of the century; and in fact it was more than the projected *tansen* income of 100 *mon* and 120 *mon* per *tan*. The most complete source for this in the fifteenth century is found in the aforementioned document of accounting for 1432. As seen there, net income was 144 *kan*—more than the 130 *kan* Masamoto would have received from the *tansen* even if he had collected the full amount. But if we remove the 14 *kan* for rice transportation costs in 1432 (no longer necessary now that the tax was submitted in currency) the result would have been a total of 158 *kan*. Other documents of accounting at the time, though limited to just one of the two villages or only to the “proprietor’s side,” suggest similar income.<sup>35</sup>

The scholarly rehabilitation of Hine Estate’s annual tax during Masamoto’s era—providing evidence it was indeed being collected—received its initial impetus in a 1999 study by Suitō Makoto, in which he showed that Masamoto used terminology specific to each tax (*tansen* and *nengu*) as he wrote about them in his diary. The key point was Suitō’s discovery that Masamoto described the collection of the annual tax with the word *shūnō* (収納) as in *Kyō Tsuchimaru mura shūnō nari* (“Today was the Tsuchimaru hamlet collection”).<sup>36</sup> Though some scholars had come to realize that these terse references referred not to gathering the harvest (the common definition of *shūnō*), but to the collection of taxes, they believed that the tax being collected was the *tansen*. Even the 1996 edition of *Tabihikitsuke*, edited by Chūsei Kuge Nikki Kenkyūkai, referred to these as the *tansen* collection in its headnotes.<sup>37</sup> But a careful charting of dates and terminology for tax collection reveals the distinction between *nengu* and *tansen* that Suitō pointed out, and with this the annual tax was revived.

Not only was the annual tax being collected, but it was done regularly and, with few exceptions, at full value. The latter point is suggested by several things, including villagers’ statements about paying the tax (a sign of their good faith, they claimed); contracts for loans secured by Masamoto in which debts were to be paid off “from the annual tax or *tansen*”; and, ironically, Masamoto’s lack of comment about the revenue on days collection was undertaken.<sup>38</sup> Had there been shortfalls in the last instances, he would have noted them or otherwise responded. Indeed, if there is any doubt as to where Masamoto stood on the matter of the annual tax, we need look no further

than the two occasions (the only occasions) on which he took villagers captive, first in 1501 and again in 1503. Both times this was brought on by West Side villagers' refusal to submit their payment; and both times Masamoto's targets were *bantō*, the village leaders whose responsibility it was to make sure the annual tax was gathered and paid. In the first instance, Masamoto kept a *bantō* locked up for more than a month. He was released only after village elders promised immediate payment. The 1503 imprisonment of a *bantō* lasted but a week, as the villagers—no doubt aware of the painful standoff of two years previous—quickly reversed course and submitted the tax.<sup>39</sup>

Granted that the annual tax was being collected, two questions remain: 1) why the discrepancy in detail, and thus in apparent significance, between it and the *tansen* in the pages of *Tabihikitsuke*; and 2) why the omission of the annual tax from documents of accounting? The answers lie in the histories and post-collection uses of the two taxes. To begin with, it is important to realize that the annual tax was an economic institution, reaching back far into the past. In many ways it was accepted as unalterable and fundamentally non-negotiable. Though the villagers of Hineno and Iriyamada continually sought reductions in the *tansen*, they left the annual tax alone. West Side villagers may appear to have been an exception, given their on-going confrontation with Masamoto over the tax. But that had nothing to do with the validity or justness of it but instead concerned the question of to whom the tax was due: the Izumi *shugo* or Kujō Masamoto. For the West Side, the worry was that they would have to pay *nengu* twice, not that the money was owed to a greater power.<sup>40</sup> The latter was an argument their ancestors had lost long ago.

As for the *tansen*, the villagers' persistent efforts to have it reduced, further reduced, or even abolished support the point I made previously: that the establishment of the *tansen* as a regular, two-season tax on Hine Estate was a recent development. In the villagers' minds, it appears still to have been extraordinary, inconsistently levied and thus not yet set in stone.

The second reason for the discrepancy in documentation between the *tansen* and annual tax lies in the simple fact that the former was earmarked for estate expenses while the latter, I contend, was forwarded to Kujō headquarters in the capital. Of course, this does not explain why documents of accounting for the *tansen* were saved in Kujō archives for centuries while those of the annual tax were not, but it does suggest why Masamoto put so much effort toward the *tansen* and why he wrote about it extensively in his diary: quite simply, it represented his portion of the estate's operating expenses (or at least part of that, since it appears not to have been sufficient for the whole). The annual tax was not used for that purpose. Even

when *tansen* revenue fell because of crop damage or unexpected expenses (as when an invading army had to be bought off in 1502), Masamoto did not draw money from the annual tax. Nor did he accept the advice of his Kyoto associate Tominokōji Toshimichi when the latter recommended he use half of the annual tax that year (presumably Toshimichi's portion) to cover the deficit in the monthly expense account.<sup>41</sup> Accordingly, the evidence points to the capital as the destination for the annual tax.

My argument that the annual tax was sent to the capital gains weight as we understand the purpose and composition of the documents of accounting. I leave the critical examination of these to the next chapter, but here it is important to understand their basic format. They were not mere tax reports, that is, records of payments received. Though probably common in the past when court families were flush with income, such reports were rare at this time. Instead, the records (*sanyōjō* 算用状) were individual reports for each levy, briefly noting revenue (often no more than just the total collected) while providing specific details about disbursement of those funds. Their focus, in short, was on how tax revenue was spent rather than upon its collection. As records of disbursement, the documents of accounting were produced at the location where funds were expended—where goods and services were bought, debts paid, and other financial obligations met. For the annual tax, none of this was being done on Hine Estate, so the relevant documents of accounting were not produced there. Given the substantial debts that Masamoto had incurred while in Kyoto (and that his son Hisatsune no doubt incurred when he was appointed chancellor in 1501), it seems likely that payments to lenders in the capital were the object of the annual tax, and Masamoto appeared determined not to draw on those monies for expenses in Izumi. For whatever reason, the documents of accounting for the annual tax were lost or destroyed (like many others over the centuries), but there is no question that they were produced. As we shall see, the records of the *tansen* kept by Masamoto's men on Hine Estate recorded costs down to the very last *mon*, indicative of a time when every *mon* mattered.

### Proprietor and Peasants: Disputes and Negotiations

Several references in the preceding section point to the tensions, and negotiations, that characterized relations between Masamoto and the villagers over taxes. Most significant was the reduction of the summer and fall *tansen* to 50 *mon* per *tan* each season for five years, a 55 percent cut that appears only to have encouraged the villagers to seek further easing of the tax. There

was, however, a history to the *tansen* reduction, and the tensions seen above merely touch the surface of the give-and-take over taxes during the four years Masamoto was in residence.

As East Side cultivators noted in a letter late in 1504, the 50 *mon* concession was granted “at the time of Masamoto’s arrival” in response to a petition from the villagers.<sup>42</sup> This was something Masamoto chose not to write about then, and no petition or contract exists, so it is impossible to know the precise date of this agreement or the deliberations that led to it. But *Tabihikitsuke* offers clues, and it is safe to say that Masamoto did not extend the rollback willingly; instead it was something the villagers gained through stiff resistance. Evidence of Masamoto’s initial position is seen in his decision, made two weeks after arriving, to press Hineno East Side villagers to submit the previous year’s unpaid “winter” *tansen*. As he noted in his diary, each of the three *bantō* was responsible for 700 *hiki*, drawn from the sections of the village he managed, resulting in a tax of 100 *mon* per *tan* (of which there were 2100). At that point, Masamoto had made no concessions on the tax rate. However, rather than agree to collect the back tax, two of the East Side *bantō* absconded. Learning of their flight, Masamoto posted bulletins outside their homes describing their misdeeds and pronouncing the residences sealed.<sup>43</sup>

But Masamoto’s resolve to collect the tax did not last long, and by the time he issued summer *tansen* notices less than a month later on 5/13, it was clear he had agreed to the 50 *mon* reduction for the coming years. A number of factors appear to have played a role, including reconciliation with the East Side *bantō* who had fled, pardoned by Masamoto and restored to their positions on 5/11. It is also likely that he was influenced by growing encroachments of the Izumi *shugo*, who issued their own *tansen* notices to Hineno West Side on 5/2. Though Masamoto instructed the West Side to firmly reject the *shugo*’s demands, the idea of fighting battles with both the villagers and the *shugo* at this early date may have pushed him toward compromise on the *tansen*.<sup>44</sup> Underlying the decision to cut the *tansen* was one critical fact, which is that it was implemented throughout the estate. Though scholars have wondered how independent the three village units were from one another, here we see them tightly linked. There is no question that village leadership of the three worked closely together as they negotiated with Masamoto to reach this pivotal agreement.<sup>45</sup>

As it turned out, the matter of the *tansen* was hardly settled, much to Masamoto’s chagrin. Setting the tax at 50 *mon* per *tan* did not end the villagers’ resistance to it; if anything, it appears to have given them confidence to push for further reductions, which they did almost immediately. As Masa-

moto noted, the villagers of Iriyamada were at the forefront of this. Their efforts began on 6/9 (the day before the summer *tansen* was due), when Masamoto received the following petition: “In this province, *tansen* is not collected on lands held by the ‘gates of power’ [*kenmon*; i.e., the court elite and temples]. For the present, with his lordship in residence, this seasonal tax should be dismissed.” In discussing the tax the previous day with Aoki and Shiono, two of Masamoto’s retainers, the *bantō* apparently referred to a shogunal directive of 1466 that, as they saw it, supported this position.<sup>46</sup> The contents of that, issued by Ashikaga Yoshimasa, are as follows.

Hineno and Iriyamada of Izumi Province are to be exempt from the acreage tax, labor exactions, extraordinary taxes, miscellaneous duties, and the like. As holdings free from the intrusions of *shugo* officials, steps to solidify control over them should be taken quickly—thus this directive.

Bunshō 1/9/5	[From:]	Seal [of Yoshimasa]
	[To:]	Kujō [Masamoto] <sup>47</sup>

Masamoto’s response to the villagers (noted in the previous section) was that the *tansen* had long been exacted, and that its present two-season structure was established at the time the Izumi *shugo* lost their hold on the estate in 1466.<sup>48</sup> Although Yoshimasa’s directive was obviously provided to Masamoto as a legal deterrent to *shugo* and other forces, the village leadership of Iriyamada claimed it was a broad injunction, meant to prohibit exceptional taxes, regardless of who sought to impose them. The petition was a reflection both of the villagers’ savvy and their grasp of local history. And though the villagers lost their case—which was dismissed out of hand by Masamoto—they revealed that they brought more than simple will and stubbornness to the battle. If we are inclined to see them as ignorant, unaware of all but the present, this should force us to rethink that notion. In all likelihood, they had made a copy of the 1466 directive (which they were obviously privy to), something to draw upon later to support their arguments. In this, they were like the other regional powers—the Kujō, Izumi *shugo*, and Negorōji monks—all of whose claims, as we shall see, rested upon decisions and documents of past decades or earlier.

Despite Masamoto’s stiff rejection of the preceding petition, less than two weeks later, on 6/21, he granted the Iriyamada villagers a remarkable concession. As he explained in his diary, he had been besieged by appeals from the villagers, whose “pitiful pleadings” centered on their inability to

engage in commerce in the province since rejecting the military governors' demands the past year. Convinced of the economic hardship and "physical distress" this caused, and with the understanding that the villagers were to faithfully pay the annual tax and other duties as in the past, Masamoto provided them assistance of 2000 *hiki*, or 20 *kan*, "for this year only."<sup>49</sup> With this, Masamoto forfeited the equivalent of more than a year's *tansen* income from Iriyamada, whose biannual payments during this period were slightly under 9 *kan*.

It is difficult to know how Masamoto viewed these early concessions. Had he expected to give less ground? Or did he realize there was little hope in immediately collecting full taxes for both *nengu* and *tansen*, given his deputies' apparent inability to do that in previous years? In any event, he had offered much and expected the villagers to respond in kind, with hard work and loyalty. Thus, when a new petition arrived from Iriyamada a mere five days after Masamoto's cash offering, he was irate and appalled: "The cultivators of the four hamlets submitted a petition. They asked that the *tansen* be pardoned, in a forceful appeal, I was told. This is outrageous, truly outrageous. I said that regardless of who brought such a message, no one was to present it to me. I noted as well to everyone that we would be issuing a reprimand in coming days."<sup>50</sup> If a reprimand was issued, it had no effect, for within two weeks, Masamoto learned that another petition was forthcoming, and he took steps to squelch it: "The cultivators have been preparing a petition with a request that the *tansen* be pardoned. This is hard to believe. Even if there were a disaster, we would not accept it—this was my message to the commissioners for them."<sup>51</sup>

For the reader of *Tabihikitsuke* unaware that Masamoto had already cut the *tansen* by more than half, he comes across in these entries as harsh and unbending, but in hindsight his anger is understandable. Should he not have been irked? After all, as he saw it, his benevolence in dramatically reducing the *tansen* rate and then offering cash assistance to the villagers was met not with thanks but with further demands from ungrateful villagers. The villagers were truly persistent and, in Masamoto's eyes, shameless.

The disputes, negotiations, excuses, and concessions of 1501 that marked Masamoto's dealings with the villagers of the East Side and Iriyamada (the West Side gets its own section in the next chapter) were evidence of the turmoil that surrounded the collection of taxes. At the same time, it was during these early months that many practices and policies were established or confirmed. This should have led to less turmoil in succeeding years, and to a degree it did, but there were clear exceptions. One occurred in early summer of 1502, when Masamoto, his patience exhausted over East Side

assertions that they would not pay certain taxes that year, ordered the Kashii River be dammed and diverted in Iriyamada, effectively cutting it off from Hineno East and West Sides. Without this supply of water, rice cultivation on the plains would be poor at best, as Masamoto noted. Fortunately for the downstream villagers, cooler heads prevailed in the form of Tsuchimaru cultivators, who pleaded in their neighbors' behalf, convincing Masamoto to reverse his decision.<sup>52</sup>

A second occurrence, less heated, but potentially of greater importance, took place later that same year. This had its origins in the discovery of insect damage to estate crops in the eighth month, upending what had appeared to be the makings of a "bountiful harvest."<sup>53</sup> Masamoto provides no details about the discussions and petitions that followed, but it is clear that the villagers were seeking an extraordinary reduction in the annual tax, something that Masamoto was unwilling to agree to. By the middle of the ninth month, however, evidence of the severity of the infestations, particularly on the East Side, led Masamoto to soften his position. He noted this in his diary, along with an acknowledgement of the villagers' plight: "Though I said that as much as one-fifth of the tax could be pardoned, the fact is that many paddies do not justify running a scythe through them."<sup>54</sup>

In a letter to Masamoto's officials, dated 9/12, the East Side *bantō* and cultivators group noted that they had presented his lordship's offer of one-fifth exclusion to the villagers, whose reply was a simple plea to "just stand at the head of the paddies and view them."<sup>55</sup> The implication—that the scene would reveal damage far exceeding one-fifth of the crop—was obvious: the villagers had no interest in accepting the offer. They also wrote of a "physical inspection," something that both sides apparently discussed extensively in person, for the next day Masamoto had two of his officials, Yamada Shigehisa and Honma Yūshun, draft a letter which included details for a contract for an altered tax system, which they then presented to the East Side village officials. It reads as follows.

#### Draft of yesterday's response

Regarding the physical inspection of the family lands (*naiken* 内検), are the cultivators firmly asking for this? If so, we will present it [to his lordship]. You are to prepare a document and deliver it here. The intent of it is to be as follows:

From the time this property was opened until Ōei 24 [1417], a period of 176 years, this was land on which a physical examination of the harvest (*gojikken* 御実検) was conducted annually, but

in that year, the body of the estate presented a petition decrying the situation, and the practice of direct proprietor management and harvest assessments (*issiki no goshintai* 一色之御進退) was done away with. At that time, we settled upon the tax for the rice tribute, which we followed as a standard for over ninety years.<sup>56</sup> However, now we want to discard the contract of 1417, and return to the practice of the past, with direct proprietor management, entrusting the approach to guidelines laid out in the previous register. Each year you will conduct a physical examination of the harvest at a set time. With the intention that this be presented [to his lordship], we honorable cultivators present this collective request.

Bunki 2/9/

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—  
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You are forthwith to provide joint signatures, draft the document in this manner, and deliver it. Then we will present it, and a reply will come in a formal order—according to the commissioners.

9/13

[From:] Yamada Shigehisa, Honma Yūshun

[To:] Hineno village East Side *bantō* and cultivators group<sup>57</sup>

As seen here, the East Side villagers were requesting a return to an earlier system of estate management and tax collection, prior to what historians speak of as *jigeuke* or *murauke*. Though Masamoto did not use either of those terms in the contract he had his men prepare or in his diary of the same date (which covers much of the same ground), what he described as post-1417 practices were *jigeuke*.<sup>58</sup>

*Jigeuke* was one of several arrangements by which the annual tax was collected during the medieval era.<sup>59</sup> It developed in the latter part of the period as one of a succession of approaches. When the *shōen* system was at its height in the tenth and eleventh centuries, the tax had been collected directly by estate proprietors and their local officials, the latter of whom conducted annual field inspections (imperfect though those might have been) and physically collected duties from individual households. For the proprietors, this meant a guaranteed percentage of the yield, but with considerable variation in income from year to year; boom years meant large revenues while poor years saw declines, great or small. The system was labor-intensive.

The Kamakura and Muromachi eras saw the appearance of *jitōuke* and *shugouke*, “receipt by *jitō*” and “receipt by *shugo*.” Under the former, the local land steward, appointed by the Kamakura shogunate, collected the tax, forwarding a percentage to the proprietor and keeping a portion for himself. This was a reflection of the growing influence and power of the *jitō*. During the Muromachi era, as *shugo* came to greater prominence, *shugouke* became common on many estates. Now it was the *shugo* who did the collecting. Because both of these practices were extralegal, neither sanctioned nor condemned by law, and because their establishment reflected not the adoption of a universal practice but private arrangements relevant in each instance to but a single estate, there was variation in actual practice and in when, and if, *jitōuke* or *shugouke* was implemented.<sup>60</sup> For example, powerful proprietors with strong regional influence, whether regental family members like the Kujō or temples like Kōfukuji, were able on some estates to maintain holdings without the intrusion of *jitōuke* or *shugouke*. Elsewhere they might have success for a period before succumbing to regional pressure. Moreover, as seen on Hine Estate, it was not uncommon for *jitōuke* to be followed inconsistently, based upon the relative strength of local strongmen and the Kujō proprietors. As for annual inspections, these continued to be the norm until sometime in the fifteenth century, regardless of the system of collection, though again there was much variation by region and estate.

*Jigeuke* or “receipt by villagers” (also known as *murauke* or “receipt by village”) represented a fundamentally different approach to tax collection and, in time, estate management. As the term suggests, it was the villagers who now collected the tax and submitted it to the overlord (usually by way of an estate deputy). Of more significance, under *jigeuke*, taxes were no longer figured according to an annual inspection of the fields by the proprietor’s agents, with adjustments calculated on the abundance or meagerness of the harvest. Instead they were unchanging from year to year, a set amount agreed upon by contract between the proprietor and the villagers. Moreover, the responsibility to pay those taxes fell on village leaders or the body of cultivators as a whole.

Extant sources reveal that in most instances it was the villagers who made the request to move to *jigeuke*, and certainly that was the case on Hine Estate, as stated in the agreement described above. However, both proprietors and villagers appear to have realized benefits from the change. For proprietors it meant no more fluctuations in annual income, a large savings in labor needed for harvest inspections, and an end to disputes over the assessed tax. For villagers it meant the possibility of increasing output and reaping the rewards of that year in and year out. They could accomplish that by bringing additional land into cultivation or raising the productivity

of land through better management, improved crop varieties, and double-cropping. Of course, *jigeuke* also required them to save in abundant years for poor years that inevitably followed.

Though the term *jigeuke* referred specifically to the receipt or collection of the annual tax by villagers, it was part of a larger shift in estate management away from direct proprietor control to self-management by the villagers, in other words, the move to the independent late medieval village. This included several key aspects. Among these was the assumption of duties and powers by the village which had previously been held by *shōen* proprietors. Of most significance were the management of common lands and water resources and the administration of justice and defense of the community against both internal and outside forces. Thus, whereas irrigation projects and their upkeep had been the responsibility of the proprietor in earlier centuries (with estate lands set aside specifically to fund that work),<sup>61</sup> those duties now fell to the villagers. And when crimes occurred within the village, it was now the responsibility of the villagers to investigate and prosecute those. In most local affairs, the proprietor kept his (and they were almost invariably “his”) hands off. According to Katsumata Shizuo, and largely confirmed by scholars since his seminal study of 1985, the adoption of *jigeuke* was the key to all of this; it provided the foundation upon which the independent villages of the era rested. Self-rule was the logical corollary to the system of self-receipt (or self-collection) and village payment of the annual tax.<sup>62</sup>

So why, after more than eighty years, did Hineno East Side villagers seek a return to the system of direct proprietor management and yearly field inspections? Surely it was not because they failed to realize economic gains over those decades. Too much evidence, including improved material well-being and increased participation in commerce, suggests otherwise. Though no written sources provide an answer to the question, a number of clues offer hints as to what had happened and what was behind the villagers’ thinking. First, there were proximate issues, in particular the difficult times of recent years. The struggles among warring powers that marred Izumi Province from the late 1490s through 1502 (and would continue at least to 1504) had taken a toll on the villages of the region, stifling agriculture and limiting commerce. Under those conditions, *jigeuke* could seem like a losing proposition. Of course, the 1502 attack on the rice crop by pests only made the situation worse. Second, as Shiga Setsuko suggests, the villagers may have believed that a return to direct proprietor control, and the tax system that defined that, would limit the military governors’ ability to demand taxes of them.<sup>63</sup> Third, it is possible that the peasants believed they had realized the biggest

gains in crop production some decades earlier and did not expect to see much more. So they asked for the change, and Masamoto, rather remarkably, accepted it. And thus the earlier practice was followed, at least for the next two years while Masamoto was on the estate.<sup>64</sup> It probably ended soon thereafter, since few warriors or other regional powers, like Negoroji, would have agreed to direct management of that sort. For that matter, it is clear that many of the rights and responsibilities that the villagers had acquired under *jigeuke* did not revert back to Masamoto as proprietor. The historical shift to *jigeuke* had set in motion changes—social and economic—that were not about to be stayed (even in a single village like Hineno East Side).

As significant as were the negotiations and struggles over economics, they did not fully define relations between the villagers and Masamoto, which were on the whole cordial, even warm at times. A primary reason for this was that the two parties were in a long-term relationship, one that stretched back many generations and would likely, in their eyes, extend well into the future. Thus Masamoto remained “his lordship” and the villagers his “honorable cultivators.” This was a relationship that was nurtured through various practices, most of which I examine in chapter 7. One of significance, however, that was part of the economic exchange at the time taxes were collected, was *kuratsuke*, literally “to place in the warehouse.”

Although examples of tax payments made in kind, primarily in rice, can be found in early fifteenth-century records of Hine Estate, they are rare at this time. And of course the *tansen*, figured in currency and based on area, was by definition paid in cash. Thus, the term *kuratsuke*, with the clear connotation of filling the tax warehouse with submissions of rice and other physical goods, was anachronistic. Nothing was surprising about that, but the fact is that there was much more to *kuratsuke* on Hine Estate than the collection of taxes, in kind or in currency. We gain some insights by examining documents of accounting for the years that Masamoto was in Izumi. References to *kuratsuke* appear there as expenses to the proprietor, drawn from the collected tax; and the amounts are slight, as seen in the following examples: “300 *mon*: expenses for the East Side wheat *kuratsuke*”; “200 *mon*: for the West Side *tansen kuratsuke*.” One entry provides slightly more detail: “200 *mon*: for the *tansen kuratsuke* of ‘the valley’ [i.e., Iriyamada], cost of *sake* and fish.”<sup>65</sup>

Turning to *Tabihikitsuke*, a fuller picture of *kuratsuke* begins to take shape. There Masamoto often noted its occurrence, usually with little elaboration. But on two occasions he provided helpful detail. The first dates to the sixth month of 1502.

Today was Iriyamada village's *kuratsuke* and partial payment of the season's acreage tax. We summoned the six *bantō* and gave them food and drink. *Kuratsuke* in the past consisted of a light mid-day meal, I was told, but because we have reduced the *tansen*, we offer them just rice.<sup>66</sup>

The second appeared one year later.

Today was the *kuratsuke* for the four hamlets [of Iriyamada]. We provided a meal and *sake* to the *bantō*. Of the six *bantō*, one from Tsuchimaru, Inakura Genzaburō, was sick and did not come. That was unfortunate. However, in celebration of the occasion, we sent him one *chō* of cash. The *bantō* brought partial payment of 180 *hiki*, I was told.<sup>67</sup>

Several points are of note. First, though the *bantō* made a tax payment on each occasion, the amount was slight, noted as partial in both entries and specifically 180 *hiki* in the second. For the *tansen*, this meant only one-fifth of the total due. One other entry in *Tabihikitsuke* notes an amount for a partial payment of 130 *hiki*, suggesting that the “partial payment” was not a fixed amount or percentage of the whole.<sup>68</sup> Second, in examining these, we can now make sense of the proprietor's “expenses for *kuratsuke*” that appear regularly in the documents of accounting: the 200 or 300 *mon* outlay went toward simple refreshments for the *bantō*, what might be termed the “tax-day treat.” As convincingly argued by Matsunaga Kazuhiro, *kuratsuke* on Hine Estate at this time represented not the payment of taxes, which was still to be completed, but instead a contract for that payment, signed as it were through a small initial tax submission and a reciprocal offering of food and drink. Full payment would come later, but the *bantō*'s participation in the *kuratsuke*, their consuming of the food and drink offered, signaled a commitment to fulfill their duty in submitting the tax.<sup>69</sup> And all indications are that it worked effectively, certainly as evidenced in the record of *tansen* payments in the documents of accounting; full payment of the tax appears to have been made not long after *kuratsuke* in most instances. The fact that *kuratsuke* was a sort of informal contract was likely the reason that Masamoto more faithfully recorded it in *Tabihikitsuke* for the acreage tax than for the annual tax: it was evidence that the former would indeed be paid, something that was usually preceded by doubt and heated negotiations.<sup>70</sup>

Once during these years the Hine West Side *bantō* failed to make their partial payment on the day the *kuratsuke* was held. The occasion was the

seventh month of 1504, and the tax due was the “spring” *tansen*. It was clear at the time that Masamoto’s stay in Izumi was nearing its end, and Negoroji monks were pressuring him for appointments as estate deputies in his absence, besides demanding an agreement on loan repayments. The villagers, too, were being squeezed by the monks. On 7/13, Masamoto received word that the West Side *bantō* provided no payment at the *kuratsuke* gathering, meaning food and drink of the tax-day treat was not reciprocated with a partial submission of the tax. It is likely that in the rush and turmoil of the day, the administration of the *kuratsuke* was delegated to a lower retainer, or possibly a monk from a West Side cottage temple. In any event, the villagers held back their payment. Masamoto took the omission seriously, sending a close attendant, Honma Yūshun, to Hineno to rectify matters. According to Honma, the villagers claimed they had no desire to be negligent, but demands from Negoroji monks to recognize their authority, coupled with a threat to burn their homes if they paid the *tansen* to Masamoto, had shaken them badly; so they withheld the payment. After much effort and discussion, Honma convinced the *bantō* to offer 80 *hiki*, and thus honor their side of the contract.<sup>71</sup>

### Simple Fictions and Precedents

As evidence of the longstanding ties between proprietor and villagers, the *kuratsuke* was a significant practice. What it did not ensure, however, as Masamoto soon learned, was that tax payments, particularly of the *tansen*, would be submitted on time. The reason was that the *kuratsuke*, and thus the full payment that followed, were almost always late, weeks or even months. Masamoto rarely provides details in *Tabihikitsuke*, but it is apparent that the villagers found numerous ways to procrastinate. This began with the first *tansen* Masamoto levied, the notice for which was issued on Bunki 1/5/13, with the tax due on 6/10. Despite the generous span of time between notice and due date, none of the three village units submitted the tax by the 10th. Of course, they were busy presenting petitions to have the *tansen* abolished, so perhaps this was to be expected. But the pattern was set: in coming years, due dates were ignored and the *tansen* was invariably proffered late. For the summer *tansen*, payment was usually made toward the end of the sixth month or early in the seventh month, while the autumn *tansen*—with bills sent out in the middle of the ninth month, and payment set for two weeks later—was rarely collected prior to the twelfth. The fact that the stipulated dates of collection were not followed was soon accepted as the norm. No

doubt this irritated Masamoto, but at least he was able to maintain the fiction that the tax came in as ordered—evidence of that was clearly written on the notices he issued.

Where fiscal policy was concerned, little proceeded exactly as Masamoto desired. But to record that in all its bluntness would be to admit failure, or at least a serious slip from the ideal. And so in *Tabihikitsuke*, Masamoto obscured, ignored, or distorted certain facts, providing instead of a full picture, a clouded one, veiled in simple fictions. One fiction took the form of whitewashing economic concessions he made to the villagers. Rather than describe them as efforts to ameliorate the villagers or reach a compromise, he offered them instead as rewards for hard work. Thus the assistance of 2000 *hiki* that he offered the Iriyamada villagers in the sixth month of 1501—preceded by their persistent pleadings—was a reward for the “diligent service of everyone since the time his lordship arrived.”<sup>72</sup>

Such simple fictions were also a mainstay of the tax collection process Masamoto and his men carried out. Evidence of this, some of which we have already seen, is abundant. The fifty-five percent cut in the acreage tax rate, glossed over in the notices Masamoto’s officials issued to the villagers, is an obvious example. Year in and year out the notices set the levy at 100 *mon* or 120 *mon* per *tan*, based on the season, though the tax was collected at 50 *mon* per *tan*. Likewise, despite consistent failures to collect taxes on the dates stipulated in writing, Masamoto refused to alter the timeline. Moreover, when there were difficulties in issuing notices on time, because of upheaval in the province or other matters, Masamoto had his men backdate the notices.<sup>73</sup>

It would be unfair to contend that Masamoto’s intention was gross misrepresentation with these simple fictions; for one thing, they are not hidden to the careful reader of the diary and financial documents. In considering the halving of the five-year acreage tax, for example, the documents of accounting are unequivocal about the lowered rate, and hints can be found in *Tabihikitsuke* even prior to the villagers’ specific discussion of it late in 1504. One appears in an entry concerning *kuratsuke*, quoted above, in which Masamoto wrote that the refreshment offered on that occasion, which had earlier been a light meal, was now just rice, “because we have reduced the *tansen*.”<sup>74</sup> A second hint is seen in a summer *tansen* bill issued in 1504, when Masamoto’s chief commissioner, Shinanokōji Nagamori, was away in the capital. In his place, the young retainer Takehara Sadao prepared the bill with the levy set at 50 *mon* per *tan*. He obviously knew what was being collected each season, but may have been unaware of the simple fiction portrayed on previous bills.<sup>75</sup>

Significant as it was for Masamoto to present an image of the estate’s fis-

cal system as sound and well-functioning, the primary reason for the simple fictions was the critical importance of precedent. As anyone who has done research on premodern elites of Japan knows, the touchstone for policies and procedures—as well as judging the actions others had taken—was precedent. Leaders at court, for example, commonly assigned scholars among their ranks to search records for instances in the past that would help them make decisions, particularly on difficult matters. The practice was as common in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as it was in earlier eras. Thus, when questions arose about how to censure or punish Kujō Masamoto and Hisatsune for the murder of Karahashi Arikazu, efforts were made to find useful precedents, or at least related examples.<sup>76</sup> As for the rejection of precedent, references to these appear frequently in courtier diaries and personal treatises that bemoan the discarding of traditions and practices held dear in the past. It is a pattern seen throughout much of the premodern era, exacerbated in periods of upheaval or change. Taira Kiyomori's political ascension in the twelfth century—marked by his destruction of precedents, according to many courtiers—was one such time, as was *senjoku*, when few court practices of earlier centuries were able to be maintained.

But it was not courtiers alone who put weight in precedents. The warriors did likewise, even though common images of them are as destroyers of such practices. In seeking evidence of this we need look no further than the upstart warrior-aristocrats of the twelfth century. In a recent study on the proliferation of documents and literary manuscripts in the early medieval era, Mikael Adolphson reveals how warrior elites (including the same destroyer of precedents, Taira Kiyomori, and his successors within the Kamakura shogunate) “pursued their agendas by enforcing and mimicking laws and precedents of the imperial court, not by subverting them.”<sup>77</sup>

What, though, about common people and their understanding of precedent? Evidence for periods before the early modern era is thin, to say the least. And yet, as we saw earlier, the villagers of Hine Estate were not ignorant of the estate's economic history and were ready to contest the proprietor's claims on that account at every step. So for Masamoto it was vitally important that written records revealed there was no variation in the stipulated tax rate, and that dates on tax bills—both of issuance and collection—remained consistent. In this manner, villagers in the future would be unable to assert that in such-and-such a year these practices were not maintained. Masamoto himself noted the importance of this in a diary entry late in the ninth month of 1503. At the time, notices for the autumn *tansen* had not been distributed (despite Masamoto's instructions to do so the previous week), and Masamoto was irate: “Though [Nagamori's] intention was to send out the tax

notices today, this date is inauspicious for any new undertaking. To get to this point and be late is irritating beyond words. If this season's bill for the acreage tax is submitted after winter begins, it will become a precedent that the villagers speak of.<sup>78</sup>

As Masamoto learned, precedent could cut both ways. On one hand, he was the beneficiary of a long-established, long-acknowledged annual tax system. Precedent was his friend in that realm. In other areas, however, precedent benefited the villagers, as they enjoyed customary tax reductions for non-producing lands while also feeling justified in staunchly resisting the *tansen*, a levy that lacked the weight of history. Masamoto tried to refute that argument, dismissing their reference to Ashikaga Yoshimasa's directive that prohibited *tansen* on lands held by courtier and religious elites, while also claiming a lengthy, if unsupported, history for the tax. But in the end he made concessions, implicitly acknowledging that precedent in some cases was on the village side.

Taxes, taxes, and more taxes, established and increased, revised and supplemented, offering a history of the land and its people as rich, and as narrow, as any other for much of Japan's past. For one wanting to draw conclusions about the effects of taxes on villagers in early *sengoku*, the abundant evidence from *Tabihikitsuke* and accounting records provides all one needs—but only if one is selective in choosing and ignoring material. As one measure, the number of imposts alone suggests a heavy burden: annual tax, acreage tax, wheat tax, labor tax, equinox tax, and miscellaneous taxes requiring offerings of horse mash, sesame seeds, tea, and other items. On other estates, the Kujō even threw in an intercalary year tax—after all there were extra days in that year, were there not?<sup>79</sup> What, we might ask, was not being taxed?

If the numbers and types of taxes alone were a clear measure of the overall weight of imposts, the question of villagers' tax burden during Japan's pre-modern eras would be easily understood. But the fact is that for any given era, and any given location, the data are incomplete and the variables too numerous for simple conclusions. The list of unknowns and partial knowns is long and includes the following: the types of crops grown (no longer thought to be mainly rice); the amount of land under cultivation; the productivity of paddies and fields; the agricultural productivity per capita; the tax rate on rice (was it 50 percent of the harvest, as in the Tokugawa era?—a reference alluded to by historians on occasion, but of little use, especially since the 50 percent figure of that era is thought to be mistaken); the object of taxation—was it just rice, except for much lighter levies on other items?

And if so, how were tax duties distributed so that rice growers alone did not shoulder most of the burden?

Restricted by limited data, historians consider the context, bolstering their arguments with evidence of economic surplus (and its ultimate destination), villager well-being and material culture, and decisions by villagers to petition and contest overseers, abscond, and even abandon their land. I have yet to address most of those factors, as this chapter has focused on the fundamental aspects of the tax system in the two villages, as well as on the disputes and negotiations between proprietor and villagers. Nonetheless, there are hints as to the complexity of the issues. For example, there was the villagers' success in seeing the *tansen* cut by half, among other concessions gained from Masamoto. Were those evidence of the economic leverage they wielded, or merely a recognition by Masamoto of the villagers' difficult situation at the time? If the former, then what is the meaning of Hineno East Side's 1502 request to abandon the set tax system of *jigeuke* and return to proprietor management (a less favorable system for them, according to historians)?

The picture is obviously mixed, admitting no simple answers. Moreover, in the following chapters it gains breadth and complexity, first, as I consider the economic pull and demands of outside forces on the villages, and second, as I examine larger questions about village life and society, questions in which long-term economics played a significant role, whether in money-lending, religious patronage, or social inequality. Economic concerns and conflicts were never far from the surface in early sixteenth-century Izumi, regardless of the proximate issues at hand.

## Bullied, Bruised, and Hungry

### Squeezed from All Sides

For villagers like those of Hineno and Iriyamada, it was not easy being the producers of the country's wealth. The first problem was an obvious one: the surplus they produced in this era of increasing productivity was not retained without a fight. It was contested by overseers, most obviously in the establishment of the seasonal acreage tax. A second problem lay in the turmoil of the age, something that opened the door to new forces seeking an economic base. And because so much of the country's wealth emanated from the villages, it was there that men of ambition, old blood and new, turned to garner income and expand their influence. The Kujō family—the proprietor of Hine Estate as established by imperial decree in 1234—was not alone in claiming the fruits of the two villages. Nor were additional claimants limited to the two obvious powers in the region, the Izumi *shugo* and Negoroji.

During the four years that Masamoto was in Izumi, outside claimants to the tax income of the estate numbered eight. Included in this group were four religious institutions or affiliated monks, the military governors of Izumi and Kii, and two minor officials in neighboring regions. Skirting Masamoto, the claimants presented written demands directly to the villagers, frequently backing these up with the threat of force. While the justifications behind the claims varied, the demands for taxes or other forms of revenue were of a kind. Typical in this regard was the following letter, addressed to Hineno East Side and originating with an individual who sought the return of unpaid loans.

Concerning the proprietor's section of this estate, in an earlier year [we] advanced funds to Kujō dono. If the villagers will kindly repay those as soon as possible, we will be greatly pleased. Please let us know your intentions. During this period, the honorable cultivators group will be responsible for the annual tax and miscellaneous taxes. If you choose not to comply, we will keep that in consideration.<sup>1</sup> However, if as in earlier years, [my master] were to be employed as estate deputy, then surely we would no longer speak of the matter of the funds advanced to his lordship. In any event, the provincial side [i.e., *shugo*] has entrusted this matter to us.

Today when I made efforts to address this matter with you, I learned that you had departed for the mountains, so I summoned Dōhō Kunai [a Hineno villager] and explained the gist of the matter to him. I wait for a detailed response from you, and I state these intentions firmly.

Respectfully.

7/26            [From:]      Kōda's assistant, Fujita Aritsugu  
                      [To:]         Hineno proprietor's side *bantō* group<sup>2</sup>

Kujō family documents reveal that Masamoto had employed Kōda, an estate official and landholder in the neighboring village of Kumatori, as a means of reimbursing a debt. Kōda's appointment as deputy was probably for a set period, with the understanding that it would end when compensation was complete. Four documents of accounting, extending from 1462 to 1472, note payments made to Kōda, revealing that his tenure covered at least those ten years, after which he was likely dismissed.<sup>3</sup> Given that there is no evidence of an outstanding loan (and no evidence that Kōda broached the subject for more than two decades), we can assume that he had a weak case. But this would have been of little comfort to the villagers, for whom the pressure to comply was real.

Nearly all claims had a history behind them, but most, like Kōda's, were rarely based on irrefutable evidence. The claims, it appears, were a starting point, a means to gain a toehold in contested or weakly held land. The fact that so many claims were advanced during the four years Masamoto resided in Izumi—laid out in letters forwarded to him by the villagers and then copied in *Tabihikitsuke*—makes one wonder if this was the norm for the period, if the struggle for lands had become this persistent, and if the claimants remained this diverse in class and status even into the early sixteenth century. The fact that Masamoto was in residence seems to have made little

difference to those pursuing the estate's revenue, and it seems fair to assume that there was nothing unusual about the rush for land and its income on Hine Estate at the time.

Whereas demands brought by Kōda and other individuals of limited means could be rebuffed with the support of Masamoto and his men, neither the Izumi *shugo* nor Negoroji were so readily dismissed. As we shall see in the following section, Hineno West Side was particularly pressed by the military governors, and suffered accordingly. But the West Side was not alone. The East Side and Iriyamada were likewise recipients of calls by the *shugo*, or their retainers, for payment of taxes. Of course, neither the upper *shugo*, Hosokawa Mototsune, nor the lower *shugo*, Hosokawa Masahisa, personally wrote or drafted letters demanding taxes. In fact, it is difficult to know how engaged they were in these efforts to extract revenue from the villagers, since their control of the land and the men under them was limited.<sup>4</sup> Though allied with the *shugo*, local men of influence maintained their own lands and interests at this time, even though they might be described by Masamoto as “retainers of the military governors.” Accordingly, some letters sent to the villagers reflect demands that appear to be those of the author alone; others are linked more closely to one or both *shugo*. Even in the former examples, however, the authors tied their demands to the power and authority of the *shugo*, as seen in the following letter of Hineno Mitsumori.

I address you by letter. Though I have made several requests for taxes since last year, to this point you have replied only with excuses and have failed to comply. This is completely unacceptable. Indeed, despite the [*shugo's*]<sup>5</sup> order to fully obey, you have held firmly to your selfish position. If you continue to act in this manner, refusing to submit, you should prepare yourself for the consequences. I will not speak of this again. I expect to receive your detailed reply shortly. Respectfully.

[1501] 8/4

[From:] Hineno \_\_\_\_ seal (name is erased, unreadable)

[To:] Hineno proprietor's side cultivators group<sup>6</sup>

A second letter reveals a closer link to the *shugo* and, more significantly, a new type of threat, one that retainers of the military governors would use on several occasions in the next four years. Just two days after the previous letter of Hineno Mitsumori, this was addressed to Tsuchimaru hamlet in Iriyamada. It appears that this was prepared and sent independently from Mits-

mori's, and perhaps without knowledge of it. The author in this instance was Nishimura Hidetsugu, described as a "*sbugo* retainer" by Masamoto. The key section of the letter is as follows: "We hear that his lordship [Masamoto] has pressured you to pay the annual tax and other levies to him, but if you do, you will be 'double taxed.' Because Hineno village is your 'parent village,' it is appropriate that you pay all taxes through Hineno."<sup>7</sup>

The concept of double taxing or *futaenashi* (二重成) was fairly common at the time, with references appearing over forty times in sources from the mid-fifteenth to mid-sixteenth centuries.<sup>8</sup> The rationale for it is well explained in the *Rokkaku-shi shikimoku* of 1567.

Payment of the annual tax rice [or] cash, as well as miscellaneous taxes, should be submitted to the established proprietary lord, as maintained over time. If by chance these are submitted to another individual, double taxing is to be carried out. Even if a fellow shows up under new circumstances and makes demands, [villagers] are to remain firm and make a report.<sup>9</sup>

As seen here, and as confirmed in the three instances in which *futaenashi* is referred to in *Tabihikitsuke*, the term appears most commonly not as a practice that had been implemented but as a threat.<sup>10</sup> In other words, though double taxing no doubt took place on occasion (as villagers of Hineno West Side learned, to their dismay), references to *futaenashi* usually point to the failings of a proprietor, brought about by encroachments from outside forces or recalcitrant villagers. Thus, *futaenashi* in word but not practice was evidence of local instability, of the existence of competing entities, none of which exercised firm control over the village or region in question. In such instances, it is not surprising that double taxing was rarely implemented.

At their core, these outside claims represented a struggle between the Kujō, as proprietors, and individuals and groups that hoped to supplant them—or at least extract a share of estate income. The villagers were the unfortunate link in the middle, caught between fights that were not really theirs. And for whatever reason, perhaps because of Masamoto's status at the top of the *kenmon* structure (wobbly though that structure now was), claimants spent no efforts plying him with their demands. Or perhaps they assumed there was no reason to approach Masamoto, who was unlikely to listen to them; better to push hard on the villagers themselves. But the villagers inevitably took the letters with claims to Masamoto, while seeking advice about how to respond. With Masamoto's knowledge, and his men's backing, most such advances were thwarted at their conception.

Most commonly, the message that came from Masamoto to the villagers was that the claimants' demands were without merit and should be dismissed. Besides firmly rejecting any and all claims, the villagers were to remind outside parties that "his lordship resides on the estate, directly administering these lands"<sup>11</sup> and that Kujō land rights had been repeatedly confirmed in shogunal directives.<sup>12</sup> More worrisome claims, such as those originating with the *shugo*, occasionally led Masamoto to threaten villagers who stepped out of line. For example, his message to East Side recipients of a *shugo* claim in 1501/8 concluded with the following: "If you make various excuses and are negligent in even one thing, we will take steps to ensure your compliance."<sup>13</sup> One month later, Tsuchimaru villagers were warned following receipt of *shugo* demands for the annual tax that anyone who accepted the claims and were dismissive of shogunal directives would be "severely punished," at Masamoto's order.<sup>14</sup> It seems there was little the villagers could do to appease the forces around them.

One response villagers took to combat pressure was to abscond, as we have seen. The practice had a long history, with some villagers in earlier centuries abandoning their land for more promising areas elsewhere, while others, when times were bad and oppression severe, left their homes and lands for good, or at least threatened to do so as a means of negotiation with overlords.<sup>15</sup> When absconding or threatening to do so at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the villagers of Hineno and Iriyamada had no intention of abandoning their lands and villages; they had too much invested in them, both in farming infrastructure (well-developed paddies, fields, and saucer ponds) and in family and cultural ties. The fact was well understood by power holders in the region, as seen in the comments of a Negoroji monk late in 1504, who plainly stated that although the villagers might protest increased taxes, "they surely would not run off to another province for long."<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, though villagers who absconded often did so as a protest against their overlord, they were not considered criminals. Their homes and property were generally free from intrusion and confiscation.<sup>17</sup> This was a second unwritten rule of absconding—the first, noted in chapter 1, being the stipulation that villagers who absconded were not free to continue to work their lands.

As a village protest against excessive tax demands, absconding often led to negotiations and compromise. Whole villages that departed had an advantage in this regard because without their labor there would be no crop, no harvest, and no income. Few overlords were willing to sacrifice a season's harvest and the tax income that came with that for a minor concession from villagers. Labor was still too scarce at the beginning of the sixteenth century

to treat it casually. Of course, what little advantage the villagers held in this regard was offset by their need to be at work, to produce the food and income that would not just pay taxes but also keep them fed during the coming year. Both overlords and villagers had a strong interest in seeing the work of growing and harvesting crops continue with little interruption.

Interruptions could occur, however, because of physical threats, a second impetus that drove villagers to abscond. The threat could come from the overlord himself (or itself, in the case of religious institutions) or from competing powers. At times of warfare the likelihood that villagers would be drawn into conflicts, or pressured to provide men and supplies (and loyalty), rose greatly—as did villagers’ willingness to leave homes to evade the threats.

Given the hardships involved in vacating homes and villages for days or even weeks, it seems logical to assume that the decision to do so was rare. But according to Masamoto, villagers of Hine Estate absconded on seven occasions while he was in residence.<sup>18</sup> Was life that miserable for them, or were the threats that grave? The numbers alone tell only part of the story. To begin with, tax disputes between Masamoto and the villagers were but one cause of the departures. Four times, the impetus to abscond was the threat of intrusion from outside powers—whether by Negoroji monks, retainers of the *shugo*, or others—or encroaching warfare. Next, the abscondings were limited to Hineno East and West Sides, and were carried out independently by each. No doubt the geography of Iriyamada allowed villagers there to remain at home when threats drove those on the plains to flee. And, for whatever reason, their disputes with Masamoto over taxes never pushed them to flee during these years. A third point is that the length of time villagers were away when absconding was short, a handful of days or fewer, on all but two occasions; apart from those, we see them back in their communities almost immediately. This and other evidence strongly suggest that some of these abscondings, certainly the abbreviated ones, were not inclusive of all individuals: women, children, and the elderly probably remained in the villages. Clearly, a village-wide departure for weeks was a radically different act (requiring extensive preparation of food and supplies) than skipping town for a day or two over ongoing tax disputes or in the face of an external threat.

Considered in context, two of the seven abscondings were weighty.<sup>19</sup> One was the result of province-wide upheaval in 1502. In order to escape warfare that closed in upon them in the fall of that year, the East Side villagers fled to the “thickets and mountains.” This is described after the fact in a letter the villagers sent to Masamoto’s commissioners, dated 10/29, but no date of departure is given. It appears, however, that the villagers were forced to spend time away from their homes during these battles more than once.<sup>20</sup>

The other weighty absconding occurred during Masamoto's first year in Izumi, and unlike that of 1502, it was multifaceted in cause and effect; moreover, it included both East and West Sides. Though the two groups absconded separately and for overlapping but distinct periods, the factors that pushed them to flee were the same. At the time—late summer and autumn of 1501—the two communities were under intense pressure from the competing powers of the Izumi *shugo* and Kujō Masamoto. Having arrived on the estate just a few months previous, Masamoto was determined to establish his authority as sole recipient of village taxes. That determination, however, was matched by the two military governors, who clearly viewed Masamoto as a threat to their plans in Hineno, which had already been undermined by Negoroji. An exchange between Masamoto and the West Side deputy, Aoki Tosa Nyūdō, reveals the tensions and issues involved.

In other matters, Aoki Nyūdō came with this message: “About the West Side cultivators, whether concerning the *tansen* or the summer wheat [tax], if we pressure them to pay in the present situation they will assuredly abscond, will they not? The villagers say [their hesitance to pay] is because the *shugo* are waiting for a response. Surely it is we, [Aoki said], who must stop the interference by the belligerent attendants of the *shugo*. If to the proprietor's demands to provide taxes [the villagers] fail to respond and then give these sorts of explanations, what are we to do? And won't [the *shugo*] repeatedly send men (*tsukai* 使) to the villages?” he asked.

To this I responded. “If the *shugo* send men, we'll hinder them, and at that time [the villagers] should abscond. In doing so, they will be showing loyalty to the proprietor. If, however, they abscond as a result of our efforts [to collect taxes], then they will be acting irresponsibly as villagers failing to serve the proprietor, and should be punished accordingly.”<sup>21</sup>

As the time of the fall harvest (and due dates for the annual tax and *tansen*) approached, the pressure on the villagers increased. Unable to placate either power without refusing the other, the villagers were stymied. So they fled, first those of the East Side, following attacks by Hineno Mitsumori, retainer of the upper *shugo*, and several weeks later those of the West Side. I discuss these incidents in detail in chapter 5, but the gravity of the situation is reflected in the length of time the two communities spent in the mountains: nearly two months for the East Side, one month for the West. And while the lengthy abscondings did not resolve matters in the long term,

the villagers made clear they were willing to sacrifice comfort and income in order to combat the intense pressures of overseers. In the process, they knew they would suffer losses, just as they knew the losses would extend to Masamoto and the *shugo*. In this sense, they would (and did) gain concessions for the coming years. Of most significance, in the three years that followed, the villagers were not pushed to the same extent, not driven to depart for the mountains for a month or more.

### Hineno West Side

Nowhere was the struggle for village wealth between Kujō Masamoto and the Izumi *shugo* played out so forcefully as on Hineno West Side. Both parties considered control of the village critical to their plans. For Masamoto, consolidating his hold on the West Side was the first step in restoring Hine Estate to its position more than a century previous. As he noted in a *Tabi-bikitsuke* entry two months into his stay, his goals were ambitious. “If I am able to do as I desire, these five villages will become as in the past a single family holding. In an era like this, for these many associates to have to accompany me here is no doubt a bother; but has not the time arrived for my long-wished-for desires to be fulfilled? This has been my determination since the day I came to reside on this estate.”<sup>22</sup> Besides Iriyamada and Hineno, the “five villages” of Hine Estate included Ibara, Kaminogō, and Tsuruhara, contiguous regions to the north and west. Obviously, if there was any hope of regaining control of them, Masamoto first needed to shore up his authority over the West Side, and he worked assiduously, at least early in his stay, to do so.

The position of the two Izumi *shugo* was in some ways analogous to Masamoto’s, despite their very different backgrounds. Like Masamoto, they were outsiders in the province, having been appointed only recently to their posts. Also like Masamoto they had claims, weak though they were, on lands in Hine Estate. These were a legacy of previous Hosokawa military governors, who made their first inroads in the estate around the beginning of the fifteenth century. Details are thin, but shogunate orders to desist from confiscating lands and income from the estate (and *shugo* acknowledgement of those orders) appear off and on during the first two decades of the century.<sup>23</sup> Then during the 1420s, the military governors were able to be appointed estate deputies (*daikan*, which by this point were just tax collectors for proprietors), evidence of which appears in documents in which they promised to forward the tax, minus their allotted portion, to the Kujō.<sup>24</sup> Writing of

this in 1502, Kujō Masamoto acknowledged the contract provided to the *shugo* at that time, while noting that their lawless confiscation of rice income led his father to dismiss them. This occurred in 1429, but disputes would continue in the years that followed, and Kujō Michiie, Masamoto's father, more than once sought the shogunate's help in ending the *shugo*'s confiscation of tax income.<sup>25</sup> One reason the struggles continued as they did, back and forth, with neither side establishing firm control, is that none of the principals were ensconced in Izumi: Kujō Michiie resided in Kyoto and probably never visited Hine Estate, and the Hosokawa military governors at the time would have likewise been inhabitants of the capital, kept in check there by the shogunate.<sup>26</sup>

The designs that Masamoto and the *shugo* had on the West Side were well known to its inhabitants, who frequently lamented their unenviable position. By all indications, life was easier for the inhabitants of the East Side and Iriyamada than for those in the western section. Furthermore, despite Masamoto's efforts to treat the whole of the estate as one, with uniform policies and standard procedures, fissures in that approach soon became apparent, and the West Side stood out as distinctly different, distinctly problematic. The issue was not just one of differences brought on by geography or *shugo* pressure, however. What eventually becomes clear in *Tabihikitsuke* is that there was a gap separating Masamoto and the West Side, one that he ultimately failed to bridge.

One factor in this was the West Side's status as a holding of Tominokōji Toshimichi. It was part of the estate that Masamoto had transferred to Toshimichi sometime prior to 1479 in order, to put it frankly, to shift to him the burden of fighting the *shugo* for control of it.<sup>27</sup> This meant that Masamoto's interest in the West Side did not reach as deeply as it did in his own sections, as much as he asserted otherwise. Certainly Masamoto did not begin his sojourn with the expectation that he would neglect the West Side. However, the administration of it was to be the responsibility of Toshimichi's men, not his, and tax collection and record-keeping for it was to be left to them, too. Extant records for it within Kujō family documents are accordingly far fewer in number than those for the East Side.

Just as significant, in moving his residence from Muhenkōin in Hineno to Chōfukuji in Iriyamada just one week after his arrival, Masamoto effectively distanced himself from the villages on the plain. His men kept him informed about developments, but he had no chance to see things there himself. In contrast, his dealings with the hamlets of Iriyamada were frequent and remarkably intimate, even if he personally met with few individuals. As a result, he knew the *bantō* of the Iriyamada hamlets by name,

enjoyed village festivals and cultural events there, and experienced the same fear and concern as his neighbors did when outside forces attacked. Added to these factors was the reality of the West Side villagers' intransigence and occasional willingness to disregard Masamoto's orders. The villagers tried his patience and tested his resolve. Remarkably, they also gained his sympathy.

The contest between Masamoto and the *shugo* over the West Side's tax revenue was as regular as the seasons. Physically separate from the estate as they were, the *shugo* chose to pressure the West Side early and often as each tax period approached. Thus, in 1501, they delivered *tansen* notices to the West Side on 5/2, eleven days earlier than Masamoto. Moreover, payment was due by the 6th, a very short period for settling the account. As if to emphasize matters, they sent a messenger to the West Side the next day demanding three laborers for an upcoming trip to the capital.<sup>28</sup> Though in coming months the *shugo* would also issue tax notices to the East Side and Iriyamada, on this first occasion their sole target was the West Side.<sup>29</sup>

In response to the *shugo*'s demands, the West Side deputy, Aoki Tosa Nyūdō, instructed the villagers not to accept the notice or the requisition for laborers. "All matters regarding the annual tax and miscellaneous taxes," he informed them, "are to be entrusted to his lordship's orders." So the villagers held off with their payments, but neither did they submit them to Masamoto after receiving the proprietor's *tansen* notice. A month passed with no change and no clear developments. Then on 6/10, Aoki learned that "attendants to the two *shugo* were raising men and would soon be entering the West Side." Masamoto's retainers and the local villagers prepared to meet the invaders, but the outside forces turned back before the two sides met. In a message dispatched to Sakai, the would-be invaders noted that they not only lacked mosquito nets for the night, but also faced resistance from village forces. Before turning back, however, they threatened to return to Hineno with a large force and compel the locals to submit.<sup>30</sup>

At the urging of Aoki, who believed the villagers were on the verge of absconding, Masamoto took steps to protect the West Side from *shugo* intrusions while showing patience in the collection of the *tansen*.<sup>31</sup> The approach worked, as the *shugo*'s men were convinced to abandon their efforts for a season. Masamoto did better: a document of accounting for 1501 reveals his receipt of the West Side summer *tansen*.<sup>32</sup>

Less than three months later, as the fall harvest neared, the process began anew. This time the annual tax was the source of contention, with demands to pay it and the miscellaneous taxes to the "provincial side" (*kunigata* 國方), delivered in a letter from a *shugo* retainer. The letter also included a threat to punish the villagers if they chose not to defy the Kujō. Such arrogance was

“hard to describe,” according to Masamoto.<sup>33</sup> Of course, tax notices from Masamoto’s men soon followed and pressure built steadily upon the West Side villagers.<sup>34</sup> Finally, in a lengthy and pitiful letter of 9/19, addressed to Aoki, the village leadership set forth their case before Masamoto. In it they compared themselves to their counterparts from the East Side, who had recently absconded under *shugo* pressure. When the latter were confronted with lawlessness by provincial forces—“the abduction of village leaders, the burning of homes, or the theft and pillage of goods, implements, and horses and cattle”—they could flee, as they had recently done. But it was not an option available to them on the West Side, they claimed, because to do so would bring about severe retribution by the military governors, “making survival within this province impossible.” Indeed they would become “the honorable cultivators who are enemies of the province [*kuni*].”<sup>35</sup>

Their plea to Aoki was that he come to the estate office to help negotiate a settlement in the next day or two when the *shugo*’s retainers returned. To fail to do so would leave the villagers with no choice but to submit the tax to them. Masamoto’s reply, sent by way of Aoki, was stiff. In it he reminded the villagers of the “repeated judgments of the shogun,” in which the *shugo*’s claims had been rejected. To pay even a fraction of the taxes to the *shugo* would result in harsh punishments. Based upon the stock phrases he used, the villagers may have read this as an empty threat, but the next sentence got their attention: “If, as you relayed to us the previous day, you accept the demands from the province, and then hem and haw about the orders that have come from here, we will send an armed force against you” (*kono kata to shite hakkō subeshi* 爲此方可發向).<sup>36</sup>

The West Side farmers were aghast, yet hardly ready to succumb. Their reply the next day was remarkably cogent, mixing assertions of loyalty (“thinking well of his lordship, we have served him in many ways during the difficult spring and summer he has resided here”); disbelief and betrayal at Masamoto’s unwillingness to help (“to refuse to mediate on behalf of the safety and tranquility of the villagers, something that will surely result in harm to his lordship’s honorable cultivators”); and righteous indignation over the threat of sending an armed force against them (“an impropriety beyond words”). They ended with a threat of their own: if the *shugo* sent men that day to collect the annual tax as promised, they had no intention of withholding it.<sup>37</sup>

Clearly unsettled by the villagers’ vigorous response, Masamoto convened a meeting with his top officials. Rather than give ground, they concluded that the villagers had to be corrected, had to be punished for threatening to submit taxes to the military governors. To fail to do so would lead “the cultivators to act more and more just as they please.”<sup>38</sup>

At dawn on 9/23, five days after the crisis began, Shinanokōji Nagamori and Ishii Aritoshi accompanied Aoki to the West Side, took captive a village *bantō*, and returned with him to Iriyamada. Feeling great pressure as a result of this and an invasion that same day by a *shugo* force, the West Side villagers absconded (despite having claimed earlier that it was not an option).<sup>39</sup> At this point, a new standoff began. Would the villagers submit to Masamoto, pay the tax, and see the *bantō* freed, or would Masamoto, concerned about the loss of the unplanted winter wheat crop, give in and allow the villagers to return without paying? A week passed with no developments. Then during the second week, Masamoto's men repeatedly caught West Side cultivators back in their fields planting wheat (as described in chapter 1). Clearly the villagers wanted to get back to work. As for Masamoto, he had already acquiesced considerably and appears to have been ready to see the fields remain unplanted that winter if need be.

Word came in bits and pieces over the next two weeks that the villagers were willing to submit the tax, but Masamoto was wary of their promises.<sup>40</sup> Until payment was received, his men were to “patrol the West Side and prevent villagers from planting wheat.”<sup>41</sup> Finally on 10/30, four village elders—the most respected individuals in Hineno, representing both East and West Sides—called at Chōfukuji to petition Masamoto to release the *bantō*. After lengthy negotiations that reached deep into the night, Masamoto relented and freed the man, contingent upon their promise that the tax would be paid in full. True to their word, the bulk of it was brought in the next day.<sup>42</sup>

Despite the extreme posturing, bitter struggles, and five-week imprisonment of the West Side *bantō*, in the end Masamoto gave up nothing and the villagers paid their long-accepted duty of the annual tax. But this was a stinging loss for the villagers who, before the year was out, had submitted full payment to the *shugo* as well—something verified in a *Tabihikitsuke* entry the following year.<sup>43</sup> The double tax was a reality in this case for the West Side.

Given the result of the struggles over the 1501 annual tax, it is no surprise that when the question of taxes came up in 1502, the West Side villagers balked. Determined to avoid the double payment of the year previous, they worked out a deal with Sakai to split their payment of the annual tax, half to the *shugo* and half to Masamoto. Masamoto firmly rejected the idea, insisting that the villagers adhere to the guidelines set by the shogunate, which supported the Kujō as sole proprietors, free from *shugo* interference.<sup>44</sup> In response, the villagers protested, not by absconding but by “standing bamboo grass” (*sasa o hiku* 引篠), a form of resistance commonly directed

against overlords, and often committed to in a pact before the gods. Bamboo grass, which had long been used as a hedge to separate residential and non-residential lands, was believed to be a physical medium in which the *kami* manifested themselves, and thus it acted as a barrier, denying entry to outsiders, such as those coming to collect taxes. In some cases, villagers also strung *shimenawa*, the twisted rope seen at shrines, a marker denoting sacred, or in this case protected, space. Taken as a whole, standing bamboo grass reflected a belief by villagers that they were in the right, that their position was moral, backed by the gods. By no means did this assure them that their petitions would be accepted, but it made a strong case: the petitions deserved careful consideration and the enclosed property deserved respect. In that sense, these acts reflected a growing consciousness of property rights, of villagers' claims to homes and lands as theirs, something less likely to have been seen among villagers in the ancient or early medieval eras.<sup>45</sup>

Underlying the strained relations between Masamoto and the West Side villagers was, to put it bluntly, a lack of trust. One might scoff at the very notion of trust as a relevant prism through which to examine relations, for if dealings between the two parties were solely economic, and brutally defined at that, then there was of course no room for trust. But a careful reading of *Tabihikitsuke* forces us to reject so constricted a view. The military governors may have had no use for trust in their dealings with the villagers (something reflected in their communications), but it clearly mattered to Masamoto and his "honorable cultivators," even if it was imperfect at times and forced at others. Where the West Side was concerned, the level of trust was always thin at best.

The reasons for this are not hard to find, with the first appearing within a day of Masamoto's arrival in Izumi, as noted in the Introduction. That occasion was the visit of East and West Side *bantō*, on which they welcomed Masamoto to their village and proffered delicacies and casks of wine. Thoughtful as this was, wrote Masamoto, word of collusion between West Side *bantō* and a *shugo* retainer was disconcerting—a note he made immediately following his mention of the visit.<sup>46</sup> Six months later, at the time of the crisis that culminated in the capture and imprisonment of the West Side *bantō*, Masamoto weighed in on the question of the villagers' loyalty in a discussion with Aoki Tosa Nyūdō. He stated that even if both Hineno village units, East and West, committed to band together in the face of an invasion by the *shugo*'s men, when an attack occurred "surely the West Side would align fully with the provincial side."<sup>47</sup> Coming in the midst of a protracted and bitter confrontation over the annual tax, Masamoto's assessment was excessively pessimistic, but it reflects the lack of faith he had in the residents of the western section.

Though rare, additional evidence of this lack of trust, and the reasons for it, appear occasionally in *Tabihikitsuke*. An incident early in 1502 is a good example. It is particularly significant since there was little reason at the outset for it to become a point of contention. Writing on 2/1, Masamoto noted that a porter traveling to the estate from Kyoto had been stopped by *shugo* retainers, who stripped him of letters and luggage. “Unbelievable,” wrote Masamoto. At that point, it seemed likely Masamoto would send a complaint to Sakai, as well as to the shogunate, his common approach to *shugo* lawlessness of this sort. Instead, two days later, he had Ishii Aritoshi draft a letter to the *bantō* and cultivators of the Tsujibana hamlet of Hineno West Side. Noting that the incident occurred within their community (which lay at the western edge of the estate, close to the town of Sano), he accused the residents of negligence, of turning a blind eye to the sordid actions of thieves, “an impropriety beyond words.” The letter added that the “judgments of the shogun will be enforced in this matter,” and “the villagers will not escape punishment.” It is not clear what evidence, if any, Masamoto had to back up his claims, but on the 6th the *bantō* sent a letter in reply, civil in tone and claiming innocence. They wrote that they only heard later about the incident, which occurred along the coast road, and they could do nothing about it because they were elsewhere at the time. In fact, “when they expressed surprise about the situation, women in the village pointed out that the thieves had been retainers of the military governors.” In concluding the letter, they wondered if the porter himself was beyond suspicion. With this, the situation was defused, and Masamoto, perhaps realizing he had overstepped his bounds, let the matter drop.<sup>48</sup>

Two other examples date to early autumn of 1503. The first occurred within the context of a dispute involving the East Side, Iriyamada, and Hineno Mitsumori, which I examine in detail in chapter 7. In describing events of one day, Masamoto recorded that an East Side official stated that letters “had been delivered by a retainer of Hineno Mitsumori, a certain Jirōemon, a West Side cultivator.”<sup>49</sup> The implications here were obvious. To describe a villager as a retainer of a local warrior (who was himself a retainer of the upper *shugo*) suggested bonds of loyalty, as well as economic ties, that could only undermine Masamoto’s efforts on the West Side.

Then just three months later, in a letter to East Side cultivators, *shugo* officials referred to a West Side *bantō* as the *kunigata bantō*, meaning a *bantō* in the service of the provincial side.<sup>50</sup> Since *bantō* were appointees of the proprietor, the West Side *bantō* had presumably received their positions under Masamoto’s associate, Tominokōji Toshimichi. Did this mean that the military governors had taken the liberty of appointing their own *bantō*, or that

one of Toshimichi's *bantō* had agreed to represent their interests? Or was it just a turn of phrase used by the officials, suggestive of their own biases and the *bantō*'s leanings? In any event, Masamoto would not have missed the significance of this description.

Before dismissing the West Side villagers as "always allied with the *shugo*," as some scholars have asserted, it is wise to consider other evidence, some of which we have already seen.<sup>51</sup> This extends from the sharing of welcome gifts, on one hand, to the Kujō's unique *kuratsuke* practices (in which West Side *bantō* participated) on the other, as well as offerings by the proprietor at the time of New Year's auspicious writing ceremonies (which I discuss in chapter 7) and numerous efforts by Masamoto and his men to protect the West Side from outside intrusions. Surprising displays of trust can be found occasionally, too. One, exhibited by Masamoto himself, occurred at the time he agreed to free the *bantō* he had held captive for five weeks in early winter of 1501, despite the fact that no tax payments had been received from the West Side. As Masamoto noted in his diary, his men were adamantly opposed to this, arguing that "Without question, if we free him in this manner, there will be no payments, whether of the remainder of the annual tax or the *tansen*. Only after all taxes are received, should he be released." But Masamoto ignored them and accepted the promises of the village leaders, with whose trust he was rewarded.<sup>52</sup> At that point, at least, West Side villagers were the Kujō's "honorable cultivators" and the Kujō their "lords of many generations."

An incident that well portrays the complicated relationship between Masamoto and the West Side villagers occurred in spring of 1504. In defiance of the previous year's requisition for the autumn *tansen*, West Side villagers stood bamboo grass late in 1503, and it was still in place well into the next year, when the villagers on 4/4 sent a letter to Masamoto asking for assistance because Negoroji monks were rumored to be on the march. Here is what Masamoto wrote of the situation.

Since last year the West Side has stood bamboo grass, and at this point the villagers have still not paid the [acreage] tax. And yet the cultivators group now presents a petition—a very strange situation indeed. Because they have encountered troubles, does this mean that the decisions they make within the given context do not matter? And if by chance they were the victims of arson, and the village firmly presented a petition [for help] that I ultimately rejected, would they honestly say from the depth of their hearts in succeeding days that they did not recognize me as the estate lord? To present a petition

while standing bamboo grass is taking a position that tries to cover both ends. How is one to respond to this? I am at a loss as to what to do. Do those who have been standing bamboo grass since last year not deserve an answer? But if by chance their village is burned, and I speak to them afterwards, surely I will have no words to say.<sup>53</sup>

Later that year, as Masamoto prepared to depart for the capital, the West Side villagers were confronted with an issue that forced them to consider their ties to the Kujō. At the time, Masamoto and Negoroji monks were in negotiations over the Karahasi debt and the future of estate management, while the Izumi *shugo* were pushing their claims forcefully. In the midst of this, the *shugo* and Negoroji reached a tentative agreement, by which the two powers would impose and share *hanzei* (the military half-tax) in Izumi—a creative interpretation of this tax prerogative.<sup>54</sup> The details of the arrangement are unclear and there is some question as to if it were actually put into practice: the two sides clearly did not have warm feelings for each other. At any rate, late in the eighth month, a retainer of the Izumi *shugo* by the name of Motoyama asked for a meeting with Ryūshōin Seishū, a representative of four Negoroji monks that were pushing to be appointed deputies of Hine Estate after Masamoto left. The subject he wanted to discuss was Hine Estate and the payment of *hanzei*. The tax was something that, in Motoyama's words, Masamoto had been confiscating. None had been paid to Sakai because of the proprietor's intervention, and the *shugo* wanted a guarantee that this would change.<sup>55</sup>

What Motoyama proposed was that “if the *shugo* and Negoroji again come to battle, and if by chance Negoroji defeats the *shugo* and advances as far as Sakai, based upon these discussions now, this location [Hine Estate] will be dealt with without change as *hanzei*. And on the other hand, if the *shugo* were to win in battle and advance as far as the great gate at the temple [i.e., Daidenbōin, of Negoroji], the West Side will still, without deviation, be required to provide *hanzei*.”<sup>56</sup> It was an interesting argument, evidence of the weight the *shugo* placed upon the economics of political control rather than military dominance. In response, Ryūshōin stated that he had no authority to agree or disagree with such a proposal but it was unlikely that his masters would look kindly on this arrangement, having just settled affairs with Masamoto.

A gathering of the seven West Side *bantō* to discuss Motoyama's proposal, replete with food and drinks, followed within a day or two at Kōzen'an, a local Buddhist temple. It was probably arranged, and paid for, by Ryūshōin, who was in attendance.<sup>57</sup> For both parties—the West Side villagers and the

monks hoping to serve as estate deputies—the issue was serious; having an agreed upon response to the *shugo*'s suggestion of a divided half-tax was critical. So they met to consider the proposal and the position they should take. They discussed whether or not to send word of it to Masamoto (which they obviously did) and ultimately whether they should make plans to pay or resist the half-tax. At a critical juncture, one *bantō*, Shōhō Kunai, spoke up. “The *shugo*,” he claimed, “are fundamentally wrong. Our ties to the Kujō have extended for generations.<sup>58</sup> If with much effort we loyally serve Kujō dono, all will be good.” Apparently unconvinced, one villager responded that “if word of this is leaked to the *shugo*, surely we will be killed.” But Shōhō Kunai was undeterred, as described by Masamoto.

When in response to further questions he gave his opinion concerning the village situation in the future—that [to serve the Kujō] would be good indeed—and thus strongly remonstrated with the others, Ryūshōin noted his agreement. “I too think the same way. And it seems that the villagers privately do as well.” “The important thing is that we leave matters to precedent, and thus consider the position of his lordship, here on out, doing and instructing accordingly”—such were the strict agreements made within the *bantō* group, I was told.<sup>59</sup>

Unsure of the future, and not yet convinced that the Kujō would be displaced as proprietors, the West Side villagers chose to hold firm, to resist incursions by new powers. The threat of the Izumi *shugo* was real, but perhaps it was best withstood by remaining allied with the overseer they were familiar with.

The primary story line of Hineno West Side during these years is one of struggle, lost income, and unyielding demands by outsiders, in particular the Izumi *shugo* and Kujō Masamoto. The *senjōku* world depicted here is mean and difficult and the villagers at the mercy of the powerful. In most respects, they suffered not because they were peasants or commoners per se, but because they were a prize being fought over by elites; they were victims both of location and circumstance. Given the difficulty of their position, and the complexity of the situation—with demands and pressure coming from both sides (and eventually from Negoroji, too)—is it any wonder that West Side villagers felt trapped, unsure of how to act or to whom to show loyalty (as if loyalty could be measured in the payment of a tax)? We should not expect them to have been either consistent or unified, and as portrayed in *Tabihikitsuke*, they were neither.

## Drought

The *Tabihikitsuke* entry of 1503/6/14 (July 7) is brief, and ominous: “People are talking about the possibility of drought. The water in the ponds is nearly depleted. If the sun shines without break for five or ten more days the ‘black heads’ will be in trouble, I am told.”<sup>60</sup> The black heads. Usually Masamoto referred to them as *jige* (地下), which I translate as villagers (though more properly it just means commoners), and which Masamoto used throughout the diary to describe the common folk of the estate or of a village or hamlet within it. Just eight times during these four years he wrote of them as *reigen* (黎元), or “black heads,” six in relation to drought or nourishing rain.<sup>61</sup>

The basic meaning of the two terms, *jige* and *reigen* are the same; both denoted commoners, as opposed to the elite. But whereas *jige* was widely used at the time, with definitions that included *jigenin* and *jigeshu* in the Japanese-Portuguese dictionary *Vocabulario da Lingoa de Iapam* of 1603, *reigen* appears infrequently, and it was unknown to the editors of *Vocabulario*. By describing the villagers as *reigen*, Masamoto may have been attempting to distance himself from them, perhaps to define them broadly as a class of rural inhabitants or to separate himself from their suffering in describing drought. Not that *reigen* was a derogatory term. It apparently originated in the idea that commoners were seen in public with bare heads, thereby displaying their black hair in contrast to members of the courtier elite, who appeared in distinctive white headgear, with hair covered and tucked into large protrusions at the rear of those, reflecting their status as public officials.<sup>62</sup> Perhaps that was so, but it was certainly as fitting that the villagers were “black heads” or “dark heads” as a result of working in the sun, something foreign to men and women of Masamoto’s ilk. In any event, two weeks later as a result of the drought, the “black heads” were grieving, and in spring of the next year, when “rain fell wildly throughout the night,” the “black heads’ were overjoyed,” confident that they were not to be cursed with consecutive years without rain.<sup>63</sup>

The threat of drought had also confronted the villagers two years previous, shortly after Masamoto’s arrival in Izumi. On that occasion, Masamoto’s first mention of concern was on 7/20 (August 2), near the end of summer, and more than a month later in the year than in 1503. Rather than write of the drought’s effects, he wrote of the villagers’ planned response to it.

From today rites for rain are to be performed before Takinomiya Shrine (this by the monks of Inunakiyama Shippōryūji). Without fail

we will receive ‘sweet rain’ within three days. If it does not rain, they will perform the same at the waterfall Shippōryū. And if their prayers are not granted then, they will conduct these at Fudō Myōō Hall. After that, if by chance there is still no rain, they will put an impure item (such as a deer bone or head-shaped object) into the waterfall pool. With that, it is impossible for rain not to fall, I have been told.<sup>64</sup>

Masamoto was clearly intrigued by the succession of rites to be performed, conducted at sacred spaces in ascending order of importance (and elevation)—at least where precipitation was concerned. Takinomiya Shrine was on the Iriyamada valley floor, Shippōryū waterfall was far up the canyon near the top of the mountain Inunakiyama, and Fudō Myōō Hall was the sanctuary at the temple of Shippōryūji devoted to the buddha of that name. The progression was not only from lower to higher elevation but also from a shrine dedicated to a native deity to a sacred space high in the mountains, and then to a particularly powerful deity worshipped at the temple. With the last step, the villagers apparently gave up on the good will of the gods and buddhas and sought to disgust or anger the dragon god into sending rain (thus the polluted items in the waterfall pool, believed to be home to the god).<sup>65</sup>

Not only was Masamoto intrigued by the rites but his description suggests that he too believed in their efficacy, something confirmed in the following days’ entries. On 7/22, the third day of the rites, “sweet rain” fell in the valley, evidence according to Masamoto that “the workings of the [Takinomiya] deity are miraculous indeed, to be proclaimed and revered.” A week later after a furious rainfall, “not one drop of which fell outside this valley and the four villages within it,” he reiterated his praise of the deity’s power.<sup>66</sup>

The villagers were likewise impressed, apparently with good reason. The dry weather of the sixth and early seventh months foreshadowed difficult months ahead, with a depleted crop and suffering, possibly death, from hunger and malnutrition before winter was out and in the following spring. As it was, the villagers knew all too well of “spring hungers,” a result of diminished food supplies during the bleak months prior to the first harvest of the year—the winter wheat. In years of abundant harvests, the spring hungers could be avoided. But pests or inconsistent rains could stifle crops, leading to hunger for at least some of the residents. And severe droughts led to famine from which few villagers escaped unscathed. So the “black heads” had reason to worry.<sup>67</sup>

Yet within a week after the rites for rain had begun in 1501, weather patterns shifted sharply and precipitation came regularly; no more was

mentioned of drought. Instead one sees in Masamoto's diary periodic notations for rain interspersed among clear days, as if all were normal, evidence that the gods had heard the villagers' pleas. Of course the villagers were elated. In celebration, the communities of Iriyamada performed a "dance of joy for rain" (*ameyorokobi no furyū*) at Takinomiya Shrine. Thirty-seven years had passed since the last such occasion, and the villagers, according to Masamoto, "celebrated especially exuberantly." The upper two hamlets—Funabuchi and Shōbu—performed with banners of silk, the lower two—Ōgi and Tsuchimaru—with banners of indigo. Not only were "dances of all sorts performed," but there was sumo wrestling and other activities before the shrine, "all of particular interest." Then in late afternoon the dancers appeared at Chōfukuji, Masamoto's residence, to perform for him and others there. They then returned to the shrine for their final performances. Just as the festivities were ending, rain again began to fall—"a wonderful sign of the gods' concern."<sup>68</sup>

This moisture that brought such delight, even rapture, was indeed "sweet rain," the absence of which brought despair, the abundance of which nourished hope. The etymology of the word "sweet rain" (*kan'u* 甘雨) is uncertain, but its meaning was clear: the rain that nourishes and sustains crops. It was, in Masamoto's words, a "damp blessing that fosters growth."<sup>69</sup> Falling as it did by definition in the growing season, it invariably brought joy to the villagers, and its effects were immediate. Water that collected in streams and reservoirs was a different thing, vital and needful and by all accounts much desired, but it was not "sweet rain." Thus, when rain fell vigorously early in the seventh month of 1504, Masamoto noted that "although the water has filled the paddies, it is as 'sweet rain' for the fields that prayers have been offered [and answered] recently."<sup>70</sup>

In 1503 dry weather came early. Masamoto's first mention of it appeared nearly five calendar weeks before that of 1501.<sup>71</sup> And this time the rites for rain were of no effect, conducted though they were over a week's period and, as Masamoto put it, "with much effort and skill in various locations."<sup>72</sup> In the weeks that followed, Masamoto presented a litany of bad news about the drought. It is the dominant theme of his writings for nearly two months, and he noted its effects—in peasant suffering, a miserable harvest, lost tax revenue, and fear for the future—for another six.

It is important to keep in mind just how rare a figure Masamoto was among elite estate proprietors, few of whom experienced life on a *shōen* or saw firsthand the effects of a mercurial climate, or pests, upon the crops and residents of their land. Nagahara Keiji's argument that in the late medieval era peasants tended to see the local military steward (*jitō*) as a villain and the

proprietor as their friend, in large part because the steward was the immediate power and could be ruthless and demanding while the proprietor was distant and seemingly benign, certainly has validity.<sup>73</sup> However, with Masamoto what we see is a proprietor who functioned as the immediate authority, but whose eyes were opened to the harsh realities, and bounties, of the countryside, and who was frequently sympathetic to the villagers' plight. His residence at Chōfukuji, a small and simple temple complex, sat squarely in the middle of rice fields, and the Kashii River flowed past the temple no more than fifty meters to the north. Feeling fatigued one day in the spring of 1503, Masamoto noted that he went to the river for the pleasure of observing it.<sup>74</sup> Of course, drought and its effects were just as immediate; Masamoto could not have avoided seeing them had he tried to do so.

Thus one can trace the painful progression of the drought over the days and weeks, marked by Masamoto's references to its increasing severity and the peasants' increasing hopelessness: "Damage from the drought has extended to more than half of the paddies"; "dreadful, dreadful"; "the common folk further bemoan their situation"; "the river beds are completely dry"; "frightening and sad"; "the extent of the drought is hard to fathom"; "because of the drought the commoners are preparing to deal with the worst"; and so forth.<sup>75</sup>

On 7/10 (August 1), Masamoto provided a more detailed image:

The drought is extremely severe. Everyone, including women and children, goes to the river, scoops up what little water there is in buckets, and carries that to pour on the paddies, I have heard. What happens is that in the paddies of the early rice, the heads emerge and in that condition dry out, white and stark, while the leaves get twisted and turn red. It is a tragic situation, something one should not have to look upon. Very grievous. Very sad.<sup>76</sup>

Despite the villagers' plight, and despite the fact that his physical well-being was unaffected either by spring hungers or severe drought, Masamoto knew that the cost of crop failure to him was high, too, as it invariably resulted in lost income. Late in the seventh month, the Iriyamada *bantō* called at Chōfukuji to discuss options for managing the harvest, what little there was of it, and to plan for the year ahead. If rain fell before many days passed, they thought they could turn the paddies into dry fields and plant mugwort; wheat would be planted two to three months later. Masamoto favored an immediate inspection of the early rice, which had been planted near the first of the year and was all but ruined by drought. He wondered if perhaps

the annual tax could be paid from what remained of it and the crop of mugwort.<sup>77</sup>

Like rice, mugwort would have been planted for its cash value, not as a food crop for the soon-to-be hungry villagers. There was little point in the *bantō* pleading with their proprietor to allow them to plant and cultivate quick-maturing food crops to be eaten by the villagers in the lean months ahead. Their first responsibility, as they well knew, was to the Kujō. Even if they were able to gain concessions from Masamoto, those would inevitably be limited in size. So the villagers turned to mugwort, an herb used both as a bitter condiment in rice cakes and as the burning agent for moxibustion. It apparently had enough cash value, and was quick enough to mature, that the villagers considered it the best crop to cultivate at this stage.

As for the year's taxes, Masamoto and his men attempted to levy and collect them as normal, but soon ran into resistance. By the time the summer *tansen* was due on 6/10, the drought had begun to take hold; the question of its severity alone remained unanswered. The Iriyamada tax-day treat, as Masamoto noted, was late. If the others were held (no mention appears in *Tabihikitsuke*), it seems likely that the atmosphere at the gatherings was tense. A document of accounting for the East Side summer *tansen* of 1503 records a full payment of over 9 *kan*, but it did not come readily. Writing on 7/8, Masamoto recorded that a messenger dispatched to the East Side, sent there because the "spring" *tansen* had still not been paid, was "badly treated." In response, Shinanokōji Nagamori and Takehara Sadao departed for the plains, "prepared to issue punishments if met with violence." As for the West Side, a document of accounting for the summer *tansen* records that the tax was cut to 30 *mon* per *tan* because of crop damage, resulting in income of just 4 *kan* 800 *mon*.<sup>78</sup>

Things did not improve with the autumn *tansen*, beginning with Shinanokōji Nagamori's failure to send out notices. On 9/21, Masamoto recorded that although he had given instructions to issue the seasonal *tansen* bills, "Nagamori pointed out various difficulties that he was aware of and so had postponed issuing them."<sup>79</sup> Just what those difficulties were is unclear, but eight days later the notices remained undelivered and Masamoto was exasperated. He summoned Nagamori and "strictly questioned him," but the latter "gave no valid reason for his failure to act."<sup>80</sup> Inexplicable though his actions were to Masamoto, it seems likely that Nagamori was hoping to avoid an unpleasant encounter with the villagers, given the impending famine they were sure to face. Clearly the villagers would be desperate—as later events bore out. Masamoto himself was shielded from direct contact with the villagers, but that was not true for Nagamori, who dealt closely with

them on matters both pleasant and painful. Moreover, he was stuck between Masamoto's insistence and the cultivators' resistance. And as Masamoto's top official, it was his responsibility to issue *tansen* notices, which he did twice yearly. In good years, he was often met with petitions to reduce or cancel the taxes, and occasionally the villagers simply refused to cooperate when he or his men arrived to collect payments.<sup>81</sup> So one can imagine his reticence on this occasion, when to the villagers all appeared hopeless.

The absence of documents of accounting for the annual tax make assessments of its collection in 1503 difficult. But it was collected, and in all three village units. Masamoto's daily entries in *Tabihikitsuke* during the latter half of the tenth month make that clear.<sup>82</sup> However, the amount the groups paid (particularly those of the West Side, recalcitrant as they usually were, and of the East Side, whose tax assessment was now based on an annual physical inspection) is unknown. Perhaps Masamoto received all that was due. Or perhaps he lowered the rate for all village units that year; after all, the previous year he had offered to cut one-fifth off the annual tax for the East Side when their crops were damaged by pests.

The physical and economic effects of the 1503 drought are difficult to gauge. No doubt many villagers went hungry, and the reduced income from lost crops probably pushed some families into straitened circumstances. But beyond that, the extent of the pain and hardship is unclear. If there were villagers that mortgaged or lost lands to rich neighbors or to Negoroji monks as a result of the drought, there is no record of it. Twice in 1504 Masamoto was told that cultivators died as a result of the drought, but no numbers of deceased were provided. A written petition by East Side *bantō* in the summer, asking for reduced taxes, stated that "a few honorable cultivators died, and of those who survived, all suffered from empty stomachs and weak waists."<sup>83</sup> In referring to the "cultivators" who died, one has to wonder just who was being referred to. Did the writers of the petition limit the group to males of *hyakushō* status, or was it more inclusive? And what about women and children, and the elderly? Were there significant numbers of deaths among them? Unfortunately, no additional details exist. It is evident, however, that both deaths and economic losses were limited because of the drought's brief duration. The villagers were in that sense fortunate. One lost harvest was a significant trial. A succession of lost harvests meant loss of property and life.<sup>84</sup>

One way to read *Tabihikitsuke* is as a tale of struggle and hardship, a depiction of *sengoku* village life in which rural folk contended against foes both

human and environmental. And certainly this chapter and the previous one provide fodder for such an interpretation (as does chapter 5, which addresses warfare and its effects). The challenges were substantial, and one cannot help but feel the villagers' pain when they were confronted by drought in 1503, coming on the heels of a damaging military uprising. And yet despite these very real struggles, *Tabihikitsuke* does not present a picture of gloom and doom over these four years. One reason is that certain issues, certain problems, simply came with the territory, and though painful, usually abated in time. Nature, the great author and benefactor of agriculture, was mercurial; and overseers and their competitors were demanding and at times ruthless. But these were perennial problems for rural villages, and they were only part of what defined life year in and year out over the course of a century.

A second reason that gloom and doom was limited was that change and hope came with the seasons in farming communities. Thus, though the drought of 1503 led to brutal spring hungers in 1504, as well as to crime and social upheaval, signs of optimism could be found. Reasons for hope had already appeared in the fall of 1503 when the weather began to turn. The limited rainfall of the previous spring and the relentlessly dry summer gave way to favorable weather patterns on 7/29 (August 20) when there was light rain throughout the day. This was followed by persistent and significant rainfall the following week. Normalcy had returned to the climate and the outlook for the winter wheat and coming crops was good.<sup>85</sup> Then in 1504, early and abundant rains filled the holding ponds, bringing the promise of a rich harvest, something that was not lost on the villagers. Masamoto did his part as well, making "water offerings" to the gods and buddhas in the spring.<sup>86</sup> And so, although the effects of the 1503 drought were severe well into the new year, the outlook was remarkably positive, and indeed the fall harvest proved to be bountiful. The change in the mood of the villagers was striking. As Masamoto reported on the first day of the seventh month (August 10), "This autumn the rice heads are full, and the people are drumming their bellies with joy." The next day, "sweet rain" fell, drenching the fields and giving the villagers further reason for hope. When the rice harvest was reaped in the eighth month, it was abundant. The villagers, noted Masamoto, "are light of spirit, feeling confident. They are much pleased, much pleased."<sup>87</sup>

As painful as the drought of 1503 had been, the plentiful harvest of the succeeding year revealed the wealth that lay in the land, and it came with an acknowledgement by the villagers that a heavy harvest meant surplus income. What percentage of that would remain with them—particularly to

those of the East Side after reconsideration of the 1417 *jigeuke* contract—is unclear, but the food shortages and lost income of the preceding year were now in the past. If the whole of the surplus had been destined to go to overlords there would have been limited reasons for optimism, little justification for villagers to “drum their bellies with joy.” For the coming year, at least, things looked good on Hine Estate.

## Enjoying the Wealth

According to at least one warrior in Izumi Province in 1501, the residents of Hine Estate were enjoying a standard of living beyond that which they deserved. He uttered his opinion in the midst of an abduction, accosting an Iriyamada villager with the words “Recently **you** lot have been living too luxuriously!” (*kono aida kakkei seshimuru ka, onore* 此間令活計歟, 己い). Perhaps to emphasize his point, he slashed at the man with his sword, leaving a gash on the villager’s left hand from the palm to the wrist as the latter fled.<sup>1</sup> It was hardly a reasoned, objective assessment of village life at the time. But one wonders what sort of thought was behind it. Was it no more than an impassioned outburst, a reflection of anger alone? Or was it perhaps a symbol of frustration at the warriors’ inability to control the villagers and take their full share (as they saw it) of the estate’s wealth? By early modern standards, the 1501 Hine Estate villagers’ lives were meager in some regards. Yet at the same time there is strong evidence that they lived fuller, more materially robust lives than their predecessors of earlier centuries. With the benefit of hindsight, we can see as well that their material culture, social structure, and patterns of living were taking the form of their descendants in the Tokugawa era. In other words, the framework of the early modern village was largely in place by this time in advanced regions like Izumi, and limited economic prosperity was part of it. The impropriety of “living too luxuriously,” of which the warrior accused the villagers in the summer of 1501, was not without a basis in fact.

In the previous two chapters I examined the nuts and bolts of Hine Estate’s economy: the productivity of the land, the villagers’ agricultural practices, taxes and the fight for those, and the effects of climate, primarily

drought. These were the big issues, considered broadly, and analysis of them provides a general picture of the economics of production and distribution. As matters of particular concern to Masamoto, they received much attention from him and his men in *Tabihikitsuke*, documents of accounting, and correspondence. In this chapter, the focus shifts. Instead of concentrating on the efforts to create wealth and the struggles for control of that, I consider its disposal and consumption. Kujō documents of accounting are the main source for this, rich in figures and concrete evidence. *Tabihikitsuke* provides additional insights, with scattered references to the way wealth produced in the village was used by all parties involved, from local residents to the competing forces of outside powers, Masamoto included.

Not surprisingly, the picture of wealth and its consumption offered by these sources is uneven. Of the effects and uses of profits acquired by the Izumi *shugo* and their retainers, hard-nosed pursuers of village tax income, we know almost nothing. At best we can infer what wealth they possessed and, accordingly, what Hine Estate tax revenue would mean to them. One tantalizing piece of evidence appears in an incident in autumn 1502 when the *shugo* retainer Satō Sōbei broke with Sakai and attempted to overthrow the military governors. At the time, Sōbei and his allies from Negoroji and other regional temples were on the march, attacking *shugo* outposts and taking captives. In the midst of this, the wife of a *shugo* retainer by the name of Ichiinoi was seized by Negoroji foot soldiers as the couple attempted to flee. As Masamoto noted, “though Ichiinoi implored them to release her for a ransom of 100 *kan*, they refused.”<sup>2</sup> Beyond this brief account we know nothing, and thus are left with more questions than answers, the biggest of which are these: Did Ichiinoi actually offer the sum of 100 *kan*? And did he, as a retainer of the *shugo* (probably of middling status), have 100 *kan* on hand to back up his offer? Just as significant, assuming the report was correct, why did Negoroji foot soldiers reject the money, an unthinkable amount for men of their status? Given what we see elsewhere in *Tabihikitsuke* and other documents during the period, the 100 *kan* figure is incongruous. After all (as I discuss below) annual salaries of Masamoto’s retainers appear to have been on the order of five *kan* or less (excepting the three commissioners), and most transactions appearing in documents of accounting are figured in *mon* or *hiki* (one-thousandth of a *kan* and one-hundredth of a *kan* respectively), or at most (like the acreage tax) in several tens of *kan*.

Perhaps the economic position of the Izumi *shugo* was different. After all, as military governors they were in a position to bring in substantial income—whether through the military half-tax, direct holdings of land, or land steward rights (*jitō shiki*). However, as warriors in central Japan they

faced heavy competition from powerful temples and courtier elites such as the Kujō, as well as from local strongmen, including those that were nominally their retainers. And of course village resistance was a constant problem, requiring time and effort to deal with and often resulting in decreased income. The picture that emerges, which is only suggestive, is that the *shugo* and the men under them or allied with them had limited wealth (reflected in military terms in their inability to control the province), and thus they pursued village income with vigor, even when their hopes of success (and the size of rewards) were slight. Accordingly, I question the veracity of Ichiinoi's offer of 100 *kan*. Perhaps the report that reached Masamoto was mistaken or the message garbled. Or maybe Masamoto wrote *kan* when he meant *hiki*. Then again, maybe Ichiinoi was willing to offer all he had, and more, to rescue his wife. Nothing changes the fact, however, that the figure of 100 *kan* is at odds with the broader economic picture at the time.

Somewhat more is revealed about the monks of Negoroji, though not in the form of material culture or consumption but in relation to money-lending and the income they received from that, a secondary theme of this chapter. As we shall see, they were not the only ones engaged in this lucrative practice. For Masamoto and the villagers, especially those of Iriyamada, the picture is fuller, indistinct in places, sharp in others. It is an imperfect but suggestive picture, and clearly not just of increase and plenty. As will become apparent, the chapter title, "Enjoying the Wealth," is in part ironic, a reflection of the inability of each group in the region to gain or retain the riches it desired. But it is also clear that there was wealth for the taking, riches to be had, in short, an economic surplus. And that surplus, even if it did not remain on the estate, was going somewhere and being consumed by someone.

### Taxes: The Picture at the Receiving End

The sharpest view of Hine Estate's economic world during the years Masamoto was in Izumi comes from extant documents of accounting for the *tansen*, found in Kujō archives. As records of disbursement they shed light on Masamoto and his management of the estate, as we might expect. But the reach of these documents is in fact much broader, revealing economic costs and benefits to all the major groups that appear in *Tabihikitsuke*, from the two military governors in Izumi and their counterparts in Negoroji to the villagers and religious institutions of Hineno and Iriyamada.

The documents of accounting themselves are fairly standard in format.

Where they vary is in the details, and it is in them that their significance lies. In addition, they provide a useful corrective to Masamoto's occasional failure to explain incidents fully, particularly their outcomes, or to cover up inconvenient truths through simple fictions, as I discussed in chapter 2. The problem is not that Masamoto's depictions of conflicts or tension, whether involving himself and the villagers or the *shugo* or Negoroji, were unduly rosy. His descriptions were forthright, and he rarely glossed over difficult issues that confronted him. However, in several instances, he failed to note how a crisis or conflict ended in the days after its peak, leaving, for example, villagers in captivity indefinitely or conflicts with villagers or the *shugo* unresolved, though subsequent developments reveal that in time reconciliation was achieved. Several such cases in *Tabihikitsuke* are cleared up in the documents of accounting, revealing in the process that some settlements were reached only after financial outlays that Masamoto had been adamant about refusing.<sup>3</sup>

The following document of accounting, for the 1503 summer *tansen* at Iriyamada, provides a useful starting point to understanding these economic issues. Though at best roughly representative (for the simple reason that there was considerable diversity in types and amounts of disbursements in each document), it includes many typical elements.

Document of Accounting, Four Hamlets of Iriyamada:  
Summer *Tansen*

Figured at 50 *mon* per *tan*

- |                                 |                               |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| [1] 2 <i>kan</i>                | Ōgi hamlet                    |
| [2] 1 <i>kan</i> 774 <i>mon</i> | Shōbu hamlet                  |
| [3] 975 <i>mon</i>              | Funabuchi hamlet (one-half)   |
| [4] 1 <i>kan</i> 750 <i>mon</i> | Tsuchimaru (two-thirds)       |
| [5] 975 <i>mon</i>              | Tsuchimaru, proprietor's side |
| [6] 1 <i>kan</i> 100 <i>mon</i> | Funabuchi, proprietor's side  |

Total of 8 *kan* 575 *mon*

Of which the following has been reported:

- |                                 |  |
|---------------------------------|--|
| [a] 4 <i>kan</i> 542 <i>mon</i> | Paid toward 7th-month estate expenses                                    |
| [b] 858 <i>mon</i>              | 10 percent reduction   |
| [c] 100 <i>mon</i>              | sent to Goshosama on 6/22  |
| [d] 100 <i>mon</i>              | Provided to Chōhōji Terasu for last year's pay                           |
| [e] 120 <i>mon</i>              | Expenses for river embankment  |
| [f] 200 <i>mon</i>              | [Iriyamada] <i>tansen</i> "tax-day treat"—funds for <i>sake</i> and fish |
| [g] 300 <i>mon</i>              | East Side wheat levy "tax-day treat"                                     |

[h] 70 <i>mon</i>	Expenses for sesame seeds, to be made into oil
[i] 65 <i>mon</i>	To Honma Yūshun, for last year's pay—yet to be disbursed
[j] 100 <i>mon</i>	To Takehara Sadao, for last year's pay—yet to be disbursed
[k] 150 <i>mon</i>	Travel funds from the capital for Matajirō
[l] 180 <i>mon</i>	Travel funds from the capital for Shiba Chūkai's underling—principal and interest
[m] 190 <i>mon</i>	Paid to Tsuchimaru—when urging the East Side to pay the acreage tax
[n] 200 <i>mon</i>	Travel expense for laborers to Kyoto
[o] 70 <i>mon</i>	Funabuchi wheat levy “tax-day treat”
[p] 628 <i>mon</i>	In the third month, the <i>bantō</i> advanced us 500 <i>mon</i> ; this was the payment for five months' principal and interest
[q] 600 <i>mon</i>	Fourth month travel expenses to the capital for Shiba Chūkai, advanced by the <i>bantō</i> ; principal and interest for five months
[r] 100 <i>mon</i>	Carpenter's wages, two-day portion
[s] 7 <i>mon</i>	Reduction as a result of flood last year in Funabuchi, by which 40 <i>bu</i> [of productive land] was lost

Total outlay: 8 *kan* 592 *mon*—an excess of 17 *mon*

Bunki 3/8/

[From:] Nagamori  
[To:] Administrative Office<sup>4</sup>

The document begins with the note that the tax was collected at the rate of 50 *mon* per *tan*, consistent with the reduction from 100 *mon* (or 120 *mon* in the autumn) claimed by the villagers. The next six lines list the resulting income by hamlet, the first four comprising Tominokōji Toshimichi's portions, the next two Masamoto's. The remainder of the document describes the disbursement of those funds. Over half went to estate expenses for the seventh month, as noted in line [a]. Just what was included in this is unclear. I suspect that outlays for rent and food made up the primary portion, but no doubt there were administrative costs as well. These expenses were shared by Masamoto and Toshimichi, with responsibility rotating between the two, month by month.<sup>5</sup> Like other expenses, the burden of them ultimately fell on the villagers, in this instance in a very direct way. As a regular outlay, these were a common component of the documents of accounting. Though the data on these are incomplete—some months' expenditures go unnoted, and there are no figures for Toshimichi—it is clear that the funds required to maintain Masamoto's contingent month after month in Izumi were not

trivial. Even if there were months where outlay was slight (might they have been as low as 590 *mon* in 1504/5, as seen in one document of accounting?), months of significant expenses, in the 3 to 5 *kan* range, were not uncommon. Evidence of the burden of these costs, varied as they were, is seen in loans taken out to cover them, small and large.<sup>6</sup>

Two other common components seen here were payments toward retainers' wages or salaries (the previous year's, in this case) and expenses for travel. The latter appear to have been granted as allowances not reimbursements, and the amounts were substantial—150 *mon* for individuals of middling status like Matajirō (line [k]) and 500 *mon* for commissioners and others of higher status such as Shiba Chūkai (line [q]).<sup>7</sup> Besides covering food and lodging, travel funds (perhaps the largest portion) went toward fees at barriers,<sup>8</sup> and even at 150 *mon* the allowances were many times larger than daily expenditures for an individual on the estate.

In contrast to travel allowances, which appear weighty in documents of accounting, retainers' salaries were paltry, at least on the surface. Records of payments are regular, showing up in one or more of each year's accounting documents, resulting in a total outlay of between eight and twelve *kan*, divided among six or seven individuals. Thus, a commissioner like Takehara Sadao could receive a travel allowance to the capital of 500 *mon*, as he did in 1502, while receiving an annual salary from Masamoto on the order of 3 *kan* (3000 *mon*).<sup>9</sup> Why the scantiness of the pay? Apparently because daily expenses (room and board, as it were) were covered by the estate's general funds. Salaries were extra. This is also likely the reason that menials and others of low status do not show up as recipients of pay or wages: they no doubt received nothing beyond what was provided for food and lodging.

Likewise missing from the documents of accounting are salary figures for the highest-ranking retainers, the two commissioners, Shinanokōji Nagamori and Ishii Aritoshi, as well as Tominokōji Toshimichi's deputy, Aoki Tosa Nyūdō. This was apparently because their pay originated elsewhere, separate from the *tansen*. Evidence for this, indirect but closely related, is seen in a contract Nagamori received four years previous, when the Kujō appointed him commissioner of Oshio Estate in Yamashiro Province. According to that, he was to receive ten percent of estate revenue (the annual tax) for his efforts.<sup>10</sup> The same practice was probably followed on Hine Estate. Takehara Sadao may appear to be an exception, since he also served as one of Masamoto's commissioners and yet his pay came from *tansen* revenue (as seen above), and it was modest. That, however, was surely a reflection of his youth and lack of experience—he arrived in Izumi shortly after his coming-of-age ceremony.<sup>11</sup>

Despite being an accounting of revenue received by Masamoto, this

record also reveals that more than a little of those funds ended up back in the hands of the villagers. One example that appears regularly was the “tax-day treat,” offered to the village elite. A weightier example is the “10 percent reduction” in line [b]. Though the means by which the villagers gained this concession is not apparent, it shows up regularly in accounting documents for both Iriyamada and Hineno East Side. Of course it was not actually collected with the rest of the tax, but rather than adjust the tax rate accordingly (resulting in a true rate of 45 *mon* per *tan*), Masamoto’s men subtracted it after the collection—at least on paper. Perhaps the 10 percent reduction was scheduled to expire sometime in the future, though no evidence of that exists. It is more likely that the villagers had acquired this as a permanent discount, perhaps as part of the shift toward their position as an independent village, in which they took on responsibilities, such as water infrastructure, that were formerly the proprietor’s. At any rate, it was income lost to the Kujō.

Unlike the expenses and outlays discussed above, all of which were regular and expected, there were also occasional exceptional expenditures in the documents of accounting. These included payments to villagers or in behalf of villagers. Three examples are found in the 1503 record of the Iriyamada summer *tansen*. Lines [e] and [s] were funds provided as a means to offset damage from flooding of the Kashii River in Iriyamada in 1502. The first was put toward repair of the river embankment; the second, addressing land lost to the flood in Funabuchi hamlet, took the form of a tax cut. In contrast, line [m] was a payment to Tsuchimaru villagers for their help in mediating a tax dispute with Hineno East Side. The sums in these instances were slight, but on other matters they could be substantial. In 1501, for example, Masamoto provided East Side villagers more than four *kan* in answer to their pleas for help as they struggled with “the trouble of entering huts,” a reference to their lengthy stay in the mountains during the turmoil of that autumn.<sup>12</sup> And twice Masamoto provided the ransom to free villagers held by *shugo* retainers, once in 1502 (at 200 *mon*) and again in 1503 (at 2 *kan* 100 *mon*). Then when three *chō* of East Side land were “damaged by heat” in 1504, Masamoto offered 1 *kan* 500 *mon* in compensation (though he made no mention of the heat in *Tabihikitsuke*).<sup>13</sup>

### Lending and Borrowing

Kujō Masamoto may have increased the tension and even the physical conflict in Izumi by his stay there, but in economic terms he was a boon to

some residents, and he and his associates clearly provided a boost to the local economy. Though constricted by what he saw as his economic paucity, that perspective was not shared by fellow residents in Izumi. Instead they saw him and his men as well-to-do consumers, rarely hampered by financial shortcomings. And in some ways, they were correct. By any standard they knew, Masamoto was a big spender, and his immediate lack of cash was only a small impediment to his needs and wants. The reason was the ready availability of unencumbered money and lenders in the area.

Of course, Masamoto was not the only borrower in the region. There is no question that the villagers of Hineno and Iriyamada borrowed currency and material goods (in particular seed rice) from regional powers such as Negoroji and from each other. The practice was common, probably universal, in villages throughout the land.<sup>14</sup> In chapter 8 I discuss Negoroji's role as a lender in pursuit of land rights in Iriyamada, but evidence beyond that is thin. The sources we would like to have—financial records of the villagers, with information about lenders and borrowers, loan amounts, rates charged, default and its effects—simply do not exist. Such matters held little significance for Masamoto, so nothing relevant appears in *Tabihikitsuke*. Just one borrower appears in these records and that is Kujō Masamoto. And yet, focused though they are on the proprietor and his needs, the economic data in these sources cover a broad social swath, with villagers and religious institutions among the groups affected by and profiting from lending.<sup>15</sup>

Masamoto and his contingent arrived in Izumi in the spring of 1501 with few goods and resources. Heading to the countryside as they were, it made little sense for them to cart large quantities of food and supplies from the capital that could be readily, and probably more cheaply, obtained locally. The problem for Masamoto was that the funds he brought were insufficient to meet the costs of setting up residence for himself and his associates and keeping everyone fed in those early months. Had he been able to collect the whole of the previous autumn's East Side *tansen* as he planned (nearly 16 *kan* of 21 due, according to his figuring) and then received the three village units' summer *tansen* in full shortly thereafter, rather than just fifty percent of that, the shortfall would have been far less acute. Instead he began in an economic hole, faced with numerous expenses and the prospect of depleted income.

Housing was Masamoto's first concern. The day he moved to Iriyamada from Hineno he "gave instructions for several building projects," to be directed by Aoki Tosa Nyūdō.<sup>16</sup> Foremost of these was a new structure at Chōfukuji, the Buddhist temple at which he made his residence. Housing for Masamoto's retainers would have been more modest than this, but it is unlikely that it was obtained without cost, whether for construction or as

rent.<sup>17</sup> These and other expenses were covered by loans, the number and amounts of which piled up rapidly during these early months. Below is a list of the early lenders and loan amounts, with disbursal dates noted where known. The bulk of the loans were contracted within two months of arrival, and though data are incomplete, few of the loans appear to have been paid back fully by the end of the year when annual assessments were made.

Lenders	Loans
Muhenkōin:	9 <i>kan</i> 325 <i>mon</i> and 1 <i>koku</i> 1 <i>to</i> of rice; disbursal in sixth and intercalary sixth months
[unspecified lender]	1 <i>kan</i> 100 <i>mon</i> , repayment for borrowed rice; and 1 <i>koku</i> 5 <i>to</i> 3 <i>shō</i> 6 <i>gō</i> of rice; disbursal in fourth month; borrowed by Shiono Hyōgonosuke [on Masamoto's behalf]
Ishii Aritoshi:	5 <i>kan</i> 785 <i>mon</i> ; disbursal in sixth month
East Side:	1 <i>kan</i> 244 <i>mon</i> ; and 3 <i>kan</i> 822 <i>mon</i> , for purchasing rice; disbursal date unknown; in the twelfth month document of accounting the loan is noted as repaid
Iriyamada villagers:	1000 <i>hiki</i> [10 <i>kan</i> ]; disbursal upon arrival, fourth month
Negoroji:	1000 <i>hiki</i> [10 <i>kan</i> ]; disbursal in twelfth month
Shinanokōji Nagamori:	337 <i>mon</i> (this appears as partial repayment of a loan, principal unspecified)
Total: 40 <i>kan</i> 213 <i>mon</i> ; 2 <i>koku</i> 6 <i>to</i> of rice <sup>18</sup>	

The sum is significant, as is the diversity of lenders, including not just Negoroji and two of Masamoto's retainers, but the abbot of a local temple (Muhenkōin) and, most strikingly, villagers of the estate itself. Of course, neither "Iriyamada villagers" nor "East Side"—as written in the records—referred to the collective body of residents in either case. Instead, as later evidence reveals, the loans were probably put together under the direction of one of the village headmen or *bantō*, who solicited funds from well-to-do associates.

Following these early exceptional outlays, Masamoto's estate expenses should have dropped, along with the debt that accompanied them. New debt could then be limited as the acreage tax was collected, summer and fall. To a degree, this is what happened. Only two loans appear in documents of accounting for 1502, and both are small. The funds from one (of 300 *mon*) was used to send a retainer to and from Kyoto on business. The other (of 110 *mon*) was put toward clothing tailored at a local temple, Chikurin'an.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, these two loans were paid off quickly, in just a month's time in the latter instance. Despite these positive signs, in the second month of 1502, Masamoto approached the Iriyamada *bantō* about providing funds for

upcoming estate expenses.<sup>20</sup> And because balances remained on some of the old loans, and tax revenue was limited after Masamoto agreed to halve the summer and autumn *tansen*, money was bound to be tight. Masamoto could only hope there would be no exceptional expenses, but of course there were, and within a year he was short of cash, leaving him unable to pay retainers on time and needing to borrow funds regularly to cover daily expenses.

Documents of accounting for 1503 and 1504 are peppered with references (twenty-one in all) to the repayment of loans. In many cases, the size of a loan and number of months in which interest accrued are recorded (though few lenders are noted for small loans). For example, as seen in the document of accounting I discussed in the previous section—that of the 1503 Iriyama summer *tansen*—the 628 *mon* repaid by Masamoto (as noted on line [p]), was based on a loan of 500 *mon* for a period of five months. For some reason, these details are lacking for the larger loans; only the repayment figure itself is provided. Accounting for them was perhaps kept separately, particularly if repayment was not complete. At any rate, the five-month borrowing period for the 500 *mon* loan was average for the group; none were in the one to two month range, and only one was an outlier on the lengthy end: a 2 *kan* loan to purchase *tatami*, repaid with 3 *kan* 100 *mon* after ten months. The *tatami* appear to have been bought on credit, not acquired through borrowing from a separate lender. Most of these loans were probably open-ended, with interest calculated monthly and no settlement date set in writing, which resulted in repayment periods of varying lengths.<sup>21</sup>

Four contracts for loans appear in *Tabihikitsuke* in 1503 and 1504, revealing the weighty roles played by the village elite, both as brokers for loans and as lenders themselves. The following, prefaced by Masamoto's comments, appears in winter 1504.

Regarding estate expenses, I recently spoke to the villagers about providing these. The Shōbu and Funabuchi *bantō* privately raised funds. Today we received requests from the two of them for documents of lending, so I instructed Sadao to draft and deliver those.

The contents:

Regarding the funds privately raised:

In sum, 1 *kan* 300 *mon*

Concerning the amount above, borrowed and received for the purpose of estate expenses: Each month interest will accrue to the extent of 60 *mon* per *kan*, and this coming autumn, whether from revenue of the annual tax or acreage tax, the debt will be directly paid off. Such is written and contracted here.

Bunki 4/3/14

[From:] Takehara

[To:] Genroku Kunai of Goshodani district, [Shōbu hamlet]<sup>22</sup>

A second contract, for 1 *kan*, follows immediately. The interest rate was the same and the lender was Shiki, *bantō* of Funabuchi.

In contrast to the preceding, funds for which were raised within the villages, the two other contracts were for loans acquired from Negoroji monks. Iriyamada *bantō*, however, were key figures in arranging the loans and guaranteeing them. For a 1 *kan* loan in 1504, the contract sets out the lender as Senjōbō of Negoroji and then states that the debt will be settled in the fall when Funabuchi pays its annual tax or acreage tax. But the contract, prepared by Takehara Sadao, is addressed to the three Funabuchi *bantō*. As it turned out, a few days after the contract was prepared, one of the *bantō* returned from Negoroji with word that he had been able to secure a loan for twice the amount, with 10 *hiki* going to the temple moneylenders for *sake*—their fee for the service. Hearing this, Masamoto ordered that the contract be rewritten accordingly.<sup>23</sup>

A contract of the previous year, guaranteed by the villagers, was similar but more complicated. Realizing late in the fourth month that he was short of funds for the fifth month's estate expenses (and with Shinanokōji Nagamori away in the capital), Masamoto took steps to make arrangements himself. As he noted in his diary, he summoned the Iriyamada *bantō* and "made a request of them [for a loan]." But they apparently lacked sufficient cash on hand, replying that "at present it will be difficult to fulfill." Based on documents of accounting at the time, it is likely that their lack of cash was at least in part due to outstanding loans to Masamoto. Despite having to turn down Masamoto, one of the *bantō*, Genzaburō Ukon of Funabuchi hamlet, said he would arrange to acquire funds from a lender, and promised to depart that day to do so.<sup>24</sup> Two days later, a contract was signed, as described by Masamoto.

Regarding the contract for funds raised for expenses on the estate, there is a strong rumor that debt cancellation will be carried out this year. Accordingly, this needs to be addressed in the document's wording—such was the request that came in a draft delivered here, which Sadao brought to me. Looking over it, though it included words to the effect of a sale in exchange, it was in fact a document of lending.<sup>25</sup> Since I saw no problems with it, I gave instructions that it be written up and delivered. However, in asking for details, we discovered that Genzaburō Ukon wrote in his own land as collateral

to the main creditor. This contract is to be kept at Genzaburō's place, and at the time the debt is paid off in full next autumn, it will be returned, I was told. Its contents:

[Drawn through] Regarding the sale of the annual tax of the Funabuchi estate proprietor's portion

[Added later:] (This document was to be destroyed once the debt was paid from the autumn annual tax. Accordingly this has been drawn through with ink.)

[Remainder is drawn through]

In total, half of the land (within Izumi, Hine District, Funabuchi hamlet)

This document is proof that the land described above is sold (*uriwatasu* 賣渡) to Manfukuin for 4 *kan*. However, during the coming autumn, after adding 40 *mon* per month for each *kan* as interest, we promise to buy back [the land]. If by chance a debt cancellation order is issued for the realm, it will not annul this contract. Thus this document exists as evidence for the future.

Bunki 3/5/2 Takehara Sadao<sup>26</sup>

Much about this document (and its background) is intriguing. By making the transaction appear to be a land sale, this certificate was apparently meant to protect the lender (and probably the guarantor—Genzaburō Ukon) from the threat of a Muromachi debt cancellation edict (though the scheme was weakened, it would seem, by a reference to that possibility). Also, Manfukuin, the Negoroji monk who provided the loan, was apparently worried about Kujō Masamoto's ability to repay, and thus demanded security, which Genzaburō Ukon provided in the form of land.

For individuals and institutions with available cash, moneylending was a lucrative business. The preceding loans from Senjōbō and Manfukuin, secured at a monthly charge of 40 *mon* per *kan*, resulted in an annual interest rate of 48 percent. This was a favorable figure for Masamoto, at least compared to the 60 *mon* per *kan* (72 percent) loans arranged with the two *bantō*, Genroku Kunai and Shiki. These were typical rates; the loans in the documents of accounting, short or long in duration, fall within this range, with many set at sixty percent.

By the time Masamoto left Izumi late in 1504, he had borrowed funds from numerous entities and individuals, numbering at least fifteen—as noted by name in documents of accounting and lending, and in *Tabihikitsuke*.

Some appear only in general terms, such as “Iriyamada *bantō*,” “Negoroji,” or “Hinenō East Side.” Others denote specific individuals. The latter number eleven, several of them lending to Masamoto more than once. The primary lenders were of two groups. The first was made up of Buddhist monks, including Hine Estate’s own Muhenkōin, as well as heads of Negoroji cloisters. The second group consisted of village leaders in Iriyamada, primarily of *bantō* status. Each of the hamlets in Iriyamada was represented in this group, with *bantō* from Tsuchimaru, Ōgi, Shōbu, and Funabuchi. In addition, other *bantō* from Iriyamada were among those who acted as brokers in arranging loans for Masamoto.<sup>27</sup>

The Kujō were in trouble. That is the first conclusion to draw from the litany of loans and borrowing described above. As should be clear, the problem was not a lack of revenue on Hine Estate. *Tansen* income may have been half of what Masamoto expected, and extraordinary expenses resulting from uncooperative weather and intrusive neighbors cut into profits, but revenue continued to be acquired from the annual tax. And the *tansen*, after all, was a bonus, a regular income stream that was unknown until the recent past (at least as an annual, two-season, impost). The problems for the Kujō (there were two) were the continuing demands of high status (which took the form most immediately of the 180 *kan* Masamoto borrowed to fund the imperial celebrations three decades earlier) and the loss of numerous estates previously held. These forced Masamoto to squeeze every drop of income he could from Hine Estate; and, unfortunately for him, there were limits to what could be squeezed. The many loans he took out while in Izumi were harsh evidence of this.

More generally, the loans Masamoto obtained speak to the economic vitality of the region. The cash economy was well established and money for lending was readily available. Negoroji was one obvious source of funds, and though the temple may have been less confrontational in its dealings with Masamoto and the local villagers than the military governors, its economic influence was paramount. With no tradition of lending, the *shugo* remained on the outside in this respect. Just as significant, these loans attest to economic inequality in the villages. The individuals (and thus families) with wealth, and therefore money to lend, were the village elite, holders of the largest plots of land and biggest incomes; these were the men Masamoto hired as *bantō*. The loans they provided (and services they offered as brokers) were indicative both of the close ties the villagers of Iriyamada enjoyed with their aristocratic guest and of the privileged and powerful position of the *bantō*. These were men of means, with cash they were willing to loan to his lordship, their proprietor, in what may have been for them a satisfying and ironic twist.

## Material Culture

In the preface to his first volume on global civilization and capitalism from the 15th to 18th centuries, Fernand Braudel described the difference between the eighteenth century and our world today in terms of ideas, on one hand, and material life, on the other. “It is quite easy to imagine being transported to, say, Voltaire’s house at Ferney, and talking to him for a long time without being too surprised. In the world of ideas, the men of the eighteenth century are our contemporaries: their habits of mind and their feelings are sufficiently close to ours for us to not feel we are in a foreign country. But if the patriarch of Ferney invited us to stay with him for a few days, the details of his everyday life, even the way he looked after himself, would greatly shock us. Between his world and ours, a great gulf would open up: lighting at night, heating, transport, food, illness, medicine.”<sup>28</sup> In more specific terms, consider issues such as refrigeration, food preparation (specifically in the shift from open fires to gas or electric ranges), and agricultural methods and work (the latter exhibiting practices that have changed significantly in some ways since Braudel wrote in the middle of the twentieth century). Even if we are inclined to dispute, at least on certain points, Braudel’s contention about our shared world of ideas, the changes in our material lives have been stark, and the point certainly holds when we examine the material lives of Izumi villagers at the turn of the sixteenth century.

*Tabihikitsuke*, to put it simply, is not a rich reservoir of information on the material culture of village Japan in the early sixteenth century. But no source is.<sup>29</sup> Historians seeking to understand such matters have had to search far and wide (and deep, too), be it in written sources for occasional obscure references, in archeological digs, and in art—drawing for example on details of commoners’ houses and shops depicted in the panoramic screen paintings known as “Screens in and Around the Capital.”<sup>30</sup> Just as diarists (most of them of the nobility) residing in the capital wrote little of the material lives of their lesser-born neighbors, Masamoto, too, ignored most of the built-up physical and material world that defined the villagers who lived around him. Their homes, their clothes, their tools, their food: these were all commonplace items that warranted no mention in Masamoto’s eyes—except when they were bound up with questions of importance to him, meaning taxes, the harvest, gifts, village resistance, and local culture. Thus the picture in *Tabihikitsuke* is limited. But of the few insights it offers, several are critical to understanding village society.

Having noted that, I begin my analysis not with the villagers’ material world but with Masamoto’s. The reason is that it provides a first step in

understanding what was available to him in Izumi (and thus in some sense available to them), while also serving as a contrast to the villagers and their material lives.

Masamoto's material culture in Izumi—the type of residence he lived in and furnishings that adorned it, the food he ate, the implements and utensils he used (both for work and for leisure)—can be pieced together from *Tabi-hikitsuke* and from documents of accounting. Details appear here and there, and though not abundant, can be filled in with what we know of the material life of courtiers in the capital. As noted previously, Masamoto gave instructions for several building projects as soon as he arrived in Iriyamada. Two months later, preparations were being made to “raise the ridge” on one of the structures, probably Masamoto's residence at Chōfukuji. Men had been to the mountains to fell timber for this, and a considerable crew was engaged in the construction.<sup>31</sup> Expenses for this are not listed, but they may have exceeded 40 *kan* for the completed structure. In the years that followed, a number of furnishings appear in the documents of accounting, perhaps as replacement items or as initial purchases. These range from the simple and inexpensive (such as straw mats, 20 *mon* on one occasion, 60 *mon* on another) to the refined (for example, *tatami* for 2 *kan*). Other items included cloth for a screen and numerous utensils and implements: dishware (five trays), a pair of jars, a tea bowl, two ladles, several quires of paper (“various types,” 2 quires for 24 *mon*; and high quality *sugiwara*, 2 quires for 50 *mon*).<sup>32</sup>

The building projects, large and small, were conducted under the direction of a *daiku*. At this time, the term referred not merely to a carpenter, but to a master craftsman who served as architect, construction supervisor, and skilled woodworker, as comfortable in designing and constructing large buildings as in detailed work such as cabinetry and wood carving. Some *daiku* also worked in stone. For those in rural areas, the bulk of their work was for temples and shrines. The *daiku* who served Hine Estate—who Masamoto referred to several times as “this village *daiku*”—was an individual of some status, a well respected member of the broader community. He resided in Sano and no doubt did work throughout the region. Late in 1502 he called at Chōfukuji bearing a cutting board as a gift. On that occasion, Masamoto's men offered him a drink of *sake* and a return gift of 10 *hiki*. He also regularly came to offer felicitations at the New Year.<sup>33</sup>

Described as he was by Masamoto as the village *daiku*, can we assume that this craftsman (and his crew, probably of temporary laborers in most instances) built many homes in Hineno and Iriyamada? And based on the answer to that, what does this tell us about the residential material culture of the villagers? No explicit evidence exists concerning the role of the village

*daiku* in building homes, but it is likely that few villagers on the estate built their residences with help from him. Accordingly, their homes were simple, inexpensively constructed, and, in many cases, crudely built. The reasons for this were several. Cost was of course the first factor, and not just because of the expense of employing a skilled builder. For a well-crafted home of careful joinery, outfitted with sliding doors and other amenities, the size and quality of lumber mattered greatly. That meant finding suitable trees (invariably deep in the mountains by this time) and then felling them and transporting them to the village, at which point the heavy labor of cutting, sizing, and joining could begin.<sup>34</sup> Only a structure of suitable size, complexity, and quality warranted the skill of a *daiku* and the material and labor costs that accompanied that. It made little sense for most villagers to even consider the idea. Homes of that nature would have been limited to the village elite and well-to-do cultivators.

So the vast majority of villagers lived in simpler dwellings, of which we can only speculate, drawing on scholars' better understanding (primarily archeological) of other late medieval villages. The poorest homes were no doubt little better than shacks, probably pit dwellings with dirt floors and thatched roofs, reaching from peak to ground. In nicer homes, the pits would have been replaced with timber-framed structures, having raised sections of plank flooring, separate from dirt-floored work areas. Some may even have had *tatami*, as suggested by Masamoto's purchase of several for his residence, but even those residences would probably have been simple.<sup>35</sup> For villagers enjoying a gradual if unmistakable rise in economic livelihoods, the overall image of housing is of relative austerity, which makes sense when considered within the historical context, in particular the turmoil of the age. And in this we find a second compelling reason that villagers' homes were simple: in an age of such uncertainty and destruction, there was little reason to put one's wealth into a fine residence. Evidence of this appears here and there in *Tabihikitsuke* (and in documents of accounting), but it is unmistakable.

For example, consider the common practice of absconding, a critical form of resistance for villagers. Knowing that in some years they would need to abandon their homes, for periods brief or lengthy, villagers were obviously aware of the risks that came with leaving structures vacant, open to damage from nature, vandals, or the outside powers they were at odds with.

Of course, to abscond meant opting for what could only be seen, at least by us today, as a period of unimaginable hardship and discomfort: picking up family, gathering a few necessities (and as much foodstuffs as possible), and departing into the woodlands, usually the mountains. There villagers would set up camp and live as best they could. This was expected,

and accepted. Perhaps, however, temporary residence in the mountains was not as miserable, not as distinct from life in the villages, as we are inclined to think. For one thing, as simple shelters lacking amenities such as heat, electric lights, running water, toilets, and baths—let alone anything else that we might see as imperative to a comfortable existence—their village homes were little more than shelters from the weather. Given the absence of comforts at home, life in the mountains for a period, though hardly pleasant, was not unbearable (distance from a well may have been the most trying aspect of life away from home; pitching camp near a stream or spring was imperative). With a little help, villagers could remain away from home for an extended time. As seen in a Kujō document of accounting dated to the twelfth month of 1501, the Hineno villagers sought assistance related to “the difficulties of living in huts” in the mountains during their extended stay there in the autumn, which Masamoto “immediately provided” in the form of three *kan*.<sup>36</sup>

If the need to abscond was one spur to constructing a modest home, a second one was the too frequent scourge of arson. Retainers of the Izumi *shugo* threatened the Hineno villagers with this repeatedly (and occasionally carried it out, usually to limited effect, though other villages in the province were not so fortunate). And even Masamoto’s commissioner Shinanokōji Nagamori was prepared to burn down homes of East Side villagers after they repeatedly refused to submit their taxes in 1503.<sup>37</sup> With arson as a primary form of intimidation and retribution, what purpose was there in putting one’s wealth into a fine residence? The threat was certainly frequent enough during these decades to keep villagers’ building proclivities in check.<sup>38</sup>

The best evidence of the limited value of villagers’ homes appears in the summer of 1502, when the province was in turmoil as a result of the uprising of Satō Sōbei. In the midst of that, with Iriyamada under siege and a coalition army of 200 men milling about Tsuchimaru hamlet, preparing to set up a permanent battle camp, Masamoto suggested that if the army refused to leave, “we on this side should put Tsuchimaru to the torch”—the only means he saw of driving out the invaders. To this the villagers readily agreed. They cancelled plans for this only after their final petition to the invaders (coupled with a bribe and a threat to stand and fight if necessary) was accepted the following day.<sup>39</sup>

Of the goods that villagers kept in and around their homes, whether for work or pleasure, *Tabihikitsuke* provides few clues. The most suggestive evidence comes from a list of items in the residence of a Shippōryūji monk, one of two accused of thievery early in 1502 (I examine the theft in chapter 6). As part of his investigation of the crime, Masamoto sent inspectors to

make an inventory of the monk's goods. Historians have assumed that these were all stolen items, but Masamoto makes no such assertion, and the inclusion of numerous Buddhist ceremonial objects raises doubts. At any rate, the point is moot, because villagers of one stripe or another (clerical or not) in Iriyamada were owners of these items. Here is the inventory.

- Clothes box (1)
- Decorative items for Buddhist ceremonies (7 varieties)
- Halberd with blade; Spear (2)
- Chinese umbrella; "Charcoal" umbrella (2)
- Damaged mosquito net (1)
- Tea jar (1)
- *Tsurikuwa ishi* (1)?
- Small tub of miso (1)
- Bamboo oil tubes (3)
- Fishing pans (2)
- Tubs (5)
- Wheat (3 *shō*) [5.4 liters]
- Small sickle (1)
- Jar (1)
- Leather-covered box (1)
- Tea mortar (1)
- Battle-axes (2)
- Steel battle helmet (1)
- Broken tubs (3)<sup>40</sup>

What are we to make of this? Was this the whole of the man's worldly possessions, excepting items of daily use? And was it representative of the goods owned by a family of cultivators—a tax-paying household—in Hine Estate at the time? It is an unimpressive list of possessions, but at the beginning of the sixteenth century few societies around the world provided commoners (or middling monks) a chance to obtain more than the bare necessities for living—and of course in times of famine they often fell short of that. The limits of material wealth are well reflected in the inclusion of a "damaged mosquito net" and "three broken tubs," none of which the monk had chosen to discard. So the list is suggestive, even if the window it offers on the villagers' material culture is narrow. Remove the various accoutrements of the Buddhist priesthood and replace them with additional household items, women's and children's clothing, a tea bowl or such, and the list might resemble one that defined the extra possessions of a family of cultivators at the time.

Perhaps, however, the villagers had more possessions than this list reveals, or (and possibly of greater significance), they had a more positive view of their material life, of their surplus goods, than do we. If not, why did they take such pains to remove personal property to safer ground when threats of attack were imminent, something I noted briefly in earlier chapters? The first occurrence was in autumn 1501, when a report reached Hine Estate that the *shugo* were summoning villagers from the plains in preparation for an attack on Iriyamada. The villagers of Tsuchimaru, who occupied the gateway to Iriyamada and were thus likely to receive the brunt of the attack, responded by “carrying off their personal property” to higher land. As Masamoto put it, “with cattle and horses coming and going, everything is in an uproar.”<sup>41</sup> The image is one of considerable movement of goods under horse- and ox-drawn power.

The second removal of goods occurred one year later, during the uprising of Satō Sōbei. The threat to villages was widespread in the province. Even those villages that were ostensibly on good terms with the warring parties could end up the victims of arson or other violence if they rejected demands for supplies or submitted to an army’s enemies. Accordingly, a large number of villages in the lowlands, including Sano, Ibara, Kaminogō, Kumatori, Shinge, and Kijima, sent goods to Iriyamada for safekeeping. In that case, this consisted not only of their valuables, but also cattle and horses “in numbers beyond counting,” according to Masamoto. The value of the draft animals is obvious. Just what was included in the personal property is unclear, but there is little question that the villagers thought highly of it.<sup>42</sup>

In describing and analyzing the economics of Hine Estate at the beginning of the sixteenth century in these three chapters, I have covered considerable ground, extending from taxes and the negotiations and squabbles over those to the effects of drought and the prominent place of moneylending. My sources have been both quantitative and descriptive, the former offering hard data, the latter providing the context for, and portraying the effects of, economics. The one clear conclusion that can be drawn from this diverse picture is that the economic world in Izumi at the time, and specifically on Hine Estate, was dynamic. The economic foundation of the system—the (largely) agricultural base upon which the whole rested, and upon which everyone from cultivators and village traders to monks, military governors, and the proprietor himself relied—provides an image of stability; but even that was in part a mirage, as reflected in the capriciousness of nature, on one hand (as it unleashed floods, dispatched pests, and held back rain on occasion) and, on the other, the efforts of villagers to enlarge their narrow

space of nature by double cropping, introducing new strains of crops, and improving irrigation infrastructure and the like. Indirect but compelling evidence of economic dynamism also appears in the form of moneylending by village *bantō* (and Negoroji), the levying of the acreage tax (a relatively new impost—at least as a permanent fixture), and villager establishment of cottage temples (a topic I discuss in chapter 8). The upheaval of the age, too, played a role in this dynamism, hindering trade and leaving crops destroyed on occasion.

The dynamism was accordingly a boon for some and, at least in certain years, a bane to others, if not all. For the common folk of Hineno and Iriyamada, the effects of this dynamic economy are difficult to gauge. Of typical villagers, whether *hyakushō* of stable families but limited wealth, or those at the bottom of the economic pile (assumed to be landless renters living on the margin), Masamoto provides few clues about their lives or livelihoods. Outside of the *bantō* and village elders, we know little beyond what Masamoto wrote in general terms about “this hamlet,” “that village,” or “the villagers,” broadly construed. Clearly “the villagers” suffered when famine hit or warriors invaded, but they also appear to have prospered during years of solid agricultural productivity, and their engagement in local markets, selling goods both in Sano and at temple markets in neighboring Kii Province, are evidence of economic vitality. The same was true for the village elites, whose wealth was evident in their moneylending activities (extending to an individual of Masamoto’s stature, no less), though this also may have reflected increased social and economic stratification in the villages, as those at the top expanded their holdings and income at the expense of the lower classes. In any event, what we see is little more than a snapshot of early sixteenth century economic life on the estate and in the region. It offers hints about broader developments, but casual extrapolation in the light of changes in time and place during *sengoku*’s many decades is unwarranted.

What we can say with confidence is that much of the dynamic quality of the *sengoku* economy at the time (in all its manifestations) was inherent to the age. It was part and parcel of the establishment and workings of independent villages, of the struggle over land and its income as the political center collapsed, of the economic turmoil spawned by warring (and invading) parties, and of the opportunities that presented themselves in a nascent commercial economy. In this sense, it seems fair to say that Hineno and Iriyamada were representative of many villages in Japan at the time, whose situations may have been unique in some respects, but whose economic challenges and opportunities, broadly defined, were similar.

## Living with War

Making sense of warfare during the period we speak of as *sengoku* or “The Country at War” is surprisingly difficult. Warfare may have been the one constant during the period, but questions of how, why, and if it mattered (and if it mattered, which of course it did, when did it matter), are not easily answered. If warfare was the defining characteristic of the period, surely we should be able to explain its significance, both in its effects upon the day-to-day existence of the country’s inhabitants as well as in broader historical trends. A few probing questions about war and its meanings during the period reveal the challenges of defining this ubiquitous phenomenon. One: who was at war (and who was not)? Two: what was the war (or were the wars) about? In other words, what was being fought over? What was its purpose? Three: did war change society (either in the short run or long run)? Four: did war affect the way that the archipelago’s inhabitants viewed their society and themselves (and how did this vary by status and class)? Five: what were peaceful periods like—for surely they existed at times and in locales during this span of one hundred years? Six: though there were clearly years (primarily late in the period) when warfare between powerful warriors was serious, sustained, large-scale, and deadly, is war an appropriate term for what occurred broadly throughout the land and over time?

Some of these questions are less impenetrable than they were fifty years ago thanks to critical scholarship of recent decades. And though the insights offered by various studies are not all of a kind, taken as a whole they reveal the futility of efforts to generalize about warfare during these hundred years. The reasons and purposes and results of armed struggle were more diverse than often portrayed, as were combatants. This was not a period of “War-

ring States,” a problematic English translation of *sengoku* which suggests the preeminence of powerful warlord domains throughout the era, as well as the idea that those warrior domains were distinct, independent states over the course of that century.

The most sustained effort in English to understand war during *sengoku* is Mary Elizabeth Berry’s study, *The Culture of Civil War in Kyoto*.<sup>1</sup> But few of the questions in the list above are of interest to her. Some, she admits, are beyond simple understanding, such as “what was being fought over?” and “what was war’s purpose?” For Berry, the Ōnin War (which marked the start of the period) was in many ways representative of the armed struggles that came to define much of what followed. The battles, the warfare, of Ōnin seemed largely pointless, or at least as diverse in purpose as the combatants were numerous. “What exactly, the conflict was ‘about’ is hard to say, for it came to be about many different things in many different places as the initial convulsion within the elite opened fissures everywhere.” Elsewhere she adds that “the experience of wartime was the experience of plotlessness,” and “Just what, we must ask, did the contenders want? I don’t think they knew.”<sup>2</sup> For Berry, this indeterminate quality of war in Kyoto (from Ōnin and beyond), and the unease over it among its inhabitants (as well as the destruction it wreaked) became the subject of her study. The “culture of civil war” was thus defined not only by the combatants, but also (and perhaps, to a greater extent) by the capital’s residents in their reactions to conflict, in their struggles to survive the wars (for they were ongoing) and their efforts to make sense of them. Berry is uninterested in closure because it did not exist, at least not for the period and place she examines, and because closure did not define the culture of the period or the lives of the people.

Missing in Berry’s depiction of *sengoku* Kyoto is not only closure but also change—at least meaningful change of the sort historians have sought as they attempt to move Japan from late medieval to early modern within these violent decades. What is surprising is that military historians, who have cast a much broader net in their efforts to understand the fighting, have provided remarkably little support for arguments that warfare effected change—at least through the first eight decades of the period. Thomas Conlan sees the Ōnin War as critical in the development of new tactics and organization, primarily in the use of infantry wielding pikes, but argues that until the middle of the sixteenth century, warfare was limited in scale, characterized by skirmishes, not pitched battles; the new methods would only be put to serious use late in the era.<sup>3</sup> Karl Friday adds that most battles during the sixteenth century “revolved around border conflicts.” This primarily involved “burning fields and towns, or plundering crops and other valuables along

the frontier, which was usually accomplished by enticing castellans along the border to switch sides.”<sup>4</sup>

As for the period’s commoners, they generally fall outside the large narratives of *sengoku* warfare, except to the extent that they helped fill the great warlords’ armies late in the era. But their regional influence and military capabilities were substantial, and diverse, as seen in the leagues of Pure Land adherents (Ikkō Ikki), the uprisings of peasant “leagues of the soil” (*tsuchi ikki*), and the military resistance of peasants, as depicted in studies by scholars such as Fujiki Hisashi and Inaba Tsuguharu.<sup>5</sup>

Though Masamoto’s stay in Izumi was brief, armed conflicts and the threat of them appear regularly in the pages of his diary. In the process, he provided one more source—a mere snapshot in time, but offering copious detail—that helps us consider the various meanings of the period’s armed conflicts.

Unlike the large-scale battles between great warlords late in the period, conflicts and fighting in Izumi at this time were overwhelmingly local and regional, and limited in size. And unlike the Ōnin War, which had origins in struggles for power within the shogunate but soon devolved into seemingly purposely fighting, the root of armed conflict in Izumi at the turn of the sixteenth century was clear. In simplest terms, it was the struggle for control of land and the rights to income from it. This was true during the four years Masamoto was in Izumi and probably for at least several decades either side of that. And it was true regardless of who the combatants were, whether regional power holders like the Izumi military governors and Negoroji clerics, lesser powers like upstart warriors, estate proprietors like Kujō Masamoto, or the residents of a village. Behind the disputes and threats about taxes and claims about land, and who would pay what, lay the reality of invading forces—usually too few in number to be called armies, but nonetheless wielding weapons and sowing chaos. In other words, the economic and political factors that put Hine Estate at the center of attention in Izumi naturally led to physical battles over revenue from the land. In the three sections that make up this chapter, I focus on different aspects of intimidation and armed conflict on the Kujō estate and in Izumi, but underlying it all is the unrelenting fact of larger fights over control of the land and its riches.

Summed up in the arguments I make in these three sections are two larger points. First is that “The Country at War” is an appropriate title for this century-long period, for it conveys the breadth and depth of the fighting while suggesting nothing about the war’s (or wars’) causes, purposes, or meanings. Hineno and Iriyamada villagers surely would have made no sense of the argument that the era they lived in was one of “Warring States.” And

while it is just as likely that the villagers would have denied that they were “at war” with anyone or any group, they would also have acknowledged serious ongoing conflicts with regional powers and the need to repel attacks and intrusions by such groups, as well as to negotiate with them. In contrast, the Izumi *shugo* and monks of Negoroji would have probably admitted being at war with each other while noting that conflict was defined as much by periods of little or no fighting (and the tactics—economic and otherwise—they pursued during those periods) as by times of actual combat. War was continual in the region, but fighting was not, and everything suggests that this was the pattern—to a greater and lesser degree—throughout much of the land during most of the *senigoku* era. One hundred years is a lengthy period of time, and the battles waged within that span, and between varying groups, cannot be understood separate from the breaks in fighting and the non-warring lives and activities that defined those intervals. The country was indeed at war, but with whom and over what was never really clear, at least when viewed from afar.<sup>6</sup>

Second, nothing in *Tabihikitsuke* suggests there was a “culture of civil war” in Hine Estate, or more generally in Izumi, comparable to that in Kyoto. As Mary Elizabeth Berry noted, the upheaval of the Ōnin War, lengthy and terribly destructive, ushered in a new age in the capital, forcefully affecting its residents. Nothing similar occurred in Izumi. Of course, armed conflict was part of the villagers’ existence, something they were forced to deal with and adapt to, but little about this was new; upheaval from fighting and turmoil in the region was something they were accustomed to prior to Ōnin, and it was as common to their parents’ and grandparents’ generations as to theirs. More generally, as seen in the rich evidence of *Tabihikitsuke*, warfare no more defined the villagers’ lives than did other factors and other forces—economic, cultural, social, and religious—that I analyze in this manuscript. Armed conflict was part of the mix, but far from all-defining.

### Taking Captives, Burning Homes, Destroying Seedlings

Kujō Masamoto’s first experience with large-scale strife on Hine Estate came just over two months into his stay, and unsettled him considerably. The aggressors were some of the *shugo*’s retainers. The objects of the attacks were several villagers of Iriyamada. Here is Masamoto’s description of the events of the first day, 6/17.

At the hour of the horse [noon], the villagers were all in a clamor.  
When we asked what the problem was, they replied that today was

the Sano market (held on days of 2 and 7). And when residents from this estate went there, two or three individuals from Ōgi hamlet were captured and bound “by the *shugo*.” In response, the villagers wondered if they should rise up in force and set fire to Sano, or if they should take captive individuals from *shugo* lands, hostages who they could exchange.

[Masamoto’s words]: Things are already in an uproar. Sano is a particularly large village. If you try to apprehend the enemy with only a small force, you will have no chance of winning. Also, as to the reasons the individuals were taken captive, first we must one way or another get a messenger to the *shugo* and then act based on their response. Though surely it has been their intention from the first to intrude illegally into the affairs of this estate, negotiation is the way of government.<sup>7</sup>

The Sano market, at the western edge of Hine Estate, was a regional “six-day market” (*rokusai ichi*). As Masamoto noted, it was held on days of the month ending in 2s and 7s—in other words, the 2nd, 7th, 12th, 17th, 22nd, and 27th—for a total of six days each month. The market was particularly important for Iriyamada, given its limited acreage of paddy. There the villagers went regularly to sell goods they produced in their mountain valley. But as a regional outpost of the *shugo*, with retainers permanently stationed there, Sano was a location of frequent clashes between the *shugo*’s men and the villagers.<sup>8</sup>

In discussing possible responses to the abductions, the villagers revealed not just their anger, but also indecision about where to direct that anger. Did those at fault include the residents of Sano, who had possibly colluded with the *shugo*’s men? If so, then their village should be attacked and burned. Or was this solely the responsibility of the *shugo*? If so, then it made sense to seize someone from their lands, a hostage or two who could perhaps be exchanged for the captured villagers of Iriyamada. In any event, their first thought was to react with force, and it is apparent that they were confident they could deliver a punishing blow, whether to the villagers of Sano or the *shugo*. Masamoto was more cautious, urging restraint and negotiations with Sakai. The villagers probably thought he was naive, assuming as he did that there may have been a good reason for the abductions. But this was early in Masamoto’s stay, and he had much to learn.

In the evening of the same day, a message arrived from leaders of Sano village. They stated that the capture of the villagers was the work of two of the *shugo*’s men, Satake and Bettō, with the help of thirty residents of nearby Kogi Estate they had pressed into service. As for the villagers of Sano, they

claimed ignorance and innocence. Rather than working with the *shugo*, they stated that they had in fact assisted the Iriyamada folk at the time of attack, “concealing the remainder of those who had come to work at the market and then helping them return.”<sup>9</sup> As the Sano residents were well aware, they would be suspected of collusion with the *shugo*, so it made sense to act quickly to stave off any possibility of retaliation. Their efforts succeeded, as did Masamoto’s call for patience and negotiation. The villagers put aside immediate plans for a counterblow as Masamoto worked to bring about the captives’ release, sending letters both to the *shugo* in Sakai and to officials in the Muromachi government.<sup>10</sup>

Four days later Iriyamada faced a more direct threat from the *shugo*, when word reached the villagers that Sakai was planning a “night attack.” To the good fortune of the villagers, that went awry, but according to word from relatives in Sano, the intrusion had been put off a day, and was still in the works. That communication was confirmed later in the day by independent messages from both Kumatori and Kinoshima estates.<sup>11</sup> At play here were the dynamics of family and regional ties, something that worked strongly in the villagers’ favor. In contrast to the Sano market abduction, in which men from Kogi Estate had been pressured by the *shugo* to assist them, here villagers from surrounding areas were the conduits for information crucial to the community’s protection. Relatives were a logical source for this, but so were neighbors whose shared interests as agricultural communities bound them together.

These incidents are telling, both about the practice and limits of warfare in Izumi at the time, as well as about the place and independence of villages. One image of warriors (better defined as just the *shugo*’s men in this instance), particularly when combined with the picture of the unprepared attackers of the West Side who forgot their mosquito nets, is incompetence. Planned attacks often were not carried out. Word of these that reached Masamoto, usually based on information from surrounding villages whose residents saw warriors at preparation for battle, were numerous. Masamoto wrote many times of the good fortune of not being attacked, or of failed or poorly executed invasions.<sup>12</sup> A prime example of this is seen in a *Tabihiki-tsuke* entry in the summer of 1502:

Since the crowing of the cock, the villagers have been in a fluster. Because of a rumor that Negoroji is on the march, provincial forces (*kuni-shū*) are out on patrol. And apparently they are preparing to set fire to this village [Iriyamada]. Tsuchimaru is the primary gateway to the village, so precautions there are critical. The same precautions

are necessary at the Tachibanaguchi valley entrance. Accordingly the villagers gathered together and then ran to these passages, I was told. And young men and others were similarly sent to Tsuchimaru.

In the evening everyone returned. The provincial forces numbered fewer than 2000. And though they had already arrived in Hineno, apparently they recognized that the villagers here were well prepared. They returned to lower Nagataki, having traveled perhaps as far as the Tottori region. Eventually they all pulled back and dispersed. That no serious incidents occurred is reason to rejoice.<sup>13</sup>

Put more charitably toward the warriors, rather than being incompetent they faced significant challenges of logistics and manpower, challenges that severely restricted their ability to successfully conduct warfare and control the region. Their fighting troops in most cases were villagers, forced to engage in combat or at least acts of sabotage and destruction in support of the handful of “real” warriors that led them—something the villagers usually resisted. It did not make for effective or fearsome combat units. It is true that when sustained warfare between the region’s powers took place, as between the *shugo* and Negorōji, the level of combat and status of the combatants rose; but the shortage of warriors still appears to have been acute. For less critical battles, mustering such forces was unfeasible; it was too time-consuming and too difficult to arrange, with other matters pressing for local strongmen’s attention.

The incident that started this confrontation, that which involved Kogi Estate villagers and the Sano market abduction, reveals the extent to which villagers were subject to outside demands for military service. Nothing about this should be surprising, since Kogi Estate, located several villages north of Hineno, appears to have been under the control of the Izumi *shugo* at this time. The extent of warrior control clearly varied within the province, based upon the position and strength of overseers. Where local strongmen with hereditary holdings maintained a strong presence in villages, their authority was in all likelihood secure, and raising an armed force from resident villagers would have been relatively easy. But in locations that lacked a strong local military presence, control of the villagers was indirect, defined primarily in tax obligations of one form or another—typically paid to the overseer or governing official as steward rights, deputy rights, or the military half-tax. Raising an army in such locales was much more challenging.<sup>14</sup>

In the case of the villagers of Hineno and Iriyamada, Kujō Masamoto’s presence on the estate provided them a four-year reprieve from outside military summons as Masamoto wrote about soon after arriving on the estate.<sup>15</sup>

As seen in a *Tabihikitsuke* entry of 1501/5/19, word of a Negoroji invasion of southern Izumi was accompanied by a directive from the temple to Iriyamada to provide assistance. Making the excuse that this would not be possible with Masamoto in residence, the villagers politely declined, and Negoroji appears not to have pushed the issue.<sup>16</sup> Though it is difficult to know the extent of Iriyamada's links to Negoroji, it is safe to assume that in most instances villagers were anxious to avoid demands for military service from regional warriors and other powers, like Negoroji. And when pressed into battle in these instances, they inevitably fought with limited enthusiasm and effectiveness, as one would expect.

Thanks to the several warnings of 6/22—five days after the initial abductions at Sano market—the Iriyamada villagers had time to prepare beforehand for the pending assault by Sakai. And in Masamoto, who was understandably nervous in the face of a rumored attack, they had a willing collaborator. Admitting that “the *shugo*'s decision to send forces against me is certainly unsettling,” Masamoto nevertheless showed no inclination to back down. “Though we might not have much of a plan for dealing with this,” he stated, “even if I have to string an arrow in a bow myself, this estate will not become a *shugo* holding with us standing by doing nothing.” So when the young men of Ōgi hamlet, those responsible for repelling the impending assault, came asking for instructions, Masamoto directed them to build a defensive framework at Tachibanaguchi, the narrow valley mouth that separated Iriyamada and Kumatori to the north, and he provided several men to assist with this.<sup>17</sup> For whatever the reason, perhaps because of the villagers' preparations, the assault was abandoned.

At this point, the worst of the conflict was over. Another six weeks would pass before both remaining captives were free, the last following the payment of a ransom by the villagers.<sup>18</sup> Just what the *shugo* gained otherwise is unclear, but the villagers, backed by Masamoto, were unwilling to budge on larger issues, such as taxes. So the *shugo*'s men took their trifling ransom—on the order of 200 *mon*, based on comparable cases—and released the villagers, freeing themselves at the same time of the bother of feeding and detaining them. It was not much to gain for their efforts. But despite that, they continued to take captives in the months and years that followed; the abduction of enemies and recalcitrant peasants was a deeply ingrained practice, widely followed throughout the land, though its effectiveness is questionable. Surprising though it may be, of the abductions described by Masamoto in *Tabihikitsuke*, the two that he carried out against West Side *bantō* for the villagers' refusal to pay taxes appear to have been the most effective; they, at least, resulted in the taxes being paid in full.

If the *shugo* gained little that was tangible through abducting Hine Estate villagers, it was not because of a lack of trying. During the course of the four years Masamoto was in Izumi, retainers of the military governors captured a total of twenty-one residents on nine separate occasions. Even if we subtract two abductions (of four individuals) that ended hours after they occurred, the number is still large.<sup>19</sup> But the impact in economic and political terms was slight, far less than the number suggests, traumatic though the abductions no doubt were for the principals and their families (I discuss the one exceptional case and its influence on community relations in chapter 7). Unlike Masamoto, who had a clear purpose and obvious targets in mind on the occasions he took captive village *bantō*, the *shugo*'s men appear to have taken captives with little thought beforehand and few well-laid plans. Part of the problem for them was that they had a difficult time targeting appropriate individuals to capture, and unless the captives were *bantō*, village leaders, or cultivators of tax-paying families, they had little or no extortion value.

The point is well illustrated by an incident in the seventh month of 1501, when three individuals from Iriyamada were captured outside Hine Estate, near the coast in Yasumatsu, and taken by their warrior abductors to Sano. Two of the captives were *sanmai hijiri* (三昧聖), independent Buddhist monks who specialized in funerals and cremation, while the third was a menial. Within the day, the men were released through the efforts of one of the monks' uncles, a resident of Yasumatsu. His argument before the *shugo*'s men was that "the 'way' of these monks means they are neither your enemies nor your allies. They cultivate not one *tan* of rice, but merely make their living by this [religious] calling. And as for the menial under Tanoshiri, he is a mere servant. If you take and keep captive these men, it will not result in you gaining any sort of judgment against them." He was correct, so they demanded a ransom of 10 *biki* (100 *mon*) for the three and then released them.<sup>20</sup>

In this case, it is likely that the abduction was unplanned, carried out after the warriors realized the men were from Iriyamada. Or if not unplanned, it is possible that it was a hit-or-miss grab, with the hope that those captured would have value to the *shugo*—an unrealized hope, as it turned out. Captives were also taken by the *shugo*'s men in the midst of battle. Here as well there was no guarantee that much was to be gained, and sometimes the captors just looked foolish. That was the case late in the tenth month of 1503, when Iriyamada villagers caught up to a small force of the *shugo*'s men and forcibly freed two East Side villagers who had just been taken. And two years previous, when Hineno Mitsumori seized East Side villagers "in the name of *shugo* punishment," West Side villagers whom he had inadvertently captured as well convinced him to release them all.<sup>21</sup>

The fact is that the military governors provided little justification for abductions. Their position is summed up well in an early exchange between Hayashi Shin'emon, a lower *shugo* official, and Masamoto's retainer Shiono Hyōgonosuke, who had traveled to Sakai to confront the *shugo* about Iriyamada villagers they were holding. After delivering documents from the shogunate that supported the Kujō position, Shiono argued what would become a common refrain of Masamoto's: that the estate was clearly and unequivocally a direct holding of the Kujō, a position confirmed both by history and shogunal decrees. Accordingly, there was no justification for the capture of Hineno or Iriyamada villagers, as the *shugo*'s men had recently done. To this, Hayashi replied that "the Iriyamada cultivators invited the *shugo*'s enemies into their village, in which they were clearly at fault. It was for this that we bound several of them."<sup>22</sup> In other words, the arrival of Kujō Masamoto and his men to Hine Estate—by the invitation of the villagers, according to Hayashi—was the wrong committed by the Iriyamada cultivators, and for this they were punished. Based on this logic, the abductions were nothing more than petty retribution. And he may have been correct.<sup>23</sup>

In the preceding discussion of abductions, the other primary force in the region, Negoroji, is nowhere to be seen. Perhaps this was a peculiarity of these four years, an absence that would be filled in other years if sources could be found. It is more likely, however, that the monks saw little reason to engage in the practice, particularly since their regional base was more confined than that of the military governors, whose retainers included individuals with outposts (in the form of hereditary holdings) spread widely in the province. For the latter, it was a simple (if often ineffective) tactic to grab a villager or two when the opportunity presented itself.

Two other practices of questionable utility that the *shugo*'s men (and others at battle) engaged in were tearing up paddies and fields and setting fire to homes. Though directed at villagers, these acts of destruction could also serve as a means of economic sabotage of an enemy who held tax or income rights in those villages. With Masamoto on the estate, Hineno and Iriyamada appear to have gained at least partial immunity from these tactics, as combatants agreed—in response to petitions and envoys from Masamoto's commissioners—to skirt the estate or move quickly through it rather than stop and burn and plunder. Evidence of this is seen in early summer of 1504, as Negoroji soldiers, in conflict with the *shugo*, pushed along the coast to the west of Hine Estate, burning sections of Yoshimi, Sano, and Kaishōji (and tearing up seedlings at the last of these three). At the same time, their Kokawadera confederates were stopped in Iriyamada, preparing to push into Hineno (with its ties to the *shugo*) and put it to the torch; but they were

convinced to abandon that plan and move on, thanks to appeals by Masamoto's men.<sup>24</sup>

A petition drafted by Masamoto's commissioner Takehara Sadao two years previous likewise urged officials within the Negoroji general council to restrain the lawless actions—including the tearing up of paddies—of forces allied with the temple. And during the same period we can find, in *Tabihikitsuke*, Masamoto's musings about Hineno's unprotected location, someplace where "rice paddies are torn up."<sup>25</sup>

Hineno village was also particularly susceptible to arson. Portions of it were burned twice by outside forces during Satō Sōbei's uprising. The extent of the damage in both instances—to the West Side hamlet of Tachibana, near Sano market, and to Hineno East Side—is unclear, but in a letter from East Side cultivators to Masamoto's commissioners, the villagers asked for assistance to return to their lands where they could build small huts as residences, presumably burned down by the warring armies.<sup>26</sup> On a third occasion, in an incident I examine at the conclusion of this chapter, *shugo* forces set fire to a fence that flanked the main gate of Kaitai'in in Hineno; Masamoto wrote nothing of the extent of damage.<sup>27</sup> In addition to these incidents, the *shugo*'s men or the monks of Negoroji and Kōno'odera threatened to set fire to the villages, but each time the danger was averted. Closer to home (and evidence that arson knew no bounds), after several days of obstruction by East Side villagers on the days set aside for collecting the spring acreage tax in 1503, Shinanokōji Nagamori, obviously infuriated, informed Masamoto in a letter that he intended to return to Iriyamada, raise a small force, and then go back to the East Side and burn the village down.<sup>28</sup> Cooler heads prevailed on that occasion, and the village was saved. In this, as in the threats from the outside, the villagers no doubt counted themselves fortunate, as indeed they were, given the numerous references in *Tabihikitsuke* to the *shugo*'s men or temple forces setting fire to homes, villages, markets, and occasionally temples in the region. This was something all too familiar to the villagers, having lost homes and goods to fire in the past and knowing they would surely suffer from it in the future.<sup>29</sup>

For the villagers, these acts—of arson, destruction of crops, and abduction—were all of a kind, different as they might appear on the surface. They were acts of intimidation, meant to compel the villagers to submission, to remind them that divided loyalties (like divided taxes) were unacceptable, and to drive home the point that resistance was futile. In each instance, they made life more difficult for peasants, whether by forcing them to rebuild homes (simple as they were), replant fields, or sue (with offering in hand) for release of prisoners. But they were also calculated not to cause excessive

harm in most instances, the reason being that regional power holders well knew that the villages were their lifeblood, and if destruction of crops or lives was severe, tax revenue would fall and villagers would flee the land or rise up in concerted violence. Most regional lords were wise enough not to push villagers that far. Also, even if land and villages were in enemy territory, how could a warrior establish good relations with local villagers in the future (assuming eventual victory) if at this time he destroyed their crops and burned their homes? For these reasons, attacks on villagers in Izumi at this time were rarely large in scale and rarely undertaken with the intention of inflicting heavy casualties. As acts of aggression with limited objectives, and conducted without lethal violence, these deeds could be justified by the *shugo*—with distorted logic, to be sure—as necessary for ruling their lands, if not the province.

Masamoto wrote just once of extreme violence by the *shugo*'s men, but it was not part of a planned attack and was probably not sanctioned by the military governors. The perpetrator was Taga, retainer of the lower *shugo* and a local strongman with bases in Sano and Ibara, next door to Hine Estate. In the midst of an extended push that he and Hineno Mitsumori (like Taga a frustrated local warrior) made in the summer and fall of 1503 to force East Side residents to pay the military half-tax, Taga cut down an East Side villager. It was, Masamoto concluded, a “terribly lawless act.” It was also something about which he could do little.<sup>30</sup>

As a final point, it seems likely that the Izumi *shugo* failed to realize the effects that their tactics would have on relations between the villagers and Masamoto. If they hoped they would increase tension between proprietor and peasants, they were surely disappointed. Instead of internal discord, arson and abductions had the effect of strengthening the resolve of estate inhabitants, high and low, and bringing villagers and Masamoto closer together. Certainly that was the case for Masamoto's retainers and the young men of the estate who joined in battle in defense of the villages.

### Villagers at Battle

Early on the morning of 1501/8/28, the villagers of Ōgi hamlet, home to Masamoto's residence at Chōfukuji, were in a panic. The temple bell at nearby Enmanji was ringing non-stop, as was a bell in Shōbu, the hamlet immediately to the east. Messengers arrived shortly, informing Masamoto that Hineno Mitsumori, retainer of the upper *shugo*, “had entered Hineno East Side and was attacking indiscriminately whatever was before

him, whether villagers or cottage temples.” He had already taken two prisoners, one Gyōbu Tarō, recently resigned as *bantō*, and a “lesser cultivator” (*wakibyākushō* 脇百姓). Forces from Tsuchimaru went to meet Hineno’s men in battle, but needed assistance, so a number of Masamoto’s retainers, including Shinanokōji Nagamori and Ishii Aritoshi, hurried off to join them. The invaders, several of whom had received arrow wounds, soon retreated outside the estate. None of the estate defenders were hit, according to Masamoto, but the abduction of the two men was worrisome.<sup>31</sup>

In the commotion of the morning, Masamoto had been left with one aged retainer, Chōhōji Terasu, and he clearly felt vulnerable. If Mitsumori’s forces were advancing from the East Side into Tsuchimaru, then the “mountain valley” and its residents were in danger, himself included. As he wrote in *Tabihikitsuke*, were the battle to take a turn for the worse, “I will set fire to Chōfukuji, and then, old man that I am, jump into that fire—such was the determination I had made.” Indeed he went so far as to write letters to his children and send them to the mountain monks at Shippōryūji, with instructions for their delivery to Kyoto. Masamoto was greatly relieved when he learned that “there was no need to go to that extent, that the invading forces had retreated.”<sup>32</sup> The attack, limited in scale as it was, had been quickly repelled by the combined forces of the estate and Masamoto’s men.

Masamoto should not have been surprised by the attack, for his recent actions—the confiscation of four *chō* of Mitsumori’s land—were the immediate impetus for it. The land, equal to four hectares or nearly ten acres, consisted of two *chō* on the East Side and two *chō* on the West Side, and in laying claim to the parcels, Masamoto was directly confronting Mitsumori. It was a risky decision. Not only was Mitsumori a retainer of the *shugo*, but his roots in the Hineno community—reflected in his family name—ran deep. He probably had a house and compound on residential holdings within the village, and the four *chō* of land were likely long-held parcels. Moreover, having served as an attendant to Karahashi Arikazu when the latter was managing the estate, he was intimately familiar with it and many of the residents on it. By all indications, he was unlikely to accept the confiscation of his land with equanimity.<sup>33</sup>

After regaining his composure following the attack, Masamoto reasserted his position on the confiscated holdings. When the East Side *bantō* called on him later that day to report that the villagers there, unable to withstand the turmoil, had fled to the mountains, Masamoto responded that he understood their concern, but that the invasions were something they would need to learn to endure. They were unconvinced, and remained away for the better part of a month, as new developments followed. If

nothing else, the crisis came at a convenient time for them: the rice harvest was still several weeks away.<sup>34</sup>

This was a period of intense pressure on Hine Estate, and none of the three village units was immune from it. With the attack by Mitsumori on the East Side at the end of the eighth month, *shugo* forces were now engaged in battle with each village. Tension between the *shugo* and West Side over the annual tax was building, with increasingly stiff threats of the *shugo* countered by Masamoto at every turn. Iriyamada's fight with the *shugo*, though no longer at fever pitch following the release of the Ōgi captives in the seventh month, was sustained by *shugo* demands for taxes, including the threat of "double taxes" issued to Tsuchimaru hamlet on 8/6, as noted in chapter 3. And with two villagers in hand, one of whom as a former *bantō* was a leading member of the East Side, Hineno Mitsumori was poised to continue his push to regain his lands. The villagers, and Masamoto and his men, were expecting armed conflict, and they took steps to prepare themselves for it.

When rumor reached Iriyamada on 9/5 that the *shugo* might be sending an armed force against them, the villagers took notice. Several points about the rumor were unsettling. One was that various forces were gathering to Sakai, evidence that a sizable group was being put together, with the more disconcerting possibility that these might include retainers being summoned from their lands. If so, the upcoming conflict would be more serious than sabotage and more extended than a sortie. Another unsettling point was that word had arrived from Kumatori villagers, neighbors to the immediate north, that they were among those summoned to Sakai and that their object of attack was to be Iriyamada. With this forewarning, Ishii Aritoshi joined villagers of the four Iriyamada hamlets at Tsuchimaru pass, where they "set a 'deer hunting' trap, as it is called," and waited for the invaders. They did not come. Instead they advanced on Tottori, an estate held by Ise Shrine to the south of Hine Estate, evidence that the *shugo* were battling more than just Masamoto and his villagers at this time.<sup>35</sup>

On 9/21, Hineno Mitsumori made a pilgrimage to Ōizeki Shrine in Hineno village and then surveyed the East Side, apparently making plans. He put out word that villagers' homes, empty at present because the residents had departed to the mountains, would be broken apart and carted off. To protect against this, Masamoto sent men to patrol the village.<sup>36</sup>

Two days later, on 9/23, violence erupted. It began when Masamoto's men took captive a West Side *bantō* at dawn, as discussed in chapter 3. Shortly thereafter a *shugo* force—headed by Hineno Mitsumori and assisted by Ayai, Motoyama, and Ōta, local warriors of note—invaded Hineno.<sup>37</sup> Accompanying those four were 1000 men mustered from villages in the region. It was an

atypically well-staffed force at the top, led as it was by warriors well enough known that they were identified by name and no doubt attended by their own men, armed and probably on horseback. The army's makeup and size (even if the given numbers were exaggerated) were evidence of Mitsumori's determination to punish the Hineno residents and recover his land.<sup>38</sup>

Masamoto did not make clear who initially resisted the warriors, whether his own men or West Side residents, but he noted that before long they were joined by more than two hundred East Side cultivators who arrived from their mountain hideout. Fighting for their own land and homes, they were obviously determined to drive out the invaders. And though an invading force of "1000 men" sounds formidable, the vast majority of those were commoners from neighboring villages, forced into warfare they wished to avoid (and against neighbors they hoped not to antagonize—something I examine in chapter 7). Is it any wonder that serious fighting, though said to have lasted three hours (as the force moved through Hineno East Side), was rare? As summarized by Masamoto, "of the enemies, eight or nine received arrow wounds. On our side, one East Side cultivator was slightly wounded by an arrow. The enemy had armor, while on this side everyone was in bare skin. I heard that all the arrows that were bound to strike, 'danced away' and missed. Was this truly not the gods' doing? The enemy army was defeated and withdrew."<sup>39</sup> Taking no chances with the possibility of a return by Mitsumori's forces, Masamoto's men prepared accordingly. Early next morning, they gathered military rations and summoned forces from the Iriyamada villages. Two or three hundred men were hidden in the mountains and a force of one hundred was placed directly under the command of the two commissioners—Nagamori and Aritoshi—and Aoki.<sup>40</sup> By the end of the day they could report that the warriors had fallen back, were now outside the estate, and appeared to be dispersing. Guards remained in place for another day, but the danger was past.<sup>41</sup>

The villagers of Hine Estate were fortunate to escape serious battles with outside forces during most of the period that Masamoto resided among them. Close scrapes were numerous and skirmishes more than a few, but extended fighting was rare. However, on the occasions when it did occur the villagers acquitted themselves admirably. As fighting men, the young males of the villages matched up well with the *shugo's* men and the temples' fighting monks. And why should they not have done so? Nothing suggests that the groups that raided and invaded periodically enjoyed clear advantages in physical strength, military tactics and training, or even weapons. Furthermore, while there is no reason to think that young men of the villages were more capable fighters than their peasant counterparts who were coerced into

battle against them, they inevitably held the upper hand, since they fought with purpose as defenders of their homes and families.<sup>42</sup>

What are we to make, then, of the “fighting men” of Izumi at the turn of the sixteenth century? Who were they and what defined them? To begin with, full-time warriors, the prototypical combatants of *sengoku*, were by all accounts few in number. The strength of traditional proprietors (court nobles and powerful temples), backed by the Muromachi shogunate, stymied local strongmen’s efforts to acquire land, and thus the wealth needed to support a larger body of fighting men. This was a common phenomenon in the central regions, and clearly reflected in *Tabihikitsuke*. There had been significant battles in Izumi in recent years, including in 1500, not many months before Masamoto’s arrival, but outside forces, such as those from Hatakeyama and Negoroji in Kii Province, made up a significant number of the fighters. Moreover, it appears that in 1501 the two Hosokawa military governors in Izumi, new to their positions following the deaths of their predecessors, had yet to build up a substantial retainer corps.

As for the “warriors” themselves, the picture of the individuals who appear in *Tabihikitsuke* as retainers of the *shugo* is not particularly flattering. These men come across as neither especially skilled nor fearsome. One way to consider them is through the nomenclature in the sources. And what becomes apparent is that the terms we use today to describe those who fought in medieval Japan would either have held different meanings for residents of Izumi Province in 1501 or been of limited significance. There is no evidence that the term *bushi*, for example, was commonly used in the province; it does not appear in *Tabihikitsuke* or other sources. Just once Masamoto wrote of “warriors,” this in a diary entry in the summer of 1502, in which he described a trip by his young commissioner, Takehara Sadao, to observe a Shinto festival. “Today was the Kokawadera festival. Sadao went to see it. Horses, armor and helmets, and in general the appearance of warriors (*musha no tei* 武者之體) was like that of the Fukakusa festival, he said.”<sup>43</sup> Were those real warriors in Masamoto’s eyes, the ones who looked the part? And was it possible that he considered retainers of the Izumi military governors no different than his own retainers, men with various responsibilities, one of which was to take up arms to fight when necessary?

Just as there were no *bushi* in Izumi at the time, there were also no samurai, at least none as commonly depicted by that term.<sup>44</sup> The samurai that Masamoto wrote of, which he did just twice, were his own men. Samurai, a word that comes from the verb to serve, were men grouped at the very bottom of the court hierarchy, with duties that included attending on their superiors and dealing with physical disputes. Ohara Kamonnosuke, who

carried out the murder of Karahashi Arikazu, was of samurai status, as was Ishii Aritoshi, one of the commissioners, which suggests something of the breadth of individuals so defined. Shinanokōji Nagamori was of *shodaibu* status, a step higher. Masamoto's mention of samurai in *Tabihikitsuke* appears both times in the context of gifts being offered, more substantial ones to him and the commissioners, and lesser ones to the "samurai members" (*samurai-chū* 侍中).<sup>45</sup>

As for the *shugo*'s men, as individuals they were usually referred to by Masamoto and others as "retainers of the *shugo*" (*shugo hikannin*) or "men of the province" (*kuni-shū*). Armies on the move were spoken of as "groups" or "forces," as in Negoroji-*shū*, the "Negoroji force." When not specifically identified as retainers of the *shugo*, most regional warriors were merely denoted by personal name or title. *Shū* (衆, more commonly read *shu* at the time) was a generic term, not limited to warring parties, and references to non-warring bodies, such as "the Funabuchi village troupe [of dancers]" (*Funbuchi mura no shū* 船淵村之衆), appear regularly in *Tabihikitsuke*. In fact, Masamoto commonly used *shū* as a plural, whether it be for a group of villagers (*jige-shū*), village leaders (*bantō-shū*), festival sightseers (*kenbutsu-shū*), or rebels (*rannyū-shū*), among others.<sup>46</sup> In short, there was no obvious military connotation associated with the word. The same was true of *tsukai* (使), a term with which Masamoto occasionally described the *shugo*'s men as they intruded into Hine Estate. He may have used the term to suggest that the men were sent by the military governors (as opposed to acting on their own), but there is no implication that they were "messengers" (the common modern meaning—used historically as well). And though never depicting a large body, which would have been a "force" (*shū*), they generally came as a group, not individually.<sup>47</sup>

In his most specific denotings of warring groups, Masamoto wrote on 1501/6/10, that provincial officials, having been rebuffed by villagers on the Hineno West Side, threatened to return after raising a "large armed force" (*taisei* 大勢); and then three months later (9/5), wrote that "there are reports that the provincial side will be sending an armed force" (*seitsukai* 勢使). He used the latter term again three days later in describing Negoroji monks on the move. Particularly compelling as evidence for the absence of a class of warriors is Masamoto's reference to a rumor he heard late in the ninth month of 1502, that with the defeat of the turncoat Satō Sōbei, "twenty-one persons" had abandoned the rebel and returned to the provincial side. "Twenty-one persons" (*hitobito nijūichinin*), not warriors or military men, but "persons."<sup>48</sup>

Based on Masamoto's writings and the words and correspondence of

others he recorded in his diary (as well as documents held in Kujō family archives), there was no category or class of warriors in early sixteenth-century Izumi. Various markers were used to define the inhabitants of the province, but a term signifying “those who fight” was not among them. To the extent that such a term’s absence admitted the commonality of skilled fighting by persons of all classes and statuses, it is accurate, for armed fighting was a characteristic of a broad range of Izumi residents.<sup>49</sup>

The point is suggested on one hand by the prevalence of weapons and other accoutrements of battle on Hine Estate. References to swords bought, stolen, drawn in defense, and used to perform executions all appear in *Tabihikitsuke* and Kujō family documents, with no indication that their existence was other than expected. No one raised questions, for example, at the time that the Ōgi official Gengorō’s hip sword was stolen at the “auspicious writing” ceremony of 1504/1/11 (which occurred within the kitchen of Chōfukuji, no less) as to why he had brought the sword with him.<sup>50</sup> Likewise, in responding to accusations by Hineno Mitsumori in the autumn of 1503 that they had resisted him with force, Iriyamada villagers wrote that, “as to the allegation that we drew our swords and advanced in opposition to your forces, that is not something that we as honorable cultivators would do.” Obviously they possessed swords; the question was whether they actually used them. The villagers did admit, however, in the very next sentence that “with his lordship here, if he gives us an order to drive off outside forces, as loyal servants of this family for generations we would have no choice but to respond with alacrity; it would not be right to ignore his words.” One has to wonder if in fact they actually “kept their weapons sheathed” at the time, since their words admit the possibility that they would do otherwise.<sup>51</sup>

Commonplace though they certainly were on Hine Estate, swords do not provide strong evidence of villagers’ martial abilities since they were a secondary weapon in battle. Much more important were bows and arrows, the primary means of combat. Masamoto’s accounts of fighting inevitably speak of “arrows flying,” “bow and arrow combat,” and “arrow wounds.”<sup>52</sup> The villagers’ prowess with the bow was reflected in the “eight or nine arrow wounds” received by Hineno Mitsumori’s forces in their 1501 confrontation with the East Side, noted earlier. As if that were not sufficient evidence of villagers’ archery skills, local warriors and monks also had the chance to observe them at the Ōizeki Shrine festival, held in the fourth month, at which, according to Masamoto, “Iriyamada village cultivators and others participated in the arrow shoot and many competed to hit the targets.”<sup>53</sup> Though ostensibly a form of devotion to the gods—the arrows that struck

the target were dedicated to them—for the contestants they were a highly popular means to show off their skill.

Evidence of other battle implements within the estate appear randomly in a number of Masamoto's diary entries and point strongly to their place in the community, broadly dispersed. For example, on two occasions inventories of personal property held by accused thieves reveal that they possessed materials for battle. Among the items held by the first thieves—two Shippōryūji monks—were a “halberd, with blade,” a “spear,” “battle axes,” and a “steel battle helmet,” as seen in the list in chapter 4.<sup>54</sup> In the second instance, the accused was a well-off Iriyamada cultivator, Shōen Uma, who was the owner of “one or two pieces of armor.”<sup>55</sup> Though Masamoto writes elsewhere of villagers fighting without armor, suggesting that few possessed it, clearly it was not unknown. But it was not cheap. As seen in a document of accounting for the East Side summer acreage tax of 1503, 900 *mon* of revenue was put toward a set of “chest and stomach armor,” apparently for use by Masamoto's men—a prohibitively heavy expense for most villagers.<sup>56</sup> In addition to these examples of weaponry and armor, Masamoto wrote, as noted earlier, of “spears stolen by the *shugo*'s men” late in 1503 at the time of an attack on Kaitai'in in Hinenō.<sup>57</sup> As local temples and shrines, modest in scale and lacking more than a handful of resident monks or priests, the religious branches in Hine Estate hardly resembled the large and powerful temples with their assemblage of lower level fighting monks, but they maintained at least a handful of arms for occasions that required them.<sup>58</sup> The same was true of the villagers.

Finally, the villagers' martial capabilities are well reflected in their own confidence—unless invading armies were clearly superior in number, the villagers expressed few concerns about confronting them—and in the respect shown them by outside powers. Decisions by *shugo* retainers to withhold attacks in the face of well-prepared villagers speak to both of these points. The same was true of developments during the midst of the Satō Sōbei uprising of 1502, which I describe in the next section of this chapter. At that time, late in the eighth month, a coalition force of between 100 and 200 men, led by Sōbei, advanced into the mountains and “engaged in violence, with the intent to set up a battle camp in Tsuchimaru.” This Iriyamada hamlet at the south end of the valley was to be the base for their operations and the source of their supplies. Learning of this, Masamoto ordered the villagers to drive off the intruders, but they were hesitant to do so. “If we were to do this with force, in the future we will not be allowed to come and go in Negoro and Kokawa [to engage in trade]. [On the other hand], if we allow [Sōbei] to

set up a base, we will become long-term enemies of the *shugo*. We are stuck, with little room to act.”<sup>59</sup>

Clearly, neither Masamoto nor the villagers had any doubt that they could drive off an army of that size. Furthermore, the following day, as the number of outside troops entering Tsuchimaru increased in number overnight, the villagers sent a letter to Negoroji (whose low-level monks were among the invading force), in which they sought the monks’ removal and concluded with the statement that “if in the future you do not censure such behavior, as villagers we will repel them ourselves.”<sup>60</sup> Finally, on 8/28, the *bantō* reported to Masamoto that despite their petitions (and bribes), they ultimately had to use force to convince the outsiders to disperse fully.<sup>61</sup>

A final example of the military strength of villagers, striking in its severity, occurred not in Hine Estate but at the northern end of Izumi Province, approximately ten kilometers southeast of Sakai, within Niwa Valley. The time was the tenth month of 1504, as Masamoto’s stay in the province was coming to an end. Negoroji had been flexing its muscles for some time, and was allied with Hatakeyama Hisanobu, military governor of Kii, immediately to the south of Izumi, as well as with the monks of Kokawadera. The united forces of these three had made considerable advances against the armies of the Izumi *shugo*, and at this time there was a group of Kokawadera men in the Niwa region. On 10/10, Masamoto reported that “as a result of the violent, lawless actions of Kokawadera monks in Niwa Valley, the villagers rose up in force, and many were struck down.” Most who died, we can assume, were monks because, in response, the Kokawadera men demanded that Hatakeyama Hisanobu put to death Niwa Genjirō, a local warrior allied with the southern forces. Why it was that the monks had acted lawlessly in a community that by all indications was controlled by Niwa Genjirō, an ally, is unclear, but the results had been disastrous for the monks, and they were furious.<sup>62</sup>

When Hatakeyama rejected their demands, they broke ranks with him, “disbanded their military camp, and stated that ‘from now on, we will not follow Owari no kami [i.e., Hatakeyama].’” Had the monks been confident of their ability to defeat and destroy the villagers, carrying out their own retribution, surely they would have done so. But they were not, so they sought the death of Niwa, who they believed was responsible for the revolt that took the lives of their colleagues.<sup>63</sup> The incident, we can be confident, did not go unnoticed by regional powers in the province. There was good reason to be wary of villagers and the military might they possessed.

## Warriors, Clerics, and Collateral Damage

Writing in his diary on 1502/7/7, Masamoto noted that “Satō Sōbei has reached an agreement with Negoroji. He has turned against the two *shugo*, and will march against them—such is the grand rumor. It is truly hard to fathom.”<sup>64</sup> Sōbei, a retainer of the lower Izumi *shugo* Hosokawa Masahisa, first appears in *Tabihikitsuke* early in the fifth month of 1501. At that time Masamoto incorrectly identified him as Saitō Sōbei, who was “to come from Sakai to Sano within the next two or three days to manage various provincial affairs there.”<sup>65</sup> Holding a position of assistant to the deputy *shugo*, Sōbei had limited influence within the hierarchy in Sakai, but he clearly had ambition, fueled perhaps by a grudge against the military governors.<sup>66</sup> And as Masamoto realized, an uprising of this sort could result in protracted warfare, even if the armies were not large.

The battles precipitated by Sōbei’s betrayal of the *shugo* began within a month and extended for two, though the threat of conflict hung over the region for the better part of autumn and winter (months 7–12), and the effects of fighting stretched over a much longer period. Certainly for the villagers of the province, nothing good came of it. And though the battle lines were drawn between the Izumi *shugo* and Sōbei (and his ecclesiastical allies to the south and east), there is little question that the villages received the brunt of the damage and the villagers suffered the greatest material losses (except in lives, few though those were). This was to be expected, one might argue, evidence of the “incidental destruction” or “collateral damage” of conflict—to use the euphemistic terms modern apologists for war have coined. In short, it might appear that the harm caused to commoners was unavoidable, part of the unintended consequences of war. But in fact most of the damage wrought by the warring parties upon villagers was inflicted on purpose; it was not unintended or unavoidable, even if allowance is made for acts such as demands for military supplies and goods. In other words, though the conflict directly pitted the armies of the Izumi *shugo* against a coalition comprising Satō Sōbei, Negoroji, Kontaiji, and Kōno’odera, many villages within the province were also targeted as enemies by these forces and suffered accordingly.

Why was this? The main reason is that villages were not autonomous entities having the option of maintaining neutrality. Even if they were free from direct control from above, with few exceptions they paid taxes to an overseer or were managed by an outside deputy, and thus were seen as the

property (at least the income property) of that entity. To attack those villages or put their homes to the torch was a strike against the overseer—which in the northern part of the province, and along much of the coast, was likely one of the Izumi military governors or their retainers. Furthermore, even villages outside of *shugo* control, such as those of Hine Estate, were pressured to provide support and allegiance to whichever force was in the vicinity at the time.

Evidence of these tactics appears regularly in Masamoto's descriptions of troop movements and battles in 1502 and 1504, as villages came under attack for their allegiance to either the Izumi *shugo* or Negoroji. In most cases, these were not allegiances that villages had chosen or even desired to maintain. But this mattered little to opposition powers, whose goal was to weaken their enemy, and do it through their rival's village holdings if necessary. In a conversation with Masamoto's commissioner Takehara Sadao in the summer of 1504, the Negoroji monk Fukujuin made the point explicitly. He said, "Negoroji troops will march in force against Kaishōji, Yoshimi, and Sano, advancing to the center of the province. The upper counties [those in the mountains] have sided with Negoroji, while the lower counties [along the plains and coast] have refused to do so. Accordingly, [we] first intend to put pressure upon the center of resistance in Yoshimi and Kaishōji."<sup>67</sup>

At the same time, Kokawadera monks, who were allied with Negoroji, moved against Hineno's neighbor Kumatori and employed similar tactics. Though referred to in earlier centuries as Kumatori Estate (proprietor unknown), during *sengoku* the region was known as Kumatori Valley, and it was home to influential families (some allied with the Izumi *shugo*, and some, like the landholding Naka family, with Negoroji); it was hotly contested by both groups. The villagers' independence is seen in their participation in a league of which Hineno was a member (see chapter 7), as well as in their willingness to send word to Hineno villagers when *shugo* retainers were raising troops.<sup>68</sup> In 1504, however, Kumatori was under siege by Kokawadera monks who intended to set fire to the homes of the valley. To the villagers' pleadings to spare them, the monks responded that they would do so if the villagers were not irresponsible. Then they burned to the ground the homes of three village leaders with ties to the *shugo*.<sup>69</sup>

Within three weeks of Sōbei's turn against the *shugo*, rumors were afloat that Negoroji forces were preparing to invade southern Izumi, apparently on a large scale. Masamoto was greatly alarmed. On 7/21 he had Takehara Sadao send letters to the Negoroji general council; to Akaibō Meison, a Negoroji monk with whom the estate had close relations; and to two monks at Shippōryūji, which was linked to Negoroji. In these, Sadao asked that

they remember that his lordship was on the estate and hoped fervently that they would avoid it in their movements. That same evening, probably on the advice of Shinpukuin Shinkai, one of the Shippōryūji monks, Sadao prepared additional letters for four members of the Negoroji deliberative council, with similar pleas. In the weeks that followed, Shinpukuin acted as a trusted go-between, gaining the respect of Masamoto.<sup>70</sup>

As a response to the rumored Negoroji intrusion, *shugo* forces began patrolling the region from 7/26, threatening to burn Iriyamada. Kaminogō, a local warrior from the neighboring village of the same name, helped avert that disaster, with the stipulation that the villagers shift their allegiance to the *shugo*. In a particularly revealing letter, he accused them of having formed an alliance with Negoroji—evidence of the military governors' paranoia over that possibility, thin though the evidence was—and suggested that they had no choice but to sever links with Masamoto as well, not an easy task to carry out while he resided among them. But it was the sort of pressure that was applied by the powers at this time of conflict: unavoidable, unreasonable, and impossible to address successfully. The villagers worked to appease Kaminogō while ignoring his demands, ultimately reporting the matter to Masamoto and taking up positions of defense at the entrances to the valley. Their military posture succeeded in keeping the warriors at bay.<sup>71</sup>

On 8/6 fighting began in earnest. Led by Satō Sōbei, coalition troops advanced on the Sano marketplace and Hineno West Side hamlet of Tsujibana, setting fire to both. In conjunction with that, Sōbei's allies, Kōno'odera and low-level Negoroji monks, entered nearby Kumatori, just north of Hineno, where they too set fires. *Shugo* forces soon appeared, engaging those armies in battle and successfully driving them out of the area. Fighting between the two sides was taken up again the next day, primarily within Kaminogō, immediately south of Hineno. Among the *shugo*'s men, Inei and Matura were killed, as Sōbei's forces carried the day. Two weeks later, there would be a day of additional battles between the two sides, preceded again by Sōbei's incendiary attacks on Sano and the Ibara hamlet of Yasumatsu. The tide turned against Sōbei on this occasion, as his forces were assailed and driven off by the *shugo*'s men.<sup>72</sup>

The military engagements described here hardly qualify as sustained warfare. Sōbei's troops were primarily interested in weakening the *shugo* by destroying villages that provided them tax income, while the efforts of the *shugo*'s forces went toward preventing that. Nothing suggests that either side was prepared for, or keen on, lengthy battles with high casualties. By all accounts, neither side could risk losing many fighters. The fact that Masamoto considered the deaths of two low-level *shugo* retainers—identified by

name, no less—as noteworthy suggests how rare battle deaths were during these years in Izumi. The point is worth stressing, since a casual reading of *Tabihikitsuke* might suggest that warfare caused considerable death and destruction during the second half of 1502. Yet that clearly was not the case. Three days of extended combat during the course of a month do not constitute sustained warfare. Nor does adding two days of fighting during the following month—the five days constituting the sum total of the year’s military conflict according to Masamoto’s descriptions. It is possible that word of some battles failed to reach Masamoto, though the evidence suggests otherwise. Even so, adding a few days of fighting to the total would do little to change the overall picture.

Limited though the fighting was in the autumn of 1502, it certainly would have felt to local residents as if Izumi Province was at war, or under its imminent threat. Like Masamoto—whose detailed descriptions of the movements and clashes of combatants reveal an extensive communications network—villagers too had their informants; word traveled fast in the province. For many villages, the threat of intrusion, arson, and the tearing up of paddies was real. More than a few were set on fire by marauding armies, though in Masamoto’s descriptions these total less than ten, a far cry from the argument that “the armies put the entire province to the torch.”<sup>73</sup> Evidence for that simply does not exist and there is no reason to assume that Masamoto, assiduous as he was in describing the movements and activities of the armed men, failed to record large numbers of attacks. As Victor Hanson made clear in *Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece*, the common assumption that premodern armies of limited numbers could wreak havoc on fields of crops and other agriculture is mistaken.<sup>74</sup> A close look at the evidence reveals that the rhetoric of such assaults was often exaggerated and the reality of the destruction unsubstantiated. After all, in Japan it was one thing for a small army to set a few homes on fire and run horses through several fields to damage crops, but burning down the homes of a village or tearing up rice paddies clearly took more work (and a willingness to spend considerable effort at the task, on one hand, and to run one’s horse through mud and muck, on the other).<sup>75</sup>

For Hine Estate the greatest threat came late in the eighth month and extended for just over two weeks. On 8/21, coalition troops under Sōbei entered the Tsuchimura region with the stated intention of setting up a battle camp there, something that greatly alarmed Masamoto and the villagers. Though the advance group consisted of no more than 200 men, their numbers were bolstered by additions later in the day, “by fives and tens,” according to Masamoto. And they gave no indication of pulling back as

night fell. In other words, they intended to stay, beginning immediately. At that point, the village elders met in consultation, drafting and delivering petitions to the invading forces, but to no avail. As described by Masamoto, the situation became dire as the night deepened, with the troops refusing to disperse. Moreover, they were becoming aggressive in their treatment of villagers. Feeling danger himself, and worried that his capture could lead to a loss of control over the village, Masamoto fled to Shippōryūji, high in the mountains above Iriyamada. There he spent the next several days, during which time the villagers worked to see the warriors removed, something they achieved through a combination of bribes and armed force.<sup>76</sup>

The coalition forces did not go far, merely to the mountains of Kaminogō, immediately to the south of Hine Estate. There they remained for the next several weeks, threatening to attack Tsuchimaru, and making occasional demands for military supplies (most of which the villagers, at Masamoto's urging, rejected). On 9/2, monks of Kōno'odera and Negoroji raised temporary battle shelters in Kaminogō, twelve or thirteen of these according to Masamoto's sources.<sup>77</sup>

Finally, on 9/19, the *shugo's* forces attacked with vigor. In a well-planned maneuver, they advanced upon the mountain encampment in Kaminogō before dawn, drove off the men staying there, and burned the shelters. Masamoto fails to note whether there were casualties that day, but as a result of the powerful counteroffensive "twenty-one men were said to have rejoined the *shugo's* forces," individuals who had apparently been convinced by Sōbei weeks before to join his rebellion. The opposition forces largely crumbled in the face of this surge, and the *shugo's* men were able to reassert control over many villages in the northern half of the province.<sup>78</sup> As an exclamation point, two weeks later, retainers of the two *shugo* forcibly entered Hineno and compelled the villagers to transfer rights to "supplemental tax" (*kajishi*) held by Negoroji.<sup>79</sup> As for Sōbei, vestiges of the coalition forces remained in Izumi until the end of the year, occasionally making demands of Hine Estate villagers, but the worst of the threat was over. Sōbei himself was probably driven to the east, outside the province, sometime after that. He reappeared in 1504, again as part of a force contending against the *shugo*.

Convolved though the events of autumn 1502 were, one way to interpret them is as a confirmation of power. Betrayed by a retainer and his confederates (all formerly loyal) and forced to confront coalition forces comprising not just those warriors but also three regional temples and their warring monks, the Izumi *shugo* gathered their men, reasserted their leadership, and took control once more of a considerable portion of Izumi Province, in the process regaining the loyalty of local warriors (and they did this without

actually leading armies themselves). On the surface, the interpretation is valid, and parts of it—such as the return of warriors to the *shugo*—are correct. But the picture is more complicated than that, especially when it comes to Negoroji's place in the conflict. Early indications that Negoroji monks were preparing for a major invasion of southern Izumi were not substantiated in later developments. Instead, the Negoroji monks who joined with Kōno'odera and Kontaiji men were “low-level adherents.” The terms Masamoto used to describe them—*Negoroji no kohōshigen* (根来寺之小法師原) and *Negoroji-shū no ashigaru* (根来寺衆之足輕)—signified those at the very bottom of the clerical hierarchy (or, more likely, just outside of it), men who performed a wide variety of mundane labors, or were lay members, not formally attached to the temple. These men were little more than menials.<sup>80</sup> The question of Negoroji's role was one that gave Masamoto pause, as seen in his musings on 8/22, early in the crisis: “So are the Negoroji general council and that fellow Sōbei really allies, I wonder? Or are they not necessarily in full accord? Knowing the truth of that would answer many questions for me.”<sup>81</sup>

Rather than a concerted effort led by Negoroji, the dominant power in southern Izumi, the force that rampaged about the province during the eighth and ninth months, setting fires and demanding supplies, was a far less imposing group, led by an upstart warrior and supported by fighters of uneven quality. The Negoroji general council apparently stepped away from its early decision to invade Izumi with force, choosing instead to offer backing to Sōbei's uprising. To the extent that Sōbei was successful, the temple supported him, but it was clearly the power behind the scenes. In answer to Masamoto's question, Negoroji and “that fellow Sōbei” appear in fact to have been allies, though the arrangement was uneven, with Negoroji in a position to impose its will on Sōbei as it deemed necessary. The big decisions fell to the temple's general council, as did the big rewards. It was not much of an alliance.

Evidence of the temple's role in shaping affairs during the fighting appears in various guises, for example, in circumstances surrounding Sōbei's requisition decrees to the villagers. Issued to Hineno East and West Sides immediately after the mountain camp was established in Kaminogō on 9/2, the demands grew in intensity in the days that followed. A message of 9/6 denounced the villagers' failure to provide supplies and workers as “inexcusable,” and ordered the immediate provision of “15 *koku* of rice and 15 laborers.”<sup>82</sup> This message arrived in the evening, but was followed by another the very next morning that differed radically in tone and import, as described by Masamoto:

The gist of the message that came this morning was that the Negoroji general council was in the middle of discussions regarding Hineo and Iriyamada, and they were, as always, taking the villagers' situation into consideration. And so [Sōbei] was now asking that the villagers gather and provide two *koku* of rice. "As for laborers, these do not need to be actual laborers. You can just grab one person. And as for the rice, we will later send replacement goods, returning what you provide"—this was the message he sent.<sup>83</sup>

In putting the clamps on Sōbei, the temple monks were not acting altruistically. Their actions were predicated upon steps taken by the villagers of Hine Estate. As the threat of a long-term occupation within the boundaries of Iriyamada took shape, the villagers took extreme measures. They had already offered a bribe to Sōbei, presented along with petitions asking for his consideration of their village. And they had sent a letter to Negoroji asking that the temple restrain the intruders, but as I noted earlier, these efforts were of no effect. So on 9/5, the *bantō* from Ōgi, Tsuchimaru, and Shōbu, three of the four hamlets within Iriyamada, departed for Negoroji to address the monks directly, with the message that "a military intrusion of this estate was something the villagers could not bear." Two days later, on 9/7, when the temple sent instructions to Sōbei to lower his demands, they were still in discussion. Finally on 9/8, the *bantō* returned with an agreement and a placard of prohibitions.<sup>84</sup> I discuss the placard in detail in the context of law in the next chapter, but two points are relevant here: first, that the Negoroji general council fundamentally put an end to the mountain encampment; and second, that the placard was only obtained at considerable cost.

In recounting the acts of war, the turmoil of conflict, the sorties and parries, the advances and retreats, it is easy to lose track of larger issues. It is easy to forget the point I made in the introduction to this chapter, that the root of armed conflict in Izumi during these years was the struggle for land and the rights to income from it. The surface phenomena have a tendency to mask that fact. But it is there to be grasped. Fundamental to the abductions, arson, and destruction of fields was the drive for increased revenue by regional powers. It was this that pushed Masamoto to take West Side *bantō* captive on two occasions and led his commissioner Shinanokōji Nagamori to threaten to burn down East Side homes in response to villagers' impediments in the face of tax collection. And it was this that shaped repeated acts of intimidation by retainers of the *shugo*. These were petty acts, of limited effectiveness and rarely fatal (by design), but they were also a logical

next-step when demands and threats for taxes went unheeded. Their limitations, as well as the strength of local resistance in the face of a typical small-scale assault by a force from the province, are well depicted in Masamoto's description of an incident in autumn 1503.

The incident grew out of a dispute between Muhenkōin Zenkō, abbot of the Hineno temple of the same name, and the Izumi *shugo* over revenue from temple land which the *shugo* claimed was due them. At least part of the tax had gone to the *shugo* in 1502, but Zenkō refused to provide this in 1503. So on 10/17, twenty or thirty of the *shugo*'s men invaded the estate and took Zenkō captive. In the process, they ransacked the temple Kaitai'in, "scattering items about and pilfering spears and the like." As a precaution against further attacks, Masamoto sent his young commissioner Takehara Sadao to Kaitai'in on the evening of 10/18, with instructions to spend the night there and be on guard. As Masamoto noted, "I made clear that they were to refrain from *sake* and such."<sup>85</sup> It was good he did so, given the report that Sadao delivered to him early the next morning.

Last night at the hour of the rat [midnight], the [provincial] force advanced [on Kaitai'in]. They burned the fence that flanked the main gate of Kaitai'in and let fly thirty or forty arrows. Everyone inside was on guard, and with [the attackers] having already set the fire, there was no place for us to escape, so we opened the gate and as one body drove forward with swords slashing. The [attackers] dispersed, where to we don't know.<sup>86</sup>

This was, as Masamoto noted, "a development beyond words." Though the *shugo*'s men had made clear their intention to confiscate Muhenkōin tax revenue in the face of Zenkō's resistance, the fact was, as Masamoto noted, that his men had already collected the portion of the tax owed him. Just as significant, Zenkō had recently resigned as abbot of Muhenkōin in favor of the same post at neighboring Kaitai'in, basically freeing him from obligations associated with his former temple. The *shugo*, unaware of Zenkō's shift in positions, had no reason to continue to hold the monk once they learned of that, so he was released.<sup>87</sup> Masamoto's assessment of the incident is telling:

At that time, the men of the province had obviously devised a clever plan "to put one sack of tea in their pocket," as they surely must have known beforehand that they would not retain Zenkō in captivity for long. In particular, they intended to appropriate the temple land [tax] from within the larger annual tax. [But] the village *bantō* replied to

them that the whole of the “slight annual tax” had been collected on the 17th.<sup>88</sup>

In other words, the men’s actions were largely futile, and had been from the first. At best they could “put one sack of tea in their pocket,” a slight amount indeed. It is a fitting image, an appropriate symbol for the vast majority of these acts of intimidation, whether carried out as a single attack or as part of an extended conflict, as when Satō Sōbei was rebelling. In either case, the rewards were often no larger than a sack of tea. Until the *shugo* (or any other regional power) were able to get a firmer hold on a village (and more generally on the province as a whole), they would be competing for income with the proprietor or other powers (as well as with the villagers themselves), and were thus unlikely to increase their revenue measurably.

For men like Satō Sōbei, just as for the two Izumi *shugo* and the monks of Negoroji, control of land and the rights to income from it were fundamental to success. His hope, we must assume, was first, to deal a blow against the *shugo*, weakening their authority and shortening their reach of power; and second, to carve out a block of land under rebel control, with a critical mass of confederates, land which could then serve as a base and source of revenue and manpower. Without that, he had little hope of undermining *shugo* authority. As we saw, on this occasion he failed.

In considering the broader effects of Satō Sōbei’s rebellion, it is important to remember that war is inevitably expensive, even if fighting is limited. Though Sōbei and his allies no doubt entertained thoughts of acquiring land and power, their lack of easy victories (and too little support from Negoroji, whose manpower and resources could have been pivotal) soon forced them to realize that their hopes were futile. But regardless of that, the costs of the war for most parties involved were not insignificant. Negoroji may have been the exception, as the general council of monks made the decision to commit only limited manpower and few resources to the conflict, while manipulating the rebelling forces from a distance. As a bonus, the temple gained 20 *kan* for the placard it provided to Iriyamada. On the other hand, it lost tax income (*kajishi*) in Hineno to the Izumi *shugo*. For others involved, the costs and losses are more evident.

Financial costs for the Izumi *shugo* appear to have been slight, but there is little question that they incurred losses in the form of diminished authority and prestige. This appeared most obviously in the initial defection of twenty-one men to the Sōbei side, and later in a lost battle (with two retainers killed). In the end, *shugo* forces showed their mettle, but if there had been any doubts before, it was now well known: the military governors’

hold over the province in general, and more narrowly over local warriors and villages, was limited. This may have been expected of newcomers to the *shugo* post, men appointed just two years previous, but it still would have been disconcerting to them. Of course, local warriors had their own interests and ambitions, so nothing was guaranteed, even for military governors with long tenures.

Specific costs borne by the villagers of Hine Estate, paid out in cash or goods, are easier to calculate, since figures exist for many of them. These included over 20 *kan* for the placard obtained from Negoroji, as well as outlays for bribes and military provisions demanded by Sōbei's forces. Some of these costs came out of Masamoto's hide as well, evidence both of his inability to shift estate expenses fully to the villagers and of the ties that bound him to them, and indeed to everyone on the estate, whether retainers or clerics like Muhenkōin Zenkō. In this regard, the estate's residents were one, having common enemies in the form of the Izumi *shugo*, local strongmen, and powerful clerics. In practical terms it meant, first, that Masamoto allowed the villagers to make payments to the "mountain camp," resulting in decreased tax income for him; and second, that he made direct payments himself as a means of keeping the invading forces at bay. Of the funds put toward the placard from Negoroji, Masamoto provided only five percent, but on other matters his contributions were larger. For example, as seen in a 1502 document of accounting for the Hineno East Side autumn acreage tax, 3 *kan* of the 9 *kan* of revenue that Masamoto received was sent to the "mountain encampment" as an offering.<sup>89</sup>

It was not the only one he sent. In an exchange of 8/28, the Iriyama *bantō* had contended before Masamoto and Nagamori that they saw no alternative but to attempt to buy off Negoroji and Kōno'odera forces with casks of *sake*, and they asked that the funds for these be taken from the annual tax—in other words, be his lordship's responsibility. Nagamori argued strenuously against this, but in the end was only able to convince them to pay one-third of the cost, with the remainder falling to Masamoto. Nagamori then departed for Hineno with the intention of "trying the same argument with the villagers there."<sup>90</sup> Though details of his discussion with the West Side do not exist, evidence that Masamoto shouldered much of the costs they incurred during the upheaval appears in documents of accounting. For the West Side autumn *tansen*, the record notes that 4 *kan* 350 *mon* was "subtracted as expenses to the 'mountain'"; what remained was collected at "25 *sen* [*mon*] per *tan*."<sup>91</sup> As seen in *Tabihikitsuke* late in 1502, Masamoto was forewarned of this. On 12/15, he wrote that the autumn acreage tax would be completely taken for expenses related to the encampment.<sup>92</sup> That

was a bit of an overstatement. Based upon a petition from the West Side, the revenue was to be “half of the half” that was common at the time (a recognition by Masamoto that he had been receiving only 50 *mon* per *tan* during these years, not the 100 or 120 *mon* he assessed).<sup>93</sup> Clearly, the upheaval had been costly and painful both for Masamoto and the villagers.

The costs of the battles to Izumi Province, to the people and its economy as a whole, are difficult to gauge, certainly less readily quantifiable than those incurred by Masamoto and the villagers. For villages at the center of the battles—those too firmly allied to the *shugo*, for example—the destruction was not insignificant. Where fields were torn up and homes burned down, the loss was undeniable. And there is no question that turmoil, even if indirect or limited in scope (as was the case for Iriyamada), removed villagers from their fields, as well as from tasks that could raise or ensure the likelihood of a good harvest. Moreover, as both Iriyamada and East Side villagers argued, upheaval of this sort, which was far too common in recent years, had limited their ability to engage in commerce. No doubt all involved (excepting Satō Sōbei, perhaps) were glad to see the battles come to an end, put behind them for good with the arrival of a new year.

For the villagers of Hine Estate, living with war could be a challenge. The point is undeniable. Losses—of income, of crops, of homes (in some cases), of stability, of peace—were real. Threats of abductions and invasions (whether fulfilled or not) could not be ignored. The litany of troubles described in the pages above can be read as evidence that the estate was under siege, literally and metaphorically. And yet, that is not the whole picture. Another image, another thread, that runs through these pages is of the measures villagers took to deal with those troubles, to deflect invasions and loss of income and crops, to rebut demands when feasible, to take up arms to protect their livelihoods, to bribe and petition, in short, to live with war, and to do so with an imperfect but surprising measure of success.



PART II

## Society and Its Boundaries



## The Problem of Law

The standard analysis of *sengoku* law in English remains a chapter by Katsumata Shizuo in the volume *Japan Before Tokugawa*, published in 1981. As Katsumata noted, his intent was to explain the rationale and policies of domain rule through an examination of the laws that daimyo issued during the sixteenth century. Rather than analyze individual legal codes, he focused instead on the “basic thrust” of the ordinances, roughly defined as house laws, which were directed at retainers, and domain laws, which were directed at the general populace. Both had the purpose of strengthening the lord’s control over the land and people within his domain. Katsumata ended his study with a discussion of *kokka* (the state) and *tenka* (the realm), two *sengoku* political ideologies that gained prominence among daimyo late in the period. As should be clear, Katsumata’s concern was with the big picture, with the way that powerful warriors solidified their power, justified their authority, and ultimately laid the foundation for the early modern political system.<sup>1</sup>

That is certainly one way to view law during the period, and it has its virtues, as it cuts through the legal chaos of the time and the physical upheaval of a world that had lost its moorings to bring order to what seems disordered.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, that is also its weakness. Not only does it largely ignore the historical legacy and precedents that shaped law (centered as it is on sixteenth-century legislation—much of it mid-century and beyond), but by examining law in the abstract, it pays scant attention to its actual practices and workings. Moreover, it feeds into the narrative (common at the time that Katsumata wrote this piece) of a logical political and institutional progression through the era, embodied in the figures of “shugo,” “shugo daimyo,” and “sengoku daimyo.” In short, Katsumata’s approach is

useful for understanding the major shifts in power and warrior organization that foreshadowed unification, but it provides few hints about what law was and what it meant (and did not mean) during the bulk of the first half of the period.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately, as the “standard analysis” in English, it offers one narrow view of *sengoku* law, which Katsumata himself surely would not claim to be a definitive, or comprehensive, statement on the matter.<sup>4</sup>

To make sense of *sengoku* law during the first half (or even two-thirds) of the period—its forms and functions—several points are critical to understand. First, is the fact that the Muromachi era did not end when *sengoku* began. The late fifteenth century was marked by many continuities in law (as well as in society and economics and almost all other aspects of history for that matter), notwithstanding the shogunate’s loss of much of its practical and coercive power. Simply put, the standards and structures were more enduring, more deeply embedded, than was the Muromachi regime itself.<sup>5</sup> Weak though the shogunate might have been, the political framework and policies it had established (and inherited) remained in place and, in remarkable fashion, continued to carry weight. This is seen in David Spafford’s study of the Kantō region in factors such as the continuing (if unofficial) rulings made by the Ashikaga head of the shogunate’s Kamakura Office; the decisions by proprietors even after the Ōnin War to submit lawsuits to the shogunate, with expectations that their claims would be recognized; and the seemingly unwavering interest in the accoutrements of political legitimacy (in particular, the office of *shugo*), which linked warriors to the shogunate and its laws, at least symbolically.<sup>6</sup>

Second, along with continuities came what we might term the murkiness of law: disputed measures; exceptions and modifications to the two medieval law codes and their supplements (*Goseibai shikimoku* of Kamakura, and *Kenmu shikimoku* of Muromachi); and questions about the legal jurisdictions of the various authorities. For example, *Goseibai shikimoku* stipulated that *shugo* (commonly translated as “constables” in the Kamakura period, reflecting their powers and duties) were responsible for maintaining peace in the provinces and apprehending murderers, and yet by law they soon came to be barred from entry to private estates (*shugo-shi funyū*).<sup>7</sup> *Hanzei* or “half-tax”—by which the Muromachi shogunate decreed that estate revenue was to be equally divided between proprietors and warriors—was likewise problematic. One reason was that the law had been established as a means of provisioning troops during wartime, something stated in the initial decrees but dropped later, leaving room for disputes when war ended. A second reason was that the code specifically stated that estates of the imperial family, temples and shrines, and heads of the regental families were to be exempt from

*hanzei*; likewise exempted were lands held directly by the original proprietor, where there were no divisions of income rights (*shiki*). But this was decreed in 1368. In time the law became difficult to enforce, much like the decree barring *shugo* entry from private estates (as the Kujō eventually learned).<sup>8</sup>

With that as background, I turn to *Tabihikitsuke* and its legal offerings and insights, which are surprisingly rich—something to be expected, perhaps, given the conflicts of the age (and the proclivity for theft among medieval villagers). But little about “law” on Hine Estate during these four years fits neatly into any larger narrative of the *senoku* legal world; nor does it ascribe a heavy role to the warring class. As much as anything else, however, in its contradictions, its imprecision, and its lack of clarity in legal jurisdictions, the workings of law on the estate pointed to the likelihood of, and need for, real political change in the land if stability were again to be attained, distant in the future though that might be.

### The Foundation (Such as It Was)

On the second day of the third month of 1502, just less than one year after arriving on Hine Estate, Kujō Masamoto presented a petition before Takinomiya Shrine in Iriyamada. In form it was archaic in style and visually striking. With this, Masamoto hoped to gain the favor of Takinomiya Daimyōjin, impressing upon the deity the need for divine assistance. The petition is composed of three parts: a formal introduction of Masamoto (“retired chancellor, lower first rank”); an appeal to the god’s wisdom and sense of justice (“Though the world is bereft of reason, still the sun and moon are in the heavens and the virtue of the gods is undiminished, is it not?”); and a concise history of the estate, concluding with a description of the indignities it was presently suffering. Writing of these, Masamoto noted the following:

In recent days the two military governors of this province have acted with much villainy, intruding lawlessly in this estate, disregarding the shogun’s will, and inflicting pain upon the commoners as they come and go—in short, acting no different than bandits. To be a governor of a province is to be the representative of the state, to protect the ‘five provinces and seven highways’ as well as the local province itself from loss by thieves and others. Indeed because he follows the correct path of government, he is called *kuni no shugo*, ‘protector of the province.’ And yet at present these men personally plan and engage in acts of lawlessness.<sup>9</sup>

To Masamoto the situation was incomprehensible. According to him, *shugo* was not a mere title, but a description of the officeholder and his duties; the term should have defined the two military governors, but they had made a mockery of it. A similar bias appears in Masamoto's depiction of an incident the previous year, when retainers of the *shugo* took hostage several villagers, who they held for more than a month in the face of petitions from both the village and Masamoto. The individuals were finally released following "payment of a ransom, this according to the *shugo*'s demands." Masamoto was appalled, describing the *shugo*'s insistence upon payment of a fee in exchange for release as "behavior appropriate to foot soldiers." "Outrageous, truly outrageous," wrote Masamoto.<sup>10</sup>

Nonetheless, despite continuing incidents of this sort, Masamoto refused to admit that the Izumi *shugo*'s intentions were invariably bad. When reports of lawless behavior by the "provincial side" reached him, he often assumed that the perpetrators acted on their own, not at the direction of the military governors. Thus, when Iriyamada villagers at Sano market were taken captive in the sixth month of 1501, Masamoto wrote to Sakai, by way of his attendant Ishii Aritoshi, that "Such disregard of the shogun's orders is reprehensible indeed, but perhaps these were the private actions of retainers. This capture of two or three of his lordship's cultivators, surely it was not based on a policy of yours."<sup>11</sup> In light of the tenuous ties between the newly arrived Izumi *shugo* and the local strongmen of the province—of questionable loyalty to the *shugo*—Masamoto's reading of their actions was not without grounds, unfounded as it appears to have been in retrospect. Nevertheless, the refrain seen here, that "this was the private doing of retainers," or "this was surely the actions of underlings" (*chūgen* 中間)<sup>12</sup> appears periodically in letters to the military governors, evidence that Masamoto retained a belief that the *shugo*, as the shogunate's representatives, were (or at least should be) above acting in irresponsible ways.

We can of course dismiss Masamoto as naive and foolish, holding to an ideal of the post of *shugo* that never existed, whether among political leaders or in the minds of men appointed to the office over the centuries. And yet Masamoto's understanding of *shugo* as government officials having duties to uphold the law was not far-fetched, and it was something that both the Kamakura and Muromachi regimes had stressed.<sup>13</sup> To Masamoto, this also meant that officeholders deserved respect appropriate to their positions, as seen in the following entry in his diary.

The assistant deputy *shugo* of this province, Saitō Katsuzane, quit that position, and Hisaeda Hisamori was appointed last winter, I was told.

Nagamori, as a commissioner, at this point had still not sent an offering [of congratulations], an unseemly omission. It really is an extreme failing. Even if the provincial side is engaged in violent activities, as for this family, we must not lose our sense of responsibility. So I sent a 100-*hiki* offering with Yamada Shigehisa, as well as a smaller offering to the assistant *shugo*'s attendant, Matsusaka Kagekazu.<sup>14</sup>

Three months later, Masamoto followed up his cash offering by sending boxes of mountain peaches to Hisaeda and Matsusaka, gifts that were warmly received.<sup>15</sup> In this manner, Masamoto worked assiduously to maintain cordial relations with the *shugo* and their associates and did so even when their behavior did not warrant it.

Fundamental to Masamoto's posture toward the military governors was a belief that the Muromachi regime was the legitimate ruling authority in the land, that the shogun was the executor of justice, and that laws issued by the regime were to be upheld. As he noted in his petition at Takinomiya Shrine, the *shugo*'s crimes included "disregarding the shogun's will." Similar references to "shogunal rulings" and "the shogun's judgment" dot Masamoto's correspondence with the *shugo*.<sup>16</sup> For example, in a letter of 1501/4/9, sent by way of Baba Kosaburō, Masamoto asserted that because the status of Hineno and Iriyamada as Kujō family land held over many generations was unquestioned, "shogunal orders had been issued" confirming that fact. And three months later he accused the *shugo* of "putting aside the shogunate's rulings while carrying out private, unlawful actions." As for the immediate dispute between him and the *shugo*, Masamoto argued that "it should be entrusted to the shogun for his judgment," or "put before the law" (*gohō ni makasu* 任御法) in the capital. He was opposed to "private consideration of the evidence."<sup>17</sup>

Masamoto's claims, not surprisingly, were supported by the deputy shogun and his officials in Kyoto, as one would expect of a regime backing a puppet ruler. Previous decrees by the shogun had, as they saw it, put the issue beyond dispute. Moreover, to the assertions by the two *shugo* that they were justified in their actions, Hosokawa Masamoto's officials noted that "regardless of the circumstances, to disregard a judgment of the shogun is a serious breach of conduct, truly inappropriate." Pursuing a related line of reasoning, the official Yasutomi Motoie reminded the *shugo* that the Muromachi government had issued judgments "as the public authority" (*kōgi*), an assertion not just of its political legitimacy but also of its position as upholder of the greater good.<sup>18</sup>

Perhaps it is to be expected that the two Izumi *shugo* fell in line with this

same position, acknowledging in word if not always in deed the authority of the Muromachi shogunate. At least at this point they were still supporters of the regime, willing to claim appointment from it and allegiance to it, to the extent that it served their purposes. In fact they had little alternative, for the simple reason that like many other *shugo* at the time, they were too weak to assert independence. Also like many other *shugo*, they undoubtedly lacked the vision *to see* other alternatives. Just as the Kamakura and Muromachi governments had shown an inability to separate warrior rule from imperial court authority (and a staunch lack of interest in doing so—as seen in their consistent efforts to protect the estates of the elite), *sengoku* warrior lords—great and small—seemed to have had a difficult time imagining themselves as independent rulers, distinct from the shogunate.<sup>19</sup> Only late in the period did that change. *Shugo* like the two in Izumi were for the foreseeable future hitched to the Muromachi government. And so when Kujō Masamoto suggested that they put matters of dispute before the shogun’s court, the *shugo* agreed. And when injunctions arrived from Kyoto, the Izumi *shugo* never dismissed them out of hand; their responses were always couched in polite, deferential language. Where they took exception to issues, it was over facts or the interpretation of those, not ultimate authority.<sup>20</sup> If we think the “distant East”—that is, the Kantō plain—was an outlier on these matters, consider the five conflicts there that David Spafford examines during this same time. As he notes, “none of the conflicts that took place between 1455 and 1525 . . . were about institutions or legitimacy or ideas of governance.” Indeed, fights over “appointment to office” were a primary factor in these clashes.<sup>21</sup>

For the Izumi *shugo*, deference in word did not always equate to subservience in action. Neither their appointments as *shugo* nor their family ties to the deputy shogun ensured the two men’s compliance with Kyoto’s wishes. Where local matters were concerned, they often went their own way, knowing that only complete defiance of Hosokawa Masamoto or collusion with his enemies would bring about military reprisal. Maintaining a dialogue with shogunate officials was generally enough to defuse tensions, as it allowed them to explain their actions, assert rights, and claim innocence. It was an ambivalent attitude the *shugo* held, but given their positions as appointees of the state, there was reason to it. A good example of this ambivalence is seen in two letters from late 1502, responses by the deputy *shugo* of the Izumi military governors to directives issued by Hosokawa Masamoto’s officials in support of Kujō Masamoto’s claims in Izumi. These were clearly the product of the two *shugo*, produced in collaboration, with parallel and supporting content. The first:

Regarding Hineno and Iriyamada, we first humbly recognize the writ sent by the shogun. We have taken charge of it, and read it. As for that locale, since the time that the two *shugo* were granted dominion over this province (*tōkoku ryō shugo hairiyō irai yori* 當國兩守護從拝領以來), we have known nothing about it being Kujō dono's directly administered land. Was it perhaps such in the past? In recent years we are unaware of it. However, in the last year or two, lord Kujō has colluded with Negoroji, and by coming here has encouraged the armies of our enemies, thus causing much trouble to the province [i.e., military governors]. But because this concerned one of the "gates of power" [i.e., the traditional elite], we have chosen to endure it with humility. As for the fires recently set, about which you asked, we know nothing of those. No doubt when enemy armies are dispatched and advance on fortified locations, and then fighting takes place, it is no surprise that combatants use arson as a tactic. Under circumstances like this, deceitful talk is no doubt transmitted to the shogun—a regrettable development of recent days. With joy and satisfaction we humbly relay this message to you. Please explain our message with reason, and if his lordship will accept it accordingly, we will be pleased indeed.

Respectfully.

10/25

[From:] [Matsura] Mamoru [deputy *shugo* of Hosokawa Mototsune]  
Response to: Yasutomi [Motoie]<sup>22</sup>

The second letter is similar in tone, a mixture of respect for the shogun and the law, combined with claims of ignorance and innocence, summed up by righteous indignation over the behavior of Kujō Masamoto. Like Matsura Mamoru in the letter above, who claimed that the *shugo* chose to endure much trouble because Masamoto was one of the "gates of power," Saitō Katsuzane, Matsura's counterpart with the lower *shugo*, wrote of the shock at seeing *shugo* lands encroached upon by Masamoto the year previous, "an unprecedented act." Even more distressing, he claimed, was "the shogunal directive that accused [the *shugo*] of carrying out lawless acts." About this he asked, "Has lord Kujō used skillful words to deceive in this manner?"<sup>23</sup>

One reason both Masamoto and the *shugo* recognized the shogunate's legal authority was that each made claims based on decisions the government had rendered in the past (or had ostensibly rendered in the past). Grounded in legal precedent and written evidence as they were, the claims

had legitimacy. Precedent, even if questionable in its origins, could be used to bolster one's position, something well understood both by Kujō Masamoto and his Hosokawa antagonists in Sakai. Thus Masamoto was able to write with confidence of Hine Estate's past, of its opening by the family as "reclamation lords," of its confirmation as such by Muromachi shoguns, and of the acceptance of that status by previous Izumi *shugo*. These were claims that were not easily rejected.<sup>24</sup>

Another precedent that Masamoto stressed (and which was supported by injunctions from Kyoto) was the shogunate's issuance of edicts that "prohibited *shugo* entry on the estate." This was the concept of *shugo-shi funyū*, well known among students of medieval Japan as the right of *shōen* owners to police their own estates, to deny entry to the *shugo*'s agents, whether in pursuit of criminals or the collection of taxes. Begun in the Kamakura period and continued into Muromachi times, it is usually presented as evidence of the private power of estates and their proprietors. It is seen less commonly in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.<sup>25</sup> Yet as Masamoto reminded the *shugo* and villagers a number of times in his correspondence, "this land enjoys freedom from *shugo* intrusion," established in earlier decades by shogunal decree and "confirmed in recent years."<sup>26</sup>

The Izumi *shugo* countered Masamoto's assertions with their own claims of precedent, two in number. Though the claims were dubious, and conflicting, neither was outside the realm of possibility. The first was that Hineno and Iriyamada were among the proprietary holdings granted to their Hosokawa predecessors when first appointed military governors in Izumi. Since then, they contended, nothing had changed. In a letter of the summer of 1501, Saitō Katsuzane (assistant to the *shugo*), maintained that this was confirmed in shogunal documents seen by a *shugo* official in the capital. To Masamoto's assertion that the villages were "family land," Saitō stated plainly, "we do not accept this."<sup>27</sup>

Based on evidence presented by Masamoto and the two *shugo*, the Kujō family's claims to proprietary rights were paramount. The *shugo*'s arguments may have sounded plausible, but the evidence was not on their side, particularly since they proved unwilling to provide documentation to the Muromachi authorities in support of their position, despite saying they would.<sup>28</sup> As Masamoto was quick to point out, not only did the *shugo* lack evidence for their claims, but in documents they produced themselves, the *shugo* unwittingly undermined their position. Had they been the rightful and long-tenured proprietors of the villages, they surely would not have written, as they did just the year previous (1501), of "lord Kujō's lands of Hineno and Iriyamada."<sup>29</sup> Weightier proof of this sort was seen in Masamoto's referenc-

ing of several documents from the 1420s in which the *shugo* at the time, acting as deputies of Hineno village, put their seal on “shipment notices” declaring that the annual tax was being sent to the Kujō. As estate deputies appointed by the Kujō, the *shugo* obviously were not the village proprietors. Furthermore, as Masamoto pointed out, in 1429 the two Hosokawa *shugo* sent letters accepting a shogunal order to give up their deputy posts on Hine Estate, a result of their failure to regularly forward the annual tax.<sup>30</sup>

Nothing reveals so clearly the weakness in the *shugo*'s arguments (and the corresponding weakness in the political might and legal authority of the Muromachi regime) as their willingness to push a second, lesser claim while holding to the first. The lesser claim was that Hineno and Iriyamada had “from early times” been divided into a “land-steward portion and a proprietor portion,” the former of which went to the *shugo* at the time of appointment.<sup>31</sup> With this, the *shugo* signaled their willingness to accept income rights to half of the estate rather than full control over all of it. And they knew full well that the Muromachi government would do little other than send letters questioning or condemning their claims and actions. In short, though the claims may have been highly dubious, the convoluted history of any *shōen*, with multiple and shifting income rights and responsibilities over the centuries, made most legal questions of ownership open to debate—especially when the central authority lacked the clout to intervene.<sup>32</sup> So the dispute between the Kujō and Izumi *shugo* continued, with both maintaining their rights based on precedent. At the same time, neither party was prepared to move the dispute beyond paper, at least not in any definitive way. So the struggle continued, part of a seemingly interminable pattern that stretched back well beyond anyone's memory.

As a reactive body—whether in contesting taxes, absconding, or resisting demands with arms—*sengoku*-era villagers were a force that overseers and regional power holders could not ignore. But beyond these practical matters, did they demand respect from those of higher status and greater power in any way, or was that too great a stretch? *Tabihikitsuke* reveals one surprising way in which that respect was given. There we find directives from both Kujō Masamoto and shogunate officials in Kyoto to the villagers in which they justify their instructions by reason and historical precedent. And though we might expect Masamoto and his officials to have addressed the villagers about some of these issues, for the deputy shogun's officials to do so was another matter. One factor no doubt was the personal tie between the two Masamotos, Kujō and Hosokawa, but there was more to it than that. Clearly the villagers had come of age when injunctions sent from Kyoto to

Izumi included parallel documents for the *shugo* and the villagers—largely similar in content but differing in intent, appropriate to the recipients. This is seen in a pair of letters the shogunate sent in the fourth month of 1501, one addressed to the *shugo*'s top officials (and meant of course for the *shugo* themselves), the other addressed to the village leadership of Hineno and Iriyamada. Both begin by noting the status of the villages as “fully controlled lands held continuously by the reclamation lords [i.e., the Kujō], now being encroached upon based on assertions that it is property of the land steward.” The documents continue briefly in tandem, decrying these encroachments, but then split, the one addressed to the *shugo* demanding that the intrusions stop immediately, the other urging the villagers to faithfully submit the annual tax and other duties.<sup>33</sup>

The terminology used in these documents is significant, requiring knowledge of terms specific to landholding by the country's elite. Two that stand out are “reclamation lord” (*kaihatsu ryōshu* 開發領主) and “fully controlled lands” (*ichien ryōchi* 一円領地). Why should villagers have known these terms? They certainly had little relevance to their daily work and lives, and it is likely that many villagers, particularly the illiterate, would have been ignorant of them. But as we have seen in their allusion to Ashikaga Yoshimasa's directive of 1466, and its reference to the “gates of power,” village leaders recognized the value in knowing the estate's workings and history. And apparently Masamoto and his backers in the capital thought likewise, as they made their case to estate residents.

Another example appears in a letter Takehara Sadao (one of Masamoto's commissioners) sent to the East Side *bantō* in the summer of 1503 in response to a series of threats issued by Taga, retainer of the lower *shugo*. Sadao began with typical points about the land being restricted from *shugo* entry and its status upheld past and present by shogunal decree, as acknowledged by the provincial powers. He then continued, “And whether in the replies of Meiō 9 (1500) or the letter last year from Saitō, Bingo no kami, there has been no deviation from this. Thus if there are villagers who permit the illegal intrusions of privately acting individuals, we must entrust the matter to the shogunate's judicial decision of two years previous and carry out punishments. His lordship [Masamoto] orders you to rapidly prepare a document listing the names [of villagers involved].”<sup>34</sup>

Sadao's brief references in his letter to the “replies of Meiō 9” and the “letter from Saitō” leave no doubt that the village leaders were expected to be familiar with them. But what were they and why should their existence, let alone their contents, have been known by the villagers? The former, the “replies of Meiō 9,” were the letters from the lower Izumi *shugo*, Hosokawa

Masahisa, and his retainer Shinomoto Motonobu that Masamoto quoted in the opening pages of *Tabihikitsuke*, which acknowledged Kujō rights to Hineno and Iriyamada, along with a promise to “respect [Masamoto’s] wishes now and in the future.” Nothing in *Tabihikitsuke* suggests that the villagers knew of these letters prior to this time; but obviously they did, and were familiar with the content—which Masamoto had thought wise to inform them of.

As for the “Saitō letter,” the author (Saitō Katsuzane), was deputy *shugo* to Hosokawa Masahisa, and although the letter in question is mentioned elsewhere in *Tabihikitsuke*, it is neither described nor quoted.<sup>35</sup> But we can confidently surmise that it recognized Kujō rights over land in Hine Estate and that the village leadership was familiar with it. Finally, it is important to note that Masamoto’s threat of punishments and his demand for a list of villagers who may have collaborated with Taga followed these notes on history. Knowing this history, the villagers were not justified in opposing what was right and legal.

### Edicts and Prohibitions

Though there was general agreement among the powers with interests in Izumi that political legitimacy resided with the Muromachi regime, neither it nor its representatives (specifically the military governors) enforced or executed the law, at least not on Hine Estate, and probably nowhere else in the province. Who and what, then, defined the law and how was it enforced? One form that law took in rural Japan in the sixteenth century was the written edict, typically a set of prohibitions or regulations, posted on a placard or noticeboard. First appearing in 1369 in the Muromachi code (forbidding gambling and luxury items and the like, and displayed along roadsides), *kinzei* or “prohibitions” were particularly common decrees of *sengoku* warlords.<sup>36</sup> Many were of debatable legal significance, being little more than a listing of prohibited behaviors (cutting and removing trees and bamboo, looting, acting lawlessly), and most were produced at the request (with payment) of temples and shrines that desired protection from passing warriors. But there were also weightier regulations that appeared on placards, three examples of which were described by Masamoto in his diary. Each is distinct in type, purpose, and authorship. Together they offer insights into local power and authority, social relations, and justice (though they provide few hints about where law was headed in the region or who would define and enforce it).

The first I have already introduced. This was the set of regulations that Masamoto had his commissioners prepare just one week after arriving in Izumi. Here it is again, with Masamoto's prefacing remarks.

As a means to curtail lawlessness, we posted the following regulations at the Hineno administrative offices and the rear seating area of this temple [Chōfukujū].<sup>37</sup>

#### Edict Board

Item: Concerning the villagers, his lordship's retainers [*gohikannin*] are not to deal with them as they please, making inappropriate demands of them.

Item: In cases of robbery involving more than three coins, even if the culprit is one of his lordship's direct retainers, if the crime is plainly observed, the thief can be cut down on the spot, without need to present evidence [to the authorities].

Item: Among his lordship's retainers, none are to violate the women or female servants of the village elite or cultivators.

The preceding articles are hereby decreed

Bunki 1/4/ Ishii Aritoshi  
Shinanokōji Nagamori  
Tominokōji Toshimichi<sup>38</sup>

The first point to make about these regulations is that they were misinterpreted for more than thirty years, with profound implications for the historiography of *Tabihikitsuke*. In simplest terms, early scholars of the diary assumed that the retainers [*gohikannin*] noted in each article referred to the Izumi *shugo*'s men, and that Masamoto was strictly warning them not to commit crimes on the estate. There was reason to this, as *bikannin* was a common term for warriors' liegemen or vassals during the medieval era. Moreover, writing during a time when the historiography of the period was defined by feudalism, it was common to view *senjoku*-era *shugo* as independent warrior lords who ruled by dint of force alone. Accordingly, Masamoto had no choice but to confront them, and these regulations were his first step in doing so. As for the honorific *go* of *gohikannin*, that was assumed to be a linguistic formality, showing respect to the two military governors.<sup>39</sup>

Much about this analysis was suspect, but not until the 1990s was it challenged by scholars whose reading of *Tabihikitsuke* was far more thorough

and critical. Not only was the traditional reading at odds with much of what Masamoto wrote and did, but the linguistic arguments were weak. For example, *hikannin* was not a term limited to warriors; it could just as readily denote a subordinate of a courtier, and in fact Masamoto himself used the term for his men.<sup>40</sup> Also, as Sakai Kimi made clear, the use of the honorific *go* made little sense as a signifier for the distant military governors but was consistent with honorific language patterns in *Tabihikitsuke* in reference to Masamoto. Clearly the honorifics were directed at him, for whom respect was shown by his men as they wrote, for example, of “his lordship’s sojourn on the estate” (*gozaishō* 御在庄), of “his lordship’s lands” (*gokamonryō* 御家門領), or of “a personal letter of his lordship” (*gojikisho* 御直書), and did this in missives sent both to the *shugo* and to the villagers.<sup>41</sup>

In correctly interpreting this early set of regulations, historians reshaped the image of Kujō Masamoto. To begin with, the three articles become nothing more than private injunctions, with no weight beyond the boundaries of the estate. To categorize them as “law,” except in the narrowest sense, is unwarranted. Next, not only were they evidence of Masamoto’s determination to rule the estate justly, but they suggest that he had limited trust in his men at this point. It is unlikely that he knew any of them well—certainly not as he would come to know them in the months ahead. He could not risk having them commit crimes against the villagers, something that could have doomed his efforts on the estate. Finally, there is the question of the regulations’ physical display. Though directed primarily at his men, they were not presented to them, but instead were posted at the village administrative offices. In this manner, they became public knowledge, serving as a warning to the Kyoto transplants and an invitation to the locals to assist in their enforcement.

In the fall of 1502 a second set of regulations, weightier and more significant than those Masamoto had prepared, appeared in Hine Estate. These were prohibitions of just two articles, prepared by Negoroji at the behest of Iriyamada villagers during the midst of the uprising by Satō Sōbei and his allies. Everything about these differed from those of the year previous, including the authors, purpose, and impetus for creation. And though their reach did not extend beyond Iriyamada (Hineno village was excluded), they represented the political and legal breadth of an outside power, Negoroji. Finally, despite being drawn up by an outside power, the regulations were recognized and accepted by Masamoto; in fact he applauded their production.

As I described in chapter 5, the regulations had their origins in Satō Sōbei’s decision to set up a battle camp within the borders of Tsuchimaru hamlet in Iriyamada. After nearly two weeks of dealing with the troops late

in the eighth month—a period marked by negotiations, threats, payments of bribes, and brief physical altercations—the villagers (and Masamoto) had reached their limits. Hearing on 9/3 that Sōbei's forces were again planning to push into Tsuchimaru, the Iriyamada *bantō* called on Masamoto to discuss their options. If they were unwilling to put all their effort into petitioning the warring parties, Masamoto argued, he intended to depart for the capital. They responded that this would leave them helpless; it would be like removing a sucking baby from its mother's breast. The destruction of the village would be immediate. As a final resort, the *bantō* committed to travel to Negoroji with bribe in hand and hopes that the temple leadership would end the assault. On 9/5, the six *bantō* representing Tsuchimaru, Ōgi, and Shōbu departed for Negoroji, where they spent the next four days “engaged in negotiations, day and night.” Masamoto received a report on the seventh that was “very favorable,” and on the eighth the *bantō* returned with an agreement, and a list of prohibitions, as follows.<sup>42</sup>

#### Prohibitions

Item: Within the estate of Iriyamada, no persons of any sort are to set up a military camp

Item: Within the same there is likewise to be no lawless behavior, violence, or plundering

The above estate is part of the holdings of Kujō, the retired chancellor. In that we at Negoroji have for some years shared a compact with this locale, we have decided to issue these injunctions. If there are any who disregard them, the estate collective is empowered to carry out strict punishments. The body of monks decided this.

Bunki 2/9/7 Daidenbōin Gyōnin Wakashu Satasho, Seison  
Daidenbōin Gyōnin Rōshū Satasho, Shūsan<sup>43</sup>

There is nothing particularly striking about the two articles of the placard. The first was unique only in its specificity to Iriyamada; otherwise it might have appeared anywhere in the land. The second was more common still, a set-phrase against lawlessness and illegal intrusions that characterized the prohibitions of this era. But the supplementary statements demand more attention, as do general questions surrounding the placard. Of the former, the third sentence stands out: “If there are any who disregard them [i.e., the articles], the estate collective is empowered to carry out strict punishments.”

To paraphrase, “Those who break the rules here decreed will be punished by the village, broadly defined, permission for which is granted by Negoroji.” Is this in fact what the villagers were seeking, permission to respond with force, to punish offenders? And was this the meaning that Negoroji intended?

At issue is the term “estate collective,” or *sōshō* (惣庄). Convinced that the word must refer in some sense to Negoroji—meaning that the temple would execute justice when the regulations were ignored—some scholars have argued that *sōshō* was either a term for Negoroji or an organization within it (though admittedly unknown to historians otherwise), or that *sōshō* was a copyist’s mistake, originating either with a Negoroji scribe or with Masamoto as he transcribed the document into his diary (the correct term would have been *sōbun* [惣分] or “collective body of monks”).<sup>44</sup> The first assertion is unsupported by evidence; to assert it means to reject the basic meaning of the term and to claim a connection that appears in no documents related to Negoroji or any other religious institution. The second claim raises a valid concern, since texts copied by hand often include mistaken characters. However, a draft of the edict held in Kujō archives—probably the original produced by Negoroji monks—is in agreement with the wording in Masamoto’s diary. Thus, if there were a mistake, it preceded Masamoto. Yet that seems highly unlikely, for it would have required not just a critical flaw in a document that the Iriyamada village heads had obtained at much effort and great cost, but also an inability to see or question that flaw by any of those involved, including Masamoto, and this in a very brief document.<sup>45</sup>

So what were the implications of the edict, since the word’s meaning is hardly debatable? One is that Negoroji was no middling power in the region, but a potent force whose decrees could not be dismissed as empty words. Why else would the Iriyamada villagers put so much effort into attaining the edict, look upon it so highly once they acquired it, and (as I explain next) pay so much money for it? As Nagamatsu Keiko argues, Negoroji had become a “public power” in the region, giving the decrees it issued considerable weight.<sup>46</sup> The articles of the edict itself may not have been remarkable, but the force behind them, which stated that they were to be obeyed, was significant. The Iriyamada villagers had every confidence that the stipulations would be followed and that Negoroji would back them up. And as we have seen, the villagers were capable of doing so; in other words, they had the force of arms to punish or drive out those intruding lawlessly in the village or attempting to set up battle camp there, excepting large and powerful armies.

The most significant question about the placard concerns its value to Iriyamada, especially in light of its monetary cost to them. Upon returning from Negoroji on 9/8, the *bantō* described the offerings they were required

to make as thanks for the regulations. These included “sword money,” “casks of *sake*,” “thanks offerings,” and cash payments. Recipients included a group of ten monks involved in the negotiations, the general temple body, and scribes who prepared the placards (one for the temple, apparently posted there, and one for the *bantō* to take back with them to Iriyamada), for a total of over 2000 *hiki*, or 20 *kan*, a hefty sum.<sup>47</sup> As we saw in chapter 2, gauging the cost, and value, of commodities and services for the period is a complicated task, but by any measure 2000 *hiki* was a considerable expense. It was more than twice what Masamoto was receiving as the summer or autumn acreage tax from Iriyamada or Hineno East Side, and it was the amount that Hosokawa Masamoto asked for as a guarantee for the government to pursue its investigation of the Izumi *shugo*’s alleged wrongdoings (and which Kujō Masamoto ultimately rejected as excessive).<sup>48</sup>

Was this placard of prohibitions really worth more than 20 *kan* to Iriyamada? The villagers apparently thought so, and so did Masamoto. There was no backlash among the village residents, no questioning of the decision, despite the painful collection of dues that followed. As much as anything else, the villagers’ willingness to pay such a high price was a reflection of the growing power and influence of Negoroji. If Negoroji was in fact becoming a public power in the region, then the prohibitions it issued carried considerable weight. No doubt the villagers looked upon the 20 *kan* as a long-term investment, and it is likely that they reaped benefits from it for the better part of the century. Only with Hideyoshi’s crushing defeat of Negoroji in 1585 was the temple’s increasingly prominent position in the region brought to an end.

Though Masamoto thought highly of the prohibitions, he was irked by the omission of Hineno village. Why, he asked, was it not included in the bargain? His assessment was of a missed opportunity, and it clearly bothered him since he refused to drop the matter. He asserted to the Iriyamada *bantō* that “it was improper for Hineno not to have been included.” To this, the *bantō* replied that they had spoken to the monks about that, but to no effect. They were told that only through separate negotiations, and separately issued edict boards, could Hineno be included. By the monks’ reasoning, Hineno was a distinct entity, dissimilar to Iriyamada in topography and political influences. As they noted, Hineno (especially the West Side) had previously been affiliated with the *shugo*, making the issuance of a prohibition like this a delicate matter. And so the Iriyamada *bantō* had not forced the issue. “Would it have made sense,” they asked Masamoto, “to push to have Hineno included on this edict board, and because of that see [Negoroji] reject the entirety, including for this village?”<sup>49</sup> Yet, as estate

proprietor, Masamoto could not help but see the two villages as one, both of which deserved the hard-earned protection.

The final edict of these years appeared in the fifth month of 1504. Kujō Masamoto issued it, but like the Negoroji regulations of two years previous, the Iriyamada villagers provided the impetus for its creation. Also like that earlier edict, this one was spurred by immediate concerns—on this occasion, famine and economic turmoil that followed the drought of 1503. The first article forbade the sale of rice, wheat, and other grains to outside merchants, while the second and third attempted to regulate the use of coins, dismissing some as unacceptable for trade and setting relative values for others.<sup>50</sup> Articles like these appeared frequently in edicts of later decades as powerful regional warriors attempted to shape commerce on their domains. Edicts defining coinage as acceptable or debased were particularly common. But unlike those of 1504, the later ones usually set policy for a warrior's whole territory, and though villagers and merchants may have appreciated such regulations, evidence that they petitioned warrior overlords to issue them is rare. In this sense, Iriyamada's actions were atypical. They were not out of line, however, with the economic practices of the era's villages. Whereas in earlier centuries the proprietor would have set all economic policies and enforced the law, now local cultivators often did so themselves, within the limited boundaries of their villages. As we saw in previous chapters, *sengoku* villagers were more fully engaged in economic matters, including policy, than their predecessors, and were largely responsible for outcomes, beyond the mere production of crops. So it is not surprising that the Iriyamada villagers pushed Masamoto to act when conditions deteriorated—he having authority that they still lacked, independent though they were becoming in many ways.

Masamoto did not say whether the 1504 regulations on grains and coinage that he produced at Iriyamada's request were posted on a placard, but I suspect they were. Public posting ensured that ignorance of the law was no excuse for failure to obey. And it was for this reason that noticeboards became the common medium for promulgating laws to villagers, or to those who might present a threat to them.

### Crimes and Punishments

Law in practice is a different matter than statutory law (or even prohibitions or regulations posted on placards). The latter, prepared and promulgated in

writing, provides the illusion of precision and immutability. But illusion it is, particularly when power and money are brought into play. In this section, I move beyond legal concepts and written prohibitions and look instead at the workings of law itself or, more correctly, the prosecution of crimes. The subject matter is a series of thefts, the most common crime of the era and one that was harshly punished.

The first of these occurred late in the first month of 1502, and is described in detail in *Tabibikitsuke*. Masamoto's description begins with a statement by Emonsaburō, an attendant of Aoki Tōsa Nyūdō: "Last night we apprehended two Shippōryūji 'evil monks,' one of whom resisted capture, so we killed him; the other we took captive." The incident was not wholly unexpected since reports had been received some days earlier of thefts of rice which had been set aside for the 'eye-opening' ceremony of the buddha Fudō Myōō. But Emonsaburō had been rash in his actions and Masamoto was not pleased. The problem was that the two commissioners, Shinanokōji Nagamori and Ishii Aritoshi, were in the capital and Masamoto had given instructions that no action be taken until their return. It was too late to turn back the clock, so Masamoto had no choice but to proceed with an investigation. He sent two men to question the Iriyamada *bantō*, with the expectation that further inquiries might reveal the collaboration of villagers. As Masamoto noted, evidence of stolen items, including bags of rice affixed with descriptive tags for "Fudō Myōō," were found in the monks' residences, so the issue of guilt was not in question. Now Masamoto wanted to know who, if anyone, was assisting them.<sup>51</sup>

It was here that matters became complicated. Despite forceful questioning, each of the *bantō* maintained that this was too difficult a request, that they were unable to assist in the investigation of the captive monk or of possible associates in the village. The reason, they stated, was that "this is a monk with whom we frequently associate, someone with many relatives among the cultivators and other villagers." Though Masamoto was willing to drop the investigation of potential collaborators in the village, he was convinced that the captive monk, clearly guilty as reflected in the stolen property, should be executed. If not, there would be a discrepancy between the punishments for the one thief, struck down on the spot, and the other, taken captive and now allowed to live. And surely, he reasoned, the dead thief's family would petition him about this disparity and the lack of justice in it. Finally, Masamoto worried that a decision like this would set a dangerous precedent, raised in the future by relatives and associates of thieves, thereby becoming a headache for Kujō officials.<sup>52</sup>

The petitioners, who had come to Masamoto's residence at Chōfukuji,

and included not just the six Iriyamada *bantō* but many senior monks from local temples in the village, would have none of this. Their discussions and petitions continued deep into the night, until one finally asked that a decision be postponed until the morrow. Masamoto agreed, and the fate of the captive monk was put off for another day. “He was not,” as Masamoto wrote, “executed that night.”<sup>53</sup>

In his entry of the next day, Masamoto skipped the close descriptions and detailed exchanges of the previous day. Instead, his writing is brief and to the point. The beginning is abrupt: “Regarding the matter of the ‘evil monk,’ I received various recommendations. One was that it be settled by payment [in exchange for his life], another that it be decided through the ‘judgment of the gods,’” in other words by determining guilt by calling on the powers of the *kami* through special ceremony. Rejecting these suggestions, Masamoto “presented an offer of benevolence,” whereby the thief would be spared if the village leaders prepared a contract denying their right to petition in future instances of theft. They refused to do so. So Masamoto sent two men to execute the monk, concluding the day’s entry with the words “Regrettable, Regrettable.”<sup>54</sup>

Thus the incident was over. All that was required was to collect the stolen goods from the monks’ residence and find a new individual to head the Shippōryūji hall of Amidadō of which the monks had been members. These were taken care of in the next few days and things returned to normal.<sup>55</sup>

Or so it appeared. But the reality was different. As revealed in a letter kept within Kujō family archives, the second thief’s life was spared. The letter, signed by three individuals (including the Tsuchimaru *bantō* Inakura Genzaburō, and a Shippōryūji monk, Gensen), was dated one week after the incident concluded and was addressed to two of Masamoto’s officials, Honma Yūshun and Yamada Shigehisa—the two individuals, incidentally, who had been sent by Masamoto to see the execution carried out. Here is the letter.

Recently a decision was issued regarding the crimes of the Inunaki “King of Brightness” thieves. For the one, there was nothing to be done, but as for the individual taken captive, though we made various pleas in his behalf, based on the intent of the law, it was decided that he too would be executed. This was a fact which we, with our private interests, bewailed greatly, something that was surely too much within the public gaze. Because of this, and without concern for the effect this would have on his lordship’s reputation, the decision was changed to allow him to live. Your confidential assistance in the mat-

ter is something we won't forget in this life and in worlds to come.<sup>56</sup>  
[remainder omitted]

What was at play here, and what can we draw from this incident? Given that the proprietor, Masamoto, was in residence at the time, the circumstances were atypical. Yet the incident is nonetheless suggestive. To begin with, Masamoto took the lead in prosecuting the crime. It was his men who investigated it and he who personally served as judge. We can assume that this was predicated upon his residence on the estate. Had he been away, the village leadership would have likely taken charge, as was becoming increasingly common at independent villages. They probably would have done so even in the presence of an estate manager or deputy, individuals who commanded neither the prestige nor authority of a proprietor like Masamoto.<sup>57</sup>

Second, Emonsaburō's decision to execute justice on the spot, when first confronting the thieves, was a common pattern of the era, broadly accepted. Masamoto, too, sanctioned it on the placard he raised soon after his arrival on the estate, though it appears he came to regret it. Here it was Emonsaburō who had acted rashly; in later instances it would be young villagers serving as night watchmen who responded violently with no forethought. What Masamoto had hoped to see was more prudence and a greater concern for proof and due process. Yet as this case shows, Masamoto was not opposed to administering justice swiftly. His intention, as revealed in his diary, was to execute the second thief the day after the two monks were apprehended. In preparation for that, he sent men to Shippōryūji to prepare a list of the stolen goods; these were to provide the evidence as he presented the case before the village leadership and temple petitioners. In Masamoto's mind, the case was closed. All that needed to be done was to convince the petitioners to abandon their plea.<sup>58</sup> Justice served quickly was efficient. And, fairly or not, it headed off potential claims by supporters of the accused.

Third, justice could be served (or as Masamoto saw it, potentially circumvented) through various means. From his position as proprietor and impartial outsider, Masamoto viewed the case in strictly legal terms: a crime had been committed; criminals had been apprehended and their guilt verified. Justice demanded punishment, something rendered to one thief already and now to be imposed upon the other. To do otherwise was of no benefit to Masamoto or the estate, so he rejected the two alternatives put forth: the payment of a fee by the accused or his family, or the "judgment of the gods." The first, a common practice in China and an occasional one in Japan, skirted the question of justice, something Masamoto was uncomfortable with. And despite his faith in the native gods on some matters, Masamoto

saw no reason to put this case before them: the evidence was sufficient to render judgment.

Fourth, even where criminal law was concerned, supporters of the accused enjoyed the right of petitioning for justice or for a reduction of the penalty. The point was forcefully made when the Iriyamada villagers chose not to accept Masamoto's "offer of benevolence" in exchange for a written contract denying the right of petitioning for accused thieves in the future. This was a privilege the villagers were unwilling to forfeit, even though it was to be specifically limited to "cases involving thieves." The fact that this condition, if accepted, was to be finalized in a written contract gave it further weight—hard evidence to be presented by later Kujō officials.<sup>59</sup>

Finally, there is the overpowering fact that the second thief was spared, that Masamoto gave in to the villagers' demands, suggesting that it was perhaps they, not he, who were the ultimate arbiters of village justice on the estate, or at least a force whose will could not be ignored. At any rate, the incident was concluded. Why it was that Masamoto wrote nothing in his diary of the actual outcome, we cannot say, for surely he knew of it and had agreed to it. His sending of Honma Yūshun and Yamada Shigehisa, two trusted advisors, to "see the execution carried out,"<sup>60</sup> as he put it, was a lie, the truth of which he was unwilling to acknowledge in his diary—a document that reflects in so many respects remarkable honesty and an acknowledgement, on occasion, of failings of policy and even personal shortcomings. As I noted earlier, this was the first of several incidents of thievery on the estate, but where law was concerned it was unlike all that followed. If Masamoto expected this to be the norm, he was mistaken.

1504 was bound to be a difficult year on Hine Estate, at least during the early months. The drought of the previous summer meant a subsequent spring of hunger and, for a few, starvation. There was no way to avoid it, as the villagers well knew. Under such conditions, communities could either rally together, tightening the bonds that unified them, or split apart, to lesser or greater degrees. Or they could do both, as appears to have been the case in Iriyamada. The first evidence of this appeared early in the New Year, an auspicious time, a period celebrated for new beginnings—something that made the incident that occurred particularly unwelcome to the residents of the mountain village.

The date was 1/11 and the occasion was the presentation of "auspicious writing." The writing in question was a document read and delivered by Masamoto's officials to the villagers, encouraging them in their work for the coming year.<sup>61</sup> The location was Chōfukuji, Masamoto's residence

and Iriyamada village's administrative headquarters. Those in attendance included village officials, elders, and cultivators, a considerable number of individuals gathered together to welcome, and celebrate, the year ahead. Everything went as planned until dusk, when word reached Masamoto that a village official named Gengorō, holding a position just beneath that of *bantō*, reported that he had "lost a hip sword in the Chōfukuji kitchen." In response, Masamoto instructed Shinanokōji Nagamori to summon to Takinomiya Shrine everyone who had been in attendance, from Masamoto's own retainers and underlings to villagers of every stripe, and there conduct a "hot water investigation" (*yugishō* 湯起請), this despite the lateness of the day. According to this practice (evidence of which can be traced back to ancient times), an individual was brought before a tub of boiling water, where he swore his innocence before the gods, and then thrust a hand into the water to retrieve a stone. The guilty received burns; the innocent did not—at least that was the idea.<sup>62</sup> Based on Masamoto's description, he expected Nagamori to subject the whole crowd of individuals to this test, one by one. What actually occurred is unclear since Masamoto provided no details. But the thief was discovered. According to Nagamori, he "came forth," perhaps under the pressure of his fellow villagers. And he returned the hip sword. His name was Giha Kunai.<sup>63</sup>

As it turned out, Giha Kunai was not the thief's name. Masamoto had apparently heard incorrectly when Nagamori reported to him late on 1/11. Instead, the thief was Genzaburō Kunai, *bantō* of Funabuchi hamlet. Why it was that a *bantō*, a village leader and man of means, would engage in thievery is hard to understand, but these were difficult times, and indebtedness and financial ineptitude were then, as now, not the monopoly of any particular class. At any rate, Masamoto was soon confronted with arguments to save his life, an echo of the "Shippōryūji evil monk" incident of two years previous. But now it was his own retainers, in particular Shinanokōji Nagamori and Takehara Sadao, advising him to pardon the thief. Their reasoning was based on two points. The first, summed up in their statement "villagers are important," was shorthand for the argument (which Masamoto acknowledged later in the same entry) that the thief was from a "tax-paying household" (*kujiya* 公事家), and to put an end to such a household was to decrease agricultural production and thus tax revenue. Put differently, villagers were important because in the early sixteenth century labor was still scarce relative to land. The second reason to save Genzaburō Kunai, Masamoto's men asserted, was because he was the Funabuchi *bantō*, an official of his lordship's direct holdings.<sup>64</sup>

As in the earlier case, Masamoto's position on this occasion was legally

and morally consistent. The fact that the thief was his own *bantō* did not move him, at least not enough to alter his stance. What if Gengorō, the official whose sword had been stolen, were to engage in thievery himself? asked Masamoto. “Would he not cite this example and the villagers’ petition, arguing that we must show no favoritism?” Then, apparently forgetting the debacle of the “Shippōryūji evil monk” incident, Masamoto concluded by stating that “in this mountain village, all thieves will be punished.”<sup>65</sup>

Further damning Genzaburō Kunai was the timing of his crime, committed, as Masamoto pointed out, within the first fifteen days of the new year. Known as the period “within the pines,” this was a sacred time, an interval when households set small pine trees in planters outside the gates of their residences as pathway markers for the god of the new year, a god of good fortune and protector of agriculture. To spoil his visit or anger him through an act of thievery, as Genzaburō Kunai had done, was a serious matter indeed, disturbing both to Masamoto and the villagers. So Masamoto ordered that his head be cut off, and it was done. There was no escaping as in the previous incident. And though Masamoto noted as before that the result was “regrettable,” he added that it was to be expected, given that “this was a sin from which the consequences are difficult to escape”—a clear reference to karma and the inevitability of punishment that followed. Finally, Masamoto gave instructions that the “tax-paying household” be preserved, the property and rights held for the thief’s eight-year-old son until he came of age. And what did the villagers think of all this? Was it acceptable to them, as suggested by the lack of voice given them in Masamoto’s account? Apparently so, for following Genzaburō Kunai’s death, the *bantō* called at Chōfukuji to note their approval; the punishment was appropriate, they said. The date was 1/13.<sup>66</sup>

Three weeks later, on 2/5, the following brief entry appears in *Tabihikitsuke*. “Rain fell throughout the day. In the early Hour of the Ox [around 1 am], the wife and children (three in all) of the Funabuchi village *bantō* [Genzaburō Kunai] were attacked and killed by an evil band. They burned down the house and everything within it. Regrettable. Regrettable.”<sup>67</sup> As compellingly argued by Shiga Setsuko, the “evil band” that Masamoto spoke of was a group of villagers acting under the direction of the Iriyamada community.<sup>68</sup> Despite sanctioning Masamoto’s execution of Genzaburō Kunai as appropriate for the crime, the villagers were not convinced that the penalty went far enough, so they took the matter into their own hands, killing the thief’s family and destroying their home. It was a brutal act, and to Masamoto’s eyes, excessive, but it answered the seriousness of the crime, according to the villagers. Under the influence of Confucian ideas, the notion that family members could be punished for a criminal’s offenses was generally

accepted, though by no means was the practice slavishly followed.<sup>69</sup> For those who question Shiga's argument that the villagers would kill Genzaburō Kunai's family, details concerning Shōen Uma, executed as a thief two years later, are instructive. At that time, the young men of Iriyamada suggested to Masamoto that the wife of Shōen Uma also be put to death. Masamoto dismissed the idea as absurd, particularly, as he noted, because husband and wife had separated prior to the incident.<sup>70</sup> Nonetheless, we see that the villagers—specifically the young men who physically enforced the law—had no qualms about inflicting harsh punishments on the guilty and the tangentially culpable.

Two questions remain, the first concerning Masamoto's decision to characterize the villagers who administered justice as an evil band. To begin with, Shiga's interpretation is not beyond dispute. Some have argued that this incident was divorced from the sword theft of the previous month.<sup>71</sup> If that were the case, then we have to ask where the evil band came from, what motivated their actions, and why the attack elicited no further responses from Masamoto or the villagers. Theft of property was one thing; a brutal, seemingly indiscriminate attack on a family within the village elite was quite another. Deadly and vicious as it was, the assault should have evoked fear and anger among the villagers, if indeed it originated outside the estate. But Masamoto had nothing more to report about it, and that is surprising. In short, circumstantial though the evidence is, it points to an inside attack. And to Masamoto (who was consistent in arguing for a reasoned approach to justice and a commitment to due process) this was vigilante justice, the work of an evil band, even if they were his villagers. Just as he had referred to the two Shippōryūji monks who engaged in thievery as evil monks, disdaining to use their names and enlisting a common idiom denoting corrupt clerics, the evil band of villagers deserved not to be named more specifically than this.<sup>72</sup>

The second question is bigger, and thornier. Simply put, what made this incident different from the one involving the Shippōryūji monks? The contrast in the villagers' actions could hardly have been sharper. In the first instance, they did everything possible to save the remaining thief; in the second, they demanded not only the blood of the miscreant but that of his family. A few factors distinguished the second case, but none seem to have warranted the violent response of the villagers. For example, there was the poor timing of the hip sword theft, defiling sacred time and coming on the heels of a severe drought. Then there was the fact that the stolen sword was a fellow villager's possession, perhaps stoking a grudge that already existed. Clearly something more was at play, something that overshadowed other factors, such as family ties, for example, which had been critical in saving the

life of the monk, but could do nothing to help Genzaburō Kunai. So we are left with suppositions, one of which seems compelling: that the trajectory of both cases was determined by social and economic factors, played out in the tight community of Iriyamada. This saved the accused monk, who enjoyed bonds of family and friendship with the villagers in the valley, but sealed the *bantō*'s fate, who most likely had abused his position of influence, enriching himself at the expense of fellow villagers and making enemies in the process. Considered along these lines, we can reconcile the villagers' behavior in the two incidents. Otherwise we are forced to conclude that they acted arbitrarily.

Genzaburō Kunai's theft of his associate's hip sword occurred early in the new year, in the first month of spring according to Japanese dating and custom. In terms of the want of food that followed the drought of 1503, it was still early. The real pain would come in the three succeeding months, during which time instances of theft related to the food shortage would become common. Shaped as they were by hunger, these incidents were of a very different nature than the two I have examined so far.

The first occurred in the middle of the second month. According to his diary entry of Bunki 4/2/16, Masamoto was visited that day by two Iriyamada *bantō*, one from Ōgi, the other from Funabuchi, who brought a detailed report of recent developments. They began by reminding Masamoto of the failed harvest of the year previous and the resulting famine and deaths from starvation that had occurred. As an emergency foodstuff, bracken roots were dug up (apparently in a communal effort), ground into flour, and then placed in the river overnight—a means of separating the chaff from the starch. But on consecutive nights the bracken had been stolen from the river. So on the night of the fifteenth the villagers set guards to watch the bracken, and thieves came. The guards chased them to the residence of the Takinomiya shrine maiden in the Matsushita neighborhood, where they cut down and killed the shrine maiden and her two children—"this because they were thieves."<sup>73</sup>

That was the report. Masamoto's musings about it, which followed immediately, reflect the unease he felt over the affair and the villagers' handling of it.

There had been repeated rumors that these individuals were thieves, and then this occurred. As for the villagers' [i.e., guards'] actions, were they not lawless in the extreme, permitting not one witness to live but instead killing them all, including the mother? And yet, because of

the persistent rumors about these individuals' evil actions, the village leaders, it is true, had already informed us that such activities were occurring. Likewise the fact that at the time no one was there [as a witness] was something that could not be helped. As the actions of thieves, the results were of their own making, brought on by themselves. Praise be to Amida Buddha. Praise be to Amida Buddha.<sup>74</sup>

As Masamoto admitted, the problem was intractable. From the first it had been painfully difficult, and at this point it was impossible to rectify. Ultimately it could be made right only through the compassion of Amida Buddha.

One month later it happened again. On consecutive nights, thieves came to the river to steal the bracken flour, and on each occasion the guards cut them down. Victims included "a young man of seventeen or eighteen, and children of lesser ages" on the first night, and "two women living by themselves" on the second.<sup>75</sup> Driven by unrelenting hunger, the bracken thieves were desperate. They were also villagers on the margins, part of the community's underclass, including households led by single women and children on their own, apparently abandoned. Poor to begin with, these were members of "non-tax-paying households," who suffered inordinately when famine struck. And as thieves of the common good, they received nothing but their fellow villagers' wrath. Masamoto was more compassionate, but was in no position to offer any real help (whether he would have done so if he could is another matter), and of course the "common good" had much less immediate pull on him, even if he understood that the villagers' well-being and prosperity had a direct effect upon his.

### The Shōen Uma Incident

A final theft of rice in the spring of 1504, this by an Iriyamada resident by the name of Shōen Uma, was unexceptional, but the implications were large. The insights offered by the incident reach beyond law and legal norms, to matters of regional power and authority, social attitudes, and economics. I examine it comprehensively here, following the various threads as they appear.

On 3/28, a mere two days after the young men of Iriyamada had chased down bracken thieves and cut them down in their residence, word reached Masamoto of another theft. It came to light when Kame Genshichi, a cultivator of Shōbu hamlet, made the trek to Inunakiyama to retrieve a bag of rice he had entrusted to the Nishinobō cloister of Shippōryūji. Upon asking

for the rice, he was told that it had been claimed and tagged by Shōen Uma, a fellow resident. But a paper scrap within the bag confirmed that the owner was in fact Genshichi. And though Uma argued that he must have remembered incorrectly about owning the rice, other stolen items were found in his possession, undermining his claim. The young men who policed and enforced the law, convinced of Shōen Uma's guilt, were determined to put him to death without delay; some even argued that mere execution, given the evidence of additional thefts, was an insufficient punishment.<sup>76</sup>

Considerable discussion followed among Masamoto, his close retainers, and Genroku Kunai, *bantō* of Shōbu hamlet. Though in favor of a quick judgment, sentence, and execution of the sentence, Masamoto also argued for the need to hear from witnesses and accusers. However, late that night Genroku Kunai returned with more information. He said they had been able to meet with Uma's older brother, Ōya Ukon (who had heard nothing of the matter) along with a younger brother, Junryō, a Kōyasan monk. After hearing the accusations, Junryō asked if it were possible to see justice served by paying a fine. Ōya Ukon agreed that would be a favorable outcome, but added that "if he is clearly a thief, for you to set aside his punishment merely because a fine is paid would be a great loss of face for his relatives."<sup>77</sup>

The new information did little to change Masamoto's mind, though it gave him somewhat more to ruminate about, as he noted in *Tabihikitsuke*. In the midst of this, as he contemplated the issues late at night, word came that Shōen Uma had furtively offered 20 *kan* as commutation for his crime, along with a written confession of guilt. With that, he sealed his fate. Speaking for the villagers (whom he did not consult), Masamoto noted that "To accept a payment so that the thief's crime is dismissed would be an affront to the villagers' honor, with weighty consequences; it should not be done." He gave orders that Uma be executed by decapitation early the next day, and it was done, "at the break of dawn."<sup>78</sup>

The effects of Shōen Uma's rice theft extended well beyond his own neck. To begin with, there were social repercussions, felt first and foremost by his family. As Masamoto soon learned, Uma was the father of three children, two daughters, ages fourteen and two, and a son, age six. The mother had recently separated from Uma, and the children were left on their own. In this condition, two days after their father's execution, they spent a night in the fields, crying and despairing their fate. Seeking comfort as dawn broke, they called at their great aunt's, whose residence bordered their own, and at which Uma had entrusted small quantities of rice and wheat. But the aunt drove them off—apparently worried, according to later reports, that she might be implicated in Uma's crimes.<sup>79</sup>

Few though the references are to women in *Tabihikitsuke*, they occupy a prominent position in Masamoto's accounts of thievery, whether as perpetrators or their relatives. And the women are overwhelmingly single. Thus, we see the account of the shrine maiden and her two children, who were cut down for stealing bracken flour two months previous to this. Then a month later, two unmarried women "living by themselves" met the same fate for the same crime.<sup>80</sup> Neither Uma's estranged spouse nor his aunt (who it seems was single) appear as thieves, but one cannot help but wonder about the state of their lives, especially that of Uma's spouse, now that she had left him.

The economic repercussions of the rice theft were significant. Because Shōen Uma was a tax-paying cultivator, a man of some means, the disposition of his property was a serious concern. In a petition the Shōbu villagers presented to Masamoto, they asked that his land and cultivation rights (*saku shiki* 作職) be entrusted to Ōya Ukon ("under the direction of the whole village," *sōjige to shite* 爲惣地下), to be held for Uma's children until they came of age.<sup>81</sup> The *bantō* reiterated the request when they delivered a report of Uma's property, which they bolstered with the following arguments. "There has been too much buying and selling of land and cultivation rights like these. Some years back, this sort of confiscation occurred under Negoroji deputies, with the result that the land was taken and sold. That was land worth 3000 or 4000 *hiki*. So, if confiscation takes place, is the land invariably going to be sold?—this we were asked by everyone."<sup>82</sup>

Masamoto assured the *bantō* that it would not be sold, that it would be held in trust for Shōen Uma's children. As proprietors, the Kujō were not like the lawless Negoroji monks, he asserted, while reminding them that the villagers were the family's "cultivators of many generations" (*fudai byakushō*). With this, and his efforts to assist the three children of Shōen Uma with their immediate needs, Masamoto received lavish praise from the villagers (this, of course, according to his record). As thanks, he suggested to the villagers that a "small offering" would be appropriate. They brought 500 *hiki* of a promised 1000 *hiki* the next day (i3/5), and the remainder three weeks later.<sup>83</sup>

Brief though it is, the report prepared by the *bantō* of Shōen Uma's landholdings offers insights into the economics of the villages and the future that awaited his children.

[I.] Register of paddies

[1] Ō [大, 240 *bu*], plus 40 *bu*, in Matsushita [Ōgi]; the first is a single section

- [2] 20 *bu*, “land within the old fence” (*furukaito*) [Ōgi]
- [3] One-half *tan* [180 *bu*, or 495.5 square meters] in Shimotaira [Ōgi]
- [4] 90 *bu*, same area [Ōgi]
- [5] 80 *bu*, mountain paddy
- [6] 150 *bu*, in Tsuchimaru, Shitarukuchi
- [7] 90 *bu*, dry field
- [II.] Land within the “southern fence” held by Shōen [Uma]
- [III.] Residential land portion
  - [a] One-half *tan*, in Wakasaki [Ōgi]
  - [b] 60 *bu*, in Shitarukuchi [Tsuchimaru]
  - [c] 40 *bu*, in Daiwa no kubo [Ōgi]<sup>84</sup>

Much about this record is surprising. To begin with, though Shōen Uma is described as a resident of Shōbu, none of the land listed is within that hamlet; most is instead in neighboring Ōgi, with the rest (one section of paddy and one residential plot) in Tsuchimaru. In other words, like some individuals who appear in the 1503 inventory of Hineno East Side landholdings (discussed in chapter 7) Shōen Uma was an absentee landlord whose properties extended beyond the hamlet he resided in. Of course, it is not clear where he resided, though perhaps it was on a plot in Shōbu on his “land within the southern fence.” The term used here was *kaito* (垣内), residential land specifically designated as such by its position “within the fence” or “within the wall,” the literal meaning of the characters.<sup>85</sup> No evidence exists as to the location of this district. As for the rest of the residential land, it no doubt consisted of plots that Uma rented out to supplement his income.

The total area in paddy on the list equals 800 *bu* or 2200 square meters (just over half an acre). Added to this was a dry field of 90 *bu* (about 250 square meters) and three plots of residential land, the largest equalling half a *tan* (180 *bu* or 495 square meters). The paddy represented less than 1.5 percent of the 17 *chō* of arable in Iriyamada, suggesting that Shōen Uma was well off, but not rich. Whether or not he worked his land himself (and with his wife before she left) is unknown. To risk his life for a bag of rice seems foolish, but greed of course knows few bounds. It is unlikely that Uma had 20 *kan* in currency on hand—the amount he offered to escape punishment—but he could have readily raised it through borrowing against his property or selling a portion of it.

With plans made for the disposition and maintenance of Shōen Uma’s property, the matter appeared to be settled. Not only that, but Uma’s was the last theft of spring noted by Masamoto. By the time his case was concluded, food was no longer in such short supply. Spring hungers gave way to new

crops and produce from fields and kitchen gardens. Moreover, the saucer ponds were full and the rice paddies held promise of an abundant autumn. It was, accordingly, a rude shock to Masamoto when he received word on 7/5, four months after Uma's execution, that the thief's younger brother, Junryō, had come from Kōyasan with a petition, demanding to know the circumstances that led to the capital punishment of his brother. Most disconcerting was the fact that he was accompanied by another individual, who was to represent him and support him, suggesting broader backing.<sup>86</sup>

Masamoto was plainly irritated by Junryō's demands. After all, Junryō had been in Iriyamada when the case was decided. He was not ignorant of the facts. But now he was demanding that accusers and witnesses be called and the case reexamined. It made no sense. As Masamoto noted to Nagamori, "if we were to accede to his demands, overlooking this and summoning the accusers [for further testimony], then should we not reexamine every other case from the past in which thieves and the like have been charged and executed, checking the confiscated goods and summoning accusers?"<sup>87</sup> Masamoto was convinced there was no reason to proceed. But Nagamori was receiving a different message, a far more worrisome one from Junryō's representative, who suggested that a failure to reconsider the case might lead to the involvement of Junryō's allies at Kōyasan and Negoroji.<sup>88</sup>

Herein lay the crux of the matter for Masamoto and the reason he ultimately agreed to reopen the case, and then proceeded in the next four days to write about it extensively, page after page in his diary. As Nagamori contended, reopening the case was the safe approach. To do otherwise could bring great harm to the villagers. It was one thing for them to still be in conflict with the Izumi *shugo*, but to then have Kōyasan and Negoroji turn against them would be ruinous, he argued. And the main reason was that "this valley's cultivators depend on work in the province of Kii to sustain their lives." In other words, conflict with these two powerful temples could lead them to close the markets outside their gates to Iriyamada peddlers, potentially crippling the local economy.<sup>89</sup> If Masamoto still had reason to hesitate, the next day Nagamori reported that Junryō was in discussions with "evil monks at Negoroji," and they were making plans to carry out violence.<sup>90</sup>

The following several days were filled with negotiations, the marshaling of evidence and cajoling of witnesses, and discussions with friends and allies about preparing for an armed clash. They were tense days. Serious conflict appeared likely. And then, early on the morning of 7/10, a messenger came with word that temple duties required Junryō to return to Kōyasan; he regretted that he had been forced to leave without offering his respects.

Masamoto thought little of that. “These are just more of his ongoing irresponsible actions.”<sup>91</sup> Why had Junryō left? Masamoto provides no clues, and he likely believed the monk would return shortly, but he did not. With no direct evidence, we can only assume that Junryō was pulled back by a greater force, probably Negoroji, whose monks (a few in number) were in negotiations with Masamoto over the debt he owed them. A settlement was unlikely to be finalized if serious conflict broke out between Hine Estate and Negoroji monks. The dispute needed to end.<sup>92</sup>

The problem of law in the early decades of the *sengoku* era is well reflected in *Tabihikitsuke*. Though far from comprehensive in its depiction of legal concerns and practices during this time (to note one glaring omission, warrior house codes are not included), much is indicative of law at the time. This is seen in the three very distinct sections of this chapter: the first dealing with the continued political legitimacy of the Muromachi shogunate and the weight of legal precedent; the second examining several posted prohibitions, issued not by the shogunate or its representatives but instead by Kujō Masamoto, a local proprietor with limited legal reach, and Negoroji, a temple whose decrees reflected its regional influence as a rising political power; the third analyzing law in practice on the estate, in other words, the way that crimes, specifically theft, were prosecuted.

As should be clear, these allow for no simple characterization of law at the time, either in conception (despite a nod to precedent), or in terms of the legal authority needed to make or define law. Additionally, these reveal that there were no firm boundaries of legal jurisdiction—a continuation, and elaboration, from before the Ōnin War; the boundaries had become yet more diffuse, more contested, several decades into the *sengoku* era. Perhaps that had begun to change elsewhere, in regions under the firm control of rising warlords, but clearly much was in flux, as we might expect in a world of political decentralization and endemic conflict. And in that sense, it is possible that Izumi at the beginning of the sixteenth century was not so different from other areas in its disparate, muddled workings of “law.”

One compelling thread that runs through these sections is the role of the villagers. Historians have argued that one mark of independent villages in the late medieval era was their assumption of policing and judicial powers—from arresting suspects to trying and punishing them—powers that earlier would have been the right and responsibility of the estate proprietor (or in more serious matters, the responsibility of the military governor).<sup>93</sup> The argument that villages assumed policing and judicial powers has been based primarily on villages in which no overlord was in residence, so the situation

in Hine Estate during these four years was different. Nonetheless, it is telling that despite Masamoto's presence, the villagers had a large say in how justice was carried out. This was a power they shared with Masamoto (who judged and executed the law), and he did not dismiss it, despite his disappointment in the villagers' decisions at times. Thus it was the villagers who determined that the Shippōryūji "evil monk" should be set free, that Genzaburō Kunai's family should be put to death for his crime, and that bracken thieves were to be cut down on the spot (though sanctioned by Masamoto in his 1501 noticeboard). Furthermore, it was at the villagers' request that Masamoto produced regulations on grains and coinage in 1504, and similarly at their urging that Negoroji monks drafted articles (if at a cost) prohibiting intrusion in Iriyamada. In sum, village initiative on legal matters was significant. Had the villagers been abetted by the decisions of Masamoto and the shogunate to include them in their legal arguments, to justify their positions with reason and historical precedent? Perhaps. Or maybe they were simply determined to do whatever they could to define their lives themselves in this difficult period.

## Community

Japan's late medieval independent villages are broadly known as *sō* or *sōson*, terms emphasizing the collective, inclusive nature and functioning of those villages. The character *sō* means “the whole” or “the totality” and it was used at the time, both by residents and outsiders, to describe the villages or village-wide organizations that set policy and managed internal affairs. As argued by Hitomi Tonomura in *Community and Commerce in Late Medieval Japan: The Corporate Villages of Tokuchin-ho* and Kristina Kade Troost in “Common Property and Community Formation: Self-Governing Villages in Late Medieval Japan, 1300–1600,” the administrative and economic powers held by the *sō* were defining characteristics of community in the villages.<sup>1</sup> As for Hineno and Iriyamada (which were unexamined by Tonomura and Troost), though they are generally considered to be *sōson*, our understanding of their internal workings is limited. Whereas Tonomura's and Troost's studies center on villages with abundant economic and legal documents produced by the villagers themselves, what we learn about the Izumi villages is revealed primarily in *Tabihikitsuke*, an outsider's diary.<sup>2</sup> Our understanding of community in Hineno and Iriyamada is bound to be different.

To begin with, community in the *sōson* or corporate villages described by Tonomura and Troost was characterized by a village shrine association.<sup>3</sup> This body served as the administrative center of the collective and had the power to issue rules and ordinances for the village, as well as to manage the *sō*'s communal property, primarily fields and paddies. As one might imagine, it was physically situated at the village's central shrine which, as described by Tonomura, functioned in Imabori as “city hall, court house, notary, tax bureau, bank, fairgrounds, church, center for the performing arts, tavern,

and playground.” Were there similar shrine associations in Hineno and Iriyamada? Probably, but no solid evidence exists for Hineno and what we see in Iriyamada is circumstantial evidence, compelling as it is. Distant as Masamoto was from Hineno, it is not surprising that he knew little of its internal workings. On the other hand, as a resident of Ōgi hamlet, not far from Takinomiya Shrine, he was familiar with village festivals held there, such as Obon and the “dance of joy for rain” following drought in 1501. Moreover, he wrote of members of the four Iriyamada hamlets meeting in a “village council” at Takinomiya in the fall of 1503 to discuss the military threat of Satō Sōbei. Beyond this, however, Masamoto offers few insights, and one has to wonder if the internal village administrative bodies in Hineno and Iriyamada were as prominent as in Imabori. Perhaps their roles were less weighty on Hine Estate because the Kujō proprietors were engaged in the estate’s management, something reflected in the activities of the *bantō*—individuals appointed by the proprietor but who of necessity dealt with internal village affairs as well. There is also the question of village communal property, evidence of which is thin both in *Tabihikitsuke* and estate tax documents.

Accordingly, it makes sense to look elsewhere, or at least more expansively, for the workings of community in Hineno and Iriyamada. And these can be found in *Tabihikitsuke* in three distinct ways: first, in village work and culture (primarily in Iriyamada, Masamoto’s backyard); second, in relations between the villagers of Iriyamada and Masamoto and his men; and third, in regional leagues and alliances, or what we might consider extended community.

### Proximate Ties, Familiar Practices

The villages of Hineno and Iriyamada, as well as the hamlets that comprised them, took shape in the 14th and 15th centuries as settlement patterns changed on many estates. Whereas *shōen* of the early medieval era were characterized by dispersed clumps of several residences, with the whole being directly managed by estate proprietors, those of the late medieval era were marked by larger, more centralized groups of dwellings which were independent or at least semi-autonomous—in other words, with these developments came the birth of the *sō*.<sup>4</sup> Community was a natural outgrowth of these changes, as neighbors grew in number and proximity, and as responsibilities that were earlier filled by proprietors fell to the villagers (even if incomplete, as in Hine Estate settlements). This was the situation in Hineno and Iriyamada, as seen in shifts in settlement patterns along with the adoption of

duties such as gathering taxes (a responsibility of the *bantō*) and the maintenance of irrigation works.

More specifically, evidence of communal work by the villagers appears here and there in *Tabihikitsuke*, as described in other contexts in earlier chapters. This was seen, for example, in Masamoto's reference to the confiscation of a "Chinese plow" by his men in the autumn of 1501.<sup>5</sup> As large implements drawn by draft animals, Chinese plows would have been used communally within a hamlet as farmers prepared their fields for wheat or barley following the harvest of the rice crop. Also significant were occasions that required the villagers to work together side by side, and none could compare with the task of resisting armed attacks by outsiders. Besides actually drawing their bows and engaging in battle, the young men whose responsibility it was to defend the villages spent much time constructing defenses, serving as guards, and lying in wait for attacks that, fortunately, came less often than feared. In the process, they formed bonds that shaped their relations for years to come, as they became village elders and village leaders, key figures in their communities.

Less dramatic in their formation but more inclusive of the village population were ties that resulted from decisions to stand bamboo grass in opposition to repression, to abscond, and to deal with famine by collectively digging bracken and preparing flour from it. These steps required consensus from the villagers and considerable communal labor. Though initial discussions on matters such as standing bamboo grass or deciding to abscond may have been limited to village leaders and perhaps tax-paying cultivators, at some point the consensus of the broader community was necessary. Absconding was bound to carry less punch if the underclass of the village chose not to join their betters in the mountains. In the midst of the crises that forced villagers to make these decisions and then work side-by-side at tasks such as digging bracken and grinding roots into flour, there were periods of tension and conflict between villagers (such as those resulting from bracken flour thefts), yet at the same time there were numerous opportunities for strengthening communal bonds.

If Masamoto was frustratingly stingy in leaving us details about daily work and local governance in the villages of Hine Estate, he made up for it in other ways, especially in his descriptions of religious and cultural practices. Though in turn pleased, irritated, or bemused by the villagers' responses to various pressures and incidents, Masamoto was invariably intrigued, and on occasion impressed, by their cultural activities. In his description of these, he left us a clear window into one aspect of the ties that bound the local communities.<sup>6</sup>

One occasion he noted (which I discussed in chapter 3) was the “dance of joy for rain” and related festivities that took place in Iriyamada in the eighth month of 1501 following precipitation that put an end to the threat of drought. This was a celebration of the whole village, a chance to revel in the rain (metaphorically, at least) that saved the fall crop. This was also an occasion on which the villagers were reminded of their common heritage as they performed ceremonies last held thirty-seven years previous. Community in this case was reinforced by a shared history.<sup>7</sup>

Far more regular manifestations of community in the villages took the form of annual observances, celebrations and ceremonies that marked important occasions within the yearly cycle. As Masamoto acknowledged, the villagers were deeply committed to the ceremonies and festivals, and they performed their parts in them with vigor. Of the local observances that appear in *Tabihikitsuke*, all were religiously based.<sup>8</sup>

The grandest of these was the Obon festival of Iriyamada, held in the mid-seventh month. In 1501 it stretched over six days and brought the villagers together both as members of their hamlets, united in dance and competition, and as residents of the larger valley.<sup>9</sup> The festival’s importance to the villagers was made clear five days previous to its start when Masamoto learned that the last of the men taken captive in Sano two months earlier had been released through the payment of a ransom by the Ōgi villagers. Though opposed by Masamoto, and refused by the villagers for a full six weeks, the ransom was paid at this time “because of requests that parents and children be able to come together prior to Obon.”<sup>10</sup> As a Buddhist festival dedicated to the memory of ancestors, and as the grandest celebration of the year, this was not an occasion that residents of Iriyamada were willing to miss.<sup>11</sup>

Whereas Obon was a celebration in the Buddhist tradition, the native deities of Iriyamada received their due in the Takinomiya festival, observed at the shrine of that name in Ōgi hamlet. Held on two consecutive days late in the eighth month, the festival typically included performances of both *sarugaku noh* and *dengaku*, or “field music,” a popular song and dance form with rural origins. Specific to shrine tradition, the festival also included prayers and ceremonies offered before the shrine, as well as dances to the gods.<sup>12</sup> In 1502, the performers were “five male *kagura* [‘music of the gods’] dancers,” and “eight nuns.”

As when the Ōgi villagers chose to pay a ransom so that families could spend Obon together in 1501, the broader Iriyamada community likewise took extraordinary steps in 1502 to celebrate the Takinomiya festival. The problem confronting them was the upheaval that accompanied Satō Sōbei’s uprising. Indeed, it was on 8/21, just three days prior to the scheduled start

of the festival, that an army had entered the mountains near Tsuchimaru, threatening to advance upon that hamlet. And it was on that day that Masamoto fled to Shippōryūji, high in the mountains above the valley. Two days later Masamoto was back at his residence at Chōfukuji and the following morning, as he wrote in his diary, the villagers were preparing to conduct the Takinomiya festival, with “formal practices to be followed.” Somehow or other the villagers had been able to drive off the invaders and return home, confident they could proceed with the festival. Their rushed and flustered condition was reflected in Masamoto’s depiction that “they arrived at the shrine grounds with topknots undone.” Yet they were also garbed in white ceremonial clothing and robes, appropriate to the rites they were soon to conduct.<sup>13</sup>

### Unexpected Community

In many respects the most remarkable, and unexpected, manifestations of community on Hine Estate during these years are seen in relations between the villagers of Hineno and Iriyamada and the Kyoto interlopers of Kujō Masamoto and his men. Perhaps community is too definitive a concept for these associations formed over a mere four years, but the pressures of the day quickly pushed the two groups together, whether in opposition to one another (as over taxes), or as allies and potential collaborators. Though class and status formed the foundation for relations between the groups, the immediate presence of Masamoto, and his willingness to be an active, if reclusive, member of society (and to direct his men to act accordingly), led to unexpected ties and interactions.

For the villagers of Hineno and Iriyamada, the arrival of Masamoto and his men must have come as a shock, even though they were forewarned of it. No longer was Masamoto the distant proprietor in the capital (and the former chancellor, no less) but instead a next-door neighbor and a presence that could not be ignored. Likewise, his men were now the villagers’ daily associates, relaying instructions, urging cooperation, issuing tax notices, and collecting taxes. How were the two sides to deal with this new reality?

The beginnings were favorable, as seen in the warm reception Masamoto and his men received upon arrival in the spring of 1501. Offerings of food and drink and promises to serve well and faithfully by the locals were reciprocated by Masamoto, most explicitly in the placard erected at the village offices, with stipulations that proscribed ill behavior of his men. That was the proprietor’s promise to be a good neighbor, a good overlord in residence.

Though this relationship, in which the villagers would be “honorable cultivators” and Masamoto would be “his lordship,” was stretched thin at times in the four years that followed, it would not be broken.<sup>14</sup>

Of course, a few respectful exchanges in early days did not mean that deeper ties would inevitably follow. Indeed, it is likely that Masamoto arrived on Hine Estate with the expectation that he would maintain his distance—physically and metaphorically—from those of low status, whether members of his small contingent or local villagers. For someone in his position it was a logical assumption, bolstered by the belief that he would be back home in the capital within a year, after having completed his business. A *Tabihikitsuke* entry written just two weeks after arrival reflects such an attitude: “Since last year, Hineno village East Side cultivators have failed to pay the allotted annual tax and other duties. So I told Aritoshi that men needed to be sent there. Accordingly, I also dispatched four or five palanquin bearers from here.”<sup>15</sup> Two points in this very pedestrian entry are significant. First is Masamoto’s use of the term palanquin bearers for the men he sent to Hineno. As we saw in the Introduction, Masamoto wrote of departing the capital with three close officials, who he noted by name, and a group of “palanquin bearers,” numbering more than ten. He obviously used the latter as a generic term for all lesser attendants, whose duties in coming months would just once include hoisting their lord’s conveyance, and who were clearly sent to Hineno for unrelated work. Though nameless in the diary at this point, the men soon appeared with specific appellations and identities. Before the fourth month was out, the “palanquin bearers” had disappeared from *Tabihikitsuke*, replaced with named individuals who came to work closely with Masamoto.<sup>16</sup>

Just as noteworthy, in sending “four or five” of these men to the East Side, it is clear that Masamoto intended to intimidate, possibly even physically coerce, the villagers into submitting their taxes. Apparently, he believed that Aritoshi, whom he had assigned to reside at Muhenkōin to manage Hineno village, needed backup support. Masamoto gave no details of what immediately followed, but two days later, two of the three East Side *bantō* absconded, as described in chapter 2. Whether this was brought on by the presence of the “palanquin bearers” is unclear, but in the months and years that followed, pressure of this sort would rarely be used.

Despite the early (and ongoing) disputes over taxes in the summer of 1501, the villagers of Iriyamada took a significant step to strengthen relations with Masamoto at the time of the seventh month Tanabata celebrations. For five days, from the 11th to the 15th, villagers from the four Iriyamada hamlets went to Chōfukuji, Masamoto’s residence, and performed dances in

the temple hall grounds after nightfall, with each night bringing performers from a different hamlet. Then on 7/16, the villagers of all four hamlets met at Takinomiya, the village tutelary shrine, for a final night of dancing and competition, conducted “as supplications to the deity of Takinomiya.” However, as a courtesy to Masamoto, they offered him their concluding performance, and farewell respects, the previous night, rather than call on him following their supplications to Takinomiya—which would put him second in line, as it were. As Masamoto noted, “it was very thoughtful.” In short, the villagers had expanded the Tanabata celebration to include an offering to the proprietor, extending their performative space from their tutelary shrine to Masamoto’s residence. This was a chance to entertain him and to showcase their talents. And just as their dances at Takinomiya were carried out as supplications to the deity, it seems likely that they considered their performances before Masamoto in the same light. As entertainment, there is no question that their efforts were a success, as seen in Masamoto’s diary entry of 7/13.

Tonight it was the Funabuchi villagers who came to the temple grounds for *furyū nenbutsu*. After the *nenbutsu*, they performed a range of *furyū* [“flowing wind dances”]. As the performance of backwoods peasants, it was certainly interesting. In their learning each acted with competence, and whether in movement and bearing or in speech they were equal to the skilled performers of the capital. In their understanding of tradition and precedent, they were not inferior to the learned professionals. They held our interest completely. I instructed that they be given 100 *hiki* for *sake* funds. Truly I did not yearn [for the capital]. I’m in extremely high spirits!<sup>17</sup>

The *furyū nenbutsu* that Masamoto referred to was probably what was commonly called *nenbutsu odori*, in which individuals combined their energetic dancing with invocations of Amida buddha. The “flowing wind dances” which followed seemed to little resemble the frenetic dancing by that same name in the capital (as discussed by Mary Elizabeth Berry), but the impression it left on Masamoto was unmistakable, and the gift he offered to the dancers was no doubt much appreciated by them. As it turned out, his generosity was stretched a few days later when dancers from Ōgi and Shōbu hamlets took their turn at performing at Chōfukuji. Their acting too was impressive, and it placed Masamoto in a predicament because, as he wrote, having offered funds for *sake* to the Funabuchi performers, he had no choice but to do likewise for the actors from these two hamlets, “linked as they are within the same village.” “In order not to lose face,” Masamoto had

Shinanokōji Nagamori provide the group from each hamlet a promissory note of 100 *biki*.<sup>18</sup>

Goodwill was fostered on Masamoto's part more generally by customary practices such as the "tax-day treat" that his men provided to village heads when they made their initial payment of taxes for the season, as well as in "auspicious writing" ceremonies of the New Year. The latter practice had originated centuries earlier as a show of support for the state, in which associates of those in power presented documents of good fortune for the coming year. Among late medieval villages it took a different form. There it was a top-down practice, centered on a document composed by the proprietor and presented to the villagers. It commonly consisted of three articles, the first an offering of praise to the gods and Buddhas, the second an encouragement of agriculture, the third an exhortation to the villagers to faithfully pay the annual tax.<sup>19</sup> While Masamoto was in residence the reading was performed by one of his officials for each of the three village units. Though clearly a display of lordly authority, this ceremony was also a festive occasion—and one held at considerable expense, footed fully by the proprietor. Gifts from Masamoto to those in attendance during these years consisted of "folding fans, *sake*, and so on," and participants were numerous: for the Iriyamada auspicious writing of 1503, Masamoto noted "more than fifty" in attendance, beginning with the *bantō* and village elders.<sup>20</sup> We can assume that those numbers were typical for Hineno, too. Obviously this was a celebration that villagers were eager to attend, and in this sense it was a time for Masamoto to remind them, in a positive way, of the ties that bound them as proprietor and cultivators.

More substantive evidence that the Kyoto men and the villagers of Hine Estate formed, in time, personal and extensive ties is seen in their united efforts to resist outside intrusions, kidnappings, and claims, as discussed in earlier chapters. The genesis for these cooperative efforts appears at the time of the first real threat of a *shugo* attack, on 1501/6/22, less than three months after Masamoto's arrival. In his lengthy diary entry of that day, Masamoto reveals how the process took shape. In response to word from the neighboring village of Kumatori that "this night the *shugo* intend to invade Iriyamada and destroy it," the villagers of the four hamlets committed "to join forces and fight together as one." Then they came to Masamoto and asked that he "provide them someone, anyone, to be a military leader" (*taishō ni dare nite mo tatau beku sōrō* 大将ニ誰ニテモ可給候).<sup>21</sup> Shortly thereafter the young men of Ōgi came to Masamoto with a request that they be given instructions. Masamoto did so and sent along several men, underlings of his chief retainers, to assist them in building defensive structures at the entrances to the valley.

On later occasions, military collaboration occurred without discussion. When intrusions took place, Masamoto's men rushed off to join village defenses, and assistance was not limited to underlings as on that first occasion. As we have seen, all but Masamoto himself took up arms as necessary, and his chief officers often spent a night or two away from home directing village defenses until the retreating forces had fully dispersed.<sup>22</sup> An incident of 10/29 of 1503 reflects the change that had occurred since that first incident. Early in the morning, a Tsuchimaru villager came running with word that a force from the *shugo* had entered Hineno East Side and taken two men captive; the East Side villagers had engaged them in battle but needed assistance. Immediately the two commissioners Takehara Sadao and Shinanokōji Nagamori dashed off to provide help. They departed, as Masamoto noted, "having not yet eaten breakfast."<sup>23</sup>

Just as significant as the physical support Masamoto and his men provided was written and verbal support expressed in the face of accusations, demands, and claims against the villages by outside parties. A striking early example concerns the Sano market kidnapping of three Ōgi hamlet villagers by *shugo* retainers, which I discussed in chapter 5. During the week after the incident, Masamoto repeatedly sent men to Sakai to deliver messages to, and argue his case before, the *shugo*. On 6/24, Shiono Hyōgonosuke, a mid-level retainer of Masamoto, returned from Sakai and described the exchange he had with Hayashi, a *shugo* official. Regarding the abduction, he explained to Hayashi that "because his lordship resides in Iriyamada, if anyone disobeys his orders in even the slightest matters, they will be punished immediately; but these honorable cultivators have not been negligent." To this, Hayashi asserted that the Iriyamada cultivators had in fact been guilty of inviting his lordship onto the *shugo*'s holdings [meaning Hine Estate], and thus obstructed its workings. In this manner they became the enemies of the *shugo*. Taking this as an insinuation that the *shugo* considered Masamoto an enemy, Shiono responded forthrightly: "Then you should have taken captive a retainer of his lordship. . . . and you should allow the cultivators who have committed no crimes to return."<sup>24</sup> Similar assertions by Masamoto and his men that "the villagers have not been lawless" or "have not been negligent" appear later in the diary as well.<sup>25</sup> Clearly the proprietor and his men had the villagers' backs in their struggles with outside powers.

As ties between the Kyoto transplants and the villagers of Hineno and Iriyamada grew closer and stronger, as they shared much and shared deeply, the language of discourse between the two occasionally took on a different character. Closeness and familiarity led to new expectations of one another, indeed higher expectations. And criticisms of the other, when they occurred,

became more intimate and more cutting. The most compelling examples of this came from the villagers' side at times when they believed Masamoto had abandoned them (or was about to do so), was taking advantage of them, or was failing to act in the best interests of the estate. One example, which we have already seen, dates to the ninth month of 1501, when Hineno West Side, under tremendous pressure from the *shugo*, withheld payments of the annual tax to Masamoto, who threatened to send an armed force against them if they paid "even a little" of the tax to the military governors. With this threat, Masamoto breached the lines of propriety and goodwill that linked him to the villagers, and they told him this. Their reply revealed not anger but hurt feelings, disbelief, and ultimately betrayal.<sup>26</sup>

In two more examples, one appearing at year-end in 1502, and another dating to spring of 1504, the villagers of Iriyamada took Masamoto to task for acting in his own interest rather than for the good of the estate. That Masamoto recorded these is noteworthy, given the obvious criticism in the villagers' statements. The first instance came on the heels of Satō Sōbei's rebellion of 1502. The financial costs of the upheaval both to the villagers and to Masamoto had been heavy, but by the eleventh month the fighting was over and the province was enjoying relative peace. As the end of the year approached, Masamoto apparently believed things were returning to normal, and he planned accordingly. In his *Tabihikitsuke* entry of 12/21 he described his intentions and the strained discussions with his men and villagers that ensued.

I heard that Nagamori's man Yajirō is to leave for the capital. Since this is a good opportunity to deliver year-end gifts, if only small items, I thought I would acquire funds and send a few things along, so I gave instructions for this. "But with the Hineno acreage tax bringing in nothing, salaries have not been paid and year-end expenses are still outstanding. In short, few obligations have been met and so it just cannot be done"—this I was told by my men. So, although I had written letters and such, I will not send them.

Then I spoke about borrowing funds from the villagers. "At present we are in conflict with the province [*kuni*, i.e., military governors]. Accordingly, if his lordship would summon help from elsewhere, and acquire military foodstuffs, the estate [*goryō* 御領] can be preserved. To reside here and tread upon this estate in form only [is improper], while we villagers serve [someone] of the most elevated standing. At this time, with the province in upheaval, surely it is inappropriate to send estate funds [*kōyō* 公用] to the capital. If those funds are avail-

able, they should be used to employ another individual [to help with defense], or to put thought toward ‘arrows and shields.’”

Well, obviously there was nothing to be done; the situation defies description. Harried and discouraged as I was about all these matters, I forgot that tonight was *kōshin* and went straight to bed.<sup>27</sup>

The entry is remarkable not only as an expression of the villagers’ unwavering confidence in their position, but also in the sharp tone they took as they made the point, with considerable sarcasm, according to Ishii Susumu, that while they served his lordship faithfully, he was merely “treading upon the estate in form only.”<sup>28</sup> Not to be ignored is the fact that Masamoto ultimately accepted their criticism, beaten down as he admitted to be at the time.

Fifteen months later, Masamoto had occasion to write of another exchange he had with Iriyamada villagers. He offered much less detail this time, but the implications are clear. The date was the third month of 1504, and the estate was in the midst of the extreme “spring hungers” that followed drought and crop failure of the previous autumn. Here is Masamoto’s *Tabihikitsuke* entry of 3/18.

Concerning daily expenses on the estate and the numbers of persons residing here, the villagers prepared a letter with several articles, as a petition. Is this not merely an irrational argument they have spewed forth? And yet the famine in the village is truly beyond description, I have been told. Is it not because of this that they presented their petition? Such are the matters that weigh on my mind. In everything there are unexpected challenges.<sup>29</sup>

What Masamoto suggested in this elliptical entry was that the villagers considered the monthly funds set aside for managing the estate (meaning those used by Masamoto and his men, and drawn from tax revenue) to be excessive, more than was necessary for the numbers of individuals being supported. It was not an assertion Masamoto was pleased to hear. Yet as on other occasions, he acknowledged (at least to himself) the reasoning and struggles behind that assertion. Read critically and in the broader context of Masamoto’s dealings with the villagers, the entry is revealing. It reminds us that relations between Masamoto and the villagers were complex: rocky at times, warm at others, marked by tension in certain periods, and periodically shaped by celebrations and gift-giving. Underlying it all was an acceptance by both parties that Masamoto was “his lordship” and the villagers his “honorable peasants.” With this acknowledgement came an unwritten code

of conduct which, as seen in the preceding examples, the villagers accused Masamoto of breaching on occasion. Masamoto himself was not so sure of this, but he at least recognized the villagers' struggles as well as the possibility that their view of matters could differ from his.

Just as the "palanquin bearers" that accompanied Masamoto to Izumi soon gained names and identities as his retainers in *Tabihikitsuke*, so did more than a few villagers, primarily *bantō* but also others, extending from messengers to thieves. Many more acquired identities as village elders, artistic performers, petitioners, and captives of *shugo* retainers. Thus, it is not surprising to see later entries in the diary in which Masamoto referred to villagers by name as he described activities or incidents in which they were involved. These included occasions both painful and joyous, the former marked by Masamoto with words of sadness in his diary. One example (noted in chapter 5) dates to summer 1503, when Masamoto decried the actions of the local strongman Taga, who lawlessly cut down a Hineno resident, "the younger brother of the 'man who danced dances'" (*mai o mau mono no otōto* 舞ヲ舞者之弟).<sup>30</sup> That same year, in describing a disease that cruelly struck a neighboring estate, Masamoto noted that the Oku Uma household in Iriyamada had also been hit with sickness, resulting in a death that very day. It was "truly unfortunate."<sup>31</sup>

Two joyous occasions Masamoto recorded were linked to festivals. The first occurred at the time of the Ōizeki Shrine Festival of 1503, when "the younger brother of Shōji Genjirō (a Hineno East Side *bantō*) participated on horseback for the first time." The following year, at the time of the Takinomiya festival in Iriyamada, Masamoto wrote that "Motodori Uma's child, who has been in religious preparations [at Takinomiya] since last spring, entered the shrine administrative office and today appeared at the festival. He is six years of age. As an expression of celebration, [Motodori] sent a cask of *sake* and other items."<sup>32</sup> Masamoto had met none of these individuals, and if he had seen them, it was probably at a distance. But by this time, three years into his stay, they were not just the family's honorable cultivators, but his neighbors, whose lives and livelihoods were now connected to his, and whose lives he had become increasingly familiar with.

A final insight into Masamoto's view of the villagers (and of his own men) is seen in *Tabihikitsuke* in a subtle and idiosyncratic linguistic usage involving the terms *ōsu* (仰) and *mōsu* (申), both meaning to say or to speak. These appear frequently in the diary as Masamoto recorded conversations and gave instructions. Described in dictionaries as "respectful" (*ōsu*) and "humble" (*mōsu*) forms, the two words commonly appear as a modern speaker would expect.<sup>33</sup> In other words, *ōsu* can be used to elevate the person one is address-

ing (or whose speech one is describing), while *mōsu* is used to lower one's own speech or words, thus showing courtesy or deference before a listener. In contrast to practices today, however, in writing in his diary, Masamoto used *ōsu* and *mōsu* to mark status as he desired to define it. Thus, when he recorded himself speaking, it was always by means of *ōsu*.<sup>34</sup> What actually occurred in person may have been different, but Masamoto had a clear idea of the image he wanted to portray.

This becomes particularly apparent when one realizes that Masamoto represented the speech of his retainers, when in conversation with antagonistic forces (primarily officials or spokesmen of the *shugo* or monks from Negoroji), with *ōsu*, while the speech of their counterparts he denoted by *mōsu*. That is the pattern seen, for example, in the heated exchange between Shiono Hyōgonosuke and the *shugo* official Hayashi that I described earlier in this section. The back and forth of their arguments are marked by Masamoto's repeated use of *ōsu* and *mōsu* in this manner.<sup>35</sup> Whether concerning weighty matters—as when his men negotiated the release of villagers or debated tax and income rights—or issues of less importance, this was a practice Masamoto followed consistently.<sup>36</sup>

But Masamoto did not stop there. In his reporting of conversations in *Tabihikitsuke*, he also gave the villagers, *his villagers*, the same prerogative of speaking by means of *ōsu*. Examples are fewer than those involving his men because Masamoto was less frequently privy to villagers' conversations. But when they reached him, he noted them accordingly. Thus, when Hineno and Iriyamada residents questioned their neighbors' decision to join *shugo* forces in attacking them in the fall of 1501, Masamoto described their message with *ōsu*, while the neighboring villagers responded by way of *mōsu*.<sup>37</sup> And the following year, in writing of Iriyamada villagers' efforts to convince forces aligned with Satō Sōbei to withdraw from Tsuchimaru, Masamoto used the term *totonoeōsu*, "to arrange," for the villagers, with *ōsu* functioning as an auxiliary verb. The invaders, of course, spoke by way of *mōsu*.<sup>38</sup>

I suspect that Masamoto raised the level of his retainers and village residents in his diary not because he regarded them with particular warmth (though there may have been exceptions), but because he was determined to put them on his side, to reveal that they were part of his group, his community, at odds with those with outside, inevitably ill-intentioned, interests. And the evidence suggests that, to a surprising extent, they were part of his community, or perhaps more correctly, that he and his men were part of the villagers' community, on their soil and in their world—for it is difficult to deny that the villagers had a larger effect upon Masamoto and his men than did the Kyoto transplants upon the villagers.

## Communities Braided and Manacled

*Sengoku* Japan was an insecure place. The point hardly needs reiterating. Political decentralization meant the fragmentation of power, with increased autonomy at the regional and local levels. And it was at those levels that the dangers were greatest. It was there that many of the fiercest battles for supremacy—if only over a small bailiwick or a few privileges—took place, at least during the first two-thirds of the period. One response to this insecurity and fragmentation was the formation of associations or leagues, the linking or combining of groups or communities.<sup>39</sup> Evidence of these appear in *Tabihikitsuke* in convincing fashion and in several combinations, a telling symbol of their significance, given the mere four years of coverage by the diary.

The first mention of a league or association in *Tabihikitsuke* appears midway through the fifth month of 1501. At that time, rumors reached Hine Estate that Negoroji forces were preparing to invade southern Izumi Province; and on the 19th, the monks sent a request for support, noting that “this village—Iriyamada—has from the past been a member of the league” (*kumi no gō* 綬之郷).<sup>40</sup> The villagers replied that they were well aware of the affiliations they shared, but with Masamoto on the estate, it would be impossible for them to comply at present; they also asked that their refusal not be interpreted as irresponsibility.<sup>41</sup> Because no additional details exist about the makeup and functioning of this association, it is difficult to know just what sort of arrangements and responsibilities defined it. Was it formed by Negoroji through pressure or coercion? In other words, did Negoroji require villages within its sphere of influence to support and fight for the temple, much as the two *shugo* did in regions under their control? Was this the “association” spoken of by the monks? Or was it a voluntary grouping, an alliance freely formed, though perhaps led by its greatest power, Negoroji?

The evidence is mixed, but it would be naive to underestimate Negoroji’s strength and influence at this time. As a rising economic and military power in the region, its pull would have been significant, and like many voluntary groupings of unequal bodies, this would have been an alliance that few villages within the temple’s sphere would have considered rejecting. At the same time, the term Masamoto used for the association—*kumi*, written with a character meaning braid or braided—suggests at least in part a voluntary grouping, the best form of alliances.

Masamoto next wrote of village associations on 9/23 of the same year. It was on this day that Hineno was attacked by a force of *shugo* retainers and “one thousand” men from surrounding villages. To the local residents’ good fortune, the attackers dispersed after a limited engagement that left few

casualties on either side. Masamoto was elated by this, praising the gods for their protection, but the Hineno residents were irate, having been attacked by an “association of previously allied villages” (*kanete kumi no gō* 兼而クミノ郷). Why, they wondered, had this occurred? In a letter the village leaders prepared that same day, they asked their neighbors why they had turned on them without warning, a failing at odds with agreements from the past. Copies of this letter were made and distributed to each of the “alliance of formerly manacled villages” (*kanete tekase no gō* 兼而楛之郷).<sup>42</sup>

Masamoto gives us little more to work with here than before in interpreting this association of villages. In fact, he complicates matters by referring to the same organization in two different ways, first as *kumi no gō*, with *kumi* written in the phonetic script; and second as *tekase no gō*, with *tekase* (manacles or manacled) represented by a Chinese character. It seems likely that by writing *kumi* in the phonetic *katakana* script, Masamoto chose not to equate this association with the previously noted “braided” alliance (likewise pronounced *kumi*). As for the second reference of 9/23, “manacled” suggests an association formed with pressure, possibly through the strong-arm tactics of the *shugo*.<sup>43</sup> But if that were the case, why did Hineno residents expect members of the association to warn them of impending attacks, especially when it was the *shugo* who forced them to take up arms against their neighbors? As the Hineno spokesmen noted, “This was done in the past, so why did you fail to do it at this time?” In response, the outside villages claimed they had been tricked by the *shugo*. As they explained, the accepted practice was for the *shugo*’s retainers to blow a conch to summon fighting men when a force was being raised to confront Negoroji troops. So when the conch was blown this time, the villagers came forth, only to realize too late that the fighting was to be directed against the Kujō estate. Villagers from some of the locales were able to pull back, they stated, but the rest had no choice but to join the *shugo*’s men.<sup>44</sup>

Given the paucity of information, our understanding of the composition and workings of these formal associations in Izumi is hazy at best. What is clear, however, is that forces were at work at various levels to form leagues and alliances, put together either through compulsion or mutual agreement. The impetus for this is undeniable. The threat of such alliances was also something that was well recognized, and feared. Thus, when Masamoto heard that Negoroji expected the Iriyamada villagers to support the alliance of which they were a part, he took immediate action, even though the villagers had already sent word to the temple that they could not comply with the request. Taking no chances at being misunderstood, Masamoto had Ishii Aritoshi summon the *bantō* from the four hamlets of Iriyamada and relay

the message that “if they or any of their relations, even one of them, were to join up, whether with Negoroji or the *shugo*, we will destroy their homes.”<sup>45</sup>

Formal leagues were not the only threat to the large power holders, nor were they the only means by which regional strength and unity were formed. Perhaps more important for the villages were the informal ties created as they cooperated with and assisted those in neighboring communities. As I described in chapter 5, one form this took was of nearby villages informing Iriyamada and Hineno of impending attacks by the *shugo*, based on rumors they had heard. Particularly striking were developments in the ninth month of 1501 when a report came from Kumatori that men from their own village had been summoned to join *shugo* forces in Sakai with the object of advancing on Iriyamada.<sup>46</sup> In this manner, the Kumatori villagers sent a clear message that they had their neighbor’s back, and that although they might be forced to join the *shugo*’s men in battle, they had no intention of attacking their upland neighbors with vigor (or at all, if it could be avoided). Bolstering these ties between neighboring villages (forged, it seems, in a recognition that they shared a common antagonist in the Izumi *shugo*) were bonds formed through marriage and other family connections. Of course, “relatives in Sano” sent word in 1501 of an impending attack by *shugo* forces; and of course the uncle of a Tsuchimaru villager worked to free him and his colleagues when they were captured in Yasumatsu, Ibara village.<sup>47</sup>

One wonders if family connections were the impetus behind the actions of Okawa villagers at the time of the *shugo*’s attack of “1000 men” in the ninth month of 1501. In his lengthy description of the day’s developments, Masamoto noted that Okawa forces rode in to join local troops “to fortify the Tachibana entrance.”<sup>48</sup> As a canyon mouth at the northeastern edge of the Iriyamada valley, near Ōgi (and not far from Masamoto’s residence of Chōfukuji), Tachibanaguchi was a critical gateway to the village; references to its defense appear several times in *Tabihikitsuke*.<sup>49</sup> As for Okawa, it was situated in the mountains just five kilometers to the east. And though linked to Tachibanaguchi by a series of canyon paths, Okawa was outside Hine Estate, making the villagers’ decision to support Iriyamada particularly weighty. It was not something the villagers would have undertaken casually or that the *shugo* would have viewed without rancor. These were dangerous ties. But they were also firm ties, as seen three years later when the Ōgi *bantō* Hikogorō Sakon called for military assistance from Okawa men as the threat of violence by the Kōyasan ascetic Junryō (brother to Shōen Uma, discussed in chapter 6) appeared imminent.<sup>50</sup>

It is hardly surprising that Masamoto was not alone in feeling threatened by regional alliances and cooperation. Just as the two Izumi *shugo* were con-

vinced that Hineno and Iriyamada villagers were in league with Negoroji, on one hand, and had invited Masamoto to the estate as a means to weaken *shugo* influence, on the other, it was not difficult for them to imagine that with Masamoto's arrival the villagers would oppose their efforts at every step or seek assistance from outsiders in resisting their demands. Furthermore, as the *shugo* were no doubt aware, the communications networks that linked the region's villages hampered their military efforts, and it was something about which they could do little.

There were ways that the *shugo* could combat regional alliances and inter-village good will. The key was to put villagers at odds with one another, for example through impressing villagers as foot soldiers for the purpose of attacking their neighbors. During Masamoto's stay in Izumi, the most sustained effort to weaken village ties—directed at Hineno and Iriyamada—was both subtle and insidious, much more so than the simple act of impressing villagers for battle. It took place in the seventh month of 1503 and was initiated by Hineno Mitsumori. Whether or not it began as a means to drive a wedge between Iriyamada and Hineno is unclear, but it became that once Mitsumori realized the position he held. The incident had its origins in Mitsumori's capture of six Iriyamada villagers at Sano market.<sup>51</sup> Since the summer of 1501, when Masamoto confiscated four *chō* of Mitsumori's holdings, relations between the two sides had been strained, to say the least. So Mitsumori's attack was not wholly unexpected, though why it was directed at Iriyamada villagers rather than those of Hineno, where his land was located, was not immediately clear. It may have been nothing more than happenstance, the fact that these individuals were at Sano market that day, and that others from the East Side or West Side were not.

Having captured the villagers, however, Mitsumori took a new tack in his battle with Masamoto. To begin with, rather than draft a letter laying out conditions for the captives' release, Mitsumori had the captives write to their associates in Iriyamada, explaining the situation as they saw it and delineating Mitsumori's demands. No one was fooled by this, since the letter was obviously composed at the warrior's behest. And yet it was also the captives' composition, reflecting their concerns as well as the warrior's. Other letters would follow, in a remarkable series of exchanges between the captives and their fellow villagers in Iriyamada. But just as the letters from the captives conveyed primarily the messages that Mitsumori wanted to have delivered, the letters from the village included, albeit to a lesser degree, arguments from Masamoto.<sup>52</sup>

The first letter from the captives lays out many of the main points of dispute that would follow, and includes several surprising assertions by

Mitsumori. It also depicts well the mixed composition of Mitsumori, on one hand, and the captives, on the other. The letter is broadly divided into two parts. One consists of the captives' discussion of their plight and their pleas for assistance. The other contains Mitsumori's arguments and demands, and it was here that Iriyamada was implicated in the warrior's recent losses. This began, according to Mitsumori, with the "insistent requests by the Iriyamada cultivators association that his lordship come here." This was the villagers' first crime, leading as it did to Masamoto's confiscation of Mitsumori's lands. Their second crime was to send men armed with bows and arrows to assist Hineno villagers when Mitsumori and his men made advances there. The first point was disputable, the second impossible to deny.<sup>53</sup>

Unsure of how to respond, the Iriyamada village leadership held the letter for a full six days, neither acknowledging its receipt nor providing an answer (and just as significant, keeping it from Masamoto during that period). At last they sent a reply, asserting that they were in no position as mere commoners to mediate between Mitsumori and Masamoto. And they reminded the captives that Masamoto had taken formal steps to stop interference in the estate by outsiders. So "although his lordship might lose five or ten farmers, and would see this as tragic," there was little more he could do at this point.<sup>54</sup> Realizing that this message (the wording of which was probably transferred verbatim from one of Masamoto's attendants, and was obviously directed at Mitsumori) would strike the captives as incredibly callous, the Iriyamada villagers implored the captives several times "not to hold a grudge against us." After all, they wrote, "without the support of his lordship, we are powerless."<sup>55</sup>

Up to this point, the discussion had been limited to Iriyamada (the captives and the village leadership) and the two strongmen behind the scenes (Hineno Mitsumori and Kujō Masamoto). But in the next several days Mitsumori reframed the argument, bringing Hineno into the discussion and working to drive a wedge between the two villages of Hine Estate. The key piece of correspondence was again a letter from the captives to their fellow villagers in Iriyamada. The message in it from Mitsumori was stiff: not only did he expect the return of his original lands, but he demanded the military half-tax from Hineno; and he expected the two villages to come together to negotiate these arrangements. The letter concluded with the captives' statement that "because the response of Hineno village will determine whether or not we are executed, if that were to happen, those in the 'mountain valley' [Iriyamada] will surely retaliate appropriately against the Hineno *bantō*." Though described by Masamoto as a "private letter to Iriyamada village," for this message to carry weight, it had to be seen by the Hineno villagers,

so Mitsumori had it delivered initially to them for their perusal. Mitsumori himself also sent separate letters to both Hineno East Side and Iriyamada, laying out his demands.<sup>56</sup>

The following day (7/27), Masamoto offered his opinion (through Yamada Shigehisa) as to how the East Side villagers should respond, and he was unbending. Hine Estate, he claimed, could not be casually discarded, “regardless of how many honorable cultivators [Mitsumori] did away with” (*onbyakushōdomo wa kazu of tsukushi sōrō tomo* 御百姓共々數を盡候共) [*sic*]. After all, “within the realm, there is a shogun (*kubō sama*), and [noted Yamada] his lordship is head of this distinguished family.” As for Mitsumori, his behavior was, “as usual, childish” (*reishiki maidō osanakamashiki* 例式毎度おさななま敷).<sup>57</sup> Thus, the correct response was resoluteness. The East Side villagers were unconvinced, and at this point showed their willingness to support their neighbors in the mountain valley. If they presented his lordship’s argument to Mitsumori, the captives would surely be executed, they said. They instead intended to prepare a petition for their release. Unable to make use of Masamoto’s suggestions, they rejected his arguments and returned the letter. Learning of this, Masamoto crossed out the copy he had transcribed in his diary.<sup>58</sup>

But despite this positive step taken by the East Side, within hours the two villages were headed toward open conflict. Late in the day, two East Side village *bantō* called on Masamoto with word that they had received a letter from Iriyamada. The gist of the letter, they said, was as follows: “At the beginning of this incident, when you [of the East Side] could have requested that we discuss this and confront it together, how did it happen that you came to collusion with the *shugo*, with the result that Iriyamada cultivators were taken captive?” To emphasize their point, the Iriyamada villagers threatened to send an armed force against the East Side if the captives were killed.<sup>59</sup> It was an assertion the Iriyamada *bantō*, as a group, reiterated to Masamoto three days later as the crisis continued. Despite countering these points with lengthy arguments, Masamoto made little progress in changing the villagers’ minds or convincing them to think broadly and consider the implications of their actions. Did they not recognize, he asked, that they were playing into Mitsumori’s hands, turning against one another just as he wished? Though unconvinced by this reasoning, they agreed to keep their armed men at home for the time being, and said they would hold a village-wide council to seek the opinions of the community.<sup>60</sup>

Masamoto wrote nothing more about the incident in *Tabihikitsuke*. But we know that the two villages did not meet in battle and that Mitsumori did not succeed in regaining his land. He did, however, sow mistrust between

Hineno and Iriyamada, weakening the potential for collaboration between them, at least for the immediate future. The best clue to how the matter was concluded is found in a document of accounting for the Iriyamada autumn acreage tax of 1503. Of the 7 *kan* 986 *mon* received, 2 *kan* 100 *mon* was paid “as an offering, to help [with the release of] the cultivators who were taken captive by *shugo* forces.”<sup>61</sup> Apparently this was only part of the required payment, but it was Masamoto’s portion, and it was a hefty sum, atypical for an abduction. Like the villagers, he was invested in the community—in this case, the peace and harmony of the broader body of the estate—and so he too contributed to the conflict’s resolution.<sup>62</sup>

This incident raises the question of ties between the villages of Hine Estate, of the extent to which the estate—with its artificial boundaries, imposed from above—fostered community on a larger scale, or at least led to unstated alliances between the three village units. To Masamoto, who stressed the estate’s status as a single unit, not a collection of villages, the incident was a severe disappointment. As proprietor, he encouraged unity among the villagers while stressing uniformity in the management of the whole, whether in taxes or in law. And as we saw, Negoroji’s decision to limit to Iriyamada its prohibitions against battle camps provoked a strong push-back from Masamoto. But the villagers of Hineno and Iriyamada appear not to have shared so fully his zeal on these matters, and this despite their recognition of the benefits and needs of a broader community and at times a united front. In short, the picture is mixed.

On one hand, collaboration among the three village units can certainly be found. It appears most clearly in the fifty-five percent acreage tax reduction won from Masamoto and granted uniformly to the villages. No doubt the leaders of the three worked together closely to gain this concession. And though we might wonder whether residents from Iriyamada, for example, actually cared if their neighbors in Hineno East Side or West Side enjoyed the same tax reduction they did, clues exist that at least some of them did. One clue appears in a 1503 East Side harvest register, an inventory of land holdings and crop yields produced the year after the villagers sought a return to a tax based on annual inspections. This lengthy record, compiled by Masamoto’s men, lists plots of land, the owners of those, and the amounts harvested. A detail that stands out is the number of owners who were residing outside of Hineno East Side, whether on the West Side, Tsuchimaru hamlet in Iriyamada (with numerous owners), Moyama hamlet of neighboring Kaminogō Estate or even Kumatori Estate.<sup>63</sup> Obviously, these individuals would have hoped to see their interests protected, and their taxes lowered, whether in their own villages or in the one next door. The same was

certainly true for those who had ties with more distant neighbors as a result of intervillage marriages or other family ties.

Collaboration is also seen in united efforts by villagers of Hine Estate to reject intrusion by outside forces. A prime example occurred in the ninth month of 1501, when armed villagers from the East Side left their hideouts in the mountains to fight alongside their West Side neighbors. The issue, however, is not so clear where Iriyamada was involved, as seen in an early refusal to assist those on the plains. The date was 6/10, just two months after Masamoto's arrival. On that day, Aoki Tosa Nyūdō sent a message from Hineno with word that two of the *shugo's* attendants were raising men in order to invade the West Side. To combat this, he requested a backup force from Iriyamada. But as preparations were being made, a message came to Masamoto from the Iriyamada villagers, stating that they refused to go and were drafting a petition laying out their concerns.<sup>64</sup>

To the good fortune of the West Side, the *shugo* force was small and unprepared, so nothing came of the feared intrusion. But Masamoto was concerned, and that evening he summoned his men to discuss the situation. The following day, Aoki and Ishii Aritoshi led a force to Hineno, having "convinced the villagers [of Iriyamada] through stiff threats" to join the group.<sup>65</sup> On following occasions, no coercion was needed, as young men from Iriyamada regularly assisted their counterparts in Hineno. What had changed? Perhaps one of the financial concessions Masamoto offered during these months was based in part on the villagers' willingness to assist their neighbors on the plains. At the same time, the forces from the mountain valley were almost always led by one or more of Masamoto's men.<sup>66</sup> The question remains, then, as to the villagers' willingness to provide military assistance without question, in particular when the proprietor was no longer living among them; after all, Masamoto's stay was brief, and the years in which the villagers were on their own were many.

Though physical borders appear not to have been a primary source of contention between the three Hine Estate villages, the same cannot be said concerning relations with their neighbors. Borders, whether natural or artificial, were a factor that on balance weakened the possibilities of alliances, of concerted actions of diverse villages. Three times Masamoto wrote of disputes over mountain access and timber rights in areas claimed by Hineno or Iriyamada. One was an ongoing struggle between Kaminogō and Hineno, which "occurred in an earlier year," but broke out again in 1503. The two appeared at the time to be headed toward open conflict.<sup>67</sup> A second dispute over timber and borders involved a league—something that produced its own metaphorical borders. Thus, when word came that villagers from Ibara,

to the northwest of Hineno near the coast, had been entering the mountains of Tsuchimaru to cut and steal trees, the Iriyamada villagers, meeting in council, concluded that the “seven village group” of which Ibara was a member had probably been behind this. It was a serious matter, and the council considered whipping any individuals they caught as retribution.<sup>68</sup> In this case, a suspicion that the Ibara villagers’ activities were backed by an external league was enough to widen a divide that had apparently been formed when the league was created.<sup>69</sup>

In sum, alliances big and small were fragile. Opposition and obstruction by power holders were common obstacles, but there were other roadblocks too, many rudimentary, including natural divisions between villages, a mistrust of outsiders, and hesitance at giving up a portion of village autonomy for the goals of a larger group. Proof of these factors appear, whether explicitly or implicitly, in the incidents examined above. In short, the impetuses for alliances and leagues that developed within the fragmentation and insecurity of *sengoku* were checked by counter forces operating alongside them. On a small scale, in a limited region, the leagues could be influential, and the alliances could be important, as they were in Izumi during these years. But large leagues, of the sort put together by the Ikkō sect in Ōmi were, not surprisingly, rare.

In chronicling just four years of life in southern Izumi at the turn of the sixteenth century, *Tabihikitsuke* presents a complex and vivid image of community. There is no question of its significance at the time. As we have seen, there was even impetus to bind distinct communities together in leagues or alliances. But there were also countervailing forces, both at the personal and group levels. Social and economic divisions (as well as crimes such as thievery) played a role, reflected for example in the vicious attack on the family of the Tsuchimaru *bantō* Genzaburō Kunai following his conviction and execution as a thief. The tensions that played out between villages were just as serious (as seen in border disputes), and the scale of conflict was potentially much larger. Important as it was, little about community was a given. I conclude this chapter with two incidents. The first is a compelling depiction of internal community bonds, of collaboration between elites and commoners, and of goodwill between villages. The second raises many more questions and, depending on one’s perspective, either adds to the richness of our understanding of community in Izumi or further muddies the water by bringing to the fore complicating issues of economics, community rights, and individualism.

The first occurred in the fall of 1502. The date was 9/1. Beginning four

days previous, on the 27th, rain had fallen steadily and with increasing vigor. Masamoto described it as “falling violently” on the 28th and continuing unabated on the 29th, resulting in flooding that was “difficult to put into words.”<sup>70</sup> The storm finally blew through on the 1st but left damage in its wake in the form of washed out culverts on the Kashii River in Iriyamada. Constructed of wood or bamboo, these were used to channel and possibly divert the stream at several locations in the upper valley. The immediate problem for the villagers was that the culverts had become lodged well downstream, in Nagataki Estate, beyond Iriyamada’s contiguous neighbor of Kaminogō. Here is Masamoto’s description of the day’s events.

As a result of the flooding yesterday, culverts from Tsuchimaru and Shōbu hamlets were washed downriver. These had become lodged in Nagataki Estate, and the villagers desired to get them back, but they were not sure how to go about it. The response to this was that “once the water drops, it will be very difficult to pull them back.” So they gathered everyone, old and young, from the four hamlets of Iriyamada and the East and West Sides of Hineno. [Shinanokōji] Nagamori himself directed their efforts as they pulled the culverts. However, even with over 400 persons they were unable to move them, so residents of the three villages of Kaminogō, as well as from Nagataki Estate, came and lent their efforts as they pulled. Moreover, the Kaminogō folks provided casks of *sake* and offered drinks to all, I was told. Today they were able to pull the Tsuchimaru culverts back into place. As for the Shōbu culverts, they got those as far as the river in front of Ōizeki Shrine and placed them there. At that point the rocks are very steep, and night had already fallen. So this will be a task for the spring. However, because this is such demanding work, they are discussing whether or not they should have new culverts made rather than put such expense to pulling and repositioning the old, I was told.<sup>71</sup>

Much about this cooperative effort between villages is noteworthy. To begin with, it occurred in the midst of Satō Sōbei’s uprising, a tumultuous and trying time for the residents of Izumi Province. Yet as this reveals, such turmoil did not define life at the time, certainly not that of the farming class, the members of which had work in their fields (and rivers) to take care of. Most striking was the willingness of outsiders to help in a demanding task, and the obvious satisfaction that came from accomplishing this work. The impression one gets from Masamoto’s description is of a work project

and community gathering, with large numbers of onlookers who came for the spectacle (and the unexpected bonus of free *sake*). We can only assume that the initial “400 persons” from Hine Estate included many who merely watched from the sidelines—the elderly, women, and children—rather than pulled on the culverts. Not to be ignored was Shinanokōji Nagamori’s role in directing the work as well as the fact that the Kaminogō villagers, who provided both labor and *sake*, were in an ongoing dispute with Hineno over mountain access, which would come to a head six months later.<sup>72</sup> This suggests that that dispute, heated though it was at times, did not determine the totality of the relations between the two villages.

The second incident was of a very different nature. Writing in his diary on the fifth day of the ninth month, 1503, Masamoto recorded the following message from the villagers of Shōbu and Funabuchi hamlets.

In Mansei [in Iriyamada]<sup>73</sup> there is a cultivator by the name of Uma. Against this person we are bringing a complaint. Within the hamlets of Funabuchi and Shōbu there is a guild of ash producers that numbers more than forty individuals and sells its products to indigo dyers. But this fellow Uma has not entered the guild. And since he has not joined the village guild, he does not burn ash [here], but instead goes to the mountainous backwoods region of Ikeda in Kii Province and there burns ash and then sells it secretly. Buying and selling here cannot be done indiscriminately; the places where ash can be sold are regulated.

It is to indigo dyers at Kaishōji that the Funabuchi villager Shirōtarō [the guild’s agent] sells ash.<sup>74</sup> Because we have been selling to these indigo dyers without break [for many years], as members of the guild of ash producers we decided we needed to explain the situation to them, which we did; but time has passed [and nothing has been resolved.]

And now, this year, because there is a drought, villagers from the Ikeda region of Kii have been coming into the Funabuchi mountains and digging up bracken. When we told them that this was unacceptable, they answered that someone from this village (speaking of that fellow Mansei Uma) had been coming to the Kii mountains, cutting wood, and burning ash to sell. Thus, in this manner, an Iriyamada resident was entering the Kii mountains [to extract materials] at the same time that Kii villagers were entering Iriyamada mountains [to extract materials]. If there were no one from Iriyamada entering the Kii mountains, they asserted, then there would be no justification for

any Kii residents to enter the Iriyamada mountains. Clearly, it was a matter that they claimed needed to be addressed first by the [Iriyamada] guild of ash producers.

These are the origins of the problem. Previous to this time, when we [of the guild] had spoken to Uma about the matter, he replied that it was his own affair. So, again, we have determined to speak to him with the unified voice of the forty members of the guild. And if his answer is irresponsible, in time the situation will surely result in a fight, will it not? And at that time, because his lordship will naturally enquire about this, we thought we'd first come privately to explain the situation.<sup>75</sup>

Neither Masamoto nor the villagers knew what to do about Mansei Uma. Masamoto's response was to demand that the villagers stop bringing trivial petitions before him, though he added that it was of course irresponsible of Kii villagers to enter the mountains of Funabuchi. His advice was for the guild to follow guidelines set by the *bantō*, whose responsibility it was to be well-versed in relevant precedents.<sup>76</sup> As for the villagers, how they ultimately dealt with Mansei Uma is unknown; Masamoto wrote nothing more of the issue. Border disputes were serious matters that could erupt into open conflict, as seen in earlier examples, so the villagers were understandably concerned. But how was a sixteenth century village to deal with a rogue in its midst, an individual determined to follow his own solitary economic path, the community be damned?

## Religion: Institutions and People

Over the past half century, few fields within the study of premodern Japan have been so thoroughly reconsidered as that of religion. The medieval era has received particular attention, but new work has reached broadly. As reflected in numerous detailed and sophisticated studies, doctrine and practice have received their due.<sup>1</sup> But in many respects the most radical shifts in thinking have come about by considering larger questions, such as “What does the proper study of religion consist of?” “How did religion fit within broader historical developments?” and “What was the relationship between Buddhism and ‘that other ancient and medieval religious practice’ (which we shall not name, but was at one time termed Shinto)?” Here are several of the primary results.

First, medieval Buddhism is no longer characterized as having, in George Sansom’s words, “failed miserably to provide the moral force that the times demanded, since the influence of the sects with the greatest power and greatest responsibility in medieval Japan was on the whole an evil influence breeding disorder, corruption, and bloodshed.”<sup>2</sup> It is a terribly quaint argument, painfully moralistic and easy to dismiss (and no doubt readily dismissed by some scholars not long after it appeared in print in 1958). And yet it was part of another interpretation, more persistent and not so readily rejected, which likewise defined medieval Japanese Buddhism in stultifying ways. This was the notion of Buddhism’s decline late in the medieval era, resulting in the loss of its preeminent place in Japanese history—to be replaced by Confucianism by the first decades of the early modern era. In recent decades,

scholars working in both the medieval and early modern eras, and in fields ranging from religious studies to art history, have revealed the flaws in this argument while opening up areas of study that were long ignored.<sup>3</sup>

Second, the idea that medieval Buddhism from the Kamakura age onward was dominated by the “new schools”—the popularly supported Pure Land faiths of Hōnen and Shinran—has been reconsidered. Kuroda Toshio, who was at the forefront of this rethinking, argued for the continued doctrinal and ideological influence of the traditional sects, the *kenmitsu* or exoteric and esoteric schools, with their emphasis on scriptures and rituals, respectively. To a considerable extent the old interpretation, which was quick to dismiss the six schools from the Nara period and the Heian additions of Tendai and Shingon, has been replaced by this newer view.<sup>4</sup>

Third, not only did Kuroda force scholars to rethink the place of the various Buddhist schools of the era, but he also justified the study of Buddhist temples and ecclesiastics as political actors, this through his argument for the “gates of power system” (*kenmon taisei*). According to this, Japan’s medieval political world was dominated by three private power blocs: the court nobility, the elite warriors, and the temples and shrines. These were the “gates of power,” and they ruled through shared governorship and mutual support—despite the fact that they were often at odds with one another. Though questions remain about the extent and duration of this system (and whether in fact it was a system at all) there is little dispute about the shared influence of these three groups and of their lengthy dominance as an aristocracy. In English the theory has received the attention it deserves—at least from the perspective of religion—in Mikael Adolphson’s manuscript *The Gates of Power*, but its influence has reached broadly, shaping the way scholars both within and without the field of religious history have viewed the era.<sup>5</sup>

Fourth the “entity that shall not be named” has received serious scrutiny from scholars, who questioned much of the received wisdom about both its establishment and its native (or not so native) practices and beliefs. They have argued that efforts to separate this belief system from Buddhism as an independent indigenous religion (despite important indigenous aspects) is difficult; and that to find anything in it approaching the essence of “Japaneseness,” was not just chauvinistic foolishness, but also quite impossible. Not only that, but they have stressed the interrelated aspects of Buddhism and the unnamed—whether in shared deities or shared practices—throughout the ancient and medieval eras. Finally they have argued that “it” had no name for most of the ancient and medieval eras, and to name it (to call it Shinto or the “way of the gods”) imbued it with status and qualities it did not hold. Having noted this, I will add that the debate about Shinto, often

heated, has continued, and has greatly enriched discussions about Japan's ancient and medieval religious traditions.<sup>6</sup> In this chapter, I bend to the convention of referring to the culture of shrines and *kami* as Shinto (with a nod to the arguments being made in the late medieval era by Yoshida Kanetomo [1435–1511] and others, who were laying out a firmer, more unified path for these religious beliefs and practices).<sup>7</sup>

I note these developments within the historiography of early and medieval Japanese religion because they provide an important backdrop to my discussion that follows. Evidence of religion in turn of the century Izumi appears everywhere in *Tabihikitsuke*, but little of it is of the sort that would please, or interest, George Sansom, and much of it—at least in earlier decades—could be dismissed as insignificant. For example, though the prominent Buddhist temple Negoroji may be hard to overlook in the diary, scholars in the past were inclined to downplay its position in the face of the rising warriors, or to fail to recognize its influence as a public authority. As for religious doctrine, *Tabihikitsuke* provides few insights. What it offers instead is a bounty of details—of religious practices, physical structures, and the individuals (both clergy and adherents) whose lives were bound up in those.

Just as the inhabitants of Hine Estate and the surrounding region comprised a set of social and community webs, with bonds of varying proximity and strength, those same inhabitants were linked by religious webs, overlapping and integrated within the communities, and extending to regional entities such as Negoroji. No one existed outside of those webs, and though they constrained individuals in some ways, they also offered support and benefits to all within them.

Religion's appearances in preceding chapters have been numerous, most conspicuously in the actions of monks, the physical presence of religious institutions, and the performance of festivals and prayers. In most instances, it has been unobtrusive, tangential to the description or analysis at hand. In a few—as in Negoroji's military activities in the summer of 1502 (and the expensive placard obtained from the temple by Iriyamada as a result), the rites carried out to end drought in the summer of 1501 (as well as the “dance of joy for rain” that followed), and the annual Obon festivities—it has been prominent. In these, we have gotten a glimpse of religion's power and influence. However, the focus up until now has always been elsewhere (on economics, conflict, community, or law), not on religion itself. In this chapter, I take up religion as the main thread. Not surprisingly, its reach was broad and its manifestations multifaceted. It touched the villagers' lives in countless ways, defining and shaping them as surely as did the land, the community, and their overseers—the other powerful and unavoidable influences in their lives.

### By the Numbers: Temples and Shrines, Monks and Kami Ritualists, Nuns and Shrine Maidens

In 1316, religious institutions occupied a prominent place in Hine Estate as seen in the map of Hineno village produced at that time. Three temples and four shrines are portrayed there, with accompanying lands that appear to comprise more than one-third of the total, both arable and institutional property.<sup>8</sup> And that, along with the physical presence of the temples and shrines themselves (as well as the ecclesiastics who served in them), no doubt gave those bodies both wealth and influence. The religious heritage of Hine Estate was weighty. What, then, was the place and significance of religious institutions when Kujō Masamoto was on the estate nearly two centuries later? In this case, the evidence is written (overwhelmingly drawn from *Tabihikitsuke*) and far more bountiful and descriptive.

One way to begin to understand the religious landscape in 1501 is to analyze the numbers—of temples and shrines as well as human representatives: monks, *kami* ritualists, nuns, and shrine maidens. I begin with a listing of the physical institutions for the two periods, as seen below. The 1316 list is drawn from the Hineno village map of that year, along with written evidence of one temple and one shrine in Iriyamada. The 1501 list for both temples and shrines is based on *Tabihikitsuke*, with a few additions, as I note.

1316	1501
Hineno Temples:	Hineno Temples:
Muhenkōin	Muhenkōin
Danbaramitsuji	Danbaramitsuji
Zenrinji	Kaitai'in
Han'udō	Kōzen'an
	Anrakuji
	Keifukuan
	Chōsen'an
	Honkōan
Hineno Shrines:	Hineno Shrines:
Ōizeki Daimyōjin	Ōizeki Daimyōjin
Mizoguchi Daimyōjin	Mizoguchi Daimyōjin
Niu Daimyōjin	Nonomiya (same as Niu Daimyōjin)
Hachiōji	

Iriyamada Temples:	Iriyamada Temples:
Shippōryūji	Shippōryūji
	Chōfukuji
	Enmanji
	Dainichidō
	Keishōan
	Kōshakuin (also Kōshakuji?)
	Rengeji
	Hōsen'an (also Hōsen'in?)
	Chikurin'an
Iriyamada Shrines:	Iriyamada Shrines:
Takinomiya	Takinomiya
	Hachiōji <sup>9</sup>

Based on these lists alone, one might conclude that the influence of Buddhist institutions on local society had strengthened considerably during these years, particularly in Iriyamada, which saw a seven-fold increase in the number of temples. But the picture, understood in its context, is more complicated than that. With its various schools and many temples, the Buddhist realm of the early medieval era was of course highly influential. The increase in temple numbers on Hine Estate therefore suggests an altered religious landscape, but not in any simple sense. Also, the higher concentration of new temples in Iriyamada than in Hineno is almost surely misleading. The data are skewed because Masamoto resided in Iriyamada, close to the many new temples (and their monks) in the area; and so it was those that he came to know and mention in his diary. Had Masamoto made his residence at Muhenkōin in Hineno, as he originally planned, I strongly suspect that the numbers of temples in 1501 would be reversed by location, with the larger increase concentrated in Hineno. As it is, three of the new temples noted in Hineno—Keifukuan, Chōsen'an, and Honkōan—go unmentioned by Masamoto in his diary; instead they appear in a 1503 document of Hineno landholdings compiled at a harvest assessment.<sup>10</sup>

Considering just those institutions that appear on both lists, it is clear that there was much continuity, that most temples and shrines in existence in 1316 were still on the estate in 1501. In fact, given the high likelihood that 1) Hachiōji Shrine remained in Hineno in 1501 (despite not being noted by Masamoto) and 2) that Han'udō of the 1316 map was not a separate institution but just a temple hall as its name implies, this means that only Zenrinji among the early religious entities was lost during these two centuries. In other words, the process had been one of accretion. And as reflected in the

new institutions, all of which were temples, most came with the designation of *-an* (as in Kōzen'an), in contrast to the *-ji* (as in Shippōryūji) or *-in* (as in Muhenkōin) of old temples.

By itself, the word *an* means a rough hut or a monk's thatched cottage or hermitage. No doubt it is from that image of a humble structure that during the late medieval era many newly established local temples came to be denominated with the suffix *an*. In *Tabihikitsuke*, Masamoto wrote not just of individual local temples and monks, such as Hōsen'an or Chikurin'an, but more generally of *jian* or "cottage temples," and *jianshū* for the monks that headed them. At the New Year of 1504, for example, he noted the celebratory visit of the Chōfukuji abbot, "as well as that of the 'cottage temple' monks."<sup>11</sup> And three years earlier, when Hineno Mitsumori entered Hineno village with force, Masamoto described him as "attacking indiscriminately, whether village residences or cottage temples."<sup>12</sup> This suggests that Mitsumori viewed the cottage temples as part of the village, complicit in its actions, something that is reflected too in developments during the "evil monks" incident of early 1502. On that occasion, as Masamoto was preparing to put to death the second of the thieves, among those who came to plead on his behalf were the six Iriyamada *bantō* and the "elderly monks of the estate's cottage temples."<sup>13</sup> The *jianshū* were part of the village community.

Unlike large temples with lengthy pasts, none of these cottage temples produced histories of their founding or of a succession of abbots. Also unlike temples and shrines with ancient origins, cottage temples were not beneficiaries of large tracts of land granted by the state or high aristocrats—whether for erecting religious edifices or for producing income. Accordingly, we need to look elsewhere for their origins and financial underpinnings. One clue for these comes from Masamoto's account of the Shōen Uma incident, which I discussed in chapter 6. As part of his lengthy description, Masamoto noted that one of Shōen Uma's brothers, Ōya Ukon, was an elder of cultivator status in Shōbu hamlet, Iriyamada, and that a village gathering had been held at Keishōan, "the private temple of Ōya Ukon." The resident monk, Masamoto noted, was a young man.<sup>14</sup>

In other words, Keishōan had been established by a member of the village elite, a well-to-do cultivator whose income—most of which he probably derived from renting land—allowed him to found his own temple, and even provide it with a monk. Scholarship on *jian* elsewhere, though limited, has focused on cottage temples set up by landed proprietors and local strongmen, not cultivators.<sup>15</sup> With an elite proprietor from the capital, and largely free of local strongmen (commonly termed *kokujin* or *jizamurai*), Hine Estate was home to cottage temples that were the product of influential families in

the village, those whose heads typically served as *bantō* or village elders. For these individuals, establishing a temple was a prestigious step, evidence of the wealth and status they had obtained, and a symbol of their piety. Moreover, it was a time-honored practice, followed by their aristocratic betters in earlier centuries, but now open to them as they acquired wealth (if limited) and independence (within their villages). Small and unimposing though they were, Hine Estate's cottage temples represented one aspect of growth and vitality in Buddhism at the time; they were evidence of the continuing (and evolving) place of the religion in village Japan. They were also seen as a benefit to the community and were accordingly granted tax-free status on their temple paddies.<sup>16</sup>

The cottage temples also presented a marked contrast to certain of the old Buddhist institutions, some of which, like Muhenkōin, were struggling. There is no question that Muhenkōin remained physically impressive and influential at the turn of the sixteenth century. To any visitor to the village it would have appeared prosperous, with considerable land holdings, imposing temple halls (some occupied by monks and acolytes), and heavy responsibilities for a yearly round of ceremonies and worship. Moreover, its abbot was a leading figure in the community and a liaison between it and the estate proprietor. But the temple's prosperity was deceiving.

Nothing suggests that Muhenkōin's problems were "religious"—in other words, based in doctrine or practice; nor had it lost adherents (a term not particularly appropriate in the circumstances). Instead, its problems were economic. Like the Kyoto nobility (its primary patrons), Muhenkōin had once enjoyed a strong economic foundation, based like theirs in substantial holdings of income-producing land—something clearly delineated in the 1316 map of Hineno village. With that as its basis, Muhenkōin grew and prospered, adding worship halls and monks' residences. But for whatever reason—perhaps adding buildings when prudence suggested otherwise, misusing temple funds, or suffering physical damage from the upheaval of wars in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries—Muhenkōin eventually found itself economically strapped, and thus forced to borrow money, or sell income rights, to meet its obligations, a sure road to decline.

We first learn of Muhenkōin's economic difficulties a few weeks after Masamoto's arrival on Hine Estate. At the time, the post of temple abbot was empty, and on 4/26, Masamoto agreed to appoint the monk Zenkō to the position. Five days later, Zenkō sent 500 *hiki* to Masamoto as an offering for the appointment. Of this, Masamoto wrote the following: "In recent years this temple has had lands and such stripped from it—some by the *shugo*, some by Negoroji. Lacking in strength, it is unable to carry

out building projects. Therefore, of the 500 *hiki* [received from Zenkō], I returned 200 *hiki* for construction and upkeep on temple buildings, retaining 300 *hiki*.<sup>17</sup>

Largely a symbolic gesture (worth perhaps 50 liters of rice), Masamoto's offering was evidence that he understood Muhenkōin's plight. In the coming months, more substantial proof of the temple's struggles would become clear. One hint appears in a *Tabihikitsuke* entry of Bunki 2/10/6, written near the end of Satō Sōbei's rebellion, in which Masamoto recorded that two of the *shugo*'s retainers—Yoshii and Saitō—entered Hinenō and compelled the villagers to pay them supplemental tax (*kajishi*) that had been “bought by Negoroji.”<sup>18</sup> Nothing about Muhenkōin appears in the entry, but three letters from proximate dates, two written by Yoshii, and one by Masamoto's officials, reveal that the supplemental tax was drawn from Muhenkōin land.<sup>19</sup> In other words, this was land within Muhenkōin's holdings, the income for which had been lost, first to Negoroji and then to retainers of the *shugo*.

Real though the loss of landed income was to Muhenkōin, its economic difficulties should not be overstated. While no extant records provide a listing of its landholdings or its annual income, evidence of its vitality is found here and there, for example in “tax tea” payments that Zenkō, as abbot, made to Masamoto<sup>20</sup> and, most convincingly, in the loans he provided to the estate. Two documents produced late in 1501 reveal the magnitude of those loans. One confirms the receipt of “the remainder of a loan from Muhenkōin.” The amount of this was 3 *kan* 200 *mon* and 1 *koku* of rice. The second is a document of accounting for funds advanced by Muhenkōin earlier in the year, as well as the interest on those. These consisted of the following: 3 *kan* 725 *mon* and 1 *to* of rice, dated to the sixth month; 1 *kan*, for the same period, for expenses for linked-verse presented at Ōizeki shrine; 1 *kan* 400 *mon*, in the seventh month.<sup>21</sup> Clearly, the temple was not destitute. It may have lost lands and income, but it had cash on hand, which it was willing to lend. In sum, Muhenkōin had lost sections of its considerable estate and, according to Masamoto, its physical structures had begun to suffer. No longer could it readily add monks and buildings to its institution as in its heyday. But the temple was far from finished, and it still had significant lands and income, enough of the latter that it was available to lend, at least when Masamoto was on the estate.

Between the substantial edifices erected through aristocratic patronage in earlier centuries and the newly constructed cottage temples (modest though they surely were), the religious institutions of Hine Estate presented an impressive built-up physical landscape. The shrines and temple halls, old and new, were far and away the most impressive structures on the estate. In

fact, much suggests that they were the only permanent structures there. The Kujō, as proprietors, maintained no buildings on the estate, laying claim to the whole but owning nothing in particular. And village residences, as I discussed in chapter 4, remained simple. Thus, both by default and by design, religious edifices defined what was built to last on Hine Estate.

Readers of *Tabihikitsuke* familiar with Japanese history will find nothing remarkable about Masamoto taking up residence in a temple, but it was a telling act, reflecting the temples' prominent place in the villages as well as the close relationship between the Kyoto aristocracy and the Buddhist elite. It is clear from Masamoto's diary that he intended to reside at Muhenkōin, arrangements for which he had obviously made before traveling to Izumi. But when Masamoto realized the danger in remaining on the low-lying plain of Hineno, he immediately moved to Chōfukuji in Iriyamada, and did so without difficulty. He wrote nothing of contacting the abbot there or of negotiating terms for his stay. As a relatively large and distinguished temple, Chōfukuji was the obvious choice for his residence in Iriyamada, leaving no reason for sustained discussion about the matter.

As for his men's lodgings, Masamoto offers no details, but there is little question that his top advisors, whom he consulted daily, resided nearby, probably on Chōfukuji lands as well. And following his unexpected move to Iriyamada, Masamoto sent a close retainer, Ishii Aritoshi, "to reside at Muhenkōin, this in order to manage Hineno village."<sup>22</sup> Likewise, on occasions when other Kujō officials needed to spend more than a day in Hineno, they invariably stayed the night at a temple. More remarkably, when messengers from the Izumi *shugo* came to the estate in the spring of 1501, Aritoshi instructed that they be put up for the night at the "lesser monks' dwelling" at Muhenkōin. The same was true for representatives from Negoroji.<sup>23</sup> Temple buildings could apparently serve as inns, even for unwanted guests.

What compensation the temples received for these accommodations is unclear. For Chōfukuji, it may have been the new structures that Masamoto had built. Or perhaps the visitors paid rent, though there is no evidence of that: the documents of accounting that Masamoto's men produced record monthly estate expenses only as a bulk figure. However, when Masamoto fled Satō Sōbei's army in the autumn of 1502—taking refuge in the mountain fastness at Shippōryūji—he provided payment for "necessities for his stay of several days," so it was unlikely that Chōfukuji went without remuneration for the four years Masamoto lodged there.<sup>24</sup>

As this last example shows, temples and shrines on Hine Estate occasionally served as safe houses. Notwithstanding the well-known instances of temple destruction by warriors that dot the medieval era, early and late,

as well as the strife that marked relations between competing temples and their warrior monks, many religious institutions remained above the fray. And the idea that temples and shrines should be free from worldly strife was still accepted and preached. This is evident in the shogunate's condemnation of the Izumi *shugo* for their attacks on Danbaramitsuji shortly before Masamoto arrived on the estate. As "land free from *shugo* incursion," the "confiscation of [Danbaramitsuji] property and breaking up of the temple hall" was "behavior beyond words." The *shugo* were instructed to "quickly put an end to their interference in temple affairs and, as in the past, treat it with the religious respect and honor it deserves" or, more literally, "carry out ceremonies before the buddhas—of sutra readings, worship, and incense burning."<sup>25</sup> Likewise, in the autumn of 1501 when the villagers of Hineno fled to the mountains in the face of an attack by Hineno Mitsumori, Masamoto instructed them in the future to retreat to Muhenkōin if remaining in their homes was not possible.<sup>26</sup>

Another role served by the temples was that of estate administrative office (*mandokoro*). There were three of these on Hine Estate, one each for the Hineno East and West Sides, at Muhenkōin and Ōizeki (and adjoining Kaitai'in) respectively, and one for Iriyamada, at Chōfukuji. As the proprietor's local branch, the administrative office served as the location for tax collection, the presentation of the New Years "auspicious writing," and the jailing of suspects. It was also a place for villagers to receive announcements and instructions. Accordingly, when Masamoto gave orders in 1501 for the regulations to "curtail lawlessness," he instructed that placards be posted at the three village administrative offices.<sup>27</sup>

Numbering the clerics on Hine Estate in 1501 is much more challenging than tallying the temples and shrines at the time. Based on Masamoto's references in *Tabihikitsuke*, the twenty or so temples and shrines were home to at least twenty-seven clerics.<sup>28</sup> That included prominent individuals such as the abbots of Muhenkōin and Chōfukuji, as well as individuals that just happened to make the pages of *Tabihikitsuke* when Masamoto mentioned them in his description of a day's activities or a particular incident. Thus an Ōizeki ritualist described as Kaminobō, that is, resident of the shrine "upper dwelling," made an appearance because he got into a fight with Magoshirō, a low-level retainer of Masamoto's, and then went into hiding.<sup>29</sup> In addition, several monks of minor status are noted by name when they arrived at Masamoto's residence with gifts or messages from their master, Muhenkōin Zenkō.<sup>30</sup>

In any case, as with the number of religious institutions he mentioned, Masamoto made no attempt to provide a complete listing of individuals, so

we can only guess at those that might be missing. What percentage of the total number did they represent? Were they a slight fraction of the whole? Or did they constitute the bulk of the individuals holding ecclesiastical positions? And what of the discrepancy in numbers between Hineno and Iriyamada—with seven in distant Hineno and twenty in proximate Iriyamada, despite the fact that Hineno was home to a large temple (Muhenkōin) and a large shrine (Ōizeki), both of which may have supported considerable numbers of clerics. There are no easy answers, but clearly the total number well exceeded twenty-seven, if for no other reason than that the figures for the two villages are skewed, mirroring the situation of the temples and shrines. On the other hand, nothing suggests that a large temple like Muhenkōin, for example, was home to monks and nuns numbering in the forties or fifties.

Just as significant is the fact that so many of the cottage temples were led by monks. It is well known that during the Tokugawa period many small temples, and most local shrines, were empty, lacking a cleric. The picture in *Tabihikitsuke*, while not definitive, is of temples large and small headed by monks, and whether or not they occupied those positions full-time, they were defined by them. This is evident in Masamoto's practice of identifying monks by the name of the temple they headed or by their temple residence (or shrine residence in the case of priests). Thus a typical entry involving a visit by monks, this at the New Year of 1503, stated merely that "Chōfukuji, Rengeji, and others came, each bringing a gift of ground tea." Later in the day, "Hōsen'an, Kōshakuji, \_\_\_\_\_ [apparently a name Masamoto forgot], Keishōan, and others also came."<sup>31</sup> Of the temples listed for 1501, just two (Danbaramitsuji and Kōzen'an, both in Hineno) appear in *Tabihikitsuke* without clear evidence of being led by a monk, and in the case of Danbaramitsuji, that lacunae is filled by a 1499 reference to the abbot in Kujō family documents.<sup>32</sup> In all likelihood, a monk headed Kōzen'an too, as well as the three additional cottage temples in the Hineno list that appear in the harvest assessment of 1503.

Cottage temple monks were not the only clerical additions to the Buddhist priesthood during this era. Another were *sanmai hijiri*, perhaps best defined as funeral monks, who we encountered briefly in chapter 5. That was the occasion on which two *sanmai hijiri* from Iriyamada, recently captured by *shugo* retainers, were released through the good offices of a relative of one of the men. A second *Tabihikitsuke* reference to *sanmai hijiri* gives evidence of their increasing prevalence at the time. By coincidence, captured Iriyamada villagers were again involved, but this time it was a funeral monk, an individual from a neighboring village, Yasumatsu, that provided assistance. The date was 1501/i6/2, and an Iriyamada villager, recently escaped from

*shugo* headquarters in Sakai, had been recaptured by two of the *shugo*'s men. According to word Masamoto received, they took him to a nearby funeral hall (*sanmaidō*) with the intention of executing him (a rather strange thing; Masamoto does not comment on the irony, or aptness, of this, but judging from his diary—perhaps unfairly—he had a limited sense of humor). To the man's pleas for mercy, the captors agreed to release him upon payment of a fine, but the funeral monk would have none of that: "Is it not improper to act arbitrarily in this manner, demanding a payment in exchange for his release? If it is your intention to take him to Sakai, then take him there!" With that, the man was released and entrusted to the monk, who escorted him back to Hine Estate.<sup>33</sup>

Funeral monks like these were uncommon in the early medieval era. At that time, certain monks at a temple were responsible for funerals, with the actual cremation of corpses carried out by outcastes. In the Muromachi era, there gradually appeared a group of independent monks who specialized in funerals and cremation—the title of *sanmai hijiri* for these individuals came later. By the end of the medieval era, many of these monks could be found residing near large graveyards in the vicinity of villages. And though the Yasumatsu resident who helped free the two Iriyamada *sanmai hijiri* claimed that the monks "cultivate not even one *tan* of paddy" (a reason to release them), he may have been overstating the case. This is suggested by the appearance of *sanmai hijiri* landholdings in Toyotomi Hideyoshi's surveys late in the century—many years hence, to be sure, but clearly denoted.<sup>34</sup> More immediately, the detailed harvest assessment for Hineno village in the autumn of 1503 records the owners of one parcel of land on the East Side as "Hijiri from Tsuchimaru."<sup>35</sup> Not only did the *sanmai hijiri* appear to hold land but it is unlikely that they had, again as asserted by their liberator, "neither allies nor enemies." By all indications, they were part of the village and thus part of the community. Surely the *shugo*'s men had been hoodwinked.

Unlike Buddhist temples and monasteries, which were headed by abbots and populated by monks, shrines often lacked full-time ecclesiastics. Nonetheless, several references in *Tabihikitsuke* make clear that we should not assume all shrine ritualists on the estate were lay members. For example, Masamoto notes that Ōizeki Shrine in Hineno contained an "upper residence" and a "lower residence," titles by which the individuals residing there (Ōizekisha no Kaminobō and Ōizekisha no Shimonobō) were known. But it conspicuously lacked a shrine head. Also, among Masamoto's initial visitors upon his arrival to the estate were Ōizeki "shrine officials and shrine monks," who came with records of prayers they had offered on his behalf, and casks of wine.<sup>36</sup>

As for Iriyamada, Takinomiya had a shrine head, a shrine monk or monks (*shasō* 社僧), and a shrine maiden (the woman killed in her residence after being apprehended as a thief of the community bracken flour), but Masamoto's references to these three are obscure, one-time occurrences, and none of the individuals were persons with whom he associated. Moreover, shrine duties mentioned in the diary, including the annual Takinomiya Festival, were directed by village leaders. So just what roles the titled individuals played at the shrine is unclear.<sup>37</sup>

The important place occupied by clerics in turn-of-the-century Izumi was reflected in their high social status. Not that all were of the same stature or exerted the same influence within society. The gap between those at the top and the bottom was wide, even if acolytes and others of notably low status are left out. Nonetheless, as a whole, their positions were weighty. We get a glimpse of this early in *Tabihikitsuke*, as Masamoto, having arrived in Izumi, spent several days during his first month receiving visitors (or their gifts), most of whom were clerics. The first of these were nuns from Rengeji, in Iriyamada, who called on 3/30, the day after Masamoto arrived. On that occasion, as on many that followed, Masamoto had his official Shinanokōji Nagamori meet with the visitors and offer them drinks, bearing a message from Masamoto that “their visit was most gracious.”<sup>38</sup> For abbots and others of high rank, Masamoto himself met with these individuals—or offered to do so, as he did several days later. At that time, having just settled into Chōfukuji, and no doubt feeling indebted to the abbot there, Masamoto queried him as to whether he would “come and receive a drink at my hands?” But the abbot declined because “his clerical robes were inappropriate” for the occasion. However, he promised to call again later, and in the years ahead the two met and shared pleasantries occasionally.<sup>39</sup>

The fact that ecclesiastics of whatever persuasion or gender felt obliged, and privileged, to call on Masamoto was itself a symbol of their elevated social status. And it was something even the cottage temple monks regularly did, for example, at New Years, over the course of the next four years. Of course, distinctions between these individuals, based on their positions and institutions, were significant. Masamoto would have hardly deigned to meet in person with the bottom half of this group, but he acknowledged their visits and sent Nagamori or another close retainer to greet them.

Literacy and education had long been associated with Buddhism, and these marks of status were plainly manifest in the temples and monks of Hine Estate. For heads of large temples like Muhenkōin and Chōfukuji, literacy was a given. But even for clerics of lesser temples and shrines, literacy appears to have been expected; for some of them it no doubt was a require-

ment for office, and for others a skill they probably obtained upon acquiring a position. Of their abilities, the villagers had no doubt. Thus, in the summer of 1503, when the Hineno East Side *bantō* Kamontarō, described as someone “lacking knowledge,” was unable to make full sense of a threatening letter from Taga, a retainer of the *shugo*, he took it to the nearby temple of Kaitai’in and asked a monk there to read it.<sup>40</sup> And in the spring of the following year, the “*bantō* and others” from Toshimichi’s holdings in Iriyamada did likewise, claiming illiteracy after receiving written instructions from Masamoto. They asked if they could return to their village and have the monk Kōshakuin read the instructions before making a decision.<sup>41</sup> Though it seems likely that the villagers were stalling for time, and that *bantō* were literate (if not necessarily at an advanced level), there is little question that their reasoning was sound, that Kōshakuin was of course in a position to read and clarify the message for them.

Not surprisingly, given the high status of Buddhism, a number of monks played an outsize role in the villagers’ dealings with Masamoto. Some served as intermediaries or mediators or, like the resident monk at Enmanji, close by Chōfukuji, occasionally acted for Masamoto as messengers.<sup>42</sup> Masamoto’s acknowledgement of clerics’ elevated status appears in a disparaging comment he made about Junryō, the brother of the thief Shōen Uma, who we encountered in chapter 5: “Though he [Junryō] is said to be a Kōya monk, he is in fact a cultivator (*hyakushō*).”<sup>43</sup>

### Muhenkōin Zenkō

Among the clerics who appear in the pages of *Tābihikitsuke*, we can piece together a detailed portrait of just one: Muhenkōin Zenkō. Others show up here and there, at the New Year or at times of annual festivities, usually offering gifts and congratulations. Some lent Masamoto (or the villagers) assistance as well as physical items such as sutras and copybooks.<sup>44</sup> A few also emerge briefly, and in sharp focus, as participants in specific incidents. The composite view is rich, but it is only in Zenkō that we get an image of an individual, distinct in attitude and character.

Zenkō was not representative of the clergy, but then no member of the group was; it was too diverse in status, position, religious affiliation, and gender for that. By all appearances, Zenkō was distinct from his colleagues because of his high status and all that that entailed. We know a good deal about him because he shows up regularly in Masamoto’s diary, not just as an occasional visitor and giver of gifts, but as Masamoto’s associate and advo-

cate for the villagers. In Zenkō we gain insights not only into the estate's religion, but also its economics, culture, and communities—especially that of Hineno in which he resided.

Masamoto first wrote of Zenkō on 4/26 of 1501. This was the date that he appointed Zenkō abbot of Muhenkōin, five days previous to the day (noted earlier) on which Zenkō brought payment for the post and received a portion of it back from Masamoto. Writing on the 26th, Masamoto described Zenkō as “an elderly monk who has been clamoring for the abbacy in recent days,” and he instructed that his desire be granted. “Today,” he continued, “[Zenkō] brought 500 *hiki*, a cask of *sake*, various delicacies, and the like. Among his gifts were fish, which I said I found surprising. I then invited him to join me, and offered him a drink.”<sup>45</sup> Zenkō's gifts were apparently his first installment for the post. Though taken aback by Zenkō's gift of fish—of which members of the Buddhist priesthood vowed to abstain—Masamoto soon found in Zenkō a refined and thoughtful acquaintance as well as a conduit to the pulse of the communities. The two were by no means equal in status, but by nature and temperament, as well as in education and culture, they were close, more so than were Masamoto and any of the men who accompanied him from the capital.

Within days of this initial meeting between the two men, Zenkō was offering his opinion on local matters to Masamoto, and the latter was accepting it. The first instance occurred on 5/11. Nearly a month had passed since two of the three East Side *bantō* had fled under pressure to pay the previous year's taxes. According to Masamoto, various arguments had been brought before him concerning a resolution, but it was “because of the elderly monk's [Zenkō's] petition” that he had the men pardoned.<sup>46</sup> Several months later, when new *bantō* needed to be selected, Masamoto gave orders for discussions to be held on the matter. After no conclusions were reached, Ishii Aritoshi went to Muhenkōin to relay further instructions. Masamoto wrote no more about the issue, but new *bantō* were soon serving, no doubt with the recommendation and blessing of Muhenkōin Zenkō.<sup>47</sup>

Zenkō also served Masamoto in a more formal manner, while at the same time acting as mediator between the villagers and their proprietor. This he did, for example, in conducting the New Year's “auspicious writings” ceremony, which I discussed in the previous chapter. For Hineno East Side villagers, this was carried out annually at Muhenkōin on the second day of the year, and as Masamoto wrote in 1502 and 1503, he instructed Zenkō to conduct this, “as was customary.”<sup>48</sup> In representing the estate proprietor, Zenkō functioned as Masamoto's agent, a member of the elite and not of the village. He did likewise when he arranged for “Ōizeki linked-verse,” com-

posed monthly by a group of unnamed but obviously elite inhabitants of the region. The completed work (for which Masamoto regularly contributed an opening stanza) was presented before the shrine.<sup>49</sup> And of course for anyone who knew, the fact that Zenkō was a close associate of Masamoto, frequently “invited within the screens” (*renzen ni mesu* 召簾前)<sup>50</sup> at Chōfukuji to meet with him in person, meant that his status and position were beyond dispute.

And yet in many ways, Zenkō’s most compelling role on the estate was as villager and village advocate. On one hand, this was reflected in simple acts, many of which portrayed a willingness to be engaged in village and estate affairs, often of a mundane sort. Accordingly, he was no cloistered cleric, shut up in his temple residence at Muhenkōin. He regularly made the journey of several kilometers from Muhenkōin to Chōfukuji to see Masamoto and relay messages, as he did in the ninth month of 1501, with word that the East Side villagers had absconded.<sup>51</sup> One month later, when the same villagers took flight in the face of *shugo* pressure, a rumor was bandied about that the *shugo* intended to send men to break up villagers’ homes if they decided to flee. There was probably little basis to this, according to Masamoto, but he agreed that it was best not to ignore it. It was, after all, a period of particularly heated competition over the villagers’ tax income. In any event, Zenkō chose to remain at Muhenkōin while the villagers were away, apparently as a lookout.<sup>52</sup>

Contesting or snubbing the *shugo* was something Zenkō appears to have done gladly on this occasion, and later, too. In the tenth month of 1503, a small contingent from Sakai entered the estate and took Zenkō captive over his refusal to submit taxes from Muhenkōin lands, an incident I described in chapter 5. But there was an important background to the story. In a letter dated one week previous, Zenkō informed Masamoto that he had been forewarned of a scheme by an attendant of Yoshii Sadasuke, retainer of the upper *shugo*, to capture him. Just who provided this information is unclear, but it appears to have come from the aggressors, men of the province who were offering Zenkō a final chance to pay up and remain free. Zenkō noted in his letter to Masamoto that it made sense to “travel to a distant location” to avoid this, but at the least he thought he should make Masamoto aware of the matter.<sup>53</sup> However, Zenkō did not leave, and he was taken captive. And perhaps that was his intention, for he held all the cards, having just several weeks earlier resigned as Muhenkōin abbot and taken a new post at Kaitai’in, a temple within Ōizeki Shrine. Muhenkōin and its lands were no longer Zenkō’s responsibility, and in taking him captive, the *shugo* came up empty. When he explained his change in responsibilities, they had no choice but to set him free.<sup>54</sup>

Dealing with Masamoto, who was not only Zenkō's associate but also the estate proprietor and a former chancellor, was obviously a different task for Zenkō than deflecting the military governors' advances. Fortunately for Zenkō, Masamoto respected him and listened to him; his was a voice that carried considerable weight, something Masamoto acknowledged in his diary, even when venting his frustration. Two of the most detailed, and poignant, examples of Zenkō's efforts to sway Masamoto appear in *Tabihiki-tsuke* within two weeks of each other, and both concerned Hineno West Side. The first entry is from late in the fifth month of 1502. At that time, West Side villagers were again under pressure from both Masamoto and the Izumi *shugo* to pay taxes. After months of haggling, threats, and intimidation during the autumn of 1501, the West Side had eventually paid both powers the annual tax, resulting in a double payment for the year, something they were determined to avoid in 1502.<sup>55</sup> Here is how Masamoto began his diary entry on 5/22, after noting the date and the weather.

Regarding Hineno West Side: whether it concerns judgments of the shogunate or [decisions of] the esteemed proprietor, on even the slightest matters the villagers do not oppose the authorities' wishes. Of course, the provincial side recognizes none of their claims and interferes forcibly in their affairs. On top of that, the West Side territory lacks defenses and, interspersed as it is with 'public land,' the men of the province act lawlessly therein. Last year the villagers again furtively continued to [present taxes] to the provincial side. Though the villagers have until now endured these conditions, recently the force used against them has increased. The much-maligned honorable cultivators can hardly "walk without fear," and they have now been encumbered with [demands for] the military half-tax (*hanzei*). For them to escape confiscations and violent intrusions, they must submit [to the *shugo*] the full annual tax. For the present period, they say they will be able to collect and pay just half of the annual tax due here.

This is what they have said repeatedly by way of Muhenkōin [Zenkō].<sup>56</sup>  
[remainder omitted]

Rather than preface this brief discourse by introducing its author—thereby connecting words and speaker in the reader's mind—Masamoto presents it as description, suggesting perhaps his musings on the subject. That changes only at the conclusion, when he notes that the villagers had sent

word through Zenkō that they intend to pay just half of the year's annual taxes. Full clarification of the paragraph comes in sentences that follow when Masamoto records his response to "Zenkō's message."<sup>57</sup> In other words, the fact that the arguments being made were Zenkō's, offered in behalf of the villagers, is far from clear in an initial reading. Though one can argue that the reference in the first sentence to the "esteemed proprietor" (*gohonjo* 御本所) points to Masamoto as the object, suggesting that the words of the description are not his, it is just that, a suggestion; the clarity provided in the English translation obscures the ambiguity of meaning and use in the original, where *gohonjo* could just as well refer to the Kujō family, as proprietor, more generally.<sup>58</sup> Perhaps Masamoto wrote in this manner unintentionally, or perhaps, as I am inclined to think, he allowed Zenkō's full argument to be presented without obvious authorship until it was concluded, thereby tacitly acknowledging the validity of his points, painful as many of them were to Masamoto himself. In sum, the section is evidence, I believe, not only of Zenkō's thorough understanding (and sympathy for) Hineno West Side's situation, but also of the considerable influence he had upon Masamoto.

In recording his response to Zenkō in the remainder of the entry, Masamoto noted that the previous year's directive from the shogunate had reiterated that the estate was "land free from *shugo* intrusion" and that anyone who facilitated the military governors' activities was subject to stiff punishment. To Masamoto, the villagers' actions were obviously hypocritical: "If the villagers now agree to pay the military half-tax, they will in essence be accepting the shogun's order in word while discarding it in deed."<sup>59</sup> And he concluded by reiterating his assertion that those who bow to *shugo* pressure were committing a serious offense. But before doing so, Masamoto admitted (perhaps only to himself?) that Zenkō's arguments were not without merit, that the West Side's "lack of [natural] defenses" caused the villagers considerable trouble, something he could "well understand."<sup>60</sup>

Two weeks later, Zenkō sent Masamoto the following letter. Like other correspondence, it was addressed to a lesser official, in this case Honma Yūshun, but the message was of course meant for Masamoto.

Regarding the [*shugo*'s demands for] half-tax, the villagers have not provided a document of consent. This is good, is it not? However, seeing that the honorable cultivators were already exhausted beforehand, surely it would be appropriate for the commissioner [Nagamori] to consider the situation carefully and provide help. If he is to do so, he should give notice two or three days previous to his arrival, which would enable the villagers to make preparations. If he comes

and stays for two or three days and listens conscientiously to what the honorable cultivators have to say, then it would be acceptable for him to collect the summer wheat tax—this is the word from the *bantō*. But if he does not come for a visit, how will your reputation be affected in the eyes of the *shugo*? Such is the question everyone will ask. Please, then, kindly discuss this matter with the commissioner, and arrange for him to come here. I have spoken from a personal position, according to my understanding. ‘It is not proper for us to address his lordship (*kubōsama* 公方様) directly,’ the villagers recognize, and in the future they will be more reserved. Respectfully.

6/5 [From:] Zenkō  
[To:] Kaga dono’s residence<sup>61</sup>

In this carefully crafted letter, Zenkō makes effective use of the indirect correspondence that governed written exchanges between individuals of high status. The writing is replete with honorific terms and verb endings, whether directed at Masamoto’s official, Shinanokōji Nagamori, or at the West Side villagers; and Zenkō concludes by acknowledging his personal bias, based upon his position. In short, he writes with considerable respect, even humility, knowing that he is asking for favors, ultimately of Masamoto. What is more striking, however, is the way Zenkō weaves together his argument, seeming to address Masamoto directly in places while elsewhere writing to the addressee, Honma Yūshun, more generally. The letter opens with positive news: the villagers have not agreed to half-tax demands, a reference to the last correspondence between monk and proprietor, on 5/22, in which Zenkō wrote of the pressure put upon the villagers to pay the tax. Clearly, this encouraging opening message was a direct response to that, and was meant for Masamoto.

The main section of the letter—a request that the commissioner (Nagamori) call on the West Side villagers—can be read as addressed to Yūshun, with the expectation that Masamoto was of course to be told of this and decide on it. At the end of this section, Yūshun is the object of Zenkō’s entreaty to “kindly discuss the matter” with Nagamori. But what of the preceding sentence, in which Zenkō reports the rhetorical question that “everyone will ask”: “But if he [Nagamori] does not come for a visit, how will your reputation be affected in the eyes of the *shugo*?”<sup>62</sup> Translated without an object, the last phrase can read, “what sort of message will this be sending to the *shugo*?” The first translation, with its wording of “your reputation,” is perhaps too explicit; the second, too imprecise. But it would be difficult for Masamoto not to realize that the “reputation” that “everyone” would be asking about was his.

As I noted previously, one of Zenkō's responsibilities—whether assigned to him or undertaken voluntarily—was to arrange a monthly linked-verse composition, to be offered at Ōizeki Shrine. Hine Estate documents of accounting from several years in the 1470s and '80s reveal that 1 *kan* of the Hineno village annual tax was put toward funding these for the year, making clear that the gatherings predated Masamoto's arrival.<sup>63</sup> Nonetheless, as a distinguished visitor with considerable experience composing verse, Masamoto was soon providing the opening stanza every other month, at Zenkō's behest. For whatever reason, however, expenses were no longer covered by the annual tax, and by 1503, they were often late in arriving. As Masamoto wrote in 1503, because funds had been difficult to acquire, he decided to "use money from the upcoming seasonal *tansen*, with each *bantō* from the East and West Sides providing an advance of 10 *hiki*."<sup>64</sup>

One year later, the same practice was being followed. Accordingly, on 1504/6/11, Masamoto sent to his associates the opening stanza of the new composition and issued instructions to Hineno village leaders to provide their donations from the upcoming *tansen*. But unbeknownst to Masamoto, the *bantō* ignored the request, and in their stead "Zenkō acted privately to cover the expenses himself."<sup>65</sup> When Masamoto found out two weeks later, he was irate: these were "unspeakable developments." His stern reprimands brought fifty *hiki* from the three East Side *bantō*, but nothing from those on the West Side.<sup>66</sup> Zenkō had been unable to protect fully the villagers in this instance, but there was no question of where he stood in their eyes. And Masamoto's criticism extended only to the *bantō*. Of Zenkō's actions, he wrote nothing, and despite this incident, the two men remained close in the few months Masamoto continued to reside on the estate.

### **Buddhism and Shinto: Contrasting, Complementary, Integrated**

As pillars of the Hineno and Iriyamada communities, the religious entities of Buddhism and Shinto enjoyed lofty statuses. Depending on one's perspective and focus, the two can be seen as contrasting religions, having different responsibilities and serving different needs in the villages, or they can be seen as complementary, existing in Richard Bowring's characterization as "two sides of the same coin."<sup>67</sup> There is reason to both positions. Each had distinct functions and different boundaries, as seen in the following summary of key points. One, Masamoto took up residence at a temple, not a shrine (though it was not unknown for aristocrats to reside in a shrine; a local shrine like Takinomiya was "the villagers'" in a sense that temples were not); two, estate administrative offices were at temples, not shrines; three, the

villages enjoyed the protection of tutelary or guardian shrines, not tutelary temples; four, village festivals and meetings (organized and run by the village leadership) were held at the shrines; five, wealthy villagers established private temples, not private shrines; six, village leaders had responsibilities to serve as shrine officials, acting for the whole community, something for which there was no equivalent within Buddhism;<sup>68</sup> seven, Buddhism, not Shinto, was responsible for the deceased, as seen in the funeral monks; eight, Buddhism supported a large (and growing) body of influential monks, whereas resident *kami* ritualists (distinct from villagers who occasionally performed rites) were few in number and slight in influence.

Some of the preceding distinctions are minor, reflecting the complementary roles of the two religious systems rather than fundamental differences between them. For example, both temples and shrines functioned as administrative offices, but the former filled that position for the estate, whereas the latter filled it for the villages. Likewise, the round of festivals and observances held on the estate was neatly divided between the two religions. In these and many other respects the two religions were complementary. Where the two differed most starkly was in the numbers and influence of their practitioners. Simply put, Buddhist monks were a ubiquitous presence in the villages and the defining figures at their temples, neither of which was true of *kami* ritualists. In fact, nothing from *Tabihikitsuke* or other sources suggests that the handful of ritual practitioners that are mentioned was critical to the shrines' functioning; many of the rites were local traditions, preserved and passed on by the villagers or, on a grander scale, by the state.

It was in those traditions, and in its lengthy and distinguished past, that the native cults maintained a position of significance in the region, despite lacking a powerful and numerous clergy or substantial financial resources. Evidence of this appears here and there in Masamoto's diary, sometimes in unexpected ways. Foremost among the shrines was Ōizeki in Hineno which, as Masamoto noted, was number four among the five grand shrines of Izumi and was thus included among the shrines of antiquity in the state records of the *Engishiki* (Procedures of the Engi Era, compiled in 927).<sup>69</sup> Two celebrations were held annually at Ōizeki: the Ōizeki Festival, on 4/2, and the Five Shrine Festival, on 8/15. Both were of regional significance, drawing participants from beyond Hine Estate. In his 1502 description of the former, Masamoto noted that Negoroji lent sixty or seventy head of horses for the festival, with the Izumi *shugo* supplying another forty or fifty, suggesting the scale of the celebration. Masamoto added that the two groups—Negoroji monks and *shugo* retainers—participated together, implying that they put

aside their hostilities for the good of the festival. It was carefully planned and “went off without a hitch.”<sup>70</sup> This was also the occasion on which Iriyamada villagers competed with many others in the arrow shoot. In addition to the arrow shoot, *sarugaku noh* performances were a regular part of the festival.

The Five Shrine Festival was held at Ōizeki in conjunction with the other four grand shrines of Izumi Province. There were two primary components to this festival: the transporting of deities in palanquins and the release of fish and birds into the wild. The former brought the deities (*kami*) from the five shrines to a collective shrine in Fuchū, the provincial headquarters of the imperial government under the *ritsurō* system, where they were worshipped as a group. Legend has it that this festival originated in the Yōrō era (717–724) under Empress Genshō, but the first clear evidence of its occurrence dates to the mid-fourteenth century.<sup>71</sup> The release of fish and birds into the wild, or Hōjōe, was a ceremony that originated in China in the Buddhist prohibition against the taking of life, transformed in this ceremony into the saving of lives. Practiced from Buddhism’s early days in Japan, the Hōjōe was made part of shrine worship in the ancient period, and became one component in the melding of Buddhism and *kami* worship in later centuries.

During Masamoto’s residence on Hine Estate, the Five Shrine Festival was held annually, regardless of local turmoil (such as that brought about by Satō Sōbei’s rebellion in 1502) and, as with the Ōizeki Festival, with the participation of individuals throughout the region, regardless of affiliation or social class. Shrine celebrations were inclusive. Just as significant, they required the assistance of participating groups, as seen in the horses lent by Negoroji and the military governors for the Ōizeki Festival. For the Five Shrine Festival, this might mean providing guards or others to help control crowds. In 1501, this practice backfired when “a fight broke out among the spectators within the ‘province’s jurisdiction’” (*kuni no kan ni oite* 於國之管)—meaning the area the military governors’ men were responsible for overseeing. This soon escalated into a bloody conflict as “the *shugo*’s men and the forces serving as guards” joined the fight. According to the report Masamoto received, “many” were killed, including both men and women.<sup>72</sup>

Just who was in charge of the Ōizeki Festival and Five Shrine Festival is unclear. But there is no question that the Buddhist clergy contributed significantly, and the festivals may in fact have been carried out under the direction of influential monks. Such sharing of duties by Buddhist monks was not uncommon, something seen as well in an occurrence on Hine Estate at the New Year of 1502, when Kujō Masamoto received a gift of delicacies from Ōizeki Shrine, accompanied by the following letter.

From Ōizeki I bring offerings of celebration: one round rice cake; one decorative rice cake in a box measure; nine “flower” rice cakes, one skewer of dried persimmons; also the “five grains” [rice, barley, millet, chestnut, beans]. I humbly offer these for your enjoyment. I ask that you present them before his lordship. In any event, I have called to show my respects. And I ask that abundant blessings be yours in the year ahead.

Respectfully.

1/2 [From:] Muhenkōin Zenkō  
 [To:] Takehara Sadao and associates<sup>73</sup>

At the least, this suggests that no *kami* ritualist at the shrine enjoyed the status necessary to present a formal New Years offering to Masamoto. But it more likely meant that Zenkō’s duties, as abbot of the most influential temple in Hineno, extended to Ōizeki. Accordingly, it is additional evidence of the integration of Buddhism and Shinto. None of this would have surprised Masamoto, or any others in the province, high or low.

One way Masamoto revealed his understanding of the ties between the two religious traditions is in a series of notes he made to himself at the end of the first volume of his diary (following the 10th month entries of 1501). There he jotted down the names of the *kami* or Shinto deities on the estate (which were also the names of the shrines that housed them), as follows: “Ōizeki Jingu (original form, Amida); Mizoguchi Daimyōjin (original form, Kannon); Takinomiya Daimyōjin (original form, Fudō Myōō).” In other words, after writing the name of each *kami*, Masamoto then gave their “original” or Buddhist titles. In this he followed the broadly accepted notion that deities of the archipelago were traces of the buddhas and bodhisattvas, appearing in this new form within the native tradition.<sup>74</sup>

A different type of connection between the two religions, which was by no means uncommon in the land, was the sharing of physical space.<sup>75</sup> This appeared most prominently at Ōizeki, where the shrine was joined by a temple, Kaitai’in (of which Zenkō became abbot in 1504, after his retirement from Muhenkōin), and numerous other Buddhist structures, including a bell tower, sutra repositories, and various cloisters.<sup>76</sup>

## Negoroji

As the economic and military counterpoint to the two Izumi *shugo*, Negoroji has appeared frequently in previous chapters. Hints about the temple’s power

and influence can be seen in matters such as its moneylending activities, its sway over Satō Sōbei as the latter rebelled against the *shugo*, and its supplementary tax holdings (*kajishi*). Particularly suggestive of the temple's place in the region is the placard it issued to Iriyamada, which restricted outside forces from setting up battle camps within the village. Significant as these are, our understanding of Negoroji, of the extent and weight of its influence in Hine Estate (and more generally in southern Izumi), becomes clear only as we learn of its history and the broader context within which it operated. As a result of Negoroji's decision to contest Hideyoshi late in the sixteenth century, the warrior attacked with full force, destroying the monastery complex with its hundreds of cloisters and monks residences. The temple's store of documents, along with other sources, was lost; and only through assiduous work by historians and archeologists in recent decades has a fuller picture of it come to light.<sup>77</sup>

Negoroji had its origins in the Shingon monk Kakuban (1095–1143), who as a young man went to Kōyasan with a desire to help revive the mountain monastic community. Revival was necessary because the monastery had suffered two catastrophic fires in the latter half of the tenth century, as well as neglect by Tōji, the abbot of which also served as head of the main Kōyasan temple of Kongōbuji. Kakuban arrived at a propitious time, as Kōyasan had begun to attract the attention of the imperial family, something reflected in pilgrimages of retired emperors, the first by Shirakawa in 1088. That was not his only visit, and his successors Toba, Go-Shirakawa, and Go-Toba followed his path to Kōyasan, resulting in a total of nine imperial excursions over the next twelve decades. With the visits came patronage in the form of estates—most significantly, the seven donated by Toba in support of the cloister Denbōin (later Daidenbōin) that Kakuban undertook to construct in 1129. Several years later, Toba made Kakuban the abbot of both Daidenbōin and Kongōbuji, a step which raised Kakuban in status but also led to conflict with Tōji, the latter being stripped of its position of authority at Kōyasan. Clashes followed, including armed battles, and in 1140, having given up his abbacies at both institutions, Kakuban took his followers off the mountain to the temple estate of Hirota in the region of Negoro, approximately forty kilometers to the west and just over the mountains from what would become Hine Estate. Negotiations and conflicts with Kōyasan continued for more than a century, with a final break occurring in 1288.

For the new religious community, establishing a financial base was critical if it were to thrive, since the temple held few *shōen* other than the ones Kakuban had initially acquired; and by this late date, becoming the proprietor or guarantor of new *shōen* was difficult.<sup>78</sup> Given Kōyasan's dominant position in Kii, it made sense for the Negoroji monks to look north

for sources of income, across the border in Izumi. The long-running war between the Northern and Southern courts (1336–92) provided opportunities to make financial inroads in the province, just as it did for the Izumi *shugo*. And though progress was slow for much of the fifteenth century, by the time Kujō Masamoto arrived on Hine Estate, Negoroji was in the midst of significantly expanding its interests—not just economic, but religious and political, too—in the region. Growth followed, both in the population of monks and the physical infrastructure of cloisters and residences for monks. As argued by Atsuta Isao and Koyama Yasunori, Negoroji accomplished this through a range of activities, each of which is depicted in *Tabihikitsuke*: 1) gaining appointments as estate deputies; 2) establishing relationships with upper-level cultivators; 3) acquiring rights to supplemental taxes (*kajishi*); 4) lending money. Just as significant, Negoroji protected and expanded its interests through its army of monks.<sup>79</sup>

In a certain sense, Negoroji came into its own as a regional power during the period that the post of estate deputy (*daikan*) was becoming the key player in the management of *shōen* and “post-*shōen*” lands. And monks from the temple were able to take advantage of this as a source of income. During the early medieval era, the term *daikan* had been used generically, referring to individuals who filled *shōen* duties in place of a superior, be it the proprietor or estate manager (neither of whom were commonly in residence), or even a minor estate official. Acting in place of the estate manager, the *daikan*’s responsibilities could be substantial, extending from policing the estate to assessing the harvest prior to setting the year’s tax. But with the emergence of independent villages (at least in the central provinces), most of those responsibilities either ended or were taken over by the villagers themselves. At the same time, the upheaval brought on by the battles between the Northern and Southern courts made the management of *shōen* difficult for absentee proprietors, who often turned to local authorities—whether military men, temples, or wealthy landlords—to collect taxes and perform other necessary tasks, few in number though those were now. In this manner, the late medieval office of *daikan* was created; and with it came a ready source of income for the new deputies, who signed contracts that defined their duties and the pay they would receive.<sup>80</sup>

Based on Kujō family sources, most *daikan* who served on Hine Estate during the fifteenth century acquired their posts either as part of a contract for a loan they advanced or as a means of debt collection when repayment of a loan was in arrears. In either case, this provided the holder both a salary (fifteen percent of the annual tax, according to one contract)<sup>81</sup> and a guarantee that estate taxes would be put toward the debt, as stipulated in the

contract. Many of the Hine Estate *daikan* appear in the records as temples (defined as holders of the deputy post or *daikan shiki*) or monks who served as representatives of the temples (though the Izumi *shugo* also filled the post for a period). A list of appointees includes Tobadera—which received the position in exchange for a loan of 100 *kan* to Masamoto's grandfather, Kujō Tsunenori; the powerful Kyoto Zen temple, Shōkokuji, to which a debt of 490 *kan* was owed; and during the last quarter of the century, monks from Negoroji.<sup>82</sup> The first Negoroji monks enlisted as deputies represented the portion of the estate that Masamoto had transferred to his associate Tominokōji Toshimichi. The transfer took place in 1479, and it appears that Negoroji monks had assumed the *daikan* post by 1485 and maintained it until Masamoto's arrival. During this same period, Negoroji monks were pushing to be made deputies in the neighboring village of Ibara (previously part of Hine Estate), evidence of the temple's aggressive economic activities in the region.<sup>83</sup>

On the surface, it would seem that the second activity bolstering Negoroji's growth—the forming of relationships with upper level cultivators—would be of less significance (at least, in economic terms) than being appointed estate deputies. But in fact it was of greater significance.

Writing in *Tabihikitsuke* four months into his stay in Izumi, Masamoto noted the following.

Cultivators' children in this province who become Negoroji teachers of the law<sup>84</sup> are called *ujiudo*. Of these *ujiudo*, one from among the children of Hineno villagers came here [following his training]. After I arrived on the estate, he thought to call on me shortly, but decided that perhaps he would wait until I made a visit to Hineno. However, I put off visiting, and so he came to offer his respects, he said. He presented a gift of one *sake* hoist and two delicacies. I stated that this was gracious of him. Nagamori met with him, and at this temple hall [of Chōfukuji] offered him a drink, I was told.<sup>85</sup>

As the sons of cultivators, the young men who became *ujiudo* were from the solid, tax-paying class of villagers, not necessarily the elite. The point is significant, because these were not families of particular wealth and influence, whose connections to a powerful temple like Negoroji might be expected. Though this is the only reference to *ujiudo* in *Tabihikitsuke* (and in other sources related to Negoroji), Masamoto clearly stated that the practice was common in the province. And his claims are backed up in sources that reveal that Kōyasan and Kokawadera likewise fostered *ujiudo* who were active in

the region. Just what work these *ujiudo* engaged in is unclear, but several scholars believe that a primary part of it was local, outside of a monastery or cloister, assisting for example with festivals and rites.<sup>86</sup>

Negoroji's connections to the villagers of Hine Estate went well beyond the *ujiudo*. Ties were everywhere, some to be expected, some not. To begin with, Shippōryūji, high in the mountains above Iriyamada, was a Negoroji branch temple at the turn of the sixteenth century, and its head was Shinpukuin Shinkai, who resided in the Higashitani region of Negoro (at the cloister Shinpukuin) but made frequent visits to Shippōryūji. There he fulfilled ceremonial duties, such as those at the New Year.<sup>87</sup> Moreover, as previously discussed, during Satō Sōbei's uprising in the fall of 1502, Shinkai mediated between Masamoto and the temple leadership at Negoroji. At a more immediate level, *yamabushi* monks from Shippōryūji (whose practices integrated esoteric Buddhism with Shinto), carried out rites at Takinomiya, the main shrine in Iriyamada. It was they who conducted, for example, the prayers for rain in the summer of 1501.<sup>88</sup> We might be inclined to dismiss the ties between the monks at Shippōryūji and the villagers of Iriyamada as distant. After all, the temple was a long trek up a steep canyon, well above the hamlet of Funabuchi. And most of the monks were no doubt outsiders, just as we can assume that Shinpukuin Shinkai was. But as we learned in the "evil monk" incident, at least one of the monks—the second of the accused thieves—was a local man, "someone with many relatives among the cultivators," according to the *bantō* who pleaded for his release. Negoroji, we can assume, had been good to him, a means to move up in the world, in a manner similar to that of the *ujiudo* Masamoto wrote about.

For the village elite of northern Kii and southern Izumi, Negoroji offered a tangible means to economic stability and religious prominence. Rather than become monks, they could donate funds in support of building projects or directly finance and establish cloisters and monks' residences themselves on "the mountain," the Negoroji complex in Kii Province. Archeological digs in the late twentieth century unearthed more than 400 of these structures, some of which were the product of wealthy villagers' patronage.<sup>89</sup> These cloisters may have been established as a means to expend surplus funds and display religious devotion, but they did not remain so. Besides lending strength to Negoroji, the cloisters became independent economic entities, a place where families could store or hide their wealth, protected, they assumed, by the collective strength of the temple complex. This is a process that began in the early sixteenth century and reached a height around mid-century, as the turmoil of war engulfed the country. Evidence of this practice is particularly rich for the Naka family of Kumatori Estate, which lay just north of

Hineno village. As seen in the Naka's large document collection—most of which consists of receipts for land, buildings, or rights to supplemental land taxes—during the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries the family bought property and rights directly. That began to change, however, following their construction of Seishin'in at the Negoroji mountain complex around 1510, as purchases increasingly came to be made by the cloisters themselves rather than the family head. While many of these activities postdated Masamoto's time in Izumi, the foundation was being laid before and during his period.<sup>90</sup>

Although there is no evidence that any families from Hine Estate constructed cloisters at Negoroji in this manner, much is suggestive, including the villagers' establishment of local cottage temples, a more modest approach in the same vein. Moreover, among those who we know established cloisters were families in neighboring communities of Sano and Kogi, besides the Naka family in Kumatori. According to Atsuta Isao, there were one or two such families in each of the four counties of Izumi, as well as a comparable number in Kii.<sup>91</sup> At the least, it is likely that members of the village elite in Hine Estate made donations toward construction at Negoroji. Not only was this a way to show religious devotion, but it was a means of forming ties with the foremost power in the region.

The third activity that led to Negoroji's growth was its acquisition of *kajishi*, literally “added land tax,” or supplementary land tax. As a surtax, this was a tax that a villager paid in addition to the basic tax (typically *nengu* and other duties) due the proprietor. The recipient of *kajishi* was the individual or family that had “bought” it or otherwise acquired it. During the late medieval period, purchasers were commonly the village elite, though *Tabihikitsuke* and other sources are silent about that on Hine Estate. To pay a tax on top of a tax was obviously a burden, but *kajishi* was also evidence of increasing production, of growing harvests and income, and it is not surprising that it was a phenomenon common to the central regions of the land, where rising productivity and double cropping were becoming the norm. Of course, for a family that had sold *kajishi*, the benefits of larger harvests very likely disappeared. In this sense, *kajishi* can be seen as evidence of growing inequality in the villages, even if the total wealth and conditions for the bulk of the villagers was improving. *Kajishi* also funded the rise of an elite landholding (or more properly, “land controlling”) class and, for families that made the transition, a growing local warrior class. But that was not all. By the *senoku* period, buyers of *kajishi* also included moneylenders and some temples, Negoroji being among the latter.<sup>92</sup>

The one mention of Negoroji *kajishi* in *Tabihikitsuke* (as noted earlier) appears in the tenth month of 1502, as the rebellion of Satō Sōbei was being

put down by the armies of the Izumi *shugo*. On 10/6, Masamoto wrote that retainers from both the upper and lower *shugo* had entered the estate and confiscated *kajishi* previously bought by Negoroji.<sup>93</sup> Though holders of *kajishi* are often described as landlords, the term is inappropriate, as seen in this diary entry. Nothing suggests that the land itself was “owned” by Negoroji (a problematic concept in itself at the time, when duties and rights to income remained defining concepts—for example in the cultivation rights [*saku shiki*] held by *hyakushō*).<sup>94</sup> What is first critical to understand is the way that *kajishi* was acquired (or for the village cultivators, how the funds were lost). The tax was not merely levied as a result of increased crop yields, as commonly suggested in scholarship in English.<sup>95</sup> Rather than consider *kajishi* as a means by which land was transferred to a powerful landholding class, we might view *kajishi* in modern terms as payments made toward second mortgages. In other words, through agreeing to pay *kajishi*, cultivators acquired one-time loans or grants from wealthy village elites or regional temples like Negoroji for purposes such as paying taxes or recovering from poor harvests or poor decisions. Unlike a second mortgage, however, there is no evidence that the grant secured by surrendering *kajishi* rights could be paid back; in this sense, it was “sold.” With the sale of those rights, annual payments of a set amount would remain the responsibility of the sellers, perhaps in perpetuity.<sup>96</sup>

Negoroji benefited from *kajishi* in two ways. First, as seen in the *Tabi-hikitsuke* entry, by acquiring *kajishi* directly, Negoroji gained immediate control of the income it received. Second, through families such as the Naka—which established cloisters within Negoroji and acquired hundreds of *kajishi* holdings—Negoroji’s influence and wealth, if indirect, expanded substantially. In fact, it appears that the latter type of *kajishi* holdings made up the vast majority of those controlled by Negoroji. Yata Toshifumi even argues that the *kajishi* Masamoto referred to in 1502 was not a direct holding of Negoroji; instead, he asserts, the temple functioned in this case (and in many others) as the guarantor or bondsman of the tax. In any event, taken as a whole, the supplemental land tax was an immense source of Negoroji wealth and influence.<sup>97</sup>

The fourth source of growth for Negoroji was moneylending. As we saw in chapter 4, the temple lent funds to Masamoto on several occasions while he was in residence. And, of course, there was the Karahashi Arikazu debt, which became Masamoto’s responsibility after he killed his cousin (I discuss the effects of this on Hine Estate in the next chapter, but suffice it to note here that the monks profited handsomely from the matter). Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that the temple’s acquisition of deputy posts

(secured from proprietors) and *kajishi* (bought from villagers) often originated in debts accumulated by those two parties. The fundamental role of moneylending at Negoroji is seen in the responses the monks made to Masamoto's proposals to settle the Arikazu debt or reconsider payback options—none of which were as favorable to the temple as the monks desired. As one of the monks, Akaibō Shūson, noted in a letter late in 1501, he had “exhausted all words in speaking to the temple moneylenders about this difficult matter, but they completely rejected [his lordship's claims].”<sup>98</sup> Later communications on this issue were much the same, as the monks reiterated that settling the debt was not “a private matter,” but involved the group of moneylenders.<sup>99</sup> Though there is little reason to believe that Shūson actually argued on Masamoto's behalf, he and his fellow monks no doubt worked with the temple moneylenders in making counterproposals. The moneylenders were clearly a force at the temple, something acknowledged by all involved.

Underpinning the preceding four activities, which were the basis of Negoroji's growth, was the temple's army of monks. In most respects, Negoroji's rise as a regional military force was an effect rather than a cause of the temple's growing influence. The temple certainly did not begin as a military power, and for nearly 150 years after the move to Negoro in 1288, it engaged only in battles that centered on religious disputes, most commonly with Kōyasan. Furthermore, its armies were small, numbering no more than several hundred individuals at most. During that time, the administrative side of the monastery, known as the *gyōninkata* (which dealt with economic and military affairs), was an important but limited force. Power and policy were shared with the *gakuryō*, the body of monks engaged in intellectual and spiritual matters. It is also true, however, that as a result of its early quarrels with Kongōbuji monks at Kōyasan, Negoroji was, in a sense, conceived in conflict. And of course it came of age at a time when struggles over land and disputes over doctrine engulfed many of the powerful temples. Warfare was natural to it.<sup>100</sup>

What eventually turned Negoroji into a regional power with an army “strong enough to defy Nobunaga” was the sponsorship of cloisters and monks' residences by wealthy village elite.<sup>101</sup> With this, the Negoroji community expanded in number and wealth, and the administrative branch of the monastery came to dominate temple affairs as its role as managers and protectors of landed interests grew significantly. Evidence of this was apparent by the time Masamoto arrived in Izumi and, as we have seen, it was a stark reality that soon confronted the former chancellor. This trend only grew after Masamoto's departure. Thus it was that late in the sixteenth cen-

ture, Negoroji's military prowess was well known, extending to Jesuit priests such as Gaspar Vilela, who, though he never visited the temple, would write home about monks who prepared for battle by "making seven arrows daily," and engaged in weekly target practice with firearms as well as bows and arrows.<sup>102</sup> The temple's military might, with armies that were said to have exceeded 10,000 men at that time, no doubt convinced the body of monks to resist Hideyoshi's advances, disastrous as that decision ultimately was.<sup>103</sup>

Religion, in all of its manifestations, was tightly woven into the fabric of life on Hine Estate. It was ubiquitous, pervasive, and influential. In institutional form it could be militarily powerful. Its reach was local and regional. And it functioned in both spheres as a consumer and distributor of economic surplus. For villagers, it encompassed and helped define joyous and celebratory occasions in rituals and festivals; and it was just as prominent at times of struggle and death. For certain individuals it was a path for, and reflection of, social status and social mobility. In physical form, religion was represented in members of the priesthood, male and female, and more strikingly, in the physical structures, large and small, of temples and shrines, symbols of devotion and reverence (and for some, pride and power). Among its clergy were individuals both revered and reviled, saints (or at least respected clerics) and so-called *akusō*, "evil monks." The latter were a reality, but not defining of the whole by any means—something well understood by the villagers, for who would not want a son to enter the priesthood or a daughter to serve at the local shrine? During the politically fractured and violent era of *sengoku*, religion remained a symbol and arena for cultural integration and interclass community. At one level, it brought the whole region together while other forces were pushing it apart. It was, in sum, in the background and in the foreground, both a power within and a power without.

Japanese scholarship on the role of religious institutions, practices, and people that dot the pages of *Tabihikitsuke* is comparatively thin.<sup>104</sup> Given its wider historical importance, Negoroji has received its due, but critical examination of the broader landscape is limited. Part of the issue may be tied to the fact that where religion (broadly put) is concerned, the diary's pages are regularly "dotted" but only rarely "blackened." Mere appearance in the diary, as in monks' New Year visits to Masamoto or in references to local temples as estate administrative offices, does not indicate significance; by themselves, such appearances are just dots. And even where the role of clerics in an incident was primary, as in the theft at Shippōryūji, the place of religion (in doctrine or practice) was of no importance. Put differently, it seems likely that clerics and the physical institutions they occupied have

been overlooked because they were such common features of *Tabihikitsuke's* landscape, ubiquitous and expected, just as they appeared to the residents of the estate. But there is no denying that those features were one of the defining characteristics of the villages and region. As I have described in the pages above, the religious landscape in Izumi was vibrant, rich, and varied.

What we see in *Tabihikitsuke* is a vivid picture of the workings of religion in rural Japan during the opening years of the sixteenth century. The time frame is brief but the depictions of institutions, practices, and people is frequently detailed and intimate. As a concluding statement, it is worth reiterating what I noted in the introduction to this chapter, that religion, in touching the villagers' lives of Hine Estate in so many ways, defined and shaped them as surely as did the land, the community, and their overseers—the other powerful and unavoidable influences in their lives.

## Settling Up

Kujō Masamoto's sojourn in Izumi began with debt and Karahashi Arikazu. And it ended with debt and Karahashi Arikazu. The debt at the beginning was Masamoto's, incurred at great cost in exchange for the promise of high court office, with Arikazu as the lender. The debt at the end was also Masamoto's, transferred to him by Arikazu at the time Masamoto took the latter's life. It was in 1504, Masamoto's last year in Izumi, that the note for that debt came due.

The year 1504 began like other years during Masamoto's stay in the province. As usual, the opening days of the first month were filled with ceremonies—personal ones for Masamoto: a cold-water purification bath, bowing before the “four directions,” and “teeth strengthening.” In addition there was the rite of “auspicious writings” for the villagers. The new year was a time of optimism, and the ceremonies were, as always for Masamoto, “something to celebrate.” The days were also filled with visits, from Hineno and Iriyamada *bantō*, monks of temples large and small, and the village carpenter. On 1/5, the first firing of the bath took place (housed perhaps at Chōfukuji or Takinomiya, it was supported by community income from two *tan* of land), and two days later rain fell “from the break of day onward—an auspicious sign of a year of abundance.”<sup>1</sup>

It appears that Masamoto was settling in to life in Izumi. What had happened to his resolve to sort out matters on the estate and return to the capital within a year's time? Though his management of Hine Estate had clearly not raised revenue to the level he had hoped for and expected, neither was it the economic or political disaster suggested by some historians.<sup>2</sup> Had there been little or no income, Masamoto surely would not have extended his stay into

a third or fourth year. In any event, it seems he approached the new year with a typical measure of optimism.

As it turned out, 1504 was a turbulent year on Hine Estate, rather like the three before it. There were struggles and there was hope. Among the former were the brutal “spring hungers” and thefts of rice and bracken flour that followed the drought of the year previous, while the latter was marked most prominently by evidence of a burgeoning harvest. Two developments, however, came to define 1504—developments which by all accounts convinced Masamoto to end his stay in the province. I examined the first, the rice theft by Shōen Uma and the judgment and disputes that followed, in chapter 6. The second was Karahashi Arikazu’s debt.

By killing Karahashi Arikazu in 1496, Kujō Masamoto and Hisatsune had removed one immediate problem facing them. But the family’s economic struggles, which they had hoped to alleviate through their contract with Arikazu, continued. And though Arikazu was dead, it is unlikely that his wife and children considered the loan of 180 *kan*—exchanged for long-term control of Hine Estate—to have been paid off in full. A balance surely remained. Moreover, as Masamoto was well aware at the time he departed for Izumi, the loans Arikazu had taken out with Negoroji monks were now the Kujō responsibility—as much as Masamoto tried to argue otherwise. This is made clear early in the Kyoto interlopers’ stay in a letter Ishii Aritoshi and Shinanokōji Nagamori sent to Akaibō Shūson, a primary holder of the debt.

Concerning the privately incurred debt of the previous commissioner, who submitted as security this estate’s acreage tax: you have told us that the original amount [i.e., principal] was 2000 *biki* [20 *kan*]; and in the many years that have passed, you collected an amount that far exceeds that. Nonetheless, because a balance still remains, it seems important that we discuss this in order to settle the matter. The messengers will provide details. Respectfully.

i6/20

[From:] Aritoshi, Nagamori  
[To:] Akaibō [Shūson]<sup>3</sup>

Though the Kujō would not have been pleased to learn that Arikazu had provided the acreage tax as collateral for the debt, “privately incurred” though it was, there was little they could do about it, particularly since Masamoto had transferred rights to the estate to the Karahashi. This letter was an early

effort to broach the subject with the monks (without promising much). More concrete arguments would follow, but the main points were laid out here. Most significant was the claim that the sum collected over the years far exceeded the principal, suggesting that the monks should consider the debt satisfied. What Masamoto's commissioners were pointing at here, and which they made explicit in later letters, was *narikarashi* (成からし)—defined by Shinanokōji Nagamori as “the customary law that once payment of interest has reached four or five times the principal, the debt is considered repaid.” The practice in fact had legal backing, but enforcement was another matter.<sup>4</sup> Regulations issued by the warrior regimes, and prior to that by the imperial court, had prohibited the collection of interest greater than the amount of the original principal.<sup>5</sup> The rationale behind that may have been sound, but there are few grounds for believing it was followed, even when the Muro-machi regime was at its political height. With annual interest rates averaging around sixty percent, loans that were not repaid within a year soon began to approach that threshold. The customary practice of “four or five times the principal” was more fitting, though hardly comforting to delinquent borrowers. In the case of the Negoroji debt, even that was insufficient, as the monks demanded their pound of flesh, and did so after acknowledging that payments so far had reached 10,000 *hiki*.

Despite ultimately taking a hard line on the Karahashi debt, the monks were remarkably patient in their demands for repayment during the first three years Masamoto was in Izumi. Not only that, but they and Masamoto maintained a cordial relationship during this time, offering and exchanging gifts on felicitous occasions and making efforts to ensure that correspondence was polite and measured. There were a couple of bumps along the road early on, but these were quickly smoothed over. The first occurred just weeks after Masamoto's arrival in Izumi, when an Akaibō representative of one of the former estate deputies of Masamoto's colleague Tominokōji Toshimichi came bearing gifts: three hoists of *sake*, three delicacies, and one box of noodles. He was not warmly received by two Kujō officials, who asked, “And how are we to relay this to him [i.e., to Toshimichi, who was in the capital]?” Telling them that he would lose face if he returned to the temple with the gifts, the representative said he would “just push the items within the gate and leave” (*gomonchū e oshimairasete makarikaeru beshi* 御門中へ押参而可罷歸). Apprised of the situation at this point, Masamoto (ever the diplomat) instructed his commissioners to take the items in trust. They did so, apologizing to the visitor and promising to forward his message to Toshimichi. With that, the situation was defused.<sup>6</sup>

Six months later there was a second incident. It originated in a letter

from the Akaibō cloister demanding repayment of the debt and threatening to send a large armed force to obtain that. This sudden unexpected push was probably linked to a shift in power at the cloister. Up until that point, its head, Shūson, had been accommodating in his demands and self-deprecating in his correspondence. But Shūson's health appears to have been failing. In fact, he may have been dead by the tenth month of 1501 when the forceful letter arrived. In the end, the pressure from Akaibō achieved nothing, as the response from Masamoto's commissioners, which revealed indignation at such an uncivil approach, apparently convinced the monks to back off. No doubt they were persuaded as well by word that Masamoto was willing to negotiate terms and settle the debt. Accompanying the commissioners' reply was a gift of thirty bowstrings, which we can assume the senders fervently hoped would not be used against them in the future.<sup>7</sup>

Outside of these brief incidents, the debt was an infrequent topic of correspondence between the two parties from 1501 through the first half of 1504. When the monks raised the topic, they did so circumspectly, noting, for example, that they had pushed the moneylenders at the temple to grant an extension on repayment.<sup>8</sup> Or they responded to Masamoto's requests for consideration by stating that any agreement needed to include co-owners of the debt, which, they implied, would tie their hands.<sup>9</sup>

Masamoto took several tacks in his attempts to reach a settlement favorable to him. Two, of little effect, we have already seen: first, claiming that the loan was privately contracted by Arikazu (and thus not Masamoto's responsibility), and second, arguing that with repayment having already equalled four times the principal, the debt was, by customary law, repaid. Just as ineffectual was the suggestion that he return the amount of the principal (2000 *hiki*) and petition for forgiveness of the remainder; and if that was insufficient, repay the principle along with interest of one hundred percent (for 4000 *hiki* total), with a payback period of two or three years. With that, he hoped the debt could be settled.<sup>10</sup> To this the monks gave no reply.

By mid-year 1504, the Negoroji monks were probably aware that Masamoto's days on the estate were numbered. At least they acted that way, significantly increasing the pressure on him, as well on the villagers of Iriyamada and Hineno. They did this in several ways: first, on two occasions, former deputies of Toshimichi's allotments, Henchiin Keisan and Tsutsuibō Seishū, made demands for property within the estate, once for land in Iriyamada and again for land on Hineno West Side. On the former occasion they explicitly stated their intention to seize property if necessary.<sup>11</sup> Second, four disciples of Akaibō Shūson, the primary holder of the Arikazu debt and previous deputy of Masamoto's holdings, pushed relentlessly to take over

that position on the estate after the visitors returned to the capital. Third, the monks worked unremittingly to force a resolution of the debt.

Tension over these issues was palpable at times, eased or broken only by conciliatory letters or gifts. As an indirect participant, Masamoto could avoid the immediate friction of these dealings, but he realized that heated discourse was unlikely to result in more propitious arrangements for him. As he reminded Nagamori early in the negotiations, it was critical to discuss matters “in a calm, respectful manner.”<sup>12</sup> And even though the monks were aggressive in their dealings with the estate, they were wise enough to step back at times or apologize for their actions (or that of their agents). Thus, an angry outburst by one of their men in the midst of negotiations on 6/16 was followed two days later by his apology for “inexcusable behavior as a result of being inebriated.” He was probably lying, but it was an excuse that allowed the process to move forward.<sup>13</sup>

Settlement of the big issues—the debt and the deputy posts—was not concluded until the last month of Masamoto’s stay. But to anyone residing on the estate, whether villagers or Masamoto’s retainers, the direction the talks were heading was evident, and it was not encouraging. The villagers clearly saw difficult roads ahead with the pending shift in local control. For residents who had previously paid their taxes by way of the Negoroji deputies Henchiin and Tsutsuibō (which included Hineno West Side and portions of the Iriyamada hamlets), the idea of dealing with them again was hard to stomach. On 7/19, the Iriyamada *bantō* called on Masamoto to inform him that the villagers of the four hamlets had met and agreed to reject any effort to have the previous deputies reappointed. They had gone before the gods with a petition of purified water, they reported, and on the morning of the morrow were to stand bamboo grass in defiance. A week later, following discussions with Masamoto, the Iriyamada cultivators group sent a letter to Negoroji headquarters asking for the temple’s consideration in the matter.<sup>14</sup>

There were other worries for the villagers, one of which they probably learned about only in later months. This concerned the acreage tax, and it is summed up well in a *Tabihikitsuke* entry of Masamoto’s just two weeks prior to his departure for the capital.

Chōhōji [Terasu] returned in the evening with this message [from Akaibō Meison]: “In considering the *tansen*, at present the provincial side is no longer causing upheaval. So based upon what conditions are the villagers paying just half of the tax? Even if the villagers were

for a time to stand bamboo grass, they surely wouldn't disperse and leave their lands for another province for long. We will put the matter firmly before them, he said." It was a remarkable answer.<sup>15</sup>

Having been appointed deputy for the proprietor's portion of the estate two weeks previous, Meison was already making plans for raising revenue in coming months. His intention, as seen here, was to put an early end to the fifty-five percent *tansen* reduction granted by Masamoto in 1501 and promised at the time to extend for five years. Though Meison's salary was no doubt set by contract, he knew the Kujō would likely supplement his income if he were able to increase revenue. In any event, the villagers had reason to worry.

It is hardly surprising that Meison's appointment as deputy occurred in tandem with the settlement of the Arikazu debt. In their negotiations during 1504, the Akaibō monks repeatedly linked the two and pushed for a debt agreement that included reappointment as estate deputies. After all, as they saw it, deputies would be needed for both Masamoto's and Toshimichi's sections of the estate, and as the most recent holders of those posts—consisting of Shūson, now deceased, and Henchiin Keisan and Tsutsuibō Seishū—it made sense that they be reappointed. Of course, what they wanted were the lucrative salaries that came with the posts, and though there was no guarantee that Masamoto would accept their requests, the Arikazu debt provided them leverage he could not easily ignore. A letter from Meison early in the ninth month is particularly instructive. After noting that the temple's moneylenders had dismissed the proprietor's latest offer of repayment, Meison expressed concern that the deputy post had already been appointed to someone else. He hoped, however, that that had not been done. On the "sleeve writing" of the letter, a customary location for straightforward messages, sometimes tangential to the body of a letter, he made his point more forcefully: "If we were to receive the deputy post, I would discuss this [favorably] with the moneylenders. But if we hear that his lordship has just dismissed the debt, we'll circulate word of this to the moneylenders and at that point won't be open to any of your petitions."<sup>16</sup>

Whether Meison actually took steps to arrange favorable terms for repaying the debt is unknown, though he would later claim that he did. Prior to the tenth month of 1504, Masamoto provided no numbers in *Tabihikitsuke* for the balance of the loan or the demands of the monks. Time and again he noted in correspondence that Arikazu had borrowed a total of 2000 *biki*, but he wrote nothing more. If indeed the monks provided him figures, he

chose not to record them in *Tabihikitsuke*. What we know is that he put off serious negotiations with the monks for three-and-a-half years, waiting until the last moment to work out an agreement.

Had Masamoto chosen to put revenue from the annual tax toward the debt, he could have shrunk the sum considerably, but it appears he did not consider that an option, for it would have meant sending little or no funds back to Kyoto. His first mention of a settlement amount appears on 10/6, when a messenger came from the temple with word that the total due, which now exceeded 800 *kan*, or 80,000 *hiki*, had been reduced to 300 *kan* through Meison's determined efforts. For this, the moneylenders sought repayment over thirteen years. Masamoto found this unacceptable, leading to further negotiations over the next several weeks.<sup>17</sup> In the end, the moneylenders, despite "completely losing face" over the concessions, agreed to a settlement of 200 *kan*, to be paid back over 10 years; the funds were to be taken from the annual tax. A contract was drawn up to that effect on 11/7 (along with one for the deputy post), and with that the matter was settled.<sup>18</sup> All that remained were years of payments. All in all, the loan was to cost the Kujō on the order of 300 *kan*, hard evidence that the 20 *kan* that Karahashi Arikazu borrowed from the monks some fifteen years previous had been obtained at a very dear price.

As a final note, despite the petitions and demonstrations of the villagers, several references to the deputy post for Toshimichi's sections make clear that Akaibō monks received the appointments, and there is little question that the recipients were Henchiin Keisan and Tsutsuibō Seishū, the individuals the Iriyamada villagers had claimed they could not accept.<sup>19</sup> In all respects, the Kujō, and the villagers, were the losers and the monks of Negoroji the winners.

## Coda

Kujō Masamoto concluded his Izumi diary without comment. He noted only the date and the weather in his last three entries in *Tabihikitsuke*. He offered no assessment of his stay, no outlook for the estate, no prediction as to where it would stand in a decade or two, or whether he or any other members of the family would again visit. It seems unlikely, however, that he was optimistic. With heavy payments of the Arikazu debt hanging over the estate for the next decade, coupled with the salary expenses of the deputy posts, expected revenue would remain modest at best—and this at a time when the family's needs were high and their remaining estates few.

Perhaps we can gain some insight into Masamoto's view of his world at this point by examining a *Tabihikitsuke* entry written just a month before his return to the capital. The entry is an outlier, one of very few in which Masamoto ignored local matters and instead discussed external affairs. The writing is matter-of-fact, despite the topic: an incident in which Hosokawa Masamoto—de facto head of the Muromachi shogunate and adoptive father of Kujō Masamoto's biological son—was threatened by rebellion and ridiculed before society. In Masamoto's depiction this is presented as unexceptional, the order (or disorder) of the day. He saw no need to decry the actions of a turncoat, defend Hosokawa Masamoto, or express concern for the boy he had given up for adoption. If he thought about those things, he chose not to write about them. What appears to have been the impetus for the entry was nothing more than the inherent attraction of the story, underpinned by a clever use of poetry. Such things were worth noting, world in upheaval or not.

According to word Masamoto received in the middle of the eleventh month, a close retainer of Hosokawa Masamoto by the name of Yakushiji

Motokazu had recently turned against his lord, raising a rebellion while arguing for a new head of the regime. Motokazu was eventually captured, and the next day forced (or allowed) to commit suicide. Before doing so, he (in Kujō Masamoto's words) "spit out these clever words, in a single verse."

地獄にハよき我主のあるやとて今日おもひたつ旅衣かな

Jigoku ni wa	In hell
yoki wagashu no	I suspect there is
aru ya to te	a good master.
kyō omoitatsu	Today I don travel clothes
tabigoromo kana	for the journey there.

Masamoto then noted this:

"Show this to lord Hosokawa," [Motokazu ordered]. [Masamoto's comments:] But think of the sentiments of [Hosokawa's] retainers. Any of them would surely feel trepidation in presenting this before him, would they not? Indeed it would be a difficult thing to do. After all, Hosokawa finds pleasure with young men. So Motokazu gave instructions that this was to be presented before [Hosokawa], with *wakashu* [young men] being read in place of *wagashu* [my lord], and then he slit his stomach, I was told.<sup>1</sup>

In other words, the subtle shift in terminology, from the written *wagashu* (我主) (my lord) to the spoken *wakashu* (若衆) (young men) resulted in a poem with new meaning:

In hell  
I suspect there are  
desirable *wakashu*.  
Today I don travel clothes  
for the journey there.<sup>2</sup>

Some scholars have suggested a homosexual relationship between Hosokawa Masamoto and Yakushiji Motokazu, though no evidence of that exists.<sup>3</sup> The poem carries punch whether interpreted that way or merely as a criticism of Hosokawa Masamoto by a heterosexual Motokazu. Be that as it may, Kujō Masamoto thought it clever, and was convinced that whoever was selected to read the poem before the military lord was sure to feel considerable unease

in doing so. What Masamoto did not comment on was the threat that Yakushiji posed to Hosokawa Masamoto and the symbol of resistance to the warrior's rule that he represented. The fact is that Hosokawa Masamoto's period in power was limited. Three years later he would be killed in his bath by disgruntled followers.

Masamoto's last entry in *Tabihikitsuke* is dated 12/7. Faithful as he was in keeping the diary, it is likely that he and his contingent departed Hine Estate that day or the following one. A document of accounting dated two weeks later, completed after their return to the capital, lists travel expenses for the group, as well as a few final outlays within the estate. The most significant of these was a payment of three *kan* to Takinomiya Shrine, perhaps a final gesture of goodwill to his neighbors in Iriyamada. Return expenses, covering everything from palanquin bearers and retainers' allowances to toll barrier charges and *sake*, equaled just over twelve *kan*. Acquired though they were without debt, the funds for these expenses were a final symbol of the financial concessions Masamoto made, willingly or not, during his time in Izumi. Of the seventeen *kan* listed, four *kan* were acquired as part of the settlement arrangements for the Arikazu debt. In other words, they were offered by the Negoroji monks as a token of agreement to the revised contract. In a similar manner, another three *kan* came by way of the monks who had been appointed deputies for Toshimichi's holdings. The final ten *kan* were provided by the villagers of Iriyamada, perhaps in thanks for Masamoto's decision to grant a tax exclusion.<sup>4</sup>

Following Kujō Masamoto's departure from Izumi, Hine Estate all but disappears from historical records. The shift from the riches of *Tabihikitsuke* is abrupt—a stark change from the days when Iriyamada and Hineno were the subject of Masamoto's daily writings. In this manner, the two villages lose their distinctive identity; they become like most other villages in the land, offering traces of an existence but withholding most of the reality we would like to see. In the Introduction, I stressed the concepts of “time, place, and people” as parameters within which to view the world depicted in *Tabihikitsuke*. In other words, I argued that we need to recognize the particular, bearing in mind that the early sixteenth-century villages of Hineno and Iriyamada (and more generally Izumi Province) did not, and could not, represent the whole of the Japanese archipelago during the century of *sen-goku*. The premise is sound. To casually assume, for example, that villages in 1550 resembled Hineno or Iriyamada, without taking into account specific factors—geography, political and military shifts, the strengths and characteristics of local powers, the dynamics of regional economies—is unwarranted. At the same time, having critically examined *Tabihikitsuke*, it is difficult not

to see wider implications, patterns and practices that were surely common beyond Izumi. I briefly discuss two of these in the following paragraphs.

Consider the rich world of economics that Masamoto wrote about and that his men documented in tax records. Many of the economic developments of the period, and the policies and practices that followed as a result, were clearly not unique to early sixteenth-century Izumi. Other villages also enjoyed the fruits of rising agricultural productivity, the expansion of commerce (one evidence of which was the spread of “six-day markets”—*rokusai ichi*), and the benefits (and pitfalls) of lending and borrowing money. On the other hand, villages were also forced to deal with powerholders’ efforts to acquire the profits of economic growth through the acreage tax (*tansen*) and supplementary land tax (*kajishi*). The bullying of villagers, as seen in outside powers’ incessant claims of income rights in Hineno and Iriyamada, was certainly replicated elsewhere, too. Since the *sengoku* economy is probably the most thoroughly examined aspect of the period, little of this noted here is new. However, in Masamoto’s detailed descriptions and copious recording of tax documents, claims to income rights (and the heated correspondence that followed), we get a sense of the depth and pervasiveness of these issues. Few villagers in the land escaped their effects.

Consider also warfare and its effects upon villages and villagers. *Tabihikitsuke*’s portrayal of villagers as capable fighters, proud of their abilities and willing to contest outside forces when necessary, is striking in its detail, but it too was not exceptional, as previously pointed out. There is no reason to assume that the weapons of war and defense (bows, arrows, and swords) that were common objects in households and religious institutions in Hine Estate were unique to residents there. With borders to protect and village laws to enforce, the need for arms for villagers throughout the land was a given. When and if villagers of a certain locale chose to contest greater powers that encroached upon them is another matter, requiring specific evidence, but it no doubt happened at times and in places. *Tabihikitsuke* also provides a counter perspective about warfare in revealing that villages were often the object of outside attacks by warriors for the simple reason that they paid taxes or provided labor to an overseer who was an enemy of the attackers. This was no doubt a common phenomenon elsewhere.

The most important insight that *Tabihikitsuke* provides about warfare in Izumi, which I believe has broad relevance for villages throughout the land, is encapsulated in the title of chapter 5: “Living with War.” As I argued, though fighting was a fixture of life in Izumi during Masamoto’s stay there, war did not define the existence of villagers in Hineno and Iriyamada. They lived in the present, struggled with challenges, celebrated on regular and

extraordinary occasions, and planned for the future. Was this typical of villagers elsewhere, or was it an aberration? There is no easy answer to the question, since evidence is found only in the details of the lives of the inhabitants, something vividly depicted in *Tabihikitsuke* but at best thinly manifest elsewhere. Moreover, evidence of warring armies' brutality on occasion—their capture and enslavement of large numbers of individuals (including women and children); their penchant for burning villages, arbitrarily at times; and their willingness to tear up fields of crops of non-compliant rural residents—all of this forces us to conclude that for some villagers “living with war” reflected a harsh and bitter reality.<sup>5</sup>

Thus the image is mixed, but the fact is that in this period of one hundred years, three or four generations of individuals and families passed their days, living and struggling and flourishing and floundering in the midst of a country at war. Their histories, we can assume, were as rich as those of Hineno and Iriyamada depicted in *Tabihikitsuke*.



## Appendix

Biographical Reference (Includes only individuals who appear in the text more than once. See *Izumisano-shi shi*, vol. 5, pp. 669–752 for brief biographies of all persons mentioned in *Tabihikitsuke*.)

Aoki Tosa Nyūdō 青木土佐入道. Family and personal name are unknown. A retainer of Tominokōji Toshimichi, serving as his deputy prior to Masamoto's arrival on the estate. Active in assisting the two commissioners, Shinanokōji Nagamori and Ishii Aritoshi.

Akaibō Shūson 關伽井坊秀尊. Negoroji monk, who had been an estate deputy for Hineno and Iriyamada prior to Masamoto's arrival. One of a number of Akaibō monks from the cloister of that name who appear in *Tabihikitsuke*. Also heavily involved in pushing for repayment of the debt incurred by Karahashi Arikazu.

Chōhōji Terasu 長法寺照. Kujō family official of samurai status. Served Masamoto throughout the period he was on the estate. Worked underneath the commissioners Nagamori and Aritoshi, and later Takehara Sadao. Active in collecting taxes, relaying messages, etc.

Hatakeyama Hisanobu 畠山尚順. *Sengoku* era warrior. Military governor (*shugo*) in Kii and Kawachi Provinces. Advanced with armies into Izumi in 1500, along with Negoroji and Kokawadera forces, defeating the two Izumi *shugo*, Hosokawa Motoari and Mototsune, who committed suicide.

Hineno Mitsumori 日根野光盛. Local warrior and retainer of the upper *shugo*, Hosokawa Mototsune. As reflected in his name, Mitsumori's family had origins in Hineno village. He held land on the estate, and

- probably had a residence there, too. During the time that Karahashi Arikazu managed the estate, he appears as a retainer of Arikazu. Continually at odds with Masamoto over land holdings.
- Hosokawa Masahisa 細川政久. Lower *shugo* of Izumi Province. Appointed *shugo* in 1500 after the death of the previous two *shugo*. Split duties in Izumi with Hosokawa Mototsune.
- Hosokawa Masamoto 細川政元. Deputy shogun (*kanrei*) of the Muromachi shogunate. De facto head of the shogunate from 1493 to 1507, when he was killed by disgruntled followers. Adopted one of Kujō Masamoto's sons as his heir.
- Hosokawa Mototsune 細川元常. Upper *shugo* of Izumi Province. Appointed to that position in 1500 after the death of the two previous *shugo*. Split duties in Izumi with Hosokawa Masahisa.
- Honma Yūshun 本間祐舜. Administrative monk of the Shingon temple Yuishin'in in Yamashiro Ono (near Kyoto). Served the Kujō family as an official. Active in Hine Estate from Masamoto's first days there until just before his return. Served as a messenger to the *shugo* and Negoroji. Along with Yamada Shigehisa, Chōhōji Terasu, and others he collected the annual tax from Hineno and Iriyamada.
- Ishii Aritoshi 石井在利. Kujō family attendant of samurai status. One of Masamoto's commissioners. Worked closely with Shinanokōji Nagamori. Heavily involved in the management of Hineno East Side through 1501. Returned to the capital at the end of 1501.
- Junryō 順良. Kōyasan monk and younger brother of Shōen Uma, convicted thief.
- Matsura Mamoru 松浦守. Deputy *shugo* of the Izumi upper *shugo*, Hosokawa Mototsune. At odds with Masamoto and his men over land rights on Hine Estate. Against Masamoto's claims that the estate had always been his family's, Matsura argued that it was *jitō* land, and thus the property of the *shugo*. Also, he claimed that the residents of Hine Estate invited the *shugo*'s enemies into the estate.
- Muhenkōin Zenkō 無辺光院善興. Abbot of Muhenkōin, Hineno village. Elderly but active in the community in advocating for and protecting the villagers. Despite residing in Hineno, he was an occasional associate of Masamoto, calling on him and sharing gifts and drinks in Iriyamada.
- Ohara Kamonnosuke 小原掃部助. Kujō family retainer of samurai status. Said to have carried out the murder of Karahashi Arikazu, at the order of Kujō Masamoto and Hisatsune. Accompanied Masamoto to Izumi.

- Saitō Katsuzane 齊藤勝実. Deputy *shugo* of the Izumi lower *shugo*, Hosokawa Masahisa.
- Satake 佐竹. Retainer of the Izumi lower *shugo*, Hosokawa Masahisa. When Masamoto arrived in Izumi, he was holding captive an Iriyamada villager in Sakai.
- Satō Hisanobu (Sōbei) 佐藤久信 (惣兵衛). The Satō were originally Izumi lower *shugo* officials. In Bunki 1/5, Sōbei was sent from Sakai to Sano to help manage affairs there. Then in Bunki 2/7, he rose in rebellion against the Izumi *shugo*.
- Shinanokōji Nagamori 信濃小路長盛. Kujō retainer of *shodaibu* status. One of Masamoto's commissioners, who he relied on heavily, and who served throughout Masamoto's stay in Izumi.
- Shinpukuin Shinkai 真福院真海. Negoroji monk of the Shinpukuin sub-temple, and the head official at Shippōryūji in the mountains above Iriyamada. Served as a mediator between Negoroji and Hine Estate. Well respected by Kujō Masamoto.
- Shiono Hyōgonosuke 塩野兵庫助. Kujō retainer of samurai status. Active in the management of the estate while Masamoto was in residence.
- Shirakawa Tomihide 白川富秀. Kujō family official of *shodaibu* status. He accompanied Masamoto to Izumi, but returned to the capital within a month.
- Shōen Uma 正門右馬. Iriyamada (Shōbu hamlet) cultivator of some means. Executed in 1504 for his theft of rice, an incident that led to a standoff between Masamoto and Shōen Uma's brother, Junryō, a Kōyasan monk.
- Taga 多賀. Retainer of the Izumi lower *shugo*, Hosokawa Masahisa, and a local warrior of some influence, with land holdings in Sano and Ibara villages. Forcibly entered Hineno on several occasions; also killed an East Side cultivator in the summer of 1503.
- Takehara Sadao 竹原定雄. Young Kujō official who went to Hine Estate soon after his coming-of-age ceremony in 1501. Served as commissioner along with Shinanokōji Nagamori after Ishii Aritoshi's departure at the end of 1501.
- Tominokōji Toshimichi 富小路俊通. Kujō family official, of *shodaibu* status, with close ties to Kujō Masamoto. Masamoto granted him half of Hineno and Iriyamada in 1479.
- Yamada Shigehisa 山田重久. Kujō family official of samurai status. With Masamoto on Hine Estate from the first. He often served as a messenger along with Shiono Hyōgonosuke and Ohara Kamonnosuke, being

sent to the *shugo*'s offices or to Negoroji. Also served as a messenger, manager, and tax collector within the estate along with Honma Yūshun and Chōhōji Terasu.

Yoshii Sadasuke 吉井貞祐. Retainer of the Izumi upper *shugo*, Hosokawa Mototsune. Active in taking captives and intruding with force in Hine Estate.

# Notes

## A Note on Conventions

1. *Kan* and *kanmon* were used interchangeably. To simplify matters, I use *kan* in all translations.

## Prologue

1. Yukawa, “Kuge saiban,” p. 32; Komori, “Kujō-ke no keishi,” p. 27.
2. On Masamoto’s background, see Hirota, “*Masamoto-kō tabihikitsuke* (Kujō Masamoto),” p. 243.
3. Ryavec, “Political Jurisdiction,” p. 37; Farris, *Japan’s Medieval Population*, p. 201.
4. On house officials, see Sugawara, *Chūsei kuge no keizai*, pp. 141–60; and Hirota, “Kujō-ke kaboku.” On the history of the Karahashi family, their ties to the Kujō, and the murder of Arikazu, see Komori, “Kujō-ke no keishi.”
5. Komori, “Kujō-ke no keishi,” p. 20.
6. Komori, “Kujō-ke no keishi,” p. 31.
7. The estate was established by government decree in 1234 as Hine-no-shō (ISS 5, No. 1, pp. 564–65). Beginning in the mid-fifteenth century, it sometimes appears as Hineno-no-shō, as written by Masamoto here. Both titles were used during Masamoto’s era (see, for example, the reference to Hine-no-shō in a letter from the Muromachi government, dated Bunki 1/4/24, in MKT, Bunki 1/5/8, pp. 21–23). With occasional exceptions (primarily in early studies), scholarly work is consistent in the use of the formal title, a practice I follow, while referring to the village alone as Hineno. See Hirota, “Ōsaka no chūsei,” for a concise historical overview of Hine Estate.
8. ISS 4, No. 10, p. 445.
9. MKT, Bunki 1/i6/20, pp. 50–51.

10. Tanaka, “Ukeoi daikansei,” pp. 7–9.
11. Komori, “Kujō-ke no keishi,” p. 27. The quote, “bringing disorder to the state” (*kokka rōzeki o itasu* 致国家狼藉) is found in Yukawa, “Kuge saiban,” p. 37.
12. *Sanetakakō-ki*, Meiō 5/1/8, in ISS 5, No. 207, p. 665.
13. For background on the Karahashi, see Komori, “Kujō-ke no keishi.” On *nainaiashū*, see Butler, *Emperor and Aristocracy*, pp. 47–50.
14. Yukawa, “Kuge saiban,” p. 30.
15. Yukawa, “Kuge saiban,” p. 37.
16. Yukawa, “Kuge saiban,” pp. 33–37.
17. *Kugyō bunin*, 3:296 (Meiō 7). Also see Yukawa, “Kuge saiban,” pp. 37–38, where he examines courtiers’ notes on this.
18. Most famously of course in *The Tale of Genji*.
19. MKT, Bunki 1/11/26, p. 97.

## Introduction

1. The first printed edition of the diary appeared in 1961 as *Masamoto-kō tabihikitsuke*, published by Zushoryō Sōkan. A more recent edition, which is the text for my analysis, appeared in 1996: Chūsei Kuge Nikki Kenkyūkai, eds., *Masamoto-kō tabihikitsuke*.

2. Sakai, *Zaichi shakai*, p. 240; Ishii, “Hineno, Iriyamada mura,” p. 33. In “Village and Rural Life,” p. 263, Pierre Souyri translates the published title of Masamoto’s diary as “The charms of the travels of the noble Masamoto,” but it is difficult to imagine that Masamoto would have used *hikitsuke* with the meaning of “charms” to describe his sojourn. As seen on the cover of this book, Masamoto entitled his diary *Tabihikitsuke*, a designation he provided, along with his signature, to each of the five manuscript volumes he kept.

3. Ishii, “Hineno, Iriyamada mura,” p. 33.

4. Yata, *Chiiki to minshū*, pp. 90–92. See MKT, Eishō 1/7/6, pp. 281–83, for the thievery case. Two scholars who raise questions about the accuracy of *Tabihikitsuke* are Hattori, “Shirusanakata gekokujō” and Suitō, *Mura no hibi*, pp. 172–74. Also see Ishii, “Hineno, Iriyamada mura,” pp. 51–53.

5. Yata makes this point in “Minshū to seikatsu,” p. 7.

6. Katsumata, *Sengoku jidairon*, pp. 95–101.

7. Tanuma, “Jikimu shihai”; Sekiguchi, “Kaikyū tōsō.” In *Sengoku daimyō*, Sugiyama concluded his analysis of Masamoto’s stay with a discussion of the proprietor’s “defeat” (p. 307).

8. Fujiki, *Sengoku no mura*, pp. 43–44.

9. Yata, *Chiiki to minshū*, pp. 87–135.

10. Sakai, *Zaichi shakai*, pp. 239–80.

11. Hirota, “Chiiki no kōkenryoku”; Atsuta, “Negoroji to Hine-no-shō”; Imatani, *Shugo ryōgoku*, pp. 216–45; Tanaka, “Ukeoi daikansei”; Nakamura, “Ishii-shi.”

12. Shiga, “Muraue o megutte”; Shiga, “Ōgimura shikiji.”

13. Also see Hirota Kōji’s critique of *Shibin* articles that address *Tabihikitsuke*: “*Shibin no Masamoto-kō tabihikitsuke*.”

The critical scholarship of recent decades is also reflected in the publication of *Shinshū Izumisano-shi shi*, 1999–2009. In particular, Volume 5 includes *Tabihikitsuke* in simplified (*yomikudashi*) form with headnotes, lengthy supplementary notes, biographies of all individuals who appear in the diary, and numerous reference documents, primarily from the Kujō family archives (these are supplemented by comprehensive documents in Volume 4).

14. Ryavec, “Political Jurisdiction.”

15. Farris, *Japan’s Medieval Population*, pp. 201–5, 247–50. I reference Farris’s study in more detail in chapter notes. Eiko Ikegami has a very brief section about *Tabihikitsuke* in *Taming of the Samurai*, pp. 130–32.

16. Hirota, “Hine Estate in Izumi Province.”

17. Tonomura, *Community and Commerce*.

18. Rüttermann, *Das Dorf Suganoura*.

19. Troost, “Common Property.”

20. Suitō, *Mura no hibi*.

21. See Yata, “Minshū to seikatsu,” p. 9.

22. For the diary entries in this section, see MKT, pp. 6–12. My analysis includes all entries except Bunki 1/3/27 and Bunki 1/4/5.

23. The “Karahashi dono” referred to here would have been Arina, Arikazu’s son. He was born in 1488 or 1489, and though but a child, the fiction remained that he was head of the family and thus the family’s representative in discussions between the Izumi *shugo* and the Kujō—so this letter was addressed to him. See the brief biography in ISS 5, p. 685.

24. See Lamers, *Epistolary Style*, for an important study and translation of Rodriguez’s work. Whereas Lamers translates *hirōjō* as “heraldic letters,” I render them as “presented letters.”

25. Just five of Masamoto’s *jikisatsu* appear in *Tabihikitsuke*, all addressed to the Izumi *shugo*. On one occasion, after the capture of six villagers by the *shugo*’s men, Masamoto wrote *jikisatsu* to both Hosokawa Masahisa and his deputy *shugo*, Saitō Katsuzane. He was rebuffed by both. As Sakai Kimi notes, he had broken the rules and ended up being humiliated. See MKT, Bunki 3/7/19–20, pp. 204–6; Sakai, *Zaichi shakai*, pp. 262–64.

26. For an example of the first type, see the letter signed by Ishii Aritoshi and Shinanokōji Nagamori and sent to the Negoroji monk Akaibō: MKT, Bunki 1/i/6/20, pp. 50–51. And for the second: MKT, Bunki 2/7/23, p. 130, also sent to Akaibō. For “private” correspondence, see MKT, Bunki 2/1/13, pp. 104–5 (from Chōhōji Terasu); Eishō 1/7/18, pp. 297–98 (from Shinanokōji Nagamori).

27. On the role and implications of intermediaries in late medieval correspondence, see ISS 5, No. 4, pp. 460–61; Sakai, *Zaichi shakai*, pp. 260–61; and Lamers, *Epistolary Style*, pp. 37–43.

28. ISS 5, No. 3, pp. 459–60.

29. See the following entries: MKT, Bunki 1/5/16, pp. 24–25; Bunki 2/2/16, p. 112; Eishō 1/9/23, p. 323. Excellent studies of the *bugyō* and other key individuals and families in Masamoto’s service, which are critical to understanding the workings of Hine Estate at the time, include the following: Fukuda, “Takehara Sadao”; Hashimoto, “Toshimichi Ason”; Iwamoto, “Shinanokōji Nagamori”; Komori,

“Karahashi-shi”; Moriwaki, “Yamada Shigehisa”; Nakamura, “Ishii-shi”; Nawashiroda, “Tominokōji-shi.”

30. MKT, Bunki 1/9/25, p. 83.

31. *Sanetakakō-ki*, Meiō 5/1/8, in ISS 5, No. 207, p. 665.

32. Sugiyama, *Sengoku daimyō*, p. 289; Ryavec, “Political Jurisdiction,” pp. 57, 66; Farris, *Japan’s Medieval Population*, p. 201.

33. Imatani, *Shugo ryōgoku*, pp. 216–45.

34. MKT, Bunki 1/6/24, pp. 37–39.

35. On Tominokōji Toshimichi, see Hashimoto, “Toshimichi Ason.”

36. MKT, pp. 6, 90.

37. Suitō, *Mura no hibi*, p. 4, mistakenly claims that the abducted Iriyamada cultivators’ family were *fudai* to Satake.

38. See Hashimoto, “Toshimichi Ason,” p. 86, on Masamoto’s inclusion of Tominokōji Toshimichi as one of the signers of these regulations.

39. MKT, Bunki 1/4/7, pp. 12–13; Bunki 1/9/23, p. 81; Bunki 3/7/27, pp. 210–13; Eishō 1/8/27, pp. 312–24.

40. I discuss his flight from danger in chapter 5. Masamoto noted that he returned from the mountain in a palanquin, but gave no details of his ascent two days previous: MKT, Bunki 2/8/21–23, pp. 137–41.

41. Masamoto described the birth of his daughter on 3/16, in a few terse words: “At the present time, it is a most pointless birth (*mueki shusse* 無益出生), providing space for ridicule. Embarrassing, embarrassing.” The girl appears just twice more in *Tabihikitsuke*, as ceremonies were conducted for her in the two weeks that followed: MKT, Bunki 3/3/16, 22, 27, p. 184.

42. Hirota, “Kujō Masamoto to Chōfukuji,” p. 4.

## Chapter 1

1. On the growth of cities, see Wakita, “Dimensions of Development.” For studies in English of medieval Sakai, see Morris, “From Shōen to Port City”; Morris, “Sakai and Urban Autonomy”; and Pearson, “Medieval Trading Towns.”

2. See MKT, Bunki 1/5/1, pp. 19–20, for Masamoto’s request for a mosquito net. Among the more prominent individuals who left and did not return were Aoki Tosa Nyūdō, whose assistants mismanaged a case of thievery while he was in the capital (Masamoto was irate and probably told Aoki not to come back); and Ishii Aritoshi, who, according to Hineno East Side villagers, made a promise to cut the acreage tax by 1000 *hiki* for three years (which he denied doing) in an incident that put him on the wrong side of Masamoto. See MKT, Bunki 3/2/27, pp. 181–82, for Masamoto’s discussion of this (Aritoshi had left the estate late in Bunki 1 (1501) and did not return).

3. Hineno and Iriyamada are described as *mura* in *Tabihikitsuke* and other sources (as opposed to *gō*—a historical term which defined administrative units, but is seen infrequently in descriptions of the estate). The four smaller divisions in Iriyamada (Tsuchimaru, Ōgi, Shōgi, and Funabuchi) are also referred to as *mura*. To distinguish them from the full village of Iriyamada, I refer to them as hamlets. On the use of *gō* and other terms in Izumi, see Kurushima, *Ikki*, pp. 73–74. Concerning *gō*, see Tonomura, *Community and Commerce*, pp. 39–42.

4. MKT, Bunki 1/6/22, pp. 36–37; Bunki 1/9/5, p. 73; Bunki 2/9/12, pp. 154–55.

5. See, for example, MKT, Bunki 2/7/26, pp. 131–32; and Bunki 2/6/26, p. 125.

6. For an analysis of the map, see Horiuchi, “Hineno mura no ezu”; Suzuki *Hine-no-shō iseki*, pp. 3–12.

7. ISS 5, No. 21, pp. 471–72.

8. On border disputes, see Garrett, “Bad Neighbors”; Oxenboell, “Village Conflicts”; and Inaba and Oxenboell, “Medieval Peasants,” pp. 9–10.

9. For brief descriptions in English of key developments, see Farris, *Japan's Medieval Population*, pp. 71–78, 129–36, and Troost, “Peasants, Elites, and Villages,” pp. 91–98. In Japanese, see Nishitani, “Nōgyō seisan.”

This depiction of economic growth and transformation is rejected in English (and originally in French) by Charlotte von Verschuer, in *Rice, Agriculture, and the Food Supply*. There she contends that double-cropping was rare, iron tools no more prevalent than in earlier ages, and water management (i.e., irrigation systems) as rudimentary as in preceding eras (pp. 63, 67, 74, 75). The result was that “no major increase in agricultural production can be seen during the late medieval period” (p. 79). Despite drawing on important work by Japanese scholars that question earlier studies that emphasized those developments—for example, about double-cropping (see Isogai, *Chūsei no nōgyō* and “Kikō hendō”; for an example of recent work at odds with Isogai, see Nishitani, “Nōgyō seisan”), the argument that agricultural productivity did not grow during these centuries, I contend, is untenable. There are several reasons.

First, population growth. Verschuer accepts the argument that Japan's population in the eighth century was 5.6 million, with, at best, limited growth up to the early medieval period. She then, p. 78, takes the very conservative population estimate of 12.3 million inhabitants in 1600 as an accepted figure (though 15–17 million is a more convincing number; see Farris, *Japan's Medieval Population*, pp. 1–11, for a discussion of these figures, and the scholarly debates about them). So the obvious question to ask is “What did two or three times as many people eat in 1600 if agricultural productivity had remained stagnant?”

Second, taxes. If Verschuer's assertion that agricultural production did not increase were correct, one has to ask what the basis was for the new levies introduced during the medieval period—such as *tansen* and *kajishi*. With no increase in productivity, and total taxes that had risen by at least fifty percent (and probably more), how did villagers survive?

Third, the basis and effects of historical change. In her summary, Verschuer concludes that there was late medieval stagnation, “a result of factors pertaining to the social environment,” in which landowning elites worked at “keeping this cheap labour in a dependent state.” In contrast to this, historians contend (in a broadly accepted argument) that the social, economic, and political environment during this period was vibrant, that it changed in a significant, irreversible way, beginning in the fourteenth century, and did so primarily as a result of the intensification and increased production of agriculture. Indeed, without that intensification, the changes would have not taken place.

10. On double-cropping, see Troost, “Peasants, Elites, and Villages,” pp. 94–95; Farris, *Japan's Medieval Population*, pp. 74–76, 130–32; Kimura, “Hatasaku no seikaku”; Nishitani, “Nōgyō seisan,” in particular, pp. 36–44.

11. This cycle can be traced in *Tabihikitsuke*. For additional details, see ISS 5, No. 95, p. 508. Also, see Masamoto's references to "paddies of early rice" during the drought of 1503: MKT, Bunki 3/7/10, 7/24, 8/7, pp. 203, 208, 215. On Champa, see Farris, *Japan's Medieval Population*, pp. 132–33, 223–27.

12. According to both Farris (*Japan's Medieval Population*, pp. 73–74, 130, 161) and Verschuer (*Rice*, pp. 21–25), references to the use of fertilizers in the medieval period are frustratingly few, but scholars agree that green manures were most commonly used.

Verschuer, *Rice*, pp. 56–76, argues that there was no systematic alternation of dry and irrigated crops due to limitations in geography and hydrology. Her discussion centers on the early medieval era, but she sees no change in late medieval times. Hine Estate in 1501–4 reveals a different picture.

13. MKT, Bunki 1/9/26, 30; 1/10/3, 5, 6, pp. 83–85.

14. MKT, Bunki 1/9/5, p. 73.

15. MKT, Bunki 2/9/12, pp. 154–55; Eishō 1/7/7, pp. 283–86.

16. Farris examines these issues in the first four chapters of *Japan's Medieval Population*.

## Chapter 2

1. As Ikegami, "Sengoku no sonraku," p. 91, notes, two critical questions about the *sengoku* era are "Who got the surplus produced by villagers?" and "How was that surplus then distributed?"

2. Spafford, *Sense of Place*, makes a similar point regarding the focus on land in the Kantō, p. 23. Also see more generally his second chapter, "Disputes Over Land," pp. 74–122.

3. The resident warrior family on Hine Estate was the Hineno, whose influence was limited. See ISS 5, No. 90, pp. 506–7. The continuing strength of elite proprietors is seen in Nagataki Estate, which was held by the temple Daijōin, and Kaminogō, which was the property of the Imperial Palace (Hirota, "Ōsaka no chūsei," p. 175).

4. ISS 5, No. 6, pp. 566–67.

5. For these figures see MKT, 144–45, which includes notes Masamoto made at the end of the second volume of his diary (WS); and the following documents of accounting recorded in ISS 5, No. 78, p. 596 (ES); No. 82, p. 599 (ES); No. 101, p. 621 (WS).

6. For 1417, the total given is 17 *chō* 8.5 *tan* 10 *ho*. See ISS 4, No. 36, (1417), pp. 363–66. A document of accounting for 1502 lists the total as 17 *chō* 1.5 *tan*: ISS 5, No. 81, pp. 598–99.

7. Farris, *Japan's Medieval Population*, pp. 139–42.

8. Sugiyama, *Sengoku daimyō*, p. 286.

9. Ryavec, "Political Jurisdiction," p. 55.

10. ISS 4, No. 79, pp. 382–83.

11. No details exist about the sale of rice and wheat by the villagers, but we can assume that it was bought and transported by wholesalers, who provided the cash with which villagers could pay their taxes.

12. For a list of miscellaneous taxes levied on the Iriyamada hamlets of Funabuchi and Tsuchimaru in 1482, see ISS 4, No. 34, pp. 472–73. Typical references to miscellaneous taxes in *Tabihikitsuke* can be found in the following entries: MKT, Bunki 1/5/8, pp. 21–23; Bunki 1/6/21, pp. 33–36; Bunki 1/8/5, pp. 59–60; Bunki 1/9/1, p. 72.

13. MKT, Bunki 1/5/16, 20, 23, pp. 24–26; ISS 5, No. 51, p. 585; MKT, Eishō 1/7/4, pp. 279–81; ISS 4 No. 79, pp. 382–83.

14. MKT, Bunki 1/5/20, 23, pp. 25–26; Bunki 2/10/30, p. 167.

15. Masamoto specifically noted the collection of the summer wheat tax in the following entries of *Tabihikitsuke*: Bunki 2/9/20, p. 157 (West Side; to collect this, Nagamori went to the West Side estate office at Kaitai'in, within Ōizeki Shrine); Bunki 3/6/24, p. 200 (West Side); Bunki 3/6/27, p. 200 (East Side); Eishō 1/8/5, p. 309 (East Side). In addition, evidence that it was collected in Funabuchi hamlet, Iriyamada, appears in a document of accounting as payment for “tax-day treats” at the time the wheat tax was collected; see ISS 5, No. 88, pp. 605–6, dated Bunki 3/8; the same document also notes its use as payment for “tax-day treats” for the East Side. In addition, the 1504 West Side wheat tax probably went to Negoroji; see the letter from Ryūshōin Seishū, in MKT, Eishō 1/7/4, pp. 279–81. Finally, though no record of the summer wheat tax exists for Bunki 1, Masamoto clearly intended to collect it (and probably did); in relation to this, see Aoki Tosa Nyūdō's comments in MKT, Bunki 1/6/14, pp. 29–30, about not pushing the West Side villagers too hard on the *tansen* and summer wheat tax or they would surely abscond. Even if the West Side was given a pass at this time, it is unlikely that the same was granted to the East Side and Iriyamada.

16. ISS 5, No. 84, pp. 600–3.

17. ISS 4, No. 79, pp. 382–83.

18. For overviews of the *tansen*, see Abe, *Shōen-shi no kenkyū*, pp. 140–65; Ichihara, “Tansen ni tsuite.” Also see Miyagawa's brief discussion in English in “From Shōen to Chigyō,” pp. 103–5. Ōyama Kyōhei examines the establishment of *shugo tansen*, including resistance by villagers, in “Kenryoku to nōmin,” pp. 1–9, and Shiga Setsuko analyzes *tansen* on Hine Estate in “Chūsei kōki Kujō keryō.”

19. *Shugo* who resided in Kyoto during the Muromachi era, as most of them did, encountered the same challenges of getting their deputies to forward revenue to the capital. See for example a letter from 1465 concerning the Iriyamada *tansen* in ISS 4, No. 154, p. 427.

20. ISS 4, No. 71, p. 378.

21. ISS 4, No. 48, p. 370; No. 72, pp. 378–79; No. 132, pp. 416–17. Also, see Shiga, “Chūsei kōki Kujō keryō,” p. 13.

22. In premodern times, Japanese divided the seasons by month, beginning with spring, months 1–3; summer, months 4–6; autumn, months 7–9; winter, months 10–12. Masamoto generally issued *tansen* notices in the fifth and ninth months (thus, summer and autumn), though he was careless in his jottings in his diary, writing at times of the “winter” *tansen* and “spring” *tansen*.

23. MKT, Bunki 1/6/9, p. 28. In his analysis of *tansen*, Abe Takeshi provides numerous examples from the fifteenth century in which *tansen* levies were paid in part with funds from the annual tax. In other words, proprietors such as Kōfukuji Daijōin

agreed to help with the levies, whereby the villagers (and other taxed bodies) provided half of the tax and Kōfukuji provided the other half, drawn from funds received as part of the annual tax. The point is significant in revealing that implementing the *tansen* as a regular two-season levy took time, and often required compromises with villagers. See Abe, *Shōen-shi no kenkyū*, pp. 140–65.

24. ISS 4, No. 101, pp. 501–2; Shiga, “Chūsei kōki Kujō keryō,” pp. 19–21.

25. References to *tansen* on Hine Estate in the second half of the fifteenth century appear in the following years (all citations from ISS 4): 1458 (*shugo* imposed), No. 146, p. 424; 1465 (*shugo* imposed), No. 154, p. 427; 1482 (Kujō imposed), No. 32, pp. 470–71 (also for 1482, No. 36, pp. 474–75); 1483 (Kujō imposed), No. 37; 1484 (Kujō imposed), No. 51, p. 482; 1485 (Kujō imposed), No. 60, pp. 484–85; date unclear, but prior to 1495 (Kujō imposed), No. 97, p. 499; 1496 (Kujō imposed), No. 101, pp. 501–2; 1499 (Kujō imposed), No. 129, p. 515.

26. The term for “sharp rebuke” was *kenseki* (譴責), which seems like a limited response for non-payment of taxes. But violent threats with heated language were uncommon in correspondence in *Tabihikitsuke*. Context alone often reveals the seriousness of a threat.

27. MKT, Bunki 1/5/16, pp. 24–25.

28. Precedent for the 120 *mon* per *tan* levy for Hineno and Iriyamada appears in a letter from Kujō officials to Akaibō Shūson, the Negoroji monk serving as estate deputy in 1499. They noted that the harvest for the year was “full,” and so no exceptions should be made to the impost of 120 *mon* per *tan*: ISS 4, No. 119, p. 515.

29. MKT, Eishō 1/11/20, pp. 338–39.

30. Here are references to the documents of accounting—all within ISS 5. For the sake of brevity, I have provided only document and page numbers. Each includes the term *sanyōjō* (算用状): No. 50, pp. 583–85; No. 78, p. 596; No. 81, pp. 598–99; No. 82, p. 599; No. 88, pp. 605–6; No. 90, pp. 617–18; No. 97, p. 619; No. 98, p. 620; No. 99, p. 620; No. 100, p. 621; No. 101, p. 621; No. 109, pp. 624–25; No. 110, p. 625; No. 123, pp. 628–29.

31. See, for example, ISS 5, No. 50, pp. 583–85; No. 78, p. 596; No. 101, p. 621. Not all documents of accounting include the term *nennen fusaku* (年年不作), but the reductions are consistent over the years, even when not specifically noted.

32. Examples of demands by the *shugo* for taxes, which were numerous, invariably included the terms *nengu shokuji* (年貢諸公事). See the letter from *shugo* retainer Nishimura Kotarō, dated Bunki 1/9/13, in MKT entry 1/9/17, pp. 76–77; and one from Yoshii Sadasuke, dated Bunki 2/8/10, in MKT, 2/8/29, pp. 142–44. An exhortation from the shogunate to the West Side village leadership, couched in the same terms, is seen in a letter dated Bunki 1/6/16, in MKT, Bunki 1/6/21, pp. 33–36.

33. I discuss the struggle between Masamoto and the West Side in the next chapter. The tax was eventually collected on Bunki 1/11/1 (MKT, p. 94).

34. For the full *tansen* notices, see MKT, Bunki 1/5/16, pp. 24–25; Bunki 1/9/14, 75–76; Eishō 1/9/16, pp. 321–22. Other dates when Masamoto specifically noted the issuing of assessments were Bunki 2/9/24, p. 157; Bunki 3/10/1, p. 222; Eishō 1/5/21, p. 266; Eishō 1/6/16, p. 271.

35. ISS 4, No. 79, pp. 382–83; No. 111, p. 406; No. 11, pp. 445–46; No. 33, pp. 471–72; No. 51, p. 482.

36. Suitō, *Mura no hibi*, pp. 48–52. The Tsuchimaru reference is from MKT, Bunki 1/9/19, pp. 77–79.

37. See, for example, MKT, Bunki 1/9/19, pp. 77–78, and Bunki 1/9/27, p. 83.

38. For villagers' claims, see the letter from Hineno East Side to Masamoto's officials in MKT, Bunki 2/10/29, pp. 166–68; for a representative loan contract, see MKT, Eishō 1/3/14, p. 243 (recorded on the contract as Bunki 4, the era-name change having just recently taken place).

39. MKT, Bunki 1/9/23, pp. 82–84; Bunki 1/10/30, pp. 89–91; Bunki 3/12/6, 13, p. 231.

40. Thus we see West Side villagers seeking a legal decision that would settle the claims between Masamoto and the military governors, leaving them to pay the tax to just one of the parties. See MKT, Bunki 1/9/24, p. 83.

41. Toshimichi's suggestion appears in a letter dated Bunki 3/6/15, recorded in ISS 5, No. 85, pp. 603–4.

42. MKT, Eishō 1/11/20, pp. 338–39.

43. MKT, Bunki 1/4/14, p. 15.

44. MKT, Bunki 1/5/11, p. 23; Bunki 1/5/3, p. 20; Bunki 1/4/24, pp. 17–18.

45. Evidence that the reduction included the whole estate is seen in documents of accounting for the three village units. For a detailed analysis of the question of the unity and independence of the villages of Hine Estate—Hineno East Side, Hineno West Side, and Iriyamada—see Yata, *Chiiki to minshū*, pp. 112–35.

46. MKT, Bunki 1/6/9, p. 28.

47. ISS 5, No. 14, p. 570.

48. MKT, Bunki 1/6/9, p. 28.

49. MKT, Bunki 1/6/21, pp. 33–36.

50. MKT, Bunki 1/6/26, p. 39.

51. MKT, Bunki 1/i6/9, pp. 47–48.

52. MKT, Bunki 2/5/1, p. 118.

53. MKT, Bunki 2/9/13, pp. 155–56. The term Masamoto used was *jukunen* (熟年), “year of a bountiful harvest.”

54. MKT, Bunki 2/9/13, pp. 155–56. The *tansen* was not included as part of this discussion, as seen in the issuing of tax notices ten days later and its full collection by the end of the year; see Bunki 2/9/24, p. 157, and ISS 5, No. 82, p. 599.

55. ISS 5, No. 71, p. 593.

56. It was in fact 85 years.

57. ISS 5, No. 72, pp. 593–94.

58. See MKT, Bunki 2/9/13, pp. 155–56, for Masamoto's extended discussion.

59. Considerable research has been done on *jigeuke*. I have drawn on the following sources for the description that follows. Ōyama, *Nāsonshi no kenkyū*, pp. 257–66; Kurushima, “Murauke sei;” Katsumata, *Sengoku jidairon*, pp. 93–95; Shiga, “Izumi kuni.”

60. Of course, one can argue that the *shōen* system itself was extralegal; however, laws were issued that regulated and protected the estates, giving the system legal recognition in that sense.

61. A Kujō family document from the early fourteenth century records that 2 *chō* 4

*tan* was set aside on Hine Estate for “well and pond expenses.” See ISS 4, No. 53, pp. 372–73.

62. Katsumata, *Sengoku jidairon*, pp. 93–103; also see Kurushima’s analysis in “Murauke sei,” pp. 77–78.

63. Shiga, “Murauke o megutte,” p. 14.

64. Evidence is seen in the detailed record of East Side holdings, listed by owner and productivity, that was carried out the following year by Masamoto’s officials: ISS 5, No. 89, pp. 606–17. Despite this evidence, Katsumata, in *Sengoku jidairon*, argued that Masamoto misinterpreted the villagers’ request as a desire to return permanently to annual inspections, when in fact they only wanted an inspection for that year, and no doubt (he claims), the land remained with the tax under contract in the years ahead; see pp. 95–97. Shiga refutes this in “Murauke o megutte,” pp. 3–4.

65. ISS 5, No. 88, pp. 605–6 (for first and last examples); No. 90, pp. 617–18 (for the second example).

66. MKT, Bunki 2/6/22, p. 124.

67. MKT, Bunki 3/6/19, p. 199.

68. MKT, Eishō 1/6/7, p. 270.

69. Matsunaga, “Kuratsuke.”

70. See Matsunaga, “Kuratsuke,” pp. 26–29, where he provides examples of *kuratsuke* for the annual tax. Two references to *kuratsuke* for the wheat tax appear in ISS 5, No. 88, pp. 605–6. Masamoto also noted *kuratsuke* for the wheat tax on Hineno East Side: MKT, Eishō 1/8/5, p. 309. For analyses of *kuratsuke* elsewhere at the time, see Oyamada, “Kuratsuke ni tsuite”; Kurushima, “Ryōshu no kura.”

71. MKT, Eishō 1/7/13, pp. 294–95.

72. MKT, Bunki 1/6/21, pp. 33–36.

73. MKT, Bunki 3/5/19, pp. 195–96; Bunki 3/6/16, p. 199; Bunki 3/9/29, pp. 221–22.

74. MKT, Bunki 2/6/22, p. 124.

75. MKT, Eishō 1/5/21, p. 266.

76. Yukawa, “Kuge saiban,” pp. 33–36.

77. Adolphson, “Weighing in on Evidence,” p. 298. Also see pp. 299–303.

78. MKT, Bunki 3/9/29, pp. 221–22; for Masamoto’s initial instructions, see Bunki 3/9/21, p. 220.

79. Kujō Hisatsune sent word to Masamoto late in 1504 of his plan to add a tax on lands near Kyoto, given that “this is an intercalary year”: MKT, Eishō 1/11/11, pp. 337–38.

### Chapter 3

1. We will keep that in consideration” (此方も可成覺悟候). The term *kakugo* appears frequently in *Tabibikitsuke*, typically as part of negotiations or as a threat. Depending on the context, the meaning can be 1) “to submit,” “to comply with,” “to accept”—directed at an opposing party or (as a negative) a rejection of a demand; 2) “to take into consideration,” “to keep in mind”—as seen in its use in this letter of

Bunki 1/7/26. As a threat, this seems both vague and soft. What becomes clear, however, is that *kakugo*, as a threat, was a euphemism, the seriousness of which can only be understood from the context. For several other examples (of nearly fifty in all), see MKT, Bunki 1/4/9, p. 13; Bunki 1/8/5, pp. 59–60; Bunki 3/5/8, pp. 189–90.

2. MKT, Bunki 2/7/29, pp. 133–35.

3. ISS 4, No. 11, pp. 445–46; No. 12, pp. 446–47; No. 30, pp. 463–64; No. 33, pp. 471–72. Also see ISS 5, No. 125, p. 521.

4. Miyagawa Mitsuru stresses the limited control over land that *shugo* had during the Muromachi period in “From *Shōen* to *Chigyō*.”

5. Mitsumori’s oblique reference to the *shugo* as author of the warning is seen in the verb form *ōseidasaru* (被仰出).

6. MKT, Bunki 1/8/5, pp. 59–60.

7. MKT, Bunki 1/8/6, pp. 60–61.

8. Suitō Makoto discusses *futaenashi* in *Mura no hibi*, pp. 121–44.

9. Quoted in Suitō, *Mura no hibi*, p. 123.

10. For the two additional *Tabihikitsuke* references, see MKT, Bunki 3/10/29, pp. 226–27; Eishō 1/7/27, pp. 305–7. See also Spafford, *Sense of Place*, p. 98.

11. Words to this effect appear repeatedly. See MKT, Bunki 1/5/3, p. 20; Eishō 1/4/13, pp. 261–62; Eishō 1/6/21, pp. 273–74.

12. MKT, Bunki 1/8/6, pp. 60–61; Bunki 1/9/17, pp. 76–77.

13. MKT, Bunki 1/8/6, pp. 60–61.

14. MKT, Bunki 1/9/17, pp. 76–77.

15. Farris, *Japan’s Medieval Population*, pp. 78–83; Birt, “Samurai in Passage,” pp. 381–83. Keirstead, “Theater of Protest,” examines peasants’ abscondings and threats to do so on *shōen* as part of the negotiations between them and proprietors, what he describes as “coded behaviors,” or “theater.”

16. MKT, Eishō 1/11/24, pp. 339–40.

17. For an exception, see MKT, Bunki 1/9/21, p. 81.

18. Here is list of abscondings, with dates and general outlines: A. Two East Side *bantō*, departure Bunki 1/4/14; pardoned by Masamoto on 1/5/11. B. East Side villagers flee several times in the face of intrusions by Hineno Mitsumori, probably for brief periods: Bunki 1/8/28, 9/4, then return on 9/23 to assist the West Side in battle; both East and West sides leave again, with the West Side villagers back by 10/17, the East Side back by 10/30. C. East Side villagers leave, Bunki 2/4/26, but are back planting wheat on 4/28; time away was ultimately brief. D. East Side villagers departed in wake of *shugo* threat, Bunki 2/6/26, but were back the same day as *shugo* forces failed to show up. E. East Side villagers flee upheaval of warfare, late summer 1502. No details on date of departure; described after the fact, Bunki 2/10/29 entry. F. East Side villagers flee based on rumor of *shugo* intrusion, Bunki 3/10/27. Short-lived, and probably only included fighting men. G. Hineno East and West Side villagers flee after learning Negoroji forces were on the move, Eishō 1/4/5. Appear to have returned almost immediately.

19. A third, in which two East Side *bantō* fled (as described in chapter 2), was significant because of the individuals’ important positions in the village, but the community as a whole was little affected.

20. MKT, Bunki 2/10/29, pp. 166–68.
21. MKT, Bunki 1/6/14, pp. 29–30.
22. MKT, Bunki 1/6/22, pp. 36–37.
23. ISS 5, No. 2, p. 565.
24. ISS 5, Nos. 3–5, pp. 565–66; No. 7, pp. 567–68; Nos. 128, 129, pp. 632–33; Tanaka, “Ukeoi daikansei,” Shiga, “Murauke o megutte,” pp. 10–11.
25. MKT, Bunki 2/8/29, pp. 142–44; the letter, signed by Shinanokōji Nagamori, is dated 8/13. For additional petitions of Kujō Michiie, see ISS 5, Nos. 130–37, pp. 632–35.
26. The two *shugo* at the time were Hosokawa Mochiari (1395–1438) and Hosokawa Motoyuki (–1448). See the brief biographies of them in ISS 5, pp. 736, 737.
- David Spafford, *Sense of Place*, pp. 90, 100, notes that control of land in the Kantō depended overwhelmingly on “presence on the land.” This was certainly true in Izumi, and it was critical to Masamoto’s success. Quite simply, by taking up residence on Hine Estate, he gained a clear advantage over his rivals: he was there and they were not.
27. For details about the land transfer to Toshimichi, see Hashimoto, “Toshimichi Ason,” pp. 78–79; Nawashiroda, “Tominokōji-shi,” pp. 6–7. Documents from the Muromachi government supporting the transfer of lands to Toshimichi can be found in ISS 5, No. 15, pp. 570–71.
28. MKT, Bunki 1/5/3, p. 20.
29. See, for example, Bunki 1/7/30, pp. 57–58 and Bunki 1/8/6, pp. 60–61.
30. MKT, Bunki 1/5/3, p. 20; Bunki 1/5/16, pp. 24–25; Bunki 1/6/10, pp. 28–29.
31. MKT, Bunki 1/6/14, pp. 29–30.
32. ISS 5, No. 50, pp. 583–85. This document of accounting covers both Hineno and Iriyama for all of 1501. Though it lists just half of the year’s *tansen* collection for the West Side, it notes that the remainder is recorded on Aoki’s document of accounting. That, and the fact that further disputes ended by mid-year, suggests that the summer *tansen* was paid.
33. MKT, Bunki 1/9/1, p. 72. This came in a letter from an attendant to Hirose Hyōgonosuke, a retainer (and spokesman) for the lower Izumi *shugo*, Hosokawa Masahisa.
34. See MKT, Bunki 1/9/14, pp. 75–76, for Masamoto’s *tansen* notice.
35. MKT, Bunki 1/9/19, pp. 77–79.
36. MKT, Bunki 1/9/19, pp. 77–79.
37. MKT, Bunki 1/9/20, pp. 79–81.
38. MKT, Bunki 1/9/22, pp. 81–82. For Aoki’s extensive dealings with the West Side during the fall, see the following *Tabibikitsuke* entries. MKT, Bunki 1/8/23, p. 70; Bunki 1/8/28, pp. 71–72; Bunki 1/9/1, p. 72; Bunki 1/9/4, p. 73; Bunki 1/9/17, pp. 76–77; Bunki 1/9/19, pp. 77–79; Bunki 1/9/20, pp. 79–81; Bunki 1/9/21, p. 81; Bunki 1/9/22, pp. 81–82.
39. MKT, Bunki 1/9/23, pp. 82–84.
40. MKT, Bunki 1/9/24, p. 83; Bunki 1/10/5, p. 85; Bunki 1/10/6, pp. 85–86; Bunki 1/10/7, p. 86.
41. MKT, Bunki 1/10/7, p. 86.
42. MKT, Bunki 1/10/30, pp. 89–91. Masamoto wrote of “four or five” village elders. Bunki 1/11/1, p. 94.

43. This is revealed in a discussion between Masamoto and Shinanokōji Nagamori. See MKT, Bunki 2/6/5, pp. 121–22.

44. MKT, Bunki 2/5/22, pp. 119–20; Bunki 2/6/5, pp. 121–22. I discuss *shugo funyū* (守護不入) in chapter 6.

45. MKT, Bunki 2/6/5, pp. 121–22. See Minegishi, “Sasa o hiku”; and ISS 5, No. 119, pp. 518–19.

46. MKT, Bunki 1/3/30, p. 9.

47. MKT, Bunki 1/9/19, pp. 77–79. Some scholars have taken this as a definitive pronouncement about West Side villagers, but that is clearly mistaken, as will be clear in my analysis that follows.

48. MKT, Bunki 2/2/1, 3, 6, pp. 110–11.

49. MKT, Bunki 3/7/27, pp. 210–13.

50. MKT, Bunki 3/10/29, pp. 226–27.

51. The description of “always allied with the *shugo*” is that of Fujiki, *Sengoku no mura*, p. 43.

52. MKT, Bunki 1/10/30, pp. 89–91.

53. MKT, Eishō 1/4/4, pp. 255–56.

54. MKT, Eishō 1/6/6, pp. 267–69.

55. MKT, Eishō 1/8/27, pp. 312–14.

56. MKT, Eishō 1/8/27, pp. 312–14.

57. MKT, Eishō 1/8/27, pp. 312–14.

58. The phrase he used was *fudai gohonjo nari* (普代御本所也), which suggests reciprocal obligations of service and fidelity.

59. MKT, Eishō 1/8/27, pp. 312–14.

60. MKT, Bunki 3/6/14, p. 199.

61. The following are linked to rain or drought: MKT, Bunki 2/5/13, p. 119; Bunki 3/6/14, p. 199; Bunki 3/6/26, p. 200; Bunki 3/7/24 (here Masamoto used *reimin* [黎民] rather than *reigen* [黎元]); Eishō 1/i3/18, p. 252; Eishō 1/7/2, p. 278. A seventh reference dated Bunki 3/7/19, pp. 204–6, appears in a letter from Masamoto to the *shugo* Hosokawa Masahisa, in which he wrote of villagers as “black heads” taken captive by Masahisa’s men. A final reference is found in MKT, Bunki 3/4/29, p. 187.

62. *Kokushi daijiten*, 10:1178.

63. MKT, Bunki 3/6/26, p. 200; Eishō 1/i3/18, p. 252.

64. MKT, Bunki 1/7/20, p. 56.

65. See ISS 5, No. 83, pp. 502–3. See Bownas, *Japanese Rainmaking*, pp. 110–30, for an ethnographic study of rainmaking dating to the early 1960s. Some elements of practices he observed can be found in Masamoto’s descriptions (in particular the idea of defiling a pool of water as a means of angering the spirits or deities therein, thereby inducing rain); other elements were foreign to 1501 Izumi. Ruppert, “Buddhist Rainmaking,” examines rites in the Heian period, focusing on the “dragon king” and monks’ rain prayers and rituals for the court.

66. MKT, Bunki 1/7/22, p. 56; Bunki 1/7/28, p. 57.

67. Farris, *Japan’s Medieval Population*, discusses villagers’ struggles with “spring hungers.” See pp. 116–17; 188.

68. MKT, Bunki 1/8/13, p. 62.

69. MKT, Bunki 2/1/7, p. 103. Also see Bunki 1/6/13, p. 29, where Masamoto

wrote that “in recent days, the cultivators have pleaded for rain, so the heavens filled a request for sweet rain, I was told.”

70. MKT, Eishō 1/7/2, p. 278.

71. MKT, Bunki 3/6/14, p. 199.

72. MKT, Bunki 3/6/26, p. 200; Bunki 3/7/2, p. 201.

73. Nagahara and Gay, “Medieval Peasant,” p. 323.

74. MKT, Bunki 3/2/14, p. 180.

75. MKT, Bunki 3/7/2, p. 201; Bunki 3/7/3, p. 201; Bunki 3/7/6, p. 201; Bunki 3/7/8, p. 202; Bunki 3/7/17, p. 204. Masamoto wrote surprisingly little about the situation in Hineno, which of course he did not witness firsthand.

76. MKT, Bunki 3/7/10, p. 203.

77. MKT, Bunki 3/7/24, p. 208. Farris, *Japan's Medieval Population*, p. 204, misinterprets the section, reading “mugwort” as “straw,” and claiming that villagers attempted to trade the straw for grain.

78. MKT, Bunk 3/6/16, 19, p. 199; ISS 5, No. 90, pp. 617–18; MKT, Bunki 3/7/8, p. 202; ISS 5, No. 99, p. 620.

79. MKT, Bunki 3/9/21, p. 220.

80. MKT, Bunki 3/9/29, p. 221.

81. In addition to the resistance by East Side villagers, noted previously (MKT, Bunki 3/7/8, p. 202), see MKT, Eishō 1/6/3, p. 267 and Eishō 1/6/16, p. 271.

82. For the collection of the annual tax in the Iriyamada hamlets and the East Side, see MKT, Bunki 3/10/14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 26, 28, pp. 223–26. On 3/11/7 (MKT, p. 228), Honma Yūshun went to Hineno West Side to collect the tax there. He was apparently successful, except where the Tsujibana hamlet was concerned, as previously discussed. That dispute lasted until the middle of the twelfth month (MKT, Bunki 3/12/6, 13, p. 231).

83. MKT, Bunki 4/2/16, p. 240; Eishō 1/7/4, pp. 279–81.

84. For a broader analysis of famine during *senyoku*, see Fujiki, “Kiga to sensō.”

85. Masamoto faithfully recorded the day's weather at the beginning of each diary entry. The last rain of any significance fell on Bunki 3/5/20 (MKT, p. 196), but his entries spoke as well of infrequent and insufficient rain during the months previous. For the shift to wetter weather in the fall, see MKT, Bunki 3/7/29, p. 213; Bunki 3/8/2–5, p. 214.

86. MKT, Bunki 4/1/7, p. 236. Considerable snow fell during the latter third of the month. See Eishō 1/i3/19, p. 252, for Masamoto's water offerings. Heavy rains fell on Eishō 1/i3/18–20, (MKT, p. 252), and were met with enthusiasm by the villagers. See fourth and fifth month diary entries for regular mentions of significant rainfall.

87. MKT, Eishō 1/7/1, p. 278; Eishō 1/8/24, p. 312.

## Chapter 4

1. MKT, Bunki 1/6/17, pp. 30–31.

2. MKT, Bunki 2/9/1, p. 148.

3. For example, see the East Side villagers' assertion that Ishii Aritoshi had promised them a reduction of the *tansen* for three years, totaling 1000 *biki*, following extended conflicts with the *shugo* late in 1501 (MKT, Bunki 3/2/27, pp. 181–82), the

payments for which are confirmed in documents of accounting, despite Masamoto's rejection of these claims (in a letter of his retainer, Yamada Shigehisa, in the same entry). See documents of accounting in ISS 5, No. 50, pp. 583–85; No. 82, p. 599; No. 107, p. 623. Also see Iwamoto, "Kuge keishi," pp. 15–16. Documents of accounting reveal that Masamoto twice paid ransom to free villagers held by *shugo* retainers, something he was clearly loath to do (and did not mention in his diary): ISS 5, No. 78, p. 596; No. 97, p. 619.

4. ISS 5, No. 88, pp. 605–6.

5. Masamoto periodically noted if it was his or Toshimichi's responsibility to cover the month's estate expenses. See MKT, Bunki 1/6/29, p. 40; Bunki 1/12/1, p. 98; Bunki 2/3/1, p. 113; Bunki 2/4/1, p. 115.

6. The 590 *mon* figure is recorded in ISS 5, No. 109, pp. 624–25; the same document notes that 1 *kan* 586 *mon* was repayment of funds for the third month estate expenses (an amount used to buy rice). The largest single month expense (of 5 *kan* 690 *mon*) is seen in ISS 5, No. 97, p. 619.

7. See ISS 5, No. 81, pp. 598–99 for travel expenses of 500 *mon* for Takehara Sadao in 1502, and No. 29, pp. 575–76 for the same for Shinanokōji Nagamori in 1501.

8. Even so, assuming that this was a two-day trip, at 150 *mon* the equivalent expenses for a year (75 *mon* per day) would be 27,375 *mon*, more than 27 *kan*, a hefty sum. Total travel days numbered around fifty based on data from the documents of accounting—just over one for each of the forty-four months Masamoto was in Izumi. Total expenses for the trips, based on the documents of accounting, were 6,300 *mon*, more than 6 *kan*.

9. ISS 5, No. 81, pp. 598–99.

10. Iwamoto, "Kuge keishi," pp. 13–14.

11. MKT, Bunki 1/4/20, p. 16.

12. ISS 5, No. 50, pp. 583–85; this was apparently promised on two separate occasions because it is listed twice, once for three *kan*, and a second time for 1 *kan* 574 *mon*.

13. ISS 5, No. 78, p. 596; No. 97, p. 619; No. 107, p. 623.

14. Von Verschuer, *Rice*, pp. 53–56 provides details on storing grains, along with the necessity of borrowing seed rice—already common in the eighth century.

15. Though Suzanne Gay's study, *Moneylenders*, centers on the capital, it sheds much light on late medieval practices and the challenges and opportunities associated with borrowing and lending. See also her discussion on moneylending in "The Kawashima," pp. 107–8.

16. MKT, Bunki 1/4/1, p. 10.

17. Evidence that outsiders paid for goods and services they used is seen in Masamoto's note that expenses needed to be paid to Shippōryūji for the several days he spent there in late summer of 1502. Masamoto fled to the mountain temple as the region was engulfed in warfare; he left Chōfukuji on 8/21 and returned on 8/23. He wrote of the need to pay for his stay on 9/12. See MKT pp. 137–41, 154–55.

18. For the loans from Muhenkōin, the unspecified lender, and Ishii Aritoshi, see ISS 5, No. 49, pp. 581–83; for the loan from the East Side, (and the repayment figure from Shinanokōji Nagamori), see ISS 5, No. 50, pp. 583–85; details about the loan

from Iriyamada villagers is found in MKT, Bunki 1/4/5, p. 11 and Bunki 1/9/20, pp. 79–81; the Negoroji loan is noted in ISS 5, No. 81, pp. 598–99.

19. ISS 5, No. 81, pp. 598–99. The 110 *mon* figure is an estimate, based on the repayment amount of 115 *mon* and one month's interest.

20. MKT, Bunki 2/2/27, 29, p. 113.

21. See the following documents for details on the repayment of loans during 1503–4: ISS 5, Nos. 81, 88, 90, 97, 109, 110, 123, (pp. 598–99, 605–6, 617–18, 619, 625, 628–29). The reference to *tatami* appears in No. 123.

22. MKT, Eishō 1/3/14, p. 243 (for this and the following contract). As seen in the prefacing comments, it was the recipient's responsibility to draw up the contract once funds were received.

23. MKT, Eishō 1/3/29, pp. 247–48; Eishō 1/i/3/2, pp. 248–49.

24. MKT, Bunki 3/4/30, p. 187.

25. A supplementary law issued by the Muromachi shogunate in 1497 warned individuals about dishonest creditors who prepare “loan contracts as bills of sale,” not as a means to avoid a debt cancellation edict. See Grossberg, *Laws*, Article 314, p. 123.

26. MKT, Bunki 3/5/1, 2, pp. 188–89.

27. List of lenders: A. retainers: Ishii Aritoshi, Shinanokōji Nagamori; B. monks/religious institutions: Muhenkōin, Negoroji, Chikurin'an, Manfukuin, Senjōbō Meishū; C. *bantō* (all from Iriyamada hamlets): Hikogorō Sakon; Genroku Kunai; Shirōtarō Sakon; Tanaka Sakon; Funabuchi Shiki; D. Other: Iriyamada villagers; Hineno East Side; *tatami* maker.

28. Braudel, *Structures of Everyday Life*, pp. 27–28.

29. Thanks to the archeological digs of some villages from this era, our understanding has increased considerably, but the limitations in what survived destruction and decomposition, particularly of villager material culture, are stark. Hirota, “Hine Estate in Izumi Province,” summarizes archeological findings on land formerly within the estate. These provide insights about village landscapes and layout, irrigation works, built structures (primarily temple and shrine sites), and stone religious artifacts, but little about villagers' personal material culture. For a study of the rich material culture of Ichijōdani, the town and palace of a *sengoku* warlord, see Pitelka, *Reading Medieval Ruins*.

30. See McKelway, *Capitalscapes*, for a detailed study of these panoramic screens. The many close-up images of townhomes, shopfronts, and city residents of all classes provide rich insights into the era's material culture, limited in focus though the screens are upon the capital and its surroundings.

31. MKT, Bunki 1/6/7, p. 28.

32. I base the 40 *kan* figure on the amount (46 *kan*) the courtier Yamashina Tokitsune paid for a residence in Osaka in 1588, when he moved there in exile with his family. The plot of land his house sat on was eleven meters wide by sixteen meters deep: *Tokitsunekyō-ki*, Tenshō 16/12/22, 3:157. Of course, Masamoto might have chosen something simpler, particularly since he expected at the time to return to Kyoto less than a year later. For references to straw mats, see ISS 5, No. 51, p. 585, and No. 90, pp. 617–18; for *tatami*, see No. 123, pp. 628–29; for cloth for a screen, see No. 50, pp. 583–85; all other items are listed in No. 51, p. 585.

33. On *daiku* see Butler, “Patronage and the Building Arts.” For references to the

village *daiku*, see MKT, Bunki 2/12/27, p. 174; Bunki 3/1/6, p. 176; Bunki 4/1/6, p. 236.

34. Totman, *Green Archipelago*, examines the use and depletion of Japan's forests from ancient to modern times.

35. Information about villagers' dwellings prior to early modern times is thin. Pit dwellings had been the norm for centuries, but there is evidence that this was changing for a portion of the populace, and in certain locales; Farris, *Japan's Medieval Population*, pp. 162–63.

On Bunki 1/9/21 (MKT, p. 81), Hineno Mitsumori threatened to dismantle and remove the homes of Hineno East Side villagers who had fled to the mountains, evidence of the value of wood and other construction materials of at least some of the structures.

36. ISS 5, No. 50, pp. 583–85.

37. MKT, Bunki 3/7/19, pp. 202–3.

38. I discuss arson during battle in the next chapter but, as we have seen, fire appears throughout *Tabihikitsuke* in all manner of conflicts, large scale or small. It appears as a weapon, as a means of attack (or defense), as an effort to weaken or demoralize, as an act of retaliation.

39. MKT, Bunki 2/8/22, 23, pp. 137–41.

40. Details of the theft and investigation, as well as the list of goods in the monk's residence (which were pasted within *Tabihikitsuke* on a separate piece of paper), are found in MKT, Bunki 2/1/26, pp. 106–9.

41. MKT, Bunki 1/9/5, p. 73.

42. MKT, Bunki 2/9/12, pp. 154–55.

## Chapter 5

1. Berry, *Culture of Civil War*.

2. Berry, *Culture of Civil War*, pp. 7, 13.

3. Conlan, "Instruments of Change."

4. Friday, "Military Technologies."

5. See Tsang, *War and Faith*, on Ikkō Ikki; Gay, "Kawashima," pp. 98–101, on *tokusei ikki*; Kurokawa, "Nōmin tōsō," on *tsuchi ikki*; Davis, "Ikki," on late medieval forms of *ikki*. On peasant resistance, studies include Fujiki, *Sengoku no mura o yuku*; Inaba, "Jiritsu suru mura."

6. Spafford, *Sense of Place*, p. 15, notes that of the conflicts that occurred in the Kantō during the period from 1455 and 1525, "none were about institutions or legitimacy or ideas of governance"; and it appears that few were based upon struggles for land, since they centered on "disagreements over succession and appointment to office."

7. MKT, Bunki 1/6/17, pp. 30–31.

8. See Sugiyama, "Rokusai ichi," on medieval "six-day markets."

9. MKT, Bunki 1/6/17, pp. 30–31.

10. MKT, Bunki 1/6/18, pp. 31–32; Bunki 1/6/21, pp. 33–36. On the Sano market abduction, also see Ishii, "Muromachi, sengoku jidai," pp. 36–42.

11. MKT, 1/6/22, pp. 36–37.

12. Besides the preceding occasion (Bunki 1/6/22), and that of the forgotten mosquito nets of Bunki 1/6/10 (pp. 28–29)—in which the military governors’ men sent word to Sakai that their decision to retreat was also a result of resistance by the villagers—see the following for references to attacks planned by *shugo* forces and the preparations made by the villagers to resist them (resulting in few battles): MKT, Bunki 1/8/23, p. 70; Bunki 1/9/2, p. 72; Bunki 1/9/5, p. 73; Bunki 2/6/26, p. 125.

13. MKT, Bunki 2/7/26, pp. 131–32.

14. On conscripting villagers, see Inaba and Oxenboell, “Medieval Peasants,” pp. 13–16.

15. Spafford, *Sense of Place*, pp. 90, 100, stresses the importance of “presence on the land” as a key to warrior control.

16. MKT, Bunki 1/5/19, p. 25.

17. MKT, Bunki 1/6/22, pp. 36–37.

18. MKT, Bunki 1/7/6, pp. 53–54.

19. The abductions: MKT, Bunki 1/4/2, p. 10 (this was the individual being held at the time of Masamoto’s arrival); Bunki 1/6/17, pp. 30–31; Bunki 1/7/11, pp. 54–55; Bunki 1/7/30, pp. 57–58 (shortly released through villagers’ efforts); Bunki 1/8/28, pp. 71–72; Bunki 3/7/12, pp. 203–4; Bunki 3/10/17, pp. 223–24; Bunki 3/10/29, pp. 226–27 (freed shortly by villagers who pursued the *shugo* force); Bunki 3/11/13, p. 229.

20. MKT, Bunki 1/7/11, pp. 54–55. I discuss *sanmai hijiri* in chapter 8.

21. MKT, Bunki 3/10/29, pp. 226–27; Bunki 1/7/30, pp. 57–58.

22. MKT, Bunki 1/6/24, pp. 37–39.

23. Fujiki discusses abductions in *Tabibikitsuke* in “Senjō no mura,” pp. 74–79.

24. MKT, Eishō 1/4/5–6, pp. 256–59.

25. ISS 5, No. 58, p. 588; MKT, Bunki 2/9/8, pp. 150–52.

26. MKT, Bunki 2/8/6, pp. 135–36; MKT Bunki 2/10/29, pp. 166–68.

27. MKT, Bunki 3/10/19, p. 224.

28. MKT, Bunki 3/7/8–9; pp. 202–3.

29. Fire was a universal weapon at the time, regardless of the size of the conflict at hand. It was used by thieves (see MKT, Bunki 1/10/22, p. 88), by villagers punishing wrongdoers (MKT, Bunki 4/2/5, p. 239), and as a potential means of defense in the face of an approaching army (Bunki 2/8/22, pp. 137–40).

30. MKT, Bunki 3/8/10, p. 215. Farris, *Japan’s Medieval Population*, p. 205, quotes Masamoto as writing in 1504 that “the violence of the constables [i.e., *shugo*] knows no bounds,” but the individual Masamoto was writing about was a previous appointee, a *shugo* who had put up Kujō family land as security for a loan, which was an act of “villainy,” *mōaku* (猛悪). See MKT, Eishō 1/11/2, pp. 332–33.

31. MKT, Bunki 1/8/28, pp. 71–72.

32. MKT, Bunki 1/8/28, pp. 71–72.

33. Masamoto notes the confiscation of Mitsumori’s land in the same entry, Bunki 1/8/28, pp. 71–72. Mitsumori had also served for a period as an estate deputy under Karahashi Arikazu: MKT, Bunki 3/6/9, p. 198; ISS 1, p. 434.

34. MKT, Bunki 1/8/28, pp. 71–72.

35. MKT, Bunki 1/9/5, p. 73.

36. MKT, Bunki 1/9/21, p. 81.

37. Fujiki, *Sengoku no mura*, pp. 43–44, misreads this incident, interpreting the invasion of the *shugo* force as a response to the capture of the West Side *bantō* by Masamoto's men, and Ayai, Motoyama, and Ōta as village forces summoned by the *shugo*'s men.

38. For details here and in the following paragraphs, see MKT, Bunki 1/9/23, pp. 82–84 (part of the entry appears after that of 9/24, as marked by a connecting line Masamoto added).

39. MKT, Bunki 1/9/24, p. 83. Those in armor would of course have been limited to Hineno Mitsumori and some of his associates.

40. Farris, *Japan's Medieval Population*, p. 202, mistakenly asserts that Mitsumori's men demanded military rations, when in fact it was Masamoto's men who gathered rations in preparation for hiding a force in the mountains as a precaution against a return of the intruders.

41. MKT, Bunki 1/9/24, p. 83.

42. In *Kanmon nikki*, Fushimi no miya Sadanari wrote of an incident north of the capital in 1443 in which villagers were following a wounded deer they had shot. The deer ran toward warriors led by Yamana Norikiyo, who decided they should take it. An argument and fighting followed, in which five of the warriors were killed and ten wounded. See Inaba's discussion in "Jiritsu suru mura," pp. 212–17.

43. MKT, Bunki 2/6/18, p. 124.

44. The common assignment of class and status to individuals during *sengoku* is problematic. Suzanne Gay lays out some of the issues in her perceptive study, "The Kawashima." See in particular her discussion of *kokujin*, *jizamurai*, *dogō*, pp. 116–17.

45. MKT, Bunki 1/9/3, pp. 72–73; Eishō 1/i3/5, p. 251.

46. For several examples of *shugo hikannin*, see MKT, Bunki 1/4/2, p. 10; Bunki 1/8/6, pp. 60–61; Bunki 1/8/28, pp. 71–72. For the range of uses of *shū*, see Bunki 1/7/6, pp. 53–54; Bunki 1/7/11, pp. 54–55, Bunki 1/7/13, p. 55; Bunki 1/7/20, p. 56; Bunki 1/8/15, p. 62; Bunki 1/9/2, p. 72; Bunki 1/9/23, pp. 82–84; Bunki 2/6/5, pp. 121–22; Bunki 2/8/2, p. 137; Eishō 1/7/19, pp. 298–99.

47. See MKT, Bunki 1/6/10, 11, 14, pp. 28–30, for references to *shugo tsukai*; and Bunki 1/9/8, p. 74, in which *tsukai* is used as "attendant" or "official" at a regional outpost: *shugo tsukai no mandokoroya*.

48. MKT, Bunki 1/6/10, pp. 28–29; Bunki 1/9/5, p. 73; Bunki 1/9/8, p. 74.

49. Very little work has been done in English on late medieval villagers or commoners at battle—excepting the activities of the Ikkō sectarians (examined most fully in Tsang, *War and Faith*). Japanese scholars have been much more active in the field, beginning with work done by Fujiki, including *Toyotomi heiwa rei*, and *Sengoku no mura*. Also see Inaba, "Jiritsu suru mura." On Hine Estate villagers' military activities, see Yata, *Chiiki to minshū*, pp. 87–111.

In discussing "The Armed Cultivator" in the early medieval period, Morten Oxenboell, *Akutō*, p. 98, writes of the "artificial distinction between 'warriors' and the rest of local society."

50. MKT, Bunki 4/1/11, p. 237. I discuss this incident in detail in chapter 6.

51. MKT, Bunki 3/7/27, pp. 210–13.

52. MKT, Bunki 3/10/19, p. 224; Bunki 1/8/28, pp. 71–72; Bunki 1/9/23, pp. 82–84.

53. MKT, Bunki 2/4/2, p. 115. For more on the use of bows and arrows in ear-

lier centuries, see Farris, *Heavenly Warriors*, pp. 12–23, and Conlan, *State of War*, pp. 58–69.

54. MKT, Bunki 2/1/26, pp. 106–9.

55. MKT, Bunki 1/i3/2, pp. 248–49.

56. ISS 5, No. 90, pp. 617–18.

57. MKT, Bunki 3/10/17, 18, pp. 223–24.

58. Mikael Adolphson has examined medieval temples' (and fighting monks') military might in *Gates of Power* and *Teeth and Claws*.

59. MKT, Bunki 2/8/21–22, pp. 137–40.

60. MKT, Bunki 2/8/21–22, pp. 137–40.

61. MKT, Bunki 2/8/28, p. 142.

62. MKT, Eishō 1/10/10, p. 326.

63. MKT, Eishō 1/10/10, p. 326.

64. MKT, Bunki 2/7/7, p. 126. For a detailed analysis of Sōbei's uprising, see Nagamatsu, "Bunki ninen."

65. MKT, Bunki 1/5/3, p. 20.

66. See brief biography of Satō Sōbei, in ISS 5, pp. 699–700 (佐藤久信).

67. MKT, Eishō 1/4/5, pp. 256–59.

68. ISS 5, No. 62, pp. 492–93.

69. MKT, Eishō 1/4/5, pp. 256–59.

70. MKT, Bunki 2/7/21, 22, pp. 127–29; Bunki 2/7/24, pp. 130–31; Bunki 2/8/22, pp. 137–40; Bunki 2/9/8, pp. 150–52; Bunki 2/9/12, pp. 154–55.

71. MKT, Bunki 2/7/26–29, pp. 131–35.

72. MKT, Bunki 2/8/6, 7, 16, 20, pp. 135–37.

73. Farris, *Japan's Medieval Population*, p. 203. Farris is likewise mistaken in claiming that "soldiers had burned down 610 homes near Sakai" in 12/1503. Masamoto's brief description includes nothing about "soldiers" or any other actors. The verbs describing the homes burned down are intransitive. Occurring as it did on 12/10 (December 28), we can be confident that the cause was a cooking fire or charcoal heater, with the conflagration fanned by the ever-present winter winds.

74. Hanson, *Warfare and Agriculture*. See in particular chapters 4 and 8.

75. *Tabihikitsuke* references to armies burning or otherwise attacking villages during Sōbei's uprising are as follows, a. Sōbei burned Sano marketplace and Hineno West Side village of Tsujibana; affiliated monks set a few fires in Kumatori (Bunki 2/8/6, pp. 135–36); b. Sōbei set fire to Sano and to Yasumatsu hamlet in Ibara (Bunki 2/8/20, pp. 136–37); c. Sōbei attacked Yoshimi, Kaishōji, Shinge, and Sano (Bunki 2/9/1, p. 148). Arson was somewhat more common in 1504 when Negoroji armies were contesting the *shugo*.

76. MKT, Bunki 2/8/21–24, pp. 137–41.

77. MKT, Bunki 2/9/3–11, pp. 149–54.

78. MKT, Bunki 2/9/19, pp. 156–57.

79. MKT, Bunki 2/10/6, p. 158.

80. See Masamoto's reference to these individuals in MKT, Bunki 2/8/21, p. 137, and Bunki 2/9/1, p. 148.

81. MKT, Bunki 2/8/22, pp. 137–40. In her close analysis of Satō Sōbei's uprising, Nagamatsu Keiko examines the critical role of Negoroji in backing Sōbei but eventually restraining him. See "Bunki ninen."

82. MKT, Bunki 2/9/7, p. 150.
83. MKT, Bunki 2/9/7, p. 150.
84. MKT, Bunki 2/9/5–8, pp. 149–52.
85. MKT, Bunki 3/10/17, 18, pp. 223–24.
86. MKT, Bunki 3/10/19, p. 224.
87. MKT, Bunki 3/10/20, p. 224.
88. MKT, Bunki 3/10/20, p. 224.
89. See MKT, Bunki 2/9/12, pp. 154–55, for detailed discussions between the villagers and Masamoto about the costs of the placard and related expenses. Of the total required, 20 *kan* or 2000 *hiki*, Masamoto noted that he provided 500 *hiki*. The document of accounting for the 1502 Hineno East Side autumn *tansen* is found in ISS 5, No. 82, p. 599.
90. MKT, Bunki 2/8/28, p. 142.
91. ISS 5, No. 101, p. 621.
92. MKT, Bunki 2/12/15, p. 173.
93. MKT, Bunki 2/12/16, p. 173.

## Chapter 6

1. Katsumata, “Sengoku law.” Birt, “Samurai in Passage,” provides details of these developments in the Hōjō domain.

2. The six-volume set of Japanese medieval law, *Chūsei hōsei shiryō shū*, provides a large compendium of law codes and rules and regulations for the medieval period, promulgated primarily by groups and individuals we classify as warriors and extending from the Kamakura and Muromachi shogunates to upstart warriors of the *sengoku* era. There is much to consider therein, but to what extent it represents “law” over these centuries (and especially during the *sengoku* era) is another matter. As characterized by David Eason, it is “a deceptively well-organized collection of codes that no one who was alive at the time they were written would ever have conceived of nor had any reason to conceive of as a unified whole.” (personal email, 3/10/2025)

3. Steenstrup, *Law in Japan*, gives little space to law in the *sengoku* era (see John O. Haley’s review of Steenstrup). The workings of law in narrower contexts show up in various studies in English and German (Tonomura, Troost, Spafford, Rüttermann), but no sustained treatments of the topic exist.

4. Katsumata passed away in 2023. His highly regarded studies on medieval social and legal history are wide-ranging and remain influential.

5. See Matsuzono, *Hō no sekai*, for the wide range of *sengoku* law that Japanese scholars are currently examining—extending from the imperial court and temples to villages and towns.

6. Spafford, *Sense of Place*, pp. 72–122.

7. Kimura, “Funyū-ken no seiritsu.”

8. Grossberg, *Laws*, Articles 56, 57, 78, 83–85, 97, pp. 48–50, 58–61, 64–65. Regarding *shugo-shi funyū* and the lack of enforcement, see the request to the shogunate by Kujō Michiie in ISS 4, No. 74, p. 380. Also see Shiga, “Murauke o megutte,” p. 11. On *hanzei*, see Wintersteen, “Muromachi *shugo* and *hanzei*.”

9. MKT, Bunki 2/3/2, p. 114.

10. MKT, Bunki 1/7/6, pp. 153–54; Ishii, “Muromachi, sengoku jidai,” p. 46.

11. MKT, Bunki 1/6/18, pp. 31–32.

12. See for example the reference in a letter from Masamoto to Saitō Katsuzane, assistant to the *shugo* Hosokawa Masahisa: MKT, Bunki 3/7/19, pp. 205–6. For other examples, see Bunki 1/7/11, pp. 54–55; Bunki 2/2/3, pp. 110–11 (in a letter from a Kujō official, Chōhōji Terasu); Bunki 2/7/29, pp. 133–35 (in a letter from Masamoto’s commissioner Shinanokōji Nagamori).

13. The issue was front and center in the laws issued by the Muromachi government, in which Article 7 of the *Kenmu shikimoku*, the foundation code of the regime, addressed the need to select “men of political ability to fill the post of *shugo*”; and in Article 2 (issued in 1338) of the Supplementary Laws, which begins as follows: “The original objective of the aforementioned *shugo* appointments was to govern the provinces and preserve order. For the sake of the people a virtuous man should be appointed to this post, and for the sake of the country, a useless one must be replaced. . . . [It] is unpardonable for the *shugo* to encroach upon temple, shrine, and *honjo* land.” More such admonitions would follow. Translations from Grossberg, *Laws*, pp. 18, 26–28.

14. MKT, Eishō 1/i3/7, p. 251.

15. MKT, Eishō 1/5/22, p. 266.

16. As was common practice, the title *shōgun* itself was not used, though the references are clearly to him as an individual or to his government. Instead of *shōgun*, we see *jōi* (上意) or *kubō* (公方), or in the case of laws issued, *ongechi* (御下知)—all of this despite the fact that not many of these rulings had been personally issued by the shogun at the time, and certainly none during the years when Masamoto was in Izumi.

17. MKT, Bunki 1/4/9, p. 13; Bunki 1/4/10, pp. 13–15; Bunki 1/7/30, pp. 57–58.

18. MKT, Bunki 2/11/21, p. 170; Bunki 2/10/18, pp. 160–64.

19. The idea of Kantō warriors’ interest in (and ties to) both the “official and the lordly” is one theme that runs through Spafford’s *Sense of Place*. See in particular, pp. 84 ff.

For Kamakura, see Mass, *Yoritomo and the Founding of the First Bakufu*, which was a reconsideration of his earlier volume, *Warrior Government in Early Medieval Japan*, in which he attributed far more power and authority to the warriors.

20. For exchanges in letters and descriptions of legal disputes, see the following: MKT, Bunki 1/4/5, 6, pp. 11–12; Bunki 1/4/9, p. 13; Bunki 1/4/10, pp. 13–15; Bunki 1/6/18, pp. 31–32; Bunki 1/6/21, pp. 33–36; Bunki 1/i6/8, pp. 46–47; Bunki 1/7/30, pp. 57–58; Bunki 1/8/18, pp. 63–65; Bunki 1/8/22, pp. 66–70; Bunki 1/9/17, pp. 76–77; Bunki 2/8/29, pp. 142–44.

21. Spafford, *Sense of Place*, pp. 15–16.

22. MKT, Bunki 2/10/26, pp. 164–66.

23. MKT, Bunki 2/10/26, pp. 164–66.

24. For several specific references, see MKT, Bunki 1/4/6, pp. 11–12; Bunki 1/6/18, pp. 31–32.

25. See Kimura, “Funiyū-ken no seiritsu,” for the early workings of *shugo-shi funyū*, which reached back to the Heian era. Also see Kobayashi, “Shugo-shi funyūken.”

26. See letters dated Bunki 1/6/16 (within MKT, Bunki 1/6/21 entry, pp. 33–36) from two of the deputy shogun’s officials, [Matsuda] Yorisuke and [Ino’o] Tamesada, one addressed to the two deputies (*shugodai*) of the Izumi *shugo* and the other to the

village leadership of Hineno and Iriyamada. Both letters note that the Kujō land is “free from *shugo* entry.” See the same within a letter dated Bunki 2/6/9 from Shinanokōji Nagamori to Tomino, a retainer of the lower *shugo*, in MKT, Bunki 2/6/8, pp. 122–23; and from Nagamori to the Hineno East Side cultivators association, Bunki 1/8/5, pp. 59–60. Also see Eishō 1/11/7, pp. 334–45 for an acknowledgement of the same by Negoroji monks; Shiga, “Murauke o megutte,” p. 11.

27. MKT, Bunki 1/4/10, pp. 13–15; Bunki 1/9/8, p. 74; Bunki 1/16/8, pp. 46–47.

28. See letter from Aritoshi and Nagamori noting the *shugo*'s failure to provide written evidence: MKT, Bunki 1/4/10, pp. 13–15; also Aritoshi letter of Bunki 1/6/18, pp. 31–32.

29. MKT, Bunki 1/4/16, p. 16.

30. MKT, Bunki 1/4/9, p. 13; Bunki 3/7/19, pp. 204–6. See shipment notices from the 1420s, as well as the letters of acceptance in ISS 5, Nos. 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, pp. 565–68.

31. The point is laid out early in an exchange between retainers of Masamoto and the lower *shugo* in MKT, Bunki 1/4/6, pp. 11–12, and regularly repeated in one form or another. The *shugo* appear to have been asserting their claims on the basis of *shitaji chūbun*, or the territorial division of estates, a practice in the latter part of the Kamakura era, in which proprietors and land stewards (*jitō*) reached an agreement to split control of an estate as a means to end conflict over its income. Authority lay with the Kamakura government to confirm these. On *shitaji chūbun* see Mass, “*Jitō* Land Possession.” See the *shugo*'s claims, as laid out by Saitō Katsuzane, in a letter to Yasutomi Motoie, attendant to the deputy shogun, MKT, Bunki 2/10/26, pp. 164–66. As decreed by the Muromachi shogunate, no outside claims could be made on land that was held continuously by the original proprietor (as well as by Fujiwara clan heads, i.e., members of the regental families): Grossberg, *Laws*, No. 97, pp. 64–65.

32. As David Spafford writes concerning the Kantō, “By the middle of the fifteenth century, hundreds of years of unlawful encroachments and lawsuits, hundreds of years of legal accretions, exceptions, redefinitions, and compromises had yielded a tenurial landscape of intractable complexity.” Spafford, *Sense of Place*, p. 74.

33. Letters dated Bunki 1/4/24, in MKT, Bunki 1/5/8, pp. 21–23.

34. MKT, Bunki 3/5/16, pp. 192–93.

35. Takehara Sadao referred to the Saitō letter in a message he sent to Hineno Mitsumori on Bunki 3/5/7. See MKT, Bunki 3/5/8, pp. 189–91.

36. According to Grossberg, *Laws*, p. 9, the first evidence of this use of public noticeboards by the shogunate is found in regulations of 1369 (Articles 99–103 of the Supplementary Laws, according to their numbering; see pp. 66–67). See Minegishi, *Chūsei saigai, senran*, pp. 130–80, on *senroku*-era noticeboards.

37. “[R]ear seating area of this temple” *kono tera no matsu* (此寺之末), with *matsu* probably referring to *matsuza* (末座), a seating area of lower status, which in this case would be in a visible location, appropriate for posting the regulations.

38. MKT, Bunki 1/4/6, pp. 11–12. Masamoto included Tominokōji Toshimichi as one of the authors of the regulations, though he remained in the capital, giving the document legitimacy for the whole estate, not just Masamoto's portion.

39. See the following studies, each of which presents the edict as a challenge to the military governors. Tanuma, “Kuge-ryō,” p. 32; Sugiyama, *Senroku daimyō*, p. 288;

Kudō, *Shōen no hitobito*, pp. 193–94; Suitō, *Mura no hibi*, pp. 9–10. By misinterpreting the edict in this manner, these studies begin with a bias that shapes, and distorts, their reading of *Tabihikitsuke*, and of Masamoto himself, in significant ways. Farris, *Japan's Medieval Population*, p. 201, takes the misreading further, tying the military governors' actions on the estate to excessive taxation of the villagers and raping of women.

40. MKT, Bunki 4/1/11, p. 237.

41. Sakai Kimi has convincingly argued that honorific language patterns in *Tabihikitsuke* are consistent with an interpretation of *gohikannin* as “his lordship's retainers”; see *Zaichi shakai*, pp. 271–72.

Examples of the honorific use of *go* in this manner dot the retainers' correspondence throughout *Tabihikitsuke*. The three I note are from letters on the following dates: Bunki 1/4/24, p. 17; Bunki 1/4/10, p. 14; Bunki 1/6/21, p. 33.

42. MKT, Bunki 2/9/3–8, pp. 149–52.

43. MKT, Bunki 2/9/8, pp. 150–52.

44. See Koyama Yasunori's discussion of the conflicting scholarly interpretations in ISS 5, No. 139, pp. 525–26. Further complicating matters, in the Negoroji placard the references to “Iriyamada estate” and “this estate” appear as *Iriyamada-shō* (入山田庄) and *tōshō* (當庄). The use of *sōshō* also appears in MKT, Bunki 1/10/30, pp. 89–91. There it refers to the combined village units of Hineno East Side and West Side, something that Masamoto wanted to clarify. It appears not to have meant the “*sō* village” in that case.

45. See Sakai Kimi's argument in *Zaichi shakai* pp. 271–74; Nagamatsu, “Bunki ninen,” pp. 53–54.

46. See Nagamatsu Keiko's discussion of Negoroji as a “public power” in “Bunki ninen,” pp. 52–54, and note 47, pp. 63–64. Also, Hirota, “Chūsei Negoroji,” pp. 24–40.

47. MKT, Bunki 2/9/8, pp. 150–52.

48. MKT, Bunki 1/11/19, 12/6, 12/11, pp. 95, 99.

49. MKT, Bunki 2/9/8, 9, pp. 150–53.

50. MKT, Eishō 1/5/1, p. 264. See Segal, *Coins*, pp. 202–8, on the debasing of coinage during this period, and efforts to regulate it. Sakurai, “Medieval Japan's Commercial Economy,” argues for the weighty significance that coinage, and its scarcity, played in the late medieval and *sengoku* economies.

51. MKT, Bunki 2/1/26, pp. 106–9.

52. MKT, Bunki 2/1/26, pp. 106–9.

53. MKT, Bunki 2/1/26, pp. 106–9.

54. MKT, Bunki 2/1/27, p. 109.

55. MKT Bunki 2/1/28, 29, Bunki 2/2/1, pp. 109, 110.

56. ISS 5, No. 54, pp. 586–87.

57. See Hirota's discussion of the incident in “*Masamoto-kō tabihikitsuke* (Kujō Masamoto),” pp. 249–50; and Ishii's in “Muromachi, sengoku jidai,” pp. 51–53.

58. MKT, Bunki 2/1/26, pp. 106–9.

59. MKT, Bunki 2/1/27, p. 109.

60. MKT, Bunki 2/1/27, p. 109.

61. I examine the “auspicious writing” ceremony in detail in chapter 7.

62. Sugiyama, *Sengoku daimyō*, p. 293. Also, see *yugishō* entry in *Kokushi daijiten*, 14:295.

63. MKT, Bunki 4/1/11, p. 237.
64. MKT, Bunki 4/1/13, p. 237. See Shiga Setsuko's analysis of this incident in "Ōgimura shikiji," pp. 73–78.
65. MKT, Bunki 4/1/13, p. 237.
66. MKT, Bunki 4/1/13, p. 237.
67. MKT, Bunki 4/2/5, p. 239.
68. Shiga, "Ōgimura shikiji," pp. 73–78.
69. For legal justification of this, see Article 11 of *Goseibai shikimoku*, in *Chūsei hōsei shiryō shū*, 1:3–36.
70. MKT, Eishō 1/7/17, pp. 295–97.
71. Shiga's analysis, published in 2007, was an elaboration of a very brief argument put forth by Katsumata Shizuo in his book *Sengoku jidairon* (1996)—and largely ignored after that. Given the ambiguity of Masamoto's descriptions, it is possible to interpret the incident as the editors of *Izumisano-shi shi* did (though it appears that Shiga's argument has been generally accepted, and there are linguistic reasons to support her claims): 1) the thief was Giha Kunai; 2) Genzaburō Kunai, as *bantō*, pleaded for Giha Kunai's life; 3) among those killed by the evil band (in an incident completely divorced from the sword theft) were Genzaburō Kunai, his wife, and a child. See brief biography of Genzaburō Kunai in ISS 5, p. 691.
72. Oxenboell, *Akutō*, deals broadly with the concept, meanings, and actions of *akutō* during the early medieval era. See in particular pp. 28–33, 42–47, 57–76; also see Garrett, "Crime on the Estates."
73. MKT, Bunki 4/2/16, p. 240.
74. MKT, Bunki 4/2/16, p. 240.
75. MKT, Eishō 1/3/26, pp. 244–45.
76. MKT, Eishō 1/3/28, pp. 245–47.
77. MKT, Eishō 1/3/28, pp. 245–47.
78. MKT, Eishō 1/3/28, 29, pp. 245–48.
79. MKT, Eishō 1/i3/2, pp. 248–49.
80. MKT, Eishō 1/3/26, pp. 244–45.
81. MKT, Eishō 1/i3/3, p. 249. Clearly the villagers wanted to make clear that they would keep an eye on Ōya Ukon to ensure the land and rights were maintained and transferred honestly. *Sōjige* (惣地下) here appears to be used generically, not as a reference to the village as a *sō* (corporate or collective entity).
82. MKT, Eishō 1/i3/4, pp. 249–51.
83. MKT, Eishō 1/i3/4–5, pp. 249–51; Eishō 1/i3/24, p. 254.
84. MKT, Eishō 1/i3/4, pp. 249–51.
85. Tonomura, *Community and Commerce*, pp. 75–77, discusses *kaito* in Imabori.
86. MKT, Eishō 1/7/5, p. 281.
87. MKT, Eishō 1/7/6, pp. 281–83.
88. MKT, Eishō 1/7/6, pp. 281–83.
89. MKT, Eishō 1/7/6, pp. 281–83. The Japanese for this phrase is *Kono tanichū hyakushō nado Kishū no hataraki o motte, inochi o tsugu nari* 此谷中百姓亦以紀州之働繼命也. Farris, *Japan's Medieval Population*, p. 204, interprets this to mean that some of Masamoto's men had "joined military forces in Kii during 1503 [sic] to get enough to eat."
90. MKT, Eishō 1/7/7, pp. 283–86.

91. MKT, Eishō 1/7/10, pp. 293–94.
92. Suitō, *Mura no hibi*, pp. 162–71, defines the case as “baffling.”
93. Troost, “Peasants, Elites, and Villages,” pp. 106–8; Shiga, “Sonraku to kendan.” As Tonomura points out in *Community and Commerce*, p. 94, the *sō* in Imabori did not wield jurisdiction over crime (*kendan*—policing, judging, and punishing). Whether Hineno and Iriyamada held those powers when Masamoto was gone is unclear.

## Chapter 7

1. Tonomura, *Community and Commerce*; see especially, pp. 1–16; 37–95; Troost, “Common Property,” examines the workings of “self-governing villages,” pp. 216–393. Studies in Japanese are numerous, and include Nakamura, *Chūsei sōson-shi*; Miura, *Minshū seikatsu-shi*; Tanaka, *Chūsei no sōson*.

2. Surprisingly, there are no clear references to “*sō* communities” on Hine Estate, either by outsiders like Masamoto or the Izumi *shugo*, or by the villagers themselves, whether in dialogue or correspondence (with the possible exception of Negoroji in the 1503 edict it provided to Iriyamada). In references to the villages, *sō* appears only nine times in *Tabihikitsuke*, generally in Masamoto’s descriptions of certain events. In most cases, it is clear that he is using *sō* as a generic term, as in “all the villagers” (*sōjige* 惣地下) (Eishō 1/i3/3, p. 249) or “all the *bantō*” (*sōbantō-shū* 惣番頭衆) (Eishō 1/7/8, pp. 287–91). Also, see Bunki 1/10/30, when village elders from both the West and East sides of Hineno village called on Masamoto. Twice, at times of crises, there is a suggestion of an established administrative body, a “general council” (*sōbyōjō* 惣評定) or “village council” (*sōyoriai* 惣寄合) held at Takinomiya in Iriyamada (Bunki 3/8/27, p. 216; Bunki 3/7/30, pp. 213–14).

3. Higo, *Miyaza no kenkyū*; Tonomura, *Community and Commerce*, pp. 49–57. Tonomura (p. 49 and p. 224, nt. 48) notes that historians refer to shrine associations as *miyaza*, but the term was not used at the time.

4. Troost, “Peasants, Elites, and Villages,” pp. 98–100.

5. MKT, Bunki 1/10/6, pp. 85–86.

6. Kimura, “Sairei to shūnō,” discusses the estate’s ceremonies. Yoshimura, “Seikatsu to bunka,” examines the cultural rhythms on the estate through the seasons.

7. MKT, Bunki 1/8/13, p. 62.

8. Moriya Takeshi examines the cultural affairs and celebrations on Hine Estate in *Chūsei no shiza*, pp. 139–60.

9. MKT, Bunki 1/7/11–16, pp. 54–56.

10. MKT, Bunki 1/7/6, pp. 53–54.

11. Izumi villagers were broadly familiar with theatrical arts common to the capital. On Bunki 1/7/16, the last day of the Obon celebration, Masamoto noted that following a *furyū* competition that consisted of performers from Tsuchimaru and Ōgi, on one hand, and individuals from Shōbu and Funabuchi, on the other, the Funabuchi actors then “performed *furyū hayashi*, *shiki sanban*, and *unoha ichiban*” (MKT, Bunki 1/7/16, pp. 55–56). *Hayashi* referred to an instrumental ensemble made up of three or four performers, playing a flute, a shoulder drum, a hip drum, and a stick drum, while *shiki sanban* and *unoha ichiban* were classical works in the *sarugaku nob* repertoire.

12. Masamoto provided details about the festival each time he wrote about it: MKT, Bunki 1/8/24, 25, p. 70; Bunki 2/8/24, 25, p. 141; Bunki 3/8/24, p. 216; Eishō 1/8/24, 25, p. 312.

13. MKT, Bunki 2/8/24, p. 141. In addition to Obon and Takinomiya, other local festivals and ceremonies included those held at Nonomiya and Hineno Shrines (both in Hineno); a Buddhist memorial service at Enmanji in Iriyamada (a stone's throw from Masamoto's residence), comprising dancing and an exposition on the Buddhist Law; and New Year celebrations, with offerings of gifts and food and good wishes for the months ahead.

14. MKT, Bunki 1/3/29, p. 9; Bunki 1/3/30, p. 9; Bunki 1/4/7, pp. 12–13; Bunki 1/4/6, pp. 11–12.

15. MKT, Bunki 1/4/12, p. 15.

16. Masamoto's last reference to palanquin bearers appears on Bunki 1/4/21 (MKT, pp. 16–17).

17. MKT, Bunki 1/7/13, p. 55.

18. MKT, Bunki 1/7/15, p. 55. Masamoto himself participated along with the cultural elite in the province in composing linked verse dedicated to Ōizeki Shrine. These were produced monthly. See MKT, Bunki 3/6/11, p. 198; Eishō 1/6/11, p. 270; ISS 5, No. 152, pp. 532–33.

19. ISS 5, No. 109, p. 514.

20. These were held on the second and eleventh (or twelfth) of the first month for Hineno and Iriyamada respectively: MKT, Bunki 2/1/2, 11, pp. 102–3, 104; Bunki 3/1/2, 11, 12, pp. 175–76, 177; Bunki 4/1/2, 11, pp. 236, 237.

21. MKT, Bunki 1/6/22, pp. 36–37.

22. For example, Masamoto noted that in the wake of an attack by provincial forces, Ishii Aritoshi stayed behind to “strengthen forces in Tsuchimaru, and did not return.” MKT, Bunki 1/9/24, 25, p. 83.

23. MKT, Bunki 3/10/29, pp. 226–27.

24. MKT, Bunki 1/6/24, pp. 37–39.

25. See for example, MKT, Bunki 2/9/9, pp. 152–53.

26. MKT, Bunki 1/9/19, pp. 77–79.

27. MKT, Bunki 2/12/21, p. 174.

28. Ishii, “Muromachi, sengoku jidai,” pp. 48–51. See Katsumata, *Sengoku jidai-ron*, pp. 120–21, for a different reading, which is less convincing in my opinion.

29. MKT, Eishō 1/3/18, p. 244.

30. MKT, Bunki 3/8/10, p. 215.

31. MKT, Bunki 3/4/3, p. 185.

32. MKT, Bunki 3/4/2, p. 185; Eishō 1/8/23, pp. 311–12.

33. Though *ōsu* has been largely replaced with *osharu* at present, *mōsu* in the sixteenth century was broadly used as the verb “to speak,” not always with strongly humble connotations.

34. This appears throughout *Tabihikitsuke* wherever Masamoto describes himself giving instructions or speaking to another. Common forms are *ōseiwaku* (仰云) and *ōsetsuku* (仰付). See representative examples in MKT, Bunki 1/3/30, p. 9; Bunki 1/4/1, p. 10.

35. MKT, Bunki 1/6/24, pp. 37–39.

36. For more examples, see the following: MKT, Bunki 1/4/4, p. 10; Bunki 1/4/6, pp. 11–12; Bunki 1/4/9, p. 13; Bunki 1/4/26, pp. 18–19; Bunki 2/12/3, p. 172; Bunki 3/5/16, pp. 192–93; Eishō 1/7/21, pp. 301–2; Eishō 1/7/28, p. 307.

37. MKT, Bunki 1/9/23, pp. 82–83; Bunki 2/8/22, pp. 137–40. Also see Bunki 3/7/12, pp. 203–4.

38. A further example reveals that on occasion Masamoto followed the same practice where village internal affairs were concerned, in essence raising and lowering the status of the parties involved (or at the least the arguments of each). In an incident I describe at the conclusion of this chapter, villagers from Shōbu and Funabuchi hamlets brought a complaint to Masamoto regarding an individual who refused to follow the guidelines of the local ash guild. Masamoto marked their speech with *ōsu*, while the lawless ash producer spoke by means of *mōsu* (MKT, Bunki 3/9/5, pp. 218–19).

Sakai Kimi discusses Masamoto's use of *ōsu* and *mōsu* in *Zaichi shakai*, pp. 245–50. For an analysis of the linguistic and historical issues surrounding “in-group honorifics,” “absolute honorifics,” and “relative honorifics” in Japanese, see Schwemmer, “Samurai, Jesuits, Puppets, and Bards,” pp. 162–65; 174–83.

39. Considerable work has been done on leagues and their many iterations during *senjoku*, extending from warrior and peasant leagues to religious ones. Carol Richmond Tsang provides a useful overview of the concept in *War and Faith*, her study of the largest and most powerful league of the era, that of the Ikkō or “Single-minded” Buddhist sect, pp. 2–5, 36–43. Also see Davis, “Ikki.” Not all leagues had significant geographic breadth or crossed boundaries beyond a narrow group, but my discussion concerns those in Izumi that did. Yata Toshifumi examines one *senjoku* league in Kii Province, the *saikashū* (雑賀衆), which briefly established a self-proclaimed independent state, centered in what is now Wakayama city. See Yata, “Senjoku-ki Hine-no-shō,” p. 2.

40. The two published versions of Masamoto's diary read the original as 絞之郷 (*shibori no gō*), but Hasegawa, “Masamoto ryūyō,” pp. 62–63, convincingly argues that it should be read as 綴 (*kumi*).

41. MKT, Bunki 1/5/19, p. 25.

42. MKT, Bunki 1/9/23, pp. 82–84.

43. See Hasegawa, “Masamoto ryūyō” for a close examination of the several terms Masamoto used to describe these allied villages and his discovery of mistaken transcriptions in the printed versions of the diary.

44. MKT, Bunki 1/9/23, pp. 82–84. In his analysis of “allied villages” (*kumi no gō*) in *Senjoku no mura o yuku*, pp. 43–44, Fujiki Hisashi sees this incident as evidence of villagers' willingness to back each other with force. But he misreads the Bunki 1/9/23 diary entry. As a whole Fujiki's descriptions of allied villages overstates the strength of these groups. *Tabihikitsuke* offers a more nuanced view, with few examples of villagers prepared to fight in a regional alliance but many more examples of regional assistance—in warning neighbors of potential invasions by *shugo* forces, in assisting in the release of captives, and so forth.

45. MKT, Bunki 1/5/19, p. 25. Masamoto no doubt would have been familiar with the violent uprisings (*tsuchi ikki*) directed at moneylenders, which wracked the central section of the country in decades prior to the Ōnin War.

46. MKT, Bunki 1/9/5, p. 73.

47. MKT, Bunki 1/6/22; Bunki 1/7/11, pp. 54–55.
48. MKT, Bunki 1/9/23, pp. 82–84.
49. See MKT, Bunki 1/6/22, pp. 36–37 and Bunki 2/7/26, pp. 131–32.
50. MKT, Eishō 1/7/8, pp. 287–91.
51. Though the initial report Masamoto received was of the capture of the villagers by the “two *shugo*,” (MKT, Bunki 3/7/12, pp. 203–4), everything suggests that this was a matter initiated by, and limited to, Mitsumori.
52. My analysis centers on the primary arguments in the letters and the main developments. Additional details are found in the following entries: MKT, Bunki 3/7/12, 19, 23, 26, 27, 29, 30, pp. 203–14.
53. MKT, Bunki 3/7/23, pp. 206–8. See MKT, Bunki 1/8/28, pp. 71–72, for Masamoto’s description of Iriyamada villagers joining the Hineno East Side to repel Hineno Mitsumori and his men.
54. MKT, Bunki 3/7/23, pp. 206–8.
55. MKT, Bunki 3/7/23, pp. 206–8.
56. MKT, Bunki 3/7/26, pp. 208–10.
57. MKT, Bunki 3/7/27, pp. 210–13.
58. MKT, Bunki 3/7/27, pp. 210–13.
59. MKT, Bunki 3/7/27, pp. 210–13.
60. MKT, Bunki 3/7/30, pp. 213–14.
61. ISS 5, No. 97, p. 619.
62. See Ishii Susumu’s analysis of this incident in “Muromachi, sengoku jidai,” pp. 57–66.
63. ISS 5, No. 89, pp. 606–17.
64. MKT, Bunki 1/6/10, 11, pp. 28–29.
65. MKT, Bunki 1/6/10, 11, pp. 28–29.
66. See, for example, MKT, Bunki 1/8/28, pp. 71–72.
67. MKT, Bunki 3/4/13, p. 186.
68. MKT, Bunki 3/4/29, p. 187.
69. For more on leagues in Izumi during these years, see Yata, “Sengoku-ki Hine-no-shō,” pp. 18–21.
70. MKT, Bunki 2/8/27–29, pp. 142–44.
71. MKT, Bunki 2/9/1, p. 148. See Ishii Susumu’s analysis in “Muromachi, sengoku jidai,” pp. 67–70.
72. MKT, Bunki 3/4/13, 16, p. 186.
73. The precise location of Mansei is unknown. See biography of Mansei Uma in ISS 5, p. 742.
74. Kaishōji was on the coast, to the west of Hineno.
75. MKT, Bunki 3/9/5, pp. 218–19. For discussions of medieval guilds in English, see Toyoda, “Growth of Commerce,” in Hall, *Muromachi Age* pp. 129–44; and Gay, *Moneylenders*, pp. 56–61. Gay writes of the guilds’ relations to overlords, who offered protection but also required tax payments and the like. Following the Ōnin War, more guilds moved toward autonomy, but ties to overlords, though weakened, generally remained. There was also competition from new groups.
76. MKT, Bunki 3/9/5, pp. 218–19. The reach and limits of Japan’s late medieval “independent villages” comes into focus when one examines any individual village,

as its powers and authorities could vary from others' (and also change over time), depending on factors such as the strength of the estate proprietor (or strength of local warriors). Just as the villagers of Iriyamada turned to Masamoto for help to resolve a boundary dispute, the villagers in Imabori did likewise in turning to Enryakuji, the proprietor of the estate they were part of. See Tonomura, *Community and Commerce*, p. 90. Also see pp. 90–94, for her discussion of the *sō*'s powers of local governance.

## Chapter 8

1. Important studies (among many) in English include Abe, *Weaving of Mantra*; Stone, *Original Enlightenment*; Ruppert, *Jewel in the Ashes*. Bernard Faure's recently completed trilogy on the gods of medieval Japan (*Fluid Pantheon, Protectors and Predators, Rage and Ravage*) reveals the depth of work being produced.

As evidence of the vibrance, and breadth, of the study of premodern religion in Japanese language scholarship, see Ruppert's two review articles of recent works (published primarily in the first decade of this century) in *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies*: "Beyond Big Events," 37:1, pp. 137–53; and "Constructing Histories," 40:2, pp. 355–75.

2. Sansom, *History of Japan*. 1:223.

3. For two examples of studies in English that move Buddhist scholarship beyond the late medieval era, see Graham, *Faith and Power*, and Williams, *Other Side of Zen*.

4. *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* dedicated a volume to Kuroda's scholarship, with numerous translations; a primary focus was his *kenmitsu taisei* theory. See volume 23: 3–4 (Fall 1996).

5. Adolphson, *Gates of Power*. See his brief summary of Kuroda's *kenmon taisei* theory, pp. 10–20.

6. Bernard Faure further reduces the distinctions between these religious traditions in *Protectors and Predators*, the second volume of his trilogy on the gods of medieval Japan.

7. An early influential study in English examining critical aspects of the relationship between Buddhism and the native cults is Grapard, "Institution, Ritual, and Ideology." For more recent scholarship in English that examines the historical place of Shinto, see the essays in Breen and Teeuwen, *Shinto in History*. For one response to those who question Shinto as an ancient religion, see Bender, "Shinto in Nara Japan." In her comprehensive study, *Shinto, A History*, Helen Hardacre takes a nuanced view of the matter, giving institutional Shinto more weight than do Teeuwen and Breen, but there is no question that the new interpretation has displaced the old in many scholars' minds.

8. A note in the north central section of the map lists temple land (which was probably inclusive of shrine holdings) as "over seven *chō*"—this in contrast to non-temple land equaling twenty-six *chō*.

9. References to these temples and shrines (or the monks and priests that headed them, given that they are denoted by each institution's name) are as follows. I have omitted those such as Muhenkōin and Ōizeki that appear repeatedly (and which I have referenced already), and I provide just a single reference for each temple or shrine, though some from Masamoto's era can be found in two or three *Tabihikitsuke* entries

(rarely more). For 1316, all temples and shrines appear on the map, excepting the two in Iriyamada: Shippōryūji, whose temple history notes its beginning in 661, and Takinomiya. All individual dates and pages refer to MKT. Danbaramitsuji, Bunki 1/6/21, pp. 33–36; Kaitai'in, Bunki 3/10/17, pp. 223–24; Kōzen'an, Eishō 1/7/13, pp. 294–95; Anrakuji, Eishō 1/7/7, pp. 283–86; for Keifukuan, Chōsen'an, and Honkōan, see ISS 5, No. 89, pp. 606–17; Mizoguchi Daimyōjin, found in notes Masamoto made at the end of the first volume of his diary (following the 10th month entries of Bunki 1), p. 90; Nonomiya, Eishō 1/8/13, p. 310; Dainichidō, Bunki 3/4/5, p. 185; Keishōan, Bunki 3/1/4, p. 176; Rengeji, Bunki 1/3/30, p. 9; Kōshakuin, Eishō 1/4/13, pp. 261–62; Kōshakuji, Bunki 3/1/4, p. 176; Hōsen'an, Bunki 3/1/4, p. 176; Hōsen'in, Bunki 2/12/4, p. 172; Chikurin'an, Bunki 2/12/4, p. 172; Hachiōji, Bunki 3/4/5, p. 185.

10. ISS 5, No. 89, pp. 606–17.

11. MKT, Bunki 4/1/4, p. 236.

12. MKT, Bunki 1/8/28, pp. 71–72.

13. MKT, Bunki 2/1/26, pp. 106–9.

14. MKT, Eishō 1/7/9, pp. 291–94.

15. Ōyama, “Kenryoku to nōmin,” pp. 10–16. Takeuchi, “Jian to shōen ryōshu,” examines cottage temples on Ikaruga-no-shō in Harima Province and their ties to warrior power. Also see Sakamoto, “Shōnai jisha,” pp. 216–19.

16. Evidence of tax-free benefits is seen in MKT, Bunki 2/9/12, pp. 154–55.

17. MKT, Bunki 1/5/1, pp. 19–20.

18. MKT, Bunki 2/10/6, p. 158.

19. ISS 5, Nos. 73, 74, and 75, pp. 594–95.

20. See MKT, Eishō 1/i3/29, p. 255, regarding the payment of Muhenkōin “tax tea.” The payment was made by Kaitai'in Zenkō, the former abbot of Muhenkōin, on that temple's behalf. In the document of transfer that accompanied the payment, Zenkō described this as *Muhenkōin no nōcha* (無邊光院之納茶).

21. Both appear in ISS 5, No. 49, pp. 581–83. Masamoto wrote of another loan from Muhenkōin, of a “slight amount,” early in 1502; see MKT, Bunki 2/2/29, p. 113.

22. MKT, Bunki 1/4/7, pp. 12–13.

23. For references, see MKT, Bunki 3/10/17, pp. 223–24; Bunki 1/4/10, pp. 13–15; Eishō 1/7/21, pp. 301–2.

24. MKT, Bunki 2/9/12, pp. 154–55.

25. MKT, Bunki 1/6/21, pp. 33–36; the letter is dated 6/16.

26. MKT, Bunki 1/8/28, pp. 71–72.

27. For several references to the estate offices, see MKT, Bunki 1/11/1, p. 94 (for West Side tax collection at Ōizeki); Bunki 2/1/11, p. 104 (for Iriyamada “auspicious writing” at Chōfukuji); Bunki 3/1/2, pp. 175–76 (for East Side auspicious writing at Muhenkōin); Bunki 2/10/16, p. 159 (Nagamori to Kaitai'in for the West Side *kuratsuke*).

28. Most of them can be identified simply from the temple and shrine names noted earlier, since that was their typical marker.

29. MKT, Bunki 3/4/4, p. 185.

30. Hōgyoku, for example, delivered a gift of rice dumplings from Zenkō on Bunki 2/5/5, p. 118; and upon seeing Zenkō captured by *shugo* forces on Bunki 3/10/17, pp. 223–24, he sent his own messenger with word of this to Masamoto.

31. MKT, Bunki 3/1/4, p. 176.
32. ISS 4, No. 130, p. 515.
33. MKT, Bunki 1/i6/2, pp. 40–41. Also see Ishii, “Muromachi, sengoku jidai,” pp. 43–46.
34. On *sanmai hijiri*, see Katsuda, *Nihon sōsei-shi*, pp. 161–65; Shimazu, “Sōsō to Kiyomizuzaka”; Takada, “Yoshino no sanmai hijiri”; ISS 5, No. 80, pp. 500–501.
35. ISS 5, No. 89, pp. 606–17.
36. MKT, Bunki 1/4/1, p. 10.
37. MKT, Bunki 3/11/13, p. 229; Bunki 3/6/26, p. 200; Bunki 4/2/16, p. 240. For ceremonies conducted by villagers, see Bunki 1/7/15, p. 55; and Bunki 1/8/24, p. 70.
38. MKT, Bunki 1/3/30, p. 9. For another example, see Bunki 1/11/9, p. 95.
39. MKT, Bunki 1/4/3, p. 10; Bunki 2/12/4, p. 172; Bunki 3/1/4, p. 176.
40. MKT, Bunki 3/5/16, pp. 192–93.
41. MKT, Eishō 1/4/13, pp. 261–62.
42. MKT, Bunki 1/i6/2, pp. 40–41; 2/5/21, p. 119.
43. MKT, Eishō 1/7/6, pp. 281–83.
44. Masamoto noted on Bunki 2/5/21, p. 119, that he returned a copybook and other items he had borrowed from the Funabuchi monk Kōshakuji, this by way of his neighbor Enmanji. On Bunki 3/1/8, pp. 176–77, he received from Shippōryūji a copy of the Daihan’nya sutra that the monks had apparently been correcting, as well as a protective talisman. And the following week, he returned to Muhenkōin a copy of the *Lotus Sutra* he had borrowed (Bunki 3/2/19, p. 180).
45. MKT, Bunki 1/4/26, pp. 18–19.
46. MKT, Bunki 1/5/11, p. 23.
47. MKT, Bunki 1/8/20, p. 66.
48. MKT, Bunki 2/1/2, p. 102; Bunki 3/1/2, pp. 175–76; Bunki 4/1/2, p. 236.
49. Masamoto wrote nothing about Ōizeki linked verse in 1501–02, and only a few times in the following two years, but he did note on such occasions that these were “monthly,” and it appears that he regularly provided the opening stanza for even months. See MKT, Bunki 3/6/11, 18, pp. 198, 199; Eishō 1/4/11, p. 261; Eishō 1/6/11, p. 270; Eishō 1/6/28, p. 274.
50. Masamoto used the term “invited within the screens” just once (Bunki 2/2/23, p. 113), but his invitations to Zenkō to join him and share a drink were many: Bunki 1/9/9, pp. 74–75; Bunki 1/12/26, p. 101; Bunki 3/10/26, p. 226; Eishō 1/12/1, p. 342.
51. MKT, Bunki 1/9/4, p. 73.
52. MKT, Bunki 1/10/17, p. 87.
53. ISS 5, No. 91, p. 618.
54. For details about this incident, including an attack on Kaitai’in by a small force from the *shugo* on 10/19, two days after Zenkō’s capture, see MKT, Bunki 3/10/17–20, pp. 223–24.
55. Evidence that the villagers paid the full annual tax to both overseers is seen in MKT, Bunki 2/6/5, pp. 121–22.
56. MKT, Bunki 2/5/22, pp. 119–20. Also see analyses by Kudō, *Shōen no hitobito*, p. 20, and Hashimoto, “Toshimichi Ason,” pp. 80–81.
57. MKT, Bunki 2/5/22, pp. 119–20.

58. See, for example, other references to *honjo* and *gohonjo*: MKT, p. 7, Shinomoto Motonobu letter; also, Bunki 1/6/14, pp. 29–30; Bunki 1/10/17, p. 87; Bunki 3/10/20, pp. 224–25. A careful reading of the entries usually makes clear if the reference is to the Kujō house, as proprietor, or more specifically to Masamoto; but there is room for ambiguity.

59. *Ima, hanzei no gi, shōdaku seshimeba, shikashinagara kano goseibai o mōshiukenagara suteokashimuru nari* (今半濟之儀令承諾者、併彼御成敗ヲ乍申受令棄置也)

60. MKT, Bunki 2/5/22, pp. 119–20.

61. MKT, Bunki 2/6/5, pp. 121–22. Kudō, *Shōen no hitobito*, pp. 204–5, and Suitō, *Mura no hibi*, pp. 97–98, state that the *bantō*'s request was for Masamoto himself to travel to Hineno to hear the villagers' petition. Both the language and the context strongly suggest otherwise.

62. *Kore ni gotōryū sōrawaneba, kuni e no kikoe mo ikaga sōrō yoshi mina mina mōshisorō* (是ニ御逗留候ハねハ、國へのきこえもいか、候由皆々申候)

63. ISS 5, No. 152, pp. 532–33.

64. MKT, Bunki 3/6/11, p. 198.

65. MKT, Eishō 1/6/11, 28, pp. 270, 274.

66. MKT, Eishō 1/6/11, 28, pp. 270, 274.

67. Bowring, *Religious Traditions of Japan*, p. 179.

68. See MKT, Bunki 1/10/30, pp. 89–91. On that occasion, village elders from Hineno East and West Sides called on Masamoto, pleading that the West Side *bantō* he had taken captive more than a month previous be released. One reason this needed to be done, they claimed, was that he had “*kami* duties” (*shinji* 神事) to attend to the following day.

69. MKT, Bunki 1/8/15, p. 62; also see ISS 5, No. 21, pp. 471–72.

70. MKT, Bunki 2/4/2, p. 115.

71. ISS 5, No. 85, pp. 503–4.

72. MKT, Bunki 1/8/15, pp. 62–63.

73. MKT, Bunki 2/1/2, pp. 102–3. This letter, in its original form (the physical copy), appears here in Masamoto's diary.

74. Considerable work has been done on the idea of Buddhist “originals” and *kami* “traces” (*honji suijaku*). For an overview, see Teeuwen and Rambelli, *Buddhas and Kami*, pp. 1–37. For a more focused study, see Andreeva, *Assembling Shinto*. The question of *honji suijaku* comes up in other contexts as well, as reflected in Jacqueline Stone's article, “Do *Kami* Ever Overlook Pollution?”

75. This was seen most prominently in the twenty-two Heian “multiplexes” examined by Allan Grapard in “Institution, Ritual, and Ideology.”

76. ISS 5, No. 21, pp. 471–72.

77. For Negoroji's history, I have drawn on Atsuta, “Negoroji to Hine-no-shō”; Atsuta, “Kishū no ichidai seiryoku”; Koyama, “Chūsei Negoroji”; Adolphson, *Gates of Power*, pp. 66–67.

78. As an exception, Ashikaga Takauji granted Negoroji the Shindachi Estate in Izumi in 1336 as a reward for the temple's military support. See Atsuta, “Kishū no ichidai seiryoku,” p. 394.

79. Atsuta, “Negoroji to Hine-no-shō”; Koyama, “Chūsei Negoroji.”

80. “Daikan,” in *Kokushi daijiten*, 8:710; Tanaka, “Ukeoi daikansei”; Atsuta,

“Negoroji to Hine-no-shō,” pp. 52–55; Anzai, *Hōkai-ki shōen-shi*, pp. 155–230.

81. Extant contracts for Hine Estate lack details on deputies’ salaries, probably because they were calculated as part of the loan or debt payment that was in most cases associated with them. Nakamura Ken examines a 1523 contract for the deputy of Higashi Kujō estate, in which the appointee was to receive fifteen percent of the annual tax, and a few other perquisites (responsibilities were also laid out in the contract). See Nakamura, “Ishii-shi,” pp. 124–25.

82. Tanaka, “Ukeoi daikansei.”

83. Tanaka, “Ukeoi daikansei; Atsuta, “Negoroji to Hine-no-shō,” pp. 52–55; Koyama, “Chūsei Negoroji,” p. 12.

84. “Teachers of the law” is a literal translation of *hōshi* (法師), one term among many for a Buddhist monk or cleric.

85. MKT, Bunki 1/i6/26, p. 53.

86. Koyama, “Chūsei Negoroji,” pp. 13–14; Atsuta, “Negoroji to Hine-no-shō,” pp. 49–50.

87. See the brief biography of Shinpukuin Shinkai in ISS 5, p. 709.

88. Koyama, “Chūsei Negoroji,” p. 13.

89. Koyama, “Chūsei Negoroji,” pp. 8–9.

90. Koyama, “Chūsei Negoroji,” pp. 9–10.

91. Atsuta, “Negoroji to Hine-no-shō,” pp. 49–50.

92. See Nishiyachi, “Kajishi” no seikaku,” for the early workings of this supplemental tax. Harada, “Honngengu to kajishi,” examines the relationship between the annual tax and *kajishi*. In English, see Nagahara, “Decline of the Shōen System,” pp. 280–82; Nagahara, “Medieval Peasant,” pp. 329–30; Troost, “Common Property,” p. 145; Gay, “The Kawashima,” pp. 108–13; Keirstead, “Fragmented Estates,” pp. 324–28.

93. MKT, Bunki 2/10/6, p. 158.

94. Gay “The Kawashima,” pp. 108–9.

95. Farris, *Japan’s Medieval Population*, p. 130; Hall, “Terms and Concepts,” pp. 19, 26. Nagahara, in “Village Communities,” p. 110, refers to *kajishi* merely as “rent.”

96. Suzanne Gay’s analysis in “The Kawashima,” pp. 108–13, is particularly useful in depicting the *kajishi* acquisitions of an upper peasant family. The critical facts are 1) that *kajishi* was bought, and 2) that this did not result in the transfer of ownership. Rights to income was the issue, as had been the norm throughout the *shōen* system; however, by the sixteenth century evidence that rights acquired as *kajishi* could and did change hands became more common. The complex nature of *kajishi* acquisition and rights is found in a certificate of “sale” transferring the “ownership” (or interests) of a Negoroji monk to the Kumatori Naka family for property in Ōgi hamlet, Iriyama in 1504/7. The sale was signed by the contemporary Ōgi *bantō*, as well as two other villagers, who probably served as guarantors, confirming the monk’s rights to the land and the veracity of the transaction. As Hirota Kōji notes in his analysis, there is no evidence of this transaction in *Tabihikitsuke*, and it is likely that it was conducted without Masamoto’s knowledge (Hirota, “*Masamoto-kō tabihikitsuke* no nikki shiryōgaku,” p. 25).

97. Koyama, “Chūsei Negoroji,” p. 10; Yata, “Minshū to seikatsu,” p. 12.

98. ISS 5, No. 48, p. 581.

99. ISS 5, No. 48, p. 581. For additional details about the debt, and the role of the moneylenders, see letters from Akaibō Meison, one dated Eishō 1/8/12, in MKT entry of the same date, pp. 309–10; and a second, Eishō 1/9/2, p. 314. Masamoto noted on Eishō 1/11/3, p. 333, that an agreement had been reached with the moneylenders.

100. On Negoroji's rise as a military power see Hirota, "Sensō to buryoku" and Adolphson, *Gates of Power*, pp. 200–202.

101. Cooper, *They Came to Japan*, p. 329.

102. Noted in Atsuta, "Kishū no ichidai seiryoku," p. 390.

103. Cooper, *They Came to Japan*, p. 329.

104. Sakamoto, "Shōnai jisha," provides the best overview of the temples and shrines within Hine Estate. Ishida, "Seikatsu to shūkyō," examines religion on the estate in the context of ceremonies and festivals. Suitō, *Mura no hibi*, pp. 193–99, covers the topic broadly in these few pages, noting the appearance of religion, with many examples and limited analysis. Also see the brief discussion in ISS 1, pp. 584–86.

## Chapter 9

1. MKT, Bunki 4/1/1–7, p. 236. A land and tax record of 1417 reveals land set aside to fund the bath, ISS 4, No. 36, pp. 363–66.

2. Sugiyama, *Sengoku daimyō*, p. 307; Ryavec, "Political Jurisdiction," p. 44; Farris, *Japan's Medieval Population*, p. 205. In the chapter he wrote for the Izumisano city history, Hirota Kōji provides a more measured assessment of Masamoto's four years in Hine Estate, of his efforts at direct rule. As he argues, although Masamoto clearly did not achieve everything he hoped for, he kept the estate in the family, where it remained for another thirty years. His appointment of Negoroji monks as estate managers when he left ensured this, though it also meant a cut in revenue (ISS 1, pp. 462–65).

3. MKT, Bunki 1/i6/20, pp. 50–51. Akaibō was a Negoroji cloister, a home to monks who had lent money to Karahashi Arikazu and who had served as estate deputies. The head of the cloister at this time was Shūson.

4. MKT, Eishō 1/7/20, pp. 299–301 and Eishō 1/8/2, p. 308. The term *nari-karashi* is not found in any sources outside these two *Tabihikitsuke* entries and an unsigned and unaddressed document within Kujō family archives, dated 11/15 (assumed to be from 1502). See ISS 5, No. 79, pp. 596–97, where the term is written 成枯. But the meaning is unequivocal and the concept, referred to in other documents of the period, was common.

5. ISS 5, No. 97, pp. 508–9. Exceptions could be made for late repayments (over ten years), according to a Muromachi law issued in 1440 (Grossberg, *Law*, Article 210, p. 98). And by 1466, the shogunate had upped the allowable repayment figure to "twice the original amount"; see Article 267, p. 113.

6. MKT, Bunki 1/4/26, pp. 18–19.

7. MKT, Bunki 1/10/24, pp. 88–89. For an example of Shūson's self-deprecating manner, see his letter of Bunki 1/9/3, pp. 72–73.

8. MKT, Bunki 2/7/21, pp. 127–29. Four months later, the monks were more aggressive in their tone, according to Masamoto, but he offered no details: MKT, Bunki 2/11/18, p. 169.

9. MKT, Bunki 2/10/8, p. 158.
10. MKT, Bunki 2/7/23, p. 130.
11. MKT, Eishō 1/4/13, pp. 261–62; and Eishō 1/8/23, pp. 311–12.
12. MKT, Eishō 1/6/16, p. 271.
13. MKT, Eishō 1/6/16, p. 271, Eishō 1/6/18, pp. 271–72.
14. MKT, Eishō 1/7/19, pp. 298–99; Eishō 1/7/26, pp. 303–4.
15. MKT, Eishō 1/11/24, pp. 339–40.
16. MKT, Eishō 1/9/2, p. 314.
17. MKT, Eishō 1/10/6, p. 326.
18. MKT, Eishō 1/11/2–9, pp. 332–37. For correspondence between the monks and Masamoto's men that led to the week of final negotiations, see Eishō 1/9/11 (pp. 316–18), Eishō 1/9/14 (pp. 318–21), Eishō 1/9/27 (pp. 324–25), Eishō 1/10/6 (p. 326).
19. MKT, Eishō 1/11/8, pp. 335–37; Eishō 1/11/28, pp. 341–42. In a final document of accounting, dated Eishō 1/12/21, there is a listing of 3 *kan* received (as an offering) for the appointment of estate deputies for Tominokōji Toshimichi's sections of the estate: ISS 5, No. 124, pp. 629–30.

### Coda

1. MKT, Eishō 1/11/11, pp. 337–38.
2. See Farris, *Japan's Medieval Population*, p. 205, and McCormick, *Tosa Mitsunobu*, pp. 201–2, for previous translations and analyses of Motokazu's poem. Both are problematic.
3. Morita, *Rekidai Hosokawa-shi*, p. 42.
4. ISS 5, No. 124, pp. 629–30.
5. For one analysis of this side of life, see Thomas Nelson, "Slavery in Medieval Japan."

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