A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

A HISTORY OF THE CAUCUS FOR A NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE

CLYDE W. BARROW

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Clyde W. Barrow

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Preface

This book was written for the purpose of achieving two *political* objectives. The first objective is defined by the subtitle of the book, where my goal has been to provide a detailed history of the first 50 years of the Caucus for a New Political Science in the context of its organizational, methodological, and ideological challenges to the American Political Science Association. There have been numerous books and articles published on the history of radical and critical sociology (Colfax and Roach 1971; Horowitz 1971; Flacks and Turkel 1978; Oppenheimer et al. 1991; Dobratz et al. 2002; Levine 2005; Manza and McCarthy 2011; Cassano and Buono 2012; Fasenfest 2014), radical political economics (Attewell 1984; Sherman 1984; Dugger 1989; O'Hara 1995; Lee 2004; Weisskopf 2014), radical history (Unger 1967; Kraditor 1972; Wiener 1989; Skotnes 2001), radical philosophy (Gottlieb 1993; Kautzer 2015), critical geography (Peet 2000; Castree 2000; Blunt and Wills 2000; Barnes 2002; Bialasiewicz 2003), and critical Asian studies (Lanza 2017), but there is no comparable treatment of CNPS even though it was, in 1967, the first dissident caucus to emerge in the social sciences and humanities. The CNPS is regularly mentioned in disciplinary histories and the occasional journal article, but it usually receives a peremptory dismissal in a few sentences—or at best a few paragraphs—despite the fact that it had a major impact on the profession and the discipline of political science. Indeed, the Caucus for a New Political Science—now the Caucus for a Critical Political Science—is not only the longest existing independent caucus within the American Political Science Association but also the only organized section that simultaneously maintains an independent and parallel existence outside the APSA as a registered nonprofit organization.

As the first organized caucus within the APSA, the CNPS paved the way for the proliferation of organized sections that now define the internal structure of the APSA and that now dominate its annual conference pan-

els. The CNPS played a leading role in democratizing the internal operations of the APSA, bringing greater transparency to APSA operations and budgeting, pushing for more demographic diversity in the APSA leadership, promoting methodological and intellectual diversity within the discipline, and opening the annual conference program to controversial topics of current interest. It played a significant role in legitimating nonbehavioral and post-behavioral methodologies in political science, and in bringing a left ideological perspective into disciplinary debates. Nevertheless, this critical perspective is almost completely absent from the extant disciplinary histories of political science, and this absence I argue is a structural effect of the official discipline's continuing commitment to scientism, or the idea of a "value free" social science, which provides its practitioners with a ready-made excuse not to apply the same types of analysis to themselves that political scientists routinely apply to other political institutions, movements, and ideas. In other words, political science is political, and it is not just political but part of an ideological state apparatus to the extent that it is embedded in university departments. Thus, my hope is that this book will begin to fill a very large lacuna in our knowledge about the political science discipline, particularly the dissident and critical tendencies within it, but I also hope the book will persuade a new generation of political scientists to analyze their discipline and profession through a more critical and political lens.

Despite the proliferation of organized sections with the APSA, the Caucus for a Critical Political Science remains unique among the more than 50 organized sections, because it is the only section that defines itself *ideologically and politically*, rather than by research topic, methodology, subfield, or demographic characteristics. The CCPS defines itself as "an association of critical scholars committed to making the study of political science relevant to building a more democratic and egalitarian economic, social, and political order" (Government of the District of Columbia 2021). While its history is intriguing, exciting, and impactful, the CCPS also remains the only viable rallying point for any potential coalition of scholars who would seek to transform the APSA in a more progressive direction. As the only organized section of the APSA that defines itself in political and ideological terms, it remains the only direct challenger to the APSA's official ideology of political neutrality and "value free" social science despite the fact, as this book documents, that the political science discipline is intimately involved in reproducing capitalism and the capitalist state. Thus, the book's second objective is defined by the title of the book. My objective is to deploy the debates within the CNPS and between

the CNPS and the APSA Establishment as the platform for a critique of the profession and the discipline of political science.

The idea of writing a history of the CNPS first occurred to me in 2007, while I was serving as chair of a CNPS constitutional revision committee at the request of Chairperson Christine Kelly. This activity led me to collect many old papers and documents about CNPS that had been long forgotten by most members, and it led me to delve more deeply in the origins and purpose of CNPS, which was founded in 1967 but did not become an organized section of the APSA until 1992. The impetus for the project accelerated the following year when Theodore J. Lowi, an early enthusiast and a critic of the CNPS, graciously agreed to join me on a CNPS-sponsored panel entitled "Methodologies of a New Political Science," which was organized for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, held at Boston, Massachusetts, August 28–31, 2008 (8:00 a.m. on Sunday morning of course). The purpose of the panel was to revisit the history of CNPS and to explore that history as a platform for a broader critique of the political science discipline. In revisiting that history, Lowi remained skeptical of the early CNPS tactic of nominating an alternative slate of candidates to compete in APSA elections, and he still questioned the CNPS's early efforts to win positions on the *American Political Science Review* editorial board. He suggested instead, as he had done in the early 1970s, that if critical political scientists really wanted to change the political science *discipline*, as opposed to capturing positions in the official political science *profession*, then the best strategy would be to "flood" the *APSR* with alternative research to such an extent that it would eventually have to recognize this trend and start publishing some of the best papers sent to it from this critical perspective. His argument was that if CNPS wanted to promote a new political science, then the best strategy was *to do* critical political science, to publish it, and to publicize it. One important result of this panel was the publication of an article on the intellectual origins of new political science, which was published in the journal *New Political Science* (Barrow 2008a). The article was favorably received, and many people encouraged me to pursue the project further, and after reading it sometime later, Professor Bertell Ollman (2017a) nudged me to bring "our history up to date in a book."

This book builds on my earlier forays into CNPS history (Barrow 2017a, 2022a), but it draws on many more sources, including the minutes of APSA Council meetings, the minutes of APSA business meetings, minutes of CNPS business meetings, organization notes in the journal *New Political Science*, CNPS newsletters, official reports of the APSA, unpub-

lished CNPS documents, personal correspondence among CNPS leaders, newspaper and magazine articles, and a wealth of published commentary on the political science discipline. I also reviewed the Christian Bay papers at the University of Toronto Archives, which generated more than 600 pages of original materials on the first decade of the Caucus's formation. Based on these sources, I have tried to piece together a coherent narrative, but I have had to rely on records that are often fragmentary or purposely ambiguous (e.g., meeting minutes). Sometimes individuals who were participants in various events were able to fill gaps with their own memories and anecdotes, but these too are frequently imperfect.

In this regard, I received assistance and encouragement from several individuals who played important roles in the origins and development of CNPS, including David Kettler, John Rensenbrink, Victor Wallis, Edward S. Malecki, and John C. Berg, who emptied their old files to provide me with Caucus newsletters, draft constitutions, committee reports, personal correspondence, and other documents that have greatly enriched the contents of the book. They have patiently answered my questions and shared occasional recollections about CNPS by email. Tamir Moustafa generously shared some additional CNPS newsletters he found at George Washington University's APSA archives while doing research on a different, but related, topic. Another group of individuals endured my email inquiries about various events in the Caucus's history, including Stephen E. Bronner, George Katsiaficas, Joseph Kling, Timothy W. Luke, Bertell Ollman, Laura Katz Olson, Joan Roelofs, Stephen M. Sachs, Meredith Reid Sarkees, Marvin Surkin, and Cyrus Zirakzadeh, who shared their memories and observations about specific events in the history and development of the Caucus.[1] I owe special thanks to Richard Isomaki, who greatly improved the manuscript with his meticulous skills as copy editor. I thank the acquisitions, production, and marketing staff at the University of Michigan Press, including Madison Allums, Marcia LaBrenz, Delilah McCrea, and Danielle Coty-Fattal for turning my manuscript into a published book. Finally, I offer belated thanks to the late Christine Kelly, who cheered this project forward from its inception.

I note that I too have been an activist and an officer in the CNPS, whose panels I first attended at the 1983 APSA annual meeting, although I did not join the Caucus until 1994. As an observer, member, and officer, I was a participant in some of the events discussed in this book, and my first inclination was to minimize my presence in the manuscript to the greatest extent possible. When I made an appearance in the first draft of the book, I usually referred to myself in the third person, which became a strange

exercise in self-alienation. However, the anonymous referees who reviewed the manuscript suggested instead that I insert myself into the manuscript more forcefully, and do so in the first person to share my perspective on those events and my analysis of them, rather than trying to give a neutralist account, which they correctly pointed out runs against the grain of the entire CNPS critique of political science. Thus, in a nod to the growing use of autoethnography in critical political science (Schram 2024), I accepted this recommendation and inserted myself back into the manuscript as an actor and a participant, rather than as an external historical observer.

However, in writing a political and intellectual history of the Caucus, I have tried to do more than just write history. In reviewing 50 years of debate, controversy, and in-fighting in the political science profession, the book also serves as a critique of the profession and the discipline, which I argue remains woefully disengaged from the concerns of ordinary citizens, particularly the working class and the poor throughout the world. Consequently, the text often fluctuates between highly theoretical commentary on the discipline of political science, on the one hand, and the details and minutiae of various meetings, on the other hand. The latter often involve the discussion of resolutions, amendments to resolutions, and parliamentary maneuverings of the lowest kind, including forays into what might pass for hallway gossip.

The typical political scientist will likely ask what any of this "politics" has to do with political science. My answer is that bureaucratic minutiae *is the profession of political science* unmasked for all to see in its mundane pettiness, and it is the platform on which the discipline of political science is built. Political science, as a historical social practice in the United States, bears no resemblance to the image that it portrays to itself, to its students, or to its public. This is important because it is the politics of the profession that continues to regulate and restrain the development of the discipline and its critical emancipatory potential. The battle of paradigms is won or lost in the squabbling that takes place in closed-door meetings every bit as much as it is won or lost in the pages of scholarly journals.

I leave it to a new generation of Caucusites to make and write the next 50 years of history for what is now the Caucus for a Critical Political Science.

Clyde W. Barrow
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
May 2023

Abbreviations

AAG	Association of American Geographers
ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union
ACS	Association for Critical Sociology
AERA	American Education Research Association
APA	American Psychological Association
APSA	American Political Science Association
APSR	*American Political Science Review*
ASA	American Sociological Association
CBF	Christian Bay Fonds, Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto
CC	Coordinating Council [of the Caucus for a New Political Science]
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CCNY	City College of New York
CCPS	Caucus for a Critical Political Science
CNPS	Caucus for a New Political Science
COINTELPRO	Counter Intelligence Program [US Federal Bureau of Investigation]
CSULA	California State University, Los Angeles
CUNY	City University of New York
DOD	Department of Defense
DSA	Democratic Socialists of America
HWSC	Hobart and William Smith Colleges
ICPR	Inter-University Consortium for Political Research
ICPSR	Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research
IUPUI	Indiana University–Purdue University at Indianapolis
LGBTQ	Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, questioning
MLA	Modern Language Association

NCNP	National Conference for a New Politics
NES	National Election Survey
NPS	*New Political Science: A Journal of Politics & Culture*
NSF	National Science Foundation
NYC	New York City
NYU	New York University
OAH	Organization of American Historians
OPR	Operations and Policy Research, Inc.
OS	Organized Section [of the American Political Science Association]
SSC	Socialist Scholars Conference
SSRC	Social Science Research Council
SUNY	State University of New York
UCLA	University of California, Los Angeles
UCSD	University of California, San Diego
URPE	Union of Radical Political Economics
USIA	United States Information Agency
WCPS	Women's Caucus for Political Science
WPSA	Western Political Science Association

1

Disciplinary History and the Caucus for a New Political Science

In 1990, Raymond Seidelman (1990, 596) called attention to "a new, small, and doubtless expanding pond of disciplinary historians," who offered up a variety of histories, interpretations, and critiques of political science or its various subfields. What began as a small cottage industry quickly grew to industrial proportions as books and articles proliferated on the origins of political science (Easton et al. 1995; Ross 1991; Furner 2011), the historical development of political science (Crick 1959; Somit and Tanenhaus 1967; Gunnell 1993a, 1993b; Farr et al. 1995), the state of political science (Finifter 1983, 1993; Katznelson and Milner 2002b), and the future of political science (Lasswell 2005). Indeed, by the mid-1990s, the history of the social sciences had become a recognized interdisciplinary field of study among professional historians and specialized scholars in the various social science disciplines (Easton et al. 1995, viii).

However, as the number of disciplinary histories proliferated in political science, it became evident that there was not a single history of the discipline, but histories of the discipline. There were disagreements about whether political science met the criteria to call itself a discipline, as compared to physics, say, with its standard model (Oerter 2006; Mann 2010). There were questions about whether political science had undergone one or two or three "paradigmatic revolutions" or whether what passed as political science even qualified as a paradigm as defined by Thomas S. Kuhn (Wolin 1968; Beardsley 1974; Schram 2006). In fact, the general consensus seems to be that political scientists gave up the search for a unifying paradigm shortly after David Easton (1969) declared the coming of the post-behavioral revolution.

Thus, Sanford Levinson (1969, 68–69) observed some time ago that "what political science as a discipline obviously lacks are epistemological paradigms with which the kind of [value-free] work postulated by Weber could in fact be done." William Crotty (1991, 3) later observed that "the unity, cohesiveness, and commonalities of the field seem to be in eclipse; perhaps they have already been abandoned." Similarly, J. Donald Moon (1991, 45–46) argued that the quest for a unified Kuhnian type "normal science" in the political science discipline is "chimerical." John G. Gunnell (2006b, 21) likewise concluded that "since the early 1970s, political science has in many respects relinquished any attempt to conceive of itself as a unified discipline and profession." John S. Dryzek (1988, 439) offers the sobering conclusion that the fragile consensus around behavioralism in the 1950s and 1960s "has been succeeded only by ever-increasing fragmentation. Political science today is held together by little more than the staples in its convention programs." Davora Yanow (2003, 398) echoed this view with her observation that political science is now fragmented into so many subfields, methodological approaches, area specializations, and competing theories that "political scientists apparently come together at APSA meetings, but only in spatial terms."

Moreover, there are even questions about whether political science has ever generated a genuine "theory"—understood in scientistic terms—as compared to the theory of gravity or general relativity. Yet, even if one dismissed such quibbling as the consequence of behavioralists' misguided scientistic aspirations, disciplinary historians could not even agree on the significance of individual scholars to the development of modern political science. Competing narratives claimed that A. Lawrence Lowell (Somit and Tanenhaus 1967, 74), Charles Merriam (Waldo 1975, 48), or George Catlin (Gunnell 2004, 2005) should be regarded as the founding father of the so-called behavioral revolution in political science. This debate posed the problem of whether the behavioral revolution began in the 1920s, the 1950s, or had been present at the very inception of the discipline. Accordingly, disciplinary historians have proposed competing periodizations, typologies, interpretations, and conclusions about the discipline's development over the last 150 years, but what no one wants to recognize is that these disagreements are *political and ideological* conflicts that are not just fought out in the pages of academic journals. Ideas do not simply triumph in political science because they are better or more meritorious than other ideas (Ricci 1977, 1980). There is a large and complex institutional apparatus that provides the organizational infrastructure of the discipline, and this apparatus is a continuously contested arena of political struggle.

As these disagreements became apparent to disciplinary historians, the *American Political Science Review* published a symposium of articles by leading disciplinary historians that finally asked the question: "Can the History of Political Science Be Neutral?" (Gunnell et al. 1995). Not surprisingly, there was no agreement on the answer to this question, as some authors responded yes, while others responded no, and one author responded sometimes but only in a limited way. The diversity of answers itself is an empirical indicator that there is no comprehensive and objective epistemological viewpoint that would allow one to write a definitive and nonpolitical "scientific" history of political science. In fact, Robert Adcock (2014a, 212) correctly concludes in his history of disciplinary histories that all "disciplinary histories are, with varying levels of explicitness, informed by contemporary identities and agendas within political science, and concerned to inform the present and future of the discipline." It is impossible to extract the historical development of political science from the politics (and ideology) of political science. In fact, the one commonality among the extant disciplinary histories of political science—whether hagiographic, critical, or pseudo-neutralist—is that they typically construct a narrative to reproduce and legitimate an ideology of political science or one that criticizes and unmasks the ideology of political science through their accounts of political science.

Amid this plethora of disciplinary histories, John Dryzek and Stephen T. Leonard (1988) argue that there are really only two types of disciplinary histories possible in the United States: Whig and skeptic. The Whig histories of political science construct teleological narratives of the discipline's development to tell a story of its inevitable scientific progress, which culminates in the behavioral revolution, formal modeling, and rational choice theory. In this version of disciplinary development, political science has gradually purged itself of politics to become a "science," although one that is usually subordinate to economics, psychology, biology, engineering, or even genetics. On the other hand, skeptical historians focus on reconstructing a past that allows one to criticize the present discipline, usually with the intent of making political science politically relevant to contemporary real-world politics. Within this typology of disciplinary histories, my critique of political science and my account of the Caucus for a New Political Science is unequivocally skeptical.

However, the Dryzek/Leonard typology limits the debate about political science to (1) questions of methodology and (2) questions about the discipline's relevance to practical politics. What is missing from this typology is ideology. Gabriel Almond (1990) has developed an insightful typol-

ogy of disciplinary histories that goes beyond the Whig/skeptic dichotomy by explicitly incorporating an ideological component into our understanding of the political science discipline. As every political scientist knows, the world can always be conceptualized along two intersecting axes that generate a 2 × 2 matrix. Almond argues that disciplinary histories, and conceptions of the discipline, should be conceptualized along a methodological axis *and* an ideological axis. On the methodological axis, Almond posits the methodological extremes of soft and hard political science. Almond includes thick description (historical and empirical), case studies, key informant interviews, focus groups, participant observation, political ethnography, and most political theorists at the soft end of political science methodology. Almond includes sophisticated statistical, econometric, and mathematical modeling, and computer simulations at the hard end of political science methodology. Significantly, Almond does not distinguish different methodologies as scientific and nonscientific, but only as soft and hard along a spectrum of scientificity.

The methodological axis of political science is analytically distinct from its ideological axis in the sense that a Marxist could do soft or hard political science. Despite the oft-repeated claim that "Marxism refers exclusively to a method" (Lukács 1971, 1), the fact is Marxists have utilized a wide variety of social science methodologies, including historical-institutional, empirical-quantitative, analytical, and rational choice, with the result that Marxists have engaged in endless methodological disputes among themselves over the last 50 years (e.g., see Barrow 1993). Similarly, political theorists—so-called soft political scientists—have reconstructed the history of political theory from conservative, liberal, and Marxist perspectives even when they employ the same, or similar, interpretive methodologies (e.g., Strauss and Cropsey 1972; Oakeshott 1962; Skinner 1978; Macpherson 1962).

Almond conceptualizes the ideological axis of disciplinary histories along the typical left-right continuum, with Marxists, critical theorists, and dependency theorists occupying the far left of the continuum. Almond (1990, 15) claims that these groups "deny the possibility of separating knowledge from action" and thus seek to "subordinate political science to the struggle for socialism." The soft left includes disenchanted liberals, critical pluralists, and social democrats of various shades of pink.[1] While Almond's description of "the left" is ideologically charged in its own right, he accurately captures the idea that most leftists reject the idea of a value-free political science and agree that knowledge should be used to promote a more egalitarian and democratic social, economic, and political order.

Almond (1990, 15) locates neoconservatives at the far-right end of the ideological continuum and describes them as favoring "a free-market economy and limits on the power of the state, as well as an aggressive anticommunist foreign policy."

When one crosses these methodological and ideological axes, it generates four separate boxes that Almond classifies as soft-left, hard-left, soft-right, and hard-right conceptions of political science. Aside from a mere typology of the discipline, Almond correctly observes that "each of these schools or sects presents us with a particular version of the history of the political science discipline." Understanding the ideological and methodological underpinnings of disciplinary histories is important, according to Almond (1990, 23), because "whoever controls the interpretation of the past in our professional history writing has gone a long way toward controlling the future." Almond (1990, 23) writes his own soft-right history of the discipline—although, of course, he claims it is value-free, comprehensive, and objective—because he is worried that the soft left "has almost preempted the writing of professional political science history" for the purpose of convincing disciplinary practitioners that political science deviated from its true calling with the onset of the behavioral revolution. Thus, Almond (1990, 24, 23) appeals to what he calls "the large methodologically eclectic majority of political scientists" with the rejoinder that "we are not about to cast off our badges of professional integrity by turning our research and teaching into political advocacy." And with this statement he advertises his own ideological and methodological commitments as the basis for writing a disciplinary history—despite his claims to the contrary.

Nevertheless, Almond is correct to point out that most disciplinary histories are soft-left histories, while his reading of the discipline is that there are no hard-right histories. Formal modelers, econometricians, and rational choice theorists would argue that there is no history to political *science*, because it only achieved scientific status in the last few decades and science after all is just science—it exists as a timeless and absolute truth. It may be discovered at a particular time and place, but once it is discovered, all previous iterations of the discipline are mere philosophy, speculation, and myth (e.g., Dahl 1956). The discipline's past is thus a prescientific wasteland of no value or interest to the present. Almond fills the soft-right box with his reading of the discipline, but this still leaves the hard-left box empty.

Who and what might fill this empty box in Almond's typology? Ellen Schrecker has identified 17 radical caucuses that came into existence from

1967 to 1969, with the Caucus for a New Political Science (CNPS) the first to be organized, at the 1967 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. The CNPS was followed in rapid succession by the Anthropologists for Radical Political Action, the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, the Middle Atlantic Radical Historians Association, the Radical Caucus of the Modern Language Association, the Psychology Liberation Movement, the Sociology Liberation Movement, the Union for Radical Political Economics, and the Union of Radical Criminologists, among others. Schrecker (2021, 359–60) finds that the immediate catalyst for the emergence of these radical caucuses was usually the refusal by professional association officers to allow the introduction or discussion of resolutions about the Vietnam War on the grounds that such resolutions were "political" and, therefore, prohibited by their associations' constitutions (see also Oppenheimer et al. 1979). This was definitely a catalyst for the organization of the CNPS, which set the stage for the emergence of similar organizations over the next two years.

However, this immediate political concern rapidly expanded into criticism of the various disciplines' common commitment to some variant of a positivist philosophy of science, which was quickly identified as the underlying reason for why disciplinary associations had to maintain the aura of being "politically neutral and scientifically objective, ostentatiously remaining aloof from polarizing issues." Thus, the radical caucuses, including CNPS, systematically challenged the methodological claim that "legitimate scholarship must be 'unbiased' and 'objective,'" particularly at a time when all of the social science disciplines were shocked by revelations about "the academy's collaboration with the military-industrial complex" (Schrecker 2021, 347, 358).

Another factor that accounts for the near simultaneous emergence of the radical caucuses is that students in the social sciences and humanities began demanding "relevance" in courses, and this typically meant dealing with contemporary topics such as the Vietnam War, imperialism, the persistence of poverty and economic inequality, racial discrimination, gender discrimination, and business dominance of the capitalist state. These criticisms echoed back into the disciplines, particularly in the voices of graduate students and newly minted PhDs joining the ranks of burgeoning university faculties. Schrecker (2021, 346) suggests that graduate students and junior faculty focused their criticism on the professional associations because these organizations guarded the gates to the academic job market and "provided the institutional structure for awarding much of the status that determined the trajectory of most academic careers."

All of the radical caucuses, including CNPS, emphasized organizational activities such as membership recruitment, self-education, and public outreach, which they pursued by organizing independent conferences, campus workshops and colloquia, panels at the established association conferences, local and campus political actions, and newsletters. Eventually, their work culminated in textbooks that challenged the mainstream textbooks, while newsletters were often converted into scholarly journals with the hope that they would gain enough credibility to help radical junior scholars get tenure. The radical caucus journals were generally not explicitly Marxist, although they contained a heavy dose of it, and they always demonstrated greater interest in contemporary social and political problems than the official journals published by the disciplinary associations (Schrecker 2021, 358). Thus, my purpose in elaborating Almond's typology of disciplinary histories is to call attention to this ideological lacuna in the history of the political science discipline. My critical history of the discipline is not comprehensive or all-encompassing, as it largely begins in 1967 with the founding of the CNPS, but it at least begins to fill this lacuna in the discipline's history.

Discipline, Profession, and Politics in Political Science

The contemporary interest in disciplinary history was initiated by Bernard Crick in 1959 with the publication of his seminal work *The American Science of Politics* (1959).[2] Crick considered his book "a critical history" of American political science, although he was quick to acknowledge that he did not "pretend to give a history of American political science as a discipline" (Kenny 2006). Instead, Crick (1959, v) focused on the development of a specific idea in a particular country; namely, "the idea of a science of politics as an episode and as a tendency in American political thought and intellectual history."[3]

Crick constructed a disciplinary history that found much to admire in the American discipline's founders, such as James Bryce and Woodrow Wilson, who emphasized a practical political science that sought to improve liberal democracy through institutional and policy reforms. For Crick, political science went astray during the interwar period, especially the 1920s, when appeals to naturalistic conceptions of "science" began to infiltrate the discipline, primarily through the works of Charles E. Merriam (1925) and George E. G. Catlin (1927). Crick (1959, v) sought to explain "the special plausibility" to American political scientists of the

idea that politics could "be understood (and perhaps practiced) by 'the method of the natural sciences.'"

Crick argued that when placed in the historical context of the competing disciplinary practices that he called "the American science of politics," the linkage of positivist philosophy to behavioral methodology should be understood not as a science but as "a political doctrine and an intellectual movement" among a specific group of American intellectuals. Paradoxically, however, it was a political doctrine that could only succeed by "forsaking actual politics for the abstract safety and certainty of pseudoscience" (Crick 1959, 248). Crick rightly observed that the idea of a political *science* modeled after the natural sciences has been, and may still be, the dominant one among most American political scientists, but in abandoning political relevance for the methodological pretensions of a pseudoscience, Crick (1959, 227) argues, American political science became a "caricature of American liberal democracy."[4]

As political scientists were still digesting Crick's critique of the post–World War II discipline, Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus published *American Political Science: A Profile of a Discipline* (1964). Unlike Crick's intellectual history, Somit and Tanenhaus's book deployed the most advanced behavioral survey techniques of the day to survey a sample of American political scientists about their current views of the discipline and profession. A short time later, they situated their empirical profile of the discipline in a wider historical context with the publication of *The Development of American Political Science* (1967). In many respects, the two books should be read together as a single two-volume work that reviews much of the same empirical data.

However, in their second volume, Somit and Tanenhaus (1967, 1) caution readers that the book is not "a full-blown history of American political science" because they deliberately limited their focus "to those aspects of the past which bear directly on the present 'state of the discipline.'" They rightly called attention to the fact that "history does not write itself but entails a deliberate selection and organization of 'facts,'" and their selection and organization of the facts, much like Crick's, was focused on identifying continuities in the discipline that extended from its origins to the present-day behavioral revolution. The difference is that their work was an empirical survey of faculty opinion and data on the profession, as well as a historical discussion of the profession's institutional development, rather than a history of ideas.

Thus, Somit and Tanenhaus went beyond Crick by providing more than

an intellectual history of the development of political science as a discipline. While they traced the idea of a science of politics from its inception at the turn of the twentieth century through the behavioral revolution of the 1950s, they also traced the rise of political science as an organized profession, and they examined how political scientists had traditionally defined their extra-scientific responsibilities and goals as professionals. Somit and Tanenhaus identified the political science *profession* (as opposed to the discipline) with the American Political Science Association (and the regional associations), the *American Political Science Review* (and nine other journals), the top 20 doctoral granting departments in the United States, major philanthropic foundations (grants), and the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. Somit and Tanenhaus thus introduced a distinction between *the discipline* of political science (methods and ideas) and *the profession* of political science (persons and institutions) that begins to move one away from intellectual history toward a sociology of knowledge, or even toward a politics of political science that has not been adequately explored by subsequent disciplinary historians.[5]

This distinction is the basis of Stephen Toulmin's admonition that intellectual disciplines must also be studied as institutionalized professions. Toulmin (1972, 262) argues that it is necessary to understand disciplines not just as "a changing population of *concepts*, associated together in more or less formally structured theories, but as a changing population of *scientists*, linked together in more or less formally organized institutions." Toulmin (1972, 262–63) observes in this regard:

> We speak, for instance, of the intrinsic "authority" (or validity) of ideas, and also of the professional "authority" (or power) of institutions and the magisterial "authority" (or dominance) of individuals. Novel concepts, similarly, win an "established" (or validated) place in scientific disciplines, while institutions and publications win an "established" (or influential) place in the corresponding professions; and both ideas and institutions achieve this position by the favour of those influential individuals who form the "authoritative" professional reference-group, or "establishment." At this point, the relationship between the disciplinary and professional aspects of science raises again, by implication, one of the central problems of political theory: viz., how certain individuals can become "authoritative spokesmen" for whole professions, social groups, or even nations.

Toulmin (1972, 265) correctly insists that the dialectical relationship between discipline and profession means that understanding the development of a discipline requires "the same type of theoretical analysis that Max Weber introduced into general sociology: it is, in effect, one further application of the general theory of dominance (*Herrschaft*) within human institutions." While I suggest that Vilfredo Pareto and Karl Marx are probably more relevant to understanding the politics of political science than Max Weber, Toulmin's observation nevertheless points to the need for what John G. Gunnell ambiguously calls an "external history" of the political science discipline. Gunnell (1993b, 10) observes that "we would be well served by a history of political science that explored systematically the conditions (social, political, and economic, among others) surrounding its development" (see Ashcraft 1987). Similarly, Steven Shapin (2010) emphasizes that science is never pure because it is produced by people with bodies, situated in time, space, culture, and society (see Brym 2015). Yet this is a path that Gunnell and most other disciplinary historians have chosen not to pursue in their own work as they continue to write the history of the discipline as a debate about ideas among a few "great" political scientists. This type of disciplinary history is nothing more than political philosophy in the tradition of Leo Strauss and Sheldon Wolin on a shorter time horizon.

In contrast, Toulmin's observation suggests that we should understand the development of political science politically and, more broadly, to understand universities and professional associations as political institutions, and even as *state institutions* with delegated sovereign authority. Such an approach would put political struggles and ideological conflict at the very core of disciplinary history. Politics should be considered as an integral component of the discipline's conceptual and paradigmatic development. Concepts are *not* autonomous, nor are their origin, development, and hegemonic status in the political science discipline. As Arlene Saxonhouse (2003, 22, 23) points out, the political science we have inherited from the past is not the result of "some imagined trial leading to the survival of the fittest. . . . Political science is inevitably a discipline enmeshed in the activities and political movements of the day."

Thus far, however, most scholarship on the development of political science has been what Gunnell (1993b) calls an "internal" history of the discipline written in the same tradition and form as academic political theory and transmitted to the discipline as a history of ideas that inevitably culminates in the triumph of behavioralism and its successors such as rational choice theory and formal modeling. These types of disciplinary

histories do not fundamentally break with a traditional view of political theory, but merely fast-forward the history of political thought to incorporate more contemporaneous texts.[6]

The historical development of political science is usually presented as an abbreviated version of the Great Dialogue—a conversation across the ages—and it matters little whether that conversation occurs over a period of centuries or decades or whether it takes place in classical antiquity or the twentieth century (Waldo 1975, 8). For example, Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (2002a, xv) explicitly state that "we think about the discipline in terms of an extended, although highly varied but coherent, intellectual conversation." John G. Gunnell (1991a, 29) argues that "the history of political science is, at least in one important sense, the history of the internal evolution of arguments within the discipline." Thus, Gunnell (1991a, 29) proposes that we approach the history of political science as "the evolution of a discursive practice and conceiving of such an investigation as something on the order of a genealogy or archeology of its internal conceptual development."

While I do not disagree with Gunnell about the importance of this type of archaeological excavation *as one aspect* of understanding the development of political science, I argue that it is just not possible to understand political science without situating genealogy and archeology in the context of a political sociology of political science.[7] To do otherwise always yields a disciplinary narrative where the competitive marketplace of ideas sorts through concepts and methods to ensure that "the best" ideas and methods always prevail in the long run, and this begs the question, best for what and best for whom?

The prevalence of this approach to disciplinary history is not surprising because most disciplinary historians in political science are trained as political theorists with little or no training in how to write political history, much less the sociology of knowledge. However, in reconstructing the history of political science in this way, they have reduced the history of political science to the history of the discipline, while neglecting the history of the profession. They have recounted the history of political science as an idea, but not as an institution. Consequently, they have failed to capture the interplay between profession and discipline and, most especially, the regulatory authority of the profession over the discipline and the constant challenges from the discipline below against the organized profession. Indeed, most genuinely critical work on the politics of higher education in the United States is authored by historians, sociologists, educators, and even literary scholars, but there are very few political scientists who

write on this topic or even incorporate this literature into their analysis of disciplinary history.[8]

My thesis regarding the dialectical interplay between discipline and profession is that once the political science discipline was institutionalized as a professional organization in the form elaborated by Somit and Tanenhaus, the profession developed into a regulatory apparatus that sought to patrol the boundaries of the discipline and to enforce an official hegemonic paradigm in the form of methodological and conceptual orthodoxy. Thus, the *profession* of political science has always acted as a brake on the development of the political science *discipline* by serving as a bulwark against intellectual movements and individual iconoclasts who criticize capitalism or who challenge the myths of American liberal democracy. The profession of political science has consistently and persistently fought a war of maneuvers to contain, marginalize, and delegitimize insurgent intellectuals within the discipline,[9] but this is a version of disciplinary history that has yet to be written by political scientists.

Despite its best efforts, the profession's official regulatory apparatus has never been able to secure complete control of the political science *discipline* for many reasons, although it nearly succeeded in the 1950s and 1960s with "external" financial support from corporate-sponsored philanthropic foundations, the US military, and US intelligence agencies. The professional regulatory apparatus could never establish its complete domination because the political science discipline, like all social science and humanities disciplines, has internal contradictions that unfold according to their own developmental logic.

First, every intellectual discipline has internal contradictions that surface as logical inconsistencies in its conceptual structure or as empirical anomalies that cannot be understood or explained by the dominant disciplinary paradigm. For example, Ellen Schrecker (2021, 395) observes that by the end of the 1960s many of the nation's leading political scientists recognized that pluralist theory could not account for contemporary political events on or off campus, but this realization did not empower the field's small and marginalized cohort of leftists, who had long been critical of pluralist theory. Indeed, as Thomas S. Kuhn (1970, chaps. 5–6) discovered long ago, paradigms do not cede their dominance simply because they confront an ever-growing list of anomalies that they cannot explain. The adherents of these paradigms simply dismiss anomalies as marginal deviations from the paradigm even when the anomalies challenge their core concepts and assumptions. This is merely a more sophisticated way of saying that political science is an ideological form of political conflict.

Once the ideological fragmentation of the discipline is acknowledged, it exposes the futility of deploying the concept of a paradigm in political science when the concept of ideology provides a more accurate description of political science. In discussing the behavioral revolution, we are not talking about a dominant paradigm in the sense that natural scientists talk of paradigms. Instead, as political scientists, we are talking about competing ideologies and, in particular, about hegemonic and subordinate ideologies.

The professional elites who control a discipline's regulatory apparatus do not abandon their preferred paradigm because of logical inconsistencies or empirical anomalies but instead act like every other fraction of the "ruling class" by attempting to avoid, evade, dismiss, ignore, or forcibly repress these challenges to the hegemonic paradigm. There are powerful material, professional, and psychological reasons for professional elites to hold fast to the official hegemonic paradigm, because it not only legitimates their claims to professional and intellectual authority but is a source of prestige, position, and income. However, as dissident disciplinary practitioners continue to grapple with these contradictions and anomalies, often at great personal cost, segments of the discipline can start to move in directions that violate the methodological orthodoxy and conceptual structure sanctioned by the official profession.

Second, disciplinary boundaries are always somewhat porous, which is why professional elites constantly patrol those boundaries, but an inevitable result of their inability to completely seal these borders is that concepts, theories, and empirical findings from other disciplines find their way into political science through a process of osmosis. The strongest regulatory efforts by professional elites can never completely exclude interdisciplinary invasions of the official discipline because in its simplest form dissidents can just choose to publish elsewhere (or establish their own journals). Thus, the political science discipline is periodically stretched, violated, and undermined by these new entries into the discipline. Finally, the mere fact that political science studies politics means that it can never fully insulate itself from economic, social, and political change. Political events that are ostensibly "external" to the intellectual discipline are incorporated into it and potentially create upheavals in its established conceptual and theoretical structure. As Theodore Lowi (1992) once said: "We become what we study."

However, a discipline cannot challenge its professional regulatory apparatus solely at the level of concepts and methods because the regulatory apparatus is a material organization that consists of authoritative

institutions inhabited and governed by living persons. Ideas cannot dislodge persons from positions of authority, and methodological debates cannot change institutions. A disciplinary revolt must necessarily challenge the scope and methods of the discipline, but it must also challenge its material regulatory apparatus by gaining partial or complete control of that apparatus, extracting concessions from that apparatus, or by circumventing that apparatus with new institutions designed to bypass the official profession and those who govern it. During the wave of disciplinary revolt that led to the formation of the CNPS, radicals did win significant positions of authority in their professions' official apparatus—most notably in history, modern languages, and later in sociology—but the intransigence of most social science and humanities professions resulted in radical disciplinary insurgencies that pursued what I call partial strategies of dual power. They struggled for position and authority within the recognized professional associations—usually with minimal success—and, consequently, they ended up forming various types of counter-associations that sponsored their own conferences, newsletters, and journals outside and parallel to the official professional associations. As one will see in the following history of the CNPS, all of these factors were at work in the sequence of causation that finally led to the eruption calling itself the Caucus for a New Political Science.

It is my contention that disciplinary historians have not sufficiently linked the history of the discipline to its politics and the history of the profession because doing so is dangerous to the intellectual hegemony of positivist political science in whatever form it takes: behavioralism, formal modeling, or rational choice theory. Such a history undermines the claim that certain theories, methods, or paradigms achieve dominance in political science because of their superior intellectual merit, however one defines that term. The convenient refusal to even acknowledge such challenges with anything more than peremptory dismissals also functions ideologically to conceal the professional elite's very active political role in marginalizing critical political science at various times in its history and in politically suppressing fundamental challenges to the profession that would reassert the discipline against the profession by questioning the official discipline's dominant ideological orthodoxy.

Yet, whether consciously or unconsciously, those who are most aware of the discipline's historical development still choose to evade the external history of the discipline, which should at least begin with a consideration of the politics of the political science profession. In this regard, George Steinmetz (2018, 281) argues persuasively that "social science is shaped by

politics and extra-scientific forces" and that "this understanding of the social determination of social science should inform social research and political critique." A foray into the political history of political science will reveal that, for better or worse, academic departments, universities, professional associations, and journals are *politicized institutions* with both direct and indirect links to the state and to wider political struggles in capitalist society (Lowi 1971, chaps. 6–7; Lowi 1972; Farr 1993). In fact, politics is not really "external" to political science if we incorporate the people who practice it into our analysis, along with the institutions that organize professional and disciplinary practices, such as universities, academic departments, professional associations, journals, scholarly conferences, foundations, research institutes, state legislatures, and federal funding agencies (Fisher 1993; Hauptmann 2006, 2016; Adcock 2007).

Disciplinary History and the CNPS

Theodore J. Lowi was an early enthusiast and critic of the CNPS and he wrote one of the first critical analyses of its place in the discipline's development. Lowi argued that understanding the "politicization of political science" was one of the most important things scholars could study to understand the history, development, and current state of the discipline. Lowi (1973, 44) argued that "the character, scale, and intensity of the crisis inside political science can be directly assessed by studying the single most important insurgent movement ever to emerge inside the profession: the Caucus for a New Political Science." Lowi (1973, 44–45) described the CNPS as an "organized insurgency" that occupies a "special place" in the historical development of political science, partly because "it produced a mailing list, officers, bylaws, and a rather distinct consciousness, part of which is expressed in an actual platform. For these reasons the Caucus is worth studying."

Lowi (1973, 45) argued that the Caucus's program and activities "define clearly enough the alternatives the profession is likely to face" and that its program defined a realistic alternative for what political science might become and might be in a more egalitarian and democratic future. This historical claim remains as true today as when it was written, but Lowi was also making an epistemological and methodological argument about the need to study political science through the lens of political science. Yet he also rightly observed that an understanding and analysis of the politics of political science is noticeably missing from the disciplinary histories of

political science, and, thus, he suggested that the history of the CNPS might be the place to begin writing such a history. However, after a brief membership in CNPS, Lowi quit the Caucus at the peak of its electoral strength in the APSA. He was disillusioned with the Caucus for having sacrificed its proposed "intellectual revolution"—the creation of a new political science—for the pursuit of a "political revolution" confined to the inner sanctums of the APSA. In an oft-quoted criticism, Lowi (1973, 45) lamented that the "Caucus for a New Political Science was converted into the Caucus for a New Political Science Association."

Political scientists ignored Lowi's call to study the politics of political science until Raymond Seidelman published his pathbreaking book *Disenchanted Realists: Political Science and the American Crisis, 1884–1984* ([1985] 2015). The CNPS had probably reached its apogee as an intellectual influence in the APSA by this time, although its political influence within the APSA had been waning for a decade. Nevertheless, when Seidelman's *Disenchanted Realists* appeared in 1985, it "helped inaugurate a new era in the historical and critical study of the discipline of political science in America" (Farr 2005, 241). Farr (2005, 241) observes that Seidelman's book "unleashed a critique of the discipline in 1985 on the basis of a tale of four generations of prominent liberal academics who wanted the science *of* politics to be a science *for* politics" by bolstering "democratic politics and the energetic state by the methods of science." In doing so, Seidelman was not only criticizing the rise of an apolitical behavioralism in the post–World War II era but also exposing the implicit ideological commitments of the profession to the liberal (capitalist) state with all its limitations. In this respect, *Disenchanted Realists* shared Bernard Crick's earlier critique of the political science discipline, which Seidelman regarded "as a scientific knockoff of American liberalism" (Farr 2005, 242).

What made Seidelman's book distinctive in comparison to other and earlier disciplinary histories is that it "rattled the iron cage of the discipline" by suggesting that "the real problem . . . was that corporate capitalism undermined at every turn the democratic state on which so many civic hopes had been invested" by successive generations of engaged political scientists (Farr 2005, 242). Seidelman suggested that the discipline's inability to surmount the limitations of its origins in American liberalism was tied to the gradual professionalization and scientization of political science. He argued that the profession of political science had slowly and gradually come into conflict with the discipline of political science and that this tension finally exploded in 1967 with the establishment of the CNPS. In fact, it had exploded once before with the publication of Charles

A. Beard's *Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (1913) (see Barrow 2000).

This critical tradition of political science had always walked a path between the Scylla of democratic political activism and the Charybdis of disengaged scientism. While Seidelman's critique of political science upended the official (behavioral) conception of the discipline, he still worked within the established genre by adopting a "great man / great books" approach to disciplinary history. Seidelman claims to document a critical reform tradition in political science extending from Arthur Bentley, Charles A. Beard, and Woodrow Wilson in the first generation to Charles Merriam, Harold Lasswell, V. O. Key, and David Truman in a second generation, to Walter Dean Burnham and Theodore Lowi in a third (and perhaps the last) generation of reform-oriented political scientists who sought to communicate with a nonacademic public. Seidelman's reconstruction of the reform tradition is essentially a conversation among disciplinary elites with a continuity and tradition that Farr (2005, 247) accurately describes as a non-Marxist left critique. It is an excellent review of the *ideas* of these important intellectuals, but it is not an analysis of the politics of political science.

Seidelman's analysis takes a step in this direction by identifying the CNPS as the contemporary "organizational expression" of the reform tradition in political science, which sought to harness science for the purpose of advancing a more democratic and vibrant liberal politics in the United States. In Seidelman's history of the discipline, the CNPS was far from a marginal eruption on the edges of the discipline; it was the continuation and rediscovery of a well-established tradition of reform political science. In this rendition of disciplinary history, behavioralism was the historical anomaly as it shunted aside reform politics for an allegedly value-neutral and apolitical political science. The eruption of CNPS was the persistence of the discipline's founding vision, which was to generate theoretical, historical, and empirical knowledge that is normatively anchored in the commitment to an egalitarian and democratic politics along with its application in critical policy analysis to help strengthen and improve American democracy.

Seidelman (1993, 311) emphasizes that "for the greater part of its history, American political science has been tied to its political sibling, American reform liberalism." However, the apolitical and "value free" orientation of behavioral political science ruptured that relationship and effectively set political science adrift and unable to account for the conflicts that arose during the 1960s, much less to offer any solutions to the

problems posed by those conflicts. In this context, Seidelman (1993, 311) notes, "A reform science of politics lived on as a species of organizational revolt, better known as the Caucus for a New Political Science." From this perspective, Seidelman (1993, 317) suggests that "behavioralism represents something of a distinct break from the discipline's reform political identity. Somewhere in the 1950s, reform political science became the undercurrent and behavioralism the mainstream."

Yet, because of his own evident commitment to the liberal reform tradition, Seidelman concurs with Lowi in offering both praise and criticism of the CNPS. Seidelman ([1985] 2015, 198) observes that from its first appearance

> the Caucus made great headway within the American Political Science Association, but notably not as a united intellectual movement or as a group of intellectuals seeking ties with a public outside the discipline itself. Indeed, the Caucus's activities centered exclusively on the politics of political science itself.

Seidelman ([1985] 20015, 198) concurs with Lowi that the Caucus accomplished a great deal in its first decade, but only with respect to changing the profession of political science:

> With such limited goals, the CNPS could be judged a success. The CNPS succeeded in democratizing the procedures of the APSA. It contested elections, set up annual panels devoted to current issues, and established a new journal, *Politics and Society*, as an alternative to the often-unreadable *American Political Science Review*.

Nevertheless, Seidelman suggests that by expending its energies on an organizational revolt, the Caucus's original concern with "changing the modes by which intellectuals thought, acted, and communicated was converted into a debate about professional standards. Anger over the Vietnam War, and social injustice was converted into debates about methodology, objectivity, and scholarly biases." Furthermore, the Caucus never successfully identified a reform public as its audience, and "seldom were bridges sought between intellectual inquiry and movement politics" (Seidelman 1985] 2015, 198–99).

Similarly, John G. Gunnell (2006a, 485) observes that over the course of the discipline's development "the generalized hope for a more effective relationship to political life tended to devolve into professional enclaves,

such as the Caucus for a New Political Science, and to surface at various points in dissident movements such as *Perestroika*." Seidelman ([1985] 2015, 199) echoes this view in his conclusion that in pursuing the politics of organizational revolt "the CNPS narrowed it goals to the concrete, material and limited demands of an interest group within the discipline, trading the uncertainties of movement activity for a larger piece of the existing pie," although its share of the pie began to shrink rather quickly.[10] Seidelman ([1985] 2015, 199) leaves it an open question whether the Caucus could "have transcended the disciplinary constraints that encapsulated it" or could have "bridged the gap between scholarship and the polity" to become a real force for social and political change, as opposed to a force for change in the political science profession.

However, Seidelman's eagerness to pigeonhole the CNPS as the organizational expression of reform political science misses the fact that the CNPS originally consisted of three parallel streams of activists, who in some ways represented all three strains of political science identified by Seidelman: political activists, organizational activists, and intellectual activists. Paul A. Attewell (1984, 9–13) observes that this pattern of division was common to all of the radical caucuses that emerged during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and none of them successfully bridged these divisions. The political activists in the Caucus saw the organization as a vehicle for taking political science out of the classroom and into the streets. Their main objective was to forge relationships with off-campus and extra-professional activist groups—antiwar, civil rights, antinuclear, anti-imperialism, trade unions, Third World solidarity—and later the women's liberation movement, LGBTQ, and ecology movements. This group of activist-scholars argued that "real" politics occurred outside the profession and that organizational activism within the APSA was a waste of time. Attewell (1984, 9–10) suggests that these activists "attempted to turn these gatherings of liberal-left professionals and academics into surrogates for political parties" because what sets the sixties apart from earlier periods of intellectual activism in the United States was "the absence of acceptable left parties outside academia."

Alan Wolfe (1970), who was one of the most vocal spokespersons for this group of CNPS activists, criticized his fellow Caucus members for being slaves to a professional mystique (1970b). Wolfe (1971) eventually resigned from the Caucus after criticizing it as a failure for pursuing organizational revolt within the APSA instead of political revolution in the United States. Many of the Caucus's original adherents followed Wolfe's recommended path, and they paid a professional price for putting politi-

cal activism ahead of intellectual work (i.e., failing to publish), as they often ended up at small institutions with heavy teaching loads or left academia to work in government service or with nonprofit community organizations, while some, ironically, became highly successful in the corporate sector they had criticized as graduate students.

At the other extreme were intellectual activists, who often came to the Caucus with top 20 pedigrees from Columbia University, UCLA, the University of California, Berkeley, the University of Chicago, Indiana University, New York University, and the University of Michigan. These intellectual radicals often gravitated toward Marxism over time, but they nevertheless embraced the trappings of academic success and were committed to achieving this success by effecting an intellectual or post-behavioral paradigmatic revolution by founding alternative scholarly journals and counter-associations (Attewell 1984, 11–20). By the mid-1980s, this group in the CNPS was expanding to include a diverse array of socialist-feminists, postmodernists, post-Marxists, eco-socialists, postcolonialists, Black Marxists, Chicano Marxists, and queer theorists. This is the path that Lowi hoped to see the Caucus pursue, although perhaps with a "softer" version of reform liberalism.

Finally, there was a third group of organizational activists who sincerely wanted to win control of the APSA presidency and the APSA Council with the goal of securing *APSR* editorial positions and pushing through a variety of resolutions and APSA constitutional reforms, including the abolition of the hated Article II of the APSA constitution, which prohibited the APSA from taking official positions on public issues and controversies. This group was the rallying point for the political activists and the intellectual activists, and it was this group that welded together an otherwise eclectic mix of radical activists. Political activism and intellectual activism were fused in a strategy of organizational activism, so it was probably not possible to escape the confines of the Caucus's disciplinary constraints without fully splitting from the APSA. Dwight Waldo (1975, 78) is perhaps alone in recognizing that Caucus membership included "varying points of view, causes, and constituencies," with the result that "calculations of a strategic or tactical nature in terms of group objectives, rather than general 'ideology,' were characteristically decisive."

A decade later, John Dryzek (2006, 491) repeated Seidelman's assessment of the CNPS, but his criticism is far harsher:

> Its assault on the commanding heights of the APSA having failed, the Caucus settled down to life as one of the APSA's ever-prolif-

erating Organized Sections, sponsoring its own (eventually quite small) set of panels, and publishing a journal, *New Political Science*, largely ignored by the rest of the discipline.

However, the fact that the Caucus was still being talked about in the *APSR* nearly 40 years after its founding by scholars such as John Dryzek and John G. Gunnell suggests that the CNPS could not be ignored because the confrontation between the discipline and the profession that it initiated had left political scientists at a "professional impasse" by the mid-1980s. This impasse had clearly not been resolved on the 100th anniversary of the American Political Science Association. In fact, Seidelman ([1985] 2015, 240–41) had gone so far as to argue that the continuing professional impasse in political science signaled "an epitaph for political science as it has been practiced in the United States." Seidelman's eulogy seemed to affirm the success of the Caucus's founding manifesto, entitled *An End to Political Science* (1970). At about the same time, David Ricci (1984, 315) published *The Tragedy of Political Science*, where he similarly argued that political science had come to serve "less as an instrument for solving problems than as a component part of the problem itself."

Disciplinary historians have been united in their criticism of the Caucus's initial commitment to an organizational revolt and for failing to bridge the contradiction between the discipline and the profession. The judgment that the CNPS could (or should) have pursued an alternative course of action, such as a political revolution outside the profession, or an intellectual revolution within the discipline, does not take into account the actual politics of the CNPS itself or its political relationship to the APSA. The CNPS began as an *ad hoc* caucus that grew into an organizational insurgency and then concluded that trajectory by becoming an institution. The Caucus became more than its origins as it picked up issues and members over time, but as a result of this continuous development there were always multiple and unresolved fissures within the Caucus. There was always an organizational fissure between associationists and counter-associationists: namely, those who wanted to reform or capture the APSA, as had occurred in the Modern Language Association and the Organization of American Historians, and those who wanted to splinter from the APSA and form a counter-association modeled on the Union of Radical Political Economics. There were hard core anti-behavioralists, and even anti-empiricists in the CNPS (mostly political philosophers), but most CNPS members conducted empirically based research, and even

behavioral research in American politics, comparative politics, international relations, and public policy.

The CNPS was often falsely characterized by its critics as a group of disillusioned political theorists, partly because many of its early leaders were political theorists, such as Christian Bay, Sheldon Wolin, William E. Connolly, Bertell Ollman, and Stephen E. Bronner, to name a few (Baker et al. 1972). Yet most members of the CNPS were students of American politics and public policy (Michael Parenti), comparative politics (James Petras), and international relations (Richard Falk and David Singer). The vast majority were not anti-empirical or anti-quantitative; they were only anti-behavioral in the sense that behavioralism had welded empirical political science to a positivist philosophy of science. They were only anti-quantitative to the extent that quantitative political scientists valued the deployment of esoteric methods above the study of substantive political problems or presumed that quantitative methods always provided the best or only way to understand politics.

CNPS members did uniformly denounce "the conservatism" of the political science profession—by which they meant its attachment to the liberal status quo—but they were nevertheless split between a hard left consisting of Marxists and socialist-feminists and a soft left composed of disenchanted liberals and critical pluralists. Much of the post hoc criticism of the Caucus has come from scholars who fall into the latter category and who left the Caucus as it became more radical in the middle to late 1970s. Moreover, this schism often surfaced as a generation gap between the Caucus's older and more established founding members and a younger cohort of graduate students and assistant professors who were winning control of the Caucus by the early 1970s through the sheer force of numbers and political energy.

Within a short period of time, the CNPS was also being criticized for not including women and people of color in its leadership positions despite paying lip service to their concerns in public forums and platforms. Therefore, from its point of origin, seeds had been planted for political differences to emerge between the hard-left adherents of a class struggle politics and the adherents of a nascent post-left nonintersectional identity politics. In its initial phase of development, all that held the organization together was a common enemy—the APSA and the "behavioral Establishment"—and thus organizational revolt was the only possible source of *political unity* within the Caucus.

Furthermore, criticisms of the Caucus's failure to solve the problems of political science are embedded in the almost exclusive deployment of a

specific approach to writing disciplinary history. For example, Gunnell notes that disciplines have typically preceded professions in the evolution of the social sciences. The founding of the American Political Science Association in 1903 marks the establishment of political science as a *profession* located primarily within the walls of the university. Gunnell (2006a, 479) suggests that "the creation of the *profession* was a rebellion against the *discipline*." While the profession was committed to norms of scientific objectivity, professional autonomy, and political neutrality, the discipline was committed to reform politics and therefore to the idea that political science should advance and strengthen democracy. Thus, like Seidelman, Gunnell suggests that it is the discipline that now periodically rebels against the profession, which is institutionalized in the American Political Science Association. Gunnell identifies the CNPS as one such rebellion in one sentence, but otherwise the CNPS is not worthy of further study in his view. Gunnell (2006a, 479) acknowledges that the emergence of the political science profession in the form of the American Political Science Association institutionalized an ideological break with *the discipline* by reformulating the relationship between politics and political science. However, this break with the historical discipline through its ongoing professionalization could not have occurred if the profession did not exert some regulatory authority over the discipline. Therefore, while the Caucus's assault on the commanding heights of the APSA may have failed—although it came very close to success—it was not misguided or futile, as some scholars claim (Landau 1972, 66).

As noted earlier, the profession of political science controls much of what Marx (1970, 64) called "the material means of mental production" insofar as it owns and regulates access to important instruments and tools of the intellectual production process: professional offices that make decisions about the profession and discipline, conference participation, journal publication, prestigious editorships and editorial board positions, peer review opportunities, fellowships, and honorary awards and recognitions. The professional elite is also more likely to serve as peer reviewers for grant awards, and they monopolize access to faculty positions at higher-education institutions that have substantially more resources to support intellectual activity. Every member of this academic Establishment will argue that it is an "elite" only to the extent that the profession is a meritocracy and everyone else simply needs to recognize that they are intellectually superior to others by pedigree, technical skills, and scholarly accomplishments. Every oligarchy that obtains its position by heredity and maintains its position with wealth and political power will nevertheless

claim that it is an aristocracy. One cannot understand the development of the discipline without also understanding the development of the profession and the politics of that profession, including its relationship to class struggle and the state. The development of American political science has been structured as a dialectic of discontent between the discipline and the profession insofar as the profession seeks to regulate the discipline even as that discipline constantly escapes the ability of professional elites to control it.

It is somewhat ironic therefore that despite the Caucus's acknowledged role in perpetuating a historic conception of the discipline that remains in conflict with the profession of political science, not one disciplinary historian has given any serious attention to the origins and development of the CNPS. To his credit, Lowi wrote an entire article on the CNPS, but since that time very little has been written on the subject. Seidelman gives the CNPS a few paragraphs, and Dryzek gives it a sentence. Similarly, in a magisterial overview of the discipline's history, Gunnell (1983, 22) summarizes the disciplinary critique put forward by the CNPS in exactly two sentences, and both sentences refer only to the Caucus's earliest formative years of 1967–70. In fact, in a 1991 essay, Gunnell (1991a, 21) refers to "the days of the New Caucus" as if it had ceased to exist. Ricci (1984, 188–90), who is otherwise sympathetic to the CNPS and its successes, considers the Caucus worthy of only three pages in a 335-page book. Likewise, Ellen Schrecker (2021, 359–60, 396), who is similarly sympathetic to the Caucus's objectives, gives it only a few mentions and about two pages of text in her study of the lost promise of American universities in the 1960s.

As I have suggested earlier, there is a reason for this blindness to the disciplinary undercurrent institutionalized in the CNPS, and it goes back to the fact that political theorists write disciplinary histories as intellectual histories. In this respect, Wolf Lepenies and Peter Weingart (1983, ix–x) propose that we problematize disciplinary history because most histories "reproduce an ideology of science which mainly reflects the interests in legitimation of the scientific profession." In contrast, an *Ideologiekritik* of the extant histories of political science would question why they reconstruct the discipline's development by focusing only on selected "great men or women" and why they consistently generate a linear and accumulative sequence of discoveries to produce a distorted and idealized picture of the discipline's development. These reconstructions present the development of political science either as a free competitive marketplace of ideas where "the best" ideas are selected by social scientists purely on the basis of intellectual criteria or as a linear sequential internal development

of ideas as they are applied to constantly evolving disciplinary puzzles and tested against empirical evidence. Vulgarities such as personal prestige and reputation, monetary inducements, professional authority, and political coercion play little or no role in these histories. Ideas are analytically (and artificially) detached from real living human beings and the social relations they inhabit, so that vulgar material factors are excluded from consideration by methodological fiat. Such an approach preserves the intellectual purity of disciplinary development as one that is uncorrupted by politics, power, ideology, or money.

However, Lepenies and Weingart (1983, xvii) argue that disciplinary histories are themselves part of an intellectual struggle within the discipline they seek to influence:

> Histories of disciplines are being written and rewritten, to extend the present (or what is to become the future) as far as possible into the past, thereby constructing an image of continuity, consistency, and determinacy. In battles for supremacy in a field, in items of uncertainty of orientation, or in conflicts over the truth claims of contradicting schools of thought a history of the discipline serves to rearrange the relative impact of past achievements, the proper evaluation of founding fathers and disciplines, heroic discoveries and consequential mistakes. Histories thus serve to legitimate new paradigms and to delegitimate old ones. A different periodization, the mentioning of some, hitherto less known, and the ignoring of others, hitherto highly respected scholars will change the image of a discipline's history, [and] it will restructure the memory of the past and, by way of socialization, structure the future.

In this sense, Lepenies and Weingart claim that all disciplinary histories are deployed strategically and, thus, have an inherently political purpose to either legitimate or delegitimate a specific vision of the discipline and the professional authorities that regulate it. By strategically deploying disciplinary histories, disciplinary historians speak to a wider audience than just other disciplinary practitioners. They (1983, xvi–xvii) speak in a general sense to "the lay public and more specifically governments, foundations and other sponsors engaged in science policy." Disciplinary historians are ideologically committed in how they write disciplinary history regardless of whether they recognize it or admit it.

In political theory per se, this methodology took the form of a "new historicism," which emerged just as David Easton was declaring the post-

behavioral revolution in 1969 (Skinner 1969). Richard E. Ashcraft (1975, 1980, 1987a, 1987b) was a leading Marxist proponent of this approach to the history of political thought, who repeatedly chastised contemporary political theorists and, by implication, disciplinary historians for failing to incorporate the basic social and historical conditions that structure intellectual and disciplinary practices into their writing of political theory.[11] This criticism remains on point whether one is writing about Aristotle in the fourth century BCE or Robert Dahl in the twentieth century. However, Gunnell (1991a, 23) accurately observes that "it is somewhat ironic that this work, which has been closely tied to the field of political science, has had the least effect in writing about the history of this discipline."

The omission of the politics of political science and its relation to broader social and political events consistently results in disciplinary histories being "written about as if it were great philosophy rather than ideology" (Ashcraft 1989, 700). It makes no difference whether the disciplinary history is critical or apologetic toward political science; the style is the same, because to acknowledge the politics of the profession would require a recognition of its ideological role in contemporary politics. Such an acknowledgment runs so contrary to the fundamental philosophical foundations of official political science—value free and politically neutral—that its adherents and court historians can never make such an acknowledgment without disciplinary history becoming a sociology of knowledge and without the discipline itself becoming a critical political science.[12]

Consequently, B. Nelson Ong (1988, 55) observes that "as paradoxical as it may seem, the discipline of political science has not been subject to the level of politicization and radicalization seen in academic fields such as sociology, anthropology, literature, and other areas." In fact, members of the official discipline find it impossible to conceive of a *politics* of higher education or a politics of political science because one of its foundational assumptions is the distinction between facts and values and the differentiation of science and politics. Political science is therefore an apolitical discipline by official definition, and thus it can never become self-aware of its political and ideological functions in a capitalist society without destroying itself in the process of becoming a new political science (McCoy and Playford 1967).

It is because I would welcome such a transformation of the discipline that I concur with Karl Mannheim's (1936, 109) claim that intellectual historians "should seek to investigate the conditions under which problems and disciplines come into being and pass away." Disciplinary historians "must be

able to do better than attribute the emergence and solutions of problems to the mere existence of certain talented individuals," that is, the great man or great books theory of intellectual history. In this respect, Mannheim (1936, 80–81, 68) admonishes political theorists and disciplinary historians to "constantly ask ourselves how it comes about that a given type of social situation gives rise to a given interpretation" and "to trace the intimate interaction between the two in the course of social and intellectual change," while keeping in mind that "the structure of society and its corresponding intellectual forms vary with the relations between social classes."

Gunnell calls this approach to political science an "external history" and, while opposed to this type of disciplinary history, he does raise a legitimate concern about how efforts of this type have been executed in the past. Gunnell (1991a, 28, 29) suggests that external histories of the discipline (or political theory) tend to "posit general and somewhat abstractly conceived historical and social contexts (for example crisis of authority) that derive from other secondary historical accounts of the period." What gets short shrift in these purported sociologies of knowledge "are details of the structure and context of the discourse of disciplines and their actual context." If one is to write an external history successfully, then "it is necessary to avoid positing contexts that are little more than reified sociological constructs and/or rapidly extrapolated and unexamined images from secondary literature that are no more knowable or given than what they purport to explain."[13]

In this regard, Israel Waismel-Manor and Theodore J. Lowi (2011a, 76) have pointed out that a major obstacle to writing a political history of political science is the "extremely thin scholarship on the politics of political science." One almost starts from scratch, with little to build upon, because as noted earlier this lacuna is built into the positivist-behavioral paradigm, which makes it anathema to conceive of political science as a form of political action and political conflict. However, as Mannheim (1936, 117) emphasized:

> Not only is the political theorist [and every political scientist] a participant in the [class] conflict because of his values, and interests, but the particular manner in which the problem presents itself to him, his most general mode of thought including even his categories, are bound up with general political and social undercurrents.

Several decades ago, Lowi (1973) proposed that critical political scientists rectify this omission by openly calling for the politicization of politi-

cal science and for the politicization of the writing of its history. In a later exchange with Professor Lowi, he challenged me directly to take my earlier critiques of the discipline "as the beginning of a fully fleshed-out argument, whether a later article or, we hope, a book" (Waismel-Manor and Lowi 1973b, 97–99). It has been more than a decade in the making, but at long last it is time to take up that challenge, and I can only hope that this book comes close to meeting his expectations.

2

Political Science

Discipline, Profession, and Ideology in the 1960s

The two books by Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, *American Political Science* (1964) and *The Development of American Political Science* (1967), are landmarks in the history of the political science discipline. Their foray into disciplinary history is so paradigmatic that their work has entered the lofty ranks of those books that scholars are required to footnote, although there is little evidence that most scholars take the time to read them. Somit and Tanenhaus generally refrained from making normative or evaluative judgments about political science based on their empirical findings, but any discerning reader at the time would have recognized that their findings signaled trouble ahead for both the profession and the discipline of political science. Their two books offer insights into the politics and political structure of political science in the early to mid-1960s that set the stage for the intellectual and political origins of the Caucus for a New Political Science.

Discipline and Profession

Somit and Tanenhaus (1964, 2) identify a *discipline* with its scope and methods. This means that for a discipline to exist there must be "substantial agreement" among disciplinary practitioners on the meaning and content of its defining intellectual practices. A discipline is therefore a "state of mind" characterized by a "general consensus" regarding the subject matter of the discipline and "the methods appropriate" for studying its agreed upon subject matter. This would make fields of study such as phys-

ics, chemistry, and biology the archetypes of an intellectual discipline because there is general consensus on what is to be studied, the appropriate methods and techniques for studying the subject matter, and general agreement on the basic laws and theories that govern research—the theory of general relativity, the principles of organic chemistry, or the law of natural selection.

In emphasizing the importance of disciplinary consensus, Somit and Tanenhaus (1964, 2) argue that any "discord over methods, like discord over scope, can pose a serious threat to a discipline." In practical terms, this means that established practitioners and disciplinary leaders must continually monitor and patrol the "outer boundaries" of the discipline—both its scope and methods—to ensure that disciplinary practitioners remain within the established consensus. Importantly, however, Somit and Tanenhaus (1964, 2–3) also claim that a consensus on scope and methods is not enough to sustain a discipline because "if a discipline is to thrive, most of its members must be convinced that the work they are doing is truly meaningful" and that "the questions they are asking are eminently worth asking and that the methods used in seeking answers to these worthy questions are reasonably suitable and productive." Moreover, a discipline is not just a state of mind or an agreement on scope and methods; it is also materially organized as a profession through an interlinked network of formal organizations established for the purpose of maintaining, advancing, and regulating the discipline.

The Profession of Political Science

Somit and Tanenhaus identify the political science *profession* (as opposed to the discipline) with the American Political Science Association, the regional political science associations, the *American Political Science Review* and nine other journals, the top 20 doctoral granting departments in the United States, major philanthropic foundations (grants), and the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.

The Department

The fundamental regulatory institution in political science is the university department, especially the top doctoral granting departments. The admission of applicants to graduate school is a departmental decision, so anyone who wishes to enter the discipline must be initially admitted to it

by a department. Once admitted, departments inculcate students with disciplinary knowledge (scope and methods) and professional norms. Thus, Somit and Tanenhaus (1964, 4) suggest that "the source of a man's [or woman's] doctorate is a status symbol that tends to mark him [or her] for life."

However, in reviewing data on political science PhDs, Somit and Tanenhaus (1967, 159) immediately identified a source of future potential conflict in the profession. They found that by the early 1960s a growing number of PhDs in political science were being conferred by "less prestigious departments." The most important regulatory power of doctoral granting departments is the authority to determine who can call themselves a political scientist by deciding who does or does not receive a PhD in political science. For instance, we would not find it acceptable for a plumber to practice medicine or law on the authority of a plumber's license and certification. We would also be less likely to believe that a licensed physician practicing medicine in the rear of a hardware store was a competent practitioner of medicine (regardless of whether that perception is accurate). Thus, not only the certification, but the social location of a particular occupational or professional practice, will be interpreted by most people as evidence of competence and skill and even the right to claim a particular professional label (Merton 1972, 15). Doctoral granting departments maintain an oligopoly on this social location by conferring an image of expertise on selected individuals that is hierarchically ranked according to location (i.e., institution or department).

The leading doctoral granting departments directly control access to the most prestigious and lucrative faculty positions in the profession, while they distribute and allocate their graduates to other equally or less prestigious departments. These departments indirectly influence the direction of the discipline by determining who is admitted to PhD programs, how graduate students are trained in those programs, what courses are offered in those programs, what dissertations are approved and recommended for publication, and by distributing their graduates to other political science departments. Thus, these PhD programs effectively generate "the discipline" as the structural effect of their educational practices.

Somit and Tanenhaus (1967, 159–60) found that historically "the most prestigious nine or ten schools turned out a majority of political science graduates" in the United States, while Harvard University, Columbia University, and the University of Chicago normally accounted for one-third of all political science PhDs awarded in the United States at that time. However, by 1965, this academic oligopoly of nine or ten departments accounted

for less than half of the political science PhDs awarded in the United States. Consequently, Somit and Tanenhaus (1967, 160) warned that "since the standing of the institution at which one takes his [or her] doctorate has a real bearing upon one's career prospects," this situation had the potential to generate an imbalance between the supply and demand for prestigious academic appointments. This disequilibrium would put "the profession in the anomalous position of discriminating against most of its membership" in terms of hiring decisions, association committees, conference participation, and publication. It was a recipe for discontent in the profession, particularly among its younger members (Somit and Tanenhaus, chap. 4).

This concern was reinforced by data that left "little doubt that the leading departments pursue a discriminatory policy, insofar as doctoral origins are concerned, in selecting their staff" (Somit and Tanenhaus 1964, 44). While the political science department at the University of Illinois would gladly hire a graduate of Harvard University, the political science department at Harvard University was not going to hire a graduate of the University of Illinois. Moreover, since a new graduate's initial appointment tended to "mark one for life," the idea that a young scholar could publish up to a better institution was already a rapidly fading pipe dream by the mid-1960s. Quite the contrary, as the level of competition increased among young scholars, a curriculum vita full of publications was not likely to land one a position at a "more prestigious" institution, particularly if that research fell outside the established disciplinary (elite) consensus. Somit and Tanenhaus made no evaluative judgment as to whether this discrimination among the top 10 doctoral granting departments was based on genuine merit or other ascriptive factors. However, when later constructing what they called "the political science hall of fame" and an even more selective list of political science "Immortals," they ultimately conceded that there were no objective criteria for compiling this list as it was all just a matter of "the opinions of the profession" (1964, 64). However, in a hierarchically organized system of academic departments, what this meant in practical terms was that the opinions of a self-selecting and self-reproducing Establishment occupying positions at the top 10 to 20 doctoral granting departments claimed to speak for the entire discipline.

The ability to regulate and influence "the opinions of the profession" was largely a matter of oligopolistic production and market share, rather than some nebulous concept of "merit." For example, Somit and Tanenhaus found that in constructing their list of Immortals, a group they called "the pro-behavioralists" were more likely to nominate Harold D. Lasswell, Robert A. Dahl, and Herbert Simon to the list of Immortals in political

science, while a group they called "the anti-behavioralists" were more likely to nominate Edwin S. Corwin, Hans Morgenthau, and Charles A. Beard, but then Somit and Tanenhaus (1964, 45 n. 6) subtly reminded readers that Corwin and Beard "were trained as historians" and thus a disciplinary purist would not consider them real political scientists. In this regard, Somit and Tanenhaus patrolled the outer boundaries of the discipline in their discussion and definition of it.

The data presented by Somit and Tanenhaus could easily support the argument that the political science *profession* was evolving from a meritocratic community of scholars into a self-reproducing oligarchy due to the increasingly unequal control and distribution of professional resources, including prestigious and authoritative faculty positions, or what Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1970, 64) called "the material means of mental production." The control of graduate education is a central component of the material means of mental production as it is a key component of the material and human infrastructure that allows certain individuals to establish, extend, and reproduce their professional authority over a discipline. Aside from the obvious material advantages of occupying a faculty position at a PhD-granting institution, these faculty also act as gatekeepers at multiple points of entry into the discipline.

While there are now federal and university regulations that encourage "diversity" in admissions on the basis of sex, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, and national origin, there are no rules that require ideological, methodological, and political diversity, nor do any rules exist that prohibit covert ideological discrimination. James E. Campbell (2019, 1) calls our attention to a telling example of this fact in an APSA task force's 74-page report titled *Political Science in the 21st Century*. While there was a great deal of hand-wringing in the report about the need for more demographic diversity in political science, "there was not a single mention of ideological or intellectual diversity—and this in a profession whose *raison d'etre* is the intellectual understanding of politics." While Campbell's concern is the absence of a strong conservative voice in political science, Kevin Funk and Sebastian Sclofsky (2021) have recently demonstrated that Marxism has also virtually disappeared from the graduate curriculum in PhD-granting political science departments in the United States.[1]

The significance of these findings is that by excluding both the ideological Left and the ideological Right from holding positions at leading university departments, and by ensuring that graduate students do not even receive a rudimentary exposure to competing ideas and theories, an official political science—the profession—is able to consolidate and repro-

duce its institutional authority and ideological hegemony while also able to expand and reproduce that hegemony across time and space on an ever-expanding scale (Campbell 2019; Rom 2019; Zigerell 2019; Wilson 2019).[2] By producing graduate students, faculty holding positions of professional authority are able to extend their influence because many of their students will be hired by the large number of non-PhD-granting institutions, who educate most college and university students in the United States. In contrast, faculty without graduate students, which is where most political science faculty who articulate critical or alternative positions are employed, means that the positions they articulate slowly "die out" over time as they are gradually replaced by individuals from the hegemonic metropole universities.

Non-PhD institutions will typically hire new faculty based on perceptions of merit, and while some of this perception will be influenced by the performance of the individual candidate, much of the selection process is influenced by the *location* where competitors for new jobs receive their PhD. New scholars who originate from more prestigious locations will be perceived as more meritorious whether or not that it is true based on some unknown but allegedly "objective" criteria. Thus, over the long run, it is not necessary that a hegemonic cohort of intellectuals directly capture the outer regions of what we know to be a vast and sprawling ideological state apparatus. It is only necessary that they retain control of its center—the top PhD-granting institutions and professional association offices—where the process of extended ideological reproduction takes place. The periphery of the ideological state apparatus is primarily, though not exclusively, a distributive component of the apparatus, which serves to transmit ideas, theories, and "facts" received from the center of the apparatus.

The growing material inequality among even doctoral granting departments was highlighted by Somit and Tanenhaus's analysis of foundation philanthropy among US political science departments. They found that from 1959 to 1964 "the rich got richer" as almost half of the total benefactions of the Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie Foundations were awarded to just three political science departments—Harvard University, Columbia University, and the University of California, Berkeley. Only 12 political science departments accounted for 80% of the three foundation's financial awards during this time. Thus, there was a distinct competitive advantage to being employed by, or trained at, one of these institutions, although they no longer monopolized the production of PhDs in political science.[3] These resources allowed selective departments to purchase expensive

computer time, to conduct expensive telephone or mail surveys, to provide students with specialized training in new statistical techniques, to provide financial support to graduate students, and to hire technical support personnel for behavioral research, which Emily Hauptmann (2022) documents was critical to the transformation of American political science after World War II.

The American Political Science Association

The decentralized structure of university departments takes on a more centralized form through individual and departmental memberships in national and regional professional associations. Somit and Tanenhaus point out that the national association of any profession typically consists of national officers, a central staff, one or more disciplinary journals, and periodic meetings of the membership. The American Political Science Association did not fully meet these criteria until 1949, when it implemented several organizational changes on the cusp of the behavioral revolution. The APSA Executive Council was abolished and replaced by an elective APSA Council with an inner Executive Committee. The office of president-elect was created to ensure greater continuity of executive leadership. A national office with a small full-time staff headed by a full-time executive director was employed for the first time by the Association. The autonomy of APSA committees was reduced by making them presidential appointments, subject to approval by the Council, which all worked to centralize the discipline's professional apparatus after World War II (Waldo 1975, 55).

Importantly, the national association is more than a simple provider of membership services because it is also an administrative and regulatory apparatus of the broader discipline. Somit and Tanenhaus rightly considered the APSA to be a political and regulatory institution, which confers professional authority on its officers. There have rarely been contested elections for these positions, and to that extent the ASPA officialdom can rightly be characterized as a self-perpetuating Establishment that attempts to regulate and steer the discipline through various mechanisms, such as association policies and business meetings, invitations to speak at conference panels, plenary talks, journal editorships, fellowships, and professional awards. These mechanisms are carrots that signal nonelite and aspiring members of the discipline as to what topics of research count as political science and what types of research count as "good" political science.

In this respect, Somit and Tanenhaus (1967, 52–53) call attention to the fact that the APSA's annual meeting serves many regulatory purposes beyond the exchange of scholarly knowledge and ideas:

> For one thing, they [the annual meetings] provided a welcome alternative to publication as a means of attaining professional "visibility." An invitation to read a paper, or to participate in a panel discussion, testified to the recipient's scholarly acceptability. Repeated invitations demonstrated that he was in good standing with, if not actually a member of, the Association's inner circle, adding measurably to his academic desirability. Regular attendance at the meetings enabled political scientists, particularly the younger ones, to enlarge their circle of acquaintances and to build a network of personal contacts which would keep them informed of promising job openings and opportunities for research support. Once well established, these lines of communications greatly strengthened the professor's bargaining position in negotiations with his "home" institution, since they multiplied his changes of moving elsewhere should local conditions of employment prove less than satisfactory. And, of course, the meetings served as a "slave market" where prospective employers and aspiring employees could be brought into fruitful juxtaposition. All of these developments, it should be noted, tended to shift the locus of power, and individual loyalties and ties, from the several departments to the discipline itself.

A discipline and its material embodiment in a department or profession rely heavily on these types of inducement regulators because one can only coerce so much compliance through prescriptive regulators (i.e., punishments and exclusions) (Gorz 1989, 35). There are many layers of prescriptive regulators that professional and departmental authorities can deploy to punish and exclude those who transgress the outer boundaries of a discipline's scope and methods. It starts with denying admission to a top graduate program, receiving less than satisfactory grades on seminar papers, refusing to serve as a graduate student's adviser, or refusing to accept a proposed dissertation topic. Another layer of prescriptive regulators involves who gets hired where, at what salary, and with what level of support resources. Somit and Tanenhaus's data on this subject showed conclusively that top graduate departments only hire new faculty from each other, so this outcome is already foreordained from the outset.

There is another layer of prescriptive regulators that include the rejection of grant applications, the denial of conference paper proposals, the rejection of journal and book manuscripts, and exclusion from editorships, professional awards, and professional office. In all of these activities, universities and professional associations are exercising delegated sovereignty conferred on them by the state to certify who can claim to be a scholar or intellectual (Offe 1996, chap. 3; Schmitter 1985). Schrecker (2021, 346–47) is correct to point out that at this time "those who bestowed that status typically belong to old-boy networks of the middle-aged, white, male professors from elite institutions," and "they did not run the learned societies in a democratic manner." Finally, a last layer of prescriptive regulators includes the denial of tenure, promotion, and merit raises, which can effectively end the otherwise promising career of a noncompliant or dissident scholar. These layers of prescriptive regulators mean that to challenge a discipline one must also challenge its profession and the regulatory apparatus maintained by it.

Importantly, however, prescriptive regulators are often inefficient and ineffective ways of patrolling disciplinary boundaries, particularly when those boundaries are fuzzy or ill-defined by a lack of disciplinary consensus on scope and methods. Radicals, dissidents, and iconoclasts do manage to secure outposts on the margins of any discipline. Yet those who command professional authority at the departmental, regional, or national level, and those who control access to the material means of mental production can offer market inducements to encourage and facilitate teaching and research that trends toward the established (elite) disciplinary consensus. The incentive regulators available to academic (and other) elites include money (salary, grants, travel), security (tenure), prestige (appointments and awards), and the power and money attached to activities like outside consulting. The objective in deploying these inducement regulators is to motivate individuals to work toward institutional goals and the established disciplinary consensus. The asymmetrical distribution of inducement regulators continually reproduces a process of disciplinary self-selection and selective entry to the command posts of the profession, so that personal motivations are integrated into maintaining the equilibrium of an existing academic and disciplinary system. The recipients of such inducements will naturally excel, and appear to be meritorious, as they rise through the academic ranks of the discipline and the administrative ranks of the profession.

Scholarly Journals

Scholarly journals are one of the more visible material manifestations of a discipline, and, as Somit and Tanenhaus observe, there is often one official organ of the discipline that is particularly influential in keeping members of the discipline informed about research findings and intellectual currents in the profession, as well as with news about personnel, current events, and book reviews. However, Somit and Tanenhaus (1964, 4) observe that

> in publishing articles, the journals do more than provide a channel of communication, for publication also serves to legitimize the research reported by certifying that the investigation falls within the scope of the discipline, employs methods acceptable to it, and is not trivial by accepted standards. Conversely, when the journals refuse to publish a person's research findings, they cast doubt on the legitimacy of this work.

A scholarly journal is also an organization or institution because it routinizes and stabilizes a fixed set of orientations and values among those who participate in the institution (Weber 1978, 1:48). A journal has an editor who makes decisions based on input from peer reviewers, who are selected by the editor. It has an editorial board that makes editorial policy for the journal and these board members are typically selected (or at least nominated) by the editor. By 1964, Somit and Tanenhaus could identify 11 scholarly journals in political science, and most of these journals were sponsored by national or regional political science associations, whose officers made appointments to their respective editorships and editorial boards.[4] However, Somit and Tanenhaus (1967, 156) found that by 1967 (it had not always been so) the *American Political Science Review* had gradually risen to become "*the* periodical in the field. A 1963 survey confirmed the general belief that publication in the *Review* carried far more prestige than publication in any other professional journal. In this respect, it was unmistakably in a class by itself."

The ability to publish an article in the *APSR* now "carried the Association's implicit imprimatur," and its pages became "an invaluable guide to the 'approved' interests of American political scientists." Yet the *APSR* came to do much more than merely reflect what was being done and thought by political scientists. Somit and Tanenhaus (1967, 55) observe that "where its editors had strong doctrinal convictions, as was sometimes

the case, the official understanding of what was 'sound' political science could be ignored only by the most illustrious or the most foolhardy and stubborn practitioners. In this sense, the *Review* molded no less than it mirrored" the political science discipline.

Competition from new journals only enhanced the reputation of the *APSR* because as the number of political scientists continued to increase in the United States, the space available in the *APSR* did not grow proportionately. Other journals increasingly came to be seen as less prestigious substitutes for publication in the *APSR*. The result was that relative scarcity made publication in the *APSR* increasingly prestigious for the political scientists who managed to get a "hit" in the Association's flagship journal. Yet Somit and Tanenhaus (1967, 156) found that this "pre-eminence carried its own penalty" as emergent critics of the *APSR* began to claim that the journal was "open only to a coterie of 'insiders' and that the acceptance or rejection of articles did not always turn on merit" but on the choice of methodology, the selection of peer reviewers, an editor's personal preferences, or membership in an elite circle of Establishment political scientists.

Inter-University Consortium for Political Research

In *The Development of American Political Science* (1967), Somit and Tanenhaus expanded their definition of the political science profession to include the recently formed Inter-University Consortium for Political Research (ICPR) based at the University of Michigan. By this time, Somit and Tanenhaus (1967, 171–72) could rightly identify the ICPR as "a major force within the discipline." The ICPR was playing a significant role in the rise of behavioralism and the development of quantitative research techniques in political science. Somit and Tanenhaus (1967, 171–72) recognized that the ICPR was playing a key role in organizing the behavioral movement nationally as it became "a rallying point for advocates of a more scientific, quantitative oriented discipline." The ICPR was able "to secure funding on a substantial scale" because of its behavioral orientation, and this made it possible to train an ever-increasing number of faculty and graduate students in the techniques of behavioral research. There was no organized countervailing power to the ICPR, with perhaps the exception of "the Straussian school" that was uncompromisingly anti-behavioral but gaining ground only in the increasingly marginalized political philosophy subfield (Drury 1988).

By 1966, the ICPR had 73 institutional members, including virtually

every institution of any graduate standing in political science. By 2022, the renamed Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research had approximately 800 dues-paying members, which allowed the ICPSR to become what Emily Hauptman (2022, 174) describes as a powerful "discipline-defining entity." As Hauptmann (2022, 175) observes:

> The consortium provided its members a research infrastructure that was far larger and more expensive than what even the largest research universities could sustain on their own. Those affiliated with its fee-paying institutional members pass through ICPSR's portals to learn to analyze the large, cumulative data sets it curates; many then embark on research careers that depend on maintaining access to them. In effect, the ICPSR standardizes at the same time that it narrows what people in several fields of political science analyze, [and] how they learn to analyze it . . . the consortium sets at least subdisciplinary standards for what counts as professionally recognized research.

State of the Discipline

In addition to their review of secondary data on political science and political scientists, Somit and Tanenhaus conducted a survey of political scientists in the United States that asked 26 questions about the discipline and the profession. I focus only on the questions that are directly relevant to a critical history of political science. The most widely cited question from the Somit and Tanenhaus (1964, 14) survey is their finding that 65.7% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that "much that passes for scholarship in political science is superficial or trivial."[5] Only 29.2% of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. Similarly, 62.8% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that most of the theoretical and analytical work in political science was nothing more than "hairsplitting and jargon." Yet, if most of a discipline's members must believe that the work they are doing is truly meaningful for it to thrive as a discipline, then, as Somit and Tanenhaus argued, these findings were a damning indictment of political science. Not surprisingly, therefore, more than half (54.8%) of respondents to the Somit and Tanenhaus (1964, 14) survey agreed or strongly agreed that political scientists were "unhappy about the current state of their discipline."

However, there were many other warning signs in Somit and Tanen-

haus's survey results. More than three-quarters (75.6%) of survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed that "much research in political science is undertaken simply because the projects lend themselves to research by a fashionable tool or because financial support can readily be secured" (Somit and Tanenhaus 1964, 14). In other words, a great deal of trivial or hairsplitting research was being produced and then published in leading political science journals simply because foundations and the federal government were enamored with behavioral research (see US House of Representatives 1967; Hauptmann 2022; Rodhe 2013; Solovey 2013; Moustafa 2024). This meant that political scientists increasingly tended to select research topics amenable to this methodological approach, rather than because the question being asked addressed an important political or normative problem. Methods were now driving the selection of research topics, rather than real-world problems of politics and governance.

Similarly, nearly two-thirds (66.6%) of survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed that "political science cannot be said to have any generally agreed upon body of methods and techniques" (Somit and Tanenhaus 1964, 14). According to Somit and Tanenhaus's definition of a discipline, the answers to this question meant that political science might be an organized profession, but it could not claim to be a discipline. The major source of division on this point is what Somit and Tanenhaus called "the behavioralism issue" in political science. Political scientists were deeply divided over the rise of behavioralism, with 44.6% of respondents saying that the *APSR* devoted "an unduly large amount of space to materials reflecting a behavioral approach," while 48.3% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. Not surprisingly, therefore, a whopping 84.1% of survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed that political scientists had become "increasingly concerned" with methodology, but the discipline was again deeply divided over whether behavioral methodology could answer the "really significant problems of political life" (38.5% no, 45.7% yes, 15.8% "can't say").

A Discipline Divided

The idea that political science was physics applied to politics generated a deep divide among political scientists. Indeed, one of the most significant conclusions drawn from Somit and Tanenhaus's (1964, 21) survey was that political scientists considered behavioralism "the single most important issue facing the discipline" and that "American political scientists have

certainly not reached anything like consensus on behavioralism." If one subscribes to the view that a discipline can only exist where there is consensus on scope and methods, and if one believes that behavioralism is the only truly scientific approach to the study of politics, then Somit and Tanenhaus's findings had the clear *regulatory* implication that it was time to apply a strict regimen of prescriptive and inducement regulators to move the discipline toward the desired consensus. While they (1964, 24) found that a majority of respondents occupied middle positions along a continuum of support and skepticism toward behavioralism, they noted that there were "extremists" on both sides—pro-behavioral and anti-behavioral—"comprising perhaps 20 to 25 percent of the discipline." Yet, as if to illustrate the findings on their first question, Somit and Tanenhaus (1964, 21) agreed that the end result of their very expensive survey "may seem a totally unnecessary demonstration of the obvious," because anyone who merely read the leading journals in political science would have arrived at the same conclusion.

However, the behavioralism issue was closely linked to another emerging concern among political scientists about the structure of power and influence within the profession. The university and its disciplines have often been described as a "community of scholars," but a significant number of US political scientists no longer saw their discipline as an intellectual community where individuals succeeded on the basis of individual merit. The profession was increasingly viewed by a growing number of political scientists as one dominated by an Establishment, or even worse, by a self-perpetuating oligarchy that reproduced itself from one generation to the next based on its monopolization of PhD production, control of the professional apparatus, and preferential access to foundation and government grants. On this point, Somit and Tanenhaus (1964, 99) found it useful to employ "power and influence as key analytical constructs" in their description of the political science profession—at least for purposes of describing how political scientists perceived those who "exercise influence and power over the management of their profession." Thus, for the first time in the history of the discipline, Somit and Tanenhaus were applying some of the key concepts of political science to the study of political science.

Somit and Tanenhaus (1964, 100–101) asked two questions that measured respondents' perceptions of a power structure within the APSA, and the responses again revealed a deeply divided profession. In response to a question of whether "American political science has developed an Establishment which largely determines the character and standards of the discipline," 46.0% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed, while 28.8% dis-

agreed or strongly disagreed. In response to the question whether "there has developed an inner group in the American Political Science Association which, in large part, controls the key panel assignments at the annual Association meetings," 42.0% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed, while only 12.1% disagreed or strongly disagreed.

Somit and Tanenhaus concluded that "a sizeable majority of political scientists perceive the existence of an Establishment which wields substantial influence over at least some aspects of professional life." They (1964, 101–2) further observed, based on write-in comments to their survey, that if they had worded the question differently or included more aspects of the profession in their question, "an even larger proportion of respondents probably would have disclosed positive perceptions of a powerful Establishment." However, as their analysis went on to document, it was not just a generic Establishment that was the object of this perception; it was the perception that a behavioral Establishment, which was out of touch with the rest of the discipline, had taken control of the profession.

John G. Gunnell (2013, 190) reports that the terms "behavioralism" and "behavioral sciences" were "first adopted by political scientists at the University of Chicago, who were devoted to developing a general interdisciplinary theory of human behavior" (see also Gunnell 2015a; Berkenpas 2016). Although critics of the behavioral movement were inclined to see it as a monolithic Establishment (Somit and Tanenhaus 1964, 101–2), leaders of the behavioral revolution were not initially unified in their understanding of what it meant to be a behavioralist. Evron M. Kirkpatrick (1958, 9), executive director of the APSA (1954–81) defined behavioralism as

> an approach and a challenge, an orientation and a reform movement, a type of research and a rallying cry . . . it is obvious that several different, and even contradictory, sets of assumptions, methods, techniques, and data currently share the name political behavior. One gets the impression that the term serves as a sort of umbrella, large enough that all those dissatisfied with "traditional" political science may huddle under it.

Similarly, Robert A. Dahl (1961a, 763) described behavioralism as a "new mood" among political scientists, but otherwise he thought "the most striking characteristic of the 'behavioral approach' in political science is the ambiguity of the term itself." Heinz Eulau (1963) stridently rejected the idea that behavioralism was a new disciplinary paradigm and instead called behavioralism a "persuasion" among political scientists.

Thus, in 1962, James C. Charlesworth (1962, iv), president of the American Academy of Political and Social Science mused that "whatever behavioralism is, it has generated a great deal of wonderment, controversy, missionary zeal, and scorn, in many segments of the confraternity of political scientists." To address this confusion, the Academy had convened a symposium "to elucidate the subject" of behavioralism that included papers by David Easton, Heinz Eulau, Russell Kirk, Mulford Q. Sibley, and Richard C. Snyder.

Charlesworth (1962, iv) observed that behavioralism "cannot be defined in a sentence; it requires an essay," and it was David Easton (1962, 1–25) who had stepped forward to write that essay, entitled "The Current Meaning of 'Behavioralism' in Political Science." Easton (1962, 1) warned that Dahl's declaration of a behavioralist victory in his 1961 "Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest" was premature and that behavioralists had mistaken "a series of preliminary skirmishes for the main engagement." The decisive Napoleonic battle between behavioralism and its critics was still looming in the future. Easton (1962, 6–7) agreed that behavioralism had "many of the qualities of an inchoate social movement," but he was convinced that "most students of politics, even those unwilling to accept classification as behavioralists, would probably agree about the general nature of its assumptions and objectives." Consequently, Easton (1962, 7–8) clearly staked out the behavioralist methodology by identifying it with a list of eight assumptions and objectives. The Academy of Political and Social Science provided funding to distribute Easton's essay, along with those of the other symposium panelists, to every member of the APSA and the American Society for Public Administration.

Thus, by the early 1960s, Easton had emerged as "the principal spokesperson for behavioralism," which was defined as a science of politics that sought to replicate the methods and results of the natural sciences (Gunnell 2013, 208).[6] Easton's eight principles were later incorporated into his *Framework for Political Analysis* (1965b, chap. 1), which Gunnell (2013, 207) describes, along with its companion volume, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (1965a), as "the most important theoretical contribution to the behavioral movement" because it articulates "most fully and thoroughly the conception of science that came to define the theory and practice of the [behavioral] movement."[7] Indeed, Somit and Tanenhaus adopted Easton's definition of behavioralism in *The Development of Political Science* (1967, 176–79), where they described it as a "creed" defined by eight "articles of faith." More than a decade later, John C. Wahlke (1979, 9 n. 1), president of the APSA (1977–78), claimed in his presidential address

that Easton's eight principles still provided the one definition of behavioralism that most political scientists would accept as the final word on the subject. Despite the preoccupation with making political science a so-called real science, one cannot escape the fact that behavioralists were equally prone to describe their commitment to behavioralism in terms reminiscent of a political ideology or religious creed. In fact, behavioralism was polarizing political scientists in much the same way as a dogmatic political ideology or religious doctrine.

Somit and Tanenhaus (1964, 85, 103–5) found that those who perceived the existence of a behavioral Establishment tended to be relatively anti-behavioral, whereas those who rejected the existence of a behavioral Establishment were usually behaviorally oriented. They found that anties-tablishment critics had generally adopted a realpolitik view of the profession; namely, they criticized the profession for its subordination of teaching to research and for the elevation of quantity of publications over the quality of publications, and they saw pedigree and insider connections as more determinative of career success than meritorious intellectual accomplishments.

For example, Dwight Waldo (1975, 61) attributed the behavioral movement's *political* success to the fact that it

> had effective leaders and ardent, able partisans, especially among the younger political scientists . . . a number of factors worked in its favor. Not the least was comparatively advantageous financing in support of training (or retraining) and research. Research (more broadly, "publication") is the acknowledged, favored route to strategic location and promotion in academia. . . . In the fifties and especially in the sixties, they succeeded in reaching high and strategic positions in academia and in the Association.

Led by figures such as David Easton, Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba, Robert A. Dahl, Angus Campbell, Seymour Martin Lipset, Heinz Eulau, Austin Ranney, Warren E. Miller, Joseph Tanenhaus, Vernon Van Dyke, Martin Landau, and many others, behavioralism had aggressively been pushing aside other approaches to political science during the 1950s and early 1960s. Waldo (1975, 113) concludes that "it is hardly open to dispute that the tendencies collectively known as behavioralism, in the ascendant in the fifties, reached a position approaching dominance in American political science in the sixties."

William C. Havard (1971, 181), a political theorist at Vanderbilt Univer-

sity, offered a less benign description of the behavioralists, who he suggests manifested

> a tendency to transform the behavioral movement from a scientific into an ideological political movement . . . one has only to look at the bent of the Social Science Research Council to see how great the effort has been to spread the doctrine. One cannot fail to be conscious, moreover, of the openly admitted attempt to capture the professional journals, the social science sections of foundations, and even whole departments. . . . From personal experience I could cite many examples of both veiled hints and open suggestions that one had better get into line or suffer the consequences.

In contrast to these political explanations of behavioralism's emerging hegemony, the Establishment deniers (behavioralists) were more likely to attribute professional and disciplinary stature to individual meritorious achievement, but, of course, an important role of any ideology is to legitimate the power and the authority of a ruling class.

In the context of an ascendent behavioral movement, Somit and Tanenhaus also called attention to a historical legacy of the political science discipline that was being jettisoned by behavioralists. American political scientists had always been committed to a set of "extra-scientific responsibilities" that consisted mainly of personal involvement in educating citizens to be informed participants in a liberal democracy. The latter included a range of activities such as public lectures, training high school civics teachers, writing civics textbooks for high schools, speaking with the media, and teaching pro bono courses in labor colleges and adult education programs (e.g., Barrow 1989).

On this point, Somit and Tanenhaus expanded on Crick's earlier critique of the fraying relationship between contemporary American political science and its historical commitment to improving liberal democracy. They observed an emerging tension between the scientistic claims of a profession that is now purported to be value free and politically neutral, and its historical commitment as a discipline to political activities that entailed ideological and political commitments. Many political scientists—mostly behavioralists—sought to resolve this contradiction by withdrawing from politics (or at least by concealing their political activities). However, Somit and Tanenhaus's survey documented that most political scientists were still committed to the professional goals of political involvement and civic education.

Finally, a profile of the political science discipline in the 1960s would be incomplete without calling attention to the emerging ideological and generational divisions within the discipline. Seymour Martin Lipset and Everett Carl Ladd Jr. provided a significant complement to Somit and Tanenhaus's profile of the discipline by conducting a survey of 60,477 faculty members in American universities in the fall of 1969 for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. Lipset and Ladd (1970) found that 56.8% of political science faculty "approved of radical student activism with reservations," while 5.9% "unreservedly approved" of radical student activism. At the same time, and only a decade after the McCarthy era had come to an end, they found that 13.8% of political science faculty now identified themselves as politically "Left" compared to 58.0% who considered themselves "Liberal." However, among political science graduate students (25%) and faculty under age 30 (22%), the proportion who self-identified as "leftists" as compared to "liberals" was significantly higher than for senior faculty (Ladd and Lipset 1975; see also APSA 1970d).

In this regard, Paul A. Attewell (1984, 23) suggests that the more bitter and hostile paradigmatic disputes become within a discipline, the more likely each paradigm's adherents will come to denigrate other paradigms, and by far the most typical form of denigration is to claim that rival paradigms and their practitioners "are not truly 'scientific.'" Within the social sciences, Attewell finds that Marxist social science has consistently evoked the greatest inter-paradigmatic hostility, particularly within the US social sciences and humanities as compared to other so-called minority paradigms (e.g., Straussianism, postmodernism). Attewell observes that "the Marxist paradigm is singularly distrusted by many members of the other schools in economics, sociology, and political science," including by the adherents of many other minority paradigms.

Importantly, inter-paradigmatic conflict can have serious material consequences for graduate students, junior faculty, and even senior proponents of dissident paradigms, because paradigmatic disputes are not just disputes about the scope and methods of a discipline, but conflicts over graduate assistantships and scholarships, completion of the PhD, postdoctoral fellowships, coveted tenure-track faculty positions, research funds, travel funds, prestigious awards, tenure, promotion, and merit pay. While all of these awards are ostensibly based on merit, Attewell points out that other factors regularly figure into these decisions, including paradigmatic and institutional loyalties, personal friendships, individual personality, and—dare we say—ideology. Thus, prescriptive and inducement regulators are designed and applied in ways that generate a structural

dependency among faculty who are not members of a paradigmatic elite or members of a disciplinary establishment. These regulators pressure graduate students and junior faculty, especially, toward intellectual conformity with the dominant and *most powerful* paradigm, with power being measured by professional control of material resources, rather than the explanatory power or intellectual superiority of the hegemonic paradigm, and all of these exercises of power breed contempt and resentment among those who are its target.

A Storm on the Horizon

While Somit and Tanenhaus were reserved in how they presented the findings of their survey, it revealed a discipline that was deeply divided on the question of behavioral methodology, with many political scientists skeptical of its value as a methodological and research orientation. Most political scientists considered the discipline's published research trivial hairsplitting and irrelevant to the solution of urgent social problems. A large number of political scientists were disconcerted by the profession's increasing neglect of teaching and civic education (Leonard 1995). Moreover, as the student movement, civil rights movement, antiwar movement, and antinuclear movement began to press on the profession from the outside, the discipline was increasingly fragmenting along ideological lines. While the hard left was a growing minority of the discipline, the liberal center was starting to splinter between Establishment pluralists, whose work legitimated the existing political and economic orders, and critical pluralists who were coalescing into a soft left that was increasingly skeptical of the pluralists' sanguine descriptions of American democracy, even as they continued to use pluralist theory and behavioral methodology as the intellectual platform for their critiques of the American political system.

Somit and Tanenhaus (1967, 209) confidently predicted "that in the next few years there will be a trend toward behavioralism and toward a behavioralistically inclined political science." They did not base their prediction on any claim that behavioralism was more scientific or in any other way superior to traditional ways of doing political science. Indeed, they wrongly predicted that behavioralists would temper their "scientistic aspirations" over time and become "more modest" in the "tone and scope" of their methodological claims. Instead, Somit and Tanenhaus identified two aspects of the profession that would likely facilitate the rise of behav-

ioralism in political science. The first factor was that more and more departments "were adding behaviorally oriented persons to their staffs" and that, once they were ensconced in tenured positions, these departments tended to "go behavioral." The second factor encouraging a swing toward behavioralism "is its success in capturing key positions within the power structure of the profession" (Somit and Tanenhaus 1967, 209). Somit and Tanenhaus (1967, 209) observed:

> An impressive number of those elected to Association office, we have seen, are either spokesmen for, or actively sympathetic to the behavioralist cause. Behavioralists exercise an important, if not a decisive, voice in determining the allocation of foundation and government research grants. Power feeds upon itself—and every profession has its careerists. The "sweet smell of success" will assuredly attract to behavioralism its fair share of academic opportunists. In this sense, behavioralism enjoys a competitive advantage beyond its inherent merits.

According to Somit and Tanenhaus (1967, 185), the key variable that gave behavioralists a competitive advantage in faculty appointments and, later, in publishing their research

> was the partiality to behavioralism manifested by those who controlled the allocation of research grants. The Social Science Research Council's Committee on Political Behavior, through which considerable money was funneled was behaviorally inclined. The foundations in general, and the Ford Foundation (with its Behavioral Sciences Program) in particular, poured large sums of money into behavioral projects. On the federal level, access to public funds was largely limited to the social sciences deemed worthy of the appellation "behavioral sciences."

Somit and Tanenhaus offered a *political* explanation for the rise of behavioralism, rather than an explanation based on meritorious competition in a free market of ideas. They identified deep divisions within political science that clearly signaled trouble ahead to any attentive observer. Thus, Somit and Tanenhaus (1967, 209) predicted that if behavioralism could "not make good on a fair share of its promises," the result would be "a reaction which not even control of the Establishment could withstand.

The perceived self-interest of the profession, plus the ambitions of a future generation of Young Turks, would play the same role in such a counter-reformation as they did in the post-1945 revolt against traditional political science." This was a prescient inference from the data because only a few months later the annual meeting of the APSA would erupt in chaos and result in the formation of the Caucus for a New Political Science.

3

Intellectual Origins of New Political Science, 1953–1967

Somit and Tanenhaus predicted that the political science profession would continue its drift toward behavioralism despite the fact that their own survey data revealed a great deal of skepticism toward behavioralism that had resulted in a polarized discipline. However, because Somit and Tanenhaus had conducted a survey of the profession, rather than a survey of the discipline, their work elided the dissident undercurrents in the discipline that were steadily gaining strength as scholars critically examined the theoretical and empirical works of leading behavioralists such as David Easton and Robert A. Dahl. The intellectual origins of the new political science can be traced to these critiques of pluralist theory and systems analysis. What emerged from this criticism was a methodological critique of behavioralism, an empirical critique of pluralist theory, and a political critique of the institutionalized relationship between political science and the corporate-liberal state. During its formative years, there was not a consensus on what constituted a new political science beyond its critical stance toward the existing discipline and the agreement that political science as an academic discipline should be committed to advancing a progressive political agenda in the United States and abroad.

Political Science as Behavioralism

The behavioral revolution[1] in US political science was advanced largely under the aegis of systems analysis (Easton 1953, 1965a, 1965b) and pluralist theory (Dahl 1956, 1961b). In comparative politics, structural functionalism tended to be the dominant behavioral approach, but it too adopted

"the political system" as its central concept and promoted the idea that American-style pluralism was the preferred outcome of "modernization" and "political development" (Almond and Powell 1966, Almond 1978; Gilman 2003).[2] Talcott Parsons (1951, 75), the sociologist who introduced systems analysis into the social sciences, identified the political system with individual and collective behaviors that provide a center of integration for all aspects of the social system.[3] David Easton (1953, 106), who played a major role in initiating the behavioral revolution in political science, constructed a distinct theory of the political system as a specialized conceptual scheme within systems analysis, while the general concept of system was supposed to unify all sciences across the disciplines. Easton (1953, 106) rejected the fundamental concepts of an earlier political science by declaring that "neither the state nor power is a concept that serves to bring together political research."[4] In urging political scientists to abandon the state and power as organizing concepts for the discipline, Easton (1953, 106) proposed that political scientists should study political systems, defined as "those interactions through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society."

Gunnell (2013, 189) observes that for the next 50 years "the concept of a system was arguably the most important concept in the theoretical repertoire of the discipline of American political science," with Easton's work being "particularly influential in the study of politics." The crux of systems analysis was that all political systems received demand inputs (e.g., parties/interest groups) and support inputs (i.e., legitimacy/resources) from society, which government decision-makers then had to process into policy outputs to address the societal and environmental demands placed on the political system. These policy outputs flowed back into a feedback loop that could generate more demands (system crisis) or more inputs (system equilibrium).

The key explanatory variable in systems analysis was what critics called "the black box" of decision-making by political elites (i.e., the authoritative allocation of values), as decision-making was the central factor that explained how political systems persist in a state of equilibrium or restore stability in response to disequilibrating "disturbances." In accounting for the long-term equilibrium of political systems, Easton (1965a, 21–23) claimed that one had to assume that systems successfully generate two system outputs: (1) the political system must be able to allocate values *for a society* (i.e., decision-making and authority) and (2) the political system must *induce* most members of a society to accept these allocations as binding most of the time (i.e., legitimacy). Thus, behavioralism and systems

analysis became closely intertwined with various theories of authority, but most notably with pluralist theory, which views decision-making as the outcome of bargaining and conflict between interest groups in society.[5]

The significance of pluralist theory is that it seemed to explain how the political system induces most citizens to accept decisions as authoritatively binding most of the time. By the mid-1950s, pluralism had become the most widely accepted explanatory and descriptive account of democratic politics in the United States, largely due to the influence of David B. Truman's *The Governmental Process* (1953), which simultaneously served as a normative theory of liberal democracy. Pluralism was not just a theory purporting to explain how pluralist democracies maintain system stability; it was a normative theory of how pluralist democracies ought to function everywhere in the world (Gunnell 1995, 19). However, the behavioral reformulation of pluralist theory was primarily the work of Robert A. Dahl (1959, 36), who argued that

> there are a number of loci for arriving at political decisions . . . business men, trade unions, politicians, consumers, farmers, voters and many other aggregates all have an impact on policy outcomes; . . . none of these aggregates is homogeneous for all purposes; . . . each of them is highly influential over some scopes but weak over many others; and . . . the power to reject undesired alternatives is more common than the power to dominate over outcomes directly.

Pluralists asserted that these political conditions prevail because key resources, such as wealth, force, status, and knowledge, if not equally distributed, are at least widely diffused among a plurality of competing groups in society. This purported pattern of "dispersed inequalities" means that no one group controls a disproportionate share of all key resources, while all groups in society possess some key resources. The pattern of dispersed inequalities among interest groups ensures that no one group dominates the political process (i.e., authoritative decision-making), while no groups are completely powerless within the political process (Dahl 1961b). In the view of many pluralist scholars, journalists, and/ public officials, the Western consensus on pluralist democracy and managed capitalism—namely, the Keynesian welfare state—was so complete that by the early 1960s liberal democracies had reached "the end of ideology" (Bell 1960; Reagan 1963). Pluralist democracy had eliminated ideological divisions and class conflict in capitalist societies and replaced them with interest group bargaining and political compromise (i.e., consensus).

Charles A. McCoy and John Playford (1967, 10) observe that by the mid-1960s it was "not unwarranted to speak of the behavioralists as members of an 'establishment' within the discipline." Indeed, by that time, David Easton (1965b, 4, 20) had declared the "behavioral revolution" a fait accompli and referred to its practitioners as a "concrete academic movement" within political science.

However, the worldwide political upheavals of 1968 called into question the dominant assumptions of academic social science at precisely the moment when behavioralists were celebrating their triumph at meetings of the social science disciplinary associations. The idea that Western political systems had achieved system equilibrium through pluralist democracy and managed capitalism literally went up in smoke on university campuses and in the streets of those same countries (Singer 1970; Young 1977). The Tet Offensive fueled increasing worldwide resistance to American military involvement in Vietnam, while the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia simultaneously plunged communism into an ideological crisis that further eroded its declining image as a viable alternative to capitalism. At the same time, an accelerating nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union reinvigorated the antinuclear movement in all of the Western countries.

In France, the May Days of 1968 brought an entire nation to a standstill, caused the de Gaulle government to temporarily flee the country, and left the French Communist Party in disgrace after its refusal to assume control of a provisional revolutionary government (Touraine 1971). There were increasingly violent confrontations between students and police in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Mexico. In Japan, students joined farmers in violent resistance to the land takings necessary to construct Narita International Airport outside Tokyo. Meanwhile, homespun terrorist groups, such as the Red Army Faction (Germany), the Red Brigades (Italy), and the Weather Underground (United States), splintered from these larger movements to launch domestic bombing campaigns against military, corporate, and government installations, and to plot assassination and kidnapping attempts on government and corporate officials. Meanwhile, a "cultural revolution" was underway in China.

Simultaneously, a series of urban riots in Harlem (1964), Watts (1965), Chicago (1966), Newark (1967), and Detroit (1967) culminated with the Kerner Commission's ([1968] 1988, 1) finding that the United States was "moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal." The commission's seven-month investigation found evidence that urban riots were the effect of overt discrimination, chronic poverty,

high unemployment, poor schools, inadequate housing, lack of access to health care, and systematic police brutality. Soon after the US government's own investigators reached these conclusions, Robert F. Kennedy, a presidential candidate who opposed the Vietnam War, and Martin Luther King, the preeminent leader of the civil rights movement, were both assassinated in the same year.

Karl Mannheim (1936, 96) observes that "knowledge is distorted and ideological when it fails to take account of the new realities applying to a situation, and when it attempts to conceal them by thinking of them in categories which are inappropriate." In the wake of historical political events that overtly contravened the fundamental assumptions of systems analysis and pluralist theory, official political science was being unmasked by real-world political events as establishment ideology, rather than pure science (Connolly 1967). American political science was not the objective "science" that it claimed to be—at least not as the positivists defined science—but an ideology that systematically concealed, ignored, or distorted empirical facts and real political relationships that contravened its most basic assumptions and conclusions. Political scientists in the United States behaved exactly as Kuhn would have predicted in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1970), which is to dogmatically double down on the hegemonic paradigm rather than recognize its inability to explain observed phenomena.

This response led Henry Kariel (1970, 1088) to muse that "what has become annoying to political scientists of diverse methodological persuasions is the profession's inability to frame and illuminate the major events of recent times." Kariel (1970, 1088) observed:

> Previously unseen (or irrelevant) parts of reality have suddenly had the nerve to make themselves visible. Pushing their way into camera range, unrecognized and unrepresented men have fought to be perceived as significant, becoming relevant if not to the professional social scientists, then at least to administrators and legislators worried about the possibility of revolution. Submerged groups (students, blacks, women, construction workers, stockholders, homosexuals, clergymen, cops, and even Army recruits) . . . have crashed into the mass media and thereby into the arena of politics.

Consequently, Kariel (1970, 1089) was not surprised when political scientists turned out in "considerable numbers for the special convention panels set up by the Caucus for a New Political Science," because events

themselves made it strikingly obvious that "the prevailing modes of explanation do not enable political scientists to comprehend phenomena." Many political scientists were coming to "vaguely sense that their approach does not permit them to see their subject matter as comprehensively as they might" (Kariel 1970, 1089).

The Idea of a New Political Science

The founding of the Caucus for a New Political Science (CNPS) is generally attributed to the efforts of H. Mark Roelofs, a professor of political science at New York University, and Christian Bay, a professor of political science at the University of Alberta, who both served as chairs of CNPS in its early years. Roelofs had attended Amherst College before leaving school in 1943 to enlist in the US Navy, where he served as a communications officer on the admiral's staff and as an instructor at the Columbia University Midshipmen's School. He was a deputy naval expert at the Paris Peace Conference of 1946, where he negotiated the dissolution of the Italian navy with his Russian counterpart. After his military service, Roelofs graduated from Amherst College in 1947 with bachelor's degrees in physics and history. Roelofs was admitted to Balliol College, Oxford University, where he earned degrees in philosophy, politics, and economics (1949, 1950). Roelofs taught at Colgate University (1950–52) and Cornell University, where he became an assistant professor (1952–58). In 1958, he joined the faculty of New York University as an adjunct professor, but eventually rose through the ranks to become a full professor (Barrow 2024e).

By 1967, Roelofs had authored *The Tension of Citizenship* (1957) and *The Language of Modern Politics* (1967). His (2004) works drew attention to a distinction between America's mythic tradition of (Protestant) *social democracy*—by which we legitimize ourselves as a nation—and our ideological (bourgeois) tradition of *liberal democracy*—by which we organize ourselves for practical governance.[6] He (2004) described his conclusions about the future of American politics as pessimistic because cyclically, we will endlessly hope—and as endlessly fail in achieving our national ideals.[7] However, for Roelofs, the late 1960s was a period of mythic hope and unbridled utopian impulses.

Christian Bay was born is Oslo, Norway, and became a naturalized Canadian citizen. He earned his doctorate in political science at the University of Oslo (1959). Bay had previously taught at Stanford University and the University of California, Berkeley, before becoming chair of the

department of political science at the University of Alberta in 1966 (Sedghi 2024). Bay was an outspoken critic of US involvement in Vietnam, but as a scholar he was best known for his book *The Structure of Freedom* (1958), which was a cowinner of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation's 1959 book award (Sedghi 1991, 2024).[8] The book proved so influential in the discipline that it was reprinted in 1965 (with a new preface) and again in 1970. In reviewing the book for the *American Political Science Review*, Felix E. Oppenheim (1959, 551) described Bay's work as "an important and useful contribution to analytical political theory because for the first time it brings to bear the findings of the various behavioral sciences on the problem of freedom."

Bay's (1958, chap. 5) book was one of the earliest systematic critiques of the behavioral persuasion, particularly as operationalized in Easton's systems analysis. Bay (1970a, ix) argued that the objective of political science should not be to identify the functional needs of social systems but to identify and promote "the uses of social science for libertarian aims." Thus, Bay's critique of systems analysis contained a barely concealed criticism of political scientists who elevated the abstract needs of the existing social and political system above the needs of actually existing persons. Systems analysts and structural functionalists quite explicitly confined "the universe of their inquiry to the welfare of systems rather than people" (Bay 1968b, 219). The concept of system equilibrium concealed an ideological bias against studying certain types of questions from a sympathetic point of view, such as protest, urban riots, revolts, the formation of radical parties, political strikes, and alienation, because these were all disturbances of system equilibrium, although studying them empathetically might reveal unmet or latent human needs that were being suppressed by the existing political and economic system.

Bay (1965, 39) extended this critique in a controversial article published in the *American Political Science Review*, entitled "Politics and Pseudopolitics," which documented in meticulous detail how "much of the current work on political behavior generally fails to articulate its very real value biases, and that the political impact of this supposedly neutral literature is generally conservative and in a special sense anti-political." Bay (1968b, 209) defined "the political" as "all activity aimed at improving or protecting conditions for the satisfaction of human needs and demands in a given society according to some universalistic scheme of priorities, implicit or explicit." He argued that the quest for human freedom was a universal value embraced by all people, everywhere, at all times, and, in this respect, his work was an odd synthesis of Aristotle and Erich Fromm (1966).

Bay (1968b, 213) argued, on the other hand, that "pseudopolitical refers to activity that *resembles* political activity but is exclusively concerned either with alleviating personal neuroses or with promoting private or interest-group advantage." By this definition, Americans engaged not in politics but in pseudopolitics and the United States was not a polity, but a democracy (in the Aristotelian sense of the word). This meant that the behavioral orientation of American political science led to elaborate descriptions of pseudopolitics, and in a manner that extolled it as the best possible form of political society. Thus, Bay (1968b, 220) claimed that behavioral political scientists, such as David Easton and Gabriel Almond, failed to see how their theoretical frameworks "can be, and predominantly are, used for the purpose of celebrating pluralist oppression and stagnation rather than as a means for seeking ways toward a politics in the service of human needs." Therefore, in a reprint of *The Structure of Freedom*, Bay (1970a, xiii) admonished his colleagues that "the political scientist should feel responsible for articulating his own values, and for structuring as explicitly as possible the totality of his own commitment . . . As a political scientist he merely owes it to himself and to his audience to make it as clear as he can where he stands with respect to those fundamental issues of politics that are relevant to each."

However, Bay made it very clear that he was not anti-behavioral and that he did not stand with the Straussians, even though his critique of political science often drew on an Aristotelian concept of politics as the pursuit of the public good.[9] Bay (1968b, 213–14) argued that "the behavioral literature of our profession is an invaluable source of facts about our political and pseudopolitical life; my plea is for more and better behavioral research." In fact, at the height of the CNPS's struggle against the APSA Establishment, Bay (1970b, v) emphatically declared that, despite his criticisms of behavioralism, "I still consider myself a behavioralist."

As Bay (1968b, 213–14) described it:

> What I ask for is a more comprehensive, more humane, more truly *political* framework of theory for the study of pseudopolitical and political behavior. . . . I plead, further, for the necessity of liberating our political science literature from the following prevailing assumptions: (1) that political research in America must take the present system for granted, leaving out the study of experiments directed toward radical change; (2) that this nation is "politically developed," even though its electorate behaves by and large pseudopolitically, not politically; (3) that it is either impossible or not

> worthwhile to develop assumptions about national goals (e.g., reduction of suffering, maximization of justice or of freedom) and to study their empirical implications; (4) that it is either impossible or not worthwhile to develop and apply psychological models of needs priorities as a basis for research into their political implications[10]—i.e., to develop a scientific study of politics founded on the study of basic human needs, as distinct from manifest wants and demands.[11]

Bay (1968b, 220) suggested a myriad of possibilities for empirical studies of how specific output and input processes, or aspects of those processes, relate to conditions of human well-being, but instead systems analysts and structuralist functionalists "tended to content themselves with studying the development and maintenance of the political system as the general dependent variable." However, Bay suggested that instead of studying "functions," why not study dysfunctions and not always with an eye to how decision-makers can suppress these disequilibrating behaviors? Instead of studying voting, why not study the reasons (attitudinal and institutional) for nonvoting (Hirsch 1970)? Instead of studying legitimation and "support inputs" for political systems, why not study political alienation and discontent? Instead of studying decisions, why not study nondecisions (Bachrach and Baratz 1963)? These were questions susceptible to empirical analysis, but they raised uncomfortable questions about the stability of the political system and its ability to satisfy the majority of citizens and their needs, and these questions raised scathing normative questions about the persistence of economic and political inequality in an ostensibly egalitarian pluralist democracy. Yet, as Bay (1968b, 221) observed, "By a natural habit of citing primarily each other's work, this school of thought [behavioralism] has produced quite an imposing consensus" on the discipline of political science. Michael Parenti (2006, 503) would later echo this theme by insisting that that even if the types of questions now being asked by critical political scientists were "ideologically inspired," their political genesis was "irrelevant . . . for they still could lead to empirical investigations that carried theoretical import."

These themes were explored at length in a book edited by Charles A. McCoy (Lehigh University) and John Playford (Monash University), entitled *Apolitical Politics: A Critique of Behavioralism* (1967), which pulled together several previously published essays by Christian Bay, James Petras, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, Todd Gitlin, Steven Lukes, and many others. Although published just prior to the actual founding of the

CNPS, the book's critique of behavioralist methodology and pluralist theory became an intellectual rallying point for members of the CNPS, who embraced the book as an early manifesto of the new political science (Ehrenberg 1999, 418).[12]

Apolitical Politics was certainly not the first book to point out the methodological limits of behavioralism (see Charlesworth 1962), nor was it the first to question the behavioralist ideal of a value-free political science (Cobban 1953; Storing 1962). Yet, in contrast to the so-called Caucusites, who identified inherent conceptual and methodological *limitations* to behavioralism, what Somit and Tanenhaus called behavioral extremists were convinced that there were no "'natural limits' to the behavioral analysis of politics" (Eulau 1963, 32). Heinz Eulau (1963, 32) for example, declared that the only limits to the application of behavioral methodology were "technological ones" and that "as technology advances, the range of phenomena amenable to scientific analysis also expands."

At an opposite extreme were some political philosophers, particularly Leo Strauss and his followers, who simply dismissed behavioralism. In lamenting the decline of political theory, Alfred Cobban (1953, 335) suggested as early as 1953 that "the degree of moral disinterestedness possible in natural science is impossible in the field of political theory." He (1953, 335) dismissed behavioralism as "the study of technique" rather than politics and derided it as "a device, invented by university teachers, for avoiding that dangerous subject of politics, without achieving science."

However, the most influential early critique of the behavioral school by political philosophers was a collection of Straussian essays edited by Herbert J. Storing, *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics* (1962). The Straussian critique created a stir in the *APSR* by asserting the now commonplace Straussian axiom that "political science is identical with political philosophy" (Strauss 1962, 308–9) and therefore, as Storing (1962, v) concluded, the behavioralists' focus on "*how* to study politics succeeds only in diverting us from the study of it."[13] However, as behavioralists' tightened their stranglehold on the profession through control of the APSA's official positions, the *APSR* editorial board, and Social Science Research Council and National Science Foundation research grants, they could easily ignore such criticism as sour grapes.[14]

For both intellectual and political reasons, the critiques in *Apolitical Politics* could not be so easily dismissed by behavioralists in the academic establishment. While Strauss castigated American political scientists for their commitment to liberal democracy—one that was shared by most

behavioralists—McCoy and Playford (1967, 10) described their book as one that "may be properly described as a 'liberal' critique of behavioralism's conservative ideological assumptions." Hence, the normative basis of the new political science critique was a commitment to democratic values that were well within the American academic and popular mainstream.

Similarly, McCoy and Playford (1967, 3) did not reject the scientific study of politics, as did the Straussians, but agreed with behavioralists that American political scientists had previously "been unduly preoccupied with the philosophic, legalistic, or descriptive treatment of political institutions." In contrast to the Straussians, the contributors to *Apolitical Politics* believed that behavioralism had a great deal to contribute to political science through its rigorous application of scientific method, its insistence on the importance of theory-building, and its willingness to draw on findings from other disciplines, such as sociology, psychology, and economics. However, they also pointed out that the contemporary generation of behavioralists had become methodological extremists, who made unsupportable claims that went far beyond those made by behavioralism's founders, such as Charles E. Merriam, V. O. Key, and Harold D. Lasswell.[15] The contemporary generation of behavioralists, while invoking these names to legitimate their work, systematically ignored the caveats of those same scholars, particularly their explicit normative commitment to improving democracy.[16]

Charles E. Merriam, who is generally acknowledged as a founder of the behavioral movement, observed that the application of statistical measurement to political behavior and governmental processes was "one of the great opportunities of modern political science, especially in the United States," but he also acknowledged "fundamental problems regarding the possibilities and limitations of quantitative method in dealing with social phenomena." Consequently, Merriam (1925, 130) concluded that "it is not to be assumed that the quantitative study of government will supersede analysis of other types, either now or perhaps at any time" (see Simon 1985). Harold D. Lasswell (1951, 4) also stressed the need for adopting "appropriate" quantitative methodologies, but as supplements to historical, institutional, and philosophical approaches, which in combination would produce "authentic information and responsible interpretations" of the policy process.

Lasswell (1951, 8, 15; see also Torgerson 1985) was very clear that while "one significant feature" of the development of the policy sciences was its use of

> careful observation, measurement, and record making, quantification is relegated to a relatively secondary position. The richness of the context in the study of interpersonal relations is such that it can be expressed only in part in quantitative terms. . . . The policy frame of reference makes it necessary to take into account the entire context of significant events (past, present, and prospective) . . . and puts the techniques of quantification in a respected but subordinate place.

In contrast to most behavioralists, who looked to psychology as the model social science, Lasswell (1951, 9) argued that Keynesian economics was "a remarkable example of the creative results which may follow, not when new quantifications are made, but when new models of institutional processes are devised, models which can unify quantitative and nonquantitative observations and point the way to new empirical, theoretical, and policy activities." This type of policy science would allow the social sciences to become "the policy sciences of democracy" (Lasswell 1951, 9).[17]

Thus, Robert Adcock and Mark Bevir (2010, 79) point out that the founding generation of behavioral political scientists held "a low-key empiricist notion of science as fact-gathering and objective reporting" that combined quantitative and qualitative analysis. While contemporary behavioralists often invoked the names of Merriam and Lasswell as forebears of the behavioral revolution, the reality is that neither of them suggested that political scientists should rely exclusively on quantitative data and statistics, nor did they argue that empirical research was confined to the highly statistical techniques and models that result in social science journals looking more like texts in advanced mathematics than political science. Merriam and Lasswell always reminded scholars that qualitative data of the sort that can be collected through key informant interviews, focus groups, government documents, foundation reports, government statistics, and even journalistic accounts of policy formation are all "empirical"—if not quantitative—forms of observation (Torgerson 1985; Isaac 2015b). Eulau (1963, vii) and others, despite acknowledging Lasswell as "a continuing source of stimulation" were ignoring Lasswell's caveat about appropriate quantification. Empirical political science was not synonymous with, or reducible to, quantitative political science (which is often quite abstract and nonempirical).

Similarly, as McCoy and Playford (1967, 10) pointed out, the late V. O. Key, "while regarded by many as a behavioralist, never allowed himself to

be dominated by his methodology. In fact, his greatness becomes apparent precisely where he leaves the narrow confines of his empirical data."[18] In this sense, the new political scientists were reaffirming Lasswell's call for a policy science that was empirical, applied, and normative in the sense that Lasswell expected policy scientists to conduct research that not only was immediately useful to decision-makers but would support and sustain democratic government by making it more informed and effective.

Thus, McCoy and Playford (1967, 11) agreed with Lasswell that "real knowledge of the political world is practical knowledge," and, therefore, "political research must address itself to real problems in their real settings, even if this involves a sacrifice of methodological precision . . . political science must be political as well as scientific." In this vein, Christian Bay (1970a, xvi) decried the current state of the political science discipline as making:

> no sense at all, with neo-Aristotelian philosophers [i.e., Straussians] disdainful of empirical inquiry on one side of the gulf, confronted with logical positivist behavioralists who shy away from any and all normative commitments on the other side. To make matters worse, communications across the chasm at times suggests the existence of two enemy camps, not two kinds of scholars with complementary contributions to make toward a common objective.

Along the same lines, Henry Kariel (1970, 1088), a founding member of CNPS, wrote that he had little patience with the "fretful," "irritable," and "older practitioners" of political science who were "blind to the underlying impulse of empiricism, because it ignores the subversive, liberating thrust of empirical science." One could do empirical research without adopting a positivist philosophy of science, and he emphasized that empirical research designed around important social problems was likely to yield results critical of the status quo. Likewise, David Kettler (2013c), the second CNPS chair (1969–70) observes that "many of us in the founding generation [of the Caucus] opposed the stark division between 'political theory' and 'empirical political science.'"[19]

Thus, it is necessary to correct the widespread misconception that CNPS was methodologically anti-empirical and anti-quantitative. The CNPS has often been seen as a group of discontented political philosophers who were rallying behind the Straussians' anti-behavioral/anti-empirical critique of contemporary political science.[20] One example of this tendency is found in an article by William C. Havard (1971, 177),

where he argues that "most non-behavioral political science in the United States tends toward the transcendentalist view," which was a set of epistemological assumptions he equated with the political philosophy of Leo Strauss. Havard draws a picture of the political science discipline as one bifurcated between empirical political science and normative political philosophy, or as a contest between a science of facts and a philosophy of values (see Wolin 1969). Havard (1971, 171, 186) incorrectly asserts that "the new anti-behavioralists are also transcendentalists in their assumptions about objective experience," and he explicitly identifies the "the *new anti*-behavioral movement" with the writings of Christian Bay, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, and the collection of articles in McCoy and Playford's *Apolitical Politics*.

In contrast to this Manichaean view of political science, Michael Parenti (1969a, 51–52) emphasized that "*the Caucus is heterogeneous in scholarly orientation*. Many vary from old-line traditionalists and classical theorists to hard-core quantifiers and methodologists. . . . What seems to unite all Caucus members to the extent that they *are* united on any questions, is a desire to redirect scholarly research toward vital and fundamental political issues, a desire to engage in, rather than flee from, relevant political discourse and controversy, and a desire to examine the implicit operational values of our science." Similarly, as Bay's statement makes clear, Havard's claim was absurd because those speaking on behalf of the Caucus were as anti-Straussian as they were behavioral skeptics.[21] Their critiques were directed at an extreme positivist conception of political science as represented by scholars such as Heinz Eulau, Robert A. Dahl, Karl Deutsch, Austin Ranney, and Nelson Polsby, who increasingly captured leadership of the profession in the 1960s and 1970s despite more measured voices in the profession. In fact, most CNPS members, including its leadership, were not political theorists but specialists in American government and politics, public policy, international relations, and comparative politics, with its membership spanning the breadth of the discipline's subfields.

Most of the essays in *Apolitical Politics* are not about political philosophy, but empirical, historical, and institutional critiques of mainstream behavioral research in American politics, comparative politics, and international relations. In fact, Dwight Waldo (1975, 115) points out that many of the new political scientists had statistical skills that were sophisticated for the time, but "in a formal sense, the positions argued by the Caucus members often were those of the traditionalists (e.g., the importance of values, a loose as against a strict interpretation of science)."[22] In fact, in a 1968 open letter to the APSA, the CNPS Executive Council explicitly drew

this connection by pointing out that CNPS "was founded in major part by men determined 'to make democracy work' by teaching 'good citizenship,' and much of the work of the Association's membership over the years was devoted to a descriptive political science which laboriously detailed for the edification of the citizenry the facts of American political institutions and practices." The CNPS was intent on continuing this tradition in political science but in a way that now engaged in "criticism of those institutions and practices" (Bayer et al. 1968, 38).

In time, a few leaders of the original behavioral revolution became critical of their own endeavor, but in the frenzy of professional ascent none of this self-criticism managed to penetrate the official disciplinary consciousness. Many of the criticisms and self-doubts expressed by pioneers of the behavioral movement were some of the same ones put forward by the new political scientists. For example, David B. Truman offered high praise for the works of the early "behavioralists," such as V. O. Key and Paul Lazersfeld, but he was equally critical of the behavioral movement from the 1960s forward. Truman observes in a 1979 interview,

> There has been a tendency to get so fascinated with the gadgetry—particularly as sophisticated, quantitative techniques and the computers and even, I must say, the sample survey, have become more readily available—with what Lasswell used to refer to as the systematic elaboration of the obvious, a minute dissection of things that don't make any difference. I remember V.O. [Key] used to worry about that . . . he would say, you know, one of the things we ought to watch out for is these guys are going to stop asking any good questions that are worth trying to answer. (Quoted in Stokes 1991, 148)

David Easton made a similar observation in a 1988 interview:

> When we discovered that there are certain phenomena that can be refined sufficiently so that they can be converted into measurable units, that great discovery helped to trigger "the behavioral revolution." And we began then to refine and measure many trivial problems that really didn't need measurement and weren't worth the time and effort that was spent on them except that they helped us to sharpen and refine our measurement tools. An important part of the discipline fell prisoner to that one component of science and seemed to feel that this was the be-all and end-all of science. (Quoted in Gunnell 1991b, 212)

One could agree, for instance, that Dahl's empirical analysis of decision-making in New Haven, Connecticut, provided valuable insights into interest group behavior and the local decision-making process, but there is no necessary reason to leap from these *empirical* observations to the *epistemological* conclusion that it is the only reliable form of knowledge about politics or political behavior. Indeed, despite its scientistic pretensions, positivism was in practice a normative theory about how political science *ought to be conducted*, rather than an empirical description of how most political scientists practiced political science in the United States (e.g., Popper 1959, 1962). The Caucusites' critique of behavioralism was that it reduced politics and political science to individual behavior (i.e., voting, public opinion, decision-making) as if there was nothing to be learned from the study of constitutional law, political history, social movements, political ideology, or the political institutions and socioeconomic context that determine, structure, and constrain those actions and decisions.

Instead, the essays in *Apolitical Politics* developed a systematic critique of behavioralism focused on three major concerns designated as "the behavioral syndrome" (McCoy and Playford 1967, 10). First, the writings of the behavioralists were characterized by "conservatism" in the sense that they always implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, celebrated the American economic, social, and political status quo. In 1959, C. Wright Mills (1963, 226) had called attention to "the unexamined conservatism and scientific pretensions of The Behavioral Scientists," and it was this observation that inspired the new political scientists to expose those hidden assumptions through a detailed analysis of behavioralist writings. In challenging the behavioralists' claim to be doing objective, value-free political science, they were also challenging the fact/value distinction that supplied the philosophical foundation for an apolitical political science, because in its claim to be apolitical, behavioralism was nonetheless profoundly implicated in politics by providing an ideological defense of the existing order.

Second, behavioralist writings consistently conveyed a fear of popular democracy by rationalizing the nonparticipation of nonelites in decision-making, and even justified widespread nonvoting as necessary to the maintenance of system equilibrium (cf. Bachrach 1967).[23] As McCoy and Playford (1967, 6; see also Surkin and Wolfe 1970, 369–70) observe:

> The behavioralists have not only shown that the concept of democracy developed by the classical theorists such as Mills is not translated into practice in the major Western democracies; they have

> also shown themselves to be not unhappy about these results of their empirical research. They are opposed to any massive extension of democratic participation in the political process. They favor the maintenance of the present low-level of citizenship involvement, and this they justify partly on the grounds that mass democracy, mass movements and high-level participation are to be feared as first steps toward a totalitarian order and partly on grounds that popular democracy is unmanageable and chaotic.

Third, behavioralist research emphasized arcane methodological principles and elaborate data collection techniques while avoiding vital political issues, such as racial and gender inequality, labor strife, poverty, and the sources of imperial warfare (McCoy and Playford 1967, 3).[24] In this respect, the behavioralists were apolitical, as even V. O. Key (1960, 54) had recognized in pointing out that "a considerable proportion of the literature commonly classified under the heading 'political behavior' has no real bearing on politics, or at least that its relevance has not been made apparent." The behavioral focus on individual behavior, system equilibrium, and methodological technique was blinding political scientists to critical political developments, such as the civil rights movement, the student movement, the poor people's movement, the antiwar movement, and the antinuclear movement, which were all gathering steam by the mid-1960s.

The behavioralists routinely selected research topics not on the basis of any criteria of political significance but rather on criteria determined by their methodology and particularly on whether a "rich database" was available that would allow them to use ever more sophisticated quantitative techniques. Behavioralists had become prisoners of a methodology that led to work that was increasingly sophisticated in its use of new technologies and statistical techniques, while simultaneously it became more "trivial, narrow, and apolitical" in the way it avoided contemporary social problems (McCoy and Playford 1967, 7; cf. Mills 1959).

Although the focus of *Apolitical Politics* was a philosophical critique of behavioralist methodology, it also included several essays that exemplified the empirical and conceptual limitations of that methodology as it had been operationalized in pluralist-oriented community power research (e.g., Dahl 1961b; Polsby 1963; Rose 1967). An essay by Shin'ya Ono (1967, 105) titled "The Limits of Bourgeois Pluralism" defended C. Wright Mills's *The Power Elite* as "the most forceful criticism of the pluralist model of the power structure." However, as with many of the new political scientists,

Ono (1967, 108) also considered Dahl's (1958) standing demand for empirical verifiability to be a valid one and agreed that Mills had partially failed the test of empirical verifiability by failing to document a well-defined power elite, and particularly by failing to "examine the dynamics of the decision-making process with reference to concrete sets of 'key issues.'" Thus, Ono proposed that new political scientists meet Dahl's challenge with additional empirical research, and, of course, many of them such as G. William Domhoff (1967, 1970) and Ralph Miliband (1969) were already at work implementing this empirical research agenda.

However, *Apolitical Politics* also reprinted Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz's (1962, 948) earlier essay "Two Faces of Power," which suggested that a fundamental limitation of the behavioral concept of power is the assumption that "power is totally embodied and fully reflected in 'concrete decisions' or in activity bearing directly upon their making." Bachrach and Baratz drew on E. E. Schattschneider's (1960) concept of "mobilization of bias," which suggests that every political system mobilizes bias in the form of dominant values, cultural symbols, political myths and rituals, and institutional processes. The mobilization of bias in a political system inherently facilitates the organization of some issues into politics, while organizing other issues out of politics.[25] By ignoring these selective mechanisms, pluralists begged the question of power by taking the key issues decided by elected officials as given, when the theoretically more important form of power was *non-decision-making*, the, the ability to keep issues off the political agenda.[26] To overcome this analytical shortcoming, Bachrach and Baratz proposed an alternative method for studying non-decision-making that would start with a detailed examination of the specific selective mechanisms that mobilize bias in particular political communities to determine their differential impact on the relative power position of different groups. The researcher

> would make a careful inquiry into which persons or groups, if any, gain from the existing bias and which, if any, are handicapped by it. Next, he would investigate the dynamics of *non-decision-making*; that is, he would examine the extent to which and the manner in which *status quo* oriented persons and groups influence those community values and those political institutions (as e.g., the unanimity "rule" of New York City's Board of Estimate) which tend to limit the scope of actual decision-making to "safe" issues. Finally, using his knowledge of the restrictive face of power as a foundation of analysis and as a standard for distinguishing between "key" and

> "routine" political decisions, the research would, after the manner of the pluralists, analyze the participation in decision-making of concrete issues. (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 952)

Philip Green and Sanford Levinson quickly followed up on *Apolitical Politics* with an edited collection of dissenting essays, which they called an antitextbook. Their book, *Power and Community* (1969), included essays by Philip Green, Sanford Levinson, Kennth M. Dolbeare, Alan Wolfe, Lewis Lipsitz, Michael Parenti, and Wilson Carey McWilliams. The two coeditors and four other contributors were on the Executive Committee of the CNPS, and nearly all of the contributors would run for APSA office on the Caucus slate in coming years (Green and Levinson 1969). Thus, unlike *Apolitical Politics*, which had appeared just before CNPS was founded, *Power and Community* was stamped with the imprimatur of the CNPS, and the book was explicitly published "to help create a 'new political science'" (Green and Levinson 1969, vii). The volume began with Green and Levinson (1969, vii) declaring,

> For several years now it has been clear that the consensus holding together the academic study of politics has been in the process of breaking down—a process highlighted in 1967 when a group of dissident political scientists joined together to form The Caucus for a New Political Science. This volume is one of several attempts now underway to hasten that breakdown and point our collective work in new directions.

The authors were united in sharing a dual critique of the dominant tendencies in the political science discipline:

> First, contemporary American political science has often been rendered irrelevant to vital political concerns by the pursuit of petty methodological purity. Second, this supposedly pure—i.e., value-free—work has always been strongly influenced by personal value-judgments, which with few exceptions have been supportive of the political status quo in the United States and have generally conveyed a false picture of political life in western democracies. (Green and Levinson 1969, vii)

On this point, it was agreed that "a new political science must be able to focus its vision on important political issues and events, and it must be

willing to confront rather than ignore the political ills of our own kind of social order" (Green and Levinson 1969, vii). The essays by J. Peter Euben, Levinson, and Dolbeare emphasized the methodological and philosophical limitations of behavioralism as a prolegomenon to laying the groundwork for a political science that analyzed "substantive political problems" (Green and Levinson 1969, viii). An essay by Michael Rogin called attention to working-class interests that could not be assimilated in the elitist model of democracy embraced by pluralist theorists, such as Robert Dahl, Charles E. Lindblom, and Nelson Polsby. Lewis Lipsitz sought to "reclaim the political voice of the poor" from political scientists who viewed poverty as a symptom of pathology rather than the effect of the economic and social system (e.g., Banfield 1958). Michael Walzer and Philip Green also challenged pluralist theory by reviewing obstacles that the established legal order put in the way of disadvantage social groups, such as the poor and minorities, who were seeking access to the political system. These essays exemplified the major goal of a new political science, which, according to Levinson (1969, 79), should be to develop an awareness "of how the world looks from the perspective of those worst off within it, instead of continuing basically to offer apologias for the leadership which now exists." In contrast to this emphasis on bottom-up political science, Kenneth Dolbeare (1969, 86) observed that "most of the empirical research done by political scientists in the last decades is irrelevant to the great policy problem of the late twentieth century," because it focused on political and policy processes instead of policy content and consequences, while "a good proportion of it merely endorses the status quo and/or promulgates benevolent images of 'American democracy.'" The theoretical thrust of all the essays was to establish that new political scientists were no longer willing to accept "the myths by which social order has been maintained." Green and Levinson (1969, ix) emphasized that

> in the world of the academic social scientist, the chief of these myths has been that of the American polity as a working example of "democratic pluralism." The main substantive theme that unites all these essays is our rejection of that myth; our conviction that the concept of democratic pluralism has been ideological and obscurantist, in that our political order is neither genuinely pluralist nor always democratic.

Four decades later, Levinson (2009, 409) reflected back on his work in new political science and concluded that the arguments advanced for a

new political science in 1969 "remain alive and well today." However, while the early Caucusites were united by a critical perspective on the existing political science discipline and the political-economic system that it rationalized ideologically, Green and Levinson (1969, ix) acknowledged that "we have no agreed-on blueprint for the alteration of this condition, though several of our essays do attempt to explore new conceptions of democratic politics." Contributors to the volume did not share a common vision of a new discipline or a common vision of an alternative to liberal democracy and free-market capitalism. Green and Levinson (1969, vii–viii) observed that it was "not an easy task" at that point "to indicate what a transformed political science might look like. . . . Our historical era seems to be one in which everyone recognizes the necessity of new modes of thought, but no one has yet successfully put forth a convincing explication of that mode."[27]

None of the 12 contributors to the volume, except Parenti, embraced Marxism—or even socialism—as an alternative to behavioralism, liberalism, or capitalism, partly because the critiques still focused more on methodology than ideology. When political alternatives to liberalism were advanced by the authors, they were usually advanced methodologically in the form of structuralism (Lévi-Strauss), phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty) or existentialism (Nietzsche/Camus) or politically in the form of communes and communitarianism, cooperatives, neighborhood councils, and various types of participatory or radical democracy. Thus, a new critical political science was putting forward a methodological critique of behavioralism while proposing a critical and empirical research agenda with the potential to yield results with normative implications that diverged drastically from those of the apolitical behavioralists.

An End to Political Science?

As the new political science gained steam intellectually, the CNPS released a book coedited by Marvin Surkin, an assistant professor of political science at Adelphi University,[28] and Alan Wolfe, an assistant professor of political science at SUNY–Old Westbury College. The book, entitled *An End to Political Science: The Caucus Papers* (1970), was a collection of essays by newly prominent members of the CNPS that proclaimed the end of political science as it was currently taught and practiced in the United States. According to Surkin and Wolfe (1970, 7):

> To change political science will require a critique of the current [behavioral-pluralist] paradigm and the development of alternative modes of research, theory, and social practice. The only way this is possible is by ending the hegemony of political science over its students. . . . In short, because the only political science permitted in America today is that defined and determined within the existing paradigm, and because only those "responsible" critics who are content to remain within the established pluralistic mold are tolerated, we conclude that the only option now available to critics and reformers is an end to political science.

Victor C. Ferkiss (1971, 883), a professor of government at Georgetown University, described the book as a "collective manifesto" of the CNPS. Edward C. Hayes (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee) (1971, 534), who reviewed the book for the *Journal of Politics*, described it as "the most sweeping attack in recent years on the current methods and uses of political science." In contrast to *Apolitical Politics*, the essays in *An End to Political Science* were largely authored by newly minted assistant professors working at the periphery of the academic establishment, such as Marvin Surkin, Alan Wolfe, Michael Parenti, Matthew Crenson, David Underhill, and James Petras. Many of the chapters previewed a wave of forthcoming books that were highly critical of the behavioral-pluralist paradigm and the political science discipline generally. *An End to Political Science* continued the critique of behavioralist methodology while deepening the critique of pluralist theory. It also extended that critique to the political science profession as Caucus leadership shifted from older liberals to younger radicals and as frustration and conflict intensified with the APSA establishment. As opposed to the politely "liberal critique" advanced in *Apolitical Politics*, *An End to Political Science* advanced a *radical* critique consisting of essays written primarily by self-proclaimed Marxists, socialists, and radical democrats.

By now, new political scientists were taking the earlier critiques of behavioralism as given, and while many of these arguments were reiterated in various contexts, the latest manifesto was more interested in documenting that while behavioralism claimed to be an "empirical" methodology, its application in pluralist studies actually "demonstrate behavioralism's intellectual and political incapacity to come to terms" with social and political reality (Surkin 1970, 27).[29] Thus, *An End to Political Science* picked up where *Apolitical Politics* and *Power and Community* left off; its main

targets were pluralist theory and the *profession* of political science, rather than epistemological and normative critiques of behavioralism.

The Critique of Pluralist Theory

New political scientists were now directing three types of critiques at the pluralists: immanent critiques, conceptual critiques, and the elaboration of theoretical alternatives.[30] Parenti (1970, 112) was hardly making a controversial statement in 1970 when he called pluralism "the new orthodoxy of American political science." Parenti (1970, 137) focused his attention on Robert Dahl's *Who Governs?*, which he considered "the most intelligent and important pluralist statement." Parenti developed an immanent critique of this paradigmatic work to demonstrate that if subjected to a more searching analysis by critics, Dahl (and others) frequently went to great lengths to verbally obfuscate and suppress their own empirical findings, which were often at odds with their ideological conclusions. By unraveling the contradictions between ideological statement and empirical fact, Parenti laid the foundation for a critique of power from below, namely, a concept of power developed from the point of view of the excluded, the oppressed, and the marginalized in American society.

The essence of Parenti's (1970, 115) immanent critique was that the pluralists employed "a double standard for the measurement of power." One did not need to go outside their own published work to find that ideological considerations were biasing the interpretation of their empirical findings and leading them to make self-contradictory methodological pronouncements to interpret away the inconsistencies in their analysis of community power structure. For example, the New Haven investigation conducted by Robert Dahl (Yale), and his former student Nelson Polsby (Berkeley), claimed both that the city's important decision-makers consisted of civic and political leaders clustered around the mayor and that only a few of these decision-makers were members of an economic elite.

Thus, according to Polsby (1963, 88–89), the only way to prove empirically that municipal authorities were under the power of an economic elite would be to document that (1) members of the elite "customarily give orders to political and civic leaders," which are then carried out by them, (2) that members of the elite routinely and successfully block policies adverse to their interests, or (3) that members of the elite place "their own people in positions of leadership." Polsby (1963, 60) argues that "if these events do not occur, then what grounds have we to suppose that the actor

is powerful? There appears to be no scientific grounds for such an assumption." On these grounds, he (1963, 60) dismissed scholars who impute a high power potential to economic elites as "indulging in empirically unjustified speculation." The failure to examine decision-making as an empirically measurable form of behavior was the basis for dismissing the earlier radical scholarship of C. Wright Mills (1956), Floyd Hunter (1963), and Paul Sweezy (1953, Chaps 9, 12). Pluralists claimed that these radical analyses of power structure had at best demonstrated a high potential for capitalist elites to exercise power, while the works of Dahl and Polsby claimed to demonstrate that this potential was not in fact realized in the decision-making process.

However, these same pluralist analyses also found that very few citizens engaged in any direct political, civic, or decision-making activity, while none of New Haven's key decision-makers were drawn from either Black or white lower-income groups (see Dahl 1961b, 180–81). Decision-makers were drawn primarily from professional, business, and higher income strata of the local community. Furthermore, it was recognized by pluralists that members of lower-strata groups did not participate directly in decision-making, nor did they customarily "give orders" to political and civic leaders that were then carried out by them. Neither did these groups routinely and successfully block policy initiatives adverse to their interests, nor did they place "their own people" in positions of leadership. Applying the same logic that pluralists applied to the economic elite, one might conclude that the poor and lower classes did not exercise much, if any, power in local politics. This might lead one to ask why such large numbers of people, with evidently very little power potential, were excluded from the decision-making processes of an ostensibly pluralist democracy.

Yet rather than draw the conclusion warranted by their own data—that the lower- and even working-class strata of American cities did not exercise power—Dahl (1961b, 164) argued that these groups exercise "a moderate degree of indirect influence" through their power to elect officials. When confronted with the fact that most Americans do not vote regularly in municipal elections, and that the less educated and less affluent are most likely not to vote, Dahl (1961b, 164, 101–2) responded that the mass of nonvoters in America could be imputed to exercise power through "influential contact" with neighbors, friends, and relatives who do vote. However, the pluralists readily dismissed similar claims with respect to the potential influence of economic elites over elected officials.

In addition, Dahl (1961b, 164) imputed a particularly important form

of preemptive power to nonvoters by asserting that "elected leaders keep the real or imagined preferences of constituents *constantly in mind* [italics added] in deciding what policies to adopt or reject." When confronted by the fact that most citizens rarely, if ever, use their political resources and, hence, never fully convert their potential influence into actual influence, Polsby (1963, 134) dismissed such observations as an "inappropriate and arbitrary" effort to assign middle- and upper-class values of participation and civic engagement to the lower classes. He (1963, 134) asserted that "most of the American communities studied in any detail seem to be relatively healthy political organisms" and thus there was no reason for concern. According to Polsby, acquiescence, passivity, and conservatism were the norm of American government because most people were content, but only a year after he published these statements Watts was in flames.

Parenti (1970, 116) suggested "that instead of declaring them [the lower classes] to be an unknown but contented entity, we allow ourselves the simple expedient of directly investigating the less privileged elements of a community to determine why they are not active, and what occurs when they do attempt to become active." As Parenti pointed out, academic studies of policy struggles involving lower-status groups were a rarity in American political science.[31] Parenti proposed that we instead observe power "from the bottom up" as a way to correct the empirical shortcomings of pluralist ideology (cf. Piven and Cloward 1971; Cloward and Piven 1974; Parenti 1978).

The immanent critique of pluralism raised numerous theoretical questions about its conceptual and methodological limits (Clun 1972). The most significant conceptual critiques involved efforts to operationalize the concepts of non-decision-making and preemption. Bachrach's and Baratz's 1962 *APSR* article "Two Faces of Power" was republished in *Apolitical Politics* (1968) and in William E. Connolly's, *The Bias of Pluralism* (1969), which made the concept of non-decision-making a standard article of faith for the new political science. However, in a preview of his forthcoming book *The Un-Politics of Air Pollution* (1971), Matthew Crenson offered the first glimpses in *An End to Political Science* of how one could operationalize this concept empirically. Crenson (1970, 144) suggested that more and more political analysts were beginning to acknowledge that "there is something to be learned from political *in*action—from *non*events, *non*issues, and *non*decisions." Crenson (1970, 144–45) drew on comparative case studies of local air pollution policy, including the absence of policy, to illustrate how "the decision-making process [analyzed by pluralists] is one by which the winners of the political game are determined;

non-decision-making helps determine what the game will be in the first place." Crenson (1970, 145) demonstrated in concrete detail how "the political issues that generate data for pluralist studies of local politics are the ones that have managed to pass through the filtering processes of non-decision-making." However, the pluralists had never attempted "to account for the seemingly important decisions that are never made, or the seemingly critical issues that never arise."

However, nondecisions were still observable and often (though not always) involved a conscious decision to exclude or suppress a potential issue from the decision-making agenda. However, it was hypothesized that many issues, and the groups affected by them, are excluded from the established decision-making process, because of what Crenson (1970, 148) called industry's "reputation for power" among political decision-makers. In his analysis of various public policies, Parenti (1970, 113) also pointed to business's "powers of pre-emption" to illustrate a key shortcoming of behavioralist methodology; namely, that pluralists failed to acknowledge "that corporate leaders often have no need to involve themselves in decision-making because sufficient anticipatory consideration is given to their interests by officeholders." This idea had surfaced earlier in Shin'yo Ono's essay in *Apolitical Politics*. Ono (1967, 108–9) challenged the behavioralist focus on observable decisions by noting that an elected official

> may exclude a whole range of alternatives because he takes the existing socioeconomic structure as something "given." This act of excluding a whole range of alternatives need not be a result of political pressures, or of a telephone call from the "downtown magnates"; indeed, it need not even be a conscious act. That is, he may do this as a matter of course, as something which is a part of the "rules of the game." But can we deny that in this case the downtown magnates have exercised a significant degree of power in the decision-making process, perhaps merely by existing, and certainly by being protected by the "consensus" or the "rules of the game? To ignore this "silent" and "unseen" aspect of power (that is, the *structure* of power) is to obscure our perception of political reality.

By 1969–70, there was a growing sense of urgency among many new political scientists that it was time to move beyond "antipluralism" and the critique of behavioralism to a genuinely new political science. Surkin and Wolfe (1970, 11) suggest that new political scientists were increasingly convinced that any effort to criticize and change the ideology of American

society and to restructure its institutions and social relations would require "the development of new modes of radical political thought and action."

By 1970, there were both "liberal" and "radical" theoretical alternatives competing to become the new political science. Parenti (1970, 112) observes that a liberal group of "antipluralists" were raising troubling questions about whether elites were mutually restrained by competitive interaction with other elites, as claimed by the theory of democratic elitism, or by pressure from the masses, as claimed by many pluralists. Henry S. Kariel (1961) and Grant McConnell (1966) argued that case studies of interest group influence over the policy process revealed that powerful interest groups did not compete against other but captured those sectors of the state and public policy that directly affected their special interest. This process of parceling out governmental power to special interest groups meant that "pluralism" was incapable of achieving the public interest because government decisions were controlled by private special interests for their own benefit. Special interest elites tended to predominate in particular spheres of government policy, where the automobile industry controlled transportation policy, agribusiness controlled agricultural subsidies, and the oil industry dominated energy policy. This strain of antipluralism was eventually identified most closely with Theodore Lowi's (1969, 51) "interest group liberalism," which describes the *actual functioning* of interest groups in government as "a vulgarized version of the pluralist model" (see also Lowi 1967).

However, a more radical strain of thought accepted Dahl's (1958) methodological challenge by claiming to prove empirically that the United States has an upper class and that the national government is dominated by this ruling capitalist class. Much of this work traced its origin to C. Wright Mills (1956, 300), who dismissed pluralist theory "as a set of images out of a fairy tale." In contrast to the pluralist model of group competition and dispersed inequalities, Mills argued that a tightly knit coalition of the corporate rich, military warlords, and a servile political directorate—a power elite—governed the United States. Mills (1956, 3–4) claimed that

> the power elite is . . . in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern society. They rule the big corporations. They run the machinery of the state and claim its prerogatives. They direct the military establishment. They occupy the strategic command posts of the social structure, in which are now centered the effective means of the power and the wealth and the celebrity which /they enjoy.

G. William Domhoff (1967, 11), a political sociologist, began building on Mills's observations, but also went beyond his theoretical claims by documenting in meticulous detail how a small corporate elite's "control of corporations, foundations, elite universities, the Presidency, the federal judiciary, the military, and the CIA qualifies the American upper class as a 'governing class,' especially in the light of the wealth owned and the income received by members of that exclusive social group." In a short time, however, power elite theory would morph into class analysis and Marxism with the publication of Ralph Miliband's *The State in Capitalist Society* (1969). As with Domhoff, the theoretical power of Miliband's analysis was that it did not sidestep a direct confrontation with official political science but established the necessity of a new political science through an immanent and empirical critique of pluralism and systems theory. Miliband's study (1969) not only was among the most important books to empirically challenge pluralism during this time but, at a theoretical level, also returned the concept of the state to a prominent role in American political science following its banishment by Easton.

The radical turn in new political science also extended the critique of pluralism from domestic to foreign policy. In *An End to Political Science*, Surkin and Wolfe (1970, 169) insisted that an analysis of American imperialism is "essential to an understanding of U.S. policies" because the dominant ideology of pluralist democracy was also running rampant in the international relations subfield. James Petras contributed an essay to *An End to Political Science* suggesting that the power structure of US imperialism operated remarkably like the domestic power structure because it emanated from the same capitalist elite. Petras analyzed US relations with Latin America to find that US foreign policy decisions were controlled by "linkage groups." Linkage groups were networks of American investors, financiers, and business executives linked to foreign military officers who had been trained in the United States and who often did business in or with the United States while depending on it for both economic and military support. At the same time, American business was able to exert "indirect influence" on foreign governments through its reputation for power and its real ability to withhold loans or credits or to manipulate import quotas for one-crop, export-dependent nations (Petras 1970, 186–87).

These works, and many others, established that a future new political science would need to develop a theory of class structure, a theory of the state, and a theory of imperialism, although, as others would soon point out, it also needed to theorize gender, race, ecology, and other forms of nonclass identity and political action. However, many new political scien-

tists were convinced that forward movement in political science was blocked by the discipline's organization as a profession. Networks of behavioralist academic elites controlled access to teaching and research positions, and there were even accusations that activists arguing for a new political science were explicitly blacklisted by them. The journals were increasingly controlled by a small group of behavioralists, while major grant awards and internships were controlled by a behavioralist Establishment linked financially, politically, and ideologically to corporate and political elites in the existing power structure. These concerns led to a new element in the critique of political science, which called attention to the fact that many of those same "value free" political scientists were integrated into the existing national power structure.

The Critique of Political Science

The critique of pluralism advanced in *Apolitical Politics* was carried forward by the more radical new political scientists in *An End to Political Science*. Surkin and Wolfe (1970, 6) agreed with earlier critics that

> pluralism reinforced a false sense of social reality among political scientists. This enabled political scientists to conclude that presidential nominating conventions were models of democratic procedure, that the electoral college needed no reform, and that machine politics in Chicago under Mayor Daley gave the mass of the people the kind of government they seemed to want. In other words, the existing order was praised, little change was deemed necessary; in some cases it was even thought deleterious to the established system.

Moreover, it was widely agreed that pluralism, "while being defended by political scientists, serves to reinforce a system experienced as dysfunctional and intransigent by other segments of society (including many organized groups) in regard to their demands and interests" (Surkin and Wolfe 1970, 5). In this respect, David Kettler (1970a, 40) observed that, whether consciously or unconsciously, political scientists "are among the prime contributors to the dominant ideology" and thus function to reproduce a social and political order that fails to represent the interests of ordinary citizens.

However, when behavioralists and others responded to this critique with the claim that the APSA was a nonpartisan and nonideological professional organization devoted to shared professional purposes, it linked

the organizational defense of behavioralism to the concept of professionalism. There were more than a few among the new political scientists who saw the drift to behavioralism and pluralism as being linked to the growing professionalization of political science (Ricci 1984). Thus, the academic establishment's response to the new political scientists set off a multifaceted critique of professionalism. Wolfe (1970, 290) observed that the historical definition of a profession is "a group of people whose expertise, fairness, and devotion were so unquestioned that decisions about who was to be admitted to the group could only be made by the group itself, privately, under special sanction from the state." For the most part, clergy, lawyers, and doctors were the classic exemplars of the professions, with each developing a system of apprenticeships and qualification tests for membership in the profession. However, an essential element of the professions is an ethic of public service and, as Wolfe (1970b, 290) notes, their service to society was considered so important "that only they should have the right to determine entry" into the profession.

Political science claimed to be a profession, and opponents of the new political science regarded political activity as unprofessional, whether inside the APSA, on campus, or in the community. Yet the paradox of the behavioral revolution and its attendant scientism is that the concept of professionalism in political science was fused to the idea that "political science is a neutral, 'pure,' science, not a body of expert and immediately applicable knowledge, like law or medicine" (Wolfe 1970b, 291). In fact, those subfields of the discipline, such as public administration and public policy, which emphasized immediately applicable knowledge of a type comparable to the classical professions, were marginalized by the behavioralist quest for a pure science of politics and government. Thus, as Wolfe (1970b, 291) notes: "Service to any clientele, an important part of the traditional professions, is not a salient characteristic of the social sciences," and, thus, any efforts to forge overt political linkages of this type were considered *unprofessional*. Official political scientists condemned political activity, and even political advocacy, as a violation of the profession's code of scientific conduct—an activity that crosses the boundary of science into ideology.

This phase of criticizing the profession and its members took the critique of *Apolitical Politics* a step further by offering concrete evidence that the purveyors of official ideology were not just well intentioned, but unconscious of the implications of their work, but had extensive financial, political, and ideological commitments to the existing power structure and were integrated into that power structure at multiple levels. Importantly, the new

political scientists did not reject a role for political scientists in policymaking, nor offer an ivory tower conception of the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. The new political science proposed an equally ideologically driven critique of "the particular uses of knowledge to which much of the profession was now committed and the complacent—even positive—attitude adopted by many political scientists toward these developments" (Surkin and Wolfe 1970, 4). Thus, when new political scientists declared that political science should be "relevant," what its members really meant was that political science should "serve the interests of the poor and oppressed around the world" rather than "the interests of the U.S. government and the corporate establishment" (Surkin and Wolfe 1970b, 4).

The Social Responsibility of Intellectuals

In 1967, the political science profession's behavioral orthodoxy, as manifested in its claims to scientific objectivity and value neutrality, came under attack at the annual meeting of the APSA following numerous revelations that social scientists, including prominent political scientists, had surreptitiously been conducting research to assist state elites craft and implement policies that benefited US multinational corporations and US power interests at the expense of impoverished peasants and workers, who often responded to their desperate conditions with revolutionary insurgencies. The US government had dramatically increased funding for social science projects after World War II, and many of these projects were classified and/or funded by the US Department of Defense, the US Army, the Office of Naval Research, and the Central Intelligence Agency. If a project was classified, this meant participants were prohibited from disclosing their involvement in these projects, which was in direct conflict with the positivists' claim that their science was the intellectual foundation of an open society (Popper 1963). These projects employed psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, and economists for purposes of devising psychological warfare and counterinsurgency strategies to be used at home and in the Global South (Rohde 2013). Political scientists became deeply enmeshed in these research networks partly through the Research Group in Psychology and the Social Sciences, which was established by the assistant secretary of defense for research and engineering, although it was publicly sponsored by the Smithsonian Institution (as a front organization).

The Research Group was led by Ithiel de Sola Pool, who received his PhD in political science from the University of Chicago (1952), where he

had studied under Harold D. Lasswell. He was currently a professor of political science at MIT who worked at the Center for International Studies (CENIS). The Research Group also included Lucian W. Pye (MIT/CENIS) and Harry Eckstein (Princeton University / Center for International Studies), who were both prominent members of the structural functionalist school of comparative politics. Eckstein was considered an expert on pressure groups and the theory of stable democracy, while Pye was an expert on guerrilla movements and the politics of Southeast Asia.

In 1963, the Research Group produced a classified study titled *Social Science Research and National Security*, led by Ithiel de Sola Pool (1963), that proposed a social science research agenda focused on the problems of US global military strategy and counterinsurgency, including a pathbreaking analysis by Harry Eckstein on the concept of fighting an "internal war." Eckstein suggested that

> there is practically no limit to the research that can be, and ought to be, undertaken on the subject of internal war. In a sense, the study of internal war is commensurate with the whole study of society, even peaceable society, for anything that increases our knowledge of social order can potentially increase our understanding of civil disorder. (Eckstein in de Sola Pool 1963, 132)

The Research Group's recommendations generated multiple research programs, which led to an expanded effort by the US Army to enlist social scientists in its research projects.[32] The most infamous of these research projects was Project Camelot, which was funded by the US Army (1964–65) until it was exposed by Chilean scholars and then later publicized in the United States through New Left outlets such as *Transaction* and *The Nation* (Horowitz 1965, 1966). The exposure of Project Camelot by Chilean professors who had been approached to join the project generated political outrage from Santiago to Washington, DC. J. William Fulbright, chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, denounced the project as

> reactionary, backward looking policy opposed to change. Implicit in Camelot, as in the concept of "counter-insurgency," is an assumption that revolutionary movements are dangerous to the interests of the United States and that the United States must be prepared to assist, if not actually participate in, measures to repress them. (Quoted in Horowitz 1965, 3)

Irving Louis Horowitz, a professor of sociology at Washington University and the editor of *Transaction*, observed that "in nearly every page of the various working papers, there are assertions that clearly derive from American military policy objectives rather than scientific method. The steady assumption that internal warfare is damaging disregards the possibility . . . that such actions as are contemplated may be more concerned with reducing conflict than with improving conditions" (Horowitz 1965, 47; see also Horowitz 1967). It was revealed that a large number of prominent political scientists had been involved in Project Camelot, including Frank Bonilla (MIT), Frederick Frey (MIT), Harry Eckstein (Princeton), Samuel Eisenstadt (Hebrew University), William Riker (University of Buffalo), Rudolph J. Rummel (Yale University), and David Schwartz (University of Pennsylvania). These revelations immediately generated outcry and debate among university scholars about the social responsibility of intellectuals in the United States.

Significantly, this debate took place against a background of events that increasingly cast doubt on political scientists' sanguine embrace of pluralism and called into question the benevolence of the US government abroad. The decade had begun with the failed US Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba (1961), which cast a spotlight on the CIA's role in subverting foreign governments (Rodriquez 1999; Bohning 2005). This was followed by a US-backed military coup d'état in Brazil (1964), which deposed a democratically elected government (Alves 1985), and US military intervention in the Dominican Republic's April Revolution (1965) (Palmer 2015). This was followed by a steady escalation of US involvement in Vietnam's civil war. On the domestic front, US politics was increasingly destabilized by a series of Black urban riots in Harlem (1964), Watts (1965), Chicago (1966), Newark (1967), and Detroit (1967), which culminated with the Kerner Commission's ([1968] 1988, 1) finding that the United States was "moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal."

In this context, the simmering "behavioral issue" identified by Somit and Tanenhaus took on a political form when de Sola Pool (1966, 111) forthrightly advanced the claim that it was *necessary* for social scientists to do research for government. He (1966, 111) argued that social scientists had an obligation to train "the mandarins of the future." De Sola Pool (1966, 111) argued that "the only hope for humane government in the future" is "the extensive use of the social sciences by government." Zbigniew Brzezinski, a professor of political science at Columbia University and the head of its Institute on Communist Affairs, added fuel to the fire by situating de Sola Pool's argument within a broader vision of the coming

"technotronic age."[33] Brzezinski claimed that the age of the "largely humanist-oriented" critical intellectual was coming to an end in the second half of the twentieth century. Brzezinski (1968, 22) argued that contemporary academics had to make one of two choices: they could either become "experts and specialists, who become involved in special government undertakings" (i.e., technocrats) or they could serve as "general-integrators, who become in effect house-ideologues for those in power." The mask of value neutrality had not been stripped off by its critics, but voluntarily removed by professional elites.

However, Hans Morgenthau (1966, 69) offered a thoughtful rejoinder to the arguments advanced by de Sola Pool and Brzezinski:

> In all societies certain social problems cannot be investigated at all, or only at grave risk to the investigator. The basic philosophical assumptions by which society lives are beyond scientific investigation, for to question them is tantamount to questioning the worth of the society itself, its justice, its rationality, its very right to exist. . . . The profit motive and free enterprise are taboo in capitalistic societies, and the popular control of government will be taken for granted rather than questioned in democracies.

Morgenthau recognized that orthodoxy among any society's intellectuals was not a spontaneous occurrence, but a political relationship that had to be institutionalized, regulated, and enforced through some exercise of political and economic power. In the United States, Morgenthau argued, this power was currently being exercised by corporations through the agency of private philanthropic foundations and by the state through its national defense apparatus. First, Morgenthau (see also Solovey 2013; Hauptmann 2022) pointed to the enormous influence

> which foundations exert upon the objects, results, and methods of research. They reward certain types of research by supporting them and stimulate more research of the same type by promising to support it. On the other hand, they thwart or make impossible other types of research by not supporting them. The political scientist who wants to share in these rewards and, by doing so, gain prestige and power within the profession cannot help being influenced by the positive and negative expectations in his concept of the social truth, of the methods by which to seek it, and of the relevant results to be expected from it.

Second, Morgenthau (1966, 71) went on to argue that

> the influence which the government exerts upon political science is as pervasive as that of the foundations and more varied, subtle, and insidious. The intimate connection which research contracts have established between the government and the universities has recently been brought to public attention; it has even been made the subject of congressional hearings. It stands to reason that a political scientist who is working on such a contract or who expects to work on one cannot feel as free to raise fundamental political issues, either within his contractual research or outside it as a political scientist who is not, either in fact or expectation, under obligation to the government. Thus, the expectations of the government not only determine the subject matter of contractual research but also influence ever so subtly its scope and in certain measure its results.[34]

However, Morgenthau (1966, 71) suggested that the government's influence over political science

> by far transcends these formal contractual relations. The government disposes of a whole gamut of professional and social rewards from appointments to consultantships to foreign travel and to invitations to social functions at the White House. By adroitly promising, dispensing, and withholding them, it keeps a large segment of the academic community at bay. The political scientist, by accepting one or another of these rewards, enters into a subtle and insidious relationship with the government, which imperceptibly transforms his position of independent observer to that of client and partisan.

Morgenthau (1966, 72) observes that to the extent that a political scientist came to value these perquisites and professional advantages "more highly than his commitment to the truth, he becomes a political ideologue, justifying morally and rationalizing intellectually what the government is doing. Yet he performs this ideological function while drawing upon his prestige as a scholar . . . what is nothing more than the ideological defense of a partisan position is made to appear as the objective truth."

Thus, Morgenthau (1966, 73) concludes that political scientists act as ideologues, or when political science becomes an ideology, "It helps to cover political relations with the veil of ideologies which mollify the con-

science of society; by justifying the existing power relations, it reassures the powers-that-be in their possession of power; it illuminates certain aspects of the existing power relations; and it contributes to the improvement of the technical operations of government. The relevance of this political science does not lie primarily in the discovery of the truth about politics, but in its contribution to the stability of society," which in turn reproduces the existing relations of inequality, exploitation, and political domination under the guise of political order and system equilibrium. Morgenthau (1966, 72) lamented that "this corruption of political science through affiliation with the government is much more widespread than one would think at first glance. Its pervasiveness and thoroughness are the greater for its victims being generally unaware of it." In contrast, Morgenthau argued that if political scientists were to speak truth to power, they would at the very least "face the risk of unpopularity" among corporate and state elites, but political science "at its very best . . . cannot help being a subversive and revolutionary force with regard to certain vested interests—intellectual, political, economic, and social in general."[35]

The large presence of MIT professors in Project Camelot also caught the critical eye of Noam Chomsky, who responded with *American Power and the New Mandarins* (1969). Much of the book was designed to illustrate the "calm and analytic attitude [among social scientists] towards the problem of how to win the [Vietnam] war . . . with innumerable examples from the writings of responsible political analysts" (Chomsky 1969, 14). Chomsky (1969, 9) claimed that "by accepting the presumption of legitimacy of debate" about continuing the Vietnam War, his colleagues had already lost their humanity. Ithiel de Sola Pool was a special target of Chomsky's ire, because in reviewing de Sola Pool's work he found that far from humanizing the new mandarins, de Sola Pool routinely argued for the need to suppress democracy in the Global South and to refuse negotiations with North Vietnam to end the war. In one telling example of opposition to democratic movements in the Global South, de Sola Pool (1967, 26) had written:

> In the Congo, in Vietnam, in the Dominican Republic, it is clear that order depends on somehow compelling newly mobilized strata to return to a measure of passivity and defeatism from which they have recently been aroused by the process of modernization. At least temporarily, the maintenance of order requires a lowering of newly acquired aspirations and levels of political activity.

With respect to Vietnam, specifically, de Sola Pool had made it clear that "I rule out of consideration here a large range of viable political settlements," including those that involve "the inclusion of the Viet Cong in a coalition government or even the persistence of the Viet Cong as a legal organization in South Vietnam." Such arrangements "are not acceptable" (quoted in Chomsky 1969, 49). This position was not only a violation of the value-neutral precepts of behavioral methodology but also a betrayal of the American political science discipline's historical commitment to advancing democracy and improving the social welfare of ordinary citizens.

Similarly, in a 1968 essay titled "The Cheerful Science of Dismal Politics," Christian Bay (1968b, 209) summarized the sentiments of a growing number of political scientists, writing that "the central task of political science as a profession apparently is to extol the present order, criticize other existing systems, and debunk radical and utopian political thought. In America in the 1960s, the task is to praise democracy, identifying this particular concept with the existing social order by way of praising pluralism and 'free enterprise.'" Bay (1968b, 216) criticized the behaviorally oriented systems-analysts and structural-functionalists who were associated with these research projects for explicitly confining "their inquiry to the welfare of systems rather than people." Bay chastised systems analysis and structural functionalism for "conservatism" insofar as they defended the status quo, whatever its form, by covertly incorporating the normative values of stability, equilibrium, and order into the "scientific" study of all political systems and promoted these values as the highest good of all systems (e.g., Huntington 1968). The result of this type of research is that

> at home, the so-called war on poverty seems destined to remain at the minor skirmish level while the rich get richer and the poor get poorer, while unemployment and crime keep rising and the explosions in the ghettoes keep getting worse. Abroad, our great liberal traditions are, especially in Vietnam, being submerged in an ooze of napalm; and in the name of liberty! . . . It is surely time for our social scientists to stop cheering. (Bay 1968b, 229)

Marvin Surkin (1968, 181) built on these critiques to argue that "the rigorous adherence to social science methodology adopted from the natural sciences and its claim to objectivity and value neutrality" functions "as a guise for what is in fact an increasingly ideological, non-objective role for social science knowledge in the service of the dominant institutions in

American society"—the corporation and the state (see also Melanson 1972, 1975). Surkin (1968, 181) admonished political scientists for having become "the law-and-order experts and guardians of the *status quo*" and "trainers of the new mandarins of the 20th century." Consequently, Surkin (1969, 573) proposed an alternative methodology for the social sciences based in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, which he argued was "consistent with the position that for a social scientist to be empirical is not to assume that he must be value-free or non-ideological." Other new political scientists would embrace variants of a Marxist social science, but as Bay (1968b, 213) put it, regardless of the theoretical framework adopted by political scientists, what was needed was a "more humane, more truly *political* framework of theory."[36] Instead, political scientists had been enlisted as intellectual soldiers of the Cold War, or as new political scientists saw it, as agents of US imperialism and racial oppression, while waving the behavioralist flags of scientific objectivity and value neutrality. This meant that the idea of a new political science had to also become an organizational struggle within the American Political Science Association.

4

Political Origins of New Political Science, 1967–1969

Systems analysis, structural functionalism, and pluralist theory were incapable of accurately describing, much less explaining, the global political unrest of the late 1960s. Consequently, as dissident political scientists began to grapple with these real-world issues, a new political science began simmering in the background of the behavioral revolution following the publication of C. Wright Mills's *The Power Elite* (1956). However, as the new critique of political science took form, its adherents increasingly identified the organized profession of political science, and its regulatory apparatus, as an institutional obstacle to the further development of a new political science. Furthermore, the official discipline's professed adherence to value neutrality came into question as debates about the social responsibility of intellectuals emerged from revelations that some of the profession's leaders not only were recipients of corporate-sponsored research grants with mission-oriented research agendas, but were integrated into the US state and military apparatuses engaged in the suppression of popular revolts at home and abroad. In this context, the American Political Science Association was no longer viewed as an autonomous professional association created to promote the independent development of political science, but as part of a corporate-state ideological apparatus promoting a policy science of corporate influence and state repression.

Consequently, new political science shifted its focus from being merely a critique of the discipline, to a critique of the profession, to becoming an organized revolt within the APSA. Thus, the changing demographics and ideological orientation of younger political scientists, along with the refusal of the official profession to incorporate the empirical and theoretical insights of critical political scientists, led to the founding of the Caucus

for a New Political Science at the 1967 annual meeting of the APSA. The founding of CNPS in 1967 initiated a 13-year organizational revolt within the APSA that transformed the profession and the discipline in important and long-lasting ways that are rarely acknowledged by most disciplinary historians.

The Kirkpatrick Controversy and the Vietnam War

The 1967 annual meeting of the APSA became highly contentious during its regular business meeting; the fissures identified by Somit and Tanenhaus finally broke into the open as a myriad of discontents with the discipline finally generated an explosion in the profession. First, registration at the annual meetings of the APSA had nearly doubled from approximately 1,250 in 1956 to about 2,400 in 1967 as the discipline rapidly expanded in concert with the explosive growth of American universities after World War II (Bay 1967b; Kirkpatrick 1970, 537). However, this growth meant that the growing cohort of junior faculty members and ambitious graduate students who wanted to join the profession were largely excluded from direct participation in the APSA's annual meeting as they were relegated to the status of passive observers.

Gerhard Lowenberg's (2007, 357) firsthand account of APSA conventions confirms that in the previous decade attendees at the APSA annual meetings had been

> relatively homogeneous in social composition and organized in a relatively casual, amateurish fashion. The membership was overwhelmingly White and male. It was stratified by seniority and by the prestige ranking of the colleges and universities to which members belonged. An establishment of tenured professors from the major institutions clearly dominated the program.

In the 1950s and early 1960s, only about one-fourth of APSA conference attendees were listed in the official program as paper presenters, while the majority of the burgeoning profession were merely onlookers expected to receive the wisdom passed down to them by the profession's behavioral Establishment. However, the steady professionalization of academic careers ricocheted back on the profession because it made participating in the APSA annual meeting increasingly important for graduate students and junior faculty seeking entry into the profession. Lowenberg

(2007, 358) observes that by the 1960s graduate students had become "acutely aware that giving papers contributes to visibility, prospects for publication, and therefore advancement. Appearance on the program justifies travel grants. Collaborative research requires opportunities for meeting."

Second, while still small in numbers, a growing percentage of the political science profession also consisted of women, Black, and Chicano scholars, while federal financial assistance had opened the doors of academia to a growing number of students with working-class backgrounds, who were the first in their families to attend a college or university. Equally important is that young new members of the political science profession often self-identified as left, rather than liberal, while many other established members of the discipline—both liberal and conservative—were increasingly dissatisfied with the drift toward behavioralism and the profession's feigned value neutrality. The sheer weight of hundreds of new members eager to participate in the expanding profession, along with growing dissatisfaction over the behavioral revolution, made it increasingly difficult to sustain the elite old-boy network that had governed the profession since 1949.

Surkin (1968, 180) observes that despite the heated controversies about the social responsibility of intellectuals, the 1967 annual business meeting of the APSA "had been a typically dull convention, with no formal presentation on major issues such as the Vietnamese War or—after a summer of riots in the cities—the urban crisis." As a result, Surkin (1968, 180) found that "the mood was ripe for some challenge from within. . . . A spark was enough to bring a new, radical spirit into existence." The first spark came in the revelation that Evron Kirkpatrick, the APSA executive director, and Max M. Kampelman, the APSA treasurer were, also serving as the president and vice president, respectively, of Operations and Policy Research (OPR), a nonprofit research organization.

OPR had been receiving funds funneled through CIA-supported foundations since its establishment by Kirkpatrick and Kampelman in 1955.[1] This revelation was first reported on February 19, 1967, on the heels of a front-page story in the *New York Times* documenting how the National Student Association had been receiving funds from the CIA for years ("The Professor and the CIA" 1967; Stern 1967; de Vries 2012; Menand 2015). Kampelman had also received funds indirectly from the CIA through intermediate conduits such as the Asia Foundation (Surkin and Wolfe 1970, 3). Surkin described OPR as a "cold-war-oriented strategy organization" that worked with the United States Information Agency (USIA) to distribute

propaganda literature in the United States and abroad and to identify books that would be sponsored by the USIA (Playford 1968).

Like many other political scientists, Surkin (1968, 179) was outraged that "top officials of a prestigious academic association with membership of 16,000 political scientists have been simultaneously holding positions with an important CIA affiliate organization." While APSA President Robert A. Dahl agreed that "the CIA has penetrated academic circles through foundations and pseudo-foundations," he warned against "rushing to conclusions with undue haste" and considered the growing demand from APSA members that Kirkpatrick and Kampelman be terminated as "premature" (quoted in "Professor Charges" 1967). Only days after the news broke on the Kirkpatrick/Kampelman affair, Dahl on February 22, 1967, appointed an ad hoc committee composed of four former APSA presidents, including Gabriel Almond (Stanford University), R. Taylor Cole (provost, Duke University), David B. Truman (dean, Columbia University), and C. Herman Pritchett (University of California, Santa Barbara), with Pritchett serving as committee chair. One could not have appointed a more exemplary insider group to speak for the behavioral-pluralist Establishment in the APSA. The ad hoc committee was charged with investigating "(1) questions arising from the fact that Kirkpatrick and Kampelman hold office both in the APSA and OPR, and (2) the broader and extremely complex problems of behavior for all political scientists in their relationships with government agencies" (Dahl 1967, 565; see also "A Probe" 1967).

In a report published in June 1967, well before the APSA annual meeting in September, the APSA Executive Committee absolved Kirkpatrick and Kampelman of any conflicts of interest based on the report submitted to them by the ad hoc committee. The Executive Committee was another who's who of the behavioral Establishment, including Robert A. Dahl, Harry Eckstein, Heinz Eulau, Austin Ranney, and the conservative Clinton Rossiter (Dahl 1967, 568). The Executive Committee found no conflicts of interest based on four sets of facts: (1) the APSA did not receive any funds directly from any intelligence agency, (2) the APSA did not receive any funds indirectly from any intelligence agency,[2] (3) all grants, gifts, and donations to the APSA had been reported in full in the annual treasurer's report, and (4) OPR was a nonprofit research organization that was legally separate from the APSA, which only conducted nonclassified research, and its office was located in a different physical location than the APSA. Consequently, the Executive Committee concluded it was permissible for Kirkpatrick and Kampelman to retain their positions with the APSA, so long as they worked for OPR on their own time (Samuelson

1967, 157). The ad hoc committee punted on the larger issue of professional ethics charged to it because it was allegedly unable, in the time available, to devote any time to these questions. It merely acknowledged that "the rapid development of political science research in the past decade or two gives the relationship between government and the profession a salience it has not had in the past" (Dahl 1967, 566).[3]

An otherwise dull APSA convention became heated when a resolution was introduced at the 1967 business meeting to prohibit the APSA's executive director and treasurer from holding office in another organization, which would have effectively terminated Kirkpatrick's and Kampelman's employment with the APSA. A reporter for *Science* wrote that "for a brief fragment of the convention, there was a bitter reminder of last winter's disclosures that the CIA was covertly financing educational and cultural organizations" ("Political Science: CIA" 1968, 1414). Instead of the proposed resolution, the business meeting adopted the report prepared by the APSA Executive Committee, which absolved Kirkpatrick and Kampelman of any wrongdoing, and successfully preempted further debate on the matter. Christian Bay denounced the ad hoc committee report as one that "had managed to bring up almost every conceivable ethical issue but the ones at hand, and to conclude with wholly non-committal recommendations" (Bay 1967a, 1096). In response, President Robert A. Dahl asked the APSA Committee on Professional Standards and Responsibilities to examine the larger questions of professional ethics that had been left unresolved by the ad hoc committee.

The otherwise placid business meeting was again disconcerted when a second resolution was introduced calling on universities to withhold the membership lists of student groups from the House Un-American Affairs Committee (HUAC), which was investigating student activism on campus. The resolution was ruled out of order as it was deemed a violation of Article II of the APSA constitution, which at the time stated that the Association "will not commit its members on questions of public policy nor take positions not immediately concerned with its direct purpose," which is "to encourage the study of Political Science" (APSA 1971g). President Dahl ruled that the resolution called on the Association to take a position on a political issue and, therefore, would not be discussed at the business meeting.

However, the role of political scientists in supporting and even facilitating the Vietnam War emerged as an even more controversial issue at the 1967 APSA convention. Lewis Lipsitz (1972, 173), a professor of political science at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, argued:

> Despite the impression the convention or the main professional journals might give, social scientists were involved in the making of significant political decisions—pacifying Vietnam; designing the bombing; creating the Diem regime; thinking about a "war" on poverty. Moreover, the political science profession as a whole gave evidence in the main thrust of its work of a shamefully thoughtless endorsement of the American status quo; an endorsement built into the assumptions and often explicit in the conclusions of much research.

Similarly, Alan Wolfe (1970b, 299), a founding member of CNPS, observed that "in spite of its ideology of neutrality, there is little doubt that most political scientists are working hard to support the contemporary American status quo." The spark that finally ignited a hot conflict between APSA officials and new political scientists was the attempt by several members at the business meeting to propose resolutions condemning US involvement in the Vietnam War. These resolutions were repeatedly disallowed by Dahl as a violation of Article II of the APSA constitution.

Moreover, in organizing the annual business meeting, microphones had been placed on the podium so that APSA officials could address the audience, but no microphones were made available to the audience for purposes of public discussion and deliberation. This arrangement drew the ire of New Left political scientists, who saw it as an arrogant affront to participatory democracy and revelatory of the behavioral Establishment's oligarchical control of the profession. When a microphone was finally provided to the audience after much protest from the floor, the moderator turned it off to silence renewed demands by audience members that the business meeting discuss a resolution opposing the Vietnam War. Christian Bay (1967a, 1096) decried the business meeting as one that "bordered on the grotesque."

A Spark Ignites a Caucus

It was at this point that Marvin Surkin, a graduate student at New York University, who was studying under H. Mark Roelofs and Bertell Ollman, raised his hand to declaim that everybody who opposed what had just happened in the meeting should reconvene in the room next door. With that spontaneous call to action, the Caucus for a New Political Science came into being as a rump convention of the APSA (Schrecker 2021, 360;

Surkin 2023). At its first spontaneous meeting, H. Mark Roelofs (New York University) was elected chair; Charles A. McCoy (Lehigh University) as vice chair, Paul Minkoff (Brooklyn College) as treasurer, and Anna Navarro (Princeton University) as secretary. Following the convention, the newly elected CNPS Executive Committee (1968, 1) communicated in its first *Newsletter* that

> the Caucus was founded, really just grew, in a most spontaneous fashion. A number of us met on Thursday afternoon of last September's APSA convention to simply air grievances, discontents, and dissatisfactions with the state of the profession. Some were disturbed about the summary dismissal of a number of resolutions at the Association's business meeting on the previous day; others expressed dissatisfaction with the characteristic subject and substance of the panels put on at the convention and of much of the material typically in the Review; while still others expressed discontent with the state of the discipline, generally, and the direction in which it seems to be going. It soon became very apparent that we all shared a common concern. We were united by a conviction that the profession as a whole, and the APSA as its organizational arm, have been dominated by a belief that the controversial and critical issues of the day lie somehow beyond our professional scope.

Following the initial spontaneous meeting called by Surkin, word spread through the convention with the result that an organized caucus had emerged within 36 hours due to a "spontaneous and wholly unpremeditated" event (Roelofs 1968a, 38). The Caucus for a New Political Science took form in a series of three meetings, each double the size of the preceding meeting, which culminated with the election of a 13-member Executive Committee, the adoption of an official name, the passing of several resolutions, and a membership list of approximately 225 persons (Bayer et al. 1968, 39). The CNPS Executive Committee (1968, 1) reported that it would reconvene at the 1968 APSA convention and would "present a program of panels that would demonstrate some of the concerns and questions that might characterize a more politically and socially relevant political science."

Despite this optimism, Surkin (2023) offers a more critical assessment of the founding event, noting "that there was a lot of excitement in the air, confusion, and lack of radical leadership to start the whole revolt . . . people wanted to protect their careers even while casting their lot with the

upstarts." Surkin's (1968, 180) assessment of the founding members is that "the group was composed mostly of young liberals"—graduate students and assistant professors—who were estranged "by the unwillingness of the APSA to take stands on issues of critical importance to the country and the world." At the same time, Surkin (2023) notes, "There were some, perhaps not too many, who were more radical if not always well defined but leaned toward socialism and progressive politics."

Despite its inchoate spontaneity, H. Mark Roelofs had been elected chairman of what was now called the "Caucus for a New Political Science" by the end of its third meeting in 1967 (Roelofs 1968a, 40; Samuelson 1967, 157; Surkin 1968, 180). Surkin's (1968, 180) contemporary account of the founding of CNPS is that it was initially composed mostly of disenchanted liberals with only a "sprinkling of young radicals who were still breathing the tumultuous air of the National Conference for New Politics (NCNP), which had held its convention in Chicago" only a few days earlier. It is the name of the Caucus where the radicals exerted their influence in the first days of its existence.

The National Conference for a New Politics had emerged from a series of meetings held in 1965 convened for the purpose of bridging the gap between radicals and antiwar liberals, which in some ways paralleled the composition of the political scientists who convened the Caucus for a New Political Science in 1967. The 1965 NCNP meetings brought together New Left and antiwar groups, leaders of the civil rights movement, including Students for a Democratic Society, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, and a large number of reform Democrats (Hall 2003, 61; Hilton 2016). The NCNP eventually established an office in New York City with a full-time staff and executive director (William F. Pepper). The NCNP called on the American people to support a "New Politics," which it defined as "an organized effort to return decision-making to the people by providing a democratic way to take effective political action at a time when the conventional American politics of party labels and personalities has become sterile" (Hall 2003, 61).

In 1967, the NCNP called its first and only national convention, which Simon Hall describes as "one of the most ambitious attempts . . . to bring together antiwar liberals, New Left radicals and African American activists" with the goal of organizing a broad-based electoral campaign to defeat Lyndon B. Johnson and pro-war members of Congress in the 1968 elections (Hall 2003, 59–60). The convention was attended by several thousand delegates representing 200 different organizations from across the United States. The intended purpose of the convention was to develop

a unified political strategy for ending the Vietnam War, but it was instead dominated by debates and disputes about race (Hall 2003, 64–65). As a result, many white antiwar liberals left the convention disappointed by what they considered "a farcical horror show," while many Black radicals left the convention as distrustful of "Whitey" as before the convention (Hall 2003, 59). Many New Left activists lamented the convention's focus on electoral politics as opposed to community organizing, movement building, and participatory democracy.

Nevertheless, the convention's major speakers, including executive director William F. Pepper and Martin Luther King Jr., articulated an inspiring vision of a "new politics" that would "ultimately result in a new social, economic and political system in the United States" (quoted in Hall 2003, 59). At the end of the convention, those delegates who had not abandoned it left the convention convinced that it "had laid the groundwork for a *New Politics* in America" (Hall 2003, 74). The 1967 NCNP convention met from August 31 to September 3 at the Palmer House Hotel, and only two days after it adjourned, the annual meeting of the APSA would convene on September 5–9, which was only a nine-minute walk to the Pick-Congress Hotel (now the Congress Plaza Hotel) (APSA 1967). It was literally a short walk for the radical political scientists who had attended the NCNP convention to carry the idea into the APSA convention that a new politics required a new political science.[4]

The Caucus began as a spontaneous affinity group[5] united by common interests and shared concerns about the political science profession and the political science discipline, but it defined that unity mainly in opposition to an allegedly monolithic "behavioral Establishment." However, the CNPS quickly transformed into what Jean-Paul Sartre (1976, 345–404) calls a group-in-fusion that would slowly institutionalize over the next ten years. The Caucus achieved a spontaneous unity in its initial confrontation with the profession, but many significant questions were left unresolved by the founding meeting, and these unresolved questions would become significant fissures in the CNPS as it developed over the next decade. Did the Caucus intend to reform the *profession* (APSA) of political science by making it more democratic and demographically diverse, or did it intend to reconstruct the intellectual *discipline* of political science? If the Caucus intended to reconstruct the intellectual discipline of political science, did this mean a greater focus on public policy (relevance) than on general theory, the development and legitimation of methodological alternatives to behavioralism, or disciplinary reconstruction of political ideology and challenging the profession's commitment to liberalism and managed capi-

talism? Finally, the founding meeting left open the question of whether any of these objectives could be achieved by working *within* the APSA.

It was the question of working within or against the APSA where the organization's disenchanted liberals and critical pluralists carried the day in naming the CNPS. Unlike similar insurgent movements that emerged in the wake of CNPS, the founders of the CNPS never referred to themselves as a union or an association, because they initially conceived the CNPS to be a caucus *within* the APSA, rather than a counter-association designed to challenge the hegemony of the APSA from the outside. Consequently, Dwight Waldo (1975, 78) correctly concluded at the time "that American political science will not suffer a major organizational schism" based on disputes over methodology or ideology comparable to those that had occurred in other social science and humanities disciplines.[6]

Thus, while the term "new political science" has an identifiable origin in New Left politics, the term "caucus" has an identifiable origin in reform liberal politics. The Caucus for a New Political Science was founded for the purpose of doing the things that caucuses do—to advocate for specific policies or resolutions and to nominate candidates for elective office.[7] The *Oxford English Dictionary* (1989, 995) defines a caucus as a group or faction "that meets in private to coordinate their votes so as to control election outcomes."[8] The *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* similarly defines a caucus as a closed meeting of a group of persons or faction "usually to select candidates or to decide on policy." Consistent with these definitions, Dwight Waldo (1975, 77) described the early CNPS as a "loosely structured organization-within-the-organization."

The Things Caucuses Do

The primary stated objective of CNPS (1968b, 1) was initially declared not to entail any capture of the APSA's bureaucratic machinery; instead its goal was to work within the APSA to "press for a more politically and socially relevant study of politics," which it would model by sponsoring its own program of panels at the APSA conventions. An early CNPS *Newsletter* (1968b, 4–5; see also Barrow 2024a) emphasized that

> all Caucus members would agree, we are primarily an *intellectual revolt*, and not *primarily* an *organizational* one. We may very well engage in organizational revolt, and seek organizational change, but only to facilitate our primary aim. It might be said that we are

> only *instrumentally* concerned with changing the *organizations* of political science, but we are *fundamentally* concerned with changing the *study* of political science. Thus, the *really* significant events of the convention would be found not in motions, maneuvers, or meetings, but in the panels that the Caucus presented.

Yet, as a caucus within the APSA and one that challenged what it perceived to be a hegemonic behavioral Establishment, the CNPS was increasingly dragged into the politics of the profession. David K. Morris (1968), who was a member of the first CNPS Executive Committee, and an associate fellow at the left-leaning Institute for Policy Studies, observes that the majority of those present at the Caucus's initial meetings in 1967

> agreed that the program [of panels at APSA meetings] was dull, irrelevant, often trivial. They acknowledged that it was ludicrous that a political science association had never held a contested election for president. They agreed that no association concerned with the study of politics should tolerate in its constitution a provision disavowing any organizational interest in the most divisive issues of the day.

However, these were issues involving the profession instead of the discipline, and to address these obstacles to the emergence of a new political science, it would be necessary to challenge the profession of political science. Morris's description of CNPS members' discontent was echoed in a lengthy formal letter from the CNPS Executive Committee to the APSA (Bayer et al. 1968, 38), which stated:

> The spark which brought the Caucus into existence was the treatment afforded certain resolutions introduced at the Association's business meeting on Wednesday afternoon at the business meeting. What was disturbing to many at the Convention about this treatment was not only that it resulted in the defeat or shelving of the particular resolutions but also that it seemed to stem from a conviction that major partisan issues of the day lay beyond the proper professional concerns of the Association. . . . Indeed, there was every appearance of an across-the-board effort to preclude formal study and discussion of all of the great social and political dilemmas facing American Society today.

The members present at the founding meetings of CNPS had adopted several resolutions, including one that asked the APSA Program Committee to devote a full day of the 1968 convention to a discussion of the Vietnam War; a second resolution asking the APSA to poll the Association's full membership on their attitudes toward the Vietnam War; and a third resolution calling on the APSA to resist efforts by the House Un-American Affairs Committee to obtain membership lists of campus student organizations (Roelofs 1968a, 39). These overtures were all rejected by the APSA officialdom, although it was agreed that more papers and panels would be devoted to the Vietnam War the next year.

However, so-called Resolution 1 and Resolution 5 were considered "the major resolutions" passed by the Caucus at the 1967 APSA annual meeting because they established the purpose and mission of the Caucus for a New Political Science. The resolutions are as follows:

> **Resolution 1**
> Whereas the American Political Science Association, at its conventions and in its journal, has consistently failed to study, in a radically critical spirit, either the great crises of the day or the inherent weaknesses of the American political system, be it resolved that this caucus promote a new concern in the Association for our great social crises and a new and broader opportunity for us all to fulfill, as scholars, our obligations to society and to science. (Quoted in Bayer et al. 1968, 39; Bay 1967a, 1096)
>
> **Resolution 5**
> Be it resolved that one of the primary concerns of the Caucus be to stimulate research in areas of political science that are of crucial importance and that have been thus far ignored. (Quoted in Bayer et al. 1968, 39; Bay 1967a, 1096)

The Caucus Executive Committee was also given a mandate to sponsor a series of CNPS panels at the 1968 APSA convention and further committed CNPS to propose a constitutional amendment at the 1968 APSA convention that would permit the Association to encourage the study of controversial issues (Morris 1968). Christian Bay (1967a, 1096) openly threatened that "if the APSA cannot be moved," it might be necessary to create a "new Society for the Study of Political Problems, for those of us who want to get out from under the wings of our own establishment." However, as discussed earlier, the Caucus chose not to secede from the

APSA, and it deferred for the time being the question whether it should run its own slate of candidates for APSA office, although a significant minority were ready to pursue this course of action. The Caucus also deferred on the question whether to establish its own flagship journal to compete with the *American Political Science Review*.

The 1968 APSA Convention

Under the new leadership of David Easton (APSA president) and Robert Lane (APSA program chair), the APSA proved surprisingly conciliatory to CNPS. The Caucus Executive Committee (1968, 1) reported:

> We have been received by the officers of the Association itself in a most cooperative spirit. For example, the Executive Committee of the Council of the Association has voted to officially approve our request to put on our own program at the coming convention—which will mean among other things, cooperation in arranging space for our panels, and the listing of our panels in the official program announcement.

The CNPS chair, H. Mark Roelofs, subsequently informed the APSA Program Committee that it intended to sponsor six panels at the 1968 convention, as well as a plenary session and separate CNPS business meetings (CNPS 1968c).[9] The panels were designed around "relevant content," but the goal was to stimulate "lively delivery and debate" among panelists and audience members (CNPS 1968b, 5). For example, a panel on the military draft included presentations by Paul Minkoff (CNPS treasurer) and Lt. General Lewis B. Hershey, director of the Selective Service. A panel on the 1968 election included presentations by Charles A. McCoy (CNPS vice chair), James McGregor Burns, and Clinton Rossiter, the author of *Conservatism in America* (1962). A panel on liberalism included presentations by H. Mark Roelofs (CNPS chair) and Louis Hartz (Harvard University), who had authored the controversial *The Liberal Tradition in America* (1955). The panel "Crime, Corruption, and Urban Politics" included James Q. Wilson, a prominent conservative critic of urban policy. Another panel featured a discussion between Sandor Frankel, an attorney with the US Department of Justice, and Melvin Wulf, legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union, while a panel on the news media featured Lee Webb of *Ramparts*, a leading New Left magazine (APSA 1968b). These were pan-

els designed not to proselytize or to purvey a single point of view but instead (1) to provoke debate and dialogue between competing points of view and (2) to incorporate government officials and professional practitioners into what was otherwise an abstract academic monologue. In fact, each of the special panels consisted of only one paper or presentation, usually by a non-CNPS person, with CNPS members serving as chairs and discussants on the panels.

The set of panels organized by the Caucus at the 1968 APSA convention was advertised under the theme "American Democracy in Crisis," and while the CNPS program added only about nine papers (6%) to the 150 delivered at the 1968 APSA convention, it was the first time the APSA had allowed a group to sponsor panels outside the regular conference program (APSA 1968d, 19). The topics addressed by the panels would hardly seem radical today, but they were new in the sense that such topics had not been broached in previous programs during the APSA annual meetings. Moreover, the CNPS Executive Committee publicly acknowledged that APSA officers had "been sympathetic and generous" in supporting their efforts to expand the APSA program (Bayer et al. 1968, 39). As promised, the CNPS panels were listed in the official conference program, although most of the Caucus's so-called special panels were held on Saturday afternoon after the end of the regular convention.

The 1968 panels were considered a "booming success" even though they were scheduled after the convention ended. The panels all boasted "overflow audiences" (CNPS 1968b, 2).[10] However, they were considered successful not just because of the surprising attendance, but because they provided "a sampling of what a more relevant political science might produce" (1968b, 1). In fact, enthusiasm for the panels was so great that the Caucus (1968b, 6) spontaneously organized three additional panels on the Columbia University student revolt, the 1968 Democratic National Convention police riot, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. While the discussion at these ad hoc panels was spontaneous and off the cuff, Caucus members agreed that this type of last-minute undertaking was warranted as a response to breaking contemporary political events.

The same year, the Caucus made the decision to establish itself as a permanent membership organization open to any member of the APSA. Dues were set at $2 to $10 depending on ability to pay (Roelofs 1968b; CNPS 1968b, 1–2, 5). By the end of the 1968 APSA convention, the CNPS (1968b, 2) had signed up nearly 400 dues-paying members. In anticipation of future activities, the Caucus elected a new and expanded Executive Committee, which included Morris Janowitz, Theodore J. Lowi, Michael

Walzer, Lewis Lipsitz, Howard Zinn, Sheldon Wolin, William Connolly, and Daniel P. Moynihan.[11] The intellectual diversity of Caucus membership led Ricci (1984, 189) to correctly describe the early CNPS as "less a circle of scholars constituting a unified school of thought than it was a floating faction riding the currents of discontent—inside and outside of political science."

The CNPS Executive Committee established a number of subcommittees and commissions in response to directives that had been passed at its 1968 business meetings. Standing committees were created for the 1969 APSA/CNPS program (Michael Parenti), publications (Henry Kariel), newsletter (H. Mark Roelofs), institutions of the APSA (David Kettler), Caucus bylaws and representation on the APSA Council (Alex Gottfried), representation at regional meetings (Lewis Lipsitz), graduate education (Martin Brownstein), and funding (Theodore J. Lowi and Morris Janowitz).[12] The Caucus also instructed its new Executive Committee to set up study commissions to investigate the possibility of publishing its own journal and to assess the role of nonwhites and women in the profession (Surkin and Wolfe 1969, 45; CNPS 1968b, 3).

With regard to the latter concern, Helene Silverberg (1993, 368) observes that in the late 1960s, women began entering political science graduate programs in substantial numbers and "formed part of a growing constituency available for mobilization against the established structure of the postwar profession." A group of these women had joined the CNPS insurgency, and the Caucus attempted to attract more women to its ranks by creating a Commission on the Status of Women in the Profession, chaired, ironically, by a male (Alan Wolfe). David Easton responded by appointing an APSA Committee on the Status of Women (APSA 1968e), but neither vehicle was deemed suitable for advancing women's issues in the profession, which led a small group to found the Women's Caucus for Political Science (Schuck 1969; Mitchell 1990). Like the CNPS, the WCPS initially sought to promote both intellectual and organizational change within the APSA. A Black Caucus was organized almost simultaneously with the other two caucuses. Indeed, the emergence of new caucuses within the APSA, and the increasing appearance of other "Unaffiliated Groups" at the APSA meetings, tended to fragment the insurgency from its outset.

In 1968, the Caucus also began publishing an official newsletter to facilitate communication with its members beyond APSA conventions.[13] From its inception, there was the expectation that the newsletter might eventually grow into a bona fide peer-reviewed journal, but in its early days the newsletter was primarily a forum for reporting general Caucus

news and events, reports of study commissions, book notes, as well as letters and editorials from members. The Caucus (1968b, 1) newsletter's editors particularly encouraged "open criticism and discussion about political science, however radical or controversial."

However, beyond these organizational issues, H. Mark Roelofs (1968b, 17), the first chairman of CNPS, reports that the Caucus met "with success far beyond expectations" at the 1968 APSA annual meeting in Washington, DC.[14] This success consisted of organizing its own set of panels at the APSA convention and securing passage of significant changes to the APSA constitution and policies. Roelofs (1968b, 17) reports that "attendance was spectacularly high, and enthusiasm was well sustained" as a result of multiple "intellectual confrontations" between CNPS members and mainstream political scientists.

The CNPS panels had such large turnouts that Caucus organizers were more convinced than ever that "many political scientists were ready to move in the direction initiated by the CNPS" (Surkin and Wolfe 1969, 44). In fact, the second APSA convention with a Caucus presence ended with CNPS membership more than doubling to over five hundred persons—about 14% of the 3,723 persons attending the conference, although it was still only 4% of total APSA membership (Kirkpatrick 1969a, 483, 530). Roelofs (1968b, 17) observes that "the Caucus came away from the 1968 convention determined to mount once again a major demonstration program at the 1969 convention in New York."

The 1968 APSA business meeting was attended by 850 people, which was the largest number ever present for a business meeting in APSA history (APSA 1968d, 20). Christian Bay (1968a) had initially proposed a resolution to rescind Article II of the APSA constitution, but the CNPS Executive Committee proposed an alternative constitutional amendment to merely amend Article II (Bayer et al. 1968, 39). This amendment added language to end of the Article II based on CNPS Resolution 1 that allowed the Association to actively encourage "in its membership and in its journal, research in and concern for significant contemporary political and social problems, however controversial and subject to partisan discourse in the community at large these may be" (APSA 1968a, 39; Roelofs 1968b).

Caucus members had vigorously lobbied the APSA Council, which invited Roelofs to explain the objective of the proposed amendment. At its September 2, 1968, meeting, the APSA Council voted to recommend the proposed amendment to the 1968 business meeting (APSA 1969c, 22–24).[15] Roelofs introduced the amendment during the business meeting, which approved the amendment.

The CNPS also returned its attention to Evron Kirkpatrick and Max Kampelman, but this time David Morris introduced a resolution prohibiting APSA officers "from engaging in intelligence and other covert activities and from using their positions to advance any partisan political interests" (APSA 1968d, 24). This resolution also passed after "a spirited debate," and its passage led Kampelman to resign as APSA treasurer, although he remained as APSA legal counsel (Morris 1968). Ithiel de Sola Pool (1968, 44) sarcastically decried the resolution as one that denied "the right of a Communist to be democratically elected to the Council" (because engaged in covert activities), prohibited Council members from having an extramarital affair (a covert activity), and made it "improper for a group of members of the Council, such as those belonging to the Caucus for a New Political Science, to meet privately before a Council Meeting to organize strategy on behalf of their views" (because that too is a covert activity).

The APSA also adopted provisional guidelines on professional ethics, which were deemed "expressions of principle" and not official policy, although incoming President David Easton was directed to appoint a Standing Committee on Professional Ethics and charge it with developing a formal policy (Bernstein Committee 1968). Finally, in a move toward greater organizational transparency, the APSA Council (1968d, 24) unanimously adopted a new policy that facilities would be made available in the future so that APSA members could attend its meetings as observers. This policy was adopted in response to a resolution submitted by David Morris and Marvin Surkin calling for open sessions of the APSA Council (1969c, 23).

Following passage of the constitutional amendment and ethics resolution at the 1968 convention, the CNPS Executive Committee published an open letter to again stress "that the Caucus for a New Political Science is a group *within* the Association . . . the Caucus is not dedicated to any orthodoxy—or unorthodoxy—in methodology, ideological persuasion, or subject matter interest" (Bayer et al. 1968, 39). In a call for new members, Theodore J. Lowi and Morris Janowitz (1965, 45), who were now members of the CNPS Executive Committee, emphasized that the Caucus had been "responsible for change in the Constitution of the Association" and had not sought to take over or destroy the Association. Lowi and Janowitz (1968, 45) sought to allay misperceptions about CNPS by noting that the organization saw itself as merely one "channel for reform in the Association." They pointed out that CNPS was "strongly committed to bringing about a closer accord between the program and activities of the Association . . . and the growing desire for relevance among students of politics today."[16]

In recognition of the APSA leadership's "cooperative spirit," Roelofs emphasized to Caucus members, and to the entire Association membership, that CNPS panels were "designed to supplement" the APSA program and "to expand it in the direction of greater relevance to the political problems of the day." Caucus panels were "in no way supposed to conflict with or hamper the program planned by the regular committees of the Association" (Roelofs 1968a, 39). The CNPS Executive Committee similarly stressed "that the Caucus for a New Political Science is a group *within* the Association" (Roelofs 1968a, 39).

Indeed, six months after its founding, the CNPS Executive Committee (1968a, 1) was pleased to report that "the reaction of the profession to the Caucus, and more specifically to the ideas we represent, has been *tremendously* enthusiastic." Despite the harsh treatment accorded to Caucus members at the 1967 APSA annual business meeting, the first Caucus newsletter reports that it was "quite apparent that we had articulated thoughts that have concerned a significant number of political scientists. We have received many communications, some from very distinguished members of the profession, applauding our efforts and offering encouragement. . . . There seems to be a tendency to regard us as representative of a significant body of opinion within the profession and the Association" (CNPS 1968a, 1).

David Kettler (2009a), who succeeded Roelofs as CNPS chair (1969–70) confirms that "David Easton and Robert Lane, as APSA Presidents, were quite open to negotiating with the Caucus, and the harsh opposition was mobilized not so much by the 'behaviorists' as by the political progenitors of the neo-cons." Indeed, some behavioralists were willing to accommodate the CNPS under the broad umbrella of liberal pluralism, but the proto-neoconservatives in the APSA Establishment intuitively recognized that the CNPS could eventually pose a more radical New Left challenge to the profession and its institutionalized relationship to corporate and state power. Thus, it turned out that methodology was not so much a dividing line in the profession as was ideology.

At the same time, Ellen Schrecker (2021, 360, 396) correctly observes that despite the reputation imposed on CNPS by later APSA officials, CNPS was initially "the most moderate" of the dissident caucuses to emerge in the late 1960s as its original demands were "hardly radical." John S. Dryzek (1988, 440) has described the professional politics of CNPS as "guarded radicalism." The subsequent absence of organized disruption in 1969 and 1970 was partly because David Easton, APSA president, and Robert E. Lane, the APSA program chair, assented to the Caucus's requests

and listed its panels, plenary session, and business meetings in the official conference programs as special panels (APSA 1968b, 39–40). The CNPS was also allowed to set up a table at the conference registration desk where it recruited members and distributed flyers advertising its panels.

Correspondence in the Christian Bay papers further documents that he, and the Caucus generally, were on cordial terms with APSA President David Easton (1968–69). After the business meeting at the 1968 APSA convention, where Easton was affirmed as the incoming president, Easton reportedly went to the Caucus's hotel headquarters and agreed that "we've got to bring this professional association up to the twentieth century" (quoted in Morris 1968). According to Surkin (2023), the incoming president's overture of goodwill went so far that "David Easton signed up as a new member of the CNPS—can't get more mainstream."[17] This claim is consistent with a *Newsweek* report that only a few hours after Easton met with the Caucus leadership, Evron Kirkpatrick himself went to the Caucus headquarters and handed over five dollars to become a dues-paying member of the Caucus despite the criticism directed at him over the last two years (Morris 1968).[18]

Even though Christian Bay was on the more radical counter-associationist wing of the CNPS, Easton kept him inside the APSA by appointing him to serve as the APSA program coordinator for the "Normative Political Theory" panels at the 1969 annual meeting of the APSA, while Roelofs was program coordinator for the special group of panels called "The Political Scientist as Policy Scientist," which explored the social responsibility of intellectuals (CNPS 1969i).[19] Bay was also on similarly good terms with APSA Presidents Karl W. Deutsch (1969–70) and Robert E. Lane (70–1971), as well as APSA Executive Director Evron Kirkpatrick over the next few years.[20] Lane had even agreed to allow a CNPS special plenary talk by Herbert Marcuse at the annual meeting, although this event failed to materialize because Marcuse was scheduled to be in Europe during the next APSA meeting (Bay 1968e, 1968f). Following a breakfast meeting at the 1968 APSA convention, where CNPS had sponsored its first panels, Bay wrote a lengthy letter to Lane, who was serving as chair of the 1969 APSA Program Committee, memorializing their discussions about the next year's APSA program. Bay (1968c) wrote:

> I come back to the issues we discussed at breakfast one day last week, having to do with the possibilities for organizing some really relevant and perhaps politically useful sessions at APSA meetings next year. . . . I am enthusiastic about this idea; with Dave Easton

> and yourself in crucial positions, I believe we shall see quite a change in the role of the APSA next year, and I doubt that we shall ever go back again to the level of triviality and political irrelevancy that tended to dominate in years past.

This cordial relationship was in distinct contrast to the radical caucuses in sociology, history, psychology, economics, and modern languages, where conferences were subjected to protests, pickets, secession, and other forms of disruption.[21] Henry Raymont, a *New York Times* reporter who covered the 1969 APSA convention, wrote that "through the week Professor Easton had applied diplomacy, persuasion and every available skill of political science to save the association from a major ideological split between conservatives and radicals. His efforts headed off disruptions, protests and pickets such as those that marked two other professional meetings last week, the American Psychological Association in Washington and the American Sociological Association in San Francisco" (Raymont 1969c, 47).

The APSA leadership also adopted a conciliatory stance toward CNPS demands for more transparency in the Association. APSA's executive director, Evron M. Kirkpatrick, began distributing the Association's annual report to the entire membership for the first time in 1969, including information on membership and conference participation. The executive director (1969a, 479) announced that "the Association continues to seek greater involvement by its members in the programs and activities" of the APSA, while noting that over 200 members already served on various committees of the Association, or act as liaisons to other scholarly organizations and government agencies. However, cooperation between the APSA and CNPS would soon turn to conflict and confrontation.

Political Reaction Against CNPS

Following a successful 1968 APSA convention for the Caucus, opposition to CNPS began to solidify and harden, particularly among the APSA's most conservative members. Moreover, once the CNPS decided to run its own slate of candidates for APSA president and APSA Council in 1969, APSA Presidents such as Heinz Eulau (1971–72), Austin Ranney (1974–75), and John C. Wahlke (1977–78) became openly hostile to the Caucus. Thus, the relationship between CNPS and the APSA became increasingly strained during the 1970s, and, as John Dryzek (2006, 491) points out, "Resistance from the now mostly behavioralist APSA hierarchy could be fierce."

In anticipation of the 1969 New York City annual meeting, the *Chicago Sun-Times* observed that "none of the learned societies is more caught up in, or agitated by, the passionate social forces swirling across mankind than political science" (Littlewood 1969). The newspaper anticipated a "stormy session" as "the 'New Left,' consisting mainly of graduate students and junior faculty members confronts the powerholders of the association with demands for change" (Littlewood 1969). Roy N. Lokken (1968), a professor of political science at East Carolina University, warned that "the Caucus for a New Political Science is a thinly disguised front for the 'New Left' radical activists who are trying to subvert and destroy our educational and scholarly institutions, to undermine the structure of our society, and, ultimately to subvert our political institutions."

George W. Carey, a professor of government at Georgetown University, shared this view, but he went a step further and organized the Conference for a Democratic Politics to challenge the "obstreperous behavior" of the "radical activists who are trying to subvert our political institutions" and to paralyze the APSA (quoted in Littlewood 1969). Carey was a constitutional conservative, who at the time was best known for his book *Liberalism versus Conservatism* (1966), coauthored with conservative political theorist Willmoore Kendall (1963, 1964).[22] Carey has been described as "a deeply engaged conservative thinker" who was "a living remnant of an older, gentler conservatism" (Georgetown University, n.d.). He would later be regarded by conservatives "as one of the preeminent interpreters not merely of American conservatism but of the thought of the American Founders" ("Farewell" 2013).[23]

Carey (1968, 40) sounded the alarm following the 1968 APSA meeting:

> The New Left, or more exactly, the Caucus for a New Political Science, now has twelve panels of its very own, with the approval and under the auspices of the Association. Beyond this, Christian Bay and H. Mark Roelofs (leading members of the New Politics group) have, by dispensation of our presiding president, six panels apiece to control on our "regular" program. This means, if the past serves as any guide, the New Political Scientists will control roughly 30% of those panels scheduled at our next convention in New York City.

Carey (1968, 40) warned that the CNPS "is just warming up for the 'take-over'" of the APSA, as it was already discussing the possibility of running its own slate of candidates for APSA office in 1969. He warned that CNPS officers were also discussing the possibility of starting their own scholarly journal. Carey (1968, 40) went on to denounce the previ-

ously unheralded Marvin Surkin as one of the Caucus's "more obstreperous spokesmen" and chastised the APSA and its leadership for allowing itself to be "bullied by the New Political Science." Carey complained that "the leadership of the Association is clearly and unjustifiably placating what the New Political Scientists themselves admit is nothing but a 'splinter group.'" Carey (1968, 40) called on the Caucus to "dissociate from the Association," but he considered this course of action unlikely because "the leadership of the Association is going to cater to the whims and follies of the New Left."

In lieu of the Caucus seceding from APSA, Carey demanded that the Association give equal treatment to all other associated groups and award them panels at the annual meeting. In response, the APSA Executive Committee authorized "the Carey group . . . to organize a series of panels for the 1969 annual meeting on the same basis as the Caucus for a New Political Science. Both the Caucus and the Carey group will submit their proposals to the Program Committee of APSA (through the Chairman, Robert Lane) for approval. Hotel space will be assigned the panels and information about them printed in the APSA Program only after Program Committee approval" (APSA 1968d, 27). And so began the proliferation of "Unaffiliated Groups," which over time would multiply and begin organizing a larger and larger share of panels at the annual meetings of the APSA.

Robert Lane (1969, 71), the 1969 Program Committee chair, was pleased to announce that "this year [1969] special groups within the discipline, whether distinguished by point of view (Caucus for a New Political Science, Conference for Democratic Politics) or special field of interest (Communist Studies) have been treated by the Program Committee as regular sections whose panels, if approved by the Program Committee, are scheduled during the regular period of the Meeting." The CNPS received 10 panels on the 1969 program (including three workshops and a plenary session), the Carey group received 10 panels, while Communist Studies received three panels (Lane 1969, 82).[24] While Lane (1969, 71) considered this new arrangement "experimental," he indicated that the Program Committee saw it as a way "to accommodate the growth of the profession . . . and the considerable interest in the substantive orientation and social role of the discipline manifested at the 1968 Meetings and in current communications to the national office." H. Mark Roelofs (1969b) was so pleased with Lane's incorporation of CNPS panels into the 1969 program that he wrote to the CNPS Executive Committee: "Look at the way Lane gingered the official program!"

The 1969 CNPS panels, which were organized by Michael Parenti, continued the themes articulated a year earlier and were organized under the theme of "Political Science and Radical Change" (CNPS 1969a, 2–4). The CNPS program highlighted rising stars among the New Left academic insurgents, including William E. Connolly, Marvin Surkin, Charles A. McCoy, David Kettler, Sanford V. Levinson, Murray J. Edelman, Alan Wolfe, James Petras, and Christian Bay (Lane 1969, 87–149). The 1969 CNPS program also included three "participatory workshops," "Political Scientists and the Social Order," "Political Science Teaching: Methods and Problems," and "Political Science Teaching and Professional Values," which circled back on CNPS members' dissatisfaction with the behavioralists' neglect of teaching political science.

However, CNPS went into the 1969 APSA annual meeting with a more ambitious agenda than just organizing panels at the APSA. Prior to the 1969 annual meeting, CNPS issued a communiqué that again emphasized that "the Caucus for a New Political Science is an organization of political scientists within the American Political Science Association" ("Caucus for a New Political Science" 1969, 368). The communiqué declared:

> The objective of the Caucus is the reformation of American political science. It hopes to stimulate a redirection of the scholarly energies of the profession into a sustained and critical concern for what is happening in America today. To this end, the Caucus believes that the organization and workings of the APSA must come up for thorough and critical examination. The Caucus is not committed to any orthodoxy, either in political ideology or methodological persuasion. It believes only that, in the light of our contemporary situation, political scientists should be asking serious, even shocking questions—questions which for too long went unasked, much less answered. ("Caucus for a New Political Science" 1969, 368)

The CNPS Executive Committee announced that as a permanent membership organization, it would establish a headquarters at one of the APSA convention hotels, where members of the committee would be available to meet with the general membership, accept new members, and collect dues (CNPS 1969h, 1). It would continue to be governed by business meetings held during the APSA convention, and between meetings day-to-day affairs would be handled by its elective Executive Committee. However, in a radical new departure, the committee announced that for

the first time it would be submitting a slate of candidates for APSA elective offices to challenge the nominees put forward by the APSA Nominations Committee.

In the spring of 1969, the Executive Committee issued a public announcement that "the Caucus has decided to conduct a campaign for these offices":

1. We believe that APSA has within its control the ability to greatly influence the nature and direction of the political science profession.
2. We wish to begin a process of re-directing the energies of the discipline so that they can be used to facilitate societal change, rather than to merely describe and perpetuate the social and political status quo. (CNPS Platform Committee 1969, 191–92)[25]

The Caucus's announcement that it would be nominating its own slate of candidates for APSA office resulted in the formation of yet another group, led by Donald G. Herzberg, director of the Eagleton Institute of Politics at Rutgers University. Herzberg was considered an authority on electoral politics, although this reputation was due more to his political experience than to his scholarship.[26] Herzberg was an old-style machine politics Democrat who held a dim view of the party's reform Democrats. Herzberg once claimed that "in the name of reforming political parties we are destroying them." He preferred an old-style politics on grounds that "wheeling and dealing, compromising and trading are preferable to hyped-up primaries and caucuses" (quoted in "Donald G. Herzberg Dies" 1980). Herzberg was a New Jersey native who had received his PhD from Syracuse University and taken a job as special assistant to the comptroller of Connecticut from 1949 to 1951. He later served as a legislative assistant to Senator William Benton (D-Connecticut) and then spent two years (1955–56) as a budget official for the state of New York. He entered academia in 1956, when he accepted a position to direct the newly established Eagleton Institute of Politics ("Donald G. Herzberg Dies" 1980).

Herzberg's new Ad Hoc Committee for Popular Vote Amendments initially included Stephen K. Bailey, Lucius Barker, Samuel Cook, David Fellman, Samuel C. Patterson, and James A. Robinson, but it claimed it "had already attracted a large membership." The purpose of the committee was to gather support for changes to the APSA constitution that would "prevent any minority at any time from capturing control of the Association through an unrepresentative business meeting attended by a small

fraction of the members" (APSA 1969e, 368). Its main tactical objective was to secure passage of a constitutional amendment that would require a mail ballot vote of the entire membership in cases where elections for APSA office were contested, rather than a vote of those present at the annual business meeting, where it was entirely possible that Caucus members and sympathizers might overwhelm the old Establishment.

Herzberg's proposal provoked a wide-ranging debate in the Association that culminated in a special symposium, "The Governance of the Association," published in the summer 1969 issue of *PS* (APSA 1969d). The special symposium included short essays by 20 prominent scholars on both sides of the issue, including a lead article by Donald G. Herzberg, which garnered support from Duncan MacRae, Aaron Wildavsky, Joseph LaPalombara, George W. Carey, Arnold A. Rogow, Harry M. Scoble, Quincy Wright, Harvey Mansfield, and William Anderson. Three members of the CNPS Executive Committee—David Kettler, H. Mark Roelofs, and Michael Parenti—argued against the Herzberg proposal, while Theodore J. Lowi indicated that he supported the Caucus's objective to create a new political science and to reform the APSA oligarchy, but he opposed the new CNPS strategy of contested APSA elections.[27]

Herzberg (1969a, 270) defended his proposed amendment as one "intended to broaden the base of participation in the affairs of the Association" and thereby sought to turn the Caucus's democratic rhetoric against it. Herzberg compared his proposal to the abolition of the poll tax insofar as participation in Association decisions required one to pay a conference registration fee and to bear the considerable costs of conference-related travel, which excluded a large number of political scientists. George W. Carey (1969b, 279–80) weighed in with the observation that "our present procedures and structures were not designed for the brand of politics played by the New Left. Though a small minority, the New Left can, through its obstreperous behavior, bring our Association to a state of paralysis."

H. Mark Roelofs (1969d, 272) responded that Herzberg was proposing a form of Gaullist plebiscitary democracy as opposed to the participatory democracy favored by CNPS. Similarly, David Kettler (1969, 271) argued that "the Gaullist recourse to plebiscite cannot be offered to the profession as some sort of signal extension of democratic participation." However, in a stinging rebuttal, which evidently represented the views of a sizable number of Establishment political scientists, Anthony King (1969, 294–95) wrote that "the Caucus reminds me of a group of *avant garde* artists who spend their time, not actually painting, but plotting how to become

curators of the local art museum. If, as they claim, the members of the Caucus want to create a new political science, they really ought to caucus less and write more." On a panel at the 1969 APSA convention, Robert A. Dahl repeated King's comment, while Karl Deutsch juxtaposed the "loud and emotional" radicals to "the sober, scholarly" behavioralists (quoted in Parenti 1969c, 700). These comments drew a quick response from Michael Parenti (1969c, 700), who pointed out that such comments were meant to create a "misleading and unfair impression" of CNPS members.

Parenti (1969c, 700) pointed out that "many of the most active members of the Caucus have made worthy contributions toward developing a new political science." Parenti (1969c, 700) acknowledged that "a call for a new political science does not produce an entire literature overnight," but he argued that Caucus activists were already making "an impressive scholarly contribution" to the discipline. Parenti (1969c, 700) pointed to Henry Kariel's *The Decline of American Pluralism*, Theodore J. Lowi's *The End of Liberalism*, William E. Connolly's *Political Science and Ideology*, and to the collection of essays in John Playford and Charles A. McCoy's *Apolitical Politics* and William E. Connolly's *The Bias of Pluralism*. One could not forget Christian Bay's widely acclaimed book *The Structure of Freedom*. One could point to Bay's pathbreaking *APSR* article "Politics and Pseudo-Politics" and to Philip Green's article in *World Politics* (January 1968). Parenti (1969c, 700) noted that James Petras "has written, among his forty or fifty publications, one of the most telling critiques of American political science literature from what might be considered a Caucus viewpoint" (also see Petras 1965).

One could recount numerous more examples of the new political science by Connolly, Green, Kariel, Kettler, Levinson, Lowi, McCoy, and Petras, who "are, or were recently members of the Caucus Executive Committee; and Bay heads the Caucus slate." It might be true that behavioralists and pluralists did not read this critical scholarship, but that lack of disciplinary awareness should not be confused with the absence of critical scholarship. Thus, Parenti (1969c, 700) concluded that "the stereotype of the activist as someone who is strong on emotion but weak on scholarship is a cheap and easy one to cultivate. In their insistence that political scientists spend less time polemicizing others and more time informing themselves, Messrs. King, Dahl, and Deutsch—on this particular question—are their own best critics."

Parenti (1969b, 285) suggested that a major reason for the APSA Establishment's resistance to change is that it is "not an innocent bystander" to the predations of American capitalism and the capitalist state. Parenti (1969b, 285) suggested that "the Association, like the universities, is much

engaged in activities relating to power and wealth in this society. A closer study of how prominent Association members fit into the inter-locking system of foundations, corporations, institutes, councils, centers, and sundry conduits and agencies would bring us the realization that the APSA is something other than an academic club grown large." Indeed, Alan Wolfe (1969, 354), a young Caucus firebrand, soon published an article in the *Antioch Review* documenting the APSA's "oligarchic yet apolitical character." He effectively applied the same method of power structure analysis deployed in the critique of pluralism to map out the APSA's internal power structure and to hold it up as an example of the discipline's apolitical politics, where not a single Association office had ever been contested by anyone from outside this academic establishment until the CNPS put up its own slate of candidates in 1969 (Wolfe and Surkin 1969).

Wolfe (1970b, 292) argued that a few conference panels at APSA annual meetings were not enough to start a revolution in political science. The Caucus needed to run its own slate of candidates for APSA offices "as a way of demonstrating alternative approaches to the discipline." Wolfe and many of his young colleagues insisted that a new political science "demanded both intellectual and organizational reform," and, consequently, democracy should be extended "to the APSA where contested elections were unknown" (Surkin and Wolfe 1970, 5). Following Wolfe's call to action, the CNPS ran a full slate of Caucusites in 1969. For the first time in APSA history the nominees of the official Nominating Committee, which historically had put forward only one name for each Association office, were now challenged by an alternative slate of candidates.

Prior to the 1969 APSA annual meeting, the APSA Council invited Herzberg to its August 12, 1969, meeting and allowed him "to speak in support of the amendments proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee for the Popular Vote Amendments" (APSA 1969a, 538). The Council deferred action on the amendments until its next meeting. However, the Council did endorse, "in principle, the proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Popular Vote Amendment that whenever there is a contest for any elective office, such contested elections shall be conducted by a mailed, secret ballot to each member under conditions prescribed by the Council" (APSA 1969a, 538). The Council then made a remarkable move designed to ensure that the Caucus could not capture the APSA's offices by a majority vote at the upcoming business meeting.

The Council agreed to recommend to the annual business meeting a proposed amendment from the APSA's Constitutional Revision Committee that would first amend the amendment process in the APSA constitu-

tion. This amendment replaced existing language that amendments to the constitution were adopted if "accepted by the majority of those members present and voting" at the annual business meeting. In place of this language, the Council recommended that approval "by at least one-third of those members present and voting" at the annual business meeting was sufficient for adoption. The APSA Council introduced additional language that "this amendment shall take effect at the close of the 1969 annual business meeting; further proposals to amend the amendment procedure at the 1969 Annual Business Meeting are rendered out of order forthwith" (APSA 1969a, 538–42). This change to the amendment process laid the groundwork for the Council's next move to deflect the CNPS challenge to its oligarchical hold on APSA offices.

At its next meeting (August 31-September 1, 1969), the Council recommended that Herzberg's proposed constitutional amendment on mail balloting be referred to the APSA's Committee on Constitutional Revision. The APSA Council also directed that in the election of officers and Council members that nominees be "designated as nominated by the APSA Nominating Committee; that the nominees of the Caucus for a New Political Science be so designated; that any other nominees designated by an organization such as the Conference for Democratic Politics be designated by their organization" (APSA 1969b, 543–45). However, as a result of this unprecedented situation, the Council also voted to recommend a substitute amendment for Herzberg's amendment to the APSA constitution providing for a mail ballot in case of contested elections (APSA 1969b). Should its previous recommendation pass, then such an amendment would only require the affirmative vote of one-third of those present and voting at the annual business meeting, and, consequently, even if the CNPS mustered a majority at the meeting, the election of officers could still be taken away from the business meeting and put to a mail ballot of the entire APSA membership.[28]

While the Council was conducting its business, the Caucus convened its own business meetings on September 1 and 2, 1969. At the first meeting, members received reports from the officers, approved resolutions to be submitted to the APSA business meeting and elected a slate of candidates to contest the APSA nominees for office. The CNPS nominated Christian Bay for APSA president, who "cautiously accepted" it, but made it clear he would not run "any razzle dazzle campaign" (Roelofs 1969b). Bay (1969f) said that he would "stand but not run" for the presidency. Nevertheless, Bay said in his speech accepting the nomination, which was entitled "What Are Political Scientists For?" that he expected CNPS candidates to be more

than a symbolic challenge to the APSA nominees. Bay (1969e) argued that such candidates were necessary because "the present apolitical, indeed antipolitical stance of the APSA is a scandal . . . I find it demeaning as a political scientist that my professional association should demonstrate no concern at all for the crucial life and death issues of our time."[29]

The CNPS nominated David Kettler, H. Mark Roelofs, and Alan Wolfe for the three vice presidential positions. Jewell Prestage, Henry S. Kariel, Lewis Lipsitz, Theodore Becker, William E. Connolly, Philip Green, and Alex Gottfried were nominated for the APSA Council. However, while the CNPS slate of candidates was being put together during the summer of 1969, it was learned that the APSA Nominations Committee planned to nominate Kariel and Lipsitz for the Council even though both of them were prominent members of the CNPS Executive Committee (APSA 1969f). This generated some discussion within the Executive Committee as to whether one could serve two masters, as a representative of both the APSA and the CNPS. With Caucus approval, Kariel and Lipsitz accepted the APSA nomination "with the understanding that they would seek to be nominated by the Caucus as well; and that if they received Caucus nominations, they would run as part of the Caucus slate and would stand on the Caucus platform" (CNPS 1969c, 4). Roelofs (1969c) had approached Grant McConnell, who was also being nominated by the APSA for vice president, to see if he would be interested in a similar arrangement, but unbeknownst to Roelofs, McConnell had already accepted an endorsement from Herzberg's Ad Hoc Committee.

In addition to nominating a full slate of candidates for APSA office, the September 2, 1969 CNPS business meeting adopted an official campaign platform—the first in APSA history—that was primarily authored by Paul Minkoff, with significant input from Charles A. McCoy, H. Mark Roelofs, and a few other leading Caucus activists (Roelofs 1969a; see Appendix A).[30] The draft platform was distributed to all CNPS members in June 1969 and approved at the 1969 CNPS business meeting (CNPS 1969c, 4–7). The preamble to the 1969 CNPS platform (see Appendix A) states:

> The Caucus for a New Political Science is nominating a slate of candidates to run for the APSA offices and Council seats that will be filled at this year's APSA convention elections. We are presenting a slate, and are conducting an electoral campaign, to express and make known our conviction that a *new* political science must now be developed. We have chosen this election as a means of presenting our views because we believe that:

1. The political science profession has invested its energies primarily in celebrating and supporting the economic, social, and political status quo, both here and abroad.
2. The American Political Science Association, more than any other single force, shapes the nature and direction of political science in America.
3. The resources of the APSA must be used to re-direct some of the energies and expertise of the discipline to encourage the development of a *new* political science—devoted to radical social criticism and fundamental social change.

The platform went on to articulate a long list of specific proposals in the areas of research and teaching, graduate students, the status of nonwhites and women in the profession, departmental ethics, internships and awards, the *American Political Science Review*, the political activity of the APSA, and APSA governance. Some of the items in the platform called for the APSA to promote more research in peace studies, liberation and insurgent movements throughout the world (without interfering in their internal affairs or the affairs of their host countries), the social and political uses of knowledge, radical alternatives to existing political institutions, radical alternatives to existing political theories, repression and power structures in America, the role of academic finance in determining the concerns of political science, and university politics. The platform also proposed that APSA members be allowed to join the APSA without an *APSR* subscription, thus forcing the *APSR* to compete with other journals for subscribers. It also proposed that the *APSR* editor should be elected by the APSA membership. The platform called on the APSA to show more concern for increasing the presently low level of participation in the profession by nonwhites and women, and, finally, it demanded that the APSA be governed on democratic and participatory principles (see CNPS 1969e; Appendix A).

Finally, the September 1 CNPS business meeting considered a number of resolutions to be submitted to the APSA business meeting. The most important resolution was "Women in the Profession." The resolution called attention to the fact that women were only 5% of the current membership of the APSA and stated that the Caucus considered this fact "evidence of pervasive discrimination in the profession against them." Consequently, the Caucus proposed that the APSA adopt a quota system for scholarships, fellowships, and APSA offices. It also proposed that facilities be set aside at APSA conventions so "women political scientists can orga-

nize and define their goals and needs" with the long-term goal of achieving "some reasonable parity between men and women in the profession" (CNPS 1969f).[31]

On September 2, 1969, the CNPS business meeting convened a second time to conduct its own elections. David Kettler was elected as chair to replace H. Mark Roelofs, who handed Kettler the gavel and departed the convention.[32] Following this meeting, Christian Bay wrote to Roelofs to inform him that he found Caucus members to be "a splendid bunch," but he lamented that "few of them . . . know how to get important business accomplished in a meeting." Bay (1969b) complained that after Roelofs's departure from the business meeting, the "Caucus came close to destroying itself later that evening" as various members "sounded off on all matters until eleven."

This situation frustrated many attendees who left the meeting disillusioned and, consequently, Bay (1969b) admonished Roelofs and Kettler (by copy) that "next time we must avoid the disaster of last Tuesday's business meeting, which started out with such a large, positive audience, which dwindled away very soon as the floor was kept open for endless tangential issues." At the same time, Bay signaled to Roelofs that even though he had been nominated for APSA president, he considered himself to be on the more radical wing of the Caucus, while complimenting Roelof's more pragmatic leadership. Nevertheless, Bay (1969b) pushed Roelofs to "continue building up a continually stronger pressure for radical confrontation within the APSA and within the profession." Bay (1969b) argued that the Caucus ought to work toward such confrontation as "some of us want to wear the hat of a 'political science liberation movement' and challenge the APSA from across the street as well."[33]

Confrontation or Cooperation?

Kettler's organizational politics were somewhere between Roelof's pragmatic incrementalism and Bay's desire for a confrontational political science liberation movement.[34] When he served as chair (1969–70), Kettler (1970b) published a lengthy essay in *Politics and Society*, which drew on Karl Marx and Karl Mannheim to ruminate on "The Vocation of Radical Intellectuals." Kettler (2013b) says the essay "was meant to be a manifesto of the position I was upholding against a number of the other original members of the group," especially Alan Wolfe.[35] In the early 1950s Kettler had been a graduate student at Columbia University, where he was influ-

enced by Herbert Marcuse, Franz Neumann, C. Wright Mills, Robert Lynd, and other radical luminaries (Kettler, n.d.). Kettler argued that Marx served as a model of the effort to integrate the struggles for knowledge and for human liberation, but it was Mannheim who posed the *contemporary* problem of the intellectuals. In the twentieth century, intellectuals had been increasingly organized into universities, where they became a relatively classless stratum, which could therefore voluntarily affiliate with one or the other of various antagonistic classes (Mannheim 1936, 154, 158). Thus, the problem of the radical intellectuals was to define a working relationship between themselves and politically active groups in society. One could take to the streets as a political activist or one could be an intellectual, but it was difficult to be both simultaneously.

Kettler (1970b, 44) did not discount street activism, but he cautioned radical scholars not to "dissipate their energies and get caught in the senseless escalation of expectations to the point of cynical passivity." Kettler insisted that radical intellectuals had to get their own house in order—the university and the professional associations—or they would soon find themselves without any place to work that was amenable to radical scholarship. Kettler (1970b, 26) observed that it was becoming increasingly difficult to be a radical intellectual in the contemporary university, first, because of "effective repression" by administrators, the police, and intelligence agencies and, second, because bourgeois intellectuals aligned with corporations and the state were deploying "an increasingly complex and sophisticated scientific apparatus hostile to radical visions." This apparatus was buttressed by corporate-sponsored foundations and government funding agencies, which now created an "urgent need to rehabilitate the theoretical enterprise among radicals" (26). Kettler bemoaned "the intellectual underdevelopment of the American Left," while recognizing that complaining about "the weakness of contemporary radical theorizing has in fact become cliché" (11, 26).

Consequently, Kettler (1970b, 44) considered the Caucus for a New Political Science and similar organizations in the other social sciences and humanities to be "a healthy and valuable development in the United States." However, Kettler considered it "bravado and imposture to speak of 'taking over' the disciplines" at the present time and instead he argued that "we struggle against ideological domination over these spheres of activity [university, profession, discipline] primarily by working within them" (44).[36] Thus, it was time for radical intellectuals to get down to the hard work of doing the thing they do best, which is to produce critical scholarship and to build a new political science. Yet, to do this work, it was imperative that

radical intellectuals protect their home base, and this meant creating safe spaces for critical political scientists inside university departments, professional associations, and scholarly journals.

The 1969 APSA Convention

This struggle escalated at the 1969 APSA business meetings (September 3 and 4, 1969). The 1969 business meeting was attended by approximately 750 political scientists. The 1969 business meetings were busy, with three separate sessions held on September 3 and 4. Samuel P. Huntington moved adoption of the constitutional amendments proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee for the Popular Vote Amendments, but these amendments were referred to the Constitutional Revision Committee by a vote of 367–344. Instead, the APSA Council's proposed constitutional amendment requiring the election of officers by mail ballot in cases of contested elections was adopted by voice vote. The Council's proposed amendment to refer all future constitutional amendments supported by 40% of those present at a business meeting to the membership by mail ballot was also adopted by voice vote (APSA 1969h, 671). Both amendments passed despite opposition from the Caucus for a New Political Science and the Women's Caucus for Political Science (WCPS, n.d.). Moreover, the amendments, as written, became effective immediately upon the conclusion of the 1969 annual meeting.

The business meeting also adopted a resolution on academic freedom that was proposed by the Council and approved by voice vote, including an amendment proposed by Sanford Levinson, who was a member of the Caucus Executive Committee (APSA 1970f). The APSA had been the first social science association to officially endorse the AAUP's 1940 *Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure*, but it did not create its own Committee on Academic Freedom until 1969, partly due to pressure from the Caucus for a New Political Science. ASPA President Robert E. Lane (1970), who was often sympathetic to CNPS demands, agreed to appoint the committee and directed it "to make a thorough inquiry into the meaning, current status, and prospects for academic freedom for both faculty and students." However, when the results of that study were released at the 1970 annual meeting of the APSA, it was made clear that many of the discipline's elites considered radicalized faculty and students, including demands for racial, ethnic, and gender diversity, to be the main threats to *their* academic freedom to engage in research like Project Camelot (Herberg 1970).

The resolution on academic freedom reaffirmed the APSA's 1947 endorsement of the AAUP's 1940 *Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure*, but it also reflected Caucus influence in expressing opposition to the investigation of campus political activities by governmental authorities, and it created a task force to investigate the extent of both overt and covert police activity on campus, including infiltration by secret police of constitutionally protected groups.

The 1969 business meeting also adopted a resolution proposed by the APSA's Council on the Status of Women, which called for the equal treatment of women in the profession. This resolution was similar to the Caucus's proposed resolution and resulted in the Caucus withdrawing its own resolution on the status of women to support the Council's proposal.[37] The Caucus's resolution to immediately abolish the APSA Congressional Distinguished Service Award was approved by a show of hands (APSA 1970b, 61; APSA 1969h, 671; APSA 1969b, 543).

The 1969 business meeting moved on to nominations for elective office. The Nominating Committee offered its slate of candidates, while Sanford Levinson nominated the Caucus slate. The Ad Hoc Committee for a Representative Slate offered nominations identical to those of the Nominating Committee with the exception that it nominated Herbert McClosky and Alan Sindler in place of Henry Kariel and Lewis Lipsitz (members of the Caucus Executive Committee). George W. Carey's Conference for Democratic Politics declined to offer nominations (APSA 1970b).

Following the conclusion of the business meetings, the *New York Times* reported that "the fears of some senior members of the association that dissenters might disrupt the weeklong conference have thus far proved unfounded. Demands for reforms by younger political scientists organized in the Caucus for a New Political Science have been confined to orderly parliamentary motions in the association's business meeting" (Raymont 1969b). A few days later the *New York Times* published a short editorial praising the "dissident Young Turks of the Caucus for a New Political Science" for having "rejected disruptive polemics," unlike their colleagues in related disciplines, and to instead "conduct their year-long campaign against the old guard within the bounds of determined lobbying and persuasion" ("Reform in Political Science" 1969).

Yet, in the midst of this electoral controversy, David Easton, once the high priest of the behavioral revolution in political science, ended the convention with a bombshell presidential address that purposely echoed many of the Caucus's talking points. Easton (1969, 1051) declared:

> A new revolution is under way in American political science. The last revolution—behavioralism—has scarcely been completed before it has been overtaken by the increasing social and political crises of our time. The weight of these crises is being felt within our discipline in the form of a new conflict in the throes of which we now find ourselves. This new and latent challenge is directed against a developing behavioral orthodoxy. . . . The initial impulse of this revolution is just being felt. Its battle cries are *relevance* and *action*.

Easton (1969, 1057) also embraced CNPS criticism of the *APSR* by noting that the journal had only published seven articles on racial conflict and urban problems between 1958 and 1968. Easton received a standing ovation from the more than 1,000 members attending the event. Following the conclusion of Easton's presidential address, Alex Gottfried, an assistant professor at the University of Washington and a member of the CNPS Executive Committee, walked to a microphone to address President Easton. Gottfried was a democratic socialist and a leader of the anti–Vietnam War movement in Seattle. Gottfried observed that while "Professor Easton's appreciation of the depth of the American crisis was not sufficiently sharp," nevertheless, "this remarkable speech by David Easton represents how far the concerns for which the Caucus speaks are gaining a response in the Association" (quoted in Hummel 1969). Gottfried observed that Caucus members could for the most part endorse Easton's call for a new revolution in political science. Gottfried concluded his remarks by stating, "Somebody not noted for admiring the establishment wants to make a motion to congratulate Professor Easton for the skill and fairness with which he presided over our meeting" (quoted in Raymont 1969c).[38]

However, one member of the CNPS was less impressed by Easton's presidential address. Alan Wolfe, an assistant professor at SUNY–Old Westbury, stood up in the audience after Easton's accolades and declared that "none of the self-criticism of the established political scientists went far enough." Wolfe denounced the "elitist oligarchy" that guided the profession and worked "to ensure the status quo rather than to promote change." Harvey C. Mansfield Sr., the former managing editor of the *APSR* (1956–65) and a member of the APSA Council, was so taken aback by Wolfe's outburst that he rose from his seat and chastised the young professor: "You got your rhetorical effect by setting up straw men and appeals whose premises were not examined. I'll tell you in your face that this is sheer intellectual dishonesty."[39] Karl Deutsch, the APSA president-elect (1969–70), also

rebuffed Wolfe by telling him: "There is a basic difference between an opinion that is stated loudly and emotionally and an opinion based on evidence" (Wolfe, Mansfield, and Deutsch quoted in Raymont 1969c).

Ralph P. Hummel (1969), a graduate student at New York University, largely concurred with Wolfe and, "after a little thought," distributed a mimeographed manifesto arguing that a truly radical Caucus would dismiss "Professor Easton's Remarkable Speech" as a "subterfuge." During his presidential address, Easton had also called for the formation of a new national federation of social scientists to operate outside the established disciplinary associations. This new organization would lead the new revolution in political science by advocating for specific solutions to political problems. Hummel claimed that Easton's proposal was a skillful attempt to defuse "the sizzling bombshell that the original challenge of the Caucus represented to the sleepy systems-maintaining minds of most members of the discipline and of the Association." He asked Caucus members to think about what would happen to the APSA if Caucus members left the Association to join a new organization of the sort proposed by Easton. Hummel (1969) concluded that Easton's proposal would:

> leave the Association, and consequently the discipline, to its accustomed task of unthinkingly pursuing a conservative, systems-maintaining political science with all that implies for society at large while a new and initially weak interdisciplinary organization begins to debate and struggle within itself over possible political applications of the social sciences. . . . If the Caucus were to endorse the proposal, indeed, it would be as if what was initiated two years ago would have to be started all over again.

The 1969 APSA meeting came to an end, but the real conflict between CNPS and the APSA was just getting underway. Following the exchange over his presidential address, Easton immediately appointed an Election Committee and charged it with implementing the procedures adopted by the Council earlier that day (APSA 1970a, 29). The Election Committee decided to substitute the word "nominees" for "candidates" on the ballots and all official communications about the election "to avoid the impression that electioneering was in order" (APSA 1970a, 28). Nominees were also required to submit a biographical statement and a 100-word "statement of views" to the election director of the American Arbitration Association. In lieu of such a statement, nominees were allowed to declare, "I subscribe to the statement of views of (name of group[s])" (APSA 1979a,

30). The nominating groups were also allowed to submit collective statements in support of their nominees.

Bay set to work on his "Statement of Views," which was to be distributed to all members of the APSA with the mail ballots. Bay (1969b) observes that he "had to write out very quickly a 'statement of views,'" and that "there has been no chance to consult anyone." Bay's statement of views endorsed contested elections in the APSA as a change that could "help build a more representative and also a more politically responsible Association." He "agreed largely with the Caucus platform"[40] and believed that "Caucus-sponsored leadership could do much to induce the postbehavioral generation of political scientists to take an interest in their Association." Bay (1969d) concluded his statement with the observation that "an apolitical Association governed by gentlemen's agreement may be a nice club but cannot claim to represent our professors."

Shortly thereafter, election ballots were mailed to the Association's 13,061 members with statements of belief and biographies for each of the candidates (APSA 1969g, 668; Mueller 1970, 311).[41] In the meantime, however, Herzberg's renamed Ad Hoc Committee for a Representative Slate inserted itself aggressively into the election. Before ballots arrived at APSA members' offices, Herzberg and his collaborators sent a letter to APSA members asking them to cast Council votes for Herbert McCloskey (University of California, Berkeley) and Alan Sindler (Cornell University) instead of Henry Kariel and Lewis Lipsitz. Herzberg (1969b, 704; see Appendix B) falsely claimed that it was only after the Nominating Committee had endorsed Kariel and Lipsitz that the two pledged to serve in the Association as representatives of the Caucus. McCloskey and Sindler were held up as "scholars of high competence and achievement," while Kariel and Lipsitz, despite their own scholarly accomplishments, were denounced as merely "members of the Executive Committee of the Caucus for a New Political Science." In contrast to the Caucus, which "advocates the full-scale politicization of the Association and the use of its resources to advance a political action program," the Ad Hoc Committee wanted "to maintain the Association as a non-partisan professional organization devoted to shared professional purposes." It was the committee's view that "this election will determine whether the Association is to be a professional organization based on shared interests and expertise in scholarship, research, and teaching or whether it is to become a political action group" (1969b, 704).

The Herzberg letter provoked a sharp response from James Prothro (University of North Carolina), who sent a letter to political science depart-

ments in October of 1969 defending the professional reputations of Lipsitz and Kariel. Prothro (1969, 703) informed readers that the "Nominating Committee knew the Caucus intended to offer nominations for the Council and was obviously aware that Lipsitz and Kariel might well receive the nomination of the Caucus. . . . Lipsitz and Kariel were nominated as competent political scientists first and not as 'ambassadors' of the Caucus." The irony was not lost on him that a group who claimed to oppose the politicization of the APSA "has the same effect . . . as the kind of last-minute smear tactic associated with the dirtiest level of ward politics" (Prothro 1969, 702), which was exactly the type of electoral politics that Herzberg knew best.

In the end, Christian Bay won 33% of the vote, while Robert E. Lane won the election with 66% (APSA 1969g, 670). The Caucus's candidates for vice president, secretary, treasurer, and Council lost by similar margins. Kariel was barely elected to the APSA Council, but the Ad Hoc Committee was successful in electing McCloskey and Sindler, which was sufficient to keep Lipsitz off the Council (see Table 1). The Ad Hoc Committee, which largely endorsed the Nominating Committee's candidates, scored a clean sweep in its electoral endorsements.

Conclusion

The Caucus for a New Political Science was a spontaneous eruption that mobilized discontent within the political science profession and the political science discipline that had been simmering for more than a decade. Its initial organizational configuration provided a platform to express a wide range of grievances that crystallized around debates about the social responsibility of intellectuals, including the APSA's refusal to a take a position against the Vietnam War, the collaboration of leading scholars with corporations and the state to repress democratic movements at home and abroad, and the absence of presentations on timely issues such as the urban crisis and poverty at APSA annual meetings. These failures of the discipline were typically attributed to the behavioral revolution's ostensible claim to be a value-neutral social science even as many of its leading proponents engaged in political activities behind the scenes.

These critiques of the discipline were rapidly redirected into a critique of the profession, which was seen as an obstacle to the emergence of a new critical political science. The CNPS identified the APSA as the discipline's professional regulatory apparatus, and, consequently, it sought and achieved numerous reforms designed to open and democratize the profession. One of the most significant achievements was that the APSA

TABLE 1. 1969 APSA Election Results

1969 American Political Science Association Election					
President		Endorsement		Votes	Percent
Robert E. Lane*		PS	AH	5,198	66
Christian Bay	C			2,609	33
Vice president					
Grant McConnell*		PS	AH	5,336	68
William Riker*		PS	AH	5,259	67
Robert E. Ward*		PS	AH	4,932	63
David Kettler	C			2,412	31
H. Mark Roelofs	C			2,383	30
Alan Wolfe	C			2,370	30
Secretary					
Thomas Dye*		PS	AH	5,415	69
Minkoff	C			2,235	28
Treasurer					
Rourke*		PS	AH	5,213	66
Clarke	C			2,489	32
Council, 2-yr. term					
Prestage	C	PS	AH	5,852	74
Samuel Huntington*		PS	AH	5,400	69
Salisbury*		PS	AH	5,067	64
Herbert McClosky*			AH	5,050	64
Kessel*		PS	AH	4,819	61
Alan Sindler*			AH	4,726	60
Waldron*		PS	AH	4,224	54
Henry S. Kariel*	C	PS		3,671	47
Lewis Lipsitz	C	PS		3,625	46
Elden				2,910	37
Becker	C			2,696	33
William E. Connolly	C			2,569	33
Greene	C			2,501	32
Gottfried	C			2427	31

Note: * Elected. C: Caucus for a New Political Science. PS: Nominating Committee of the APSA. AH: Ad Hoc Committee for a Representative Slate.

Source: Mueller 1970, 312.

agreed to sponsor the new journal *PS* in response to demands by the CNPS for a forum that would allow political scientists to do more than publish arcane articles about subjects most political scientists considered trivial. The journal was launched as a forum for political scientists to debate issues about the profession and the discipline, share news about the profession, and share insights about teaching political science.

The CNPS could also claim a significant achievement in its sponsorship of the first "irregular" panels at the APSA annual meeting, which expanded opportunities for participation in the annual meeting. The ratio of paper presenters at the annual meetings increased each year, until approximately 90% of attendees at APSA annual meetings were participating in the official program by 2006 (Lowenberg 2007, 357). The Caucus's success in winning its own conference panels stimulated the emergence of other organized groups, which not only sponsored additional panels but would eventually culminate in the APSA's formal recognition of organized sections in the 1980s. Thus, the emergence of CNPS set in motion the process that largely generated the organizational structure of the APSA that we know today. These changes to organizational structure also included winning a commitment to open meetings of the APSA Council and the publication of an annual budget and annual reports that are distributed to all members of the APSA. The CNPS was the first group within APSA to demand studies of the status of women and nonwhites in the political science profession, and these demands partially contributed to the emergence of a Women's Caucus and a Black Caucus in the APSA. Finally, the CNPS persuaded the APSA to at least nominally reaffirm its commitment to protecting the academic freedom of political scientists at a time when radical and left faculty were increasingly being dismissed from their positions due to antiwar political activism.

The CNPS leadership was so encouraged by these early victories, often achieved with the cooperation of APSA officers such as David Easton and Robert Lane, that it finally decided to run its own slate of candidates for APSA office in 1969. While those candidates were soundly defeated in a mail ballot election, the results were sufficient to persuade CNPS officers to continue running an alternative slate. However, the alternative slate was a bridge too far for many conservatives in the APSA, who mobilized in response to the CNPS challenge and began to deploy the full array of regulatory sanctions available to it. Thus, cooperation gave way to conflict, and this conflict with the APSA would preoccupy the CNPS and consume its energy and resources for the next ten years.

5

The West Coast and the Radicals, 1970–1974

Despite its early successes, the 1970s was a decade of continuous turmoil within the Caucus for a New Political Science as the multiple strands of critique within it played out in a series of internal conflicts. First, as did many New Left organizations, the CNPS attempted to maintain a semblance of participatory and radical democracy while seeking to stabilize its organizational structure within the APSA. This led to debates and struggles about whether the focus of CNPS should be to continue its challenge to the APSA (organizational revolt), redeploy its energies toward street-level political activism on and off campus (political revolution), or focus its energies on the intellectual development of a new political science (intellectual revolution). The latter discussion led Caucus members to struggle with the idea of what constitutes a new political science beyond its initial critique of behavioralism and pluralism. However, this topic opened a rift between the older, disenchanted liberals who had mostly founded CNPS and young radicals who self-identified as leftists and who increasingly embraced Marxism. By the 1970s, these fissures opened a temporary geographic split between the CNPS and what came to be known as the Western Caucus for a New Political Science.

The Western Caucus for a New Political Science

Despite its electoral defeat in 1969, the CNPS pressed forward into 1970 with another conference program, a series of resolutions for the annual business meeting, and a full slate of candidates to contest the Nominating Committee's and the Ad Hoc Committee's candidates for APSA office. The APSA Council again authorized the program chair to allot panels to the

Caucus for a New Political Science and the Conference for a Democratic Politics, subject to review by the program chair "for their scholarly appropriateness." However, a future confrontation was also set in motion when the APSA Council decided that after 1970 "all panels, plenary sessions, or other aspects of the program must be organized under the direction of the Program Committee and no panels will be allotted as a bloc to any person or group of persons outside the Committee" (APSA 1970e, 408). The CNPS ended up with 12 panels at the 1970 convention that were rolled into the regular program and scheduled on the same days and times as regular APSA panels (APSA 1970c). The CNPS panels were well attended for the third year in a row, but this success was tenuous as a West Coast / East Coast split in CNPS brought a simmering dispute between liberals and radicals—pragmatists and revolutionaries—to a boil.

Edward S. Malecki (2024a), an assistant professor of political science at California State University, Los Angeles (CSULA) had been introduced to the Caucus by Alan Wolfe, who was hired to teach at CSULA during the summer quarter of 1968.[1] Malecki, whose dissertation was titled "Quantitative Methods in the Study of Interest Groups" (1969), brought together several young faculty in his new department to organize the Western Caucus for a New Political Science. Malecki had studied under Murray Edelman, and by this time Malecki was embracing Marxism, which was a growing trend among younger faculty in the CNPS (Malecki 1973, 1977, 1981). The CSULA group expanded to include a burgeoning group of Leninists at the University of California, Riverside, and a group of Trotskyites at the University of California, Irvine, who joined together to form the nucleus of a new Western Caucus for a New Political Science. Another core group of the Western Caucus were the SDS organizations at CSULA, with Malecki as their faculty sponsor, and at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), where Victor Wolfenstein was the faculty sponsor. Maleki was also a faculty consultant to UNO, a student Chicano activist group at CSULA. Malecki (2022) was therefore able to bring Chicanos into the Western Caucus, such as Carlos Munoz and Ray Rocco, who were leading the Chicano movement at CSULA and in East Los Angeles.[2] Carlos Munoz (University of California, Irvine) chaired the new Chicano Caucus, which was an independent counterpart to the APSA's Committee on the Status of Chicanos in the Profession. Ray Rocco would later be hired as an assistant professor of political science at UCLA. Thus, the Western Caucus not only injected a strong Marxist perspective into the Caucus but also brought Chicano voices into the Caucus for the first time, and this was reflected in its subsequent candidates for APSA office.

By the time the 1970 APSA convention was held in Los Angeles, the

Western Caucus had already established itself as a credible organization independent of the national CNPS. At the April 1970 annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, the Western Caucus effectively replicated the CNPS strategy on a regional level. The Western Caucus organized its own parallel panels at the 1970 WPSA meeting and nominated candidates for WPSA offices, who captured 35% to 40% of the votes cast, which was slightly more than CNPS captured at the national level in 1969 (WPSA 1970).[3] At the WPSA business meeting, the Western Caucus echoed CNPS themes by criticizing "the sterile character" of panels at the WPSA meetings and the "the sad practices" of the *Western Political Quarterly*, which they claimed was controlled by an old-boy network (Smith 1971, 12). The challenge from the Western Caucus was so formidable that WPSA President H. Paul Castelberry appointed several Western Caucus members to WPSA's standing committees and agreed to incorporate several Caucus panels into the regular program for 1971.

With the 1970 APSA convention being held in Los Angeles instead of Chicago, New York City, or Washington, DC, the geographic composition of the CNPS business meetings shifted toward the Western Caucus. The organizational split between the West Coast Caucus and the national (East Coast) Caucus resulted in the CNPS Executive Committee agreeing to meet jointly with the Western Caucus Steering Committee to plan strategy for the 1970 APSA business meeting and election campaign. Charles Fox, a graduate student at Claremont University, observed that there was obvious "apprehension on the part of the Western and National contingents of the Caucus toward each other," but Fox sought to allay these concerns by emphasizing that the Western Caucus's statement of purpose and the CNPS 1969 platform "reveal[ed] that at least their rhetoric is close." Fox suggested that the main difference between the West Coast and East Coast contingents was not goals and values, but "a question of style and its obverse—the Caucus image" (CNPS 1970a, 3). The East Coast Caucusites were perceived on the West Coast as Ivy League parliamentary reformists seeking respectability from the APSA Establishment, while West Coast Caucusites were political activists who had mostly attended public universities in the West and Midwest. Nevertheless, both sides agreed that cooperation toward common goals was the best strategy.[4]

About the joint meeting between the national CNPS Executive Committee and the West Coast Steering Committee, Malecki (2022) observes that

> at our first meeting with CNPS leadership in Los Angeles it was apparent that CNPS was going to collapse and disappear because most of the early supporters of the Caucus were walking away from

> leadership positions for a variety of different reasons. Alan Wolfe wanted to abandon the Caucus and initiate an explicitly Marxist organization. Mike Parenti was dealing with criminal charges from his involvement in an anti-war protest on the campus of the University of Illinois, hence no longer had time to devote to the Caucus.[5] Christian Bay, Mark Roelofs, and Dave Kettler were simply fatigued by the internal battles of trying to provide leadership to an essentially penniless organization.[6]

In an effort to salvage the larger organization, the Western Caucus put aside its reservations about the proposed CNPS slate of candidates for APSA office and agreed not to oppose the slate if three names were added to it: Edward S. Malecki (secretary), Ralph C. Guzman (Council), and Emily Card (Council) (CNPS 1970a, 1, 4). Guzman was a graduate of California State University, Los Angeles, a faculty member at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and the first Chicano to receive a PhD in political science from UCLA. He was active in the early Chicano movement and a leader of the Chicano anti–Vietnam War movement (Grebler et al. 1970). Card was a graduate student at UC Riverside and a founder of the Women's Caucus in the Western Political Science Association (Bayes, no date).

Although differences in political style were put aside for the moment, the 1970 business meeting on September 8 brought another simmering schism to the surface as so-called counter-associationists pressed their case to secede from the APSA. Kenneth Dolbeare, at that time an assistant professor at the University of Washington, urged the Caucus to form a new political science association. Richard Harris, a UCLA graduate student, criticized the Caucus for "being a 'loyal opposition party' which tended to feed into the legitimacy of the present APSA 'establishment.'" Alan Wolfe also urged the Caucus "to pull out of the APSA." Ira Katznelson, a professor at Columbia University, countered on behalf of several members who called "for support of the Caucus because it was on the edge of achieving many of the goals for which it had fought for the last three years" (Harris and Katznelson quoted in CNPS 1970a, 2). The outcome of the debate was inconclusive, as it was decided to postpone consideration of the issue for another year.

A second meeting held on September 11, 1970, opened yet another fissure in the Caucus as concerns were raised by members who also belonged to the Women's Caucus and Black Caucus. Joan Rothschild (CUNY), a former member of the CNPS Executive Committee, criticized the Caucus for not doing its part to build a CNPS–Women's Caucus coalition, which

she found frustrating because "the Women's Caucus had been loyal to the coalition especially by providing many votes at Business Meetings" (quoted in CNPS 1970a, 3). Others joined this criticism by pointing to the lack of a CNPS–Black Caucus coalition. David Kettler indicated that he had contacted these groups about putting some of their members on the Caucus election slate but did not receive a response from them. The mutual recriminations left the larger issues festering for another time, but it was temporarily put to rest by Christian Bay's proposal to endorse Victoria Schuck for APSA vice president, an APSA Nominating Committee candidate, although it was too late to add her to the Caucus slate.

Finally, David Kettler, the outgoing CNPS chair, acquiesced to the Western Caucus's demand that the balance of power on the CNPS Executive Committee shift to the West Coast. Kettler observed that many of the East Coast members were being term-limited out of office due to a Caucus by-law. As a result, most of the functioning CNPS Executive Committee for 1970–71 was on the West Coast. Most of the officers that year were based at CSULA. Thus, Malecki (2022) observes that "the Western Caucus largely by default became the CNPS executive committee for the following year." This "policy of geographical concentration" was presented to the general membership as one necessary "to achieve an effective work group between the conventions" (APSA 1971d, 82). When the new Executive Committee convened for the first time on September 12, 1970, the official minutes of that meeting report, "Judson James formally transferred the symbols of authority to Western representative Fox: one six cent stamp, a box of membership cards, and a rubber stamp with the word consensus written on it" (CNPS 1970a, 5). Following this official transfer of power to the West Coast, Edward S. Malecki (2022) was elected CNPS chair by the new Executive Committee. He writes,

> I spent the next year trying to unify the competing voices within the Caucus umbrella and help the CNPS survive. Since virtually everybody seemed to agree that the U.S. was dominated by a wealthy power elite, my colleague Ben Smith and I, both friends of Bill Domhoff, tried to craft a message that would appeal to Marxists and non-Marxists.

The confrontation between the West Coast and East Coast contingents of the CNPS generated an extended discussion about the future structure of the CNPS. The new Executive Committee adopted as its theme the concept of "dignified audacity" as a compromise between the conflicting styles

of the two coasts, although no one ever defined what this meant in terms of policies or actions. A more substantive discussion revolved around the idea of restructuring the Caucus as a loose confederation of regional caucuses, which would combine in a general assembly at the annual meetings of the APSA. This proposal was advanced primarily by Marshall Windmiller, a professor at San Francisco State University. Dankwart A. Rustow proposed dividing the Caucus into two sections, with one section on each coast. Charles Fox questioned whether it was advisable "to structure nonstructure" as this seemed to be the de facto organization of the Caucus already, and it was not working well. In the end, it was decided to solve the issue of regional representation by creating three vice chairs—West, Midwest, and East—who would be elected by members from each of those regions (CNPS 1970a, 6).[7]

This organizational issue fed into the upcoming campaign to elect Hans J. Morgenthau as president of the APSA. In an August 1, 1970, meeting with the CNPS Executive Committee, Morgenthau revealed that, unlike Christian Bay, he wanted to run a real campaign for APSA president (CNPS 1970c). Thus, at its September 8, 1970, meeting, the new CNPS Executive Committee agreed that it would not rely on a mass "junk mail" distribution, as it did in 1969, but would create a formal campaign organization with an emphasis on personal contact with APSA members. Each regional vice chair would identify a state coordinator for each state in his region, and each state would be divided into "precincts" consisting of one to three colleges. Each precinct would have a captain in charge of making personal contact with APSA members in that precinct, first, to campaign for Morgenthau and, second, to recruit new members to the Caucus. This new campaign structure was also designed to facilitate the mobilization of Caucus members for the 1971 APSA business meeting in Chicago (CNPS 1970a, 7).

The 1970 APSA Convention and Election

The September 8, 1970, APSA business meeting began with a vote to remove APSA dues from the Association's constitution and to allow the Council to set the dues. This constitutional amendment passed, but a motion by Dankwart A. Rustow to create a graduated scale for dues based on personal income failed by a vote of 96 to 87 (APSA 1971b, 55). Charles A. McCoy presented a constitutional amendment on behalf of William E. Connolly that would allow members to join the APSA at a 20% dues dis-

count if they chose not to receive the *APSR*. This amendment was endorsed by 50 political scientists, including most members of the CNPS Executive Committee.[8] McCoy and Connolly submitted another proposed amendment that would make the managing editor of the *APSR* an elective office (APSA 1970g, 427).

The APSA Council recommended to the business meeting that the McCoy-Connolly amendments be defeated. Austin Ranney, the managing editor of *APSR*, was especially opposed to the second amendment on grounds that the *APSR* "should be a professional journal representing the best scholarship in the profession" and not "a political plum to be won by factions in elections" (APSA 1971c, 71).[9] Both amendments failed at the business meeting—the first by a vote of 46–106 and the second by a vote of 61–101 (APSA 1970i, 659).

The Caucus fared better in leading the fight for a one-year delay in voting on a so-called "Wildavsky constitution." Aaron Wildavsky (UC Berkeley) had been appointed previously to chair a Committee on Constitutional Revision with a charge to completely rewrite the APSA constitution. The text of the document was not published until just before the 1970 APSA convention and the published version was not accompanied by any rationale or explanation for why the APSA needed to rewrite the entire constitution. Dankwart A. Rustow (1971, 124) observes that "most of us saw it for the first time when we picked it up at the entrance of the ballroom of the Los Angeles Hilton." Upon close examination, Rustow found that the Wildavsky constitution omitted two key provisions that had been added at the initiative of the Caucus in previous APSA meetings. The first omitted provision was the statement that "the Association . . . actively encourages, in its membership and its journals, research in and concern for significant contemporary political and social problems and policies." Another provision omitted from the Wildavsky constitution was the language that "the Association shall not be debarred from adopting resolutions or taking such action as it deems appropriate in support of academic freedom and of freedom of expression by and within the Association." Rustow was irate that these deletions from the existing constitution meant that "substantive discussion of controversial issues or explicit championship of academic freedom would no longer be countenanced" in the APSA. Rustow (1971, 124) warned that if these provisions were deleted from the APSA constitution, "partisanship would be introduced into the nominating process in its crudest, most personal form" by those political scientists who were complaining the most about injecting politics into the APSA. This partisanship would be reinforced by a new provision that

would require nominations for office other than those of the Nominating Committee to be made by 200 members, as opposed to the current 10 members required in the constitution. Given the generally low attendance at APSA business meetings, Rustow (1971, 125) calculated that even "unanimous support by the assembled membership might not be enough to place on the ballot a second name for a given office." The Wildavsky constitution was clearly designed to be an anti-Caucus constitution. There were many other provisions that would have transferred power from the general membership to a shadowy assembly, while making resolutions adopted at the business meetings "advisory only" and with "no binding force," and excluding members from observing the proceedings of the assembly. Rustow (1971, 126) concluded that adoption of the Wildavsky constitution "would enthrone the power of a tight oligarchy" (see also Fox 1971; CNPS 1970b).

Another of the Caucus's partial successes at the 1970 APSA business meeting was the passage of the so-called Chicano resolutions. The Committee on the Status of Chicanos in the Profession proposed resolutions calling upon "political scientists to pay more professional attention to the needs and aspirations of the Chicano community" and reaffirming that the APSA should expand Chicano participation in the political science profession. The Chicano Caucus, which was supported by the CNPS, sought to merge its own resolutions with the official resolution. However, the Chicano Caucus resolutions explicitly described Mexican people in the United States as an "oppressed minority," stated that the recent East Los Angeles riot was "instigated by the Los Angeles county sheriff," and claimed that Chicano men, women, and children "continue to be harassed by the police." The Council's resolutions were adopted by voice vote, and the Chicano Caucus withdrew its proposed resolutions so that there would be time to consider resolutions proposed by the Women's Caucus (APSA 1971b, 62–63).[10]

The CNPS Executive Committee also hoped to challenge the APSA Council's decision to discontinue designated CNPS panels at future conventions. David Kettler, CNPS chair, submitted a resolution instructing the APSA "to make available to the Caucus for a New Political Science ten panels at the 1971 meetings and at subsequent meetings until and unless it shall be determined by the membership that the Caucus no longer represents an important intellectual development within the discipline" (APSA 1970j, 421). Kettler argued that the Council's December 4–5, 1969, decisions "would liquidate the policy which has given some panels to several groups during the past three years" (APSA 1970j, 421). Kettler emphasized that Caucus panels were playing an important role in the profession

because they addressed "crucial issues overlooked by the official political science" and that official political scientists should accept the idea that "an alternative paradigm of our discipline is in formation" (APSA 1970j, 421).

The CNPS tried to generate support for the Kettler resolution by distributing a flyer that read:

> If you dislike the uncritical collaboration of political scientists with the powers that rule this country and control most of the world's wealth; if you dislike research orthodoxies that can serve no defensible political purpose; if you dislike a system that encourages competitiveness and careerism instead of serious concern with politics, then you should belong to the Caucus for a New Political Science. (CNPS, no date)

The Kettler resolution was near the bottom of the meeting agenda, so it was not brought to the floor for discussion or a vote but instead was referred to the general membership for a mail ballot, where it lost by 1,924 (for) and (4,672) against allowing joint CNPS-sponsored panels in the future. Christian Bay politely challenged this decision with new APSA President Heinz Eulau and received a terse bureaucratic response from Eulau and Evron M. Kirkpatrick citing the APSA Council resolution adopted on December 4–5, 1969, and the recent APSA membership mail ballot vote (Eulau 1971; Kirkpatrick 1971).

In response to this decision, the CNPS Executive Committee returned to its original 1968 format of organizing an independent program to run concurrently with the APSA panels (APSA 1970i, 659; APSA 1971a, 48–49; APSA 1971b, 62–63; Malecki 1970a, 4). However, Christian Bay (1970c, 674–75) came away from the 1970 APSA meeting with "a keen sense of disappointment," and he reports that many Caucus members were suspicious that "there might have been a deliberate plan to avoid that discussion [of CNPS-APSA joint panels]."[11] Thus, Bay (1970c, 674–75) once again floated the idea that "the A.P.S.A. needs the Caucus more than the Caucus needs the A.P.S.A." He argued that the APSA membership was split along generational lines, so "if in the end the Caucus were to choose to conduct their annual meetings, whether nationally or regionally, apart from the A.P.S.A. meetings, the A.P.S.A. would tend to become more of an old people's club and the Caucus more of a young people's movement." Bay (1970c, 674–75) indicated he "should regret both developments, but the former more than the latter" and, thus, the threat of secession was again on the table.

The APSA Nominating Committee, the Caucus for a New Political Science, and the Ad Hoc Committee each nominated a full slate of candidates in 1970 for APSA office, with the Women's Caucus endorsing selected candidates. The Black Caucus was boycotting the APSA convention. The CNPS nominated Hans J. Morgenthau, who was director of the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy at the University of Chicago, to run against Heinz Eulau, who was the candidate put forward by the APSA Nominating Committee and endorsed by Herzberg's Ad Hoc Committee. The Caucus nominated Richard Falk for vice president and endorsed David Spitz and Victoria Shuck, who had been nominated by the APSA Nominating Committee. It nominated Edward S. Malecki for secretary and Ben Stavis for treasurer. The Caucus nominated Emily Card, Ralph Guzman, Marcus Raskin, and Mulford Q. Sibley for APSA Council, while endorsing several of the APSA candidates: David Kettler, Joyce Mitchell, William P. Robinson, and Dankwart A. Rustow (APSA 1971a, 48).

Following Morgenthau's nomination for APSA president, the *Los Angeles Times* ran a front-page story that was headlined: "War Critic Seeks Control of Political Science Association." Morgenthau was quoted as saying that he was running for president of the APSA because it "has avoided the real political issues of the day." He observed that most of what political scientists were teaching in the classroom was "irrelevant" and concentrated mainly on "justifying, embellishing, and elaborating on the political status quo." Morgenthau said, "There exists a discrepancy in what we see existing in American government and we read in textbooks." Morgenthau also reiterated the Caucus's concern that the APSA is "closely linked with government and business interests" through foundations and government funding agencies, and this resulted in political scientists who tended to "justify and rationalize the political status quo" (Shuit 1970, 1). APSA President Karl Deutsch defended the APSA against Morgenthau's criticism by citing Article II of the APSA constitution.

Independent of the Caucus, a group of 23 prominent political scientists wrote an open letter to members of the APSA urging them to cast their ballots for Morgenthau (Arendt et al. 1970).[12] The signatories praised Morgenthau as a scholar whose work had "inspired an entire generation of political scientists," and who was not afraid to speak out "on the urgent issues of the day while drawing a clear distinction between his professional role as a political scientist and his civic duty as an American." The letter's signatories suggested that Morgenthau "should long since have been elected President of the Association" and "the failure to elect him President in the past is a reflection upon our former nominating proce-

dures" (Arendt et al. 1970). Richard Falk, the CNPS vice presidential nominee, claimed that a major part of the explanation for this oversight is that the APSA was increasingly dominated by "pseudo-scientists," who were narrowly focused on statistical and behavioral analysis (Roberts 1970, 24).

As tensions escalated between the CNPS and the APSA, the Caucus and its independent supporters were also challenged in 1970 by a new group—the Committee for a Responsible Political Science (CRPS), which was cochaired by Warren E. Miller and Austin Ranney (1970).[13] A CRPS letter to APSA members called attention to Morgenthau's statements in the *Los Angeles Times* and suggested "the issue he raises goes to the heart of our life as a profession and organization. We believe that the Association should continue to avoid any official definition of intellectual orthodoxy. Even more, we must not attempt to translate individual political partisanship into unified action in the name of the whole Association." However, the CRPS went further in accusing Morgenthau of making "public slurs on what most political science teachers are attempting to do in their classrooms" but having done nothing to advance teaching or research while serving as APSA vice president only two years earlier (Miller and Ranney 1970). In contrast, the CRPS praised Heinz Eulau for a strong "record of past service to the profession. . . . Few political scientists, and certainly not the Caucus candidate, can match Professor Eulau's record of service to his colleagues" (Miller and Ranney 1970).

The Ad Hoc Committee also weighed in on the 1970 election by declaring that the previous year's election proved that "a large majority" of political scientists believed that the APSA "should remain a non-partisan professional organization based on shared scholarly concerns with the study and teaching of politics" (Herzberg 1970). In contrast to this widely held conviction, the Ad Hoc Committee accused the CNPS of nominating a slate of candidates who would "transform the Association into a political action group" (Herzberg 1970). Moreover, the Ad Hoc Committee warned political scientists not to be fooled by the Caucus's new campaign strategy of adopting "a new 'low profile' with the Caucus presenting itself as a group of moderate reformers" (Herzberg 1970). The letter went on to cite examples of alleged discrepancies between the appearance and reality of the Caucus's electoral objectives.

Morgenthau's campaign was unsuccessful, but it closed the gap between the Caucus candidate and the APSA candidate by nearly 9 percentage points, as he won 42.9% of the votes compared to 57.1% for Eulau (AAA 1971; Taylor and Tullock 1971, 354; APSA 1971j). Moreover, the Caucus successfully increased its representation on the APSA Council. Victoria

Shuck, who was elected vice president, had been endorsed by the CNPS and the Women's Caucus, although she was not per se on the Caucus slate. William Robinson, Dankwart A. Rustow, and Joyce Mitchell were elected to the Council as part of the Caucus slate, although these candidates had also been nominated by the APSA Nominations Committee (APSA 1971a). In fact, in a significant concession to the Caucus, four of the APSA's eight nominees were members of the Caucus slate (Kettler, Mitchell, Rustow, and Robinson) as were Jewell Prestage and Henry Kariel, who had been elected the previous year.

Whither the Caucus?

Following the Los Angeles meetings of the CNPS, David Kettler (1970c) was "not exactly jumping for joy" over the "shenanigans at the Caucus meeting." He "couldn't stand the parliamentary maneuvering around the [Wildavsky] Constitution," and he was disheartened by the shelving of his proposal to reinstate Caucus panels at the APSA meetings. Kettler was now so pessimistic about the APSA that he concluded "the phase of Caucus activity focused on the Business Meeting of the APSA must be brought to an end—perhaps the whole operation must be redefined." Kettler decided he had fulfilled his last obligations to the Caucus after serving as chair (1969–70), writing statements of support for the 1970 Caucus resolutions, and running for APSA Council. Kettler (1970c) decided he "ought to stay out of things for a year or so because there is something unpleasant about the spectacle of past chairmen and machers trying to keep things on the course they had ordained for them."

While disappointed over the outcome of the 1970 APSA and CNPS meetings, Kettler was nevertheless hopeful that a different generation of leadership might emerge from the Los Angeles events. Despite being ousted from office by the Western Caucus for a New Political Science, Kettler (1970c) was impressed that "the California people who now have a majority on the executive do not, contrary to some impressions, represent a particularly 'extreme' sort of 'radicalism.'" Quite the contrary, Kettler (1970c) pointed out: "The strong language at the membership meeting came from people [like Alan Wolfe] who disassociated themselves from the Caucus altogether." Moreover, even though Kettler's proposal to overturn the APSA Council decision to disallow Caucus and other unaffiliated groups to sponsor panels at APSA meetings never came to a vote, Kettler boasted that he "wrangled a deal for next year with Sidney Verba [APSA

program chair] which I consider better in some ways."[14] The "deal" was to include Peter Bachrach on the APSA Program Committee and to allow him to organize a group of panels under the heading "Political Science and the Sociological Imagination."[15] Kettler had also joined with John Pocock to allow sponsored panels by the newly formed Conference for the Study of Political Thought. However, after moving to the newly established Trent University in Canada, Kettler "backed off" from the Caucus because he "did not believe that CNPS should be an organization of aggrieved faculty but an agency for change in the discipline," and he "stopped attending American political science meetings altogether for twenty years."[16]

Edward Malecki, who had been elected CNPS chair (1970–71) during the tumultuous Los Angeles convention, was more optimistic about the future of the Caucus. The 1970 APSA election resulted in six Caucus-endorsed candidates being elected to the 23-member APSA Council. Malecki (1970a, 1) observed that "as a result of the past two elections, the Caucus has an edge into the previously monolithic governing structure of the APSA." However, in neither election did any "straight Caucus" candidate win against an APSA nominee. Thus, Malecki (1970a, 2) concluded, "It is also clear that a Caucus endorsement by itself is not sufficient for winning an election." Malecki (1970a, 3–4) estimated it would be three to four years before Caucus candidates could win without a joint APSA endorsement, but he also emphasized that "the individual scholar's reputation has an impact on the voting patterns," as was evident in the fact that Hans Morgenthau, Richard Falk, and Mulford Q. Sibley captured several percentage points more in votes than other Caucus candidates.

On the basis of this improving vote total, Malecki (1970a, 3) defended a continuation of Caucus participation in APSA elections, conference panels, business meetings, and other APSA activities, which he argued were key to confronting the values "that have become all too dominant within the APSA. . . . a single professional standard [behavioralism]; a unitary motivation [academic status seeking]; and, a narrowing of the purposes of the Association [making the Association an efficient bureaucracy dispensing services for the upwardly mobile]." Nevertheless, Malecki (1970a, 3) was disturbed by what he called "the utter duplicity of key leaders of the discipline," particularly the Ad Hoc Committee and the Committee for a Responsible Political Science, who had waged a personal smear campaign against Morgenthau.[17] Malecki (1970a, 3) was especially incensed by charges that Morgenthau wanted "to turn the APSA into a political action group to any greater extent than it has already been turned to such purposes." He called this claim "ludicrous" and held it up as

"indicative of the lengths to which some established figures will go . . . when confronted by a strong threat to their power." Malecki considered these attacks nothing more than "political hatchet-jobs undertaken by establishment figures of the discipline," and these attacks signaled the likelihood of more aggressive attacks on the Caucus as its support increased within the APSA (Malecki and Smith 1971a, 2). In contrast to these false assertions about CNPS, Malecki pointed out that "the key aim of the Caucus is an open discipline; a discipline open to all ideas and to all people regardless of race, religion, ethnicity, sex, academic views, or political commitments." To achieve this goal, Malecki (1970a, 3) argued that the Caucus would have to pursue a multipronged strategy to challenge the myth that political science is "a pure science of politics which transcends existing social institutions and cultural values."

Nevertheless, a growing and intense dissatisfaction with the APSA surfaced at the 1970 CNPS business meetings, and this led some members to challenge the optimism of Caucus leadership. In *The Caucus Papers*, Wolfe (1970, 303) observed that radical intellectuals in many of the social science disciplines had pursued two strategies that while "initially essential" had "now reached the point where at least in political science they are counterproductive." These strategies were muckraking within the discipline and professional organization within its disciplinary association.

In political science, muckraking included the numerous critiques of behavioralism and pluralism, the critiques of the APSA and the professional mystique, and documenting the often subtle but still repressive limits to academic freedom within the American university. Wolfe (1970, 303) observed that after three years of muckraking "all of these activities . . . are fun. All of them, in addition, have become tiring." Wolfe's (1970, 303) assessment of the current situation was that "there is only so much rationality within the universities and the academic professions" so that in the end rational arguments designed to point out the intellectual limitations of the discipline and political flaws in its organization will persuade only a small number of people to join the Caucus for a New Political Science—either intellectually or politically. Quite the contrary, it was the nature of any organization to develop ingenious rationalizations to deflect those critiques (e.g., Herzberg's charges of anti-professionalism), or when challenged by raw political organization to respond in kind (e.g., the Ad Hoc Committee). Consequently, Wolfe (1970, 304) concluded there was "a point in the development of insurgent groups within academic disciplines where they have to stop being internally critical of the practices and content of their profession and turn their attention to more important things."

Wolfe (1970a) urged the CNPS and its individual members to shift their attention away from challenging the profession to more productive activities such as communicating directly with the general public or organizing neighborhoods and communities.

A second activity being pursued by insurgents in the social sciences was organizing within the academic professions for radical ends. Wolfe again concluded that organizing inside the APSA was a waste of time. First, he acknowledged that radicals would always constitute a minority within the political science discipline, so in the long run what difference would it make to have a Caucus member on the APSA Council or a Caucus member on the *APSR*'s editorial board? Organizing within the APSA would just lead to more muckraking for the sake of more muckraking, but it would never yield substantial political gains or substantial change in the content of the *APSR*. Second, the new political science had defined itself intellectually as a critique of behavioralism and pluralism, while politically it was articulating its organizational aims in terms of traditional liberal values, such as academic freedom, transparency, and democratic representation. In this respect, Wolfe (1970, 305) considered it worth noting that the original critiques of behavioralism had come from Straussians and other political philosophers, while the most widely accepted critique of pluralism had been that of interest group liberals, most of whom "were excellent scholars, but who could hardly be considered political radicals" (e.g., McConnell, Lowi). In the short run, however, Wolfe acknowledged that Lowi would probably exert more influence on the discipline than Miliband, so continuing the critique of pluralism did not necessarily lead one beyond corporate liberalism.

Thus, what were the next steps for the Caucus for a New Political Science? First, Wolfe suggested that the CNPS recognize that any hope of transforming the political science discipline or capturing its professional association was a pipe dream. Wolfe worried that dissipating members' energies on these false promises would lead to cynical passivity after too many harsh defeats. The best the CNPS could hope to achieve within the APSA, and within the wider profession, was to make universities and the social science disciplines "places where we can do our work, including, of course, work between teachers and students" (Wolfe 1970, 306). In fact, many in the Caucus began asking how to go about teaching a new political science and how to pursue a politics of higher education that would create protected spaces for such teaching (Bay 1972a; Lowi 1972; Kariel 1972; Ollman 1976, 1978a; Kesselman 1979). An important part of this strategy was the publication by Caucus members of new introductory textbooks on

American government, including *Political Analysis: An Unorthodox Approach* (1972) by Alan Wolfe and Charles A. McCoy, Michael Parenti's wildly successful *Democracy for the Few* (1974a), Edward S. Greenberg's *American Political System: A Radical Approach* (1977), and Theodore Mills Norton and Bertell Ollman's *Studies in Socialist Pedagogy* (1978).

Second, Wolfe proposed that insurgent political scientists join with their more numerous colleagues in disciplines such as sociology and history, and with colleagues in other nations, to establish a new flagship journal and to create new interdisciplinary professional associations of radical scholars. The purpose of a new journal was to provide a platform for the new political science unhindered by the ideological and methodological restrictions of mainstream journals. What Wolfe had in mind was a genuinely interdisciplinary coalition that would be established outside the existing disciplines. Wolfe pointed to the Socialist Scholars Conference, which was first convened in 1965 as an example of the type of interdisciplinary association he had in mind. This type of interdisciplinary association, with its own flagship journal, might generate the critical mass to confront existing disciplinary associations with a dual power configuration (Surkin and Wolfe 1969, 61; cf. Nicolaus 1969). On the other hand, Wolfe (1969, 372) predicted correctly that "if reforms are instituted while the same political science I have described is adhered to, nothing will be gained. Interest will temporarily pick up; business meetings will become more lively for a while . . . candidates will run against one another; but eventually things will be pretty much the same." Wolfe did not run on the CNPS slate after running for APSA vice president in 1969. He resigned from the Caucus in 1971 (Wolfe 1971).

Wolfe's criticism of the Caucus drew a rejoinder from Lewis Lipsitz (1971, 539), who accused Wolfe of "abandoning common sense." Lipsitz (1971, 539) argued that Wolfe's position on the Caucus had "an overwhelming air of unreality" because it assumed that an organization of liberal-left scholars should immediately "become related to the left movement" by organizing among students and local communities. This led Wolfe to dismiss the Caucus's successes as misdirected failures and to ignore the fact that many in the Caucus were individually "relating to the left" in various ways while remaining active in the Caucus. Moreover, Lipsitz pointed out that the Caucus had clearly articulated goals in its 1969 platform and had received thousands of votes from APSA members in two elections. Lipsitz also chastised Wolfe for dismissing the APSA as a "conservative haunt," when the available date proved that most political scientists identified as liberals (58%) or leftists (13.8%) (Ladd and Lipset 1971). Lipsitz (1971, 539)

conceded that political scientists were less radical than sociologists, anthropologists, and philosophers, but the picture "isn't as bleak as Wolfe makes out."

In the end, the Caucus's partial failures did not require any great theoretical analysis because its "essential problem was the most mundane of all political problems: organization." Lipsitz argued that the Caucus had sound goals and that the idea of organizing within the APSA made sense because other political scientists were the targeted constituency. Outside the APSA, the Caucus "would probably have been a minor splinter group." He insisted that "the idea of contesting elections also seemed to be a useful educational device, if nothing else. BUT, we never got properly organized to do the job." Thus, Lipsitz (1971, 539) was convinced that "the failure of the Caucus rests in large part on its inability to mobilize the potential resources it had, both at conventions and in the mail ballot elections." This failure was testimony to the "lack of political savvy," "naïve moralism, and the will-to-lose so common among dissenters."

Malecki and Ben Smith (1971a, 1), a colleague of Malecki's at CSULA, extended the debate with an essay addressing the future of the Caucus after the frustrations of the 1970 business meeting, as exemplified by Wolfe's criticisms. The essay was directed mainly at the considerable number of Caucus members who felt the APSA was beyond reform and who thought an independent association might better serve the purpose of the Caucus.[18] In fact, by this time, a small group of graduate students had already splintered off from the CNPS to form the Marxist-oriented Radical Students for Politics. Despite the appearance of this splinter group, Malecki and Smith (1971a, 1) started from the premise that "there was something of a consensus among the 300 persons who attended the Caucus meeting in September on confronting the APSA establishment one more time before considering further the formation of a counter association." This question had become more salient since the 1970 convention after it was learned that the Kettler amendment to restore joint APSA-CNPS panels had been defeated in the mail ballot, while APSA seemed on the verge of adopting a new, repressive Wildavsky constitution.[19] Malecki and Smith (1971b, 1) were also bemused by the idea that "that APSA . . . will select and promote from among the dissenting groups some who will participate in APSA panels. . . . Those scholars who disagree with the main drift of the discipline are now to be judged in the competence of their disbelief by those they disbelieve."

Malecki and Smith continued to dismiss allegations that CNPS was politicizing the APSA because insofar as the APSA was involved in the

authoritative allocation of values for the profession, it was absurd to pretend that the APSA was not already, by Easton's definition, a political institution. However, Malecki and Smith reiterated the concern articulated earlier by David Kettler that professional repression was now a major political problem in the academy and the profession. The threat to academic freedom and professional autonomy did not emanate from the state so much as from one's own colleagues in the university and the political science profession. Malecki and Smith (1971a, 2) warned that "there is a problem . . . finding a place *within* the political science profession for research and discussion of questions of interest to those on the Left (or Right) and to those whose approaches, methods, and concepts in the study of politics differ substantially from the prevailing preconceptions within the sub-areas of the discipline." Should this trend continue and should the CNPS not make a significant electoral breakthrough in the near future, Malecki and Smith laid out several possible alternatives for the future of the Caucus. Malecki and Smith's (1971a, 4–5) preferred option, if the CNPS were to secede from APSA, was to do so only if CNPS joined forces with sociologists, economists, anthropologists, historians, and psychologists to form a new interdisciplinary professional association of radical scholars, but one that did not impose any ideological litmus test for membership. As Wolfe had argued earlier, an interdisciplinary association of this breadth and magnitude would be able to challenge the established disciplinary associations, while each of the radical caucuses alone would likely remain marginalized minorities within its discipline. The CNPS Executive Committee formally approved this idea and authorized Malecki to begin discussions with other critical and radical professional associations. Malecki (2024b) joined the Union of Radical Political Economics and the Marxist section of the American Sociological Association, but "neither group expressed interest in creating a broader radical association."[20]

Meanwhile, APSA President-Elect Heinz Eulau lost no time in launching a counterattack against the Caucus at a meeting of the APSA Council. At its June 7–8, 1971, meeting, Eulau presented members with a "Prolegomenon to a Discussion of APSA Priorities" (APSA 1971h, 546).[21] Eulau declared that the APSA is "neither a labor union nor a trade association . . . we are in no position to bargain collectively, or as an association, to make demands on the universities." Thus, he advised members of the Association who were concerned about the social and economic welfare of its members and who wished to enter into a trade union relationship with their university to join the American Federation of Teachers or similar organizations. Likewise, Eulau was fed up with discussions in the APSA

about academic freedom and professional repression. He urged anyone who was concerned about these issues to join the American Association of University Professors. Finally, Eulau touched on the matter he said was "closest to my heart," which was to emphasize that the Association is

> not set up or organized for political action or the propagation of political points of view. . . . My objection to political action groups in the Association is not that they may have certain aims, some of which I probably share, but that they seek to use and, I think, misuse the Association as an instrument for the achievement of their political aims. (APSA 1971h, 546)

Sidney Verba, the 1971 program chair, continued the ideological counteroffensive when he announced the preliminary program for the 1971 APSA annual meeting. Verba (1971, 155) justified and defended the APSA's decision to exclude panels by organized groups by first calling attention to the fact that

> the Program Committee has been operating under a new rule of the Council of the Association barring the delegation of panels to other groups outside of the Program Committee. There are no panels organized by the Caucus for a New Political Science, the Conference for a Democratic Politics, the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, or any other group—except for official committees of the Association.

Verba (1971, 155) realized that this decision would renew criticism of the annual meeting as one dominated by an Establishment, and he conceded that "insofar as membership of the program committee makes one, by definition, a member of the establishment, the criticism cannot be refuted." However, Verba (1971, 155) denied that the existence of an APSA Establishment "suggests bias and old boy networks," although he conceded that the modal participant was "from the University of Michigan with a Yale Ph.D." or a member of "the same species with a Berkeley or Harvard or Chicago or some such place thrown in." Instead, this "overrepresentation" of the so-called top departments was evidence of "the selectivity that goes on in choosing faculty at various schools and the self-selection in terms of motivation of those who wind up at such schools" (Verba 1971, 155). In other words, the APSA was an intellectual meritocracy and not a political oligarchy.

Despite a concerted effort by individuals such as Deutsch, Eulau, Wildavsky, Huntington, Polsby, and Ranney to freeze the CNPS out of APSA, the Caucus still managed to offer its full slate of 12 panels at the 1971 APSA meeting, although they took place outside the regular program. Furthermore, Verba kept his word to David Kettler, as Peter Bachrach organized five more panels under the heading of "Political Science and the Sociological Imagination" that were listed in the APSA program (APSA 1971f). In addition to its 17 panels, the CNPS again nominated a full slate of candidates for APSA office.

Following the Caucus's strong showing in the 1970 APSA elections, the APSA Nominating Committee agreed to nominate Christian Bay for the APSA Council in 1971, and with official support, he was the only CNPS nominee to win a position in that election. Bay was also elected CNPS chair the same year. However, because the Caucus did not appear in the official program, Bay (1971c, 593) wrote to APSA members to inform them that "the Caucus for a New Political Science, although it has been excluded from participation in the official program of our annual meetings, nevertheless is alive and well, and expects to continue to grow." The 1971 APSA convention was comparatively uneventful except for a renewed debate about the Wildavsky constitution, which after a general discussion was defeated by a vote of 172 against and 59 in favor. As it did not meet the 40% threshold required for a mail ballot vote, the new constitution was declared not to be adopted, and this heralded a significant victory for the Caucus (APSA 1971e).

The CNPS nominated another full slate of candidates for APSA office in 1971, including Richard Falk for president; Theodore Becker, Carlos Munoz (University of California, Irvine), and H. Mark Roelofs for vice president; Judith May for secretary; and Charles J. Fox for treasurer. For APSA Council, the Caucus nominated Christian Bay, Kenneth Dolbeare, Dorothy Buckton James, Judson L. James, Lewis Lipsitz, James F. Petras, Raymond Rocco, and Irene Tinker. H. Mark Roelofs, Charles J. Fox, Christian Bay, Dorothy James, Judson James, and Irene Tinker were coendorsed by the Women's Caucus. Christian Bay and Richard Falk (1971) drafted "A Statement in Support of the Caucus Slate," which declared that the Caucus for a New Political Science was "a coalition of APSA members who share a profound dissatisfaction with our association's *de facto* alliance with the American economic and political establishment, against its many victims, at home and abroad." The statement emphasized that "the Caucus aims at a gradual transformation of the roles of political scientists" and that "as Caucus members all of us are working within the APSA rules

for the purpose of changing them" (Bay and Falk 1971). The statement acknowledged that some individual supporters may belong to movements or organizations with more radical or revolutionary strategies, but the Caucus itself was concerned primarily with promoting a new political science that was relevant to the urgent problems of human survival.

Falk (1973–74) would later issue a separate document, "Caucus Goals and Tactics," that encouraged members to work harder because the previous year's impressive electoral outcome had been achieved "with virtually no output of effort nor input of resources." Falk was convinced that with greater effort the CNPS could gain control over the APSA and *APSR* within the next three years. However, Falk (1973–74) emphasized that working harder meant that Caucus supporters would need to undertake a "concerted effort to organize a nucleus of people who will devote time and energy, both to expanding our base of support and to fashioning an intellectual and normative consensus that allows for diversity and yet embodies a new conception as to the vocation of political scientists." Falk indicated that he wanted to form a broad coalition with the other caucuses organized by women, Blacks, Chicanos, and Third World peoples, as well as with radical caucuses in the other social sciences and humanities. In terms of substantive issues, Falk (1973/74) wanted "to open up the APSA as a forum to discuss the great normative issues of the day bearing on equality, violence, participation, environmental quality, war and peace, community, dignity, liberation, and revolution."[22]

Donald G. Herzberg (1971b) and the Ad Hoc Committee once again endorsed the APSA slate of candidates, although it warned political scientists that Christian Bay, who had been nominated for the Council by the APSA Nominating Committee,[23] "is also Chairman of the Caucus for a New Political Science." Bay's (1971b) "Statement of Views" that year said that he "had a vision of a new political science committed to Justice as well as to Truth. I hope our profession will someday become preponderantly critical of, and resisting, when possible, callous abuse of governmental and private economic power." The Ad Hoc Committee's campaign letter to APSA members again claimed that "the Caucus for a New Political Science views the Association as an instrument for achieving its political goals. If elected, the slate of officers nominated by the Caucus could be counted on to use the Association to achieve their divisive political objectives." In contrast, the Ad Hoc Committee and the other APSA nominees pledged "to preserve the professional orientation of the APSA, to prevent its being transformed into a pressure group, and to enlarge the role of APSA members in the decisions of the Association" (Herzberg 1971b).

Falk captured 41.9% of the vote for APSA president and, thus, moved the Caucus even closer to winning the presidency, but Christian Bay was the only Caucus candidate elected to office in 1971 (APSA 1972a).

Christian Bay was simultaneously elected chair of CNPS (1971–72) following Malecki's one-year term as CNPS chair, so leadership of the Caucus gravitated back to the East Coast. Kettler (1971) took Bay's election as one last opportunity to express his displeasure with Wolfe's performances at the 1969 and 1970 APSA conventions, and he wrote to Bay that "we have been reading, in *Politics and Society* and elsewhere, a fair amount of confessional literature, in which writers presume to identify the Caucus with their own illusions of a few years ago, in order to implicate it in their disillusionment." Kettler (1971) urged Bay to not be swayed by this faction of the Caucus and to remain committed "to the basic themes of Caucus statements and to the basic pattern of Caucus actions," which he thought established "a manageable complex of tasks." These tasks, according to Kettler (1971), consisted of four key activities:

1. To identify the structural bias of American political science as a discipline and thereby challenge the practical supremacy of a dominant ideology within academia;
2. To provide a forum and create a critical audience for theoretical work which deviates from the dominant ideology;
3. To facilitate resistance against the power which stifles or distorts critical work in political science; and
4. To challenge the political science discipline's collaboration with oppressive political projects and processes by supporting the women's, black, and chicano groups in the profession, among others.

Kettler did not want to impose an orthodoxy on the Caucus, and he was prepared to entertain "important and legitimate disagreements" within the Caucus over how to attain these objectives, but he was also concerned that some Caucus members resorted to overblown rhetoric when confronting colleagues within the Caucus. He argued that disagreements over tactics "ought not to be assigned some cosmic theoretical significance, so that opponents must be unmasked as traitors to the revolution or dupes of the exploiters."[24] However, as a concession to activists like Wolfe, Kettler (1971) wondered if it might not be worthwhile to start engaging "in some appropriate political action in conjunction with the panels at the APSA meetings," as he felt "the counter-resistance has managed to depoliticize these pretty effectively" over the last three years.

After his letter to Bay, Kettler (2013a) ceased to be active in the Caucus, partly because he moved to Canada, but also because he felt his time was better spent on writing new political science than on talking about it at business meetings. Kettler had decided to pursue Lowi's call for an intellectual revolution instead of an organizational revolt. On June 10, 1972, Kettler (1972) wrote to Christian Bay informing him that "I am firmly convinced that those of us who are no longer beginners must not take an active role in this struggle unless we are also producing good work. . . . I feel I must put up or shut up," and for Kettler that meant publishing new political science.[25] The demands of publishing had pushed aside time for activism, and it proved too much to do both at the same time.

Kettler was not the only new political scientist struggling with what it meant to be a new political scientist. CNPS members began to openly ask what it meant to do new political science beyond the mere critique of behavioralism and pluralism. An important early context of this confusion was that Marxism did not achieve prominence within the political science discipline until a decade after it had done so in cognate disciplines, such as economics, sociology, history, and philosophy, and when it did emerge, it was a much weaker current of thought than in those other disciplines. Mark Kesselman (1982b, 82–83) attributes Marxism's late arrival to political science to the fact that "Marx engaged in little systematic analysis of the formal sphere of politics and the state" and, thus, left political scientists with much less to work with than he bequeathed to economists, historians, philosophers, and sociologists.[26] Consequently, it was not until the middle to late 1970s, following the Poulantzas-Miliband debate (Barrow 2002), that a nucleus of concepts and theory began to emerge in the United States that could facilitate the development of a specifically Marxist political science, that is, a theory of the capitalist state (Barrow 1993).

Moreover, while the founding members of CNPS demanded a new political science, most of its original founders were not inclined toward Marxism or any of the post-ideologies that had yet to gain currency outside of European intellectual circles. CNPS members uniformly denounced "the conservatism" of the political science profession—by which they meant its attachment to the corporate-liberal state—but there were numerous intellectual fissures within the Caucus from its inception. The Caucus also quickly evolved beyond its origins as it picked up issues and members over time, but due to this rapid development there were always multiple and unresolved divisions within the Caucus.

This identity crisis became so acute that the problem of what constituted a new political science resulted in the fall 1971 issue of the Caucus newsletter being devoted mainly to presenting the CNPS Executive Com-

mittee's views of what it would mean to do new political science. However, the intellectual question posed to the CNPS Executive Committee was deflected into problems of organization. Justine Mann (Georgia Southern University) complained that attending regular panels at the APSA conventions was "worse than useless," and she could not remember the last time she "really read an issue of the *APSR*." Thus, Mann hoped the Caucus would challenge the existing association journals with its own journal to reestablish "meaningful dialogue among political scientists" (CNPS 1971, 1).

Philippa Strum (Rutgers University) lamented that "the political science profession today appears to be controlled by people who don't like politics. They are delighted to play with numbers and theoretical approaches, but they are distressed by and incapable of dealing with the human element, which includes the problem of ethics and values. What is therefore needed is an organization that will restore politics to political science. This means recognizing that politics cannot and should not be value-free" (CNPS 1971, 2). In a similar vein, Stephen M. Sachs (Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis) argued that the main goal of the Caucus should be "a more open discipline and a more just society" (CNPS 1971, 2). To achieve these goals, H. Mark Roelofs considered it essential for the Caucus to have a serious program of panels at the APSA meetings to establish that it is an "intellectual movement" within the discipline, rather than a "political faction" within the profession (CNPS 1971, 3). However, Gerald Houseman (Indiana University at Fort Wayne) was doubtful whether winning APSA offices or sponsoring panels at the APSA convention "will result in broad or general acceptance of Caucus principles." Houseman was among the earliest members to call for the Caucus to "consider a national convention of its own," rather than "meeting in the shadow of the APSA convention" (CNPS 1971, 3). Similarly, William Hallert (American University) argued that the most pressing issue for the Caucus was whether or not to remain within the APSA. However, Hallert suggested that regardless of its future organizational form, the "great debate" on methodology "must not serve as a point of contention within the Caucus" because "methodology does not have to affect relevance," and relevance was the defining ideological purpose of CNPS (CNPS 1971, 6). Thus, every potential controversial position within the CNPS had a proponent on the Executive Committee.

Moreover, despite the preferences of most CNPS leaders, there was an organizational divide between associationists and counter-associationists: namely, those who wanted to reform or capture the APSA as had occurred

in the Modern Language Association (MLA) and the Organization of American Historians (OAH),[27] and those who wanted to splinter from the APSA and form a counter-association modeled after the Union of Radical Political Economics. The associationists held the majority, so the new political science insurgency did not initially take the form of a counter-association as occurred in economics, sociology, and philosophy. However, this also meant that instead of laying the groundwork for a counter-association similar to those that emerged in economics, sociology, and philosophy, many of the Caucus's founders were committed to the idea that they could quickly achieve electoral victories such as those won in the OAH and MLA, where self-declared Marxists had been elected to the presidencies of those associations. Indeed, for a while (until 1974), this view was highly plausible and realistic given the Caucus's surging electoral fortunes during the early 1970s.

Christian Bay expressed his frustration with the current state of affairs in a "Chairman's Report" distributed to CNPS members in June 1972, which echoed Lipsitz's earlier remonstrance. Bay identified a persistent problem that would plague the Caucus throughout its subsequent history. It was an organization that only convened once a year at the APSA convention but relied on a small group of dedicated activists to sustain it for the other 51 weeks of the year. Bay (1972f) wrote:

> With my year as a chairman of the Caucus soon ended, a brief report to the membership is in order. I will begin with what's wrong with you people: there are not nearly enough of you. Not enough of you pay your dues and communicate with us *between* our annual meetings. If we had an active membership equal to the number of consistent voters for Caucus candidates, we would soon be able to bring about a very different kind of APSA.

Bay (1972g) was convinced that "we are considerably stronger now than at this time last year," but he was also concerned that the Caucus was not clear about its principal objectives and that it had "organizational problems." Bay (1972f) thought that most members saw the organization "as a *caucus* within a professional organization" that wanted to democratize the APSA and create "a climate of politically responsible political science. We want to confront the APSA establishment, and eventually bring about its downfall. We want to promote a political science that serves, not the U.S. government or the privileges of the senior professoriate in our

universities, but the public interest: human needs, justice, human rights, man's survival into the 21st century. We want a *critical* political science, committed to radical inquiry, and to a more humane and safer world."

In fact, Bay (1972b, 92) argued "the very idea that professional associations should *not* take political stands" was "part of the liberal make-believe that serves to protect this country against winds of change, in the interest of the most over-privileged class the world has ever seen." He argued that the profession's claim to value neutrality played a significant role in sustaining the myth of liberal pluralism. This myth was that liberal societies rest on free political discourse and a competitive market of ideas. Bay (1972b, 92) argued, however, that competition between ideas was "effectively closed off as an avenue toward changing the established system." The marketplace of ideas was more like a liberal-conservative duopoly than a competitive free market.

Bay (1972b, 94) insisted that "the continuing horrors of the American warfare against the Indochinese peoples and through other local proxy regimes against other oppressed peoples, have become too much to live with . . . the Pentagon now has become a blight on mankind." He (1972b, 94) also pointed to "the continuing disparities between rich and poor in the United States, and most explosively between whites and blacks" as a social problem that "becomes more starkly visible and more bitterly resented every recent year." Thus, Bay (1972b, 94) was now convinced that "the make believe of democratic pluralism and patriotic idealism is wearing off" on the populations of the Western liberal democracies.

In this context, Bay (1972b, 95) suggested it was time "to shed the notion that professional associations should refrain from taking political stands." He well understood that corporate and state elites would resent any uninvited "meddling" in politics by professional political scientists. Nevertheless, Bay insisted that professional associations needed to accept professional responsibility for their passivity and acquiescence in the face of a "monstrously unjust war" and poverty in the shadow of affluence. Bay (1972b, 95) argued that professional political scientists could live up to their professional responsibilities by exposing "frauds and cruelties, and by championing the public interest, especially in areas in which we have, as professionals, more experience or insight than the average group of our compatriots."

Bay issued his appeal after three consecutive elections in what amounted to a new multiparty system in the APSA—Nominating Committee, CNPS, and Ad Hoc Committee—which also included regular endorsements by the newly formed Women's Caucus and Black Caucus.

In this context, a veritable cottage industry sprang into being as behavioral political scientists put their tools to work analyzing voting patterns in APSA elections. The studies found remarkably little straight ticket voting among APSA members (Mueller 1970; Taylor and Tullock 1971; Grofman 1972). Consequently, an analysis of the 1971 election by Bernard Grofman (1972, 282) concluded "that given present voting patterns," CNPS nominees could never be elected unless they were simultaneously endorsed by either the APSA Nominating Committee or the Ad Hoc Committee. Consequently, Grofman (1972, 283) advised the political science establishment that "as long as the Ad Hoc Committee and APSA combine forces, it would appear that the Caucus can be frozen out, except for such nominees as are 'given' it by the APSA Nominating Committee."[28] In other words, Grofman was proposing a center-right coalition government as a way to permanently exclude the Left from representation in the APSA.

The Battle Lines Harden

When Heinz Eulau was APSA president (1971–72), CNPS panels were again excluded from the 1972 regular conference program, although they did receive a "courtesy listing" in *PS* prior to the convention (APSA 1972b, 107–66).[29] In addition, CNPS panels were held off-site at the Institute for Policy Studies (Washington, DC), rather than at the Washington Hilton Hotel, the official site of the convention (Bay 1972e). The Caucus sponsored what may have been the first ever APSA panel on "Marxism and Political Science," with James F. Petras (Pennsylvania State University), Bertell Ollman (New York University), Isaac Balbus (Princeton University), and Joseph O'Malley (Marquette University) (APSA 1972c). Moreover, in a prescient window onto the future, Dwaine Marvick (UCLA), the 1972 APSA program chair had suggested that in the future, APSA should consider following "the practice of sister disciplines by creating a number of permanent 'sections,' each of which is charged with planning a major part of the annual program" (APSA 1971c, 559).[30]

The 1972 APSA business meeting had only one Caucus item on the agenda other than nominations for APSA office. Christian Bay introduced a resolution to the APSA Council requiring the APSA to reestablish its recently abolished Committee on Academic Freedom. The resolution warned that the "climate of intimidation keeps getting worse" on university campuses and, consequently, the APSA should examine "the AAUP's definition of academic freedom, with a view to clarifying and improving

on the principles and practices of academic freedom in our profession." H. Mark Roelofs was allowed to address the Council regarding the proposed resolution, and he argued that relying on the AAUP to safeguard the academic freedom of political scientists was a mistake, because the AAUP was "too legalistic" and "not sufficiently political" (APSA 1973c, 43–44). As Roelofs correctly understood, academic freedom is not a legal or constitutionally protected right of faculty, but a political relationship with university administrations and, therefore, one based on class and professional power. Roelof's view of the AAUP was that it "fiddled and dittled and wondered" over its definition of academic freedom even as obvious cases of academic repression were multiplying on US campuses, including cases of ideologically or politically motivated repression against political scientists (quoted in APSA 1973c, 44).

Phil Ryan (1973) identified Angela Davis, Michael Parenti, and Samuel Popkin as academic freedom cases that had recently captured "the attention of most American political scientists as well as the press" (see Parenti 2010). The CNPS repeatedly challenged the APSA and its Committee on Professional Ethics and Academic Freedom for having "done nothing" on the Popkin case (CNPS 1973b, 6–7).[31] The Council recommended against adopting the Bay resolution by a vote of 18–4, with nearly all support coming from three Caucus representatives present at the meeting (Bay, Robinson, Rustow). When the resolution to reestablish the Committee on Academic Freedom was brought to the floor of the 1972 APSA business meeting, it was defeated by a vote of 62 in favor and 77 opposed (APSA 1973a, 48–49).

The CNPS again nominated a full slate of candidates for APSA office in 1972, which pitted Peter Bachrach (Temple University) against Avery Leiserson (Vanderbilt University).[32] In a stunning near victory, Bachrach captured 49.5% of the vote for APSA president. Bachrach was within 59 votes of winning the presidency (3,265 to 3,206) out of a total of 6,471 votes cast in the 1972 election. The vote was so close that a recount was requested by Peter Bachrach and Christian Bay, although the recount produced no change in the outcomes and was certified by the American Arbitration Association (APSA 1973b, 54). Bay and Roelofs were elected to the APSA Council, but Bertell Ollman (2017a) recounts that "it brought tears to my eyes in recognition of how close we were to bringing off what would have been one of the biggest radical success stories of the century."

Following this near victory, Christian Bay began raising questions about APSA oversight of the electoral process because the APSA Elections Committee, appointed by the president, had made significant procedural

errors in the last two elections. Bay (1972h) wrote to Robert E. Ward, APSA president (and member of the Ad Hoc Committee) asking why Ward "stopped short of undertaking to place Caucus members on the APSA Election Committee for next year," which Bay considered "an obvious thing to do, for reasons of prudence as well as fairness." Bay also raised this issue in a meeting of the APSA Council, where he complained that the Election Committee "was composed of anti-Caucus members exclusively." Donald Herzberg challenged Bay by claiming that the Ad Hoc Committee had the same right to be represented on the Election Committee as did the Caucus, which led Bay (1973a) to retort, "as if the Ad Hoc Committee ever has had or will have anything to fear from the kind of Election Committee that has been appointed." While President Ward was initially inclined to appoint at least one Caucus member to the Election Committee, he evidently succumbed to pressure from Herzberg and the Ad Hoc Committee on grounds that the Election Committee should remain impartial and neutral, rather than an assemblage of competing interest groups. Bay was irate that feigned neutrality was once again used as a smokescreen to ensconce the APSA Establishment—itself a dominant interest group—despite having made numerous procedural errors in its administration of APSA elections.[33]

Bachrach's near victory led the CNPS to launch an aggressive membership drive with a mass mailing that rearticulated its purpose and mission:

> The Caucus for a New Political Science is a broad coalition . . . committed to openness within the American Political Science Association. It opposes the recurrent efforts to transfer power from the membership to an exclusive, self-perpetuating group. . . . The Caucus believes in the principle of free inquiry. Political scientists must be able to pursue research in any area without constraint or fear of unorthodoxy. Scholars should respond to social concerns as well as methodological needs. . . . The Caucus for a New Political Science contends that the Association must respond vigorously to mounting pressures against academic freedom, the problems of teachers at small colleges, the employment crisis, the views of students, and the special needs of women and minority groups within the profession. (CNPS 1973d; see also CNPS 1975g, 381)

Partly in response to the CNPS electoral results, the Caucus's panels were again included in the official 1973 APSA program under a new sec-

tion of courtesy listings for unaffiliated groups. This arrangement became the standard operating procedure for unaffiliated groups until the APSA took Marvick's advice a decade later and created its first organized sections. Under the new arrangement, the CNPS sponsored four tightly themed panels under the rubric "Corruption in American Government" and two roundtables under "The Costs of American Involvement in Vietnam" (APSA 1973e; Roelofs 1972; CNPS 1973b).[34]

Three of the four panels were well attended with normal-sized audiences of 35, 40, and 25, although the two Vietnam roundtables drew 75 and 125 attendees in a year when overall convention attendance was down to only 1,100 (CNPS 1973b, 7). However, after two years of relative calm, Roelofs and Bay ignited the 1973 APSA business meeting with three controversial resolutions on (1) "student representation on the APSA's Council and most committees," (2) the "professional ethics of political scientists in high office," and (3) an "investigation of aspects of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's public conduct" (APSA 1974a, 21–27).

Christian Bay introduced a resolution to allow graduate students to sit on the APSA Council and to be appointed to most APSA committees. The proposal was discussed at length at the September 3, 1973, meeting of the APSA Council, where Bay made an impassioned plea to provide the "APSA's considerable student membership with an opportunity to take part in the leadership of our Association" (APSA 1974a, 22–24). However, Council members were well aware of the fact that the Caucus had a strong and growing base of support among graduate students, which led to the proposal's defeat by a vote of 19 to 3. Following this defeat, Bay complained that "during my two years on the Council I have time and again been impressed with the futility of trying to make our current governors understand, let alone allow themselves to be influenced by, a number of widely held shared beliefs and attitudes within our profession, and especially among younger colleagues and graduate students." Bay (1973c) asked APSA officials, "How many more such 'victories' will it take before most reform-minded political scientists will decide to leave the APSA behind?"

However, the more explosive resolutions dealt with Henry A. Kissinger, a professor of political science and international relations at Harvard University, who was about to become US secretary of state. The media had recently revealed that Kissinger, who had been President Nixon's national security advisor since 1969, had been involved in multiple secret wiretaps of journalists and government officials, including fellow political scientist Morton H. Halperin, for the purpose of identifying the source of information leaks (Reed 1973). Roelof's resolution condemned

Kissinger for his "involvement in the illegal invasion of privacy of some of his fellow political scientists in public office," and accused Kissinger of "unprofessional and unethical conduct" (APSA 1973f, 315). The resolution called on the APSA Committee of Professional Ethics to investigate Dr. Kissinger's conduct and to publish the results of that investigation in *PS*. Bay's resolution censured Kissinger for being "an accomplice in the terror bombing of Hanoi" the previous fall and accused him of deliberately misleading the public with "peace at hand statements" just before the 1972 election that saw Nixon reelected. The resolution alleged that Kissinger had engaged in war crimes and public lies and that such public conduct was "incompatible with minimum standards of professional conduct for political scientists" (APSA 1973f, 316).

The APSA Council received the resolutions, but David Fellman (University of Wisconsin), a member of the Council and chair of the Committee on Professional Ethics and Academic Freedom, indicated that he planned to raise a point of order at the business meeting challenging both resolutions as violations of Article II of the APSA constitution. Fellman was a member of the Ad Hoc Committee for a Representative Slate (1977). Fellman argued that because the Roelofs/Bay resolutions would require the Association "to make and publish moral evaluative judgments about the conduct of public officials, it is contrary to the basic purposes of the Association as set forth in its Constitution," and such resolutions are "specifically forbidden by the express language of the Constitution" (APSA 1973d, 27). Nevertheless, the Council moved the resolutions to the business meeting with a 19–3 "defeat" recommendation.

Roelof's and Bay's Kissinger resolutions highlighted the division between the liberal and radical wings of the Caucus. When Philippa Strum, the incoming CNPS chair (1973–74) learned of the resolutions, she wrote to Bay, chastising him for acting solely on his personal dislike of Kissinger, while insisting that "the Caucus doesn't have to make itself attractive to radicals." Strum's admonishment drew a sharp response from Bay (1973b), who replied, "I have tried to think through the consequences of this initiative and have concluded that it will do the Caucus more good than bad even if we were to lose dismally." Bay (1973b) argued that "if we are not consistently radical in our intention of pressing the basic moral and political issues within our profession, then I suspect that would leave the Caucus with the feeling that it is becoming just another faction within the same moderately liberal establishment . . . without much momentum for really changing things." Bay (1973b) hoped that the Caucus would endorse his resolution at its business meeting and concluded that "per-

haps the radical stance that I want will never win elections; although it certainly came close last year!"

However, as promised, when Roelof's Kissinger resolution was brought to the floor of the APSA business meeting, Fellman raised his point of order, and APSA President Robert E. Ward ruled it out of order as prohibited by Article II of the APSA constitution. Roelofs challenged the ruling, but the meeting voted 245 to 106 to uphold the decision. Bay then withdrew his resolution on grounds that it had become moot given the president's ruling on the Roelof's resolution. A reporter for the *New York Times*, who was present for the meeting, concluded that "the overwhelming vote not to consider the resolutions apparently reflected a feeling by the members that the association should not concern itself with the actions of political scientists in office" (Reed 1973). Dankwart A. Rustow, the current CNPS chair (1972–73) claimed that the 1973 annual business meeting of the "APSA conclusively showed its inability, under the current ancient regime, to transact any meaningful business whatsoever . . . the only resolution passed (this one unanimously) was one that urged the Texas School authorities not to prescribe a uniform set of social science texts for the whole state—an impeccable pluralist-liberal issue on which everyone from mossbacks to radicals could concur" (CNPS 1973b, 3).

The APSA Nominating Committee, the Ad Hoc Committee, and the CNPS each nominated a full slate of candidates in 1973. For the second time, the Caucus nominated Peter Bachrach for APSA president. Dankwart A. Rustow was nominated for vice president; Marvin Zionis (University of Chicago) for secretary; and Milton Kotler (Institute for Policy Studies) for treasurer. The CNPS Council nominees marked a significant shift toward assistant professors, which presaged a coming revolt within the CNPS itself: Lucius Barker (Washington University), Kay Boals (Princeton University), Stanley Hoffman (Harvard University), Philip E. Jacob (University of Hawaii), Katherine H. Klotzberger (CUNY), Charles A. McCoy (Lehigh University), Bertell Ollman (New York University), and Philip G. Ryan (American Civil Liberties Union) (APSA 1974b, 28). Boals and Klotzberger were co-endorsed by the Women's Caucus.

The Caucus organized an energetic campaign to elect Peter Bachrach as APSA president following his near miss the previous year. Dankwart A. Rustow (1973b), CNPS chair, wrote to Bachrach he was confident that "with the head start we have compared to last year I am sure we—you—will make it" this year. In addition to its earlier membership drive, the Caucus identified 380 persons who were members of CNPS but not members of APSA, and they were encouraged to join the Association prior to

the September 10 registration deadline to "help us turn it around." Rustow (1973a) wrote that "there have been many excellent reasons in the past for being critical of the APSA, and hence for leaving it or not joining it in the first place," including its domination "by a closed oligarchy devoted to a narrow and arid view of professionalism." Rustow observed that the *American Political Science Review* "has become increasingly remote from the study of actual politics," while the current APSA establishment has "put its entanglements with the Washington scene above service to the whole membership." Rustow (1973a) criticized APSA leadership for its "persistent lack of responsiveness" to "the legitimate concerns of blacks, women, and other minority groups in political science." Rustow (1973a) listed the Caucus's victories over the last six years and reminded members that "no opposition group in any professional social science association has come as close to victory as did the Caucus in 1972." Thus, Rustow (1973a) made a plea for non-APSA Caucus members to join the APSA because "we need your support *within* the APSA and we need it *now*."

Rustow (1974, 8) prepared a mailing to all APSA members that was signed by a large contingent of prominent political scientists, including some "conservatives" who simply found Austin Ranney, the APSA presidential nominee, distasteful. Rustow identified Ranney as a candidate "who represents all that deserves opposing in establishment political science." The Caucus took out a full-page ad in the September 1973 issue of *APSR* urging members to support the Caucus candidates. The Ad Hoc Committee countered with a letter mailed to every APSA member listing the names of the more than 100 prominent political scientists who now belonged to the Ad Hoc Committee (see Appendix B). The letter admonished political scientists that "whatever our differences we are all professionals, and as such we all have the same high stakes in preserving and expanding the Association's professional character and services and in resisting *any* effort to commit APSA to a particular partisan ideology" (Herzberg 1973). To this end, the Ad Hoc Committee endorsed the entire slate of candidates nominated by the APSA Nominating Committee, while praising Ranney in particular for "two decades of service to the discipline." The Ad Hoc Committee accused Caucus leaders of making "several serious allegations" against the APSA that the committee believed misrepresented the Association's record on women, minorities, employment, and academic freedom (Herzberg 1973).

However, the Ad Hoc Committee was especially insistent on warning political scientists that "the leaders of the Caucus for a New Political Science are now trying to sell its image as an ideologically diverse group seek-

ing moderate reform." In reality, the Ad Hoc Committee claimed, the Caucus was still committed to its 1969 platform which called for "a *political* science association" and "a drastic reorientation of political science . . . for radical social and political change" (Herzberg 1973). The Ad Hoc Committee was concerned that "transforming APSA into a partisan political instrument could only destroy its present and potential usefulness" (Herzberg 1973). Despite mounting its most vigorous campaign to date, Bachrach again fell short of winning the APSA presidency, with his vote slipping from 49.5% in 1972 to 45.6% in 1973. Lucius Barker was the only Caucus nominee elected in 1973 to join Rustow and Roelofs on the APSA Council.

However, in assessing the 1973 election results, Rustow observed that "if candidates for all offices are considered together (President-Elect, three Vice-Presidents, Secretary, Treasurer, and eight biennial members of the Council), the broad trend becomes clearly apparent. . . . Caucus candidates have registered a slow but steady advance, from an average of 31% in 1969, to 37, to 38, to 41 and now to 42%." Rustow (1974) was encouraged that "this showing, surely, is evidence both of the continuing broad current of dissatisfaction in American political science and of the increasing success of the Caucus in formulating a responsible alternative with wide appeal throughout the profession." Rustow (1974) acknowledge that the Caucus had only managed to elect three out of 26 APSA Council members, but he thought it was a large enough minority "to have the establishment pay some heed."

Following its strong electoral results the previous year, the CNPS sponsored 20 panels in 1974, as well as two workshops, "Academic Freedom" and "Non-Academic Employment for Political Scientists," with Charles A. McCoy serving as program chair (APSA 1974c). A major focus of Caucus panels at the 1974 conference was "Epistemological Alternatives to Behavioralism." Rather than merely criticize behavioralism and pluralism, Caucus panel organizers decided it was time to start articulating the epistemological and theoretical bases of a new political science. There was a roundtable on the general theme of alternative epistemologies, but there were also specific panels on phenomenology, Marxism, archetypal epistemology, and feminism as a case study of the relationship between epistemology and social problems (Boals 1974).

The main item of Caucus business during the APSA Council meeting was a proposal from Philippa Strum, CNPS chair, that the *APSR* devote an entire issue to women and politics in recognition of International Women's Year. Strum (1974–75, 9) reports that Nelson Polsby, the *APSR*'s managing editor

> launched into a ten-minute diatribe aimed at your bemused reporter [Strum] because she had been rash enough to suggest that an entire edition of the *APSR* be devoted to Women and Politics. . . . Polsby retorted that *APSR* has done virtually nothing other than devote itself to women and politics . . . he implied at the same time that anyone who takes the subject of women and politics seriously is more to be pitied than scorned. The rest of the Council sat quietly while Polsby denounced the mover of the resolution as insolent, irresponsible, ill-informed, ill-prepared and a variety of other qualities more reflexive of the *APSR* editor's command of adjectivial [*sic*]style than relevant to the question at issue. Apparently, displays of spleen and professional irresponsibility are so usual at Council meetings that this one could go virtually unnoticed.

The 1974 CNPS business meeting elected John Rensenbrink (Bowdoin College) to serve as CNPS chair (Barrow 2022b). Rensenbrink had joined CNPS in only 1972, after dropping out of the APSA 12 years earlier. Rensenbrink had "been turned off to establishment APSA and its works for a long time," but he believed "in the direction CNPS is going" (CNPS 1973a, 4). In contrast, Rensenbrink did not believe that CNPS members should "allow the bureaucratic academicians to define *professional* for everybody. As we know, their definition is careerist, technicist, limited to established themes narrowly considered, and obedient to the configurations of existing power" (CNPS 1973b, 2). Importantly, Rensenbrink's election would soon initiate a radical redirection of the Caucus away from contesting APSA elections (the profession) toward efforts to build a new political science (discipline) and an independent CNPS. His election marked the beginning of a decisive leftward shift in Caucus leadership from disenchanted liberals to socialists, and this would eventually generate a great deal of controversy within CNPS over the next four years.

The CNPS introduced various resolutions to the 1974 APSA business meeting, but as the battle lines hardened, it became increasingly difficult to win concessions or compromises from the APSA. The CNPS revisited the issue of APSA membership without an automatic subscription to the *APSR*. Gerald L. Houseman, and more than 50 political scientists—mostly CNPS members—submitted a constitutional amendment to the APSA business meeting that would allow members the option of not receiving the *Review* in exchange for a five-dollar reduction in dues. Houseman (1973, 1974) had conducted a survey of several hundred APSA members and found that "the *APSR* is generally disliked, is considered tedious, bor-

ing, pompous, irrelevant, etc." Nevertheless, the APSA Council recommended by a vote of 19 to 3 that the proposed constitutional amendment be defeated, with only Roelofs, Rustow, and Sidney Verba supporting the amendment (APSA 1974d, 296). At the 1974 APSA business meeting, the proposed amendment was introduced by Houseman with support from CNPS. Austin Ranney argued against the proposed amendment on behalf of the APSA Council, and it again failed to receive the required 40% support necessary to submit it to a mail ballot vote of the general membership (57 in favor and 133 against) (APSA 1974e, 393; 1975b, 43).

Similarly, Kenneth Sherrill introduced a resolution to the APSA Council calling on the APSA to condemn discrimination in access to higher education and employment opportunities, which passed the APSA Council, but Strum (1974–75, 9) remarked that "members of the APSA demonstrated their burning concern with the issue by forcing the meeting to adjourn for lack of a quorum." Strum (1974–75, 9) concluded that "someday someone will write a straight-forward history of the APSA and everyone who reads it will assume it to be a satire. Surely, readers will say, the combination of malice and sheer nonsense that is shown as permeating APSA cannot be reflective of a real professional association."

Prior to adjourning, however, the main order of business in 1974 was once again the nomination of candidates for APSA office. James MacGregor Burns, a member of CNPS, was nominated for APSA president by the Nominating Committee, the Ad Hoc Committee, the Caucus for a New Political Science, and the Women's Caucus, with the result that Burns was unanimously declared president-elect at the business meeting. However, the Caucus did contest the other offices by nominating Jewel Prestage for vice president and Wilson Carey McWilliams for secretary. In its campaign literature, the Caucus reminded members that James MacGregor Burns "is one of the original members of the Caucus for a New Political Science," which means "this year you can vote for a better political science: For President-Elect James MacGregor Burns" (CNPS 1974; Burns 1974).

For APSA Council, the Caucus nominated Hayward Alker Jr., Leonard Binder, Harold W. Borkowski, Robert L. Hardgrave Jr., Dale Rogers Marshall, Frances Fox Piven, Mulford Q. Sibley, and Ellen Wade (APSA 1975b, 43–44). The Caucus successfully elected Wilson Carey McWilliams as secretary. The Caucus also won a majority of the contested Council seats by electing five of its nominees to the Council—Alker, Binder, Marshall, Piven, and Sibley—which gave the Caucus its largest ever representation

on the Council not counting other individuals, such as Lowi, Verba, and Barker, who had occasionally voted with the Caucus on specific issues (APSA 1976a, 26). Thus, the next two years would be a high point in CNPS influence within the APSA.

From Organizational Revolt to Intellectual Revolution

The 1974 election would be the last serious electoral campaign mounted by the CNPS following a series of business meetings in late 1974 and early 1975. William E. Connolly and Jean Bethke Elshtain introduced a resolution at a regional CNPS meeting held at the Northeast Political Science Association in November 1974, which called on the CNPS to refocus its electoral activity from winning elections to presenting a "strong critical presence and clear alternative voice" within the APSA. It had become clear to them that if CNPS wanted to just win elections, it would have to nominate slates of increasingly moderate candidates and spend a substantial amount of money from the Caucus's limited budget. The Connolly/Elshtain resolution passed the Northeast Regional CNPS business meeting, which was forwarded to the national CNPS Executive Committee (Rensenbrink 1974–75a, 1974–75b).

At its January 4, 1975, meeting, the CNPS Executive Committee nevertheless arrived at "a sense of the meeting" that it should continue participating in APSA elections, but agreed it would de-emphasize electoral activity mainly because it was draining too much time and money away from other Caucus activities that were deemed more relevant to building a new political science (Rensenbrink 1974–75a, 1974–75b). It was decided, however, to put the question to a mail ballot of the general membership (Rensenbrink 1976c, 4). Theodore Norton, Stephen M. Sachs, and H. Mark Roelofs officially weighed in to support the proposition that CNPS should spend less money on elections and focus more on "theoretical reorientation (the search for a new political science)" (CNPS 1976a, 13–14). Christian Bay and most of the Coordinating Council (officers) opposed the proposition on grounds that the allocation of moneys among different activities should be left to CNPS elected officials and decided on a year-to-year basis (CNPS 1976a, 12–15, 22–23).[35] The anti-elections proposition was defeated, but the CNPS Coordinating Council was already scaling back spending on APSA elections, and it continued to do so for the remainder of the decade.

Conclusion

From its founding in 1967 until it ran its last candidate for APSA office in 1979, the primary activity of the CNPS was to introduce policy resolutions and constitutional amendments at the annual business meetings of the APSA and to nominate candidates for APSA office starting in 1969. An equally important influence on the APSA was CNPS sponsorship of alternative conference panels that dealt with contemporary political issues, the critique of behavioralism and pluralism, the social responsibility of intellectuals, and alternative methodological and epistemological foundations of a new political science.

Ironically, at the peak of its organizational strength, the CNPS abandoned its organizational revolt to refocus its efforts on establishing the intellectual foundations of a new political science and to build enclaves within the university that would make it possible to build and practice a new political science. Thus, it is ironic that within four years of its founding, Alan Wolfe, one of the Caucus's original members, left the organization and authored a scathing critique of the CNPS for being focused on pseudopolitics (organizational activism) instead of politics (political revolution). Theodore Lowi, one of the movement's leading intellectual inspirations and a charter member, also left the Caucus and authored a similarly scathing critique of CNPS for sacrificing intellectual revolution to organizational revolt. While coming from divergent standpoints, both individuals criticized the Caucus for diverting its efforts into *organizational activism* within the APSA and, thereby, abandoning both the ideals of *political revolution* (Wolfe) and *intellectual revolution* (Lowi) that had catalyzed the movement for a new political science. However, both of them left the CNPS just as it was beginning to move in the directions they advocated.

Similarly, Stephen Andors (SUNY–Oswego), a Caucus member, articulated another critique of the Caucus's organizational revolt. He argued that despite the Caucus's incremental successes in making the APSA more democratic and more transparent *as an organization*, seven years of insurrection had not made a dent in the more diffuse ideological and organizational power structure that regulated the political science discipline.

> Power in our profession does not . . . lie in the APSA or in any other nationally organized professional organization. It lies in the institutional structure of the American educational system; in the hands of people who control the prestige positions in key graduate centers

> and who staff the key organizational positions which confer the capacity to influence or even determine the allocation of "manpower" in the form of teaching slots; and in the hands of people who train M.A.'s and Ph.D.'s who filter down through the educational hierarchy to become parts of the system of political socialization and political culture. (Andors 1974)

Philippa Strum (1974, 6), CNPS chair (1973–74), countered that "the Caucus is more successful and more influential today that it has ever been. It may also be about to go out of existence." Strum reported that for the first time two persons had been elected to the APSA Council with no backing other than that of the Caucus. In many Council votes on APSA policy, the positions advanced by the Caucus were close to receiving majority support and the Caucus was capturing more than 40% of the vote in APSA elections. Strum (1974, 6) pointed out that there was now an "extraordinary Caucus presence, both within the APSA leadership and among the panels." Many Caucus members were being appointed to important APSA committees and, in some cases, appointed as chairs of those committees. Strum (1974, 6) concluded that "this should be a time of great optimism for the Caucus." It was instead the beginning of a period of growing ferment and discontent within CNPS that would rapidly move it toward temporarily becoming a counter-association.

6

The Caucus Left Turn, 1974–1979

In announcing its first slate of candidates in 1969, the CNPS issued an election platform "to make known our conviction that a *new* political science must now be developed" (see Appendix A). The election platform went on to elaborate a nine-point program with proposals on research and teaching, responsible research policy, educational organization, graduate students, the status of nonwhites in the profession, the status of women in the profession, departmental ethics, internships and awards, criticism of the *American Political Science Review*, and the demand for more democracy and transparency in APSA governance. The CNPS did succeed in electing many of its members to the APSA Council, although never enough to claim a majority. In 1972, Peter Bachrach, the Caucus nominee for APSA president, captured 49.5% of the vote (see Chapter 5). When James MacGregor Burns, a CNPS member, was elected APSA president by acclimation in 1974, CNPS reached the heights of its organizational influence within APSA. The organizational revolt had extracted some liberalizing reforms from the APSA Establishment, and CNPS panels were firmly ensconced at the annual meetings of the APSA. Finally, after only three years of activism, CNPS had persuaded APSA President David Easton to declare the coming of a new (post-behavioral) revolution in political science.

Yet the radicals on the left were dissatisfied with the outcome. While the organizational revolt could claim a partial victory, the political revolution of the 1960s was rapidly dissipating in US society and giving way to a new type of identity-based interest group politics. The intellectual revolution anticipated by post-behavioralists was still just an idea. As a result, liberals who were satisfied with the organizational reforms won by CNPS began to demobilize and drop out of CNPS during the late 1970s, while

radicals who wanted an intellectual revolution *in the discipline* began to consciously mobilize for the purpose of building a new permanent organization—a counter-association—to promote a new political science outside the institutional limitations and restrictions of the American Political Science Association.

The Left Turn Begins

Following the unanimous election of James MacGregor Burns as APSA president in 1974, the 1975 meeting of the APSA was comparatively quiet compared to the previous eight years. Instead of protracted floor fights over controversial resolutions, CNPS instead presented its notion of what a good convention program would be like by once again organizing a set of panels independent of the APSA. Moreover, the panels in 1975 marked a continuing move away from the critique of behavioralism and pluralism and reflected the growing movement to articulate an alternative new political science, while continuing to address practical professional issues confronting young faculty and graduate students (APSA 1975c; Sherrill 1974–75).

There was evidently no controversy at the 1975 annual business meeting, partly because the CNPS was refocusing its efforts elsewhere. The nominations process had become routine and ordinary by this time, but in 1975 the Caucus initiated a drift to the left with the nomination of Murray Edelman (University of Wisconsin, Madison) for APSA president, Jean Bethke Elshtain (University of Massachusetts, Amherst), Michael Parenti (Cornell University), and James W. Prothro (University of North Carolina) were nominated for vice president. Margaret Levi (University of Washington) was nominated for secretary, and Walter Dean Burnham (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) was nominated for treasurer. For APSA Council, the Caucus nominated James David Barber (Duke University), Eric M. Davis (University of Chicago graduate student); Richard R. Fagen (Stanford University), Betty Glad (University of Illinois), Manfred Halpern (Princeton University), Inez Smith Reid (Barnard College), Dankwart A. Rustow (CUNY), and Diane Wittenberg (Miami University of Ohio graduate student). Murray, Elshtain, Levi, Glad, and Rustow were co-endorsed by the Women's Caucus, and the APSA Nominating Committee co-endorsed Inez Smith Reid for Council (APSA 1976b, 35–36). Rensenbrink (1975d) wrote to CNPS officers to enthusiastically declaim that "the slate speaks for itself—an outstanding group of political scientists. Let's get on with the campaigning and the winning!"

To support its electoral efforts, the Caucus distributed a special election issue of its newsletter *New Political Science*, which emphasized its past accomplishments in reforming the APSA, as well as the scholarly standing of its candidates, who were all well-published scholars. The CNPS called attention to the fact that the Caucus had consistently supplemented the official conference program of the APSA with panels that addressed "questions of substantive political concern," such as revolution in the classroom, the politics of pollution, the costs of American involvement in the Vietnam War, and working-class politics. In reviewing the Caucus's past accomplishments, the *Newsletter* (CNPS 1975f, 1) reminded readers that

> the Caucus has taken the lead in defeating a constitutional revision (1970–71) that would have transferred control of APSA affairs from the membership to a self-perpetuating "Assembly." It has fought for the restoration of a separate APSA Committee on Academic Freedom. It has championed student representation on APSA committees and urged more adequate appropriations for the Committees on the Status of Blacks and on the Status of Women . . . In 1973, it helped defeat a sharply regressive dues structure that would have imposed the financial burdens of APSA on those least able to pay. Last year, candidates endorsed by the Caucus for a New Political Science won a majority of the contested seats in the elections for the APSA Council.

The Caucus (1975f, 1) asked APSA members to support "our continued efforts to democratize and strengthen the Association." The *Newsletter* emphasized that "the Caucus, through its members on the APSA Council, its annual convention panels, its task forces, and expanded programs of independent and regional conferences, continues to focus attention on vital theoretical and practical issues, and to fight for a more open Association" (CNPS 1975f, 1). The Ad Hoc Committee for a Representative Slate,[1] which was now chaired by Alan P. Sindler, countered with a letter sent to APSA members. Sindler (1975) claimed that

> in recent years the Caucus for a New Political Science has been following a strategy of trying to project a "moderate" image in its election materials. But in their communications *to each other*—and, above all, in the *actions* of most candidates they have endorsed—they show they have never deviated from their original goal: to convert APSA into an instrument for reshaping the way political scien-

> tists study and teach, and to commit it to exposing, in the words of the organization's leaders, "the incapacity of . . . the capitalist system and ending our profession's alleged current attempt to cover up this incapacity." (Report of CNPS Committee on Structure, July 1975)

Sindler (1975) lamented that in the previous year the Ad Hoc Committee had made a mistake by not mustering a campaign due to the unanimous declaration of James MacGregor Burns as president-elect. However, Sindler observed that "the Caucus for a New Political Science felt no such restraint and campaigned hard for their nominees with the result that several Caucus nominees were elected to the APSA Council." Sindler (1975) alleged that "the 1974–75 Caucus members of the APSA Council kept the Council so tied up in angry arguments over procedural trivia that it was prevented from coming to grips with such pressing matters as declining public and private foundation support for political science, the worsening job market and the increasing attacks on academic freedom and tenure precipitated by that market."[2] Ironically, it was CNPS that had led the fight to make the defense of academic freedom a priority for the APSA, and it was CNPS that pushed efforts to replace the old-boy hiring network with an open and competitive job market that led to the current practice of posting job openings with the APSA and interviewing prospective candidates at APSA meetings.

The official election materials sent to APSA members by the AAA once again included "Statements by Nominating Groups," and these statements clearly articulated two opposing conceptions of the political science profession. The APSA Nominating Committee claimed that "its nominees were chosen with one overriding criterion in mind: their professional competence and concern" (AAA 1975a). The Ad Hoc Committee restated its long-standing position that it was committed to "a nonpolitical and professional APSA . . . and opposes efforts to transform APSA into pressure group for political ideology" (AAA 1975a). The Caucus stated that it would "continue to encourage a new and more relevant political science, while opposing all brands of sectarianism or orthodoxy . . . The CNPS slate represents a broad range of academic interests and methodologies" (AAA 1975a). The Caucus's professional concerns were to "democratize and strengthen the Association," to fight for "fair representation of women, national and other minorities, and students," and to confront the twin dangers to the profession generated by the Great Recession of 1974–75, including resistance to the ongoing attacks on academic freedom (AAA 1975a).

The statements of views published for each of the individual Caucus candidates reveal that CNPS had still not congealed into an ideologically cohesive organization except insofar as it continued its critique of behavioral political science, pluralist theory, and the profession's attachment to corporate and state elites. Murray Edelman observed that "a great deal of politics escapes our explanation and research methods and . . . too much of what we teach is problematic. We need to be sure that the symbol of science is not used to constrict methods and knowledge rather than free them, and that it is not used to muster support for regimes rather than to analyze and criticize them" (AAA 1975b). Michael Parenti suggested that "the resources of the Association have been used largely to impose a status quo paradigm upon our profession. While pretending to an objectivity and precision it never possessed, our discipline has become an apology for the existing social order" (AAA 1975b).[3] Eric Davis echoed Parenti in a slightly different way with his call for political scientists to engage in a "continuing critique of the normative and conceptual underpinnings of the research paradigms and theoretical frameworks which we employ" (AAA 1975b). Similarly, Margaret Levi argued that "the study of politics is at the crossroads: the profession can continue in its conservative focus on governmental institutions and elites or it can broaden its perspective to include concern with problems of social control, political economy, and peoples' movements" (AAA 1975b). While most Caucus nominees wanted to promote a more intellectually open discipline, Dankwart A. Rustow called on political scientists "to put aside sterile feuds in the profession" and set about the practical business of fighting against declining funding for public higher education, addressing the dismal labor market for young PhDs, and protecting the employment gains of women, minorities, and dissenters (AAA 1975b). The CNPS presidential vote declined from its previous highs in 1972 and 1973 (49.5% and 45.6%), with Edelman capturing 40.6% of the vote. Christian Bay (1975a) wrote to Kenneth Sherrill, the current cochair of CNPS to say, "I knew we weren't going to do well, but I had hoped we could elect at least a few more than we did."

Building an Organization

The 1975 CNPS business meeting reelected John Rensenbrink cochair of CNPS along with Kenneth Sherrill (Hunter College / CUNY). In 1973, Sherrill had written the first article on LGBT politics ever presented at an APSA annual meeting. He participated in a failed effort to organize an

LBGT caucus in the 1970s but later became a founding member of the LGBTQ Caucus founded in 1987–88 (Thomas 2023; Tronto 2024).

The cochair arrangement immediately generated disagreements over appointments and other matters of policy (Sherrill 1975). A part of the disagreement between Rensenbrink and Sherrill is that Rensenbrink had undertaken several initiatives as chair the previous year, including the organization of an independent conference at Brown University, and he continued implementing other initiatives started at that time without consulting Sherrill or previous CNPS chairs. Rensenbrink was attempting to solve the organizational problems identified earlier by Christian Bay by putting in place a formal organizational structure for the first time. During its eight years of existence, the Caucus met only once a year at the APSA convention, and between conventions it relied on a very small group of activists in its Executive Council to keep the organization intact, but these activists did not have any formal institutional authority to act for the organization, and there was no institutional structure for exercising such authority. It was a problem common to New Left organizations, which often insisted on direct participatory democracy and "spontaneous" political action rather than representation and institutionalization.

However, a more substantive conflict emerged during Rensenbrink's chairmanship as he recruited more radicals into the organization and appointed them to leadership positions. Rensenbrink began engineering a generational and ideological shift in Caucus leadership, which was aimed at moving the Caucus in a more explicitly "socialist" direction and moving it toward becoming a counter-association to the APSA. The first point of conflict between Rensenbrink and Sherrill was the alleged "appointment" of Morton Schoolman as secretary-treasurer. Sherrill opposed Schoolman's appointment, although partly due to a misunderstanding of how Schoolman was appointed.

Sherrill reacted angrily to a November 24, 1975, memorandum from Rensenbrink that he sent to a new "Coordinating Council," but which only reached Sherrill via a courtesy copy sent to him by Dankwart A. Rustow. Sherrill wrote to Rensenbrink that the September CNPS business meeting had elected them to serve as cochairs once the APSA election results were released on December 9, 1975. Sherrill (1975) reminded Rensenbrink that "we agreed that all appointments would be mutually agreed upon. . . . We also agreed that the Secretary-Treasurer would have to be independent of both of us, and therefore at a University with which neither of us were connected."

Morton Schoolman (2020) had just completed his PhD at Brown University, but he had begun teaching at Bowdoin College in fall 1975, the same

institution as Rensenbrink. Thus, Sherrill (1975) informed Rensenbrink, "I cannot accept Mort Schoolman, purely because I believe that no one at Bowdoin or CUNY ought to control the treasury or mailing lists." He (1975) further informed Rensenbrink that "I take your unilateral appointments to have effect only until December 9, 1975." Sherrill (1975) copied Christian Bay asking him in a handwritten note: "Christian, *PLEASE* help, respond, react." The differences between Sherrill and Rensenbrink were eventually resolved, although Sherrill (1976) observed that substantive "differences in emphasis and in long term ideological orientation" existed between the two cochairs (see also Bay 1976).[4] Sherill was a liberal associationist, while Rensenbrink was a radical counter-associationist.

Sherrill's opposition to Schoolman led Bay (1975b) to respond to him, "I am distressed about the conflict that seems to have developed between yourself and John [Rensenbrink]; what the CNPS doesn't need is internal struggles of this kind." Bay (1975b) asked Sherrill to accept Schoolman as he had actually been *elected* at a general membership meeting held at Brown University, where Sherrill was in attendance. Bay (1975b) argued that "he [Schoolman] is a good choice" who has "shown himself to be capable and hardworking for the Caucus, which is important."

Furthermore, Sherrill and Rensenbrink had agreed to appoint Theodore Norton and Stephen M. Sachs as co-program coordinators for the 1976 APSA convention and to appoint Adolph Reed Jr. (South), Charles J. Fox (West), and Craig Malone (Northeast) as regional coordinators. Bay (1975a), Sherrill, and Rensenbrink had earlier agreed that appointing western and southern regional coordinators was of paramount importance because, despite the Western Caucus eruption in 1971, it was still the case that "most of the active people are in the East and Midwest." The Caucus needed to build its membership in the West and the South.

In addition, on May 2, 1975, while Rensenbrink was serving solo as CNPS chair, he had appointed Victor Wallis to chair a new CNPS Task Force on Structure that was charged with making recommendations to improve the organization and operations of the CNPS.[5] The only new unilateral appointment by Rensenbrink was his apparent appointment of Jean Bethke Elshtain to replace Philippa Strum as newsletter editor, but as it turns out Elshtain had also been elected to her position at the Brown University business meeting. Nevertheless, Sherrill (1975) argued that "we should have collegial editorship of the CNPS Newsletter, reflecting our ideological and substantive diversity."

Evidently, the main source of conflict was that Rensenbrink had begun implementing the preliminary recommendations of the Committee on Structure chaired by Victor Wallis (1975b) by organizing all appointed and

elected CNPS officers into a newly created Coordinating Council. The new Coordinating Council replaced the much larger Executive Committee that had previously been elected at annual business meetings. However, Rensenbrink's actions were not precipitous or unilateral, but the culmination of a process he had initiated after being elected CNPS chair at the 1974 APSA convention. Soon after his election, Rensenbrink (1974a) informed the CNPS Executive Committee that Bowdoin College "was quite pleased at my election to the chairpersonship of the Caucus . . . despite being of a generally conservative orientation." In fact, Bowdoin College was the first institution to provide the Caucus chair with "a budgetary disbursement on behalf of the Caucus to cover some expenses" (Rensenbrink 1974a). Bowdoin also provided Rensenbrink with clerical support, office supplies, and travel reimbursements for his activities as CNPS chair. He informed the Executive Committee that Bowdoin would be willing to increase his operating budget on a matching basis if the Caucus was to provide the chair with a designated budget for the first time.

In his 1975 chairperson's report, Rensenbrink forcefully articulated the left turn taking place in CNPS, including a shift in its political priorities and a reconfiguration of its organizational structure. Rensenbrink (1975b, 4) invoked the Caucus's founding as one that "pointed in the direction of alternatives to establishment-oriented assumptions about the discipline and establishment-oriented understandings of the relations of political science to political practice." However, instead of building a new political science, the Caucus had instead become "absorbed by the processes of election to APSA office and absorbed by APSA politics." Rensenbrink (1975b, 26) was not among those members who wanted to withdraw from APSA elections, because he thought friends on the APSA Council "are in a position to fight against repression," but he well understood that the CNPS members elected to APSA office would generally come from the moderate to liberal wing of the Caucus. Consequently, it was not realistic at this point to think that the Caucus could ever be anything more than a loyal opposition within the APSA. Rensenbrink (1975b, 4) was also not interested in "taking over" the APSA machinery and imposing a new "system bound orthodoxy in the moderate to left-liberal mode" as this would just substitute a new orthodoxy for the old one. Moreover, Rensenbrink did not consider such a takeover politically realistic or compatible with the Caucus's emphasis on an open and pluralistic profession. Thus, maintaining *representation* on the APSA Council was important, but it was only one means to a larger end, and winning elections was not the original or primary goal of the Caucus for a New Political Science.

Thus, Rensenbrink (1975b, 5) argued that the Caucus "needed to push

harder on its goal of transforming the discipline in the direction of a new political science." While supporting continued participation in APSA elections, Rensenbrink (1975b, 26) thought it best that "people near the operational center of the Caucus should not run for APSA office; our center should be and act as an independent body . . . to sustain our central strategy of independently working for a new political science." Rensenbrink effectively proposed a bifurcated or dual Caucus, which would have an APSA-oriented liberal wing and a more radical leadership focused on building a new political science outside the APSA. Of course, this again raised the question for Rensenbrink (1975b, 27): "What is a new political science?"

At an organizational level, it meant institutionalizing the Caucus as a permanent independent organization with a constitution, bylaws, continuity of leadership, and a stable succession of leadership. Rensenbrink was pushing forward on this front with the Committee on Structure. It also meant the Caucus needed to expand its reach by organizing panels at the regional political science associations, such as the Western Caucus had done in 1970 and 1971. More importantly, it meant the Caucus needed to start sponsoring its own conferences and not just panels at the APSA. If pressed on the question of what new political science meant in terms of methods or substantive content, Rensenbrink (1977, 6) answered that "political science had become the prisoner of ruling class ideology." The major arm of the discipline, the American Political Science Association, reinforced both the ideology and the elaborate mystification that such ideology made necessary. Consequently, a new political science must *begin* with the assumption that "the anti-capitalist revolution is coming. . . . A new political science must take its point of departure from that understanding."

To break "the biases of the discipline," Rensenbrink (1977, 6) argued that new political scientists would need to challenge imperialism, sexism, racism, class arrogance and class discrimination, monopoly capitalism and welfarism, deference to the hierarchical organization of authority and power, academicism in research and teaching, the elitism of big universities linked to big government through research grants, old-boy networks, oligarchy in the Association, and "a so-called 'behavioral' epistemology which dogmatically separated fact and value, while proclaiming itself to be the only arbiter of 'facts.'" It was a long list and a big research agenda, but Rensenbrink (1975b, 27) suggested that beyond this starting point, a future new political science would emerge through "progressive knowings (as Dewey and Bentley would say); that is through a process of discussion

and debate." Rensenbrink's (1975b, 27) organizational objective was "to create more ways to facilitate discussion and debate about a new political science" (see also Wallis 1975a).

Once elected CNPS chair, Rensenbrink immediately turned his attention to "the infrastructural capability of the chairpersonship." Rensenbrink (1974a) informed the CNPS Executive Committee that this problem was of immediate importance and would "continue to be a problem unless we begin to do something about it." Rensenbrink (1974a) observed that "so far in the history of the Caucus we have operated more or less on an *ad hoc*, almost catch-as-catch-can basis," and while Rensenbrink expected the Caucus to continue just muddling through for the time being, he was "interested in a longer-term solution." Rensenbrink (1974a) asked members of the Executive Committee to begin "thinking about the structure of CNPS."

Rensenbrink had inherited a Committee on Structure created a year earlier when Philippa Strum was CNPS chair, but Rensenbrink is the one who activated the committee by appointing Victor Wallis (Indiana University–Purdue University at Indianapolis) to chair the committee, which included Jean Bethke Elshtain, Kevin Maguire (Gustavus Adolphus College), and Susan Risch (Wilmington College). The committee was appointed at the direction of a May 2, 1975, Executive Committee meeting held in Chicago at the Midwest Political Science Association. On July 15, 1975, the Committee on Structure submitted a *Report on Proposed Directions for the Caucus* (CNPS 1975h), which incorporated comments and criticisms made by participants at a June 1975 "Conference on Fundamental Political Alternatives."

The preliminary report was the main topic of discussion at the CNPS business meeting convened at the September 1975 San Francisco APSA convention. The preliminary report was also subjected to additional scrutiny at a November 7–9, 1975, "Socialist Perspectives" conference convened at Brown University, and it was again discussed at a CNPS Coordinating Council meeting convened a week later at the Northeastern Political Science Association (CNPS 1975h). Thus, from Rensenbrink's perspective, the report of the Committee on Structure had been thoroughly scrutinized by Caucus leaders and the general membership, while membership on the new Coordinating Council had been approved by a CNPS business meeting. In his response to Sherrill, Rensenbrink (1976a) thus pointed out that "these task forces have developed organically out of a series of discussions and debates during and between many successive business meetings stretching back two years." In fact, the controversy over the new organiza-

tional structure was exactly the problem the new organizational structure was designed to avoid in the future.

The report of the CNPS Committee on Structure observed that the Caucus for a New Political Science had been spontaneously formed in 1967 "as an informal group within the American Political Science Association" (Wallis 1975b, 6). The report concluded that in the past the Caucus had been "united more by what it opposes than by what it favors. . . . With the passage of time, and with the deepening crisis which surrounds real-life politics, it has become more urgent and more practicable for the Caucus to define itself in a positive sense." However, given its origins, the report argued that a positive definition of the Caucus first required an explicit understanding of its continuing dependent relationship with the APSA. The Caucus remained organizationally dependent on the APSA insofar as

a) we are defined (however arbitrarily) as practitioners of the discipline which the APSA claims to speak for;
b) our coming together is facilitated by the professional legitimacy attached to APSA activities;
c) we see the APSA membership as our constituency for readership, support, and recruitment;
d) we can see the APSA itself as an institution whose aims might one day be defined by us; and
e) we see our particular political objectives as including—and being in part defined by—a commitment to free inquiry. (Wallis 1975b, 6)

Despite this dependence on the APSA, the CNPS Committee on Structure suggested that the Caucus should also be considered "a unity independent of the APSA" (Wallis 1975b, 7). This unity emerged from the politics of political science, which the Committee defined as follows:

1) There is an essential link between the theory or science of politics and the practice of politics;
2) The attempt to deny such a link is associated with a widespread double standard, according to which political partisanship is considered "unprofessional" in the case of those who oppose the *status quo*, but perfectly acceptable on the part of those who accept it;
3) The need for such a double standard arises from the incapacity of the *status quo* in question—i.e., the capitalist system—to stand on

its own merits: an incapacity which is manifesting itself at an ever-accelerating pace;

4) The attempt to cover up this incapacity constitutes the single most far-reaching obstacle to free inquiry both within the Political Science profession [and] in the U.S. mass educational–cultural complex as a whole;
5) The deepening crisis of the system threatens us as political scientists in a dual sense: on the one hand, by limiting the money available for instructional purposes, and on the other, by raising the likelihood of political repression; and, finally,
6) This dual threat gives rise to a dual responsibility: on the one hand, to protect ourselves against the economic squeeze, and on the other, to help clarify the basic issues both to our fellow political scientists and to the public at large—not just as a matter of intellectual curiosity, but as step toward solving the problems which the prevailing orthodoxy works to cover up. (Wallis 1975b, 7)

The CNPS Committee on Structure declared that "we intend to act upon these conclusions both inside and outside the APSA," and with those words the committee articulated what would later become known as the "double identity" strategy (Wallis 1975b, 7). This idea was that the Caucus had a "dual character, as an organization operating both inside and outside the APSA" (Wallis 1975b, 29). The committee proposed that the Caucus conduct work independently of the APSA, while simultaneously working within the APSA, but to accomplish these dual purposes the CNPS would need to establish a formal and permanent organizational structure outside the APSA. The objectives articulated for the Caucus were nothing fundamentally new, as they included more mass political education modeled on the Union for Radical Political Economics' *Dollars and Sense*, a panel program at APSA meetings, transformation of the *APSR*, democratization of the APSA, and an expansion of the services offered to members by APSA (e.g., job placement) (Wallis 1975b, 7–8). What was new in the report was the proposed organizational structure for achieving these objectives.

The Committee on Structure noted the obvious fact that the CNPS did not have a formal constitution, and to this point, its members had felt relatively little pressure to produce one. The committee surmised that the Caucus had been able to evade this problem partly because of its parasitic relationship to the APSA, and partly because of the limited number of

people who were prepared to devote a substantial amount of time to governing the Caucus. Evidently, not even the New Left was immune to Roberto Michels's iron law of oligarchy. Thus, the committee made two recommendations aimed at converting the Caucus for a New Political Science from a spontaneous New Left affinity group into a permanent and institutionalized organization.

The committee's next recommendation was that the Caucus begin to enforce "the minimal obligation" that members pay annual dues. Rensenbrink (1974c, 3) had earlier reported that CNPS had "about a thousand members." However, the Committee on Structure recommended that the Caucus develop a process for maintaining a formal membership list—and not just a mailing list—and that it remind members of their obligation to pay dues.[6] The committee emphasized that paying dues should be "an absolute prerequisite for exercising membership voting rights, for being a member of the Executive Committee, for accepting nominations by the Caucus to APSA office, and for participating—other than by invitation—in any of our panels" (Wallis 1975b, 29).

The committee's additional recommendations aimed to institutionalize "the selection and exercise of leadership within the Caucus." The committee emphasized that its recommendations were a *minimum* program of change based on what the committee saw as the present needs and capabilities of the organization. The first recommendation was that the current 59-member Executive Committee be limited to dues-paying members and to individuals "who commit themselves to work actively on one of the Caucus Task Forces," but with the caveat that CNPS had to recruit more members from outside the Northeast (Wallis 1975b, 29). It was recommended that the Caucus create a committee (similar to the APSA) to recommend nominees for APSA office as opposed to the current "caucus" system, where select members acting without formal authority nominated a slate of candidates to the CNPS/APSA business meeting.[7]

Finally, the committee recommended that the CNPS Executive Committee be replaced by a Coordinating Council, which would manage the day-to-day activities of the Caucus between annual meetings. The new Coordinating Council would consist of the Caucus's national officers, the newsletter editor, the regional coordinators, task force chairs, and Caucus representatives on the APSA Council. The chair would be expected to regularly consult with the Coordinating Council on matters of policy. This would establish more consistency in Caucus decision-making between APSA conventions, as compared to the present system, where Executive Committee meetings were convened at regional political science associa-

tion meetings with very few people in attendance, and the attendees varying from place to place (Wallis 1975b, 29).

The key meeting for Rensenbrink (1976a) was a CNPS business meeting convened on November 18, 1975, in Providence, Rhode Island, where two items were approved by attendees, although Sherrill apparently left the conference early and did not attend this meeting (CNPS 1975c).[8] The first item was a motion introduced by Rensenbrink to incorporate CNPS as a nonprofit organization. After some discussion about the legal status of CNPS, it was agreed that CNPS was an educational as opposed to a political organization under IRS regulations, which would allow it to register as a nonprofit with tax-exempt status. This would be a first step toward establishing CNPS as a permanent counter-association to the APSA. The motion was adopted by unanimous vote (CNPS 1975c).

Rensenbrink introduced a second proposal to ratify a Coordinating Council, which would consist of the chairperson, newsletter editor, program coordinator, task force coordinators, regional coordinators, two Caucus representatives from the APSA Council, and one former chairperson. Rensenbrink urged the meeting to approve the proposal on an ad hoc basis, evidently with a gentlemen's agreement that he and Sherill had already agreed on most of the appointees. The proposed Coordinating Council would replace the existing Executive Committee and allow Rensenbrink to "move the Caucus in the direction we wished to see it go." Rensenbrink complained that there "had been a vacuum of responsibility in the Caucus" and the new organizational structure would make the officers accountable to the chair and the chair accountable to the general membership (quoted in CNPS 1975c). Dankwart A. Rustow agreed that the Caucus had reached a point where "we need a more limited and effective group than the old Executive Council" (quoted in CNPS 1975c). Laura Katz Olson (Lehigh University) agreed that the elective Executive Council was not an effective working group.[9] Michael Parenti at first objected to the proposal on grounds that it would create a system of inherited leadership, but in the end, he endorsed the proposal and moved its adoption. The creation of a Coordinating Council was approved and its members were all endorsed by unanimous vote of the meeting, with a prompt to Victor Wallis urging the Committee on Structure to "work out the details of this issue for the future" (CNPS 1975c; Rensenbrink 1975e).

However, mainly due to a lack of timely communication and misperception, when Rensenbrink announced the appointment of the new Coordinating Council, it set off a major dispute between Rensenbrink and some of the activists from the founding generation of Caucus leaders.

Dankwart A. Rustow and Philippa Strum (1975) sent a letter to Rensenbrink informing him,

> We have been profoundly disturbed by what we perceive as the undemocratic and arbitrary manner in which Caucus policy has recently been proclaimed from Brunswick, Maine. As your immediate predecessors as chairpeople of the Caucus we are writing out of common concern for the survival of the Caucus. That we, as well as your current Co-Chairperson, feel shut out is a serious matter, and we hope you will give it your immediate and sincere attention.

The dispute, once again, was that Rensenbrink had allegedly appointed a Coordinating Council without consulting his cochair, although this allegation was false and based on misinformation (as there was no cochair at the time). Quite the contrary, Rensenbrink's announcement merely implemented the plan developed by the Committee on Structure, which had been approved on an ad hoc basis at the November 18 business meeting. This document had been discussed at the San Francisco APSA meeting, where it was decided to circulate the proposal to the general membership and to amend it as necessary after membership input. The document was circulated in the Caucus *Newsletter*, which had correctly presented the Wallis proposal for Caucus governance as a working document subject to change. Nevertheless, Rustow and Strum (1975) went on to chastise Rensenbrink:

> Nonetheless, without either waiting for the regional meetings at which the document could be discussed or polling the membership, and after the decision at Brown to postpone endorsement, you went ahead with the creation of a Coordinating Council whose very existence has not yet been approved. It is additionally disturbing to note that a very few repeated names—most of them, as far as we know, of persons, brought into Caucus activity under your personal aegis—were responsible for virtually all the articles in the Newsletter and that those few names, repeated again and again, constituted the overwhelming bulk of your premature appointments to CNPS office. Are we beginning to offer our profession the substitution of a Caucus oligarchy for that of the APSA?

Another disagreement surfaced between Sherill and the radical wing of the Caucus over the status of the *Newsletter*. Stephen M. Sachs, the

CNPS co-program coordinator (1975–76) wrote to Sherrill informing him that "there is a strong feeling among at least some of us that we ought to expand *New Political Science* into a journal" that would become "a counter journal to A.P.S.R." (Sachs 1975). The newly activated left wing of Caucus radicals, which included mostly Marxists and nonsectarian socialists were now attempting to push CNPS to become more of a counter-association similar to the Union for Radical Political Economics. However, Rensenbrink (1976c, 5) emphasized that as CNPS moved toward greater clarity in defining itself, it would not "end up with an avowedly Marxist, or still worse, a Marxist-Leninist orientation and organization." However, Rensenbrink (1977, 8) concluded the CNPS would become less of a pressure group within the APSA and "more like a counter-Association."

Politics & Society: The Journal Controversy

As early as 1969, various Caucus members had floated the idea of creating a new CNPS journal to compete with the *American Political Science Review*. The journal controversy was gaining momentum by 1974–75 under Rensenbrink's chairmanship mainly because of a disappointing experience with *Politics & Society*, which had been the organization's first foray into publishing a journal (Waldo 1975, 114; Seidelman 1985, 198). In 1969, Ira Katznelson and Marvin Surkin approached the CNPS Executive Committee to request start-up funding and an ongoing subsidy to start a new journal *Politics & Society*. The CNPS Executive Committee agreed to fund the journal in its first years of publication.[10] The journal published its first issue in November of 1970. The journal's editorial board consisted of Ira Katznelson (editor), Gordon Adams, Philip Brenner, Judith Coburn, Lewis Lipsitz, and Alan Wolfe, who were all CNPS members. Its 15-member group of advisory editors was a who's who of new political science, including Peter Bachrach, Henry Kariel, Ralph Miliband, and Michael Parenti, among others.

An introduction to the first issue stated the need for a new academic journal by invoking C. Wright Mills's (1959) searing indictment of the social sciences, which he criticized for "promoting 'a set of bureaucratic techniques which inhibit social inquiry by 'methodological' pretensions, which congest such work by obscurantist conceptions, or which trivialize it by concern with minor problems unconnected with publicly relevant issues'" ("Editorial Introduction" 1970, 1). The new journal's editors went

on to chastise the official political science association journals for being equally "obsessed with technique at the expense of imagination, significance, and readability." In contrast, *Politics & Society* was to provide "an alternative forum" for political scientists, sociologists, historians, and other scholars seeking to publish research in "undersupported areas of research," but with the requirement that articles be written in non-jargon-laden, "lucid English." The journal's editorial policy was to "encourage a variety of methodological approaches" but to reject any discussion of methodological questions divorced from a discussion of substantive issues ("Editorial Introduction" 1970, 1).

In its first years, *Politics & Society* emerged as a leading outlet for political analyses informed by Marxist or socialist theory, with articles by Robert Alford, Amy Beth Bridges, Stephen Eric Bronner, Alan Wolfe, Edward S. Greenberg, David Kettler, Claus Offe, Michael Parenti, Jean-Claude Girardin, Isaac Balbus, Manuel Castells, James Petras, and Immanuel Wallerstein.[11] By 1973, CNPS was on the verge of adopting *Politics & Society* as its official flagship journal. Phillipa Strum (1973a, 6), CNPS chair, reported cryptically in late 1973 that CNPS officers were "completing arrangements for a hook-up between CNPS and *Politics and Society*." However, two years later the draft report of Wallis's (1975b, 6) Committee on Structure proposed a "more purposeful relationship to *Politics & Society*."

At the same time, *Politics & Society* had sometimes served as a platform to castigate CNPS, with individuals like Alan Wolfe using it to vent their discontent with the organization. In fact, the relationship between CNPS and *Politics & Society* began unraveling in 1973, when the spring issue (vol. 3, no. 3) quietly discontinued the advisory editors and reconstituted the editorial board in ways that signaled its drift away from new political science. Bertell Ollman (2017b) observes that the journal's eventual separation from CNPS was almost to be expected: "The apostasy was not so great with Katznelson—he just wasn't as radical as the rest of us—but that Wolfe is something else!"[12]

Politics & Society began publishing fewer Marxist-oriented articles and began to carve out a niche as the platform for what would later be called "the new institutionalism" in political science. Indeed, only one issue after the journal initiated its separation from CNPS, *Politics & Society* would publish Theda Skocpol's (1973) review of Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, where she articulated the basic premise of the new institutionalism and state autonomy theory as a rejection of Marxist theories of the state (Barrow 1993, 126). Alan Wolfe left the journal in early 1976, to be replaced by Erik Olin Wright and Temma Kaplan in

late 1976. Fred Block and Theda Skocpol, two of the leading new institutionalists, were added to the *Politics & Society* editorial board in early 1979. By the second half of the 1970s, *Politics & Society* did not have any institutional or personal ties to CNPS.

To Be or Not to Be a Caucus

The disappointment with *Politics & Society* led to a discussion about whether the Caucus newsletter should become a journal, and this debate became a focal point of the long-standing debate within the Caucus over whether it should remain a caucus within the APSA or become an independent counter-association. The issue was raised at the November 18, 1975, business meeting at Brown University, where Rensenbrink said he wanted next year's slate of CNPS candidates for APSA office "to be more to the 'left'" (CNPS 1975c, 3). Theodore Norton responded with a motion that CNPS "spend no more money on elections for APSA office and that we rely on regular APSA channels to promote and make known our candidates for APSA office." Roelofs seconded the motion, and this set off a lengthy debate that revealed deep divisions over the issue (CNPS 1975c, 3).

Rustow unsuccessfully moved to postpone the motion and pointed out that CNPS was now spending less on elections than at any time in its history, since Bachrach's disappointing defeats in 1972 and 1973. Christian Bay also opposed the motion and argued instead that "we need to radicalize APSA members through regular political channels," but Norton questioned whether political education was best done "inside or outside of APSA." Michael Parenti also opposed the idea on grounds that such a policy "would tie our hands" at a time when the CNPS "might have a chance to take over the majority" of the APSA Council. He suggested that the Caucus should wait for the results of the next election and rely on those results as a guide for making such a decision (Bay, Norton, and Parenti quoted in CNPS 1975c, 3).[13] Parenti's position echoed a statement by Charles A. McCoy at the previous year's (1974) APSA convention: "Let's give APSA two more years in which to shape up" and, if not, then the Caucus should move toward becoming an independent counter-association (McCoy quoted in Rensenbrink 1974a, 3).

Joan Landes (Hampshire College) argued that even if CNPS won a majority on the APSA Council, it was no guarantee that Caucus positions would be adopted because "CNPS nominees to APSA office are not bound to or even instructed to follow a series of caucus positions; moreover, past

nominees have been notably lax in supporting positions with which the CNPS is identified." Roelofs concurred that instead of spending large sums of money to contest elections, the CNPS treasury would better be spent on "CNPS purposes," and Jean Bethke Elshtain agreed that the Caucus's limited funds were best spent "on other projects the CNPS might hope to undertake." In the end, Norton agreed to a friendly amendment to raise this question in the next issue of the Caucus newsletter and to put it to a vote of the general membership. The motion passed, but the depth of disagreement on the question is revealed by a Coordinating Council vote of nine for, eight against, and two abstentions (Roelofs, Elshtain, and Norton quoted in CNPS 1975c, 3)

Building a New Political Science

In addition to reorganizing the Caucus leadership structure and moving its nominees for APSA office to the left, Rensenbrink's tenure as chair and cochair facilitated another initiative that moved the CNPS in a more radical direction: its first independent conferences. At a Caucus Executive Committee meeting convened on January 4, 1975, Rensenbrink proposed a new CNPS Forum, which would be an independent and continuing forum on American politics. In a draft prospectus, Rensenbrink proposed that the first forum be organized on the theme "Is a Renewed American Revolution Possible Today?" The forum was proposed for June 19–22, 1975, and would be convened at the River House in York, Maine. While the forum would be composed mostly of CNPS members, Rensenbrink wanted to invite members of the Women's Caucus and the Black Caucus, as well as reporters from major media outlets, such as the *New York Times*, *Boston Globe*, *New Republic*, and *Washington Post*. In his draft prospectus, Rensenbrink identified 60 potential participants, which included prominent left-wing political scientists, economists, sociologists, historians, and philosophers. Rensenbrink (1975a) envisioned the forum as featuring "one or two major speeches, several duo-logues between two scholars around a book one of them has written, spontaneous meetings, workshops, roundtables . . . over a long weekend among sixty people in a manor house setting."

Following the initial forum, Rensenbrink suggested that the Caucus sponsor follow-up meetings in local areas that had a critical mass of CNPS members to carry the revolutionary theme outward to members throughout the country over the next several months (August 1975 to April 1976). Rensenbrink anticipated a second follow-up conference at the River

House with the title "The Science of a New American Revolution" to be held in April 1976, with more local follow-up meetings. Rensenbrink foresaw a third event, which would be a CNPS-sponsored conference convened parallel to the APSA meeting in Chicago in early September 1976, with the theme "The Science and Politics of a New American Revolution: Towards a Synthesis." If the Caucus could pull off this sequence of events, Rensenbrink (1975a) was convinced the Caucus would "have launched the Forum on a continuing basis." The first River House forum proved successful, although Rensenbrink's long-term plans failed to materialize due to a lack of funding and organizational capacity.[14]

However, a second and larger conference did materialize, when Morton Schoolman and Anthony Affigne informed Rensenbrink they had obtained "a substantial grant" from the Brown University Student Caucus to sponsor an independent CNPS conference, "Socialist Perspectives on Social Change in the United States" (CNPS 1975e).[15] This conference was convened at Brown University on November 7–9, 1975, with more than 200 panelists and attendees. The conference featured Sheldon Wolin and John Rensenbrink as keynote speakers, which was followed by eight panels and a concluding session over a three-day period (Schoolman 1975a). The panels all brought to bear a socialist perspective on various topics in US politics, foreign affairs, and the political science discipline (see Appendix C).

The panels at the "Socialist Perspectives" conference moved the Caucus in a more radical direction, as compared to its panels at the APSA conventions, by adopting an explicitly socialist perspective that gave some ideological coherence to the Caucus beyond its critique of official political science.[16] The faculty presenting papers at the conference were a who's who of the Caucus left wing, as most of the participants were mostly self-declared Marxists and nonsectarian socialists. The conference was organized with only one panel in the morning and one in the afternoon to ensure that all conference participants could attend every panel and to allow speakers more than a nominal 10-minute summary of their papers, as was now typical of an APSA convention. Beyond the regular panel format, each session was followed by small-group discussions led by a designated group leader. The conference not only was considered a great success by participants and CNPS officials but further launched the CNPS down the path of becoming an independent counter-association.[17]

Such a conference might seem commonplace today, when we have the Socialist Scholars / Left Forum Conference, the Rethinking Marxism Conference, and the Historical Materialism Conferences. At the time, however, it was almost a first of its kind. Furthermore, the success of the

"Socialist Perspectives" conference provided a springboard for further inroads into the APSA the following year (1976), when CNPS influence reached an unprecedented level due to the support of APSA President James MacGregor Burns. Burns was a panelist at the "Socialist Perspectives" conference as he was not a member of the behavioral Establishment, but a highly regarded specialist in leadership studies and the US presidency, who relied on historical, biographical, and psychoanalytic methods of analysis (Burns 1973). While hardly a radical, Burns was a member of the Caucus. Rensenbrink (1974c) wrote to the CNPS Executive Committee on October 24, 1974, that "Jim Burns will be filling positions, or be in a strong position to influence choice of people for positions, on the APSA program committee (especially program chairperson)." Toward this end, Rensenbrink met with Burns at his home in Williamstown, Massachusetts, on November 10, 1974. At that time, Burns indicated that he needed "more time to decide on persons for the program committee," but there is no doubt that Rensenbrink pushed for Caucus-friendly names (Rensenbrink 1974b).

Burns conveyed to Rensenbrink that he planned to take the Bicentennial of the American Revolution as an opportunity "to establish a new dimension to the presidential office," where the APSA president would take a "thematic lead and focus attention through the annual program on theoretical and/or practical issues encountered in the discipline." Thus, the APSA president could some bring some coherence to the APSA program outside "the present potpourri approach to panel formation." Importantly, Burns and Rensenbrink agreed that "many caucusites would be participating in the 'American Third Century' panels, some in leading roles." However, Burns conveyed strongly to Rensenbrink (1974b) that he hoped the Caucus's prominence in the 1976 APSA program would not erode "a durable 'two party system' in the profession," as he hoped the Caucus would continue to be "a significant and independent critical voice" within the APSA. The end result of these conversations was that Frances Fox Piven (Brooklyn College / CUNY) and Benjamin R. Barber were named cochairs of the APSA Program Committee on the United States Bicentennial (APSA 1976d, 440).

The CNPS sponsored 14 panels at the 1976 APSA convention, but it also scheduled several open meetings for a number of task forces that had been appointed to review various Caucus policies and organizational issues, such as political education, employment, academic freedom, and the writing of a CNPS constitution (APSA 1976c). The CNPS panels at the 1976 APSA meeting, where topics such as socialism, Marxism, imperial-

ism, class structure, dialectics, and revolution achieved unprecedented prominence (CNPS 1976e), revealed a noticeable shift to the left.

Rensenbrink and Sherrill wrote to CNPS members that the conference program at the 1976 APSA meeting in Chicago was "dramatic evidence of the force of the Caucus for a New Political Science. The Caucus program is perhaps the best we have ever done. . . . The APSA program, relative to *its* past, is positively stunning, and we may indeed point out that this has been done under the leadership of Caucus members Frances Fox Piven and Ben Barber, who were appointed by Caucus endorsed (and Caucus member) President Jim Burns" (Rensenbrink and Sherrill 1976).

On the other hand, the prominence of Caucusites on the APSA president's themed Bicentennial panels "appalled" former-APSA president Heinz Eulau (1976), who wrote to *PS,*

> The program has gone completely berserk and out of hand. Not only do the Caucusites monopolize the Bicentennial Sequence, so-called, but they also have their own "Caucus for a New Political Science" panels. And for the Regulars there are not only regular panels but, if they are unhappy with regularity, those alternate panels where you can meet some deviants. If you are still unhappy, there are the panels of the "Foundations of Political Theory Group" whoever in hell they are . . . or the "Women's Caucus for Political Science." . . . There are many other program goodies that make my mouth water and almost leave me speechless.

Eulau (1976) was dismayed by the growing "balkanization" of the discipline and complained about "spoilers like the 'Policy Studies Organization' . . . let's do anything to make our discipline policy-relevant!" In a not so veiled shot at David Easton for allowing these tendencies to take hold in APSA, Eulau (1976) concluded his rant with "You get the point! Some smart prophet once called it 'The New Revolution in Political Science.'"

In 1976, CNPS could point to seven of its member or allies on the APSA Council, including Hayward R. Alker Jr., Benjamin R. Barber, James David Barber, Leonard Binder, James MacGregor Burns, Frances Fox Piven, and Mulford Q. Sibley (APSA 1976e, 50). These members carried one significant resolution through the APSA Council, which responded to the April 19, 1976, final report of the US Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (1978). After more than a year of public hearings and investigations, the Senate report documented a pattern of illegal activities by US intelligence agen-

cies that included wiretaps of US citizens, the infiltration and surveillance of domestic political organizations, the assassination of foreign government officials, and the orchestration of coups d'état against democratically elected governments in foreign countries. It was also revealed that US social scientists were regularly recruited to collect intelligence under the cover of conducting field research.

At the August 31, 1976, meeting of the APSA Council, Frances Fox Piven called attention to a recent resolution of the AAUP that had been adopted in response to the Senate report. Piven moved that the APSA adopt its own resolution drawing "attention to the dangers which the activities of the covert intelligence agencies of the United States pose to the integrity of academic institutions" and "declare its firm opposition to any initiative by government agencies to involve academics in covert intelligence operations under the guise of academic research" (APSA 1976e, 55). Samuel Beer offered a substitute motion to refer the matter to the Committee on Professional Ethics and Academic Freedom, which passed by a show of hands 11 to 9. In response, James David Barber offered a second resolution that the APSA declare "its firm opposition to any initiative by governmental agencies to involve academics in covert intelligence operations under the guise of academic research." This abridged version of the resolution passed 13 to 7 after it "was fiercely debated for two hours" and was carried by the block vote of CNPS representatives on the Council allied with a few American politics specialists, who were not participating in research outside the United States (CNPS 1977b).

Rensenbrink and his supporters in the Caucus were also successful in nominating the most left-wing slate of candidates in Caucus history up to that point. The APSA Nominating Committee put forward John C. Wahlke as president-elect. Wahlke was a member of the Ad Hoc Committee for a Representative Slate's Executive Committee, and the Caucus countered his nomination with Frances Fox Piven (APSA 1977a). Wahlke was a professor of political science at the University of Iowa who strongly emphasized his commitment to the so-called science of political science.[18] While he conceded that the behavioral revolution had delivered less than it promised, he countered its post-behavioral critics by suggesting that the shortcomings of behavioralism were not due to its epistemological assumptions, which he accepted, but due to the fact that behavioralism in practice was still pre-behavioral. Wahlke (1979, 9) was one of the first political scientists to argue that the discipline should incorporate the findings of the biobehavioral sciences, such as neurophysiological science, psychophysiology, and psychophysics to "correct mistaken assumptions of the rela-

tionship between political attitudes, political words, and political actions." While disclaiming "any form of associational orthodoxy in matters of philosophy or method of research," Wahlke nevertheless emphasized that he fully subscribed "to the Association's constitutional principle requiring it to be nonpartisan and to avoid involvement as an association in political and social issues which do not impinge directly on the academic freedom or professional life of its members" (AAA 1976).

Frances Fox Piven[19] was a professor of political science at Boston University, where she was a colleague of self-professed "radicals," including Howard Zinn[20] and Murray Levin. Piven had achieved notoriety, along with her husband Richard A. Cloward,[21] when they published an article in *The Nation* promoting increased enrollment in social welfare programs as a way to collapse the existing welfare system and force government leaders to replace it with a guaranteed annual income (Piven and Cloward 1966, 2011). Their book on *Regulating the Poor* (1971), which criticized liberal social welfare programs as forms of social control, rather than as a way to ameliorate poverty, brought Piven widespread recognition inside and outside academia. Piven argued that

> despite claims to neutrality, the Association promotes some kinds of political inquiry, and denigrates other kinds. It does this in planning of the Annual Program, in distributing scholarly awards, in selecting the editor of the APSR, and in elevating some scholars and teachers—and not others—to positions of eminence in the discipline. For the most part, these activities of the Association have created a bias toward a narrow empiricism that pretends to neutrality and objectivity in political matters, while stubbornly ignoring the institutional and intellectual contexts in which scholarly work is conducted and applied, which are not neutral at all. (AAA 1976)

Piven promised to pay greater attention to the problems of faculty at smaller schools, the problems of unemployed political scientists, and the problems of women, minorities, and political radicals, who are "often the first fired as a result of university cutbacks" (AAA 1976). Piven was the first woman ever nominated for APSA president, and, as such, she received the endorsement of the Women's Caucus for Political Science. She was also considered the most radical candidate yet nominated by CNPS. In addition to Piven, the Caucus nominated Hayward R. Alker Jr. and Philip E. Converse for vice president; Robert Alford for secretary, and Dina Zinnes for treasurer. For APSA Council, the Caucus nominated Benjamin

R. Barber, Marguerite Ross Barnett, Amy Beth Bridges, Samuel Hendel, Chun-tu Hsueh, Alfred C. Meyer, Bertell Ollman, and Don Van Atta. The Women's Caucus co-endorsed Alker, Converse, Zinnes, Barber, and Barnett.

The APSA Nominating Committee issued a statement saying only that its nominees were "distinguished and representative of the fields and interests of the Association's members" (AAA 1977). The Ad Hoc Committee reasserted its position that its candidates "are committed to maintaining the Association as an organization that is hospitable to all points of view and approaches to the study and teaching of politics" (AAA 1977). Thus, the Caucus countered with the statement,

> We desire neither an arid dogmatism in which diversity is stifled nor a lax pluralism in which openness for the sake of being open overrides the serious commitment to finding better answers to problems of knowledge and politics. Yet, the institutional surroundings in which we work subtly shape and restrict the direction of our political science. New or controversial perspectives have hard sledding, especially perspectives which are oriented to the problems of those who are without power and whose interests are ordinarily ignored. It takes conscious effort therefore to keep our discipline open in the sense that the kind of work we do collectively is oriented to the problems of all people, classes, and groups—and not just those who are powerful and privileged. (AAA 1977)

By 1976, universities were enduring harsh fiscal austerity measures in the wake of the Great Recession of 1974–75, which meant that academic jobs were increasingly scarce at a time when overt academic and ideological repression was on the rise in US universities. The CNPS agenda was subtly changing to recognize that one could not pursue a new political science without creating safe spaces for radical academics to pursue their work within universities and within the APSA, as David Kettler had warned five years earlier. Thus, the politics of CNPS was steadily narrowing from large-scale social activism to university politics and policies. In 1976, only Barnett and Converse were elected from the Caucus slate, which meant that, with turnover, Caucus representation on the Council declined from seven to five members, and it would continue on a downward slide for the remainder of the decade (APSA 1977c, 349; 1977d, 473).

Constitution and Bylaws

The waning electoral fortunes of the Caucus, which were partly due to its purposeful shift away from APSA electoral politics, nevertheless gave added impetus to the drive to establish CNPS as an independent organization. As a follow-up to the report of the Committee on Structure, Victor Wallis and Stephen M. Sachs prepared a draft version of a CNPS constitution that was completed in early spring of 1976 (CNPS 1976b). The draft constitution was reviewed by the Coordinating Council at a meeting on March 27, 1976 (CNPS 1976d).[22] The first sentence of the preamble declared:

> The Caucus for a New Political Science was formed in order to help make the study of politics relevant to the struggle for a better world.[23] As an educational organization, it offers a forum to diverse positions within the framework of this struggle. At the same time, it recognizes that political study and criticism, it is to be effective, must cease to a purely "professional" concern and must instead become a function of the community as a whole. Accordingly, the Caucus will seek access to general as well as specialized audiences, and it will also strive to regulate its own affairs in a manner consistent with its commitment to maximizing well-informed political participation. (CNPS 1976b; see also Wallis 1977a)

The draft constitution allowed "anyone who agrees with the broad aims of the Caucus"—not just APSA members—to join the Caucus upon payment of annual dues. It mandated a progressive dues structure with the actual rates set by the annual business meeting. The draft constitution established a "soviet" or "council" form of governance with four levels of policymaking bodies: Caucus officers, Coordinating Council, Caucus Assembly, and general membership, with the highest order of collective power vested in the general membership.

The Caucus officers included a chairperson who was responsible for acting as the official representative of the Caucus, chairing national meetings, reviewing the work of Caucus committees and task forces, and distributing an annual report the general membership. The other three officers were the secretary-treasurer, APSA program coordinator, and publications coordinator. Officers were elected to one-year terms by mail ballots sent to the general membership. The Coordinating Council included all Caucus officers, the coordinators of all Caucus task forces and committees, the elected regional coordinators,[24] and four at-large repre-

sentatives elected by mail ballots sent to the general membership. Task forces and committees were authorized by the Coordinating Council or general membership (annual business meeting), although the actual members of task forces and committees were appointed by the chairperson. The draft constitution also contained a provision allowing "any groups within the membership which might otherwise suffer discrimination" and which constituted at least 5% of Caucus membership to automatically receive a position on the Coordinating Council by direct initiative (Wallis 1977a).

The Assembly was an idiosyncratic feature of the draft constitution, which was a New Left compromise between direct participatory democracy and representative government. While major decisions were normally made by the general membership at annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, it was recognized that events change quickly, emergencies arise, and unforeseen circumstances require that decisions be made more than once per year. The Assembly consisted of "the Coordinating Council, all other members of the Caucus task forces and committees, and also any 'at large' volunteer members" (CNPS 1978a, 1978b). The at-large members merely had to declare their intent to volunteer for the Assembly in writing to the Caucus chair, and there was no limit on the number of years that an individual could serve on the Assembly. The Assembly was authorized to make policy decisions for the organization between annual meetings of the APSA. In practice, the Assembly largely consisted of members living in New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New England, because a majority of Caucus members lived in these states.[25]

Finally, the draft constitution required that the general membership be convened annually in August or September during meetings of the APSA, with two additional business meetings scheduled each year in regions other than the APSA meeting. The draft constitution was revised and adopted at the annual CNPS business meeting in 1976, with the constitution becoming effective on March 15, 1977, unless at least 20% of the general membership wrote to the CNPS chair to indicate their disapproval. On March 15, 1977, the CNPS finally completed its decade-long journey from spontaneous affinity group to group-in-fusion to institutionalized organization. It was now independent of the APSA but still dependent on it (CNPS 1978b). The organization's new status was secured when Stephen M. Sachs was elected CNPS chair (1976–77) at the 1976 APSA convention in Chicago.

Shortly after his election, Sachs (1976, 3) informed members that

"beyond election campaigning . . . our first priority should be enhancing the development of a new political science." One of Sach's (1976, 3) key projects would be to advance this goal by converting *New Political Science* "from a newsletter with overtones of a journal into a journal, but one that still fulfills our need for a newsletter." With the Caucus now spending less money on electoral activities, there would be more funds available to publish more and larger issues of *New Political Science*. To facilitate the transition from newsletter to journal, the Caucus established a new Publications Committee to manage the journal, along with a journal editorial board, which would set policy for the journal, but also be responsible for soliciting and reviewing article submissions.

During its transition phase, the plan was for *New Political Science* to consist primarily of short one- to two-page book reviews, short articles on the state of the profession, and summary articles and announcements of new works in progress. The plan was to publish no more than one longer article or symposia in each issue with the expectation that *New Political Science* would be published four times per year. In addition, *New Political Science* would continue to include announcements of events, conferences, CNPS reports, and member comments on CNPS business (Sachs 1977, 4). Harry Vanden (University of South Florida) was appointed as the first coordinator of the new editorial board.

A second Sachs project involved setting up a series of debates between Caucus members and behaviorally oriented scholars on epistemological and substantive problems in political science. This was an effort to carry forward Rensenbrink's earlier proposal for an ongoing Caucus forum, which would sponsor a series of debates on university campuses throughout the country to spotlight the expertise of Caucus faculty working on those campuses (Sachs 1977, 4; also see Norris 1977). At an organizational level, Sachs was enthusiastic about implementing the new Caucus constitution and bylaws, while trying to expand and strengthen Caucus activities at the regional political science associations.

Finally, Sachs attempted to implement Malecki's earlier idea of establishing working partnerships with other radical caucuses. CNPS, in conjunction with the Union for Radical Political Economics, agreed to cosponsor the Fifth Annual Conference of the Union of Marxist Social Scientists (UMSS). At the time, UMSS was an annual conference held in the foothills of the Sierra Nevada mountains near Nevada City, California. The conference was advertised as "a socialist conference in both form and content" (Sachs 1977, 5). Sachs (1977, 4) considered the UMSS conferences "very successful," as evidenced by the fact that its conferences normally

drew about 800 attendees (see UMSS Los Angeles Collective 1974). The Midwest Caucus for a New Political Science similarly agreed to participate in the "Conference for a Relevant Social Science" (April 1–3, 1977), which was generally focused on workers' self-management, economic democracy, and community self-governance.

The Move Toward Socialism

For the first time in a decade, the Caucus did not introduce any resolutions at the 1977 APSA business meeting as its organizational revolt continued to wind down and the Caucus moved more toward becoming a counter-association. As the Caucus scaled back its caucus-type activities, its representation on the APSA Council continued declining, so it could only claim four representatives on the Council by 1977 (APSA 1978a, 44). However, it was no doubt to Heinz Eulau's continuing chagrin that CNPS continued building on its earlier success with conference panels, when it sponsored 18 panels at the 1977 APSA convention, as well as a workshop titled "Radical Teaching," two open meetings of its new Coordinating Council, a general membership business meeting, and four open task force meetings (APSA 1977b; CNPS 1976c, 1977a). Its panels now covered a range of topics in American politics, comparative politics, political economy, and political theory, which would not ordinarily have been on the regular APSA program. With conference panels on workplace democracy, power structure research, critical theory, market socialism, and dialectics, the Caucus continued its leftward drift by nominating C. B. Macpherson[26] to oppose Leon D. Epstein, as the APSA's nominee for president-elect. This was the first time in APSA history that a self-identified Marxist had ever been nominated for APSA president.

Epstein (1967) received his PhD from the University of Chicago and was considered an expert on political parties. He had been a key figure in leading the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin–Madison in a more behavioral direction while serving as chair (1960–63) and college dean (1965–69). In contrast, Macpherson was a colleague of Christian Bay's at the University of Toronto, where he taught political economy and political theory. While Macpherson was widely recognized as a political theorist, he had received an MSc in economics from the London School of Economics, where he studied with Harold Laski. MacPherson is best known for *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (1962). Macpherson (1966, 1977) was a highly regarded critic of the limita-

tions of liberal democracy as it operated with the constraints of capitalism. MacPherson (1973, chap. 7) had also published a devastating response to Milton Friedman's *Capitalism and Freedom* (1962), where he rebutted Friedman's claim that capitalism was a system of voluntary exchange operating without coercion, while he defended socialism against Friedman's assertion that it was incompatible with freedom.

The Caucus slate included Jewel Prestage and H. Mark Roelofs for vice president; Adolph Reed Jr. for secretary; and Michael Rogin for treasurer. For APSA Council, the Caucus nominated Peter Bachrach, Jo Freeman, Maria Fulco, Ira Katznelson, Pat Rector, Inez Smith Reid, Stephen M. Sachs, and Mulford Q. Sibley. Bachrach and Freeman were co-endorsed by the Women's Caucus (APSA 1978b). However, the CNPS continued to lose ground in APSA elections and, after the 1977 election, the behavioral Establishment reestablished its control of the APSA Council, with only two Caucus members still serving on the Council (APSA 1978d, 397).

Nevertheless, the following year (1978), the CNPS sponsored 21 panels and six workshops at the APSA convention, which not only gave it a significant presence in the APSA conference program but also injected a noticeable upsurge of socialism and Marxism into the APSA program (APSA 1978c, 206; CNPS 1978e; see Table 2).

The CNPS continued to scale back its caucus-like activities in 1978, although it did submit one resolution on the Bertell Ollman academic freedom case (APSA 1979a, 1979b, 1979d). The Caucus again submitted a full slate of candidates for APSA office, which was headlined by its nomination of Bertell Ollman to run against Warren E. Miller, the APSA nominee (APSA 1979c, 40–41).[27] The two candidates could not have provided a starker contrast between two competing visions of the political science discipline. Miller was the archetype behavioralist renowned as one of the coauthors of the paradigmatic behavioralist classic, *The American Voter* (1960), with Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, and Donald Stokes. This book, which was based on survey research conducted by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center, established the so-called social-psychological "Michigan school" of voter behavior analysis. Miller was also heralded as a leading founder of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan, and he had played an important role in starting the biannual National Election Studies database.

In contrast, Ollman was an Oxford-trained Marxist political theorist who taught at New York University. In many ways, Ollman's nomination signaled the Caucus's widening organizational break with APSA. Ollman

TABLE 2. CNPS Panels at APSA Convention, 1978

Critical Social Theory and Practice	Chair: Henry S. Kariel, University of Hawaii
The Works of Louis Althusser	Chair: Enid Hill, American University in Cairo
Workshop in Dialectics II: Problem of Contradictions	Chair: Bertell Ollman, New York University
Phenomenological Perspectives	Chair: Richard A. Beth, Boston University
Roundtable on Radical Politics and Everyday Life	Chair: Steve Fisher and James Foster, Emory & Henry College
The American Left	Chair: Mulford Q. Sibley
Is There an American Praxis?	Chair: John Rensenbrink, Bowdoin College
Third World Marxism	Chair: Harry Vanden, University of South Florida
Psychological Perspectives on Social Change in Socialist Societies	Chair: Karen Rosenblum-Cale, Socialist Studies Committee
Self Management	Chair: Stephen M. Sachs, IUPUI
Stalinism and Neo-Stalinism	Chair: Stephen Cohen, Princeton University
Perspectives on Political Dissent	Chair: Harvey Fireside, Ithaca College
Roundtable of Former Prisoners	Chair: Robert Sharlet, Union College
Public-Private Policy Linkages	Chair: Henry Steck, SUNY, Cortland
Women and Public Policy	Chair: Ruth A. Schwartz
U.S. Energy Policy: Corporate Capitalism	Chair: Randal H. Ihara, Kentucky Ctr for Energy Research
Marx and Freud	Chair: Jean Bethke Elshtain, UMass Amherst
Walzer's "Just and Unjust Wars": An Evaluation	Chair: Jon Weiner, University of California, Irvine
The Left in Europe	Chair: Victor Wallis, IUPUI
Contemporary Perspectives on Radical Policy Economy	Chair: Timothy Luke, Washington University
Public Policy in Education	Chair; Louis Comfort, San Jose State University

Source: Compiled from information in APSA 1978c.

was a leading figure in the rise of academic Marxism in US political science during the 1970s and 1980s. He was catapulted to academic prominence by his first book, *Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society* (1971), which was published by the prestigious Cambridge University Press. Sales of the book were so robust that it was reprinted three times (1972, 1973, 1975) and then released in a second edition (1976), which was reprinted two more times (1977, 1978). Ollman's *Alienation* was recognized immediately as a major contribution to the development of "human-

ist Marxism" in Western political theory, which reanchored Marxism in Marx's early philosophical writings, such as *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, as opposed to his later economic writings, such as *Das Kapital* (Seigel 1973). Ollman (2017b) boasted that he had proposed "the most radical program statement of any of those offered by the other Caucus candidates who ran for this office," although he acknowledged that his radicalism was "at least partly responsible for why I got the lowest vote (27%) among our Caucus candidates. But I think this figure represents how radical—even Marxist—most of the Caucus was at the time, and . . . how close so many other members of our discipline were to sharing these views" (see Ollman 1978c).

In addition to Ollman, the Caucus nominated Christian Bay and Mulford Q. Sibley for vice president, Stephen M. Sachs for secretary, and Betty Glad for treasurer. The Caucus's APSA Council nominees were Joel Edelstein, Jo Freeman, Jane Gruenebaum, Richard Lipsky, Alfred G. Meyer, Laura Katz Olson, Judith Stiehm, and Harry E. Vanden. This list of nominees signaled a passing of the torch to a new generation of young radicals, who were mostly committed to "socialism" in some form. The Women's Caucus endorsed most of the Caucus's nominees, including Bay, Sachs, Glad, Freeman, Gruenebaum, Lipsky, Olson, and Stiehm. The Ad Hoc Committee (1978) endorsed the APSA nominees and again sent a letter to APSA members suggesting that "the slate nominated by the Caucus for a New Political Science . . . if elected, would almost certainly attempt to commit the Association to political activities on behalf of one narrow ideology."[28] None of the Caucus candidates were elected that year, and after the election Peter Bachrach was the sole Caucus member left on the APSA Council (APSA 1979f, 485).

Yet, in 1979, the CNPS sponsored 20 panels at the APSA convention, including three panels cosponsored with the Comparative Socialist Studies Committee. This new relationship with a sister organization signaled the Caucus's new commitment to a positive affirmation of socialism as its members moved beyond the critique of behavioralism and pluralist theory to embrace various strands of Marxism, critical theory, feminism, and on rare occasions, the existential phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty or Jean-Paul Sartre (APSA 1979e). As the Caucus moved steadily toward establishing itself as an independent socialist counter-association, the imperative to engage official political science, politically or intellectually, began to wane on the cusp of a new decade. Thus, instead of panels devoted to the critique of behavioralism and pluralist theory or to the social responsibility of political scientists, the Caucus-sponsored panels in

1979 were devoted to topics such as dialectics, Lenin, Stalin, Gramsci, Eurocommunism, Habermas, critical theory, workers' self-management, and socialist feminism.

The Caucus panels drew approximately 266 attendees (16 per panel on average), but the APSA plenary session alone drew 240 attendees and APSA regular session panels recorded 4,284 attendees, which meant that attendance at CNPS panels was 6.2% of the total attendance at APSA regular session panels (APSA 1980a). Moreover, by 1979, CNPS had set in motion a process of parallel and cosponsored panels that resulted in 33 "unaffiliated groups" sponsoring panels that were listed in the 1979 APSA program. These panels' total attendance of 2,416 meant that unaffiliated groups now accounted for 56 percent of the total attendance at APSA conference panels. Thus, CNPS had set in motion a movement that was steadily eroding the discipline's hegemonic center by building a new and more diverse political science around that core.

However, this also meant that by 1979, CNPS was just one of many special interest groups, and it was now competing with other unaffiliated groups such as the Comparative Socialist Studies Committee, the Conference Group on the Political Economy of Advanced Industrial Societies, the Foundations of Political Theory Group, and the Women's Caucus for Political Science for panel attendance.[29] At the same time, the 1979 APSA convention was the last hurrah for CNPS's foray into APSA electoral politics. By the time political scientists assembled for the APSA convention in late August 1979, there was only one Caucus sympathizer left on the APSA Council (Betty Glad). When the APSA Nominating Committee put forward Charles E. Lindblom as president-elect of the APSA, the CNPS countered with the Marxist Michael Parenti.

Lindblom had come to occupy an odd position in the political science discipline because his thought had evolved in a leftward direction over the course of his career. Lindblom was a professor of political science and economics at Yale University, where he had been a colleague and collaborator of Robert A. Dahl's, who worked with him to operationalize the concept of pluralism as an "empirical" theory (Dahl and Lindblom 1953). Lindblom (1959) was an early advocate of the theory of incrementalism, which argued that US political institutions made "revolutionary" change impossible, and that policy evolved in incremental baby steps. Early in his career, Lindblom (along with Dahl) had rejected Marxist class theory and C. Wright Mills's theory of a power elite to argue instead that plural elites compete and bargain with one another for control of government and its policies. Lindblom, in particular, had argued that peaceful competition

and compromise between political and economic elites—politics and markets—was the key to maintaining liberal democracy and a robust market economy.

However, by the time Lindblom was nominated for APSA president, he had come to the conclusion that liberal democracies were not pluralistic, but polyarchal, because the power of different elites was asymmetrical and unequal. This line of thought culminated in the publication of *Politics and Markets* (1977), where Lindblom famously introduced the concept of the "privileged position of business" as a key to understanding the politics of liberal democracies as a "prisoner" of corporations and capitalist markets (Lindblom 1982). Lindblom's book was so provocative that Mobil Corporation (1978, A21) took out a full-page advertisement in the *New York Times* to denounce it.

A decade earlier, the 1979 version of Lindblom was one the CNPS would have endorsed with enthusiasm, but the Caucus had moved further and further to left over the last five years, and it was nominally on its way out of the APSA anyway. Thus, as if to out-do the Ollman nomination a year earlier, the Caucus nominated Michael Parenti as president-elect. Whereas Ollman was an ethereal Oxford scholar, Parenti received his PhD at Yale University, where Lindblom and Dahl taught, and at a time when the Yale political science department was a driving force in the development of pluralist theory and behavioral methodology. Parenti was a prolific scholar, a harsh critic of pluralist theory, and a fiery speaker who was wildly popular on the left because he exemplified the Marxist concept of praxis in his own life.

Parenti was not just a scholar but a political activist who had been dismissed from the University of Vermont in 1972 despite being a highly productive scholar who had been recommended for contract renewal by the faculty. The Vermont Board of Trustees refused to approve Parenti's contract renewal on grounds that he engaged in "unprofessional conduct." His unprofessional conduct included carrying the flag of the National Liberation Front at an antiwar demonstration in downtown Burlington, publicly expressing antibusiness attitudes, and refusing to say the Pledge of Allegiance during an invited talk at the Burlington Rotary Club (Hegel 1986). Parenti was later beaten and arrested during an antiwar demonstration at the University of Illinois. The Caucus completed its final slate of nominees for APSA office with Peter Bachrach, Dale Rogers Marshall, and Frances Fox Piven for vice president; Philippa Strum for secretary, and Betty Glad for treasurer. For APSA Council, the Caucus nominated Jo Freeman, Martin Gruberg, Marian Lief Palley, Stephen M. Sachs, and Mulford Q. Sibley.

Marshall, Piven, Strum, Glad, Freeman, Gruberg, and Palley were co-endorsed by the Women's Caucus (APSA 1980d, 32).

The Insurgency Ends

Following the 1979 APSA election, the APSA Council was once again a solid wall of behavioral orthodoxy, and all that had really changed after 10 years of electoral contests is that four of the Council's 24 members were now women (APSA 1980c, 28). The *APSR* was more solidly behavioral than at any time in its history after a succession of editors that included Austin Ranney, Nelson Polsby, and Charles O. Jones. However, the Caucus had become a visible presence at APSA conventions, and it had brought a critical perspective into the conference program that had been completely absent prior to 1967. Caucus members were authoring monographs, journal articles, and best-selling textbooks that challenged official political science on a wide range of topics in domestic and foreign policy, while bringing a sympathetic treatment of the plight of exploited and oppressed groups and classes to discussions of American politics, comparative politics, and international relations. The Caucus had been instrumental in promoting a post-behavioral revolution in political science, and, importantly, by the end of the 1970s socialism and Marxism were being widely discussed in the discipline. Furthermore, the Caucus had thwarted the most egregious efforts to further consolidate the power of an academic oligarchy with a repressive constitution, and it had even won concessions that made APSA operations more transparent to members.

Yet, as the New Left learned generally by the end of the 1970s, democracy itself was not enough to carry the day. As internal Caucus critics had always alleged, political scientists were strongly attached to corporations and the state through funding agencies, but also in terms of their ideological loyalties. While the CNPS came painfully close to winning the APSA presidency in 1973 with Peter Bachrach, and in some ways did win in 1974 with James MacGregor Burns, its fortunes waned after this high point of influence. The Caucus's declining influence was partly because many of the liberal and democratic reforms secured by the CNPS splintered its coalition with the Women's Caucus, the Black Caucus, and the Chicano Caucus, whose leaders were increasingly co-opted into the APSA Establishment with funding for behavioral studies of these previously neglected groups. As the Caucus took a more radical and even explicitly socialist turn after 1974, many liberals were not willing to follow the Caucus down



Figure 1: APSA Presidential Election Results, 1969 to 1979. Source: Tabulated from data reported in "Committee Reports" in No. 1 issues of *PS* (1969–1980).

that road. Political scientists were simply not as radical as their counterparts in sociology, economics, anthropology, history, philosophy, or modern languages.

Following Hans Morgenthau's failed bid for the APSA presidency in 1970, the CNPS nominated Richard A. Falk (1971) and then Peter Bachrach for the presidency (1972–73), with Bachrach capturing 49.5% of the vote in 1972 and coming within 59 votes (out of 6,471 cast) of winning the presidency (see Figure 1). Following presidential bids by Murray Edelman (40.6%), Frances Fox Piven (37.9%), C. B. MacPherson (29.5%), Bertell Ollman (28.4%), and Michael Parenti (21.1%), the Caucus ceased to run any candidates for APSA office. Organizational politics returned to normal when the officers and Council members nominated by the APSA Nominating Committee "were elected unanimously in an uncontested election at the 1980 Annual Business Meeting of the Association" (APSA 1980g, 476).

7

From Organizational Revolt to Organized Section, 1979–1991

Following its founding in 1967, the Caucus for a New Political Science (CNPS) led an organizational revolt within the American Political Science Association (APSA). This revolt challenged the neglect of salient political issues and social movements in the annual conference program, the marginal status of women and nonwhites in the profession, the lack of attention to pedagogy in political science, the absence of contested democratic elections in the APSA, and the emerging behavioral orthodoxy of the *American Political Science Review* (*APSR*). The Caucus's initial phase of organizational revolt was most visible in a series of contested APSA elections (1969–79), where CNPS ran its own slate of candidates for the APSA presidency and APSA Council.

However, CNPS was severely criticized, on the one hand, for engaging in an internal organizational revolt as opposed to a strategy of external political revolution (Wolfe), while on the other hand, it was criticized (Lowi) for attempting to reform the political science *profession* (i.e., the APSA) instead of promoting an intellectual revolution in the *discipline* of political science. After decisive electoral defeats of the Caucus's APSA presidential candidates in 1978 (Ollman) and 1979 (Parenti), the CNPS adopted a new "double identity," which sought to pursue the twin goals of political revolution and intellectual revolution. The Caucus sought to become a counter-association working outside the institutional framework of the APSA, while simultaneously maintaining a presence within the APSA through panels on the annual conference program.

Yet, despite John Rensenbrink's efforts to strengthen the Caucus's internal organization, by the mid-1980s its organizational infrastructure was collapsing, its new flagship journal *New Political Science* was in crisis,

and the APSA was gradually phasing CNPS out of the annual conference program. Consequently, CNPS eventually returned to its origins as a caucus within the APSA—albeit it now in the form of an official organized section of the APSA, while the CNPS counter-association continued to exist as a shadow organization for the sole purpose of publishing *New Political Science*. The period from 1979 to 1991 marks a distinct phase of development in the political history of CNPS, which is demarcated on one end by its abrupt withdrawal from APSA electoral politics and, on the other end, by its reentry into the APSA as an organized section in 1991. In the end, CNPS found that it did not have the organizational capacity, nor enough intellectual support within the broader political science discipline, to launch a counter-association comparable to those in economics, sociology, history, or philosophy. Thus, CNPS returned to its origins as a "caucus" within the APSA, but with a more modest goal of facilitating the careers of radical scholars by creating a safe haven for radical scholarship that played within the established rules of the professional game—journal publications, books, APSA conference presentations, and the conferring of official awards.

The Double Identity Strategy

As discussed in earlier chapters, the CNPS was founded spontaneously in 1967 as a "caucus" within the APSA for the purpose of doing the things that caucuses do—to advocate for specific policies or resolutions and to nominate candidates for elective office. Beginning in 1975, however, the Caucus's electoral fortunes began to decline at an accelerating rate in a dialectical process where the Caucus began withdrawing financial and organizational resources from its electoral campaigns while nominating increasingly radical, and eventually Marxist, candidates for APSA office. As its electoral fortunes declined further, CNPS withdrew nearly all support for electoral campaigns within the APSA, while it drifted further to the left with its nominees for APSA office. In 1977, C. B. MacPherson won 29.5% of the vote for APSA president, while in 1978 Bertell Ollman captured 28.4% of the vote, followed in 1979 by Michael Parenti's just 21.1% of the vote. By 1977, it was apparent to the newly elected CNPS chair, Victor Wallis (1977b, 6), that the Caucus was now permanently "stuck with a confirmed minority position within the Association."

As a result, CNPS reduced its expenditures on electoral campaigns to near zero in 1977 (Wallis 1977b, 6), and it ceased running candidates for

APSA office after 1979. Moreover, with opportunities to win electoral office in the APSA waning each year, CNPS leadership concluded that any arguments for "increased moderation" as a tactic for winning over an indecisive silent majority of disenchanted liberals and critical pluralists within the APSA were no longer relevant considerations. While serving as CNPS chair at this critical juncture in the organization's history, Wallis (1977b, 5) suggested that the current electoral crisis "clearly pointed toward radicalization" of the Caucus and a greater emphasis on its prospects as a counter-association to the APSA. Thus, when CNPS nominated Bertell Ollman for APSA president in 1978, the CNPS officially declared itself a "socialist" organization and two years later declared itself a "socialist-feminist" organization (Rensenbrink 1982a, 94).

Bertell Ollman's resounding defeat in the 1978 election for APSA president signaled the collapse of the CNPS electoral strategy within the APSA. Not only did the Caucus candidate lose the presidential election by an overwhelming majority, but the Caucus also lost all contested seats on the APSA Council after having won five of eight contested Council seats as recently as 1974. The 1978 electoral defeat posed an immediate and urgent question whether the Caucus should even continue to exist as a dissident organization within APSA. If the purpose of a caucus is to nominate candidates and propose policy resolutions, but it is no longer doing those things, then in what sense can it continue to exist as a caucus?

The collapse of the CNPS organizational revolt thus set the stage for what John Rensenbrink described as "a socialist takeover" of the CNPS at its September 1978 business meeting. The 1978 APSA meeting was convened in New York City, which facilitated an unusually high turnout among radical graduate students and young professors from New York City and its environs. However, unlike the Caucus's founding in 1967, the socialist takeover was not a spontaneous event, but one that had been in the works since John Rensenbrink was first elected CNPS chair in 1974–76. In preparation for the 1978 APSA convention in New York City, Christian Bay (1978b) circulated a letter to a dozen of the more radical CNPS leaders on August 4, 1978, suggesting they convene a "pre-Council meeting" in New York City to plan the CNPS business meeting.[1] This informal "takeover" meeting was scheduled for the evening of August 30, 1978, at Bertell Ollman's apartment, and Bay (1978b) suggested that "some of us overpaid senior people might take along a little booze to make the world seem a bit better."[2]

When the CNPS business meeting convened a few days later, Rensenbrink (1982a, 93) describes the takeover group as a coalition of "Marxist

humanists, feminist socialists, decentralist ecologists, and participatory democrats." A major point of contention at the 1978 business meeting was once again whether the Caucus should continue participating in APSA elections or splinter from the APSA to form a radical political science association, as had been done a decade earlier by the radical economists, who established the Union for Radical Political Economics (URPE) (1968), the critical sociologists who established the Association for Critical Sociology (1969), and the radical philosophers who established the Radical Philosophy Association (1972).

While there was support for a proposal to convert the CNPS into a counter-association, the prevailing view at the meeting was advanced by Victor Wallis, a young professor at Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI), and the current chair of CNPS (1977–78). Wallis argued convincingly that the Caucus should adopt a double identity as a dissident minority caucus within the APSA *and* pursue an independent existence as a counter-association outside the APSA. Wallis successfully convinced a majority of members that the CNPS should not give up either of these identities, nor should it vacate either field of action. The CNPS should continue advancing socialism within and without the APSA. While Bertell Ollman, a prominent Marxist, was selected to run as the Caucus candidate for APSA president in 1978, a more critical outcome of the 1978 meeting was that for the first time the Caucus declared itself to be an explicitly "socialist" organization (Rensenbrink 1982a, 94).

The CNPS abandoned its electoral strategy after 1979 but maintained an organizational presence within the APSA by convening alternative conference panels and plenary sessions designed to challenge the official political science discipline. At the same time, the collapse of its electoral strategy led the CNPS to entertain the idea that it could become a counter-association to the APSA that would simultaneously facilitate the development of a political revolution outside the APSA, while promoting an intellectual revolution within the political science discipline. The political revolution would be facilitated by organizing local chapters of CNPS that could link up with local activist groups and with other radical scholarly associations on university campuses. The intellectual revolution would be promoted by establishing a new scholarly journal to compete with the *APSR* and the regional political science association journals. Thus, in 1979, the Caucus launched *New Political Science: A Journal of Politics & Culture*, which was self-published by an editorial collective consisting primarily of graduate students at Columbia University.

Jane Gruenebaum and Paul Thomas were subsequently elected cochairs

of the Caucus for 1978–79 based on their commitment to building a counter-association. They argued that a key element to the success of a counter-association would be the organization of independent local chapters of CNPS throughout the United States, which they suggested would generate "a rapid growth in membership" (Wallis 1979, 91). Not coincidentally, Gruenebaum and Thomas were founders of the two most vibrant local CNPS chapters in the country (New York City and Berkeley). Gruenebaum had received her PhD from Columbia University and was currently an assistant professor at Sarah Lawrence College. Gruenbaum (1981) was a specialist on feminism and women and politics, although she would soon leave academia to become a policy researcher at the Brookings Institution and later became executive director of the League of Women Voters.[3] Paul Thomas had come from England to do graduate work at Harvard University as a John F. Kennedy Scholar, where he was awarded his PhD in 1973. Thomas was currently an associate professor at the University of California, Berkeley, where he taught political and social theory, especially Marxism. Thomas had just published what was to become a well-respected classic, *Karl Marx and the Anarchists* (1980).

Gruenebaum and Thomas (1979) echoed Wallis's position that the Caucus would act with a double identity. They suggested that the organization's emphasis might fluctuate between one identity or the other given particular contexts and circumstances, but the prevailing view by 1979 was that the CNPS's organizational revolt had ended. It was time for CNPS to build on its intellectual stature within the APSA to strengthen its identity as a separate counter-association. As Edward S. Malecki had proposed nearly a decade earlier, Gruenebaum and Thomas argued that a second step in building a counter-association would be to forge links with like-minded organizations in other disciplines, such as the URPE, the Radical Historians Organization, the Radical Philosophy Association, the Association of Critical Sociologists, the Modern Language Association, and the radical geographers. However, as had been the case with earlier attempts to organize local chapters, and to establish alliances with other radical caucuses, neither goal was achieved with any notable success.

In fact, following the September 1978 business meeting in New York City, debates within CNPS intensified between members who supported the Caucus's role as a caucus within the APSA and members who advocated a more activist political role for the Caucus outside the APSA. The debate was increasingly polarized between strategies of internal (to the APSA) organizational revolt and external political and intellectual revolution. Yet it appears that only a few vociferous members thought CNPS

should adopt one position to the exclusion of the other, as most members continued to support the Rensenbrink/Wallis concept of double identity. However, the debates sharpened during this time (1978–79) as CNPS leadership shifted to a new generation of Caucus members, who regularly campaigned on the idea that the Caucus was a socialist organization that should have a more activist orientation, although this group was split as to whether "activism" meant on-campus activism or movement-based activities outside the university. Thus, some younger members, particularly graduate students, rejected the double-identity strategy in favor of a pure counter-association similar to the URPE. For example, G. A. Gullic (1978, 33) criticized the Caucus for not breaking completely with the APSA and establishing "itself as a separate political organization dedicated to promoting socialist ideals." The fact that it had not done so was adduced as evidence that "the Caucus does not possess a truly socialist orientation."

The American Political Science Review and *New Political Science*

The Caucus's failure to elect anyone to APSA office in 1979 exposed a waning commitment among many of the Caucus's founding members to sustain the organization after it abandoned its electoral strategy within the APSA. The gradual withdrawal of many critical pluralists and disenchanted liberals from CNPS opened the door for the new leadership cadre to launch one of the Caucus's most significant and controversial undertakings: the establishment of a new journal called *New Political Science: A Journal of Politics & Culture*. The journal emerged as part of a wider intellectual ferment in the social sciences and humanities, and, as with other disciplinary insurgencies, the journal was viewed by its founders as the cornerstone of an emerging counter-association that would directly challenge the *APSR*.

The *APSR* has often been the target of criticism by a broad range of political scientists, who employ a variety of different methodological approaches but who question the journal's adherence to the dogma of a value-free behavioral political science. Raymond Seidelman (1985, 198) argues that a contributing factor to the emergence of the CNPS in 1967 was that articles in the *APSR* were "often unreadable." The same discontents with *APSR* resurfaced in the Perestroika revolt of the early 2000s, which denounced the APSA's flagship journal for promoting a "methodological bias toward the quantitative, behavioral, rational choice, statisti-

cal, and formal modeling approaches" (Monroe 2005, 1, 9). Perhaps most damning is the observation by George Carey (1972, 51), who complained that it was rare to find an article in the *APSR* that was not "trivial or just plain boring."

Critics of the political science discipline have directed much of their ire at the *APSR* because, as the profession's official flagship journal, it serves "not only as a repository of research but also as a scholarly trend-setter and arbiter of standards" (Sigelman 2006, 465). As Somit and Tanenhaus pointed out decades ago, because it is the profession's flagship journal, the *APSR* purports to be a gatekeeper that allocates legitimacy and prestige (values) within the political science discipline (Kettler 2006a, 531). Lee Sigelman (2006, 464), a former editor of *APSR*, notes:

> Much like course syllabi, textbooks, and organized sections, journals simultaneously reflect and construct fields of study, and over the years the Review has played an important role in constructing political science. By stamping its imprimatur on certain types of research more than on others, it has powerfully shaped the political science research agenda.[4]

While skeptics dismiss the importance of this gatekeeping function, there is no doubt that Caucus members, such as Christian Bay, Michael Parenti, Peter Bachrach, and Sheldon Wolin, among others, had regularly published in the *APSR* until its editorial control shifted decisively to the behavioralists in the late 1960s. Moreover, as Heinz Eulau concedes in a 1988 interview, it is naive to believe that editors cannot manipulate the acceptance and publication process within certain limits. With his characteristic bravado, Heinz Eulau even dismisses the concept of double-blind peer review by multiple reviewers with the sarcastic observation that some academics believe that "you cannot trust any one individual," but "for some reason you can trust a two-to-one majority. And you know damned well that whether an article gets in or not depends on to whom it is sent," and that decision is made by the editor (quoted in Marvick 1991, 192).

The ostensible flagship journal of the political science discipline was not alone in drawing the ire of critical or nonbehavioral scholars. The *American Journal of Sociology* has been criticized for many of the same reasons as the *APSR*, and the *American Economic Review* is dismissed by radical and institutional economists for its unflinching adherence to orthodox neoclassical economics. Thus, in an interesting article entitled "What Is a Critical Journal?," Martin Parker and Roby Thomas (2011, 420)

call attention to the fact that over the last six decades "virtually every discipline within the social sciences in the 'English speaking world' has developed a critical wing which claims that the centre of the discipline is conservative and that radical changes to the canon are required." *NPS* was just one of many critical journals founded between 1969 and 1994. Parker and Thomas (2011, 421) observe that "one of the most common beginnings for critical work is the recognition that knowledge has a politics and hence that the institutions of knowledge production—universities, publishers, journals—have a politics too." In this regard, Parker and Thomas (2011, 421) claim that "in the broadest of terms, the 1960s and 1970s versions of criticality were either Marxist, or feminist, or both," and *NPS* certainly fit this rubric.

While CNPS had already decided to reconstitute itself as a socialist counter-association in 1978, a second impetus for the founding of *NPS* was the election of Austin Ranney as president of the APSA in 1974–75. While the CNPS candidate (Murray Edelman) lost the presidential election, the Caucus did elect five members to the APSA Council. This was the largest number of Caucus members ever elected to the Council, and Ranney, who was on the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Committee for a Representative Slate, recalls that their presence on the Council made his year as president "a pretty tough one." Ranney recounts that he "faced a council that was nearly evenly divided between caucus people and ad hoc people, by far the largest number of caucus people that had ever been on the council, and it was a year in which a major decision was to be made, the decision to pick the new editor" to succeed Polsby (quoted in Polsby 1991, 230).

When Ranney assumed the APSA presidency (1974–75), Nelson Polsby, a well-established behavioralist and bête noire of the CNPS, succeeded Ranney as managing editor of the *APSR*. Ranney had successfully secured Polsby's appointment after stepping down as managing editor on November 14, 1969. Ranney had been appointed managing editor of the *APSR* by President David B. Truman, the father of modern pluralist theory, in July 1965. At its meeting of December 4–5, 1969, the APSA Council appointed a search committee to evaluate potential candidates for a new managing editor. The search committee, which was largely stacked with members of the behavioral Establishment, included President Karl Deutsch (chair), Robert E. Lane (president-elect), Austin Ranney (managing editor), Herbert McClosky (Berkeley), Joseph L. Nogee (University of Houston), Vernon Van Dyke (University of Iowa), and Robert E. Ward (University of Michigan), as well as three members of the APSA Council and one member of the *APSR* editorial board.

The search committee made clear that it preferred an individual "knowledgeable in American Government and Political Theory, since a majority of the manuscripts submitted are in these areas." The call for editors stated that "the new Managing Editor should be committed to encouraging the best work done by any and all of the different approaches to political analysis now used or emerging in the discipline; he or she should not be dedicated in any way to promoting a particular approach over the others. The new editor should be a scholar of established reputation" (Ranney 1970). The language "he or she should not be dedicated in any way to promoting a particular approach over the others" was no doubt intended to exclude Caucus members, who were typically dismissed by behavioralists as ideologues and activists, rather than scientists. In fact, in a later interview with Polsby, Ranney bluntly admitted that "it was very clear in my mind that it wasn't going to be any caucus type" who became editor of *APSR* (quoted in Polsby 1991, 230).

At its January 15, 1970, meeting, the APSA Council approved the search committee's recommendation of Polsby. The search committee had submitted a ranked list of six candidates to the APSA Council. The candidates were ranked using an averaging system, with each member of the committee assigning a rank of 1 through 6 to each name, and while Polsby was selected, he was the first choice of only four out of the 10 search committee members. Ranney, who was also a member of the Council, moved that Polsby be approved as the new managing editor, which was approved unanimously (APSA 1970e, 411). Shortly after becoming managing editor, Polsby petitioned the APSA Council to allow him to appoint associate editors, as well as additional members to the editorial board. Polsby's list was a who's who of behavioralists and orthodox pluralists, with half of the proposed new editors having past or present connections to Yale University, where Polsby had studied with Robert A. Dahl (Cain 2007; see also Merelman 2003).

Upon reviewing the list at their June 14–16, 1970, meeting, several members of the Council expressed disappointment that the list included only one Black and no women and "was a relatively small and unrepresentative group." Thomas Dye observed that the list had the appearance of a "friends and neighbors selection system." Ellis Waldron "commented on 'the narrow base of intellectual nurture' of Polsby's list." Robert H. Salisbury asked "for broader representation to avoid charges of elitism." Polsby replied that his list of names represented "an honest statement of where he intended to seek primary advice." Polsby stated that the *APSR* "should be the last bastion of unqualified commitment to scholarly quality." The

Council approved his nominations by a vote of 16–2 despite its concerns and objections (Dye, Waldron, Salisbury, and Polsby quoted in APSA 1970h, 602–4; also see APSA 1970e).

At its September 4, 1972, meeting, the APSA Council unanimously approved Polsby for a second term as managing editor with his term expiring at the end of June 1977 (APSA 1973c, 41). John Rensenbrink, the CNPS chair, had recommended Susan Rudolph, James David Barber, and Ted Robert Gurr as candidates who would command Caucus support. When Rensenbrink (1974–75b) saw the names proposed by Ranney for *APSR* editor, he wrote to CNPS members on the APSA Council that there "was not an acceptable name on the list."

Rensenbrink had even met with incoming APSA President James MacGregor Burns, who had received the CNPS endorsement, to discuss the future of the *APSR*. Burns agreed with Rensenbrink (1974b) that "the new editor should have a high sensitivity to epistemological and ideological currents in the profession and the polity and not ingenuously and metaphysically assume that there is only *one*." Burns agreed that the *APSR* should "foster a continuing debate and dialogue among them," rather than serve as the outlet for a single methodological approach to political science (quoted in Rensenbrink 1974b). Consequently, it was clear to Ranney "that there would be a lot of caucus opposition" to any candidate he would favor, and "it was going to take a great deal of politicking" to maintain behavioralist control of the *APSR* (quoted in Polsby 1991, 230). Ranney's politicking succeeded with the selection of Charles O. Jones, Maurice Falk Professor of Politics at the University of Pittsburgh, as the next managing editor of the *APSR* (1975–81) (APSA 1975a, 42).[5]

Jones was well connected to the behavioral Establishment, and he had been an early Executive Committee member of Donald Herzberg's Ad Hoc Committee (Herzberg 1971b). Jones was a specialist in methodology, the US Congress, electoral behavior, and policy studies. He previously served on the APSA Council, as APSA treasurer, and twice as APSA program chair. He also served as executive director of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (IUCPSR). In recommending Jones to the APSA Council, Ranney made an oblique swipe at the Caucus by emphasizing that Jones "has no feeling of mission to make the discipline into the kind of intellectual enterprise that suits his personal vision" (APSA 1976a, 26–30). Theodore J. Lowi nominated David Danielski (Cornell University) as an alternative candidate, while Frances Fox Piven sought to delay the vote on managing editor until the next meeting. Piven's motion was defeated 5 to 16 and Jones was elected by secret ballot

with a vote of Jones 17, Danielski 6, and one abstention. In 1979, Jones was reappointed to another three-year term on the recommendation of APSA President Leon D. Epstein (APSA 1979g, 485). The *APSR* was firmly under behavioralist control, and, as the CNPS insurgency drew to an end, it was clearly time to abandon any hope of winning influence on the *APSR* editorial board.

Thus, by 1979, Victor Wallis (1979, 90–91), CNPS chair, concluded the Caucus was at a turning point. It retained a sizable base of support within the APSA despite having mounted "the strongest ideological challenge yet made to the APSA establishment," but Wallis observed another trend within APSA, which was that student membership had declined from 4,875 in 1969 to 2,549 (−52%) in 1978. Attendance at APSA conferences was also down from previous highs. Wallis (1979, 90) observed that "a new generation of radical political scientists was emerging which, in its vast majority, has chosen not to receive 'the' journal of the profession [*APSR*] and is also less likely to ever attend APSA conventions."

Based on these observations, Wallis agreed that the immediate future of CNPS lay outside the APSA in a counter-association that could recruit this cadre of new young radicals from within the political science discipline, but outside the political science profession. As the potential membership base of CNPS shifted out of the APSA, it meant that CNPS now needed a full-scale alternative outlet to the *APSR*, so its positions would reach directly to the grassroots membership. Wallis (1979, 90–91) agreed that the Caucus's continued presence within the APSA "forces it [the APSA] to pay more than just lip-service to its supposedly unchallenged ideals of free inquiry and equality of opportunity," but he suggested that CNPS panels at the APSA were more and more becoming "exchanges among ourselves," rather than a dialogue with the discipline. For this reason, CNPS was not likely to reach a significant or sympathetic audience outside its own membership at the annual meetings of the APSA.

Wallis (1979, 89) argued that the establishment of a journal would be an important first step in making CNPS "a viable counter-institution to the American Political Science Association." The journal was to serve as the Caucus's most immediate tangible challenge to APSA's intellectual hegemony within the discipline, but there was a clear expectation at the time that the Caucus would be strengthened—and eventually superseded—by its double identity as a counter-association to the APSA. Increasingly, after 1978, the Caucus's long-term strategy shifted away from organizational revolt within the APSA toward challenging the intellectual hegemony of the *APSR*. The Caucus had been publishing a newsletter

called *NPS* for several years, although it had continually grown in length as it turned into a forum for debating the meaning, strategy, and tactics of a new political science. The decision to convert the newsletter into a full-fledged academic journal was made in 1978 with the goal of stimulating the theoretical and organizational development of the CNPS as a socialist counter-association to APSA.

The newly formed New York City chapter of CNPS, consisting mainly of graduate students at Columbia University, volunteered to edit the new journal, when on September 1, 1978, Nicole Fermon,[6] Jane Gruenebaum, Carl Lankowski,[7] and Ezra Zask submitted a proposal to Victor Wallis, the CNPS chair. The proposal called for transferring the editing and production responsibilities for *NPS* from the CNPS Publications Committee to an Editorial Collective that would work under the supervision of a CNPS editorial board. The proposal argued that the New York City chapter could deploy more material, organizational, and human resources to the proposed journal than was available from the current CNPS Publications Committee and, thus, it would make *NPS* "financially independent of subsidies from the CNPS general operating budget" (Fermon et al. 1978). The New York chapter claimed that "there currently exists at Columbia University a core of people involved in putting out a local newsletter. Some have experience in other publications. Should the national newsletter be brought to New York, other people at Columbia and throughout the city could be mobilized with a minimum of effort, to supplement those now working in this area" (Fermon et al. 1978). The Columbia University Department of Political Science also submitted a letter of support guaranteeing office space for the journal's Editorial Collective, which would also give it access to the university's bulk rate mailing and telephone service.

The proposal claimed that under the Editorial Collective's new management *NPS* would

> serve as an organ for the goals and interests of the Caucus. It should place questions of theory in an active political context. It should be instrumental in defining who we are and the manner in which our work is related to intellectual, political, and cultural issues. *New Political Science* (NPS) should be an important recruiting and organizational tool for the CNPS and for popular struggles at the site of academic and research institutions or wherever such institutions are strategically involved. NPS should serve as a channel of communication for members of the Caucus. (Fermon et al. 1978)

The New York chapter proposed to publish *NPS* three times per year (winter, spring, and summer), and each issue would include an editorial introduction discussing the theme of the issue; a group of feature articles organized around that theme; special articles on university struggles, such as academic repression and racial/sex discrimination; articles on critical pedagogy; organizational news; book reviews; correspondence from readers; and news about popular struggles in the United States and abroad. The day-to-day production of the journal would be in the hands of an Editorial Collective selected by the New York chapter of CNPS. However, it was proposed that general oversight of "the journal would be in the hands of an NPS Editorial Board," which would be composed of members "with terms of tenure determined by the CNPS Coordinating Council" (Fermon et al. 1978).

The editorial board would set policy for the journal, assist in soliciting and reviewing articles, and serve as a network for collecting organizational news for the journal. The editorial board would also be responsible for establishing distribution networks through local bookstores, securing library subscriptions, soliciting individual subscriptions, and identifying potential advertisers. While a copy of the new journal would be provided to all dues-paying members of CNPS, it was expected that the journal could become more financially self-sufficient through library and individual subscriptions, college bookstore sales, and advertisements. The New York chapter was convinced that it had a fundraising base in New York City sufficient to capitalize the initial issue of the new journal, but its ongoing success would require national fundraising, an increase in CNPS dues, a willingness by members to subscribe to the journal, and efforts by faculty to secure library subscriptions from their own universities. As was pointed out by David M. Johns (1978a, 31), a member of the New York chapter: "Dues do not now cover even the limited (size and frequency) issuance of the present newsletter."[8]

Victor Wallis (1978a, 27) recommended that "we entrust it to them [the New York chapter] for the coming year, with the possibility of renewal." Thus, the journal *NPS* came into existence when the Coordinating Council approved its transfer to the New York City Editorial Collective on August 31, 1978 (Wallis 1978b; CNPS 1978c). Wallis (2017) observes that once the transfer was approved by the Coordinating Council, "My role was to facilitate the formation of the collective which at that point took over the tasks of running the journal." Once the Collective was established, *NPS* would be legally owned, published, and managed by a six-person New York City Editorial Collective, which consisted almost entirely of political science gradu-

ate students at Columbia University or junior faculty who had recently graduated from Columbia University. While the journal received input from CNPS through a Caucus-appointed editorial board, the journal was otherwise an independent, self-perpetuating entity ("Note to Readers" 1979, 7). Under the new arrangement, the journal was not technically owned by the national CNPS, but by the Editorial Collective of the New York chapter, which included Bruce Andrews (Fordham University),[9] Vincenzo Brevetti (New York Labor Research Association), Carol Brown (University of Lowell), David Johns (Columbia University), Nicole Fermon (Fordham University), and Carl Lankowski (Columbia University).

The Editorial Collective began work on the new journal in September 1978, and by August 1980, individual journal subscriptions had increased to 450. The journal had also secured 60 institutional subscriptions. In early 1980, the journal initiated over-the-counter sales at New York City bookstores and sold approximately 100 copies per issue in the early years of the journal. However, Lankowski observes that the journal's founding had the immediate and unanticipated impact of turning the national CNPS into an adjunct of the journal within a year (1980).[10] Until this time, and despite Rensenbrink's organizational reforms, CNPS had been a loosely organized voluntary group that convened once a year at APSA meetings, where it elected a chair, program coordinator, and secretary-treasurer, who then appointed most members of the Coordinating Council and various task forces. It was supported with meager voluntary membership dues, which had largely been used to support APSA election campaigns and the distribution of its newsletter.[11] However, in founding a journal, much of the Caucus's finances, and most of the energies of its young radicals, were redirected toward the operation of *NPS*. Ironically, the journal's strongest supporters came from the more APSA-oriented members of the Caucus, rather than its counter-associationists. Lankowski found that the former group "whole-heartedly supported the development of the journal" because they saw it as a tool for elevating the *intellectual* stature of CNPS *within* the discipline, rather than as a vehicle for challenging the APSA (Gruenebaum and Thomas 1979, 92–94).

In 1979, the journal successfully secured tax-exempt status from the Internal Revenue Service under Title 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.[12] Its new tax-exempt status opened the door to fundraising drives at the CNPS/APSA receptions and the Marxist Union conference in New York City and allowed the journal to accept individual donations. Nevertheless, by early 1981, the journal's financial condition was reported as "precarious" (Lankowski 1981, 102–3). A decade later (1989–90), the jour-

nal's financial position was a little better, as it reported $5,264.11 in total receipts and a closing balance of $4,105.55 on August 15, 1990. On the same date, the CNPS had another $859.60 in cash on hand (Berg 1990).[13]

The journal quickly ran into trouble—not just financially—but also in its operations and production. The journal began its first year with plans to publish quarterly, but after releasing the first issue (1979), issues 2 and 3 were released late as a single joint issue. The same was true of the first two issues of volume 2 (1980) and volume 3 (1981). The editors altogether failed to release the last issues of volume 3 (1982), and the same was true for volume 4 (1983). Only one issue was released for volume 5 (1984), volume 6 (1985), and volume 7 (1986), and then the journal ceased publication for two years (1987 and 1988). By 1989, the journal's status became an object of heated discussion at the annual CNPS business meeting (see below) (CNPS 1989, 2).

Much of the journal's early difficulties were not related to finances per se, but to constant turnover and instability in the journal's Editorial Collective. In 1979, when *NPS* published its first issue, the Editorial Collective consisted of Bruce Andrews, Jonathan Birnbaum, Ellen Chase, Nicole Fermon, David Johns, and Carl Lankowski. By the following year, Birnbaum had been replaced by Vincenzo Brevetti and Chase had been replaced by Carole Brown. As most of the editors were graduate students, it was also difficult to find time for graduate work and editorial work, so the Editorial Collective increased to eight persons in 1981, but over the next two years members of the Collective continued to be replaced as others dropped out. Thus, as early as 1982, John Rensenbrink, who was a member of the editorial board, had openly questioned whether the journal's Editorial Collective could endure over the long term.

One problem, according to Rensenbrink, was that the Editorial Collective and the CNPS were separate entities. While the journal purported to be the official flagship journal of the CNPS, the Caucus in fact had no direct authority over the journal, nor any influence on its editorial direction. Moreover, numerous problems had already surfaced within the Collective. The first problem was "natural attrition, burnout, relocation of key people [as they graduated and found jobs] as well as the rising conflict among persons over time." These problems were creating "powerful entropic forces" that had the capacity to destroy the journal. One of the major problems identified by Rensenbrink was that the Editorial Collective consisted primarily of graduate students and assistant professors with no established professional reputations, while the Caucus-appointed editorial board, which was only an advisory body, consisted primarily of estab-

lished senior professors. Rensenbrink (1982a, 95) observed that the Collective did all the work while the editorial board took all the credit.[14] This relationship put junior faculty and graduate students in a position where they could not focus on their own research to become successful scholars. The result was a general neglect of the journal in favor of more pressing graduate student responsibilities, such as assigned readings, seminar papers, presentations, dissertations, and job searches.

The solution adopted to mitigate this problem was to split the Editorial Collective into a Northeast Editorial Collective, based in New York City, and a Berkeley Editorial Collective, based in California, with the goal of distributing the editorial work among more people. The Northeast Collective had demonstrated that it could only put out two issues per year, but if the Berkeley Collective could manage the same, the journal could meet its target of four issues per year. This arrangement also brought more experienced faculty into the journal production process, including Timothy W. Luke, Carl Lankowski, and John Rensenbrink in the Northeast, as well as Paul Thomas in Berkeley. After only one issue, the collectives changed their names to the East Coast Collective and West Coast Collective.

Moreover, the socialist takeover of CNPS was consolidated when the 1979 business meeting voted (outside the constitution) to restructure the Coordinating Council by adding one member from the journal's East Coast Collective, one member from the journal's West Coast Collective, and one member from the journal's editorial board. To promote representation of new local chapters, it was agreed that any local chapter with 10 or more members would be awarded a voting member on the Coordinating Council. There were only two local chapters with this many members—New York City (East Coast Collective) and Berkeley (West Coast Collective)—which effectively guaranteed that the journal (i.e., New York City and Berkeley) now controlled the CNPS's Coordinating Council. However, the socialist takeover was so disruptive that the 1979 CNPS annual business meeting failed to elect a national CNPS chair, although the socialist takeover was consolidated the following year (1980) when Carl Lankowski was elected chair at that year's APSA/CNPS business meeting. In the 1990s, the journal would eventually overcome its financial problems and become a significant source of revenue for the Caucus, but as this revenue was owned by the Collective and not by CNPS, an unelected journal collective came to dominate its nominal parent organization.

While chair of the editorial board, Rensenbrink tried to compensate for the Collective's initial shortcomings by enlisting editorial board members as manuscript referees, while asking each board member to contrib-

ute $50 per year to help sustain the journal financially. As mostly established tenured members of the profession, editorial board members were also asked to write articles for the fledgling journal to bolster its prestige and visibility. They were also asked to help secure library subscriptions to the journal on their campuses. In contrast to the instability of the Editorial Collective, the editorial board was remarkably stable during this period, with little turnover in membership—at least until 1990.

The Rensenbrink reforms did little to improve the journal's operational performance. After producing only one issue, the West Coast Collective was dissolved, while four of the eight members of the East Coast Collective dropped out, including Lankowski and Rensenbrink, which left Timothy W. Luke, an assistant professor at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, as the only faculty member on the East Coast Collective. From the second half of 1983 through 1989, the Editorial Collective consisted of Timothy W. Luke, Florindo Valpacchio,[15] and Nicole Fermon; the latter two being graduate students at Columbia University. Nicole Fermon was the only member of the original 1979 Editorial Collective still listed as an editor of *NPS* in 1991.

The Caucus finally intervened in the journal's difficulties in 1989 after Meredith Reid Sarkees (Niagara University) was elected chair of CNPS (1988–90) and John C. Berg was elected secretary-treasurer (1988–92). Berg (2021) recalls that "the main issue debated" at the 1989 CNPS/APSA business meeting "was the non-appearance of the journal for 3 years (greatly angering Fred Swan . . . because they had taken his subscription money)." It was agreed that Fred Swan, John C. Berg, Dennis W. Moran, and Harry Vanden would serve as a committee to collaborate with the past editors in an attempt to revitalize the journal. A year later, under the leadership of the new CNPS Chair George Katsiaficas (1990–91), the journal was reorganized to make it more accountable to the CNPS. The Caucus took over ownership of the journal from the Editorial Collective, and a new managing editor was appointed to replace the diffuse, ever-changing, and ever-shrinking Editorial Collective, which was now down to three members (Valpacchio, Fermon, and Luke). In 1990, the Editorial Collective was replaced by an editorial team consisting of Meredith Reid Sarkees (managing editor), Harry Vanden,[16] and Nicole Fermon, with the latter included to keep some continuity (Berg 2021).

The editorial board was also reduced in size and completely recast in 1990 as only four of the previous 17 editorial board members were carried forward into that year.[17] Caucus leaders of the previous decade, such as Peter Bachrach, Charles Fox, Nancy Hartsock, Mark Kesselman, John

Rensenbrink, Carl Boggs, and Theodore Norton were replaced with a new generation of Caucus leaders that included John C. Berg, George Katsiaficas, and Laura Katz Olson. Nevertheless, a year after the reorganization, Meredith Reid Sarkees, who was now managing editor of *NPS*, reported that the editors were still facing financial constraints, difficulty with desktop-publishing software, difficulty with advertising and sales, a shortage of good article submissions, and a shortage of manuscript reviewers (CNPS 1991b, 1991d). Consequently, the new editorial team continued to have problems releasing the full set of four issues per year and regularly missed issues through 1991, which served to undermine the journal's reputation and prestige among librarians, subscribers, and the wider profession.

What Is New Political Science (Again)?

NPS was elevated to the status of an official flagship journal in 1979 due to the successive efforts of CNPS Chairs Stephen M. Sachs (1976–77), Victor Wallis (1977–78), Paul Thomas (1978–79), and Jane Gruenebaum (1978–79). The CNPS was entering a new phase of development that would focus on creating a more secure place for critical thought and left-wing political activities within the university generally, with the hope of forging links between the Caucus and progressive groups outside of academia. However vague this alternative politics might be, it was clear that by 1979 the socialism of the young radicals in CNPS had superseded the procedural politics of the old liberals. New political science was now a critique of capitalist society, and by proposing a socialist alternative it had positioned itself as a clear *ideological* alternative to the centrist-liberal orthodoxy of official political science.

Yet this new direction raised an old question: What is the role of Marxist and socialist intellectuals now embedded in the university, rather than in radical social movements or left-wing political parties? The second issue of *NPS* broached this question by publishing several essays written by prominent left scholars for the CNPS conference "Marxism and Academic Freedom," which had been held at the School of Marxist Studies at New York University (November 1978). Frederick Jameson (1979, 31) argued that "the first business of a Marxist teacher . . . is clearly to teach Marxism itself." Jameson concurred with Bertell Ollman that the purpose of teaching Marxism was "to form Marxists," but he rejected the idea that any professor could "convert someone *ex nihilo*" by presenting a critique of pluralist theory or by attempting to force Marxism on students through

an authoritarian pedagogy. Instead, Jameson suggested that Marxist professors could "at best articulate and give intellectual content and specification to tendencies and needs and predispositions that people already have," and this would be especially true as larger numbers of poor, working-class, and lower-middle-class students attended universities (Jameson 1979, 31).[18]

On a broader front, Jameson (1979, 33) argued it was essential for Marxist intellectuals

> to create a Marxist culture in this country, to make Marxism an unavoidable presence and a distinct, original and unmistakable voice in American social, cultural, and intellectual life, in short, to form an American Marxist intelligentsia for the struggles of the future—this seems to me the supreme mission of a Marxist pedagogy and a radical intellectual life today.

If intellectuals created a more radicalized cultural milieu, as opposed to any efforts to indoctrinate students, Jameson (1979, 32–33) argued, students would independently

> find out that such a thing [as Marxism] exists, and get lodged in some part of their brain the general outlines of Marxism. . . . They don't need it now; but if we're right about history, there will come a time when suddenly this presently merely abstract doctrine will come back into their minds as a solution to urgent problems. At that point, retrospectively, the things we all taught them, in apparently imperceptible accretions that left no trace, will come back and be activated for the first time. That is, it seems to me no negligible function for us to play, even if it offers very little immediate personal satisfaction.

Richard C. Lewontin offered a similar if more militant version of Marxist pedagogy. Lewontin was a renowned evolutionary biologist, mathematician, and geneticist at Harvard University who self-identified as a Marxist. Lewontin's (1979, 25) work in genetics and evolutionary biology challenged the increasingly popular theory that IQ and income inequality were genetically determined and therefore impermeable to social policy.[19] As the New Right began its ascendancy in the United States and other liberal democracies, Lewontin (1979, 29) argued that "the primary function of Marxists in the university must be to take part in what is, in fact, a

class struggle." Lewontin (1979, 29) chastised radical intellectuals who after a decade of campus rebellions still retained a "false consciousness of identification with the university. They are confused between the ideal of an institution of scholarship and truth, and the reality of the university as a political institution, as a weapons foundry in the class war."

Lewontin (1979, 25–26, 27; see also Boggs 1979) admonished radical intellectuals, Marxist professors in particular, to recognize that

> the university is a factory that makes weapons—*ideological weapons*—for class struggle, for class warfare, and trains people in their use. . . . The university is the source of creation of ideology; it is the source of legitimation of ideology; it is the source of propaganda for ideology. Creation, legitimation, and propaganda are the three functions of bourgeois universities in the state. Therefore, as a worker in that situation—as a worker in a weapons factory engaged in the manufacture of instruments of class domination—our chief task must be to disrupt production. We must make its weapons useless, prevent their use on the battlefield of class warfare, and at the same time, attempt to create other weapons—counter weapons—that can be put into the hands of people on the other side of class struggle. . . . That is the primary function of Marxist scholarship.

Lewontin considered it essential for Marxist professors to debunk mainstream science in all its forms as ideological to university students, as this activity was a necessary aspect of delegitimating bourgeois ideology. However, Lewontin emphasized that delegitimating activities had to extend beyond the classroom. He (1979, 28) argued that "delegitimation of the authority of bourgeois ideologues and their ideology means writing, speaking on radio, on television, in schools, in newspapers, and magazines." Ideological warfare had to be waged on the op-ed page of the *New York Times*, on local educational radio and television, and in national magazines such as *The Atlantic* and the *New York Review of Books*, which had shown themselves amenable to publishing work by critical left-wing scholars. Following these jeremiads, *NPS* settled into the task of replacing the Caucus's organizational revolt with the search for an intellectual revolution.

Despite the numerous problems with *NPS* during its first 13 years, the Editorial Collective and its successor editorial team did manage to self-publish 15 issues of the journal, which included articles by an all-star list of Marxist and other left-wing scholars. During this time (1979–91), *NPS*

published 105 articles authored or coauthored by 101 different scholars, with the vast majority of authors appearing in the journal only one time.[20] In fact, only eight of the 101 authors who published in *NPS* had multiple (two or more) contributions to the journal, including Timothy W. Luke, Fred Block, Mark Kesselman, Stanley Aronowitz, Larry Hirschorn, Dick Howard, Theodore M. Norton, and Victor Wallis. Most of these individuals were officers or activists in the CNPS, but this relationship also led many political scientists to see the fledgling journal as an insiders' club.

However, this perception was misplaced, because in addition to the cluster of CNPS member authors, *NPS* was an outlet for a long list of prominent Marxist, feminist, and left-wing scholars, including Isaac D. Balbus, Etienne Balibar, Jean Baudrillard, Robert W. Cox, Jacques Derrida, Andrea Dworkin, Barbara Epstein, Kathy E. Ferguson, Jürgen Habermas, Dick Howard, Frederic Jameson, Douglas Kellner, Manning Marable, Herbert Marcuse, and Paul Piccone. This is not a list of authors that would ever appear in the *APSR* or any of the regional association journals.

An equally dramatic difference between *NPS* and the *APSR* is evident in a comparison of keywords that appear in the titles of articles published in the two journals from 1979 to 1991 (see Table 3). For purposes of comparison, I identified 42 clusters of keywords that in my judgment would be most likely to appear in a critical or radical political science journal. I identified 105 articles in *NPS* and 543 articles published in the *APSR* during this 13-year period. The number of times each of the 42 keywords appears in the title of an article was tabulated, while recognizing that is possible for more than one keyword to appear in the title of one article.[21] The keywords appeared 142 times in the 105 articles published in *NPS*, or 1.4 times per article, while the keywords appeared 183 times in the 543 articles published in the *APSR*, or 0.34 times per article, less than one-third the frequency that such terms appear in articles published by *NPS*.[22] In fact, only 15 of these keyword clusters account for nearly 75% of the total appearances of the 42 keywords in *NPS*, while the same 15 keyword clusters account for only 28% of the total appearances of the 42 keywords in *APSR*.

The five most frequent clusters of keywords illustrate the difference between the two journals. The five top clusters of keywords in *NPS* during this time were (1) academic freedom / higher education / intellectuals / university, (2) socialism/socialists, (3) democracy/democratic, (4) feminism/patriarchy/women, and (5) Marx/Marxism. The articles published in *NPS* clearly aligned with CNPS's stated commitment to socialist feminism at the time, and they convey an ongoing concern for the plight of university intellectuals as a form of struggle. By contrast, the five most

TABLE 3. Comparison of Keywords in Article Titles, *NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE* and *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*, 1979 to 1991

	Number	%	Number	%
Keyword	*NPS*		*APSR*	
Academic Freedom / Higher Education / Intellectuals / University	11	7.7	1	0.5
Socialism/Socialists	11	7.7	1	0.5
Democracy/Democratic	9	6.3	0	0.0
Feminism/Feminization/Patriarchy/ Women	9	6.3	6	3.3
Marx/Marxism	9	6.3	6	3.3
Critical/Critique	7	4.9	5	2.7
Labor/Unions/Workers	7	4.9	4	2.2
Insurgency/Protect/Revolution/ Transformation	6	4.2	4	2.2
Left/Progressive/Radical	6	4.2	6	3.3
State	6	4.2	10	5.5
Capitalism/Capitalist	5	3.5	2	1.1
Ecology/Environment/Environmentalism	5	3.5	3	1.6
Immigration/Immigrant	5	3.5	0	0.0
Pedagogy/Teaching	5	3.5	0	0.0
Race/Racism	5	3.5	4	2.2
Total	**106**	**74.6**	**52**	**28.4**

Source: All issues of *New Political Science and American Political Science Review*, 1979–1991.

frequent clusters of "radical" keywords in the *APSR* during this time were (1) democracy/democratic, (2) participation/participatory, (3) bureaucracy/bureaucratic, (4) power / domination / social control, and (5) liberalism/liberal. This is a cluster of concepts consistent with the hegemony of a liberal-pluralist paradigm, and the list of *APSR* keywords reads as if it were taken directly from Robert A. Dahl's *Who Governs?* (1961).

Another factor distinguishing *NPS* from official political science journals, such as the *APSR*, was its openness to interdisciplinary research on politics conducted by scholars and practitioners with affiliations other than political science departments. The authors, topics, and theoretical approaches—mostly Marxism and feminism—certainly distinguished *NPS* from the official association journals, but more than 60% of the contributors to *NPS* were not affiliated with a political science or government department. This would lead many mainstream political scientists to conclude that *NPS* was *not* a political science journal. Yet one of the distinguishing features of a critical political science is its refusal to separate "poli-

TABLE 4. Department Affiliation of *NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE* Authors, 1979 to 1991

Department	Number	%
Political Science/Government/Politics	39	38.6
Sociology	16	15.8
Nonacademic/Unaffiliated	15	14.9
Languages and Literature	12	11.9
Philosophy	9	8.9
Economics	2	2.0
History	2	2.0
Urban Planning	2	2.0
Anthropology	1	1.0
Women's Studies	1	1.0
Public Health	1	1.0
Zoology	1	1.0
Total	101	100.0

Source: Data tabulated from information in "Contributors" List In Issues of *New Political Science*, 1979 to 1991.

tics" from class, race, ethnicity, and gender (sociology) or from capitalist development (economics, history). Thus, sociologists were significant contributors to the journal (15.8%) as were scholars affiliated with English, language, and comparative literature departments (11.9%) (in part because of a special issue on literature and politics). However, nonacademic practitioners affiliated with nonprofit and government organizations were also significant contributors (14.9%), which conveys the journal's early commitment to a concept of praxis, "to making political science relevant to the struggle for a better world." The list is rounded out by scholars affiliated with philosophy, history, economics, women's studies, urban planning, anthropology, public health, and even zoology (see Table 4).

Finally, the journal published a combination of unsolicited peer-reviewed manuscripts and invited submissions in its first 13 years, as most issues during this time were structured around a theme. From 1979 to 1991, 11 of the 15 issues published were themed issues (see Table 5). The themes covered theoretical topics, such as critical theory and bureaucracy, Marxism and theory, and literature and politics, as well as contemporary political topics, such as socialism in France, racism in Europe, and "The Central American Maelstrom." One themed issue was devoted to ecology and politics, while another issue was devoted to sexuality and capitalism. In this regard, *NPS* covered the full spectrum of class, race, gender, and ecology, as well as the political implications of Francois Mitterrand's 1981

TABLE 5. Themed or Special Issues of *NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE*, 1979 to 1991

Year	Theme
1979	The Socialist Academic: Between Theory & Practice
1979	Sexuality and Capitalism
1981	Tactics & Ethics: What's Left?
1982	Critical Theory and Bureaucracy
1983	Ecology & Politics
1983	Socialism in France
1984	Marxism and Theory
1985–86	Social Movements
1986	Between Literature and Politics
1989	Racism in Europe
1990	The Central America Maelstrom

Source: All issues of *New Political Science*, 1979 to 1991.

Socialist Party victory in France and the devastating impact of President Ronald Reagan's support for right-wing authoritarian regimes in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras.

Normalcy in APSA / Crisis in CNPS

In the midst of the double identity debate in the Caucus and the struggle to launch a new journal, the APSA announced a new set of conference regulations, which many argued were directed against the CNPS, as well as other unaffiliated groups, with the goal of marginalizing their presence at APSA conferences. The CNPS was notified in November 1979 that its panels at APSA meetings would not be listed in *PS* or the official meeting program, unless panel members preregistered for the meeting at a rate of $25 for APSA members and $35 for nonmembers. Several CNPS panel chairs notified the CNPS Program Committee that participation under these circumstances would be problematic because CNPS panels frequently included individuals who were neither political scientists nor even university scholars. In addition, many CNPS panel participants were CNPS members but not APSA members. Many of the latter were modestly paid activists with nonprofit and community development organizations or professors at small and poorly funded colleges. There was also concern that the preregistration fee was a hardship on graduate students and younger scholars, who were a core membership base of CNPS.

The new APSA policy led Jane Gruenebaum to convene an emergency meeting of the Assembly on May 3, 1980, because as an immediate former CNPS cochair (1978–79), she was one of the only persons who might legitimately call such a meeting at a time when the Caucus had just failed to elect a new chair at its last national business meeting.[23] The Assembly voted to reconstitute itself as a National Interim Executive Committee of the CNPS in the absence of any other effective national governing body. With this vote, the 1977 CNPS constitution was not only jettisoned by its active members on an emergency basis, but literally forgotten over the next decade by the organization's constantly shifting leadership.

The general sense of the National Interim Executive Committee was that the "APSA's initiative constituted a bald effort to censor dissidence at its annual meeting" ("CNPS Organizing Notes" 1980, 77). The APSA policy on preregistration was denounced as an effort "by the APSA oligarchy to consolidate its conservative, tenured, for the most part white and male social base," as it was this same APSA Establishment that had opposed the 1978 vote to move the APSA convention out of Chicago due to Illinois's failure to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment.[24] The APSA Establishment had also been indecisive and evasive in its position on the Bertell Ollman academic freedom case by refusing to take a position on the matter or come to the defense of a Marxist colleague (APSA 1979h). Thus, the APSA's move was seen by many as a direct assault on CNPS, and, consequently, a few members of the meeting took the opportunity to again make the case that CNPS was wasting its time in APSA and should "embark on a new, independent phase of development" ("CNPS Organizing Notes" 1980, 77).

By a vote of 11 in favor, three opposed, and two abstentions, the National Interim Executive Committee decided to cancel all CNPS panels at the 1980 APSA meeting and to convene its panels at an alternative site in Washington, DC. The APSA listed the Caucus's 10 panels in its official 1980 program, but CNPS still moved its panels from the Washington Hilton, the official conference hotel, to the Institute for Policy Studies, where Michael Parenti was a visiting fellow. The 1980 panels attracted approximately 300 participants, which was only slightly lower than the previous year (APSA 1980f, 176–78; CNPS 1981b).

Another outcome of the May 3, 1980, meeting was the election of a Commission on Goals and Strategies, which was charged with formulating a set of goals and strategies for the 1980s. The commission consisted of Paul Thomas, John Rensenbrink, Jane Gruenebaum, Nancy Hartsock, Victor Wallis, Michael Parenti, and Carl Lankowski ("CNPS Organizing Notes" 1980, 78). The committee was given 18 to 24 months to complete its

work with the expectation that a final report would be delivered to the next elected CNPS Coordinating Council (rather than the National Interim Executive Committee) and serve as the basis for a discussion by members at all levels of the organization (Lankowski 1981, 105).

At the August 29, 1980 business meeting, new national officers were elected, including Carl Lankowski as CNPS chair and Nancy Hartsock as CNPS program chair.[25] Hartsock "strongly supported" reinstatement of a Caucus program at the site of the APSA's annual meeting, but the matter was left undecided at the time (CNPS 1981b, 117). The matter was taken up again by the Coordinating Council on January 31, 1981. At this meeting, the CNPS chair was instructed to submit two proposals to the APSA Council for consideration at the latter's May 15, 1981, meeting. The first proposal was that conference registration fees be waived for all those who were not political scientists making presentations at the APSA annual meeting. This proposal was accepted by the APSA Council at its May 15, 1981 meeting. The second CNPS proposal called for the introduction of a sliding scale of conference registration fees for political scientists to encourage more participation by graduate students, part-time instructors, and junior faculty. This proposal was sent to committee for further study, but eventually the APSA adopted a sliding scale for APSA *membership dues* and a much lower conference registration fee for students (CNPS 1981b, 117). Thus, in 1981, the CNPS returned to the APSA annual meeting as an unaffiliated group, but it did so by promoting a feminist surge within the APSA annual meeting.

The Feminist Surge (1981)

At meetings of the APSA, the CNPS would typically sponsor a plenary session with invited guest speakers in addition to its regular conference panels. The plenary was often held at a site away from the main APSA conference hotel. In September 1980, a roundtable called "Feminism and the Caucus" was held at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, DC. Approximately 80 people attended the session. John Rensenbrink (1982a, 94) recounts that the roundtable generated a "sense of excitement, seriousness, and hope . . . that at last the Caucus was not only 'reaching out' but was beginning actively to embrace the powerful critique and creative philosophic and scholarly energy of the feminist movement" (see also Lankowski 1981, 101).

There were only two women on CNPS panels at the 1979 and 1980

annual meetings of the APSA (see Figure 2). However, in response to the 1980 plenary roundtable, this situation changed dramatically when Carl Lankowski (1981, 100) nominated Nancy Hartsock, a Marxist-feminist, to serve as CNPS program chair in 1981. Hartsock accepted the nomination but on the condition that the broader CNPS membership support "a strong and official CNPS commitment to feminism," which meant that henceforth the Caucus would no longer identify itself as a socialist organization, but as a socialist-feminist organization (Lankowski 1981, 100). A ballot was sent to members in December 1980, who voted overwhelmingly in favor of the new designation.

Hartsock, who would soon thereafter publish her pathbreaking book *Money, Sex, and Power* (1983), initiated a feminist surge in the CNPS by placing a heavy emphasis on panels devoted to feminism and to women and politics/capitalism. As a result, 12 of the CNPS's 17 panels in 1981 were devoted to feminist theory and to various aspects of women's status and role in the politics and economies of both advanced and developing capitalist societies (APSA 1981).

As a result, in 1981, 70% of the participants on CNPS panels were women compared to 9.5% in 1979 and 7.1% in 1980 (see Figure 2). The feminist and women's politics panels presented the research of a post-1960s generation of feminist scholars such as Nancy Hartsock, Rosalyn Petchesky, Irene Diamond, Judith Stiehm, and Hamideh Sedghi; CNPS activists Zillah Eisenstein, Jane Flax, Natalie Sokoloff, and Martha Ackelsburg; and CNPS stalwarts John Rensenbrink and Carl Boggs. The 1981 program began with the roundtable "The State of Feminist Analysis in the Discipline," which included Natalie Sokoloff (John Jay College), Sandra Harding (University of Delaware), Gayatri Spivak (Université Paul Valéry), and Muriel Diemen (Lehman College). The panels then proceeded to analyze issues such as the international division of labor and women in the Third World, sexuality and violence, the status of women and the rise of the modern state, and women and socialist development, among other topics (see Table 6).

The program concluded with the plenary session "Feminist Strategies for the 1980s," presented by Charlotte Bunch of New York City Interfem (CNPS 1981c, 125). Bunch suggested that the key to feminist strategy for the 1980s was to "prevent the manipulation of women" by casting them as merely another interest group. She argued that "feminism is not just women's issues." Rather, feminism "is a transformational politics" that changes the way people consider social, economic and political issues, and this transformation had to include men. Bunch emphasized that "men can and



Figure 2: Number of Women Participants on CNPS/APSA Panels, 1979 to 1991. Source: Data compiled from information in APSA 1979f, 1980f, 1981, 1982a, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991.

TABLE 6. 1981 CNPS/APSA Feminist Surge Panels

Panel No.	Panel Title
1	Roundtable on the State of Feminist Analysis in the Discipline
2	The International Division of Labor and Women in the Third World
3	Sex and Class in German Feminism
4	Sexuality and Violence
5	Psychoanalysis and Feminism
6	The Status of Women and the Rise of the Modern State
7	Political Implications of Culture and Biology
8	Women and Socialist Development
9	Understanding the Role of Women in Liberation Movements
10	Anarchism: A Practical Possibility?
11	Working It Out in Other Societies: Women's Participation in Social Change
12	Roundtable on Contemporary Capitalism and Its Attacks on Women
13	Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology and Philosophy of Science
A	Why I Am (Am Not) a Marxist
B	Imperialism and Revolution in Latin America
C	Hegemony and International Relations Research
D	Workplace Democracy in the United States

Source: APSA 1981, 229–32.

must be feminists" and should not be "let off the hook" (quoted in CNPS 1981a, 788–89).

The 1981 APSA conference became the impetus for a special issue of *NPS* on feminism that was edited by Nicole Fermon the same year. The following year, when Joan B. Landes was program organizer, women constituted 41.4% of participants on CNPS panels, but women's participation in CNPS panels gradually fell back to 8.0% in 1984, while in subsequent years women's participation in CNPS panels trended toward an equilibrium of around 25%, but again reached 45% in 1991 (see Figure 2). Moreover, it is fair to say that throughout the 1980s women's participation on CNPS panels was noticeably higher in years when a woman was the organizer or co-organizer of the CNPS program (Gruberg 1982, 568). In a tabulation of women's participation in the 1981 and 1982 APSA meetings, Martin Gruberg (1982, 568) similarly found that "one factor conducive to representation of women on the programs [of the APSA] has been the presence of other women as section heads and chairpersons." Gruberg (1982, 568) found that "women were somewhat more conspicuous in the panels sponsored by the unaffiliated groups than in the official program. . . . Their best showing, as expected, was in panels sponsored by the Caucus for a New Political Science and the Women's Caucus."

The Dialogue Panels (1983)

Following the feminist surge, the Caucus probably reached its apogee as an intellectual force in the early to mid-1980s, as exemplified by the 1983 meeting of the APSA. The behavioralist theme of the 1983 APSA meeting was "The Science of Politics." Several panels with invited papers were constructed to emphasize the official theme. The CNPS program chairs, Bertell Ollman and Stephen E. Bronner, approached the APSA Council to propose that APSA cosponsor twelve "Dialogue Panels" with CNPS. In the spring of 1983, the APSA announced that its forthcoming conference program "will include theme panels on the science of politics, dialogues between 'mainstream' and 'radical' political scientists" (Rudder 1983, 151). The APSA's executive director noted that "the dialogue panels were conceived by the Caucus for a New Political Science and are being jointly sponsored by the APSA's Program Committee" (Rudder 1983, 151). Herbert F. Weisberg, the 1983 APSA program chair, also called attention to the dialogue panels in his introduction to the 1983 annual meeting program. Weisberg wrote that the APSA was "co-sponsoring with the Caucus for a New Political Science 12 dialogues on major issues in political science" (APSA 1983, 326). The dialogue panels were deemed so important by APSA that they were assigned their own temporary organized section number—Section 24.

To set the stage for the dialogue panels, the spring 1983 issue of *PS* included a "Forum on the Discipline" that featured an article by Michael Parenti. Parenti's (1983, 189) opening salvo focused on the politics of political science:

> How scientific information is shaped is often predetermined by the dominant organizing principles and assumptions of the prevailing paradigm. And paradigmatic dominance is achieved and maintained partly by means exogenous to the science itself, for instance, by financial support, authoritative opinion and ideological orthodoxy. Scientists have paid dearly for maintaining certain views and their oppressors often have been other scientists working in hand with the authorities of university, state or church.[26]

Parenti observed that things had been no different in political science. Even though one could identify an increasing number of competing models and approaches to political science, there was still a prevailing orthodoxy that pushed alternative perspectives to the margins of the discipline.

The marginalization of nonorthodox perspectives in the discipline was based on an institutionally sanctioned intellectual hierarchy, which reproduced the hegemony of a dominant orthodoxy not because of its intellectual superiority, but because of its greater political control of key resources: professional associations, official journals, grants, prestigious university positions, awards, and so on. Professions are systems of political power. One of the most important political results of this system within political science is that "important scientific questions remain unexamined or to be settled by assertion and injunction rather than by a free exchange of evidence and ideas" (Parenti 1983, 189). And so the stage was set.

Many of the dialogue panels were held in large ballrooms with several hundred attendees and standing room only. The panels pitted current and future luminaries of the academic Left, such as Peter Bachrach, Sheldon Wolin, Stephen E. Bronner, John Ehrenberg, Ira Katznelson, Mark Kesselman, Ralph Miliband, C. B. Macpherson, Bertell Ollman, Michael Parenti, Cornel West, Frances Fox Piven, James Petras, Carl Boggs, and Nancy Hartsock, against representatives of the behavioral Establishment, including David Easton, Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dahl, Sidney Verba, David Apter, Philip Converse, William H. Riker, Leon Epstein, Karl Deutsch, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Aaron Wildavsky. The dialogue panels covered topics such as the concepts of liberalism and democracy, the scientific status of political science, the state in capitalist society, class versus elite theories, and public choice versus Marxist explanations (see Table 7). Thus, the panels enjoined vigorous debates around essentially contested concepts (Gallie 1956), the philosophy of social science, and the relative merits of behavioral and rational choice decision-making models as compared to Marxist class analysis. It is safe to say that there has never been such a direct showdown between two competing visions of the political science discipline, nor has there been anything comparable to it since that time.

One of the many highlights of the dialogue panels, which became legendary in Caucus circles, was the confrontation between Michael Parenti and Nelson Polsby on the question of class versus elite theories. Rather than confront Parenti's empirical argument—odd for a behavioralist—Polsby instead repeated his infamous distinction between the naive insurgents who criticized power (CNPS) and the mature professionals who studied it (behavioral Establishment). John Ehrenberg (2007, 509) observes that "Polsby did little more than give voice to a problem that continues to haunt the work we do and still makes it professionally difficult to shoulder the responsibilities that should come with our training, expertise, and privileges."[27]

TABLE 7. Section 24, Dialogues on Major Issues in Political Science.

24-1	Liberalism (Thursday, 10:45 a.m.)
24-2	Democracy (Thursday, 1:30 p.m.)
24-3	Political Science—a Science? (Thursday, 3:30 p.m.)
24-4	State in Capitalist Society (Friday, 10:45 a.m.)
24-5	Welfare State (Friday, 1:30 p.m.)
24-6	Class Consciousness (Friday, 3:30 p.m.)
24-7	Comparative Politics (Saturday, 10:45 a.m.)
24-8	Nuclear Weapons as Instruments of National Policy (Saturday, 1:30 p.m.)
24-9	Class vs. Elite Theories (Saturday, 3:30 p.m.)
24-10	Public Choice vs. Marxist Explanations (Sunday, 8:45 a.m.)
24-11	Political Economy (Sunday, 10:45 a.m.)
24-12	Human Rights and Political Obligations (Saturday, 8:45 a.m.)

Bertell Ollman, New York University
Co-Sponsored by Caucus for a New Political Science
Source: APSA 1983, 333.

On a personal note, 1983 was my next to last year in graduate school, and the 1983 APSA meeting in Chicago was the first time I attended a political science conference. It was an opportunity to see and hear many of the scholars whose books and articles I had been required to read in graduate school. I still vividly recall attending the dialogue panels on democracy, political science, the state in capitalist society, class versus elite theories, and public choice versus Marxist explanations. I remember my excitement and thinking, "Wow! This is political science!" As an introduction to the state of the discipline, it was a highly misleading experience, although it had the beneficial effect of motivating me to return home and finish my dissertation as quickly as possible because I wanted to be a part of this exciting profession.

I was awakened to reality two years later at the 1985 APSA meeting in New Orleans. I sat through a litany of turgid and boring 10-minute presentations at panel sessions I squeezed in between the alienating experience of daily hovering around my little job market pigeonhole to see if I had received any paper slip invitations for job interviews. I also had the disappointing experience of being scheduled at on an off-site (CNPS) panel where I "delivered" the paper "Intellectuals in Contemporary Social Theory: A Radical Critique," with the expectation that surely political scientists would want to reflect on their role in contemporary capitalist society. There was exactly one person (a panelist's wife) in the audience. I considered it a lesson learned on the "class consciousness" of university intellectuals. At least the paper turned into my second publication, and, of

course, it was published in a sociology journal and not in a political science journal (see Barrow 1987).

Building on Success

On the heels of launching a new journal, the APSA feminist surge, and the Caucus's earlier success in winning concessions on APSA dues, John Rensenbrink claimed that the radicals' takeover of CNPS had been a resounding success. Rensenbrink (1982a, 93) observed that CNPS not only had maintained its presence at the APSA annual meetings, but fielded programs in 1980 and 1981 by Paul Thomas and Nancy Hartsock that "seldom have been better, and probably were better attended than ever before." He noted that by acting as an insurgent vanguard within the APSA, the Caucus had opened the door to a variety of other caucuses and unaffiliated groups, which now presented their own programs parallel to the official panels sponsored by the APSA. Consequently, Rensenbrink (1982a, 93) proudly boasted that "the total of program offerings at APSA meetings in 1981 bears little resemblance to the delimited, ingrown, and status-quo worshipping program of 1967."

Meanwhile, under the leadership of Carl Lankowski, the organization continued its effort to build local chapters and to establish a presence at regional political science conferences (Rensenbrink 1982a, 94). This was a strategy that had been pursued vigorously in the mid-1970s under Rensenbrink's leadership, although with limited and only temporary success in the West, Midwest, and Northeast Political Science Associations (CNPS 1974–75). As these efforts were renewed, Rensenbrink (1982a, 94) confidently declared that in 1982 the fortunes of the CNPS "are steadily on the rise."

However, Rensenbrink's postmortem stood in sharp contrast to the "Report to the Membership" published in June 1981 by Carl Lankowski, who as chair of CNPS had a great deal of unwelcome news to report. First, it was now clear that other unaffiliated groups, such as the Women's Caucus and the Conference Group on the Political Economy of Advanced Industrial Countries, were siphoning off many of the Caucus's APSA-oriented members. This was having an impact on CNPS membership and attendance at its APSA conference panels. For example, the August 29, 1980, business meeting in Washington, DC, drew only 50 attendees, compared to the hundreds that had once attended such meetings in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The 1979 and 1980 APSA plenary sessions were poorly attended despite "the timeliness of the topics and the acumen of

the speakers" (Lankowski 1981, 99).[28] In 1979, total attendance at the 17 CNPS panels had fallen to 266 persons (16 per panel), and in 1980 average attendance fell further to 12 persons per panel (not including the plenary session) (APSA 1980b, 16; Lankowski 1981, 100).

Lankowski attributed declining attendance at CNPS panels to two factors. One factor was the establishment of a new Conference Group on Political Economy of the Advanced Industrial Countries, which had fielded seven panels in 1978, 12 panels in 1979, and 21 panels in 1980. The Caucus now faced increasing intraconference competition from the Conference Group, other newly formed caucuses, and the proliferation of unaffiliated group panels at the APSA. A second factor in declining attendance at Caucus panels was that its organizational infrastructure was collapsing under the disappointment of its electoral failures in 1978 and 1979. The Caucus had failed to elect a CNPS program coordinator for the 1979 APSA conference, which meant this task had defaulted to the outgoing CNPS cochairs, Jane Gruenebaum and Paul Thomas at a time when the cochairs already carried a formidable organizational burden. The next year (1979), the Caucus failed to elect a chair to lead the organization for 1979 to 1980. This disarray led to inadequate preparation and planning and to incomplete panel listings in the official APSA meeting program, which was often missing the names of panelists and even the location of the panels (Lankowski 1981, 100).

Another factor that may have contributed to the Caucus's further decline was that in 1981 a new and more vibrant outlet for socialist scholarship emerged in the form of the Socialist Scholars Conference (SSC). The SSC was reestablished in 1981 by Bogdan Denitch, who was a founder of the new Democratic Socialists of America and a professor of sociology at the CUNY Graduate School. He was supported in this endeavor by Stanley Aronowitz, who had been a labor organizer and was now a professor of political science at CUNY. The SSC quickly became the largest interdisciplinary meeting of socialist scholars in North America, and, thus, it functionally fulfilled one of the Caucus's long-standing goals but without the CNPS being formally present at the conference.

The SSC was sponsored by the CUNY chapter of DSA, and it received enthusiastic support from City University's socialist chancellor, Joseph A. Murphy. The conference attracted scholars attached to the Communist Party USA, *Monthly Review* magazine, *Socialist Register*, and academic Marxists from universities throughout the world. The conference rapidly grew until it attracted 1,500 to 2,000 attendees per year with 300 to 400 speakers on up to 200 panels. The conference organizers claimed that

nearly every major socialist thinker appeared at the conference, so it is possible that the SSC siphoned off far more Caucus members, and potential panel participants, than internal competition within the APSA. It is also possible that the emergence of the SSC contributed to a dilution of the Marxist and socialist influence within the Caucus itself over the next two decades, because SSC was simply a more attractive venue than APSA meetings for presenting Marxist scholarship and debating left-wing politics (Left Forum 2024). Thus, while the appearance of the SSC may have contributed to declining interest in CNPS within the APSA, the irony is that the SSC realized the earlier ambitions of Edward S. Malecki and John Rensenbrink for an interdisciplinary socialist conference that was independent of APSA and the other mainstream social science associations.

CNPS and the New Identity Politics

Lankowski (1981, 99) openly asked Caucus members to consider whether the CNPS could survive "as a marginal group within APSA when its 'natural constituency' was becoming the new 'mainstream' participants?" Lankowski was referring to women, Blacks, Latinos, ecologists, and LGBTQ constituencies, which were all brokering their own deals with the APSA Council, while the CNPS was left out in the cold. These groups were being systematically co-opted into a mainstream liberal-pluralist paradigm of APSA politics taken right out of Robert A. Dahl's *Who Governs?* as they were offered official recognition of their caucuses, new journals, and eventually guaranteed representation on the APSA Council. For this reason, Lankowski was concerned about the ongoing incorporation of the new identity politics groups into a liberal-pluralist coalition led by the APSA Establishment and deployed against the socialist politics of the CNPS.

Lankowski's concerns are largely confirmed in Helene Silverberg's (1993) account of the origins of the Women's Caucus for Political Science (WCPS). Silverberg notes that in the late 1960s, when the CNPS was founded, women were entering political science graduate programs in larger numbers, and many of these women initially joined the CNPS to express their discontent with the profession (Shuck 1969).[29] In 1968, the Caucus had tried to solidify its position with this growing constituency by creating a Commission on the Status of Women in the Profession, which was chaired by Alan Wolfe. However, many women did not join the Caucus, so CNPS supported a campaign that was independently initiated by

female members of the APSA to have the Association establish its own Committee on the Status of Women. APSA President David Easton appointed such a committee in 1969 (Roelofs 1968b). Many of the latter women were wary of CNPS, which they claimed was as male dominated as the APSA.

For instance, Joyce M. Mitchell (1990, 206, 209 n. 4), who was endorsed for APSA Council by CNPS, observes that

> the CNPS raised many issues: the Vietnam War, the involvement of professionals with covert intelligence, the diminished status of teaching, neglect of normative theory, formal disdain of applied research and strictures of professional neutrality on political issues. Problems of race received some attention in this crowded agenda, but the "women question" was hardly prominent. It was not included in the first program panels the CNPS organized for the 1968 meetings.

Moreover, the first CNPS Executive Committee elected in 1967 included one woman, who served as secretary, while the following year "brought 10 new leaders, many known male political scientists, but just one woman replacing the first—and again a graduate student" (Mitchell 1990, 209 n. 5). Thus, impatient with both the APSA and the CNPS, a small group of women founded the WCPS at the August 1969 annual meeting of the APSA, and like the CNPS, the Women's Caucus was simultaneously committed to promoting organizational reform within the political science profession and intellectual change within the political science discipline (Silverberg 1993, 368).

However, Silverberg (1993, 369) observes that the intellectual and political diversity of the Women's Caucus quickly

> worked to displace emerging theoretical debates with professional concerns. . . . Since women's caucus members were linked only by their sex and their common opposition to sex discrimination in political science, the WCPS focused its attention on professional concerns. It participated in APSA elections, developed new grievance procedures, drew up sexual harassment guidelines . . . attacked antinepotism laws [which prevented dual-career hiring], and generally helped to lower barriers to women's advancement in the profession.

Similarly, Philippa Strum (1973b, 5) observes that by 1973 the WCPS was "beset by ideological struggles," and it chose to evade these struggles by refocusing on narrow professional issues of concern to women as opposed to the larger theoretical and epistemological issues raised by feminist theory. Silverberg (1993, 369) also concludes that because of its growing focus on professional concerns, the WCPS ultimately failed "to serve as a forum for scholarly debate and methodological revision," and this failure "left it permanently on the sidelines of new feminist intellectual developments already under way in the discipline." The WCPS did not offer an epistemological, methodological, or ideological critique of the discipline, but instead offered multiple and legitimate criticisms of the *profession*.

According to Silverberg's analysis, the failure to engage the *discipline* at an intellectual level opened the door to a second and much larger group of women, who negotiated what Silverberg calls the "behavioralist compromise." This compromise entailed adopting behavioralist assumptions, methods, and research questions, while incorporating "women's behavior" into the research tradition established by their male predecessors. Hence, the women-and-politics research agenda maintained its methodological continuity with postwar behavioralism, and by expanding the discipline's jurisdiction in this way, it enabled "feminist political scientists to append women to mainstream research agendas without having to challenge the larger questions, categories, and models of the discipline" (Silverberg 1993, 370). Kristin A. Goss (2007) documents how corporate-sponsored philanthropic foundations also played a role in facilitating the behavioral compromise with targeted research support. In Silverberg's account of events, the behavioralist compromise was in place by 1975. While many of the Caucus's female members also joined the WCPS, as socialist feminists their *ideological* program did not fit neatly with the WCPS's behavioral methodological and liberal political orthodoxy, which made for an increasingly tenuous alliance.[30]

Yet, an even more telling example of co-optation politics comes directly from the 1991 report of the APSA Committee on the Status of Latinos in the Profession (Avalos 1991). The 1991 report acknowledged the obvious problem that Latinos were underrepresented in the profession and that efforts were needed to recruit more Latinos into political science, starting with programs at the undergraduate level. However, as the committee also acknowledged, the "primary concern here is the historical record of the publication of research on race and ethnic politics in political science journals" (Avalos 1991, 242). The committee conducted a quantitative

analysis comparing the publication of research articles on race, ethnicity, and gender in political science journals to sociology journals and to one interdisciplinary journal. The mainstream political science journals included the *APSR*, the *American Journal of Political Science*, and the *Western Political Quarterly* (now *Political Research Quarterly*). The "control" journals included the *American Sociological Review*, the *American Journal of Sociology*, *Social Forces*, and the *Social Science Quarterly*.

The committee's research found that from 1964 to 1988, only 11 articles had been published on the Latino community in the four political science journals and only one article had ever been published in a "major" political science journal other than the *Western Political Science Quarterly*. On a percentage basis, this was a much lower rate of publication than in the sociology and interdisciplinary journals. The committee acknowledged that this finding "raises a number of important questions: Why are so few articles on race and ethnicity being published in the leading journals in political science and why are articles on race and ethnicity more likely to be published in sociology or interdisciplinary journals than in political science journals?" (Avalos 1991, 244).

The committee found that a

> possible explanation for the lack of articles published on race, gender and ethnicity in political science journals is a philosophical and theoretical one, namely the reluctance on the part of the discipline of political science to accept critical (or radical political economy) theory as a legitimate model of analysis of political phenomena. It is the harsh reality for Latino(a) political scientists, and for Marxist political scientists, that no mainstream journal has ever consistently published articles which use critical theory as their primary method of analysis . . . the discipline has historically been dominated by institutionalist, political behavior and rational choice approaches and partly because the social and political climates generated by the Cold War have limited the academic freedom of Marxist scholars. (Avalos 1991, 245)

In other words, the Committee acknowledged that most Latino/a scholars trained in the 1960s and 1970s had adopted a Marxist, critical theory, or radical political economy approach to the analysis of Latino politics, and these approaches were generally anathema to mainstream political science journals.[31] In fact, the committee found "a somewhat narrower range of topics in mainstream political science journals as opposed

to the more varied range of topics found in sociology journals," with the former focused almost exclusively on elections and voting behavior (Avalos 1991, 245). This meant that most Latino/a political scientists published in "journals outside the discipline of political science" and "these journals alone rarely guaranteed good chances for tenure and promotion at most research institutions in political science" (Avalos 1991, 245).

The committee is to be commended for its intellectual honesty, but it is simultaneously culpable for its methodological and ideological parochialism. The committee never questioned *why* mainstream political science journals were less receptive to articles by critical or Marxist scholars than other social science disciplines. The committee never questioned *why* the field of political science was so narrowly defined by disciplinary elites that a research article addressing a political topic, but published in a sociology, anthropology, history, or political economy journal would not count as "political science" and, therefore, not be considered a bona fide article for tenure and promotion decisions. It is a parochial disciplinary practice that strikes one as absolutely asinine and it provokes a number of *political* questions.

First, the obvious problem is that there was not an absence of Latino scholars or an absence of scholarship on Latino politics, but the problem as defined by the committee is that there was not enough *behavioral* scholarship on Latino voting and public opinion. The problem in the judgment of the committee was that the extant political science on Latinos was critical and Marxist instead of behavioral and quantitative.[32] One might conclude from this analysis that the problem was *the political science profession and its journals*! It makes one wonder if the real problem was that the political science Establishment was not the gatekeeper to journals in sociology, history, anthropology, and political economy and, therefore, could not control the content of those journals. This question is particularly salient when one considers that the committee readily acknowledges that journals in other cognate disciplines were more open to interdisciplinary and critical research orientations, as well as to methodological pluralism—all of which challenged the fundamental assumptions and assertions of official political science.

Second, after defining "the problem" of Latino/a scholarship in this way, the committee concluded that the fundamental problem was that "the primary data used for these analyses [voting behavior and public opinion], the National Election Survey (NES), has never oversampled any major minority group (e.g., Blacks or Latinos) in the United States so that analyses of ethnic electoral behavior could be done" (Avalos 1991, 245).

Hence, the committee arrived at three recommendations:

1. A new cohort of younger Latinos needed to be recruited into the profession.
2. The National Election Survey needed to begin oversampling Latino and Black voters so that a new generation of Latino and Black scholars would have a common public "database" for studying Latino and Black voting behavior, and
3. The profession should establish training programs in behavioral and quantitative research techniques targeted at ethnic and racial minorities so they could eventually succeed in the disciplinary mainstream.[33]

This became the blueprint for again extending the sphere of behavioral political science so that it took "in a greater variety of parties and interests" and, thus, as James Madison said, made "it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other" (Hamilton et al. [1787/1788] 1961, 83). By extending the sphere of behavioral political science in form, the APSA successfully deflected, suppressed, or marginalized substantive *intellectual* challenges to the discipline by critical Latino scholars (cf. Funk and Sclofsky 2021).

Pitfalls and Prospects of CNPS

Only a year after declaring the left turn in CNPS a resounding success, John Rensenbrink reconsidered his position in an *NPS* article on the pitfalls and prospects of CNPS as it lurched into the 1980s. Rensenbrink cautioned that despite the Caucus's many successes during the 1970s and early 1980s, there were also many pitfalls awaiting the Caucus in the future. A central concern for Rensenbrink was that the "class consciousness" of university intellectuals was waning as the activism of the 1960s and 1970s faded into the distant memories of what were now aging full professors. Junior faculty and graduate students had no memory of the tumultuous politics, ideological disputes, and methodological debates that had brought the CNPS into existence. In fact, Rensenbrink (1982a, 95) lamented that it was even becoming "fashionable to downplay the critical importance of class" in comparison to gen-

der, race, and ethnicity as Marxism gave way to the identity politics of postmodernism and postcolonialism.

For this reason, however, Rensenbrink considered it necessary for the Caucus to follow through with the feminist breakthrough of 1981 and to further integrate feminist analysis into every future issue of *NPS*. He also advised the Caucus to become more open to the issues raised by Black and other Third World struggles and the emerging ecological critique of capitalism. Rensenbrink (1982a, 95) argued that the Caucus had to "go beyond 'reaching out'" to these groups and embrace their "critique and political perceptions in a 'new political science.'" New political science would have to renew itself amid changing economic and political conditions and become new once again in the context of these changing dynamics.

Rensenbrink was also concerned about the problem of leadership succession in the 1980s. Rensenbrink (1982a, 96) reminded members that the Caucus had "suffered the embarrassment of being without a chairperson" in 1979–80, and this embarrassment was compounded by the fact that "the Caucus has always depended on its leadership to move it along." Rensenbrink hoped that efforts to organize local chapters would start building a future leadership cadre, while making the organization's continuity, and even its existence, less dependent on a small group of enthusiastic activists at the national level.[34] In building local chapters, Rensenbrink (1982a, 96) emphasized that the Caucus might one day renew its "political style within and without APSA." He was convinced that local chapter building was the key to recruiting the next generation of graduate students, and he considered the Columbia University and Berkeley chapters models to be emulated by others. Rensenbrink (1982a, 97) suggested that the CNPS start sponsoring a national conference separate from the APSA modeled on the "Socialist Perspectives" conference it had organized at Brown University in 1975. If such a conference were held on a regular basis, it would aid greatly in recruiting new members, and it would provide a scholarly outlet for Caucus members with less affinity for the APSA.

Finally, Rensenbrink identified a deeper problem that had first surfaced at the 1978 APSA meeting in New York City. At that meeting, it became evident that there were two wings of CNPS, which coexisted uneasily in their common commitment to socialism. One wing of the Caucus was "more closely tied to conceptions and habits of professional work within the discipline, and to professional expectations," while a second wing of the Caucus consisted of political activists who were "more critical of the 'professional' side of the profession" (Rensenbrink 1982a, 97). The latter group was not only committed to articulating the founda-

tions of a new political science but was seeking to create a *new politics* based on a new political science. Rensenbrink considered both wings of the Caucus important to its continued vitality, but because Caucus business meetings were held during APSA conferences, it was the former wing that was now preponderant in Caucus decision-making. Rensenbrink (1982a, 97) feared that this hegemony of the pure intellectuals would gradually make the CNPS less distinctive and less dynamic and that it would cease "to be the hard-hitting organization it should and can be."

What Is to Be Done?

The CNPS was still struggling with its double identity when in June 1981 Carl Lankowski published a position paper in *NPS* as a member of the Strategy and Goals Committee. He asked other members of the committee to submit their own position papers with a promise to publish them in *NPS* before the committee submitted its final report to ensure that the committee's work was transparent to general Caucus membership. However, there is no evidence in *NPS* that other members of the committee followed his lead, and, in fact, there is no evidence that the committee ever issued a final report, as the Caucus would soon descend into the worst organizational crisis of its history (1983–85).

Lankowski argued that the basic parameters for defining CNPS goals and strategies in the 1980s were (1) that the Caucus was a socialist-feminist organization of scholars and (2) as a scholarly organization, the Caucus operated primarily within America's system of higher education. Lankowski (1981, 105) observed that, as socialists, Caucus members "embrace the general goal of the transformation of capitalist society in order to remove the most significant causes of alienation, to contribute to the construction of a just, humane and democratic social order." However, Lankowski (1981, 105) believed the Caucus had to realistically circumscribe its efforts by focusing "on our own immediate arena of daily action, i.e., on academe." In this respect, Lankowski's position paper was a direct repudiation of Alan Wolfe's earlier call for a Caucus focused on off-campus political activism, while he was unknowingly embracing the strategy promoted by David Kettler a decade earlier. Lankowski argued that the best CNPS members could do on the cusp of the Reagan Revolution was defend their positions within academia.

Lankowski offered several reasons for this conclusion that seemed to be gaining currency among some of CNPS's leading members. First, he

argued that higher education had become a field for class struggle because it was now a key site for the development and distribution of ideologies that reproduce specific techniques of political domination. As higher education was progressively drawn into the matrix of state-capital relations—serving as an ideological state apparatus—capitalist reproduction mechanisms became susceptible to direct challenge within the university (Althusser 1971).[35] Second, higher education had become, and would continue to be, a key site for socializing a significant portion of the working class, who might be socialized into abandoning their class origins to achieve social mobility or socialized as an organic intelligentsia of the working class who could take up positions of leadership in a new labor and socialist movement. This makes the mere act of teaching not just political, but an arena of ideological and political class struggle (Ollman 1976, 1978a; Mills and Ollman 1978; Boggs 1979). Moreover, Lankowski (1981, 106) argued that one lesson from Marx and Engels's *Communist Manifesto* is that it can be

> safely assumed that our pedagogical and political practice in this arena will positively affect students from bourgeois as well as from working class strata. We can expect to contribute to the formation of a socialist intelligentsia. . . . We must recognize our academic struggles for what they have actually become—bona fide elements of a broader class struggle.

At the same time, Lankowski warned that it would be naive to believe that the position of radicals within academia was safe and secure. The Bertell Ollman academic freedom case, where the governor of Maryland had intervened to prevent his appointment as department chair because he was a Marxist, was merely a warning shot by the capitalist class and its political minions. Lankowski warned that the ruling class would not indefinitely allow a Marxist cultural revolution to sweep through American universities without a political response. Consequently, Lankowski (1981, 107) admonished Caucus members that "we must organize ourselves" because it "takes no great theoretical insight to realize that we will be susceptible to decimation 1950s-styIe unless we unite for the struggle that we cannot wish away. *They* know who we are" (Barrow 2025).[36]

However, beyond overt academic repression, Lankowski (1981, 107) predicted that a major restructuring of higher education would be initiated by a new class of servile university managers "generating a sense of crisis to bring us under control." Neoconservative ideologues, politicians,

and university administrators were already deploying a strategic narrative that there were too many demands for racial and sexual equality, for culturally and class-relevant curricula, for decent university services, democratic accountability of administrators, and democratic participation in decision-making by students and faculty. The political reaction against these demands would include cuts to higher education budgets, rolling back student services, raising student tuition and fees, cutting faculty salaries, industrializing classroom relations, vocationalizing the curriculum, increasing dependence on the financial support of large corporations and the Department of Defense, and introducing more explicit forms of political control through administrative and bureaucratic rules on faculty conduct.

Thus, Lankowski (1981, 107) asked what Caucus members could do on their own campuses to meet this challenge, and he suggested that "the general goal . . . is to resist incorporation under the restructuring process while we create a counter-agenda of our own." The key to achieving this goal would be local organizations or chapters, which could forge alliances with like-minded groups on their campuses to challenge the neoconservative agenda campus by campus. While recognizing the need for faculty unionization, Lankowski suggested that local Caucus chapters could also facilitate the development of a socialist and feminist pedagogy on campus; it could join other faculty and student groups in fighting for curricular innovations, staffing decisions, and the funding of extracurricular projects at the department level. Lankowski (1981, 108–9) was convinced that

> what we need are working collectives with a clearly defined and limited program which is in part attuned to local problems, but which confronts these within the context of a framework for action. The national organization should be the place where local problems are discussed and general priorities are set. The Caucus' annual programs should be outgrowths of ongoing discussions at the base. The Caucus must be more than the collection of left academics which shows up at annual APSA meetings.

The Local Chapters Experiment

The CNPS began discussing the creation of local chapters and regional organizations as early as 1974, when it was still operating in an ad hoc manner with little formal organizational structure. The CNPS was in a

great deal of flux when John Rensenbrink was elected chair in 1974–76, but he appointed the organization's first regional coordinators with the goal of stimulating independent regional CNPS conferences, building a CNPS presence at regional political science association conferences, and cultivating a new generation of leadership from the ground up. Rensenbrink appointed Adolph Reed Jr. (South), Charles Fox (West), and Craig Malone (Northeast) as the first regional coordinators.

After traveling to many regional political science meetings to promote the CNPS during 1974 and 1975, Rensenbrink (1975e) felt his efforts were successful "to a marked degree." In a written report to the Coordinating Council and 56 other activist members of the CNPS, Rensenbrink (1975e) argued that the CNPS could "build on the autonomy of local and regional groups" to create "a federative pattern of power [within CNPS] rather than the rigid hierarchy that I inherited" from the past. Yet, in fact, nothing much happened as a result of this initiative, and there is little evidence that local chapters or regional conferences were organized by members of the CNPS during this time. There was simply not enough critical mass outside the Northeast, except in Berkeley and Los Angeles, for local chapters to form. At best, the CNPS regional groups sponsored one or two panels on an irregular basis at the Midwest, Northeast, and Southern Political Science Associations.

Cyrus Zirakzadeh, who served as a member of the West Coast Editorial Collective of *NPS* in the early 1980s, provides a quite different grassroots perspective on the CNPS presence at US universities during this time. Zirakzadeh states that he first heard of CNPS in 1973 during his senior year of undergraduate studies at the University of Michigan. Zirakzadeh (2018) had taken "quite a few classes from faculty known to be either outright Marxists or sympathetic to Marxism, which at that time was the main theoretical alternative" to the dominant behavioral-Straussian paradigm at Michigan. Although active in the cooperative movement and other political activities, Zirakzadeh (2018) notes that even at its heyday in the 1970s the CNPS "was never central to my campus life or politics." Its peripheral status for students was because "the Caucus for a New Political Science was largely interested in governance of the professional discipline" rather than social movements, and, therefore, Caucus faculty members did not seem interested in reconstituting the political science discipline intellectually or politically (Zirakzadeh 2018).

The Caucus's image on campus stood in stark contrast to the URPE, which actively recruited students by inviting undergraduates to attend

URPE-sponsored seminars and to meet with visiting radical political economists. Zirakzadeh (2018) encountered the same situation when he began graduate school at Stanford University in 1974:

> Other than URPE, there was nowhere for graduate students in political science with more radical interests and commitments to find an alternative intellectual home—or at least a home that was formally organized. So the graduate students either went to URPE meetings, or they formed small reading circles where we read and discussed every other week writings by Althusser, Baran and Sweezy . . . the various Dependency writers from Europe and Latin America, the Frankfurt School, and so on. . . . I would not come across the Caucus again until roughly my fourth year of graduate work at Berkeley (around 1979 or 1980).[37]

I remember a similar experience when I began graduate school at UCLA in 1977, where there was a large contingent of Marxist faculty and graduate students in political science, sociology, anthropology, history, urban planning, film studies, and comparative literature. The more advanced graduate students would frequently tell me that I "had to join the Caucus," but no one knew how to join the Caucus. I had no idea how (or why) to join the Caucus because it did not have an organized presence in the Department of Political Science, nor was there any obvious point of contact at the national level. The result is that my first contact with the Caucus did not occur until 1983, when I attended many of the dialogue panels at that year's annual meeting of the APSA. Even then, and despite my enthusiasm for the dialogue panels, I did not join the Caucus until 1994, when its new status as an organized section was in jeopardy due to a change in APSA's minimum membership requirements.

The 1980s marked a renewed effort to build an organizational infrastructure that was wider, deeper, and more permanent than the one provided by annual meetings of the APSA and occasional emergency meetings of the Assembly. The question of establishing local chapters of CNPS was again broached at the 1978 business meeting, but it was at the 1979 and 1980 business meetings that the rationale for local chapters began to take shape for the new leadership. On September 5, 1981, the CNPS annual business meeting agreed to formally grant local chapter status to any campus-based group desiring to affiliate with the CNPS, so long as it provided a statement of organization in accord with the basic goals and strat-

egies of the CNPS. It further agreed to invite one member of each local chapter to sit on the CNPS Coordinating Council, with voting rights granted to individuals representing chapters with at least 10 members.

In 1981, Carl Lankowski was urging the creation of local CNPS chapters for the purpose of engaging in department-level and university-wide initiatives in the areas of curriculum development; personnel recruitment, retention, and promotion; and university governance, and of supporting broader political initiatives in higher education, such as the South Africa divestiture movement (Anzovin 1987). Lankowski's (1981, 101) goal was for local chapters to strengthen the Caucus's ability "to participate meaningfully in efforts to initiate a socialistic academic politics on a broader scale," while sustaining an academic environment favorable to critical scholarship. However, the stated purpose of the new policy adopted at the annual business meeting was more bureaucratic; the purpose of local chapters was to increase Caucus membership and to increase visibility on local campuses instead of limiting its presence to national APSA meetings (CNPS 1982a, 90).

A New York City chapter of CNPS was the first local chapter, although it had been informally established in 1977 before the national policy. The New York chapter became a formal organization in the spring of 1978 when 15 graduate students at Columbia University joined together to oppose the university's plan to hire Henry Kissinger as an endowed chair of international relations. However, the New York chapter quickly doubled in size to include graduate students and young professors at other nearby universities, and, as it expanded its membership, it also took on a wider goal and purpose (Johns 1978b, 14; CNPS 1978f).[38] The New York chapter became especially interested in linking "socialist theory to ongoing progressive struggles," and it was particularly concerned with advancing "the spread and legitimation of Marxist and other critical perspectives within the field of political science." The New York chapter aligned itself politically with those Caucusites who "have expressed an interest in altering the direction of the organization in order to transcend the parameters of professionalism within which it has developed" during the previous decade. Specifically, the chapter envisioned a Caucus that is "more politically engaged than it has been in the past" by contributing "to building a new, humane, and socialist politics" (CNPS 1978h).

The New York chapter came to exert considerable influence over the national organization, partly because of its members' proximity to Assembly meetings, which were nearly always held in New York City, but also because most members of the *NPS* Editorial Collective came from the

New York (Columbia) chapter. This group was also highly organized in preparation for the 1978 APSA convention (the socialist takeover), which was held in New York City (Johns 1978b). Shortly after it was organized, the New York chapter issued a statement that its actions would be

> informed by two principles that lie at the root of the new political science. The first is that political science is not and cannot be neutral. We are opposed to the dominant political science which, with its narrow expertise, its avoidance of real issues, and its antidemocratic practice, serves both directly and indirectly to prop up the status quo. The second principle is that we must link or work as intellectuals with direct action. We cannot achieve our goals of a new university in a new society by merely writing—we must participate in the day-to-day work of organizing and working for change. (Johns 1978b, 17)

Importantly, however, when the New York chapter talked about working for change, it was talking about "remaking the discipline" of political science and changing universities by "gaining control of university resources and building new programs, hiring progressive faculty, and recruiting students who have a commitment to political action in support of those outside the small circle of policymakers that runs the government and economy" (Johns 1978b, 17). In addition, the New York chapter sponsored or cosponsored numerous events, including a "Conference on Dialectics" (April 22–23, 1977) and a three-day "Conference on Economic Planning and Economic Democracy" (May 4–6, 1979). Both of the events were cosponsored with the Center for Marxist Studies at NYU. It sponsored forums on Eurocommunism (with Mark Kesselman),[39] Rudolph Bahro's new green politics in Eastern Europe, and "The Resurgence of the Right and Strategies for Fighting It" (Toloudis 2008). The New York chapter also sponsored a "Conference on Marxism and Academic Freedom" with keynote addresses by Michael Parenti and David Harvey. Other participants included Frederic Jameson, David Gordon, and Bertell Ollman ("Recent Conferences" 1977, 432; "CNPS/NYC Chapter Report" 1979).

Behind the leadership of Paul Thomas, Berkeley was the second university to establish a local chapter of CNPS, where notably Cyrus Zirakzadeh was quickly drawn into the new chapter ("Chapter Formation" 1982). Thomas led the formation of the Berkeley chapter in the spring of 1980 and submitted a statement of intent to the national Coordinating Council, which identified the chapter as a socialist and feminist organization. Its

first public activity occurred on March 11, 1980, when the chapter sponsored a talk by Paul Johnston, a local trade unionist, who was also a member of the Bay Area Kapitalistate Collective.[40]

The Berkeley chapter set a 1981–82 agenda that included talks on Reaganism, the Left in Germany, the European peace movement, antinuclear activism, the prospects for French socialism following the election of François Mitterrand, a report on Nicaragua, the 1978 British monetary crisis, and a teach-in on militarism. The Berkeley chapter cosponsored a "Bay Area Symposium on Feminism and Political Theory," held in Santa Cruz in the spring of 1981, which was attended by approximately 100 people. Within its first year, the Berkeley chapter had established several study groups for students and faculty.

The Berkeley chapter's long-term goals included the creation of a wider radical network that would forge closer ties to other radical groups such as the local URPE, and even forging bonds with community groups to create "a motivated, radical counter-community." The Berkeley chapter reported that it began reaching out to incoming graduate students at this time through social functions and educational events, which reportedly met "with considerable interest and a modest but growing increase in membership in the chapter" ("Chapter Formation" 1982, 92).

A key outgrowth of the Berkley chapter was the establishment of a West Coast Collective to assist with editing and publishing the Caucus's journal *NPS*. The West Coast Collective published volume 2, number 4 (December 1982) of the journal and reported that its efforts in publishing the journal "put to rest any doubts that the act of publication and the production of a journal is also a political act" ("Chapter Formation" 1982, 92). In concluding its first report to the wider Caucus, the Berkeley chapter hoped its efforts would "strike a chord elsewhere in the country . . . [in] areas in need of new Caucus chapters. If our experience on the west coast is any guide, people who set about to form chapters will surprise themselves at how deep, quick and positive a response will meet their efforts. Our message is, in a word, organize" ("Chapter Formation" 1982, 92).

Political scientists at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, led by Carl Lankowski, also established a small local chapter in Geneva, New York, in 1981, which after one year claimed to prove "that a relatively small group of committed students and faculty, working together within the framework of a small liberal arts institution, can have a significant impact on local political issues and contribute significantly to supporting national efforts" ("Caucus News" 1981b, 116). In its first year the HWSC chapter of the Caucus organized opposition to a campus visit by former Rhodesian

Prime Minister Ian Smith, wrote a set of community friendly and "green" guidelines for the college's new building program that was adopted by the faculty, and mobilized students and faculty for local and national demonstrations against Ronald Reagan's aggressive welfare cuts (see Piven and Cloward 1982). The HWSC chapter also launched a successful Marxist-feminist study group. The following year (1982), the HWSC chapter organized the conference "World Systems of Labor and Production: Challenges to Social Democracy in the 1980s," which included talks by Robert W. Cox (York University), James Mittleman (CCNY), Rick Shryock (Columbia University), and Stanley Aronowitz (CUNY). The keynote address was delivered by William Winpisinger, the socialist president of the International Association of Machinists, while the closing talk was delivered by Tony Benn, the leader of the socialist left wing of the British Labour Party ("Caucus Notes" 1982b, 148).

A local chapter was established in Seattle, Washington, in 1980, and another local chapter led by James Block was established at DePaul University in 1983, although there is no reported activity for these chapters (Lankowski 1981, 101–2). It is likely that the local chapters at least succeeded in attracting a new generation of graduate students and faculty, but the federated structure of autonomous local chapters envisioned by Rensenbrink never materialized to the extent envisioned, nor did the Caucus-led campus activism envisioned by Lankowski gain much steam in the 1980s. It appears that CNPS local chapters were defunct by the mid-1980s, if not earlier, as there is no reported activity in the minutes of Caucus business meetings or in Caucus newsletters after the early 1980s.

The Organizational Crisis, 1983–1985

By 1983, it was increasingly evident that the radicals' ambitious plans were yielding few permanent results. Local chapters were already disintegrating, the number of panels awarded to CNPS at APSA meetings was declining, CNPS panel attendance was declining, membership was declining, business meetings were poorly attended, and *NPS* was not being published regularly. The Caucus began addressing these organizational issues at the initiative of Stephen M. Sachs, who was now serving as chair (1982–84). Sachs had received his PhD from the University of Chicago (1968), while serving as a lecturer at Indiana University South Bend (1965–69). He was subsequently hired by Indiana University—Purdue University, where he was a colleague of Victor Wallis, and he had just been promoted to full

professor. Sachs (1978, 1979) was studying workers' self-management as a self-identified applied philosopher, and he had coedited a book on applied poverty research (Goldstein and Sachs 1983).

As the new CNPS chair, Sachs wrote to members that "C.N.P.S. has much yet to develop as an organization" (CNPS 1983, 1). He observed:

> During the last several years the focus of the Caucus has been primarily on the development of *New Political Science*, while continuing the program at A.P.S.A. and initiating local chapters. Now that *NPS* has become a solid journal, while fine programs at A.P.S.A. continue and Chapter Formation has begun, I agreed to serve as Chair for 83–84 with the idea of beginning to re-establish internal democratic processes and committee and regional activity which had ceased to function. (CNPS 1983, 1)

Sachs's first goal was to strengthen communication with the general membership by reinvigorating the Caucus's newsletter, which was now called the *Caucus Forum*. The *Caucus Forum* was intended to be a "vehicle for internal discussion and in re-establishing the Assembly composed of all those wishing to participate in C.N.P.S. affairs during the year" (CNPS 1983, 1). Sachs convened two "open meetings" of the Coordinating Council in New York City in January and April 1983 in an effort to open Caucus decision-making to more members, but the two meetings were so sparsely attended that the Coordinating Council decided no official business. Similarly, while many people had expressed interest in serving on various task forces proposed by Sachs, "no concrete proposals" had been made by the summer of 1983 (CNPS 1983, 1). Thus, at the 1983 annual business meeting, Sachs again proposed the creation of several membership task forces on publications, academic freedom, constitution and procedures, APSA affairs, and regions (conferences), which were all intended to make recommendations to strengthen the Caucus's faltering organizational capacities.

However, the extant records suggest there was not even a functioning CNPS Coordinating Council from 1984 to 1986, and, in 1985, the new CNPS chair evidently failed to schedule a business meeting at the APSA convention in New Orleans. Consequently, a poorly attended ad hoc business meeting was convened by active members of the Caucus, which was chaired by Laura Katz Olson. According to Joseph Kling (2021), who had just joined CNPS and was attending his first business meeting, "The major item of discussion on the agenda was whether the Caucus should disband." By the end of the meeting, Laura Katz Olson and Stephen E. Bron-

ner had agreed to serve as cochairs for the coming year (1985–86). After the ad hoc business meeting, however, Olson and Bronner wrote to members informing them that "for various reasons, including a real breakdown in communications," there was no CNPS business meeting in 1985, and this "made it apparent that some hard decisions will have to be made about the future of the Caucus" (CNPS 1985, 1).

As longtime members of CNPS, Olson and Bronner were strategically situated to lead the Caucus in the midst of its crisis, and they were highly regarded scholars. Olson had received her PhD from the University of Colorado, Boulder in 1974. She immediately joined the political science department at Lehigh University and was an associate professor at the time she was elected cochair of the Caucus. Olson had established herself as an expert on health care policy, aging, and women's studies with her recently published book, *The Political Economy of Aging: The State, Private Power, and Social Welfare* (1982), which was nominated for the *Washington Monthly* 1982 Annual Book Award. She had also coedited *Public Policy and Aging: The Politics of Growing Old in America* (1983). Olson had been an active member of CNPS since 1973.

Stephen E. Bronner received his PhD from the University of California, Berkeley in 1976. He immediately joined the political science department at Rutgers University, and he too was an associate professor of political science when elected cochair. At the time, Bronner (1981) had established himself as an expert on Marxist political theory by having published an intellectual biography of Rosa Luxemburg and an edited collection of Rosa Luxemburg's (1978) letters. He had also edited a book on the German expressionists with Douglas Kellner (1983). Bronner had been active in CNPS since the 1970s and had served as a member of the *NPS* editorial board since 1980.[41]

The 1985 breakdown was a critical event, but as the new cochairs recognized, it was merely the culmination of many years of dwindling membership and participation in Caucus affairs. Olson and Bronner emphasized that a CNPS business meeting would be convened at the 1986 APSA convention in Washington, DC, but they warned members that they had to immediately take several actions to ensure the success of the next business meeting. The first action was that faculty with graduate students should discuss the Caucus with them and urge them to take part in the next business meeting. The cochairs wrote that "unless graduate students themselves decide upon the need for a left-network, the Caucus will assuredly fold" (CNPS 1985, 1). There is no question that Stephen E. Bronner and Frances Fox Piven were critical to salvaging the prospects of CNPS on

this front as an influx of their graduate students over the next decade reinvigorated the organization with a new CUNY-Rutgers leadership axis that displaced the older Columbia-Berkeley leadership axis. This leadership nucleus persisted into the mid-2000s, when it was expanded into a UCLA-CUNY-Rutgers leadership axis. Meanwhile, members were informed that the Caucus would continue sponsoring panels at the APSA meeting as an unaffiliated group "on the traditional broad set of Caucus concerns: Political Economy, Feminism, Marxism, imperialism, democratic policy concerns, workplace democracy, the role of the left, critical theory, etc." (CNPS 1985, 1).

The 20th Anniversary Retrospective

In 1987, the CNPS sponsored a 20th anniversary retrospective on the CNPS, which featured John Rensenbrink, H. Mark Roelofs, and Christian Bay, the original founders of the CNPS, although it does not appear that there is any record of what was said in those presentations except for one account by B. Nelson Ong, a young neoconservative professor who served as secretary to the National Association of Scholars. Ong (1988, 55), who attended the panel, describes the gathering as one that "included many of the founders of the organization, now well into middle age and securely tenured, and took the form of a retrospective, often nostalgic, of the achievements of the past two decades." The participants lamented that "as paradoxical as it may seem, the discipline of political science has not been subject to the level of politicization and radicalization seen in academic fields such as sociology, anthropology, literature, and area studies" (Ong 1988, 55). Consequently, since 1967, the Caucus's fortunes had "waxed and waned, taking it from the verge of organizational power within the American Political Science Association (APSA) to a position that seems uncomfortably peripheral to those who still remember its salad days." Despite two decades of CNPS insurgency, the discipline had "managed to keep its center of philosophic gravity well within the spectrum of American opinion." Moreover, while the Caucus still commanded a significant following among political scientists, Ong (1988, 55) noted some of its apparent decline in the late 1980s was attributed to "a siphoning of energies into new professional groupings, organized around feminist and ecological agendas."

In this respect, the Caucus's founders could proudly point to the fact that it had been midwife to the birth of several other groups designed to shake up the APSA: the Women's Caucus, the Black Caucus, the Chicano

Caucus, the Foundations of Political Theory, and the Conference Group on Political Economy. Many other caucuses emerged after the CNPS paved the way, but it was also acknowledged that "some caucuses it originally sponsored have become part of the establishment or have lost their radical impetus and vision" (Ong 1988, 57–58). It was noted that the dramatic proliferation of "ideologically partisan" unaffiliated group panels at the APSA had also caused a decline in the attendance at CNPS panels, which now averaged 12 persons per panel. The proliferation of these alternative groups was creating logistical problems for the APSA conference as there was now insufficient space at the conference hotels to accommodate all of these panels in addition to the regular APSA program. This meant that the CNPS was not only seeing its number of panels at the APSA meetings reduced in number; they were also being shunted off to secondary hotels located far from the main conference hotel.

Ong reports that some Caucus members wanted to reignite the old organizational revolt even if it commanded only one-third of the APSA's membership. Other members argued "that the Caucus had lost it strength and had become in the eyes of the mainstream a 'withering, ineffective group' very different from the organization that aroused 'fear and hatred' in the seventies." According to Ong (1988, 57–58), the founders—Bay, Roelofs, and Rensenbrink—argued that the reason CNPS had once been feared and hated was not because of the organizational insurgency, but because it challenged the APSA Establishment's "scholarship, which challenged their being. It tried to create a new model of political science to displace the old."

However, in transforming an organizational revolt into an intellectual revolution, it was acknowledged that the organizational revolt had "helped identify a body of dissenters on the Left," and it was now necessary to rebuild a network of left scholars through the Caucus. This network could review each other's papers, help fellow members get published, support CNPS members secure tenure track appointments at their own institutions, write letters of recommendation for job candidates, and volunteer to serve on tenure committees. Thus, it was suggested that one of the major new goals of CNPS going forward should be to provide a safe haven for radical political scientists and to help them advance within the profession. This idea presaged the emerging next phase of development in CNPS history after it became an organized section of the APSA in 1992.

In contrast to the ongoing splintering of the CNPS, the behavioral Establishment was successfully reconsolidating its hegemony within the APSA. First, in 1979, the WCPS had successfully led a campaign at the

annual business meeting to force the APSA to withdraw its contract with Hilton Hotels to hold the 1980 APSA convention in Chicago, Illinois, because the Illinois state legislature had refused to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment. Following legal action by Hilton Hotels for breach of contract, the APSA officialdom successfully stripped the annual business meeting of the power to make many decisions for the Association, and it recentralized those decisions in the APSA Council. Second, after 1979, when Michael Parenti received an all-time low of 21.1% of the votes cast for APSA president, the Caucus ceased running candidates for any APSA office. With the APSA oligarchy again firmly in control of Association business, organizational politics in the APSA returned to normal. The end of the CNPS organizational revolt led CNPS Chair Carl Lankowski (1981, 101) to lament that "*the future looks bleak within APSA*."

To Be or Not to Be an Organized Section

At its September 1981 meeting, the APSA Council approved, in principle, the establishment of sections or organized subfields within the Association (Mann 1981, 729). The APSA staff were instructed to prepare a set of guidelines for the promotion, organization, and operation of these sections, which were approved at the Council's September 1982 meeting. Thus, for the first time, groups of APSA members who shared a common interest in a particular subfield of the discipline could organize meetings under the auspices of the APSA and receive logistical support from the APSA such as collecting dues and maintaining membership lists. This practice was already well established in many other social science associations such as the American Psychological Association, the American Sociological Association, the Association of American Geographers, and the American Education Research Association.

David Easton's decision as APSA president to allow CNPS to begin sponsoring panels at the APSA meeting in 1968, and listing those panels in the official APSA program, had opened a Pandora's box. By 1981, there were 36 unaffiliated conference groups, research groups, and caucuses operating outside the formal structure of the APSA, but they were convening panels, roundtables, and keynote addresses at the APSA convention. The development of unaffiliated groups had been further encouraged by the APSA's subsequent policy of making free meeting space available at the convention hotels and providing courtesy listings in the official program to unaffiliated groups.

At the 1982 APSA meeting, there were nearly 150 sessions—panels, plenaries, invited talks, and workshops—organized by the unaffiliated groups. This policy was becoming costly to the APSA and difficult to manage, and, thus, the APSA Council concluded it was necessary to create a structure for this growing component of the profession and its annual meetings (APSA 1982a). Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to speculate that the CNPS's challenge to the APSA in 1981 regarding proposed new rules for the treatment of unaffiliated groups also played an immediate role in forcing the APSA Council to finally act on the matter.[42]

To initiate the process for recognizing organized sections, the APSA invited unaffiliated groups which had previously sponsored sessions at the APSA's annual meetings to submit a statement of purpose to be published in the autumn 1982 issue of *PS*. The Council agreed to consider petitions for new organized sections every six months thereafter so that groups would continue having an opportunity to initiate section petitions in the future. The first groups that responded to the Council's request were the CNPS, Foundations of Political Theory, the Indian Policy Network, the Legislative Studies Group, and the Policy Studies Organization (APSA 1982a, 629–30). However, CNPS was initially noncommittal as to whether it would become an organized section. Instead, CNPS responded to the APSA's inquiry with an official statement that "the Caucus for a New Political Science is considering the possibility of petitioning for Section status," but before doing so the CNPS leadership wanted it owns members to respond to six questions (by letter):

> First, should CNPS petition to form a section? (Note: 100 members of APSA must agree to join a section for it to receive formal status.)
>
> Second, if such a section is formed, should it be *qua Caucus for a New Political Science*? or, should it go by another name? In the latter case CNPS would continue to exist and would have a close liaison with the section so named.
>
> Third, if the latter alternative is followed (that is, a section is created bearing a name other than CNPS) what should its name be? One leading suggestion is Socialism and Feminism. Do you, the interested reader, support this name, or do you have an alternative suggestion? (See question six for a tentative formulation of the purpose of a section on Socialism and Feminism.)
>
> Fourth, are you interested in joining a CNPS-sponsored section? This means, financially, an annual fee of $3 in addition to regular APSA dues.

> Fifth, if the sentiment is in favor of forming a section, should the final decision to go ahead be made at the Executive Committee meeting in New York in January, 1983 (in time for the APSA Council's meeting in March); or should the Caucus wait until the APSA national conference in Chicago in September, 1983 to make a decision? (Note: The March meeting of the APSA Council will be the first at which they will consider petitions for sections. There is an advantage in being timely, though later Councils will also obviously consider petitions.)
>
> Sixth, on the double assumption that the Caucus may form a section, and that it may be named "Socialism and Feminism," does the following tentative formulation of its purpose meet with your general approval? "The Section on Socialism and Feminism will offer critical analyses of liberal capitalist, state communist, fascist, and patriarchal hegemonies; it will debate the meanings and applications of socialist and feminist concepts; it will mutually search for a common ground of epistemological, political, and scholarly awareness as a basis on which to encounter more effectively such problems as those relating to sex, class, race, age, violence, the assault on nature, and the breakdown of international order; and, it will do these things as part of a fundamental effort to retrieve, deepen, and expand the general understanding of 'the political' and of political life." (See also Letters to the Editor, this issue) (APSA 1982a, 629)

Nancy Hartsock and John Rensenbrink were put in charge of receiving members' responses and collating the results for consideration by the CNPS Coordinating Council at its next meeting in January 1983. In a letter to the editor in the same issue of *PS*, Rensenbrink indicated that he previously had "extensive discussions" with APSA Executive Director Thomas Mann about the proposed new policy on organized sections and its potential impacts on CNPS. Based on those discussions, he advised Caucus members that CNPS would be allowed to continue organizing panels at the APSA's annual meetings as an unaffiliated group, even if it decided to forgo section status; however, once organized sections were established, the priority for conference panels would go to (a) the APSA's regular program panels and (b) to panels sponsored by organized sections. These two categories would have no limits placed on the number of panels allowed, so henceforth unaffiliated groups would receive panel allocations on a space-available basis, and it was likely that there would not be enough rooms available at the annual meetings to accommodate all the requests

from unaffiliated groups. Rensenbrink (1982b, 569) argued that CNPS should become an organized section as he thought that "on balance this is a workable arrangement, that the Caucus will not be disadvantaged by it (will not be 'swallowed up' by APSA) and may indeed gain from it. It can help the Caucuses' own professed intention to help invigorate and transform APSA and the discipline through a continuing process of debate."

Rensenbrink (1982b, 569) indicated that the question of organized section status had been broached at the 1982 APSA meeting in Denver, and the question had stimulated "the full force of factionalism" within the Caucus along two fault lines. The first division was between members who favored organized section status and those who opposed it. According to Timothy Luke (2017c), Bertell Ollman and Michael Parenti "were totally against it." A major concern was that CNPS would be required to dissolve itself as a distinct and separate organization to join the APSA as an organized section. This concern led to fears that organized section status would become a bureaucratic mechanism for the APSA to co-opt the CNPS and reduce its dissident influence within the discipline. Those who opposed organized section status argued that CNPS was an independent counter-association to the APSA, and they pointed to the success of comparable groups such as the URPE, Association of Critical Sociologists, Radical Historians Organization, and the Radical Philosophy Association to bolster their case. These organizations sponsored their own conferences, published their own journal, and maintained independent organizations with dues-paying members. On this issue, Laura Katz Olson (2021) observes that there were "VERY SPIRITED (and angry) conversations about whether we should become a section of APSA or remain separate" during this time. However, Mann's assurances to Rensenbrink the following year seem to have allayed some of these concerns.

Stephen E. Bronner (2021) notes that, in contrast to dissident organizations in the other social sciences and humanities, "the Caucus was somewhat in disrepair: we weren't growing and we weren't respected (if that's the right word) so that working with us, let alone publishing with us, didn't actually help people—especially young grad students and assistant professors." By the mid-1980s, it was highly doubtful that the CNPS could have survived solely as an independent counter-association similar to URPE. While support for this position dwindled over the course of the 1980s, its proponents were able to block a successful vote on organized section status because of the profound disagreements among organized section proponents over the name and mission of the proposed organized section.

A second line of conflict opened among those who supported organized section status, and this split was over what to name the new section. The original proposal was that the section be called the Socialist Feminist Section, consistent with the Caucus's previous membership vote one year earlier, but according to Rensenbrink (1982b, 570) this drew opposition "from people important to the Caucus" who "were clearly uneasy with Socialist Feminism for a variety of reasons." A second proposal was to call the new section the Socialist Section, but other leaders were equally opposed to leaving out the word "feminism." As a result, Rensenbrink (1982b, 570) proposed calling the section the Socialism *and* Feminism Section "as a generalized rubric within which the dialogue (or conflict) can go on." Timothy Luke (2017c) observes that "the idea of a 'socialist section' was not wholly improbable in 1982."

However, the debate over the name and mission of the proposed section crystallized and intensified long-simmering ideological disagreements among members of the CNPS. First, while the Caucus had taken a radical and even Marxist turn in 1978, Marxism's cachet began to wane throughout the 1980s as it became just another theory among many others on the left. The interest in Marxist state theory that had swept academic circles following the Miliband-Poulantzas debate began to dissipate by the mid-1980s as many radical scholars simply drifted away from Marxist state theory (Barrow 2002). Second, there was a general trend in the social sciences and humanities toward abandoning grand theories due to the emergence of widespread intellectual disillusionment with grand-scale metanarratives, such as Marxism and its attendant transformational projects of socialism and communism (Lyotard 1984). The shift from Marxist to post-Marxist to poststructuralist and postmodernist theory shifted radical and left analysis from macroscopic to microscopic "technologies of power," such as language, family, interpersonal relationships, culture, leisure and entertainment, and the configurations of repressed desire (Foucault 1972, 12; also, see Deleuze and Guattari 1987).[43] The Left was shifting from political economy to cultural studies, and in this effort to identify the "polymorphous techniques of power," the state and Marxism came to be seen as just another discursive practice (political theory) (Foucault 1980, 11).[44] Thus, Marxists and socialists within the Caucus found themselves beset with challenges from anarchists, from Black, Chicano, and LGBTQ scholars, from ecological activists, and, once again, from disenchanted liberals.

While many of these scholar-activists gravitated toward their own identity caucuses and organized sections within APSA, those committed to a democratic and egalitarian social order demanded a place within the

CNPS. There was no longer *the* struggle for a better world, but multiple struggles jostling with each other under a single umbrella called the Caucus for a New Political Science. The pressure to move in this direction was evident by the mid-1980s as illustrated in Bertell Ollman and Edward Vernoff's three-volume book, *The Left Academy* (1982–86). While the first volume of this series was entirely about the influence of Marxism in the social sciences and humanities, the third volume of the series published in 1986 was a potpourri of chapters on feminism and Marxism and the influence of Marxism in Black studies, Puerto Rican studies, Chicano studies, and Asian American studies. The book provided Caucusites with the first whiff of intersectional analysis, but with Marxism and class analysis still anchoring its foundations.

Finally, there was a new buzzword on the horizon: globalization. The emerging interest in globalization was another trend that by the 1990s was pushing Marxist political theory into the background. Indeed, there was a never-ending litany of books and articles on the crisis of the nation-state, the eclipse of the state, the retreat of the state, and even the end of the nation-state (see, respectively, Poggi 1990, 184; Ohmae 1990; Evans 1997; Strange 1996).[45] The central theme in these eulogies was that nation-states had lost control of their national economies, currencies, territorial boundaries, and even their cultures and languages and that macroscopic forms of power were shifting from the nation-state to the global market, transnational corporations, and globalized channels of communication.[46] The cumulative result of these trends, as Leo Panitch (2002, 92) observes, was that Marxism and socialism "became quite unfashionable."

The result was a deadlock over the question of organized section status within the CNPS that lasted for the entire decade of the 1980s. Despite the Caucus's inability to arrive at a clear decision on the issue, the APSA Council approved the first organized sections at its March 1983 meeting, which included Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations, Law and Courts, Legislative Studies, Public Policy, Political Organizations and Parties, and Public Administration, but CNPS was not among the groups that submitted a petition for recognition as an organized section. In the summer of 1983, Steven M. Sachs, the CNPS chair, initiated further discussion of whether CNPS should become an organized section of the APSA (CNPS 1983, 1). He reports that most communications from members were "either strongly favorable, or cautiously favorable (assuming that A.P.S.A. will not attempt to use the section to limit the Caucus's independence and freedom of action)." Sachs did not receive any communications that were outright opposed to the idea. However, everyone expressed

opposition to the various names that had been proposed for the organized section, including the Socialist and Feminist Section. While this name was consistent with the Caucus's 1981 vote to declare itself a socialist-feminist organization, by 1983 Sachs claims that members considered the name "too narrow" or not inclusive enough to build the organization's membership base. Similarly, Laura Katz Olson (2021), who had attended every CNPS business meeting since 1973, recalls debating "whether socialist or radical was more appropriate." She states that while the idea of a socialist-feminist section "may have been mentioned" at business meetings in the early 1980s, there was never "any serious discussion about calling itself a socialist-feminist section or organization." Some members proposed calling the new section the Democratic Socialist Section or the New Political Science Section, but Sachs reports that "the most popular so far is 'Critical Political Science'" (CNPS 1983, 2). The issue was supposed to be decided at the 1983 annual business meeting. There is no extant record of that meeting, but the proposal was either rejected or postponed, as the CNPS did not petition to become an organized section until 1991.

As the purported counter-association began to emerge from its organizational crisis in the second half of the 1980s, the Caucus began drifting back to its original conception of an ideologically diverse caucus within the APSA. The 1987 CNPS business meeting, which was again presided over by Laura Katz Olson and Stephen E. Bronner passed a "Statement of Principles" designed to reestablish its old identity. At its business meeting on September 5, 1987, the CNPS adopted the following resolution:

> The Caucus for a New Political Science (CNPS), a broadly diverse group of scholars within APSA, seeks:
>
> a) To identify, define, and exemplify the role of the radically critical intellectual in American society;
> b) To carry that role into the APSA and to confront and challenge its orthodoxies;
> c) Out of these processes, to define, develop, and sustain a new political science, which, more than the old, will be committed to the needs of our times. (CNPS 1987)

The 1987 resolution set the stage for revisiting the question of whether CNPS should become an organized section. This question was again broached in 1989, when the new chair, Meredith Reid Sarkees (1988–90), raised it at the CNPS business meeting in Atlanta, Georgia. The question

was listed as a major item for discussion at the 1989 business meeting (Sarkees 1989a). The top two items on the 1989 business meeting agenda were the "Future Organization of the Caucus" and "Caucus Philosophy." In fact, however, there was only a "brief discussion" among meeting participants as to whether the Caucus should remain an unaffiliated group or become an organized section. During the meeting, Sarkees suggested that the main advantages to the latter were (1) drawing strength from APSA listing as a group, which might (b) improve the organization's financial condition, and (c) a more prominent listing of Caucus panels in the official APSA meeting program. The main disadvantage to becoming an organized section was that the Caucus had a long history of "past differences in ideology with the APSA leadership" (Sarkees 1989b). The outcome of the meeting was that the chair was directed to conduct further research on the question.

Sarkees (1989b) soon reported back to the membership "that the relationship of the unaffiliated groups, the organized sections, and the APSA Program Committee is in a state of flux," and this was leading "to much confusion" throughout the APSA. Sarkees reported that the APSA's leadership was now split on whether to allow unaffiliated groups to continue participating in the annual meeting, with some on the Council welcoming them, while others were opposed to their participation unless they paid for their meeting rooms at the conference hotel and all panelists paid a conference registration fee.

As more unaffiliated groups converted to organized sections, the pressure on CNPS to do so increased, while many newer members of the Caucus saw it as the only way to salvage the Caucus from its near collapse in 1985. John C. Berg, who had only recently joined the CNPS, emerged as another leading proponent of becoming an organized section of the APSA. Berg was a professor of political science at Suffolk University who had once served as a legislative research assistant to US Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-Wisconsin). He received his PhD from Harvard University and specialized in legislative politics, interest groups and lobbying, and environmental politics. Berg recalls that "very few people" were active in the Caucus by the late 1980s and, consequently, he was soon elected secretary-treasurer (1988–92) even though he was a comparatively new member.[47] In his capacity as secretary-treasurer, Berg also became the editor of a new *Caucus for a New Political Science Newsletter*, which was supported financially for many years by his department at Suffolk University. Despite his short time in the Caucus, Berg (2021) concluded that "given the organizational weakness of the Caucus at that time" becoming an organized sec-

tion of the APSA was a matter of survival, and it was "something we felt we had to do to assure our place in the program of the annual [APSA] meeting."

Joseph Kling was another key addition to the pro-organized section group. Kling joined CNPS in the fall of 1985, the same year that he accepted a position as visiting assistant professor at St. Lawrence University. Kling received his PhD from CUNY in 1981. He specialized in social movements, public policy, and American political thought. Prior to his academic career, Kling had worked as a community organizer in Brooklyn. Kling's first CNPS business meeting was the ad hoc meeting convened in 1985, when the major item of discussion was whether to disband the Caucus. Kling (2021) recalls: "You can imagine my dismay, then, when the major—if not the only—item on the Agenda was whether the group should disband itself." Kling (2021) conveys a concern that was common to many young scholars in the dismal job market of the 1980s:

> Getting onto one of the Caucus's panels was the only way I made it onto the program, so it was clearly recognizable as the place for a Newbie political scientist on the Left to go. All my other submissions to panels had been turned down. So I had a lot to thank the Caucus for. . . . It actually made my life as part of the Profession possible.

As a result of the 1985 meeting, Kling (2021) says, "I recognized immediately that this group's continuation was essential if a Left Political Science was to have a meaningful presence at the APSA." First, Kling (2021) argued that one reason for continuing CNPS was to "guarantee the presence of a Marxist perspective at APSA—which was still advocating the idea of an 'a-political political science'—a political science that was ethically and 'scientifically neutral.'" Second, Kling (2021) argued that to maintain the Caucus "was to offer a home to young and developing Marxist scholars. They needed a voice in the Profession, they needed to have their work publicized and be presented on panels, they needed connections to editors of left-oriented Journals to get their papers published, they needed access to left-oriented networks, they need to meet others who shared similar, though at the same time conflicting world views (when did Marxists ever fully agree with one another?)." Kling (2021) observes in retrospect that without the Caucus "I would have remained stuck in a small liberal arts college in the backwaters of far upstate New York," whereas attending his first CNPS panels had already "introduced me to colleagues and associates who could stim-

ulate my thinking, broaden my access to like-minded scholars, and enrich the possibilities of my presence in the field."

In early 1990, Sarkees (1989b) suggested to CNPS members that "there appear to be three options the Caucus could pursue in terms of its status."

Option I. The Caucus should become an Organized Section and no longer retain an organizational identity independent of the APSA.

A. Advantages:
1. Panels listed in the main program.
2. APSA keeps track of membership and collects dues.
3. APSA will cover some of the costs of mailing newsletters for new groups.

B. Disadvantages;
1. Fear of losing identity within a group it once opposed.
2. APSA keeps $3 per member of the dues collected.
3. Need signatures of 100 Caucus members who *are*, or promise to become, APSA members.
4. May not be accepted if we consider ourselves as a political group. We need an individual "intellectual viewpoint."

Option II. The Caucus should continue to participate in the APSA annual meeting as an Unaffiliated Group and retain its organizational identity independent of the APSA.

A. Advantages:
1. We keep all dues.
2. We maintain position of Caucus as a group opposed to APSA.

B. Disadvantages:
1. Our panel listings remain at the back of the program.
2. We may not be able to rely on the talents of John Berg and the willingness of Suffolk University forever to cover the costs of our newsletter.
3. We may get fewer and fewer panels at APSA unless we can stimulate attendance.
4. At some point, we may be requested to pay for rooms in which panels are presented.

Option III. The Caucus should split into two groups—an Organized Section and an Unaffiliated Group, which would allow the Caucus full access to and participation in the APSA annual meeting, while maintaining an organizational identity independent of the APSA.

A. Advantages:
   1. The Caucus can maintain its autonomy as a political action group.
   2. Panels are co-sponsored by both groups, so they are listed both in the main program under an organized section, and in the back under an unaffiliated group.
   3. APSA keeps track of membership and collects dues for organized section.
   4. APSA will cover some mailing costs.

B. Disadvantages:
   1. Do we have enough members to support two groups?
   2. APSA keeps $3 per member for all the dues they collect.
   3. Caucus would still have to keep track of people who do not want to join APSA, thereby continuing to rely on John Berg.
   4. Can we develop an independent "intellectual thrust" needed to become an organized section, separate from the "political" theme of the Caucus?
   5. Need 100 members who are or agree to become APSA members.

The *Newsletter* that laid out these options included a mail ballot that put the three options to a vote of the full membership. However, the results of that vote were disappointing and inconclusive as only 30 ballots were returned, and they evenly split with nine votes each for Options I, II, and III, with two votes for two options, and one abstention (Sarkees 1990). Thus, the decision to become an organized section was again postponed due to the extent of disagreement within the leadership and the membership of the CNPS.

Amid the organizational disintegration and welter of competing intellectual tendencies swirling within CNPS, support for organized section status continued to gain strength among a coalition of longtime CNPS members—Stephen E. Bronner, Denis Moran, Laura Katz Olson, John Rensenbrink, Stephen M. Sachs, Meredith Sarkees, John Ehrenberg, and Timothy W. Luke—and a group of newly emerging leaders who had recently joined the CNPS, including John Berg, George Katsiaficas, and Joseph Kling. A key turning point in the drive to become an organized section occurred in 1988, when George Katsiaficas, a professor of political science at Wentworth Institute of Technology (Boston) attended his first

APSA meeting. Katsiaficas had received his PhD from the University of California San Diego, where he was a student of Herbert Marcuse. Katsiaficas became active in the anti–Vietnam War movement in 1969 and had even been a target of the FBI's COINTELPRO program as a Priority 1 ADEX. Prior to becoming a professor, he had worked for 11 years in Ocean Beach, California, in a radical countercultural community that fought against the war.[48] John Berg, who had known Katsiaficas as a result of their political activities in Boston area left politics, urged Katsiaficas to join CNPS, which he did in 1988.[49] Given his stature and reputation in the New Left, Katsiaficas (2021) was soon elected to chair the Caucus (1990–91) because, as he notes, "there had been some tensions within the Caucus" and he was "asked to step in as an outsider."

At the August 31, 1990, business meeting of CNPS, Katsiaficas introduced a motion to petition APSA for recognition as an organized section under Option III (as proposed by Sarkees), which would maintain the Caucus's double identity as an independent organization. The motion passed unanimously on a voice vote. The rationale for adopting Option III was that it would (1) allow Caucus members who did not want to join the APSA section to remain members of the Caucus, (2) allow members to change their mind if organized section status did not work out, and (3) preserve the Caucus's tax-exempt status and ownership of the journal outside the APSA.

Joseph Kling was selected to coordinate the application effort, starting with the required "Petition for Establishing the Caucus for a New Political Science as an Organized Section of the American Political Science Association" (CNPS 1991a). Berg (2021) points out that "the APSA was extremely insistent that we could not organize around a political viewpoint, but only around a field of study." Thus, a section name that included words like "socialist" or "feminist" would not have been allowed by the APSA. and this effectively rendered the previous decade of debate moot. At the same time, Berg (2021) observes, "There were always people in the Caucus who didn't consider themselves to be socialists or socialist-feminists," so a generic name like New Political Science appealed to this group of members, while retaining continuity with the Caucus's history. Given the long-standing controversy and disagreement about what to name the organized section, and in lieu of majority support for any other proposed name, it was finally decided to default to the Caucus' existing name—New Political Science.

In the end, the CNPS (1991a) petition to the APSA declared:

> The purpose of the [New Political Science] Section will be to help make the study of politics relevant to the struggle for a better world. The panels, roundtables, and workshops presented by the Section at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association will offer a forum for diverse positions within the framework of this struggle. We share the conviction that the study of politics is never value-free, and that political scientists, whatever their field of focus, have an active responsibility to connect their understanding to the search for human betterment and social justice.

The mission statement "to help make the study of politics relevant to the struggle for a better world" was quite different from Stephen M. Sach's original 1982 proposal for a Socialism and Feminism Section that would "offer critical analyses of liberal capitalist, state communist, fascist, and patriarchal hegemonies." However, Berg (2021) states that the leadership's "original thinking was that the Organized Section was a legal fiction" and, consequently, "we decided it was OK to give it a more mealy-mouthed description, which is where the struggle for a better world came in." Ostensibly, the proposed mission statement was more acceptable to Caucus members who did not consider themselves socialists or feminists, while satisfying the APSA's demand that the new section not advocate a political viewpoint. In fact, this language had been lifted from the preamble of the 1977 CNPS constitution, which had been newly rediscovered by Katsiaficas.

Joseph Kling was appointed to chair a new CNPS Membership Committee, which was responsible for mailing the section petition to the general membership in a letter dated November 8, 1990, with the goal of soliciting the 100 signatures required for organized section status.[50] In his letter, Kling (1990) informed members that the fall 1990 CNPS business meeting had decided to petition the APSA for recognition as an organized section primarily because "competition for panel listings and for rooms at the APSA's annual conference has been intensifying over the last few years. As an organized section, our panels would be included as part of the regular Association Program, we would have priority for rooms as other groups, and dues would be centrally collected." The petition was distributed to Caucus members a second time as part of a January 1991 newsletter (CNPS 1991a, 2).

However, Kling placed the organized section initiative in the broader context of other initiatives designed to reinvigorate the Caucus after a decade of instability and near collapse. He (1990) observed that "in recent

years, an expanding group has committed itself to reviving the Caucus as a critical voice within the Association. Our programs, panels, and plenary sessions have become stronger and more consistently challenging. We have reorganized the work of the Caucus journal, *New Political Science*, and are attempting to bring it out more regularly." In this context, the long-term goal of petitioning for organized section status was "to create, within the body of the American Political Science Association, an organized group of critical and dissenting scholars who remain committed to challenging, both intellectually and practically, whatever is currently passing as the conventional wisdom" (Kling 1990).

The CNPS submitted its signed petition to the APSA, and on May 1, 1991, the Caucus was notified that "the Council has approved your petition to convert the Caucus for a New Political Science to an Organized Section of the American Political Science Association" (Sterling 1991). Joseph Kling (1991), who led the petition drive, wrote to Berg: "Well we did it! Now what?" The first action was to notify Caucus members of the APSA's decision, which was done in June 1991, when the *Caucus for a New Political Science Newsletter* issued a "News Flash!": "The Caucus for a New Political Science has been recognized as an Organized Section of the American Political Science Association" (CNPS 1991c).

However, the APSA guidelines for becoming an organized section required sections to have a formal written constitution or bylaws. The CNPS had adopted a written constitution that ostensibly became effective March 15, 1977. At the August 30, 1991, annual business meeting, Katsiaficas informed members that he "had been working on proposed changes in the Caucus bylaws," and as a measure of the organization's internal disarray during the 1980s, Katsiaficas reported that the Caucus bylaws (i.e., constitution) "had been lost at some time in the past, but that he had unearthed them, and that they needed revision to bring them into line with our actual practice, and to adjust to our recognition as an Organized Section of the APSA" (CNPS 1991d). Furthermore, as Katsiaficas (1991) wrote to members in September 1991: "Now that the Caucus is also an Organized Section (OS) of the APSA, we need two parallel constitutions—one for the OS and one for the Caucus as an independent entity."

Katsiaficas proposed 12 amendments to the 1977 CNPS constitution, which were mostly minor housekeeping matters designed to ensure that the two constitutions were consistent with each other. The only significant changes were that the terms of Caucus officers were increased from one year to two years, while the membership clause for the organized section limited membership to APSA members who had paid their annual APSA

and section dues, while the Caucus constitution was changed to read that "Members of the APSA Organized Section for a New Political Science will become Caucus members automatically, without the payment of additional dues" (CNPS 1992). John Ehrenberg moved adoption of the new constitutions at the 1991 business meeting, which were passed unanimously. The amendments were then submitted to the general membership by mail ballot for approval as required by the original 1977 Caucus constitution. The new constitutions were approved, effective January 3, 1992.

Academic Awards

At the August 31, 1990, business meeting of the CNPS, and in anticipation of becoming an organized section, Stephen E. Bronner moved to establish the proposed section's first award in honor of Christian Bay, one of the Caucus's original founding fathers. Bay had recently passed away (Sedghi 1991). The award would be given each year to the author(s) of the best paper delivered at a Caucus/APSA panel the previous year, and the paper would be published in *NPS*. Bronner proposed that each panel chair nominate one paper from the panel and that the winner be chosen by CNPS's elected officials. Fred Swan offered a friendly amendment to have the chair appoint a three-member committee to choose the winning paper. The amended motion was approved unanimously (CNPS 1990, 1). The first Christian Bay Award Committee consisted of Stephen E. Bronner, Dennis W. Moran, and Micheline Ishay (CNPS 1991d). In 1993, Carl Boggs was the first recipient of the Christian Bay Award.

At the same business meeting, Bronner moved that the Caucus establish a book award to complement the Christian Bay Best Paper Award. Bronner suggested that both awards should go to someone who did not have tenure, to facilitate the careers of young radical scholars. Bronner's newest proposal sparked a great deal of discussion about several issues, including whether the establishment of honorary awards would make CNPS too much like the APSA. It was also disputed whether such awards should be limited to nontenured faculty, and there was concern that no written criteria had been proposed to guide the award committees in deciding what constituted a "best paper" or "best book." There was also debate about what the book award should be named, with proposals for the Rosa Luxemburg Award and the Michael Harrington Award being put forward by members.

In the end, a motion by Joseph Kling was unanimously adopted that "the Caucus should establish an award for the best book published in the preceding year consistent with the aims of the Caucus." It was further agreed that the chair should appoint a three-member committee to make the award each year and that the CNPS chair should work with the committee to establish "a more exact definition of the criteria" for making the book award (1991d, 2). It was then proposed (by Joseph Kling) that possible names for the book award should be solicited by mail through the Caucus newsletter with the winning name to be subsequently chosen by mail ballot. It became the Michael Harrington Book Award in honor of one of the founding members and leading intellectual figures in the Democratic Socialists of America. In 1993, the first Michael Harrington Award went to H. Mark Roelofs for his book *Poverty of American Politics* (1992). The CNPS was once again doing the things that caucuses do.

Conclusion

In the span of 14 years (1978–91), the CNPS mutated from an ad hoc insurgent revolt within the American Political Science Association into a socialist feminist counter-association, only to be reintegrated into the APSA as an organized section. Thus, in 1992, the New Political Science Section of the APSA effectively replaced the CNPS in all but name as its commitment to socialist feminism was displaced by the ambiguous "struggle for a better world." The Caucus counter-association continued to exist in the background as a shadow of the section, although it did retain the important function of publishing the journal *New Political Science*. As a separate organization, the Caucus was also exempt from Article II of the APSA constitution, so long as it did not invoke any affiliation with APSA.

The CNPS probably reached the apogee of its intellectual and political influence in the APSA with the "Feminist Surge" (1981) and the dialogue panels (1983) of the early 1980s. What was distinctive about this period of intellectual revolution was the willingness of CNPS members to directly engage the behavioral-Straussian power bloc in virtual hand-to-hand combat, as exemplified by a 1987 CNPS panel on the US Constitution that included James W. Caesar, a neoconservative Straussian, or a 1987 panel on terrorism that included a former deputy director of the CIA and the Israeli ambassador to the United States. There was a willingness to invite members of the political science establishment to join Caucus panels,

where they could be directly engaged and challenged by Caucus members (and vice versa), and perhaps there was also a greater willingness among members of the APSA Establishment to engage with dissidents.

However, it is undeniable that following the dialogue panels, and what many considered the mediocre performance of the discipline's behavioral Establishment on those panels, there was a steady decrease in the number of panels allocated to CNPS at subsequent annual meetings of the APSA. The number of panels allocated to CNPS fell from a high of 23 in 1982 to a low of five (see Figure 3) in 1990 after the APSA informed Chair Meredith Reid Sarkees (1990) that the number of panels allocated to the Caucus would continue to decline unless attendance improved, as attendance at the Caucus panels had been "extremely poor" for many years.

The declining number of panels allocated to CNPS was the result of a new APSA policy implemented in 1989 that restricted the total number of panels allocated to unaffiliated groups. Beginning in 1989, the APSA implemented a formula that limited the total number of panels to space available and then apportioned those panels as follows: 50% for panels sponsored by the APSA Program Committee, 30% for panels sponsored by APSA organized sections, and 20% for panels sponsored by unaffiliated groups such as the CNPS. A behavioral hegemonic equilibrium was being reestablished in the profession through administrative and bureaucratic mechanisms.

However, the double identities of the CNPS were effectively fused in the form of an organized section. John Berg (2021) concurs that even though the original thinking of Caucus leaders in the early 1990s was that the organized section would be merely a legal fiction, in fact, it was the section that quickly became "the dominant organizational form, though the Caucus continued to exist as the publisher of the journal." The organized section emerged as the dominant side of the Caucus because it was now the recipient of regular annual dues, the repository for the official membership list, the gatekeeper to APSA conference panels, the grantor of academic awards, and the convenor of the annual business meeting at APSA conventions.

While there were good reasons to be concerned about the long-term impact of being reintegrated into the APSA, the reality is that CNPS faced a Hobson's choice of either dissolving or becoming an organized section. The founders of CNPS in 1967 never thought about it as an organization, because they saw it as a localized insurgency that was part of a wider New Left social movement. Hence, they never saw the need to institutionalize CNPS because it was never supposed to be anything more than a sponta-



Figure 3: Number of CNPS Panels at APSA Meetings, 1979 to 1991. Source: Data tabulated from information in APSA 1979f, 1980f, 1981, 1982a, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1999, 1991.

neous ad hoc caucus occasionally convened for the specific purpose of nominating candidates and sponsoring policy resolutions to challenge the APSA Establishment. The idea that the CNPS would still exist 24 years after its founding was an idea never entertained by most of the founding leadership, and, thus, it continued to operate for an entire decade as a loosely organized "caucus" with little permanent existence beyond a chair and an APSA program coordinator, who were both elected and replaced annually. As with any direct democracy, the decisions rendered at its annual business meetings were largely a function of who showed up in any particular year, although the number of people who showed up gradually declined from several hundred in the late 1960s to only a few dozen by the late 1980s. In fact, the CNPS did not even establish a formal constitution and bylaws until 1977—10 years after its founding—and, as George Katsiaficas later discovered, the 1977 constitution was basically set aside during the Columbia-Berkeley takeover of the Caucus, and it was not rediscovered until the CNPS became an organized section.

Despite the push for a counter-association in the late 1970s and 1980s, the CNPS did not have the organizational infrastructure necessary to become an independent counter-association, as much as some members may have willed it. In addition, the political science discipline is not as large as history or sociology, and, for whatever reasons, it has proven to be a more conservative discipline than many of its cognate disciplines. As Bertell Ollman (1978b, chaps. 4–5) and Mark Kesselman (1982b) observed at the time, Marxism came late to the political science discipline, and it never penetrated political science to the extent one found in sociology, history, economics, anthropology, or education. Thus, a more radicalized CNPS could not generate the critical mass of support necessary to splinter off as a separate counter-association. The CNPS could not even publish its journal on a regular schedule. The effort to build a federation of local chapters collapsed within three years. Meanwhile, the APSA was able to steadily increase its pressure on CNPS by encircling it with competing unaffiliated groups, and later with organized sections, while year by year reducing the number of conference panels allocated to CNPS.

While a coalition of long-established and newly minted leaders managed to salvage the wreckage of the CNPS by winning recognition as an organized section, its reentry into the APSA meant the Caucus was required to accept the rules of the academic game as defined by the APSA and the wider academic profession. It was now about jockeying for panels at the APSA meeting, presenting papers at the APSA meeting, and adding those lines to one's curriculum vita. It was about publishing articles and

winning awards for the best paper or best book. It was about securing tenure and promotion at one's host institution. In accepting these rules, Raymond Seidelman (1985, 196) observes, "The CNPS narrowed its goals to the concrete, material and limited demands of an interest group within the discipline, trading the uncertainties of movement activity for a larger piece of the existing pie," although in fact that piece of the pie would continue to shrink over time. The APSA steadily reduced the number of annual conference panels allocated to CNPS from a peak of 23 in 1982 to only six in 1989. Moreover, according to Joseph Kling (2021), "Our panels were consistently exiled to marginal hotels at marginal times." It was time to withdraw from the field of battle and regroup for another day.

8

The Period of Quiet Institutionalization, 1992–2021

As the intellectual and political climate in the United States became increasingly hostile to Marxism and the Left generally, CNPS increasingly focused its efforts on creating a safe haven for radical political scientists within the APSA and the broader academic discipline—essentially withdrawing into Theodore Adorno's strategy of intellectual hibernation (Wohlfahrt 1979). The mythical golden age of the American university ended as state governments steadily reduced funding for public higher education and the federal government reduced funding for student financial aid, while converting that aid from grants to loans. What had been a growth industry in the previous four decades entered a period that was at first described as the corporate university, but by the early 1990s, the corporate university was being transformed into the neoliberal university of the twenty-first century (Schram 2016; Barrow 1990b, 2024g).

In response to the political attacks on universities, and the increasingly precarious position of radical intellectuals, it was imperative that the Caucus for a New Political Science adapt to these changing circumstances following its decade of open organizational revolt within the American Political Science Association and subsequent efforts to promote an intellectual revolution within the discipline (Barrow 2017a). One adaptation, as discussed previously, was the founding of the journal *New Political Science* in 1979, which provided a new outlet for radical scholarship in political science. Caucus leadership signaled the transition to a new strategy of hibernation in the first issue of *New Political Science* by calling attention to the changing external political conditions in the United States:

> In the absence of a large, supportive movement, the advance of the "march through the institutions" begun a decade ago, has ground to a halt. Although spirited struggles continue, they focus less on the fulfillment of a program than on a defense of positions already attained. Though western universities may never have contained so large an audience sympathetic to Marxist interpretations of society, it is nevertheless true that attention has been turned from the realization of a corresponding politics to the protection of its right to existence. ("Note to Readers" 1979, 8)

The CNPS's new strategy and tactics were described in the second issue of *NPS*, which was devoted entirely to an analysis of the socialist academic and the structure of higher education at a time when the Bertell Ollman academic freedom case was unfolding in front of a national audience. The second issue of *New Political Science* declared that the Caucus remained "committed to developing an understanding and critique of capitalist society, to helping create the social changes needed to transcend it, and to replacing feelings of isolation with a sense of community and collective action," but it was nevertheless refocusing its energies internally "on building the strong organization needed to advance an alternative politics and to create a socialist center of gravity within the profession" ("The Socialist Academic" 1979–80, 3). The CNPS would continue to build a new political science, but it would do so by creating a more secure presence for critical political science within the discipline by building defensive positions within the university and within the profession.[1]

Somewhere over the Rainbow

The APSA had steadily reduced the number of conference panels allocated to CNPS from a peak of 23 in 1982 to 6 in 1989. John Rensenbrink raised the issue at the September 1, 1989, CNPS business meeting and suggested that an important reason why CNPS and other unaffiliated groups were seeing dramatic reductions in their panel allocations was "because we don't have the clout we had in the seventies when we ran candidates for APSA president and APSA council" (quoted in Sarkees 1989b, 2). Consequently, Rensenbrink made a proposal that was supported by Stephen E. Bronner, H. Mark Roelofs, and John Vail to test the waters to see if anyone was interested in getting back into the APSA electoral process (Sarkees 1989b, 2). Rensenbrink asked anyone interested in getting back in the

game to contact one of the four members who now called themselves the Ad Hoc Committee of Four. Nothing seems to have come of this effort.

The following year, at the August 31, 1990, business meeting of the CNPS, George Katsiaficas, the incoming chair, moved that CNPS should once again become active in APSA elections by nominating a "Rainbow Slate" for APSA president and APSA Council. There was a twofold political background to the idea of a Rainbow Slate. First, the Reverend Jesse Jackson, a rising figure on the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, had delivered his famous Rainbow Coalition Speech at the 1984 Democratic Party national convention. Jackson called on the party to build a new progressive majority that extended beyond its traditional blue-collar (white) working-class electoral base by appealing to African American (black), Latino (brown), Asian (yellow), women (pink), LGBTQ, and ecological (green) constituencies. Jackson had run for president in 1984 and 1988, and his concept of a Rainbow Coalition pointed to a new left-progressive politics that addressed inequalities beyond the traditional class-based bread-and-butter economic issues of the New Deal. Second, the Katsiaficas proposal sought to weld CNPS politics to this larger movement as a response to previous complaints that other caucuses and organized sections representing these constituencies attracted members away from CNPS and competed with its conference panels. Katsiaficas proposed that a Rainbow Slate should be mutually agreed upon by CNPS, other progressive caucuses, and organized sections after negotiations among them. The Rainbow Slate would run on a mutually agreed-upon issue platform. The motion passed unanimously, and a committee was established to explore the idea, which consisted of John Ehrenberg (Long Island University), Hamideh Sedghi (Millersville University), Stephen E. Bronner, and Bertell Ollman (CNPS 1990, 1).

The following year, at the 1991 annual business meeting, Katsiaficas reported that a Rainbow Slate had been selected, but the proposed nominees had decided not to run when the APSA Nominating Committee put forward Lucius Barker as the establishment candidate for APSA president. Lucius Barker (Stanford University) was deemed an eminent progressive African American political scientist, who specialized in constitutional law, civil liberties, and African American politics. Katsiaficas wrote to Caucus members that Barker is "just the sort of candidate we would like to have nominated" and there was "some possibility that he will be opposed from the right" (CNPS 1991d, 2).[2] Of course, it had long been forgotten that Lucius Barker had also been a prominent member of the old Ad Hoc Committee that regularly opposed the Caucus in the 1970s. In order not to

split the allegedly progressive vote in the APSA, the Caucus decided to endorse Lucius Barker. John Ehrenberg (1991, 4), the incoming CNPS chair, supported Barker's endorsement because he was also "on record about the empty, boring, apolitical, inward character of the articles" in the *American Political Science Review*, so it was hoped that his presidency would open the door to challenging "what passes for the authoritative review of the profession." Thus, CNPS's new dream of a Rainbow Slate was sunk on the shoals of the APSA Establishment's strategic deployment of identity politics. Yet this did not deter the 1991 business meeting from unanimously approving the appointment of another task force to work on building another Rainbow Slate for the following year, but there is no evidence that the task force made any headway.

Following the derailment of the Rainbow Slate, CNPS lapsed into a phase of quiet institutionalization as it was integrated into the routines of becoming Organized Section No. 27 of the American Political Science Association. However, at its August 29, 1996, business meeting, John Ehrenberg again raised the question of whether CNPS should sponsor a slate of candidates to run for APSA Council. A committee consisting of Ehrenberg, Bertell Ollman, and Stephen E. Bronner was appointed to explore the matter with other APSA sections (CNPS 1996a, 3). Once again, however, nothing came of the effort, so at the 1998 CNPS business meeting, Ehrenberg expressed his concern that CNPS had become too quiescent over the last decade, so he again proposed that CNPS work with other organized sections "to mount a three-fold challenge to official political science: (1) run an alternative slate of candidates for APSA offices, (2) doing something about the *American Political Science Review*, and (3) sponsor a series of debates with establishment political scientists as had been done in the early 1980s" (CNPS 1998a). After discussion at the business meeting, it became clear that only the third item on Ehrenberg's list commanded much support from the general membership, so "a committee was formed to pursue this issue," consisting of John Ehrenberg and Carl Boggs (CNPS 1998a, 3).

The Ehrenberg/Boggs committee solicited input from members, but the only response was from me.[3] I had only been a dues-paying member of CNPS for four years, but as a newly minted full professor I decided to respond to Ehrenberg's call to do something about the *APSR*. I suggested three possible action items:

1. Adopt the Northeastern Political Science Association model in which association membership, conference registration fee, and

journal subscription (POLITY) are three separate items. In other words, I can belong to the APSA, but not subscribe to *APSR*.

2. Adopt the model used in other social sciences (e.g., sociology) . . . the ASA offers several journals as part of its membership fee. Thus, when I pay my dues to ASA, I get to choose two journals from a range of journals, including some very good ones (not just the *AJS*). This forces the "mainstream" journal to compete in a "free market" for association support against other journals. Since most of the APSA leadership now subscribe to this ideology, why not turn it against them? Why should any of us support a monopoly journal? It would be interesting to see how the *APSR* fares if people were offered the option of opting out or opting for an alternative journal.
3. As part of this same model, the ASA has separated its book review section into a separate journal (*Contemporary Sociology*)—an interesting option, because everyone I know admits that they never read anything in the *APSR* except the book reviews (Swidorski 1999).

At the time, I was unaware that variations of these proposals had been made as early as 1969, but it still strikes me as a promising idea and one that would command support from a large majority of contemporary political scientists, and especially from organized sections that publish their own journals. During the same August 29, 1996, meeting, Bertell Ollman called attention to the Caucus's successful panels at the Midwest Political Science Association and suggested that "the section should not limit its activities to the annual meeting [of the APSA]" (CNPS 1998a, 4). He encouraged members to organize CNPS panels at other regional meetings and to form local chapters on their own campuses. Ollman invoked the familiar call for CNPS members to join the other radical caucuses, such as the Radical Philosophy Association, the Union of Radical Political Economics, and Marxist Sociology as a means of building contacts and forging alliances with these other groups.

In the end, all the Caucus could muster was the launching of its first website in December 1996, with Chris Toulouse acting as webmaster. The website included the Caucus's mission statement, information on how to join the section, a list of officers and award recipients, the CNPS/APSA conference program, information about the journal *New Political Science*, and a journal archive (CNPS 1996b, 3). However, following the 1998 CNPS business meeting, it was learned that Margaret Levi (University of Wash-

ington) and Jim Johnson (University of Rochester) were coordinating an electronic "Ira Katznelson for President" campaign, which foreshadowed the "Perestroika revolt." CNPS gave lukewarm support to the campaign by announcing it in the newsletter, but CNPS did not take an active role in the campaign (CNPS 1998b).

CNPS/APSA Panels in the 1990s

After becoming an organized section on January 1, 1992, CNPS saw its panel allocations increase at APSA conventions. The Caucus sponsored 100 panels and roundtables with 395 papers and roundtable presentations from 1990 to 2000.[4] Depending on the year, CNPS was allocated as few as six panels and as many as 13 panels, not counting the one panel each year that CNPS set aside for its annual plenary address. In terms of the subfield distribution of panels, the Caucus's programs gave greater emphasis to political theory (35%) than the official APSA program, but over half of CNPS panels were in American politics, comparative politics, and international relations (see Table 8).

The topics covered by the papers and presentations during this time reveal that the Caucus retained its core emphasis on Marxism and socialism during the 1990s while expanding to embrace an intersectional version of identity politics. About 33% of the papers delivered during this time dealt with Marxist or socialist theory, labor politics and class analysis, inequality and poverty, the state, and imperialism (see Table 9). Another 23% dealt with race, ethnicity, gender, feminism, and LGBTQ politics, with many of them emphasizing the concept of intersectional alliances. While postmodernism informed some of these analyses, postmod-

TABLE 8. Subfield Distribution of CNPS Panels at APSA Meetings, 1990 to 2000

Subfield	No. Panels	% of Panels
Political Theory	35	35
American Politics	29	29
Comparative Politics	21	21
Political Economy	10	10
International Relations	5	5
Total	**100**	100

Source: Data compiled from information in APSA 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000.

TABLE 9. Major Paper Topics of CNPS/APSA Panels, 1990 to 2000

Topic	Number of Papers	% of Papers
Marxism/Socialism Cluster		
Marxist Theory	28	6.7
Labor/Working Class Politics	22	5.3
The State	21	5.0
Socialism	19	4.6
Class Analysis	19	4.6
Imperialism/Military Intervention	17	4.1
Inequality and Poverty	11	2.6
Subtotal	**137**	**32.9**
Identity/NSM Politics Cluster		
Feminism/Women & Politics	39	9.4
Race & Ethnicity	30	7.2
LGBTQ Politics/Queer Theory	27	6.5
Subtotal	**96**	**23.0**
Social Movements	40	9.6
Politics of Culture	26	6.2
Democratic Theory	16	3.8
Globalization	15	3.6
Environmental Politics	14	3.4
Campaigns & Elections	14	3.4
Other	59	14.1
Sub-Total	**264**	**44.1**
TOTAL	**417**	**100.0**

Source: Data tabulated from information in APSA 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000.

ernist, poststructuralist, and postcolonial theory did not make a strong incursion into the CNPS at this time. Beyond these two large clusters of topics, the 1990s also saw a surge of papers on social movements, which covered topics such as the New Left, new social movements, third-party campaigns and elections, and community mobilization.[5] The CNPS was no longer the booming voice it had been in the 1970s and the 1980s, but it nevertheless succeeded in maintaining a critical voice—even a socialist voice—within the APSA.

During the 1990s, a group of most frequent panelists emerged as compared to the 1980s, with Bertell Ollman and Stephen E. Bronner occupying leading spots during that 11-year period.[6] During the 1990s, however, John Ehrenberg, Michael Forman, Carl Boggs, Elizabeth A. Kelly, Micheline Ishay, and Susanne Peters were also among the CNPS members

TABLE 10. Most Frequent Panelists on CNPS Panels at APSA Meetings, 1990 to 2000

Name	Affiliation	Papers/Presentations
Bertell Ollman	New York University	8
John Ehrenberg	Long Island University	8
Carl Boggs	National University	7
Stephen E. Bronner	Rutgers University	6
Michael Forman	University of Washington Tacoma	6
Elizabeth A. Kelly	DePaul University	5
Micheline Ishay	University of Denver	5
Susanne Peters	Giessen University (Germany)	5
	TOTAL	**58**

Source: Data compiled from information in APSA 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000.

with five or more presentations on CNPS panels. Collectively, however, this group accounted for only 15% of all CNPS/APSA panel and roundtable presentations during the 1990s (see Table 10).

A second tier of frequent panelists (three to four presentations) included Carl Swidorski (College of St. Rose), Christine A. Kelly (William Paterson University), Douglass Kellner (UCLA), John C. Berg, Joseph M. Schwartz (Temple University), Manfred B. Steger (Illinois State University), Nancy Hartsock (University of Washington), Jose R. Sanchez, Mark Mattern (Baldwin-Wallace University), William Corlett, George Katsiaficas, John R. Martin Jr., and Timothy W. Luke. However, the vast majority of CNPS panelists were "one and out" presenters, who were usually non-Caucus members opportunistically using the CNPS as an entryway to the APSA meeting.[7] There was some concern that these non-Caucus members were denying access to otherwise deserving members of CNPS, while others thought that allowing non-CNPS members onto CNPS panels was a way to recruit new members to the Caucus. There is no evidence that this latter strategy was successful in recruiting new members; instead it discouraged dues-paying members from being more active in CNPS and perhaps cost the organization members in the long run.

New Political Science: A Journal of Politics & Culture

The year after CNPS became an organized section, CNPS Chair Joseph Kling (1993, 1) wrote to members that the Caucus was now trying "to strengthen our presence as a critical voice in the APSA. . . . We've been

making some progress." Kling (1993, 1) indicated that the Caucus had "broadened the topics addressed in the Caucus program" and had been forging stronger partnerships with other caucuses and organized sections to cosponsor panels with them. These efforts were generating more paper proposals for Caucus-sponsored panels, as well as larger attendance at the panels. In addition, the *New Political Science* journal had been "restructured" editorially in 1989–90 (by Sarkees and Katsiaficas) so that it was no longer operated as an independent editorial collective run by graduate students, but now had a managing editor appointed by a new Journal Executive Committee. The main goal of the editorial restructuring was to ensure that the journal was published on a regular schedule four times a year.

In 1997, CNPS (1998d, 6) signed a five-year contract with Carfax to upgrade the journal's production quality and distribution. After two years of being published by Carfax, George Katsiaficas (1999b, 10) the current editor of *New Political Science*, could finally report that "subscriptions to New Political Science have been growing robustly" and that the journal had been published on schedule four times a year for the last two years. The journal had added a regular feature—"What Is Political Science? What Should It Be?"—to reinvigorate the discussion of what it means to be a new political scientist. Katsiaficas (1999b, 11) emphasized that in contrast to some other left journals, *New Political Science* "has no 'line' and we publish a variety of views. We are home to many voices, both within the Caucus and in the world at large."

In 1999, Carfax was acquired by the Taylor & Francis Group, which resulted in another significant increase in the journal's institutional and individual subscriptions (Katsiaficas 1999a). Through this expanded subscriber base the journal became not only financially self-sufficient by the end of the 1990s but also the Caucus's major source of revenue, while the APSA section continued to rely on meager membership dues (five dollars per year). Furthermore, under Katsiaficas's leadership, the journal launched a parallel book series published by Routledge, which in its first three years released a highly acclaimed book on the Black Panthers (Cleaver and Katsiaficas 2001), as well as books on Latino social movements, multiculturalism, the politics of cyberspace, the fall of the Berlin Wall, globalization, and African political thought. By the end of 2000, it was decided that revenues from the journal and book series were brisk enough to begin attaching cash grants to the section's Christian Bay Best Paper Award, Michael Harrington Best Book Award, and new Cloward and Piven Award (given to an activist group headquartered in the city of the APSA convention) (CNPS 2000c, 11–12).

Despite improvements to the journal's quality, timeliness, and financial condition, some members again raised issues about the journal's relationship to the Caucus. The journal was now technically owned by the Caucus but was under the direct supervision of a Journal Executive Committee (comparable to the old Collective), rather than the Coordinating Council. The Caucus elected only two representatives to the 25-member Journal Executive Committee, which otherwise elected its own members, but the journal's revenues were controlled by the editor and Journal Executive Committee. Consequently, some members were concerned that the journal was drifting away from the Caucus, much as *Politics & Society* had done two decades earlier, and was becoming the province of a small self-selecting elite within the Caucus. While this issue was raised and briefly discussed at the 2000 annual business meeting, it was decided to postpone the discussion to allow members to reflect on the issue (CNPS 2000c, 5–6).

Otherwise, CNPS now went about doing the things that organized sections do in the APSA. While CNPS continued to focus on building a new political science through its journal and conference panels, it strengthened communication within the organization by improving and expanding its newsletter. Over time, the newsletter increasingly published short articles on new political science, but it was otherwise a means of communication within the Caucus. The newsletter included book reviews, Caucus news, award announcements, job announcements, fellowship and grant opportunities, radical course syllabi, and conference announcements (e.g., Socialist Scholars Conference, International Political Science Association, Rethinking Marxism Conference, the Peace Studies Association Conference, Radical Philosophy Association, Conference of the Society for Utopian Studies). These conferences effectively substituted for the leadership's earlier ambition of establishing an interdisciplinary radical conference sponsored by CNPS.

However, a notable venture in this direction was the Caucus presence within the International Political Science Association (IPSA). The IPSA had been established in 1949, but by the 1990s many critical political scientists were concerned that IPSA was being transformed into a conduit for exporting "American" (behavioral) political science to the rest of the world. Thus, during the 1990s, a few CNPS members became active in IPSA, which led to CNPS cosponsoring its first independent conference since 1975. The CNPS conference, "Capitalism vs. Democracy: Strategies of Resistance and for Social Change," was cosponsored with the Study Group (37) on the Foundations of Economic and Political Democracy of the International Political Science Association, and it was held on June

16–18, 1995, at Suffolk University (Berg 1995a, 1995b). Following the conference, the IPSA study group was made permanent and renamed the Study Group on Socialism, Capitalism, and Democracy, which still exists today as IPSA Research Committee (RC) 49 (Berg 1995b, 3; see IPSA 2024). This study group was "devoted to the study of movements and theories . . . that see a contradiction between the democratic principle of majority rule and the capitalist principle of absolute sovereignty of the market" (Ollman 1997).

John C. Berg (2021), who organized the 1995 conference and the permanent study group, observes that the IPSA committee was deemed to have resolved the problem of "socialism" not being in the Caucus's name as it provided a conference outlet for those who explicitly wanted to be identified as socialists or who wanted to study socialism. The 1995 IPSA event was followed up with the conference "Contemporary Capitalism: Potentials for Resistance and Change," which was held in Aarhus, Denmark, on August 9–11, 1996. At this time, the study group was affiliated with CNPS as well as with IPSA (CNPS 1996c). RC 49 effectively became the Caucus presence at IPSA meetings for the remainder of the decade. During the 1990s, CNPS also maintained a presence at the Midwest Political Science Association, with one or two panels per year throughout most of the decade (1995–2002). The CNPS also sponsored two panels at the 2000 Socialist Scholars Conference "Marxism and the Study of American Politics" and the "Seattle WTO Protests" (CNPS 2000a).

Bertell Ollman, H. Mark Roelofs, John Ehrenberg, and Stephen E. Bronner reestablished a New York University chapter of CNPS on December 9, 1997, when they convened a meeting to discuss the question "What Is Political Science?" The event was attended by 26 graduate students and two faculty, with the result that a local chapter of approximately seven members was established at the conclusion of the meeting. Ollman encouraged others to duplicate this effort at their own universities: "What are you waiting for?" he asked: "ORGANIZE!" (CNPS 1998c). However, the local chapter experiment was again short-lived even in New York City.

The Membership Crisis

Despite these organizational successes, CNPS was simultaneously confronted by yet another organizational crisis generated by its new status as an organized section of the APSA. A decade after these sections were authorized by APSA, the minimum number of members required to

maintain status as a section was increased from 100 to 250 dues-paying members, beginning in the 1995–96 program year. In 1993, when the new policy was adopted, Caucus membership was fluctuating between 450 and 500 members, but the official records showed that many members had not paid dues to the APSA in many years, and a large number of Caucus members were not members of the APSA organized section. In fact, only 196 Caucus members were also organized section members, because of widespread disaffection with the APSA (Berg 1993a, 1). In other words, a large majority of CNPS members did not belong to the APSA.

Consequently, John C. Berg, CNPS secretary-treasurer, reminded members that CNPS maintains a "dual existence" precisely so persons disaffected with APSA could remain members of CNPS, but unfortunately the non-APSA Caucus members did not count as members of the organized section for purposes of the APSA's membership headcount. Technically, therefore, CNPS membership had fallen below the new minimum threshold, and its status as an organized section was in jeopardy only one year after its official recognition. A few months later, Berg (1993b, 1) again reported that "official OS membership has fluctuated recently between 185 and 200—so we need from 50 to 65 more members" to retain organized section status.

The immediate response was to ask members to encourage progressive colleagues and graduate students to join CNPS. Individuals who were APSA members, but who had forgotten to check the section membership were encouraged to update their membership. Individuals who were not APSA members were asked to join the APSA, and if they were "deterred by the high cost of membership and the unreadability of the *American Political Science Review*," they were asked to become associate members of APSA at a much lower cost ($35), but this allowed them to join the NPS section for only $5. John Rensenbrink suggested that CNPS members also join the Section on Transformational Politics, which had a similar membership problem, and that if members of each section joined the other one it would immediately solve both section's membership problems. Kling (1993) emphasized that retention of organized section status was important because it gave greater visibility to the Caucus, better access to panel space, and a greater ability to weigh in on APSA policy.

The membership crisis generated an aggressive membership drive, and it was at this point that I joined CNPS in 1994 after being a fellow traveler for the previous decade. The membership drive was successful at recruiting fellow travelers and sideline sympathizers, including Cornel West, and a new West Coast cohort dubbed the "UCLA Mafia," who would assume

various leadership posts in CNPS over the next two decades.[8] Organized section membership had increased to 244 by the summer of 1994, but CNPS still had about the same number of "unaffiliated" members who belonged to the Caucus, but not to the section (Kling 1994).

By November 1995, Joseph Kling, CNPS chair, reported that CNPS membership had increased to 263, which was slightly more than necessary to maintain organized section status. However, following the two-year membership scare and the potential for losing organized section status, John Ehrenberg proposed that the Caucus create a new position of membership director to make membership recruitment and membership retention a permanent aspect of Caucus organizational activities. Dennis Moran was appointed as the first CNPS membership director (Kling 1995). Membership recruitment continued to be a constant theme throughout the decade in Caucus newsletters, in chair reports, and at annual business meetings, because the NPS section was always perilously close to the minimum membership threshold of 250. In the next decade, however, CNPS would be a fortuitous beneficiary of the Perestroika rebellion.

New Initiatives

During the second half of the 1990s, there were four chairs of CNPS: Joseph Kling (1995–96), Stephen E. Bronner (1996–97), Carl Boggs (1997–99), and Laura Katz Olson (1999–2001). It is evident that this period of quiet institutionalization resulted in another shift of identity as the name of the newsletter was changed in mid-1996 from the *Caucus for a New Political Science Newsletter* to the *Newsletter of the New Political Science Section of APSA*. At the same time, the official minutes of its business meetings no longer referred to the Caucus for a New Political Science / New Political Science Section, but only to the NPS section. In 1997, the APSA no longer listed Caucus panels under the name *Caucus* for a New Political Science, but only as New Political Science panels. Under the chairmanship of Stephen E. Bronner, the section adopted a new informal policy that "young scholars should take precedent" in constructing CNPS panels as a way to advance their careers in an increasingly hostile academic and political environment. John Ehrenberg, the 1996 program coordinator informed members that CNPS panels "have always had a dual nature—they serve as a home for people who may not have any other venue for presentation and are also a way to promote new scholars" (CNPS 1996a).

Olson, in particular, launched several new initiatives aimed at transitioning CNPS into the twenty-first century. First, Olson (2001) approached the APSA about hosting the Caucus website on www.apsanet.org, and the APSA agreed to do it, although the Caucus would have to update and maintain the site. Bruce Wright maintained the site until about 2010. Second, after years of discussion, CNPS published a membership directory in 1999 under the editorship of Mark Mattern, whose college funded the printing and distribution of the directory. In 1999, the directory listed 766 CNPS members, which suggests that its decade-long membership recruitment drive had been quite successful (CNPS 1999).

Third, while serving as CNPS chair, Olson attempted to infiltrate the APSA bureaucracy by nominating 15 Caucus members for various APSA committees. She succeeded in getting only one person appointed to a committee but proposed that future chairs make it a tradition to continue to nominate CNPS members for APSA committees as she remembered a time when Caucus members had been regularly appointed to APSA committees and even served as chairs of committees (CNPS 2000c, 5). It does not appear that her successors followed this advice, or at least met with no success in the effort.

Fourth, in 2000, Michael Forman (University of Washington, Tacoma) was charged with establishing an NPS listserv to disseminate information and to facilitate ongoing discussions among Caucus members with greater timeliness than was possible with the mailed paper newsletter (CNPS 2000b). In the next decade, under the leadership of Christine Kelly, the listserv would displace and replace the old paper newsletter, which had now been superseded in purpose by the journal and the listserve.[9] Finally, while Olson was serving as CNPS chair, the "Perestroika revolt" erupted within the APSA, and Olson (2001, 3) informed members that "the Caucus should decide what role, if any, it wants to play in the Perestroika efforts to expand APSA leadership to include a more diverse group of political scientists, to revise the APSR, etc." She forwarded a copy of the infamous October 15, 2000, "Perestroika Memo" to members in the February 2001 newsletter for the benefit of those who had not received it (CNPS 2001a).

CNPS and Perestroika: Ideology or Methodology?

The Perestroika revolt began on October 15, 2000, when an anonymous Mr. Perestroika sent an email to the editors of *PS* and *APSR* "On the irrelevance of APSA and APSR!" asking the email's numerous recipients to

"spread this letter as widely as possible" (Monroe 2005, 9–11). Many of the same discontents that had led a previous generation of political scientists to organize the CNPS resurfaced in the Perestroika revolt, which denounced the APSA as an organization controlled by East Coast Brahmins and as one that promoted a "narrow parochialism and methodological bias toward the quantitative, behavioral, rational choice, statistical, and formal modeling approaches" (Monroe 2005, 1, 9). The so-called Perestroiki sounded an old refrain by announcing their disaffection with the *APSR*. This complaint generated support in an open letter signed by 222 political scientists that was published in *PS* two months after the Mr. Perestroika email. The open letter reinforced Mr. Perestroika's claims by reporting the results of a 1998 survey of APSA members, which found that "a very large portion of APSA members, to say nothing of scholars who have given up on APSA, were critical of the current condition of *APSR*" ("An Open Letter" 2000).

The familiar complaint with *APSR* was that it was biased in favor of "technicism" and, more specifically, that its contents were slanted toward rational choice and statistical analysis to the exclusion of qualitative, historical, interpretive, philosophical, and other methods of political analysis (Kasza 2000a, 2000b). In place of this ever-narrowing technicism, Gregory Kasza (2000b), who would soon emerge as a spokesperson for Perestroika, called instead for "an ecumenical science of politics." The criticism lodged against the discipline by Mr. Perestroika resonated to such an extent that its supporters were calling for a revolution at the next annual meeting of the APSA, scheduled for September 2001. The revolution was scheduled to begin at 10:00 p.m. in the San Francisco Hilton Continental Parlor 2—not exactly a royal tennis court, but it would suffice for the purpose.

The *Chronicle of Higher Education* reports that approximately 250–300 persons assembled in the small windowless conference room, "clutching cocktails and sporting plastic name tags. . . . Some donned the plain red protest buttons distributed at the door, making it easier to tell the committed from the merely curious. Surely a few came just for the booze (cash bar)" (Miller 2001).

Michael C. Desch, an associate professor of political science at the University of Kentucky, opened the meeting with a toast to Mr. Perestroika.[10] D. W. Miller reports that, unlike the 1967 Caucus insurrection, which was led by younger faculty and graduate students, it was this same group that was now reluctant to speak up at the Perestroika event, so it was left to a few tenured faculty to fire up the insurrectionists to frequent hoots and applause. John J. Mearsheimer, a renowned professor of international rela-

tions at the University of Chicago, declaimed that there is "a hegemonic threat out there" from rational choice scholars, who draw conclusions about political behavior from game theory, empirical data, and large-N people. Mearsheimer said: "This is about the mathematization of political science. I'm in favor of filling the zoo with all kinds of animals. But I'm concerned about them running us out of the business or making us marginal" (quoted in Miller 2001).

Rogers M. Smith, a political theorist at the University of Pennsylvania, said to cheers and laughter: "I'm not very proud of being a political scientist, and I'm not very proud of political science . . . because we are not as useful as we could be." Smith called on the audience to create "a critical gadfly profession" that would be "dangerous and troublesome and no longer trivial in the world" (quoted in Miller 2001).[11] Susanne Rudolph (University of Chicago) argued that "people who do rational choice select problems because they are susceptible to quantitative measurement," but "the basic political point is that we're against hegemony, against a monopoly of knowledge" (quoted in Miller 2001). The following day, a similar number of people turned up for a panel discussion and strategy session on what was to be done next in this latest disciplinary revolt.

Many older commentators could not help but notice the parallels between the Perestroika revolt in 2001 and the CNPS insurrection in 1967 (Salisbury 2001; Lowi 2005). Yet, as John S. Dryzek (2006, 491) observed, "Many of the younger members of the Perestroika e-mail list in the early 2000s were apparently unaware of this last attempted reformation of the discipline, and needed reminding that once there was the Caucus, and indeed that it lived still" (see also Gunnell 2015b). Indeed, Timothy W. Luke (2010), who was nominated for APSA Council on Perestroika's first alternative slate (2000) reminded younger scholars that there was still a CNPS, which had long been a voice for many of their concerns. Bertell Ollman also reported that that he had attended one of the Perestroika meetings and encountered "many young political scientists who were not familiar with the Caucus or its history" (quoted in CNPS 2001b, 7). However, once informed of its existence, many Perestroiki joined the Caucus, as membership in the New Political Science Section grew from 309 in 2000 to 516 in 2007 (Rudder 2000).

In many respects, the APSA Establishment's response to the Perestroika revolt was similar to its response to CNPS in 1968 and 1969 under David Easton and Robert E. Lane. During the first Perestroika reception, Robert D. Putnam, the incoming APSA president (2001–2) and a former member of the old Ad Hoc Committee, addressed the meeting to say that

he endorsed the complaint that political science had become less relevant to those outside the profession. He told the Perestroiki: "I know it's dangerous for a movement to be co-opted, and it's useful for a movement to have a Winter Palace to storm," but "for the moment I'm the little guard in front of the palace" (quoted in Miller 2001).

However, there was clearly going to be a changing of the guard as the Nominating Committee put forward Theda Skocpol, a professor of government at Harvard University, to become the next president of APSA (2002–3). Skocpol was considered sympathetic to Perestroika as she had signed the open letter about the *APSR*. During her subsequent presidency, the APSA convened a Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy "to examine what, if any, impact rising economic inequality had on political voice, governing, and public policy" (Jacobs and Skocpol 2006). Skocpol was followed in quick succession by Susanne H. Rudolph (2003–4), Margaret Levi (2004–5), and Ira Katznelson (2005–6).

Lee Sigelman, the incoming editor of *APSR*, responded to Perestroika by assembling a more academically diverse editorial board—at least in terms of personal demographics, geographical location, institutional type, and methodological approach to political science. Sigelman also announced at the San Francisco meeting that he would drop a long-standing requirement that the journal's peer reviewers unanimously agree on the merits of an article, with the goal of breaking the impasse over publishing scholarship that relied on qualitative methods. Sigelman stated his intention to make the *APSR* more hospitable to mathematics-free articles.

In 1968, the APSA had created a new journal, *PS*, in response to CNPS criticism of *APSR*, and so too in 2003, the APSA created yet another new journal, *Perspectives on Politics*, "to publish articles that integrate different subfields and apply research to matters of public policy" (Miller 2001).[12] As they had done in 1967, the APSA leadership responded to the Perestroiki's concerns about the lack of programming for faculty at teaching institutions by creating a new Section on Teaching Political Science with dedicated panels at the annual meeting, established a new *Journal of Political Science Education*, and established a separate "Teaching and Learning" conference (Harriger 2010).[13]

In the midst of these concessions, Kasza articulated a seven-point manifesto defining what would count as an ecumenical political science. His first point was that Perestroiki rejected "the hegemonic project of hard science," which he argued "threatens academic freedom" in political science and damages graduate students by convincing them that they must "sacrifice their intellectual integrity to enter this profession." Second,

Kasza (2001, 597) argued that formal modeling, rational choice theory, and statistical analysis was "bad science in the study of politics" as had been documented by various critics over the years.[14] Third, in yet another echo of the old CNPS, Kasza (2001, 597) argued that "hard science" was "increasingly irrelevant to the normative and practical problems of real politics," and on this point the *New Republic* had recently chimed in with a critique of the profession's "irrational exuberance" over rational choice theory (Cohn 1999). Similarly, the *Wall Street Journal* had poked fun at the APSA convention for trying to figure out "how many politicians can fit on the head of a pin," and the *Journal* wondered "if the field has gotten too arcane" (Harwood 1997; see also Jaschik 2010).[15]

To rectify these problems, Kasza (2001, 597) proposed restoring political philosophy to "a central place in political studies so that the ends of political life once again become our common focus." He also proposed that qualitative research methods be incorporated into graduate school curricula so that young political scientists might emerge as broadly trained scholars, rather than narrowly skilled technicians and hypothesis testers. Kasza wanted to reorganize political science research around the study of substantive problems, rather than attempts to selectively validate the flawed methodological assumptions of behavioralism and rational choice theory. Thus, Kasza also wanted to reverse the decline of policy studies, so that political scientists did more work on the impact and consequences of public policies, which was a demand that hearkened back to the pleas of Philip Green, Sanford Levinson, and Kenneth M. Dolbeare in the early days of the CNPS.

Finally, Kasza called for greater focus on the Global South, as well as more interdisciplinary research in political science. These demands, if met by the APSA, would promote a profession and journals that "emphasize political substance and catholicism with respect to methods and approaches" (2001, 597). Kasza (2000a, 737) was convinced that the best way to achieve these goals were competitive elections for APSA office with multiple candidates on the ballot, who would offer "statements of their ideas concerning political science and the Association." This was exactly as it had been in the 1970s, but Kasza was rebuffed in his efforts to require the APSA Nominating Committee to put forward more than one name for each position on the grounds that the APSA constitution already provided a mechanism for nominating additional candidates at the annual business meeting.

While there were unquestionably echoes and repetitions of the Caucus insurrection in the Perestroika revolt, there were two significant differences between the movements: political ideology and political activism.

John Ehrenberg (2001, 10), a former CNPS chair (1991–93) weighed in immediately to remind political scientists that "the Caucus was the first group to raise many of the issues which Perestroika has been pushing over the past few weeks and since we've been yakking about our pathetic discipline for the better part of three decades, I think we have a certain pride of place in this debate." Ehrenberg was concerned that discussions on the Perestroika listserv had quickly degenerated into two lines of thought. The first line of thought was that the whole Perestroika campaign was turning into a campaign for single person's candidacy for APSA president, that is, Theda Skocpol. Second, and more important, Ehrenberg (2001, 10) was dismayed by the fact that "the whole Perestroika thing is beginning to take the form of an old, boring, deracinated and reified discussion of methodology." Ehrenberg (2001, 10) focused on the latter concern, but he did not think that either line of thought "will raise the issues the Caucus has been pushing for years."

Ehrenberg (2001, 10) argued:

> To reduce our political critique of APSA and Political Science to yet another vapid, barren and pointless discussion of methodology misses the whole point. Too many of us, in the Caucus and outside of it, have taken a reflexively reactionary and anti-quantitative position as if Marx himself wasn't a social scientist using the most advanced scientific methods available to him in an effort to understand the anatomy of capitalism. Our collective revulsion at the idiocy of behaviorism, rational choice, and other methods of the field gets translated too often into a disdainful and haughty refusal to look seriously at what 90% of our colleagues are doing. It's all well and good to look at everyone else in the discipline and conclude that they're morons, but the isolation and sectarianism that result aren't good for any of us or for the points we want to make. . . . A critique of methodology is NOT a political critique—and it's not the critique . . . which the Caucus should be making.[16]

Ehrenberg called on Caucus members to make the Perestroika revolt a *political* debate that "raises fundamental questions about the discipline's relationship to the state, to the existing distribution of economic and political power, to its refusal to engage the issues which a critical stance demands. *THAT'S* the issue, not whether some individual would be a good president or whether political scientists should be using numbers. To claim that political scientists should not use quantitative tools is, quite

simply, idiotic." Moreover, Ehrenberg (2001, 11) emphasized, if the Perestroika debate remained focus on a methodological critique, it "makes it impossible for us to make the political point," and "it's an important reason why people don't really listen to what we have to say." By refocusing the debate on political issues, instead of methodological ones, and by making the debate about the discipline instead of office-seeking individuals, "We can politicize the debate" and "help move it to the left" (Ehrenberg 2001, 11).

Bertell Ollman entered the fray from a slightly different angle, but he too wanted to shift the debate away from methodology and onto *what is studied* by political scientists. By the early 2000s, the newly hegemonic paradigm was rational choice theory and formal modeling, but the underlying positivist philosophy of science remained intact, and the new hegemonic paradigm continued to anchor political science in flawed rational actor assumptions and market metaphors imported from neoclassical economics (see Ashcraft 1977; Monroe 1991; Maki 2009; Hayward 2010; Drezner 2015).

Ehrenberg (2007, 509) would also criticize the official discipline's "fascination with economics." Ehrenberg (2007, 509–10) argued that

> the more influence [neoclassical] economics exerts over the methodological tools and general world-view of a given social science, the more conservative its effect is likely to be. And from the very beginning of the "behavioral" revolution in the early 1960s to the contemporary hegemony of "rational choice," the demobilizing, individualizing, and apolitical influence of economics on political science is clear and present. The fascination with modeling, the hostility to ideology, the fetishism of "parsimony," the suspicion of group activity, the deliberate avoidance of big questions, the hoarding of expertise—all this, and more, can be partly explained by the attempt to graft the scientism of economics onto the study of politics.

In this respect, Ollman (2000, 554) could rightly observe that official political science was still preoccupied with the question of "how to study" politics instead of "what to study." This remained a significant point of difference between Perestroika and CNPS. Ollman (2000, 555) observed that rational choice theory and formal modeling merely carried the miniaturization of political science one step beyond behavioralism by dismissing what people actually do politically, such as make decisions to concentrate

on the *hypothetical* "calculations involved (or supposedly involved, or, for some scholars, ideally involved) in making choices." In the end, Ollman concluded that the main problem with official political science was not what it studied, or how it studied it, but what it did not study, because it seemed that all the most interesting and important questions that might command the attention of political scientists were either not amenable to "scientific" investigation or they were deemed outside the discipline's official boundaries; for example, social class and economic inequality were the province of sociology and economics, respectively (e.g., see Gray 2019).

The objects of study in political science were still method driven, which meant the scope of political science was increasingly narrowed to those things that were susceptible to quantification and modeling, that is, elections, public opinion, and hypothetically rational decision-making. Yet, according to Ollman, the most significant lacuna in the hegemonic paradigm was the continuing absence of capitalism from political science, and this ideological problem had not been broached by Perestroika. The assumption by official political scientists, including a Perestroika sympathizer like Skocpol, was that political institutions are neutral arbiters of group conflict within an autonomous political system (Barrow 1993, chap. 5). This a priori analytical premise allowed political scientists to still assert that the state is "a set of institutions independent of the capitalist class and, therefore, more or less available to any group that organizes itself effectively to use it," the very argument proposed by David Truman (1951) and Robert Dahl (1961) decades earlier. This means that despite a wealth of empirical evidence to the contrary, official political scientists continue "to treat our society as a democracy made up of individual citizens rather than a dictatorship of the capitalist class, albeit one with democratic trimmings" (Ollman 2000, 561). Ollman concluded that these ideological and conceptual blinders ensured that official political science would studiously avoid questions such as how capitalism not only limits, but undermines, liberal democracy, and, thereby, the discipline's official practitioners continued to trivialize or evade the nondemocratic premises and practices of liberal capitalist "democracies." In this respect, the Caucus's ideological critique of the discipline went deeper than Perestroika's methodological critique of the discipline.

John Medearis (2006, 578) rightly observes that a major reason for the difference between CNPS and Perestroika was that the CNPS had emerged "as the scholarly wing of a broader [New Left] political movement."[17] Thus, while CNPS challenged the hegemonic behavioral orthodoxy within political science, it also challenged the ideological conclusions of pluralist theory

to such an extent that it eventually became the socialist section of the APSA. It was attempting to forge alliances with radical caucuses in other disciplines, challenge the growing corporatization of the university, and link up with broader social movements outside of academia. CNPS may have had limited success in achieving these objectives, but it was part of a larger political and ideological movement and not just an organizational revolt within the APSA. Similarly, Michael Parenti (2006, 503) observes that "not long after the Caucus for a New Political Science was formed, it became clear that the postbehavioral critique was really a radical one, directed less at a particular research mode than at the centrist or 'mainstream' orthodoxy shared by many behavioralists and traditionalists alike."

On the other hand, Perestroika did not emerge out of a broader political movement, and, thus, Anne Norton (2015, 425) observes that "the passion for politics that had animated disciplinary struggles in the 1960s was absent from perestroika." The leading participants in Perestroika's online discussions successfully argued in favor of restricting the Perestroika challenge to questions of methodological pluralism. In the end, the Caucus's organizational challenge to APSA was deflected by incorporating it as just one of many organized sections, and, similarly, Perestroika's methodological challenge was shunted off to its own intellectual ghetto as yet another new organized section, Qualitative and Multi-Methods Research (McGovern 2010).[18] Once Perestroika achieved this goal, there was simply nothing left of the movement, and after 2004 there were no longer any Perestroika panels listed in the APSA conference program, but CNPS was still a presence within the APSA.

The Caucus still had a larger and unfinished challenge in the critique of capitalism. Thus, Stephen E. Bronner (1998, 485) reminded CNPS members of the long road ahead, because in an age of neoliberalism, the political conditions were far different from those that originally gave rise to CNPS:

> The New Left felt it had a world to win. Everything seemed possible and politics was imbued with a sense of adventure. That feeling is perhaps what I cherish the most; it is palpably missing today and it cannot be artificially reinvented.

Yet Perestroika did provide the impetus for CNPS to make another foray into APSA electoral politics when it was reluctantly drawn into another election contest by the remnants of the revolt. CNPS membership nearly doubled as Perestroika's more politically inclined followers gravi-

tated to the Caucus, rather than the new Section on Qualitative and Multi-Methods Research, which absorbed many of the Perestroiki. In late 2009, Stephen E. Bronner wrote to me as the newly elected chair of CNPS (2009–13) suggesting that the Caucus should once again contest APSA elections in the wake of Perestroika. I indicated that I supported the idea, "although it comes at me sooner than I expected, but I also want to be sure we don't go off on some wild adventure" (Barrow 2009).

At about the same time, I was contacted by Gregory Kasza, who informed me that he had nominated at least one candidate-by-petition for APSA Council each year since 2003. Kasza (2009) observed that "these are the first challenges to the official slate since the Caucus for a New Political Science put up alternative candidates in the late 1970s." Kasza (2009) emphasized that "our goals have been to promote the re-legitimation of qualitative research and to institutionalize competitive elections in APSA. Although we have made some progress in fostering methodological pluralism, we have made no progress toward democratizing the association." Kasza (2009) expressed his frustration with the APSA, which had previously formed two special committees to explore the question of competitive elections, but neither committee had produced a positive result for the Perestroiki. Consequently, Kasza proposed that CNPS join with Perestroika to "turn the fall 2010 APSA election into a referendum on competitive elections by nominating a full alternative slate of 8 candidates-by-petition for Council."

Should the alternative slate win control of the Council, Kasza (2009) proposed that the coalition submit a resolution to the Council to amend the APSA constitution as follows:

1. The official nominating committee will put forward 2 candidates for each elective post (instead of one, as the constitution currently specifies).
2. The members of the nominating committee itself will become subject to election (currently they are appointed).
3. Each APSA member will be able to vote for only four candidates for Council and one candidate each for vice president and president-elect.

The third provision was intended to allay concerns among the identity/minority caucuses (Latino, African American, LGBTQ, women's) that "democracy" in APSA elections would undermine minority representation and return control of the APSA to middle-aged white males. Some, if not all, of the identity caucuses had negotiated special deals with the APSA

Establishment to ensure what they called "substantive democracy" by guaranteeing that the APSA Nominating Committee would nominate candidates from each of these groups each year. Thus, the APSA Establishment had used a strategy of identity-based interest group pluralism to deflect attention away from the Association's ideological orthodoxy and its institutional relationships to corporations and the state. Kasza indicated that he had already recruited seven candidates to run for Council in fall 2010. Two of the candidates—Sanford F. Schram and Laura Katz Olson—were long-standing members of CNPS. Kasza (2010) was hopeful that "the backing of a formidable group like NPS, with its long history of supporting genuine elections in the association, would give a tremendous boost to this effort."[19] Kasza presented his proposal to the CNPS annual business meeting on September 3, 2010 (CNPS and APSA OS 2010, 2).

Kasza's proposal was circulated on the CNPS listserv, where it immediately reignited old debates about the Caucus's relationship to APSA and the role of identity politics in CNPS. The main objections to Kasza's proposed alternative slate was that it was supposed to bring more democracy to APSA but had not been selected using a democratic process. Furthermore, no one on the slate was formally accountable to any organization that might potentially support the alternative slate, which had often been a problem with CNPS-endorsed APSA Council members in the 1970s.

Despite these objections, the alternative slate was nominated by petition, and Anne Norton, Laura Katz Olson, and Michael C. Desch were elected to three of the eight contested Council seats. They placed second, third, and fifth, respectively, in total votes received, but if only 14 and 26 more votes had been cast for the ninth (Yanow) and tenth (Schram) highest vote recipients, the alternative slate would have captured a majority of the contested seats for Council in 2010. Olson became the first CNPS member elected to the APSA Council in 30 years, and the entire slate was again within 1% of the total votes cast of capturing a majority of the contested seats (APSA 2011a). When I informed CNPS members of the election results, I wrote: "I am looking forward to the next elections and hope that with just a very little extra effort the progressive wing of the APSA can become the governing wing of the APSA" (Barrow 2010b).

Reforming the Discipline or the Profession?

Despite the encouraging electoral results, the 2010 APSA election sparked renewed debate in CNPS about the efficacy of participating in APSA elec-

tions that largely recycled old arguments to a new audience. Peter Bratsis (2010) reopened the debate with a message to CNPS members stating:

> I'm very happy that some of our people are on the Executive Council but I'm still not sure what it is that we want to accomplish or what could be accomplished by way of the APSA machinery. People who are close to the sensibilities of the Caucus, Ira Katznelson recently, have been President of APSA and I don't think it has made one drop of difference within the discipline or even APSA's journals and conferences. Frances Piven, Michael Burawoy, and Jill Quadagno have all recently been presidents of the ASA and sociology is just as servile to corporate and institutional power as it was before their tenure. My fear is that we face the danger of forgetting our substantive mission and chase futile and meaningless goals such as the "ranking" of our journal and getting our people onto committees that are of no consequence . . . my impression so far is that APSA is of no political or intellectual consequence.

John C. Berg (2010) countered this argument with the claim that it was false to assert that elected APSA officers make no difference to the profession or discipline. He suggested that "the clearest example . . . was APSA's policy to relocate the conference city in a pro-labor way. This policy was adopted while Margaret Levi was President, and I don't think it would have been adopted without her." Berg (2010) also pointed out that the APSA president appoints the conference program chairs, "who do have a significant potential to affect the program" as the Caucus had learned long ago when President James MacGregor Burns had appointed Frances Fox Piven and Benjamin R. Barber to coordinate the Bicentennial panels. Furthermore, Berg (2010) observed that there had "been several attempts to raise the membership threshold for sections to a point larger than our current membership," and this would have resulted in the dissolution of CNPS as an organized section of the APSA. Similarly, elements of the APSA Council had repeatedly attempted "to get rid of the Teaching and Learning Conference as a waste of money," in contrast to the Caucus, which had fought for more teaching-related activities in the APSA since its founding in 1967. Berg (2010) also pointed to the long-standing Caucus position in favor of "an explosive reform: letting members choose which journals they would get (and pay for), rather than requiring us to get them all." This was still unfinished business for the CNPS. John Ehrenberg (2010) agreed that CNPS still needed to do "something about that appall-

ing APSR." Ehrenberg (2010) suggested that by making APSA journals a matter of "pick and choose . . . it might weaken the stranglehold the model-fetishists and profession-advancing elements have on our 'flagship' journal by relegating it to just one of a number of options."[20]

Although I supported the 2010 election campaign, I was simultaneously pushing the Caucus to move back toward a counter-association strategy that would include a name change, a new mission statement, and an independent conference. While CNPS membership was rising and the Caucus was financially in the best shape of its history, CNPS faced the same questions that had been raised in the late 1970s. Kasza's sense was that most of the identity caucuses, and Perestroika itself, were divided over the issue of competitive elections because many believed that applying a "diversity principle" to the APSA's Nominations Committee would better guarantee what they called "substantive democracy," that is, demographic diversity of representation. In 2011, the APSA constitution was amended to require the Nominations Committee to follow a diversity principle when nominating candidates for office. The new diversity principle required the Nominations Committee to "select candidates with due regard to geographical distribution, fields of professional interest, types of institution, race, gender, ethnicity, methodological orientation, gender identity, sexuality and other important forms of diversity" (APSA 2012). While this principle virtually guaranteed representation for the identity caucuses and for qualitative methods, it excluded CNPS to the extent that it did not include ideological diversity in its list of protected classes, which strikes one as rather odd for a *political* science association.

Christine A. Kelly (2011b), the immediate past chair of CNPS (2005–9), considered it ridiculous that some APSA members were claiming that "the alternative slates cut into the votes of APSA sanctioned 'minority' candidates and threatens 'diversity.'" She argued that "genuine diversity cannot be achieved through undemocratic processes." Consequently, Kelly was firm in her position: "I for one have *no interest* in going down the identity politics rabbit-hole . . . but I definitely think there exists a substantive (and if you don't like that a practical) vulnerability to that critique," which would allow the identity caucuses to badmouth any future alternative slate on that basis. Kelly (2011b) lamented that, unfortunately "it's just a reality. And it's a reality that matters in APSA where interest group pluralism is both the ideology and the practice; where 'liberals' and 'progressives' who care about 'diversity' are mind-tripped and produce the kinds of tortured dialog seen in the Perestroika thread."

In addition, however, Kelly (2011a) shared a concern voiced by many

others in CNPS that the alternative slate was largely the product of a single self-appointed individual (Kasza), rather than a process of political organizing within and between the various caucuses and sections. Kelly (2011a) emphasized that "the ability to develop serious opposition that has roots and can mobilize votes comes from *how* you do it, not just doing it."

I concurred with these objections, but I informed CNPS members that I was left wondering,

> What is the alternative mechanism? Does NPS spearhead a slate generated through its own "primary" system? Does NPS convene a caucus of caucuses or a section of sections (leaders or general members)? Do we organize a "political party" based on a coalition of sections and, if so, how does that "party" nominate a slate? (Barrow 2011b)

However, I wrote to CNPS members in the spring of 2011 to acknowledge that "several members of our organization have already expressed an interest in running an NPS slate of candidates for APSA offices." I reminded members of the Caucus's past electoral success in the 1970s but cautioned that "going down this path again will take an enormous amount of effort by many individuals, so (1) I want to know clearly whether or not we are actually prepared for such an undertaking and (2) I want to know whether we can articulate a clear *political* agenda other than simply running for office for the sake of running for office" (Barrow 2011b).

I also pointed out that

> the situation within the APSA has changed significantly since the 1970s, particularly with respect to organized sections. In 1967, New Political Science became the first organized "caucus" within the APSA and it was soon joined by a women's caucus, an African-American caucus, and a Latino caucus . . . but whereas we were "the only game in town" in 1969, there are 41 organized sections in the APSA. In my view, the APSA (and the discipline) is essentially a holding company for the plethora of organized sections that now constitute the actual discipline as a practice. The persistent discontent with the APSA officialdom is because it does not any longer represent the actual practice of political science, but merely one way of doing political science. (Barrow 2011b)

This changed situation meant that an NPS slate of candidates would "only be possible by working in coalition with other organized sections

and it is by no means clear that we would exercise leadership in such a coalition" (Barrow 2011a). In fact, Perestroika's anti-empirical rhetoric and its emphasis on qualitative methodology posed a problem for CNPS, as John Ehrenberg had articulated earlier. Thus, I emphasized that "while I firmly believe that the APSA's leadership and journals do not reflect the actual *practice* of political science as that practice is performed by most APSA members," I was also "not interested in a campaign that polarizes the association between 'qualitative' and 'quantitative' methodology, since our own members use both methods and, frankly, I don't think there is anything 'quantitative' about the types of rational choice/formal modeling approaches that many find objectionable—they are arid, abstract, empty and sterile—not empirical" (Barrow 2011a). On this point, I reminded CNPS members that "NPS is a PROGRESSIVE organization so it would be counter-productive to our own goals to elect individuals purely on the basis of their commitment to qualitative methods, but who are fundamentally opposed to our ideological and political commitments" (Barrow 2011a). In this regard, I concurred with Ehrenberg's earlier critique that Perestroika had "served more as a launching pad for the institutional advancement of a few individuals than as a transformative event within APSA" (Barrow 2011a).

In the end, CNPS agreed to officially participate in Kasza's 2011 alternative slate by nominating the current CNPS chair (Barrow) and two former CNPS chairs (John Ehrenberg and Manfred Steger) (APSA 2011b). However, the only clear political agenda that CNPS members could agree on was the disarticulation of *APSR* from APSA membership as in other disciplines and the reinvigoration of *Perspectives on Politics*, which was already underway with the appointment of Jeffry C. Isaac as the new editor. Yet the debate over competitive elections at the 2011 business meeting renewed CNPS disaffection with the APSA and its new form of liberal pluralist orthodoxy (i.e., centrist Democratic Party identity politics).

Consequently, I wrote to the CNPS Coordinating Council: "As we suspected, others [sections] are just cutting deals with the APSA establishment, although as we pointed out during the floor debate [at the previous APSA business meeting], the only reason those deals get cut is because of the pressure being exerted by the existence of an alternative slate. It only confirms my pessimism about the absolutely dismal state of a moribund discipline. It's another example, in my opinion, of why NPS has to maintain and strengthen its existence outside the APSA" (Barrow 2011c). While discussion within CNPS leadership again turned to working outside the APSA, I reminded everyone to "work hard to get the NPS candidates

elected to the Executive Council—Dual Power Strategy—work within the state, while working to smash the state!" (Barrow 2011c).

However, none of the CNPS candidates were elected to the Council, as they ranked 12th, 13th, and 15th in a field of 15 candidates. I won 32.6% of the vote, Steger won 31.5% of the vote, and Ehrenberg won 29.1%of the vote (APSA 2011c). The Caucus had not mounted a vigorous campaign, and it was still more than 300 votes short of placing a candidate on the Council, but the results indicated there was still a significant reservoir of support for CNPS beyond its dues-paying membership. Ange-Marie Hancock, who had been on the alternative slate the previous year, was the only person elected from the alternative slate in 2011. Following these results, Christine Kelly (2011b) made known that she "would FAR rather build an independent, democratic, and more representative NPS than spend time on reforming the APSA. If we prioritize broadening our base by way of becoming a more independent as well as culturally and politically diverse unapologetically LEFT academic enterprise, the other might be doable—or irrelevant." On October 5, 2011, I responded to Kelly and the entire CNPS Coordinating Council that I agreed with her position despite some personal caveats. My rather lengthy response was the following:

> First, as I have now stated in two *NPS* articles, I have long thought that the future of CNPS will be its ability to organize and expand outside of APSA; hence, my unfulfilled longing for an NPS conference. In the long-run, I would rather encircle the APSA and just render it professionally irrelevant, since it is already politically irrelevant. I would love to run an NPS slate, but things have changed dramatically within APSA since we last did it in the 1970s. The main difference is that we are no longer the only caucus or organized section so going it alone just won't work. . . .
>
> Second, at some point, we have to face the fact that APSA politics, as you say, revolves around a rights-based interest group liberalism, which does not require democracy, or even participation, to achieve its goals. We (NPS) always run up against the hard reality that there are 14,000 other political scientists, who aren't progressive, who don't care about organizational democracy, and who generally don't care period. NPS membership has always fluctuated between 3% to 7% of APSA membership and those numbers are consistent with the ideological complexion of the discipline as we know from the Seymour Martin Lipset surveys/polls of university professors. This is another reason why an NPS slate is not likely to win an election on its own.

> Consequently . . . if we now decide to go further down that path how much time, energy, and personnel are we prepared to devote to it? Elections exhausted NPS in the 1970s, and in my view, almost destroyed it. It took a full decade before NPS fully recovered by applying formally to become an organized section in the early 1990s . . . capturing or changing the APSA does nothing to change political science. We have already changed political science by what we do, and we can change it further by doing more new political science, i.e., through publishing and activism. So, my big question is what do we get if we win an election? Yes, we get a more democratic and diverse political science association, but do we get a different or new political science? (Barrow 2011d)

I reiterated that Perestroika's "main agenda is methodological and not ideological" and, thus, overlapped with the CNPS agenda but was not identical to it (Barrow 2011d). In more pessimistic moments, it was tempting to agree with Bratsis's prediction that Perestroika and contested elections would not change anything in political science, but it would be wrong to say that *nothing* changed in the aftermath of Perestroika. The *professional* elite continued its slow march toward demographic, institutional, and geographic diversity, while the *discipline* allowed more methodological pluralism at least in its provinces and periphery. Yet, as research conducted by J. Tobin Grant (2005) demonstrated at the time, the hegemonic core of the political science discipline retained a deeply scientistic self-image, and this meant that political scientists would remain dissociated from the political impact and consequences of their research.[21] The persistent and chronic criticism of the official journals enunciated by the Perestroiki exemplified a continuing distance between the profession of political science and the discipline of political science, if we identify the discipline with the intellectual orientations and methodological practices of most living political scientists.

In fact, in the wake of Perestroika, the APSA (2011d, 1) created a Task Force on Political Science in the 21st Century, which concluded that, 10 years after Perestroika,

> Political science is often ill-equipped to address in a sustained way, why many of the most marginal members of political communities around the world are often unable to have their needs effectively addressed by governments. Just as importantly, political science is also ill-equipped to develop explanations for the social, political, and economic processes that lead to groups' marginalization. This

> limits the extent to which political science is relevant to broader social and political discourse . . . issues related to marginalization including race, gender, and inequality are not well represented in articles published in the discipline's flagship journals.

This observation is reminiscent of the same concerns that led to the founding of CNPS in 1967 and, thus, one has to seriously question whether the *discipline* has evolved at all in the last 60 years even if the *profession* is now more demographically diverse. Indeed, the task force concluded that a key reason for these continuing intellectual lacunae is that

> political science tends not to be self-reflective about the analytical limitations of many of its traditional methodological approaches. The tendency to accept its approaches as "objective" science, for example, tend to inhibit the development of a more critical debate about the potential phenomenological bases of much empirical social science. (APSA 2011d, 1)

One might consider such an honest report to be progress in the discipline, but it should also remind us that one of the distinguishing characteristics of a critical political science is not the methods it employs, but its commitment to foregrounding what official political science does not study. Official political science does not study the working class, nor does it really study women, African Americans, Chicanos/Latinos, or ecologists. When official political science did respond to critiques advanced by critical political scientists, it did so by integrating these categories of analysis into the behavioral-pluralist paradigm to study them merely as interest groups or voting blocs, but it never examines the underlying genesis of group identity, nor does it ask why these groups come into being as political actors or why they were systematically marginalized by an ostensibly liberal and democratic political system.

Official political science does not study "labor" or "the working class," but it does occasionally look at the small number of workers organized into trade unions by considering them as just another interest group competing on an equal footing with corporations. Official political science will still not entertain the question whether the class structure of capitalism is based on the exploitation of labor and the extraction of surplus value, which is evidently a question for economists to sort out. As a result, official political science will not even broach the question of "class struggle," except as something to be contained and stabilized by political institutions, because

it otherwise disturbs the functional equilibrium of the political system. Official political science still barely studies the problem of how institutions and public policies contribute to the problems of poverty and economic inequality, because such concerns are the province of sociology and economics. Official political science does not study ecology, but when it finally does turn its attention to environmental issues, it does so again through the lens of interest group politics, but with little notice of the fact that environmental politics and the ecology movement emerged as a response to the devastating and potentially catastrophic impact of capitalist economic development on the planet and the human ecosphere.

Moreover, despite the political science profession's earnest efforts over the last two decades to improve its public image by demonstrating its erstwhile relevance to politics, those efforts have merely advertised its longstanding acquiescence to corporate capitalism and the capitalist state (e.g., Lupia and Aldrich 2014, 2015). Indeed, in contemplating the question of political science in the twenty-first century, the APSA (2011d, 13, 4) Task Force on Political Science in the 21st Century acknowledged that political scientists still treat race, ethnicity, and gender "as marginal aspects of the political system," while textbooks are not "representative of issues related to ethnic, racial, gender, class, and other dimensions of diversity and inclusion" (see also Sclofsky and Funk 2018; Funk and Sclofsky 2021). The APSA (2011d, 1) report observes that this finding is not surprising because the political science profession, as represented in most university departments, "does not currently include scholars with backgrounds from the full range of positionalities including race, class, gender, and sexual orientation that are often the most marginalized in societies." The APSA (2022) Presidential Task Force on Systemic Inequalities in the Discipline concluded more recently that not much has changed, and despite its title, this report only addresses marginalized demographic groups within *the profession* but has nothing to say about systemic inequalities within the political science *discipline*.

However, the question of relevance highlights an ideological blind spot in the positivist orientation of official political science. This blind spot is highlighted in the 2021 mission statement of what is now the Caucus for a Critical Political Science. The CCPS mission statement was approved at the September 23, 2021, annual business meeting, and it now defines the organization as "an association of critical scholars committed to making the study of political science relevant to building a more democratic and egalitarian economic, social, and political order" (CNPS and APSA OS 2021, 3). This mission statement highlights that the real question for criti-

cal political scientists is not whether political science is relevant, but relevant to what and to whom?

Critical political scientists are engaged scholars, scholar-activists, and sometimes activist-scholars. They emphatically reject the scientistic myth of value neutrality in the social sciences insofar as one should not confuse scientific objectivity with political neutrality. A scholar may conduct rigorous and objective scientific studies of a topic, but this does not mean that the results or the original research questions are politically neutral. Critical political scientists refuse to ignore the fact that all social scientific knowledge is anchored in ideological assumptions and concepts that can be subjected to scrutiny and critique by self-reflective scholarship (Mannheim 1936; Habermas 1971). Thus, critical scholars cannot be indifferent to the social and political impact of their science, nor can one pretend that even if a scholar pursues knowledge for its own sake, this does not mean that one's research findings do not have potential consequences beyond the journal that publishes them.

However, as exemplified by David Easton's early work on the birth of the behavioralist revolution, positivists have always drawn a sharp distinction between so-called "pure science" and "applied science." Easton (1965, chap. 1) claimed that applied (policy) science depends on and builds on pure scientific research, so he was clear in his own work that political scientists should not adopt "the policy orientation" being proposed by Harold D. Lasswell at the same time. Easton is clear in his claim that scientific explanations of political behavior must logically precede the solution of urgent practical problems in society. The gist of Easton's argument was that political scientists had not yet built up a sufficient storehouse of verified scientific propositions (general theory) to justify their intrusion into the policy domain. Thus, Easton was prepared to let policymakers muddle through on their own in the midst of multiple political, social, and economic crises, but for how long? (Lindblom 1959).

This question was answered more than 60 years later with the release of the APSA's Task Force report *American Democracy in an Age of Rising Inequality* (2004), which had been commissioned while Theda Skocpol was president of the APSA. The report drew stinging rebukes from Frances Fox Piven and Brian Waddell, who are both members of CNPS. The rejoinders were not intended as quibbles about the details of a single report but instead were a continuation of a Caucus critique of the discipline. Frances Fox Piven (2006, 45) called the report a good "first step," but she also criticized it for being "timid" in its conclusions and policy recommendations. Brian Waddell (2012, 47) observed that the report "lacked

any serious consideration of why inequality has accelerated in recent decades" and seemed "to consciously evade the question of corporate power, and the ways that business and government interact as two interrelated systems of power." As Waddell notes, theoretical explanations, as opposed to mere empirical description, would necessarily involve a critical examination of the public policies adopted since the beginning of the Reagan Revolution, which facilitated the growth of economic and class inequality in the United States.

The irate response by Jacob S. Hacker (2006, 47), a member of the task force, was that "if members of the Task Force were 'timid' . . . we were only in the appropriate sense that we were restrained by the limited state of current knowledge." Hacker (2006, 48) made the methodological claim that "the ongoing refinement, and sometimes replacement, of theories and concepts rooted in sustained lines of empirical inquiry ultimately drives the social sciences forward." Consequently, Hacker (2006, 49) pointed to the alleged "need for new research and new theories and, yes, new debates." Twelve years later, a new APSA (2016, i) Task Force on Racial and Class Inequalities in the Americas could still claim accurately that "to some extent, political science has lagged behind cognate fields of history, economics and sociology in terms of scholarly attentiveness to inequality."

Thus, in another context, I have often asked, exactly when do we theoretically know enough as political scientists to become policy advocates and engaged scholars? (Barrow 2018). The philosophy of science that undergirds official political science provides a ready-made excuse for never doing so, because conclusions and recommendations must always be postponed while political scientists test yet more hypotheses of limited or trivial importance or wait on the results of the next field experiment (assuming that the results have not been fabricated) (Gass 2015). The commitment to a specific definition of science has merely been a pretext to avoid politics—an excuse for political scientists to neglect salient issues that raise unsettling questions about the structure of capitalist society, as well as the nondemocratic and even antidemocratic aspects of liberalism, but even worse is that the structure of official political science often obstructs any meaningful discussion of solutions to these problems by reproducing what Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro (1994) call the flight from reality in political science.

Finally, it is important to make one last observation about the current "political science is relevant" movement within the political science profession. I would be remiss if I did not point out that, contrary to many misconceptions, critical political scientists have not primarily criticized

official political science for being irrelevant. Rather, critical political scientists have criticized the profession for feigning scientific disinterest and political neutrality while covertly applying its talents to ignore pressing social issues, help suppress marginalized social groups, sustain the exploitation of working classes around the world, and legitimate the undemocratic exercise of power by corporate and state elites at home and abroad. Political science has never been irrelevant, but it has been dangerous to ordinary people all over the world.

It is exactly for this reason that official political science does not seriously study itself as a profession or as an intellectual discipline, nor does it use the tools of political science to study the university as a political actor or as an extension of the state.[22] Official disciplinary histories have instead corralled the study of the discipline within the confines of traditional political theory, a marginalized subfield, while dismissing the idea that the university or the political science profession should be studied as political institutions. Thus, the court historians of political science continue to present the development of the discipline as a disembodied dialogue across the ages, where ideas compete with each other detached from their historical, sociological, and political context, and where the "best" ideas necessarily win. These official histories merely reproduce and legitimate the official discipline's conception of itself as an intellectual meritocracy, when it is in fact a political organization, and an organization welded to the power and interests of a ruling class and the capitalist state.

9

The Future of Critical Political Science

I have suggested that the political and intellectual history of the Caucus for a New Political Science evolved through three phases of development: (1) a period of organizational revolt against the American Political Science Association and the political science profession, (2) a period of intellectual revolt against the political science discipline, and (3) a period of quiet institutionalization as an organized section of the APSA. Within these phases of development, there have been persistent debates about the nature of the organization; namely, is it a caucus within the APSA or a counter-association against the APSA? This conflict has largely been resolved by the adoption of a double identity. It is an organized section of the APSA, but it also has an independent legal existence as a nonprofit corporation that owns the journal *New Political Science*. There have also been persistent debates about what counts as new political science beyond the methodological critique of behavioralism, the empirical critique of pluralist ideology, and a political critique of the profession's subservience to corporate and state power. These critiques of the discipline and the profession of political science continue to serve as an umbrella that brings together a wide range of critical political scientists, including multiple strands of Marxism, radical feminisms, critical theory, post-Marxism, poststructuralism (especially Foucauldian), ecological theory, and queer theory, as well as a few postmodernists, disenchanted liberals, and critical pluralists (Barrow 2024a).

However, amid this welter of intellectual diversity, the CNPS is the one organized section of APSA that has consistently defined itself in ideological terms as an association of progressive and politically engaged scholars. It took more than a decade for CNPS to establish its identity as a "socialist" organization, although this label is sometimes a point of contention within

the organization even today. However, on September 23, 2021, the Caucus for a New Political Science voted to change its name to the Caucus for a Critical Political Science, and it now explicitly defines itself as "an association of critical scholars committed to making the study of political science relevant to building a more democratic and egalitarian economic, social, and political order" (Government of Washington, DC 2021). The Caucus reaffirmed this identity in 2023, when it was one of the few organized sections to boycott the APSA meeting in Los Angeles in a show of solidarity with striking hotel workers (Love 2023).

The 50th Anniversary Conference

The change of name and the new mission statement for what is now the Caucus for a Critical Political Science was the culmination of a move back toward counter-associationism that was initiated by Christine Kelly and me beginning in 2008. At the August 28, 2008, CNPS business meeting, I submitted a resolution to create a task force to investigate the possibility of sponsoring an independent CNPS conference to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the organization's founding in 1967. I emphasized that the proposed conference "would not affect what we do in the organized section at APSA" (Barrow 2008b).

A major purpose of the 50th anniversary conference was to once again promote the growth of the Caucus outside, but parallel to, the APSA and the regional political science associations, and to do so with a competing vision of political science. In arguing for the proposed conference, I reminded members that in the past CNPS had made numerous efforts to expand its role beyond the APSA by sponsoring local chapters and regional mini-conferences, a CNPS Forum, a York, Maine, conference (1975), and a "Socialist Perspectives" conference at Brown University (1975), while simultaneously attempting to institutionalize a CNPS presence at regional political science association meetings (e.g., the Northeastern, Western, Midwestern, and Southern Political Science Associations). These initiatives had met with limited and temporary success, but these efforts had been abandoned after the Caucus was reintegrated into APSA as an organized section in 1992. I argued that the Caucus had reached its limits within the APSA following the Perestroika revolt and it was time to once again look outside the APSA.

The identified goals of the conference were

- to promote a fundamental redefinition of the purposes, categories, and politics of political science,
- to expand political science into a genuinely interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary form of scholarship,
- to promote the development of political science as an international and global discipline beyond the categories and purposes of the American Political Science Association:
- to promote political science as engaged political action,
- to promote the growth of the Caucus for a New Political Science outside the Organized Section framework of the APSA,
- to increase the manuscript pipeline to *New Political Science*,
- to provide additional professional opportunities to progressive young scholars, while providing opportunities to senior scholars, who are more interested in substantive presentations and discussions as opposed to adding one more line to their curriculum vitas.

It was agreed that the conference would be designed to promote authentic intellectual exchange and to provide individuals with an opportunity for serious discussion and debate, as opposed to the cursory 10-minute presentations and limited discussion opportunities provided at APSA meetings. Thus, it was agreed that the bulk of the conference would consist of two-hour panels limited to no more than two or three papers with 25- to 30-minute presentations and one discussant (15-minute presentation), which would leave 30 minutes or more for audience participation and discussion.

After a great deal of discussion and deferral over the next few years, I again pushed the idea at the 2014 CNPS business meeting with the argument that it was time to either put up or shut up, because the 50th anniversary of CNPS was fast approaching and one needed a significant lead time to organize a new conference. The earlier proposal (CNPS 2007) was reaffirmed unanimously. I was appointed conference coordinator and, finally, after 10 years of delay, CNPS finally convened its first independent conference since 1975 at the Isla Grand Beach Resort in South Padre Island, Texas (Barrow 2017b). The conference featured panels on Marxism, globalization, and the state; the politics of anti-capitalism; radical politics; contemporary American progressive politics; Green politics and theory; the Latin American left turn; economic inequality; the politics of intersectionality;

Indigenous identities; resisting neoliberal higher education; and a plenary session on the future of new political science, among many other left-oriented topics (CNPS 2017a).

The original conference proposal had suggested that if the 50th anniversary conference was successful, it should become the first in an ongoing biennial conference. The 50th anniversary conference attracted participants from 22 states and four countries (CNPS 2017b), who evaluated the conference favorably, while indicating they wanted to make the conference a regular biennial event and continue it at the same location to establish a conference identity. In 2025, the new Conference for a Critical Political Science sponsored its fourth biennial conference at the same location.

From New Political Science to Critical Political Science

The influx of new members to CNPS during the Perestroika revolt turned out to be an embarrassing reminder that by the 2000s new political science was so un-new it was unknown to the next generation of critical political scientists. Consequently, at its 2010 annual business meeting, when I was CNPS chair, I proposed that the Caucus once again consider changing its name to something with more resonance among contemporary radical scholars. There was widespread agreement among those attending the meeting that "New Political Science" did not substantively describe the Caucus, and the business meeting voted unanimously to explore the idea of changing the Caucus and section names. Once again, however, there was significant disagreement among those attending the meeting as to what would be an appropriate new name. The ensuing discussion resulted in proposals for Radical Political Science, Progressive Political Science, and Critical Political Science, but it was agreed to continue the discussion on the NPS listserv. The editors of *New Political Science* were also instructed to contact Taylor & Francis to check the impact of such a change on the journal (CNPS and APSA OS 2010, 3).

As a follow-up to this meeting, I polled the CNPS Coordinating Council and Publications Executive Committee and found that 79% of the leadership supported a name change, as did a similar percentage of the general membership in a later email poll. When offered the option of changing the name to Critical, Radical, Left, or Progressive, the name Critical Political Science won 58% of the vote, followed by Left (19%), Progressive (19%), and Radical (4%). I subsequently contacted the APSA section director

about whether it would be possible to change the section's name, and I was informed that "based on information found in the Section Handbook . . . I don't see any reason why you could not change the name of your section" (Davis 2010).

However, the message from Taylor & Francis regarding a name change was "strongly against a change in title" of the journal (Delahunty 2010). The Taylor & Francis liaison to *New Political Science* wrote that he had "always assumed that the journal title 'New' meant progressive" (Delahunty 2010). Thus:

> Unless a journal is addressing a fundamental new area of research (or a field is changing, and the current title does not reflect this) we always advise against a change of title. The journal title is your brand, and this is valuable currency amongst your past authors, reviewers, and readers. Library subscriptions do typically drop off and also there is a risk that citations are not attributed to the new journal title. . . . Further, discoverability in abstracting and indexing databases and on the web for your readers is a major issue for title changes. (Delahunty 2010)

The Taylor & Francis liaison suggested that the Caucus could change its name without changing the name of its journal and the publisher offered assistance to facilitate this transition, such as rewriting the journal's aims and scope or changing the journal subtitle. The publisher could also "announce the caucus name change inside the journal and send a message to all the authors from the past two years." The publisher also offered to arrange for a new cover design to otherwise signal the organizational name change (Delahunty 2010).

Nancy S. Love (Appalachian State University) and Mark Mattern (Baldwin University), the coeditors of *New Political Science*, were not persuaded by the publisher's expressed concerns. In a communication to the NPS listserv, Love and Mattern (2010) wrote:

> While we trust and respect [the Taylor & Francis liaison], we believe that his response represents an institutional perspective that may be one-sided, focusing entirely on the potential costs while discounting or ignoring potential benefits. We note that the librarian's testimony that he pasted into his most recent email did not extensively address reasons against a name change; rather, the librarian concentrated on addressing ways to minimize the problems with tran-

> sition. This may suggest that a transition without considerable damage is feasible, if our publisher is willing to work with us on it, something [the liaison] has also indicated he will do. Mark discussed a name change with the head librarian on his campus, and was told that name change, from a library's perspective, is "inconsequential," at most a minor irritant.

Following the conclusion of a robust debate and discussion on the NPS listserv, I wrote to the officers informing them that there are three options on the table:

1. No change of name (and, therefore, no change to the journal name).
2. Change the section/caucus name and change the journal title to parallel the name change.
3. Change the section/caucus name, but leave the journal title the same, but perhaps fiddle with the inside cover to better describe its association with the caucus. Some have also suggested changing only the sub-title of the journal (Barrow 2010b).

I further observed that the 2010 business meeting, which initiated the latest name change discussion, had agreed on two main rationales for a name change. First, the "Caucus is not really 'new.'" The organization is now 43 years old and the New Left which bequeathed its name to the organization was a distant memory even for long-established members. Second, it was agreed that the word

> "new" does not substantively describe the Caucus and, consequently, prospective new members are not intuitively attracted by the name to find out more about the Caucus. For example, one can intuitively glean the purpose and focus of sections like Politics and History, Political Communications, Foundations of Political Theory, Literature and Politics, Environmental Politics just by the name alone. Does "New" have the same intuitive impact as Critical, Radical, Left, Progressive, etc.? It's partly about attracting members, but it's also about conveying an accurate description of what we are as a caucus and section. (Barrow 2011e)

If approved by the Coordinating Council, the plan was to propose a name change at the 2011 annual business meeting. However, the majority

of the current leadership was swayed by the Taylor & Francis letter and worries about journal subscriptions. By this time, the journal was the Caucus's main source of revenue, and, due to the journal, CNPS had finally achieved financial stability independent of APSA dues. Furthermore, the United States was on the cusp of the Great Recession (2008–10), and universities were experiencing the aftershocks of austerity budgets. University libraries were particularly vulnerable targets at the time, and many universities were forced to scale back their increasingly expensive journal collections. Given the perceived risk to the journal, the majority of the Coordinating Council decided not to propose a name change at the next annual business meeting.

While concern for *New Political Science* had been a determining factor in the decision not to not pursue a name change at the 2011 annual business meeting, ongoing conversations among Caucus officers began to shift opinion away from that position over the next decade. One persuasive case study was *The Insurgent Sociologist*, which had grown out of the Sociology Liberation Movement at the 1969 annual meeting of the American Sociological Association. The journal began by publishing work mainly within the broadest boundaries of the Marxist tradition, but it gradually began to publish articles informed by postmodern, feminist, cultural studies, and other perspectives that critically evaluated the workings of the capitalist system and its impact on the world. Consequently, in 1988, the journal changed its name to *Critical Sociology* to align with its sponsor, the Association for Critical Sociology (Fasenfest 2014, 2024). Moreover, *Critical Sociology* (2024) is now one of a select few alternative left journals that has achieved widespread recognition and respect within the world of social science scholarship. Thus, there was precedent for a successful name change of the type contemplated by CNPS.

Second, it became clear following the Great Recession that the publication of scholarly journals was increasingly monopolized by a small number of commercial publishers operating in a global market, which now packaged journals into bundles that are sold to libraries at a price based on volume.[1] Thus, it is less and less the case that libraries purchase individual journal subscriptions and therefore it was deemed highly unlikely that an individual journal would be dropped because it was included as a part of a larger bundle purchased by the library. As this information filtered through the Caucus, and as membership once again began to decline, informal discussions resurfaced among Caucus leaders about the possibility of revisiting a name change.

In this new context, the name change question finally arose in 2020–21

when it was discovered as the result of an Internal Revenue Service inquiry that CNPS had never incorporated as a nonprofit 501(3)(c) corporation despite a long-standing oral tradition to this effect. The CNPS had applied to the IRS in 1979, when the journal was founded, and it had received tax-exempt status at the time (CNPS and APSA OS 2020).[2] However, CNPS had never taken the second step of incorporating as a nonprofit. CNPS inhabited the odd legal space of an unincorporated tax-exempt organization, and legal counsel recommended that CNPS move to dissolve itself and incorporate as a new tax-exempt nonprofit corporation (CNPS and APSA OS 2020).

During the Coordinating Council's deliberations on the incorporation process, Judith Grant (Ohio University), a coeditor of *New Political Science*, and I suggested that the incorporation process would be an ideal opportunity to revisit the question of a name change and to reconsider the Caucus's ambiguous mission statement. As the name and mission statement would be memorialized in the new articles of incorporation, it might be the last opportunity for the Caucus to make such changes. Based on written proposals that I submitted to the Coordinating Council, it voted on June 14, 2021, to conduct a membership poll proposing that the Caucus change its name to Critical Political Science or Radical Political Science (Barrow 2021b). The Coordinating Council appointed a subcommittee chaired by me that included Judith Grant and Bradley J. Macdonald (Colorado State University), the CNPS Book Series editor, to craft a new proposed mission statement. While the membership poll was being prepared and distributed, the subcommittee concluded its deliberations and recommended the following mission statement: "an association of [critical or radical] scholars committed to making the study of political science relevant to building a more democratic and egalitarian economic, social, and political order" (Surak 2021).

A special meeting of the CNPS Coordinating Council was convened on August 2, 2021, by the chair, Nancy S. Love, where the Council agreed on a proposed course of action. The first step at the annual business meeting would be a vote to dissolve the Caucus for a New Political Science followed by a second vote to form a new nonprofit corporation to be called the Caucus for a Critical Political Science or the Caucus for a Radical Political Science depending on the outcome of the membership poll.[3] It was reaffirmed that under the Caucus's current constitution and bylaws both actions would need to be approved by a majority of the membership attending the Caucus's annual business meeting scheduled for September 23, 2021 (CNPS and APSA OS 2021a). The proposed mission statement was endorsed unani-

mously by the Coordinating Council and, in consultation with legal counsel, it was agreed that the new organization could be incorporated and operating by January 1, 2022, if approved at the annual business meeting. It was acknowledged that the option of remaining the Caucus for a New Political Science would be an implicit outcome if members voted to reject the proposed name change. Finally, while there was some support for changing the name of the Caucus's journal to *Critical Political Science*, it was decided to leave this question open for the present time as previous debates a decade earlier had concluded that it was possible to change the name of the Caucus without changing the name of the journal.

On September 21, 2021, the Coordinating Council took a formal vote to approve the previously discussed resolutions and to submit them to membership at the annual business meeting.[4] The results of the membership poll were overwhelmingly (75%) in favor of renaming the organization the Caucus for a Critical Political Science, so the Council voted unanimously to propose to membership that the new nonprofit organization be called the Caucus for a Critical Political Science (CNPS 2021).

At its annual business meeting on September 23, 2021, the Coordinating Council proposed two resolutions: (1) "to dissolve CNPS and create a new Non-Profit Organization" and (2) to change "the name of the Caucus for a New Political Science to the Caucus for a Critical Political Science." Both resolutions passed by a vote of the business meeting. Barrow introduced a motion from the floor to adopt a new mission statement for the Caucus describing it as "an association of critical scholars committed to making the study of political science relevant to building a more democratic and egalitarian economic, social, and political order." This motion passed by a vote of the business meeting (CNPS and APSA OS 2021b). Finally in October 2021 an official request was sent to the APSA Organized Section Committee to change the name of the section to Critical Political Science (Barrow 2021c). The request was quickly approved by the APSA along with a parallel mission statement declaring Critical Political Science "a section of critical scholars committed to making the study of political science relevant to building a more democratic and egalitarian economic, social, and political order." The APSA's approval of the section name change and mission statement was another small victory, as it is highly unlikely that the APSA would have approved such a mission statement in 1991 as being too political or ideological.

The New Political Science Section of the APSA became the Critical Political Science Section of the APSA in November 2021. The Caucus for a Critical Political Science came into existence on November 12, 2021. The

new name for both entities and the incorporation of the Caucus as a tax-exempt nonprofit organization solidified the organization's double identity as one that exists simultaneously within the APSA and outside the APSA. Thus, the Critical Political Science Section intends to continue participating in the affairs of the APSA to ensure that critical and radical perspectives are articulated within the official political science profession. Critical Political Science will most assuredly continue sponsoring panels at the annual meetings of the APSA. It will continue its long-standing role in providing professional support to graduate students and junior scholars who articulate critical and radical perspectives in their scholarship and teaching activities. It will continue to emphasize and support the ethos of scholar-activism and engaged scholarship in contrast to the alleged value neutrality of the official discipline.

At the same time, the Caucus for a Critical Political Science has maintained ownership of the journal *New Political Science*, and it is now one of only two section journals that are owned and managed outside the institutional structure of APSA. This separate identity ensures that the journal remains an independent voice for critical scholarship in the political science discipline. Moreover, *New Political Science* has grown from a small self-published journal with a few hundred subscriptions into a global presence with 3,280 higher education institutions worldwide providing access to the journal. *New Political Science* records approximately 130,000 article downloads each year, and 68% of these full-text downloads are by scholars working outside of North America (Taylor and Francis 2024).[5] The journal now routinely ranks in the second quartile of Scimago Journal Rankings.

It is also likely that the Caucus will continue to sponsor a biennial conference to provide a professional outlet for critical scholarship that cannot be accommodated at annual meetings of the APSA due to limits on the number of panels assigned to the CPS section. Moreover, the biennial conference provides an outlet for nonsectarian left scholarship that is not often well received at more orthodox left conferences or at mainstream political science association conferences. The Caucus's legal standing as a separate nonprofit organization also means it is free to take public positions on matters of urgent and controversial public policy without the preemptive restrictions of the APSA. Importantly, the name change and the new mission statement signal that after 58 years the Caucus for a Critical Political Science has decided to identify itself as a left scholarly association that is methodologically and ideologically inclusive, while articulating a clear political commitment to building a more democratic and egalitarian

economic, social, and political order. Whether one calls this social order communism, socialism, economic democracy, or some other name is a debate for the future.

Conclusion

During its period of quiet institutionalization, the CNPS was no longer challenging the APSA Establishment despite some early aborted efforts to organize a Rainbow Slate, and despite continued support for electoral activity among a vocal minority of CNPS members. Instead, CNPS leaders focused on strengthening *New Political Science* as a bona fide and reputable journal that could institutionalize the idea of a new political science within the discipline. Similarly, after being approved as an organized section of APSA, CNPS leadership focused on stabilizing and growing the organization's membership and on building its organizational capacities with a renewed increase in APSA/CNPS conference panels, a regular newsletter, a membership directory, a website, and a listserv.

After a decade of quiet institutionalization, however, the Caucus found itself in the midst of a new disciplinary rebellion known as the Perestroika revolt. It again entered the treacherous terrain of APSA electoral politics, and while the results were no different than in the 1970s, it nevertheless established that the organization's message still resonated with a significant percentage of political scientists. CNPS membership has rarely exceeded 5% to 7% of APSA membership, but its electoral support has regularly captured between 31% and 49% of the profession's active members, and this is no small accomplishment for a dissident organization. Dwight Waldo (1975, 113) offered one of the earliest, and most balanced, appraisals of the CNPS, when he observed that "the Caucus (predominantly but by no means exclusively younger political scientists) acted vigorously, sometimes stridently, in an attempt to nullify or reverse dominant patterns in political science." Waldo suggests that although it won "no major victories, in terms of election of officers or control of Association affairs," he argues that these defeats were "not necessarily a measure of effect, especially long-term, or of the validity (or invalidity) of the ideas advanced" by CNPS. For Waldo (1975, 113–14), the Caucus's most enduring impact on the political science discipline was that the "the term 'postbehavioral' came into use to designate the mood and programmatic intent of the new dissenters." The post-behavioral revolution in political science resulted in the establishment of two new scholarly journals, *Politics &*

Society and *New Political Science*, which were both direct offshoots of the CNPS. These alternative journals were only the beginning of a wider movement as other caucuses, committees, and, later, organized sections began to publish alternative political science journals focused on socialism, race and ethnicity, feminism, ecology, human rights, the Third World, and qualitative methods.

By 1975, Waldo observed, the Caucus had unsettled things sufficiently to inject a great deal of uncertainty into the future of political science. Even as the Caucus's electoral fortunes began to wane, Waldo (1975, 115) speculated,

> The long-range significance of the "postbehavioral" forces is another matter, complicated and problematical, hidden from view. Perhaps from the vantage point of 1980s the rise of the Caucus and the proclamation of a "postbehavioral sensibility" will appear but a temporary aberration, another detour in a march toward a more scientific politics. Perhaps a new balance of forces will emerge, a rearrangement of professional ends and means, motives and techniques, in which science is cultivated less for its own sake and used more in a conscious attempt to realize preferred values.

Thus, Waldo left open "the question of the long-range influence of some of the opinions and tendencies represented by the 'antiestablishment,'" because he believed "these could, in the long-run, gain more acceptance and—conceivably—become decisive in 'official' political science" (78). No disciplinary historian disputes the fact that most political scientists have continued the drift toward a post-behavioral political science, and, even as early as 1975, Waldo could already observe that the APSA annual meeting program had expanded to include "much variety" as a result of the courtesy listing accorded to an ever-growing list of unaffiliated groups, who represented a "wide variety of 'committees,' 'caucuses,' 'organizations,' and 'associations'" (1975, 79). It would be a gross exaggeration to say that contemporary political science is what it is today because of the CNPS, but it is not off the mark to claim that the APSA and the discipline would not be what they are today without the CNPS.

The Caucus alone did not usher in the post-behavioral revolution in political science, but the CNPS initially played a leading role among dissidents within the APSA, and it was the tip of the post-behavioral spear for two decades (1967–87). In 1969, CNPS became the first official section to be awarded its own panels at the APSA annual meeting, which were

listed in the official program. This opened the door to similar claims from other caucuses, which quickly emerged in the wake of CNPS, including the Women's Caucus for Political Science and the Black Caucus, which both nominated or endorsed candidates for APSA office for a brief period of time. In due course, these caucuses were followed by the Chicano/Latino Caucus and the LGBTQ Caucus.[6]

The CNPS established a model for other groups to organize within or alongside the APSA, and it set the stage for the APSA's recognition of organized sections in 1982. In cooperation with these other groups, the CNPS successfully pushed to open up the APSA convention to alternative topics and methodological perspectives. The Caucus also wrung from APSA leaders more transparent and democratic procedures for conducting annual business meetings, constitutional and governance reform, and open meetings of the APSA Council. The CNPS promoted greater concern in the APSA for the problem of academic freedom in American universities. The CNPS promoted the special concerns of women, African Americans, and Latino/as in the profession, and it supported the creation of official study committees that eventually secured better representation of these groups' interests in the APSA.

The CNPS most assuredly succeeded in supporting changes in the *profession* of political science that have resulted in greater diversity in the latest generation of APSA officers and in the composition and orientation of panels at APSA meetings. The Perestroika revolt, which was supported by CNPS, catapulted nonbehavioral political scientists into the APSA presidency, such as Theda Skocpol (2002–3), Ira Katznelson (2005–6), Carole Pateman (2010–11), and Rogers Smith (2018–19), who at least represent a soft center-left in political science. This new leadership has injected greater concern for the problems of class, racial, and gender inequality in the politics of liberal democracies even if it does little to address those concerns. None of these things would have happened without the organizational revolt of 1967–79 or the Perestroika revolt of 2000 to 2007. Thus, the political science *profession* has changed a great deal over the last 50 years, but it often seems that the official political science *discipline* has not changed much during that time. Yet the political science discipline continues to develop outside and beyond the official discipline as defined by the *APSR* and the regional association journals. In many ways, the political science discipline at least partially freed itself from the political science profession.

For example, one of the long-term impacts of CNPS on the profession and the discipline of political science was to initiate the trend toward orga-

nized sections, which now represent a plurality of methodological approaches and areas of study that were previously excluded from the discipline or marginalized by it. The proliferation of these organized sections emerged from a growing interest among political scientists in interdisciplinary, issue-oriented, and methodological research that falls outside the official discipline and cannot find an adequate outlet in the official panels of the APSA or the official disciplinary journals. There are now 52 organized sections in the APSA, and it was the Caucus that created the conditions that made it both necessary and possible for the APSA to incorporate these diverse groups into the professional organization of political science. Whether in groups devoted to political theory, political economy, political history, class and inequality, biopolitics, qualitative methods, sexuality and politics, ecology, literature, or political science education, the proliferation of organized sections has enriched the political science discipline by facilitating the incorporation of new and interdisciplinary approaches, methods, and knowledge into the discipline, along with previously marginalized areas of study. The APSA's 52 sections now have a cumulative and overlapping membership that far exceeds the total individual membership of the APSA (2025).[7] The organized sections publish 24 official journals, although CPS remains one of only two sections that independently owns its journal through its dual existence as CCPS. These journals cover topics, and incorporate methodological approaches, that would otherwise not be covered in the *American Political Science Review* or the regional association journals.

During the 1970s and 1980s, there was also a proliferation of unaffiliated groups, which followed the CNPS's lead by claiming the right to sponsor panels at annual meetings outside the APSA's official program. The APSA now recognizes 38 of these groups, although they are now called "related groups" (APSA 2024a). The related groups consist of "several different types of groups, including subject matter groups, caucuses, identity groups, think tanks, nonprofits, and other academic associations" (APSA 2020, 19). Each related group hosts one or more panels at the APSA annual meeting for the purpose of adding diversity to the conference and to represent a broad spectrum of civic and political issues. These groups span the spectrum of methodological and ideological commitment, to include labor politics, critical policy studies, environmental politics, interpretive methodologies and methods, Indigenous studies, the Latino Caucus, and the LGBTQ Caucus (APSA 2024a).

While this pluralism is far from the socialist-feminist political science envisioned by Caucus leaders in 1978, the pluralization of the discipline

has opened space for these types of political sciences that did not exist in 1967. Indeed, the APSA has been almost helpless to stop the proliferation of new political sciences in the explosion of organized sections, related groups, and alternative professional associations, which has also resulted in the publication of alternative journals, the convening of alternative scholarly conferences, and the emergence of alternative professional associations, including the Union of Radical Political Economics, Socialist Scholars Conference and Left Forum, Rethinking Marxism Conference, Historical Materialism Conference, and CCPS Biennial Conference, among many others, which collectively generate as much attendance as the annual APSA convention, or more. To this extent, the CNPS has been comparatively successful in achieving its realistic objectives. The CNPS sustained the critique of pluralism, advanced alternative post-behavioral social science methodologies, launched two alternative journals and three book series, and made the practice of a radical and critical political science—in many forms—at least tolerated within a discipline inhabited by people that Alan Wolfe once described as intellectually immovable and just plain strange.[8]

There are critics who argue that the organized sections and related groups, including CPS, have been co-opted and ghettoized through this process, but one can also make a compelling argument that political science—defined as a discipline anchored in a positivist philosophy of science—has been systematically deconstructed underneath its own professional umbrella. The intellectual relationships—the official paradigm of political science—continues to be reproduced by the Association's flagship journal, but the *APSR* does not any longer define the discipline of political science for most political scientists. In fact, the APSA's mission statement now reads like the mission statement of any other membership services organization, such as the American Association of Retired People or the American Automobile Association. While the APSA (2024b) still claims to be "the leading professional organization for the study of political science," its mission statement now has an alternative emphasis:

> With a range of programs and services for individuals, departments, and institutions, APSA brings together political scientists from all fields of inquiry, regions, and occupational endeavors within and outside academe to deepen our understanding of politics, democracy, and citizenship throughout the world. The Association promotes a lively, diverse community of scholars, teachers, students, and practitioners who bring wide-ranging interests,

> methodologies, and perspectives to the analysis and conduct of government and politics.

The CPS has been partially reintegrated back into the APSA as a comparatively small organized section that has seen its conference panel allocation steadily diminished as a proportion of the total annual meeting. It no longer has any representation on the APSA Council and no representation on the *APSR* editorial board. The APSA still does not have competitive elections for officers, and it still maintains a coerced monopoly that requires APSA members to subsidize the *APSR* with their dues, while other disciplines give members the right to opt out of the official flagship journal or to receive other journals sponsored by the organized sections. The APSA requires its members to pay what many consider inordinately high membership dues while it regularly runs budget surpluses, which it uses to fund pet projects and awards that primarily advance the interests of the APSA Establishment, its graduate students, and young scholars being groomed to become members of that Establishment. In this respect, there is much that has not changed in the profession in nearly 60 years, and there is still a political program of organizational revolt to be pursued.

At the same time, there are frequent questions by professional elites as to whether political science is even a discipline in any meaningful sense of the word.[9] Indeed, by 1975, only six years after David Easton had declared the coming of the post-behavioral revolution, Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (1975, v) commented on the hazards of editing the first comprehensive *Handbook of Political Science* (eight volumes) by noting their most significant challenge was giving order to an "ill-defined, amorphous, and heterogenous" field of study. A decade later, David Easton (1985, 143) echoed this sentiment with this observation:

> There are now so many approaches to political research that political science seems to have lost its purpose. . . . There is no longer a single, dominant point of view or one that unmistakably catches the imagination. . . . The discipline is fragmented in its methodological conceptions even though it is probably fair to say that scientific inquiry still represents the mainstream.

John S. Dryzek (1988, 439) observed in 1988 that "the fragile consensus of behavioralism has been succeeded only by every-increasing fragmentation. Political science today is held together by little more than the staples

in its convention program." Easton (1997, 17) reiterated this concern as he again lamented that political science was "shattered into a multitude of methodological and substantive pieces," and this had resulted in "a deep sense of loss of purpose and direction." Lee Sigelman (2006, 464), a former editor of the *APSR*, reviewed the burgeoning literature on the history of political science to find "a broad and recurring theme of disciplinary fragmentation." Sigelman (2005, 323–24) concludes that "political science is hardly a 'discipline' at all in the sense of being a distinct branch of learning. . . . These days it is harder than ever to find a center of intellectual gravity in our discipline." The intellectual configuration described by Easton and Sigelman would not qualify as a "discipline" based on the criteria established by Somit and Tanenhaus in 1964, and, thus, Dvora Yanow (2003, 398) concludes that "political scientists apparently come together at APSA meetings, but only in spatial terms." Sanford Schram (2003, 2006, 2016a) advances this conclusion even further by suggesting that contemporary political science is not only post-behavioral, but post-paradigmatic.

Thus, not surprisingly, John G. Gunnell (2006b, 21) observes that "since the early 1970s, political science has in many respects relinquished any attempt to conceive of itself as a unified discipline and profession." Yet Easton's description of the state of political science poses a dilemma insofar as he claims that the discipline is fragmented but simultaneously claims that a scientific approach to political science still represents the mainstream of the discipline. Easton (1985, 148) argues that "we cannot speak of a single, dominant tendency" in political science, but it remains a fact "that most leading members of the discipline continue to accept the appropriateness for social inquiry of the scientific methodology found to be so successful in the natural sciences." Yet how can a discipline be so fragmented that it is no longer a discipline and still have a mainstream or official disciplinary orientation defined by most of its "leading members"? Gunnell (2006b, 21) states this paradox in a different way: How can one criticize orthodox political science when "methodological pluralism has been the predominant value" in the discipline for the last 50 years, and "all factions seemed to be once again happy with the idea of identity in difference"?

Both statements can be true, because the fragmentation narrative of the political science discipline is flawed insofar as it does not account for how the profession continues to hierarchically order the discipline. If one has a positive orientation toward the fragmentation narrative, then it conveys the image of a discipline that has reluctantly arrived at a pluralist equilibrium, where theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches either compete on an equal footing or simply retreat into their

respective silos, without any one perspective being able to achieve dominance within the discipline. The fragmentation narrative merely replicates a discredited pluralist theory that was deployed ideologically in the 1950s and 1960s to ostensibly describe American politics. It is now deployed as an ideological description of the political science discipline.

If, on the other hand, one has a negative orientation toward the fragmentation narrative, then it portrays the political science discipline as a discipline in chaos and without a paradigm. From this perspective, political science has either failed to achieve scientific status or has regressed to a prescientific or nonscientific status as compared to its glory days as an aspiring behavioral science. I suggest that the political science discipline is neither as pluralistic nor as chaotic as claimed by most contemporary scholars. It is best described as an ordered polyarchy, where a hegemonic perspective still rules the profession through its superior command of prestigious faculty positions, grants, awards, professional office, and official journal editorships, while other perspectives are hierarchically arranged in subordination to this dominant perspective.[10]

Kenneth Shepsle (1990, 41) has proposed a compelling alternative metaphor that comes close to capturing this idea by comparing political science to a loosely linked chain of islands, keys, and a mainland. This image of political science effectively captures how the profession continues to organize the discipline even as earthquakes have fractured the mainland to create a large number of islands and keys that are floating away from it. The main point of Shepsle's analogy is that there is still a mainland, and that mainland is still constituted by its commitment to a positivist philosophy of science that is considered anachronistic even in the natural sciences. It is an intellectual orientation that still accepts the fact-value distinction and the idea that one can ascertain universal laws in both the empirical and normative aspects of political behavior. The narrative of fragmentation, while nominally accurate as an empirical description of political science, begins to unravel as soon as one reintroduces *inequality and hierarchy* into a description of the discipline.

Professional elites have managed to reassert relationships of hegemony amid apparent chaos. Once the hierarchical ordering of this fragmentation is grasped as a relationship of dominance and power, it exposes the futility of deploying the concept of a paradigm in political science as opposed to the concept of ideology. We are not talking about a standard model or dominant paradigm, in the same sense as a physicist or a biologist talks about a disciplinary paradigm, because we are talking about competing ideologies, including a *dominant ideology* that subordinates,

delegitimizes, and marginalizes competing ideologies that articulate the worldviews and political concerns of nonruling classes and groups in capitalist society.

I have suggested on several occasions throughout the book that "the profession" should be conceptualized as part of an ideological state apparatus (ISA). Nicos Poulantzas's work on the capitalist state offers a key insight into the process of maintaining and reasserting ideological hegemony amid the constant war of maneuver, and this insight is applicable to political science insofar as it is part of an ISA. Poulantzas (1973, 130–37) argues that a key role of the capitalist state is to organize the ruling class and to disorganize the working classes, and to keep them away from the centers of political and state power. The state generates an "isolation effect" among opponents of the existing order by fragmenting and deflecting the working classes away from the centers of political power. If we view the contemporary development of political science through this theoretical lens, then we draw a very different conclusion about the state of the political science discipline.

The political science discipline, despite its real intellectual diversity, is still organized as a hierarchical system of ideological power with a highly organized and hegemonic core standing against a fragmented opposition that is dispersed and disorganized across a wide array of factors—gender, race, ethnicity, method, subfield, subfield specialization, topic, and ideology. What disciplinary elites are really bemoaning in their laments about the fragmentation of the discipline is that so much opposition to the discipline's central core still remains despite their best efforts to co-opt it, marginalize it, or squash it. Those on the left who lament the discipline's fragmentation are really lamenting the fact that they have not managed to capture the profession's administrative apparatus, nor have they managed to organize a dispersed opposition into a coherent counter-discipline after nearly 60 years of a multifaceted disciplinary insurrection (Kettler 2006b).

Consequently, the *discipline's* diversity is still not reflected in the profession as defined by its flagship journals, officers, and councils, and this generates the appearance of an official discipline (the mainland) surrounded by a welter of much smaller and less important (i.e., "nonscientific") challenges to the official discipline. Thus, Judith Grant (2007, 87–88), along with most critical political scientists, continues to criticize the *APSR* for being "insufficiently reflective about the politics of the discipline itself." Grant (2011, 88) observes that the *APSR* continues to be the profession's strongest gatekeeper by defining "political science in a way that relegates many people who hold Ph.D.s in political science to the margins of

the discipline, if not excluding them altogether," with real consequences for individual careers and professional standing. Indeed, as Lee Sigelman (2006, 463) observes in his empirical review of the *APSR*'s published articles, it is increasingly difficult for the APSA Establishment to maintain the official myth that this disciplinary hierarchy in any way represents the meritorious accomplishments of its "best" practitioners.

Even as most political scientists were moving into a post-behavioral era by the end of the 1970s, official flagship journals have never reflected this transformation of the underlying discipline. The deconstruction of the underlying discipline is instead reflected in the proliferation of alternative journals, the distribution of panels at APSA and regional conventions, alternative book series, the emergence of new interdisciplinary (and radical) professional associations, and to a lesser degree course offerings at colleges. Consequently, Grant (2011) suggests that we just "forget the *APSR*" and continue to encircle the official discipline with more and more islands of critical research.

One effect of this strategy is that the APSA Establishment does not exert the magnitude of professional authority attributed to it by the CNPS's founders despite the fact that the profession and the discipline continue to be organized into hierarchically ranked orders (e.g., departmental rankings, impact factors). The persistent criticism of the profession's flagship journals signals a continuing distance between the profession and the discipline. In this respect, Judith Grant (2011, 89) points out that "the APSA and the *APSR* are wrongly positioned at the center of the discipline, and then used to police the borders of that discipline according to behavioral and quantitative precepts that are alleged to be value-neutral and apolitical." The profession continues to arrange the discipline hegemonically in a hierarchical order that still privileges a positivist orientation, but at least it has been encircled by alternative approaches to political science that persistently challenge it in a never-ending war of maneuver—the old Maoist strategy of organizing peasants to encircle the cities. The profession's power structure has been cracked even if it has not been broken, and it is increasingly circumscribed inside its own shrinking territory. What this means politically is that a sector of the ISA is slowly and unevenly being fractured over time.

It is easy to dismiss the organizational struggles of intellectuals as inconsequential, whether they are assaulting the commanding heights of the APSA, occupying a university building, attempting to influence free speech policies and hiring decisions at individual universities, or establishing a new radical journal or podcast. It was often argued by critics of

CNPS that these struggles are not "real" politics, but I suggest that the authors of such statements are the ones who do not understand contemporary politics or the state. Classes and other groups rarely confront the state as a singular unified subject, except perhaps in the unlikely case of a general strike, a mass strike, or an armed revolutionary conflict. This is because the state consists of a number of particular institutions that, together, constitute its reality and interact as parts of what may be called the state system (Miliband 1969, 49–53). Ralph Miliband includes universities, government funded research endowments, and government research bureaus in his concept of an ideological apparatus. Poulantzas (1979, 307) correctly argues:

> State power is generally formed by an alliance of the dominant classes or class fractions, the power bloc in a capitalist social formation. So despite the fact that one class or fraction normally has hegemony, the political power of the other classes or fractions "in power" involves dislocations among the State apparatuses.

Like Miliband, Louis Althusser followed Antonio Gramsci's (1971) lead by expanding the definition of the state to include universities as one of the core institutions involved in the promulgation and inculcation of a dominant ideology (Therborn 1980; Abercrombie et al. 1980). Thus, Poulantzas also reminds us that the state apparatus is actually a network of apparatuses, which each consists of a multiplicity of institutions, and that the apparatuses and their institutions are arranged in hierarchies that define different *state forms*. In modern capitalist societies the state is a vast and sprawling network of apparatuses and institutions loosely coordinated, if at all, through mechanisms that provide a tenuous cohesion to the state. Importantly, the diffuseness of the ISAs in capitalist societies means that the conquest and smashing of state power is never an all-or-nothing proposition, because it is—in the Gramscian phrase—a war of maneuver, waged on many fronts, in many trenches, with shifting lines of battle, where victories and successes occur side by side on the same day. The conquest of state power is never absolute; it is never uncontested; and it is never complete, because it is an ongoing and contingent *political* struggle. As Poulantzas (1979, 305) observes: "It would be wrong to think that the State apparatus in the narrow sense was some kind of indivisible monolith."

In this respect, it is naive to think of class struggle as a form of political conflict that pits a unified ontological subject (a class) against an equally

unified ontological opponent (the state). Classes and groups organize in many forms, along many fronts, and they seek to capture or oppose pieces of the state at specific levels, at specific times, and in specific places. The class struggle is a complex and diffuse network of mini-struggles. These struggles may coalesce from time to time into larger social movements, and sometimes into revolutions; however, it is important that all of these struggles persist as best they can at all times regardless of how small they may appear against the background of a sprawling Leviathan. Left intellectuals directly engage in class struggle against the dominant ideology and against its material support infrastructure at the level where we encounter it—the department, the university, scholarly journals, and professional associations. The magnitude or the place of the intellectuals' class struggles should not be taken as a basis for minimizing those struggles, which is merely another way of trying to delegitimize political activity by university intellectuals.

Poulantzas was convinced that the ISAs have the greatest level of relative autonomy from the capitalist class because they are only loosely connected to the central repressive state apparatus. Thus, according to Poulantzas (1979, 305) "the ideological State apparatuses display *a degree and form of relative autonomy* which the branches of the repressive State apparatus do not possess." Consequently, the ISA is the easiest for nondominant classes and fractions to penetrate for purposes of delegitimating the state and the ruling class, which is why in the transition to fascism—and we seem to be engaged in such a transition at the present moment—the ISA comes under increasing scrutiny by government and by branches of the repressive state apparatus. The ISAs

> are in fact the apparatuses best able to concentrate in themselves the power of non-hegemonic classes and fractions. They are therefore both the favoured "refuge" of such classes and fractions, and their favoured spoils. The classes and fractions in these apparatuses may not even be allies of the hegemonic class, but in bitter struggle against it. (Poulantzas 1979, 308)

The strategic lesson to be gleaned from Poulantzas's analysis of the state apparatus is that the battle for democracy is about far more than electoral mobilization, restoration of the Voting Rights Act, or the elimination of state-level voter suppression laws. It is about an internal realignment of the state apparatuses and their relationship to classes in capitalist society, and this means the struggle for control of the university, the strug-

gle for control of professional associations, even the struggle for control of publishing outlets are part of the broader class struggle for socialism. In its structural effect, the Caucus for a Critical Political Science, similar dissident organizations, and indeed all left intellectuals are dislocations within the core of the ISA. They are a concrete manifestation of class struggle within the ISA (Barrow 2024f).

The CCPS and its allies have been partially successful in achieving some of their most realistic objectives absent a mass left-wing political movement in the United States to support and reinforce those efforts. *New Political Science* never became a full-blown alternative to the *APSR*, although it did achieve some level of respectability in the discipline, contrary to Dryzek's assessment, and it did provide left-wing political scientists with a publication outlet that may have helped some scholars achieve tenure and promotion within their departments (Barrow and Boryzcka 2024). By itself, *New Political Science* did not even come close to dislodging the hegemony of the *APSR*—that glory ironically went to the *American Journal of Political Science*—but *New Political Science* is part of a larger critical movement in the social sciences that has successfully democratized academic publishing over the last 50 years and opened it to a much wider variety of radical and critical approaches. In this respect, critics such as Seidelman, Gunnell, and Dryzek are incorrect in their claim that CNPS failed to win any significant or lasting intellectual gains.

It is important to recognize that the Caucus for a Critical Political Science was (and is) only one part of a much larger counter-movement among university intellectuals that includes radical and critical sociology, radical economics, radical geography, radical philosophy, and radical history, as well as cultural radicals in the Modern Language Association. These movements have collectively generated new areas of scholarship, while supporting scholarly outlets for that scholarship, including *New Political Science*, *Critical Sociology*, *Review of Radical Political Economics, Radical Philosophy*, *Antipode*, the *Radical History Review*, *Rethinking Marxism, Historical Materialism*, as well as feminist-inspired journals, such as *Hypatia*, *Signs*, and the *International Feminist Journal of Politics*. These are just the "official" journals of a broad radical movement among American intellectuals, but these movements have spawned many other journals and magazines that provide outlets for radical scholarship on questions that are still ignored by the profession's official journals.

It should also not be forgotten that one of the APSA's own official journals, *PS: Politics & Political Science*, established in 1969, was a direct response to Caucus demands that the *APSR* become a vehicle for report-

ing professional news, such as the minutes of APSA business meetings, APSA Council meetings, APSA budgets, and nominations for competitive awards and fellowships. The Caucus also demanded that *PS* serve as a forum for debates about the discipline and the profession and that more space be devoted to questions of teaching and pedagogy. Rather than change the format and gatekeeping role of the *APSR*, the APSA Council agreed to establish and fund a new journal to serve these demands for the profession's democratization. Political pressure from the Caucus was key to winning a graduated dues structure for APSA members, and a reduced membership fee for graduate students.

While capturing the APSA would have been a signal dislocation within the ISA, it was never crucial to either the political or intellectual objectives of new political science, because the APSA does not organize many of the relationships criticized by the Caucus. The *political* relationships that were condemned by the early Caucus were organized directly through the CIA, the National Science Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, private foundations, a network of private and corporate consultant relationships, and many other linkages that have nothing to do with the APSA, and which the APSA can neither obstruct nor facilitate with any great capacity. These are relationships organized by corporations and the state.

Furthermore, the APSA does not monopolize the discipline's relationship to the state, and it does not control access to the wider public. Conservatives have understood this fact better than radicals and leftists. There is a widely recognized cadre of conservative public intellectuals who have taken their case directly to the media and to the public with popular publications, radio and television talk shows, and whose simply written books we assign as required readings even though most of the public intellectuals on the right are not university professors. Conservative intellectuals have rejected the university as a liberal enclave, and, consequently, they have established alternative modes of communication that connect directly with political elites and mass audiences. Left intellectuals are finally countering this front of the ideological struggle with new online magazines (e.g., *The Jacobin*), podcasts, and YouTube videos. As Alan Wolfe (1970b, 306–7) observed in *The Caucus Papers*: "Neither Marx nor Voltaire pursued his vocation within a university," nor did Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, or V. I. Lenin. On this point, Seidelman's critique of CNPS was on target, because it is a call for left intellectuals to again become public intellectuals.

Furthermore, one must acknowledge the truth of Alan Wolfe's claim that there are ideological limits to the rationality of the discipline. Its lead-

ing members are integrated into the US and global power structure as advisers and consultants, where power and interests, rather than the pursuit of truth and fairness, prevail over all else. Political Science is not just about science; it is about ideology and power, but the structure of power and ideology originates in locations not even touched by the APSA, which is merely one effect of those social and political relationships.

Appendix A

Election Platform (1969)

The Caucus for a New Political Science is nominating a slate of candidates to run for the APSA offices and Council seats that will be filled at this year's APSA convention elections. We are presenting a slate, and are conducting an electoral campaign, to express and make known our conviction that a *new* political science must now be developed. We have chosen this election as a means of presenting our views because we believe that:

1. The political science profession has invested its energies primarily in celebrating and supporting the economic, social, and political status quo, both here and abroad.
2. The American Political Science Association, more than any other single force, shapes the nature and direction of political science in America.
3. The resources of the APSA must be used to re-direct some of the energies and expertise of the discipline to encourage the development of a *new* political science—devoted to radical social criticism and fundamental social change.

To implement a movement toward a new political science, we propose a number of specific measures to be taken by the Association.

I. Research and Teaching
   A. Encouraging New Areas of Academic Work
      The ASPA should use its moral, political, financial, and status resources to legitimize, encourage, and support research and teaching in areas that would facilitate social criticism and societal change. Critical areas include:

1. peace studies
2. alternatives of radical action to achieve social justice
3. liberation and insurgent movements throughout the world (without interfering in their internal affairs or the affairs of their host countries)
4. the social and political uses of knowledge
5. radical alternatives to existing political institutions
6. radical alternatives to existing political theories
7. repression and power structures in America
8. powerlessness in America
9. the role of academic finance in determining the concerns of political science
10. studies in University politics—including:
    —university governance (who controls, and who *could* control)
    —the university as a political force
    —the university as a political issue

B. A Responsible Research Policy for the APSA
The APSA should give detailed reports to its membership on the research activity it sponsors and fosters, and should expect instruction from the membership in this area. For example, the APSA's delegates to the SSRC and the NSF should be elected by, and be responsible to, the membership of the Association.

C. Educational Organization
1. Academic Governance
Political scientists should be the first to insist on democratic control by students and faculty in shaping departmental and university policies. The APSA should encourage research and experimentation in this area.
2. Political Science Curricula
Curricula and programs in political science should reflect the concerns of a *new* political science. Curricula should be concerned not only with technical training, but also with the development of political commitment.
3. Rich and Poor Schools
The APSA should foster cooperation and mutual assistance among schools by promoting:
   a. exchange of faculty between rich and poor schools
   b. pooling library, grants, and other research facilities

c. the increased participation in professional affairs by faculty of poor schools (including financial support)

4. Excellence in Teaching
The ASPA should develop a reward system to encourage excellence in teaching at all levels.

II. Graduate Students
The APSA should encourage full participation by graduate students in the forming of *all* departmental and professional decisions. Graduate students must help shape the course of their own education. They should be assured of the freedom to develop new approaches to the study and understanding of politics.

III. Status of Non-Whites in the Profession
The APSA should be concerned with increasing the presently low level of participation the profession by non-whites. This should include the attention to immediate problems of participation, and to helping remove societal patterns of discrimination now reflected in the profession. The APSA should maintain a permanent commission on this subject, with substantial non-white membership.

IV. Status of Women in the Profession
The APSA should be concerned with the increasing presently low level of participation in the profession by women. This should include attention to immediate problems of participation, and to helping remove societal patterns of discrimination now reflected in the profession. The ASPA should maintain a permanent commission on this subject.

V. Departmental Ethics
The APSA should establish a code of ethics to govern the behavior of university political science departments. Faculty and students could bring un-ethical departmental behavior before and APSA Ethics Commission, and departments that have behaved improperly would be subject to censure. Behavior considered un-ethical might include politically motivated dismissal of faculty or students and departmental sponsorship of classified research.

VI. Internships and Awards
A. The APSA should sponsor and encourage study internships to *non*-establishment political organizations, such as: commu-

nity action groups, peace groups, radical groups, and student political organizations.

B. The APSA should grant awards to *non*-establishment individuals and groups for efforts that have encouraged societal change and social justice.

VII. APSR

A. APSA members should be allowed to elect membership *minus* the APSR subscription; thus forcing the APSR to compete with other journals for subscribers.

B. There should be periodic election, by the APSA membership, of the editor of APSR.

C. A significant portion of the APSR should be devoted to discussion of curricula, the teaching of political science, and non-establishment research areas.

D. Instead of using all of its subsidy resources on the APSR, the Association should use some of its resources to subsidize regional and other journals.

VIII. Political Activity of the APSA

The APSA leadership should make a full accounting to the membership of their lobbying activities in behalf of the profession. For example, did they oppose the attempt to take away financial aid to student activities? What research oriented lobbying was done by the APSA?

IX. APSA Governance

The APSA should be governed on democratic and participative principles. Neither a total reliance on mail ballots or business-meeting legislation satisfy these criteria. The APSA should adept a governing mechanism that employs mail referenda for major constitutional questions, and elections based on new and diverse patterns of representation such as regional units, fields of interest, and other groupings within the profession. (Caucus for a New Political Science 1969e)

Appendix B

Members of the Ad Hoc Committee, 1974

The AD HOC COMMITTEE
2934 EDGEVALE TERRACE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20007
THE SPONSORING COMMITTEE

Joel D. Aberbach, Michigan
Gabriel A. Almond, Stanford
Chas. W. Anderson, Wisconsin
David E. Apter, Yale
John A. Armstrong, Wisconsin
Walter F. Berns, U. of Toronto
Allan Bloom, U of Toronto
Lincoln P. Bloomfield, MIT
Richard A. Brody, Stanford
Franklin L. Burdette, Maryland
Jas. MacGregor Burns, Williams
George W. Carey, Georgetown
Gwendolen M. Carter No'western
Karl H. Cerny, Georgetown
Aage R. Clausen, Ohio State
Bernard C. Cohen, Wisconsin
Philip E. Converse, Michigan
Beverly Cook, Wisconsin
Cornelius P. Cotter, Wisconsin
William J. Crotty, No'western
Milton C. Cummings Jr., John Hopkins
Robert A. Dahl, Yale
Manning J. Dauer, Florida

Lane Davis, Iowa
Jack Dennis, Wisconsin
Karl W. Deutsch, Harvard
Martin Diamond, No. Illinois
Thomas R. Dye, Florida
Chester B. Earle, Am. Univ.
Valerie A. Earle, Georgetown
Samuel J. Eldersveld, Michigan
Leon D. Epstein, Wisconsin
Heinz Eulau, Stanford
David Fellman, Wisconsin
James W. Fesler, Yale
Donald M. Freeman, W. Florida
Alex. L. George, Stanford
John W. Grumm, Wesleyan
Fred Greenstein, Princeton
Chas. B. Hagan, U. of Houston
Henry C. Hart, Wisconsin
William C. Havard, Jr., VPI Pendleton Herring
Lawrence J. R. Herson, Ohio St.
Richard C. Hofstetter, Ohio St.
Matthew Holden Jr., Wisconsin
Jas. B. Horigan, S.J., Georgetown
Robert H. Horwitz, Kenyon
Ralph K. Huitt, Na. Ass. of Land Grant Col. & State Univs.
Samuel P. Huntington, Harvard
Charles S. Hyneman, Indiana
Harold K. Jacobson, Michigan
Kenneth Janda, No'western
Donald B. Johnson, Iowa
Cecelia M. Kenyon, Smith
John H. Kessel, Ohio St.
John W. Kingdon, Michigan
Robert E. Lane, Yale
Jospeh LaPalombara, Yale
Harold D. Lasswell
Ernest W. Lefever, Brookings
Charles M. Lichenstein, FCC
Juan J. Linz, Yale
Seymour Martin Lipset, Harvard

William S. Livingston, Texas
John F. Manley, Stanford
Harvey Mansfield, Sr., Columbia
Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Harvad
Dwaine Marvick, UCLA
Eliz. W. Marvick, Claremont
Donald R. Matthews, Michigan
Herbert McClosky, U. of Calif., Berkeley
Donald J. McCrone, Iowa
Wallace Mendelson, Texas
Josephine F. Milburn, R.I.
Eugene F. Miller, U. of Ga.
James N. Murray, Iowa
Betty A. Nesvold, San Diego State
Richard L. Park, Michigan
Samuel C. Patterson, Iowa
Robt. L. Peabody, Jns. Hopkins
J.W. Peltason, Illinois
Clara Penniman, Wisconsin
Howard R. Penniman, Georgetn.
Don C. Piper, Maryland
Ithiel de Sola Pool, MIT
Kenneth Prewitt, Chicago
C. Herman Pritchett, U. of Calif., Santa Barbara
Robert D. Putnam, Michigan
Lucian W. Pye, MIT
Douglas W. Rae, Yale
Randall B. Ripley, Ohio St.
Jose S. Sorzano, Georgetown
Donald S. Strong, Alabama
Stanley Rothman, Smith
Ellis Sandoz, E. Texas St.
Victoria Schuck, Mt. Holyoke
Richard Smolka, Am. Univ.
Donald G. Tacheron, Joint Committee on Congressional Operations
Joseph Tanenhaus, S.U.N.Y
Jan F. Triska, Stanford
David B. Truman, Mt. Holyoke
Vernon B. Van Dyke, Iowa

Clement E. Vose, Wesleyan
Robert E. Ward, Stanford
Sidney Wise, Franklin & Marshall
Raymond E. Wolfinger, U. of Calif., Berkeley
Betty H. Zisk, Boston U.

Dear Colleague:

We are sending this letter to every member of the American Political Science Association—graduate students and teachers, academics and non-academics, Blacks, Chicanos and Whites, women and men. The reason is fundamental: whatever our differences we are all professionals, and as such we all have the same high stakes in preserving and expanding the Association's professional character and services and in resisting any effort to commit APSA to a particular partisan ideology.

Appendix C

Program of the Conference on Socialist Perspectives on Social Change in the United States, 1975

The Caucus for a New Political Science has received a substantial grant from the Brown University Student Caucus for the purpose of organizing a conference on "Socialist Perspectives on Social Change in the United States." The conference will be held at Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, November 7 through 9. Those interested in obtaining further information may write or call John Rensenbrink, Chairperson, CNPS, or Morton Schoolman, conference organizer, at the Department of Government and Legal Studies, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine 04011. The following panel topics and panel participants have accepted invitations to make presentations:

Friday Evening, November 7, 8:15:
Keynote Speakers: Sheldon Wolin, Princeton University; John Rensenbrink, Bowdoin College.

Saturday Morning, November 8, 9:30:
"Socialist Perspectives on the United States as a World Capitalist Power."
James Petras, SUNY, Binghamton; Dankwart A. Rustow, CUNY; Ira Katznelson, University of Chicago; Alan Wolfe, Richmond College; Michael Parenti, Cornell University.

Saturday Morning, November 8, 9:30:
"Socialist Perspectives on the City and the Country: Economic Decentralization and Community Power."

David Harvey, Johns Hopkins University; Theodore Norton, New York University; Murray Bookchin, Ramapo College; Frances Fox Piven, Boston University; David Vail, Bowdoin College.

Saturday Afternoon, November 8, 2:00:
"Socialist Perspectives on the Concept of Class in Marxist Theory."
Paul Piccone, Washington University; Russell Jacoby, Boston, Massachusetts; Trent Schroyer, Ramapo College and the New School for Social Research; Stanley Aronowitz, Staten Island College; Marvin Surkin, Brooklyn College.

Saturday Afternoon, November 8, 2:00:
"Socialist Perspectives on the Assumptions, Methodologies, Orientation and Use of Radical and Socialist Research."
Mulford Q. Sibley, University of Minnesota; Murray Edelman, University of Wisconsin, Madison; Kurt Wolff, Brandeis University; Peter Bachrach, Temple University; Isaac Balbus, York College CUNY; Marx Wartofsky, Boston.

Sunday Morning, November 9, 9:30:
"Socialist Perspectives on Marxism and Feminism"
Jean Bethke Elshtain, University of Massachusetts, Amherst; Virginia Held, CUNY; Joan Landes, Hampshire College; Nancy Hartsock, Johns Hopkins University; Carole Gould, Swarthmore College.

Sunday Morning, November 9, 9:30:
"Socialist Perspectives on Power and Social Political Reorganizations."
John Rensenbrink, Bowdoin College; James Macgregor Burns, Williams College; Archie Singham, Howard University; Joesph LaPalombara, Yale University; Victor Willis, Indiana University and Purdue University at Indianapolis; Mark Roelofs, New York University.

Sunday Afternoon, November 9, 1:30:
"Socialist Perspectives on Human Needs and Human Wants."
William Leiss, University of Toronto; Christian Bay, University of Toronto; Paul Breines, Boston University; C. B. Macpherson, University of Toronto; Morton Schoolman, Bowdoin College.

Sunday Afternoon, November 9, 1:30:
"Socialist Perspectives on National Minorites and the Class Struggle." Philip White, Yale University; William Ellis, Howard University; A Baraka, Newark, New Jersey (not yet officially accepted); James Turner, Cornell University; Juan Mari-Bras, Secretary General, Central Committee, Puerto Rican Socialist Party (not yet officially accepted).

Saturday Evening, November 8, 8:15:
General Meeting for members and for all those interested in the Caucus for New Political Science.

Sunday Afternoon, November 9, 4:00:
Concluding Sessions.

Following panel presentations and question and answer periods, time permitting and energy, smaller groups for the purpose of discussion will be formed. (American Political Science Association 1975d)

Notes

PREFACE

1. Much of the narrative in this book relies on unpublished sources in the possession of the author. However, Sarah Surak and Andrew Scerri, the editors of *New Political Science: A Journal of Politics and Culture*, are currently establishing a digital CNPS/CCPS archive at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, where most of the cited material will be made available to other scholars.

CHAPTER 1

1. I use the term "disenchanted liberals" when referring to political scientists with a liberal-democratic political orientation, who opposed specific US public policies on *moral or ethical* grounds, e.g., the Vietnam War, US involvement in the overthrow of democratically elected foreign governments, discrimination against African Americans, and the violent repression of student activists, among others. I use the term "critical pluralists" when referring to political scientists who engaged pluralist theory but came to reject it as a misleading description of US politics on *empirical* grounds, e.g., documented class, racial, and sexual inequality.

2. I am aware of Haddow 1939, which is a description of teaching political science in colleges and universities at the time, but it is not a history of the discipline as we understand it today.

3. Kenny (2006, 547) rightly observes that while Crick's book "survives in the footnotes of many historical accounts of political science, its contents are now largely overlooked or forgotten," partly because it offered an argument "for methodological pluralism and political relevance."

4. On the relationship between liberalism and American political science prior to the behavioral revolution, see Adcock 2014b.

5. Lowi (1973, 44) reiterated this same point but was largely ignored by the discipline and its historians.

6. See Ashcraft 1975, 1989 for a critique of this approach to political theory based on its failure to incorporate political conflict and social development as a necessary context for understanding the history of political ideas.

7. Mannheim, (1936, 67–68n), observes that "the sociology of knowledge, unlike

the orthodox history of ideas, does not aim at tracing ideas back to all their remote historical prototypes. For, if one is bent on tracing similar *motifs* in thought to their ultimate origins, it is always possible to find 'precursors' for every idea. There is nothing which has been said, which has not been said before (*Nullum est iam dictum, quod non sit dictum prius*). The proper theme of our study is to observe how and in what form intellectual life at a given historical moment is related to the existing social and political forces."

8. The earliest exceptions to this general claim are Seybold (1980, 1987) and Roelofs (1992). Recent exceptions are Oren (2003); Ravecca (2019); Wilson and Kamola (2021); Hauptmann (2016, 2021, 2022); Kaufman-Osborn (2023).

9. For example, Sclofsky and Funk (2018).

10. Kress (1979, 535) had earlier observed that "in becoming an interest group within the profession the ultimate impact of the Caucus was to make political science safe for its in-house critics," but "most of us recognize a need for some measure of professional security."

11. For a brief biography of Richard E. Ashcraft, see Niemi and Barrow (2024).

12. This observation also leads to the conclusion that political ideas and the methods for studying politics do not rise or fall based only on intellectual merit, but also because of their elective affinity in orienting competing social groups and classes (Barrow 1990a).

13. Gunnell's critique is apparently aimed at works such as Macpherson 1962.

CHAPTER 2

1. See also Campbell 2019; Rom 2019; Zigerell 2019; Wilson 2019.

2. The term "official" political science is taken from Waldo (1975, 78). The term also appears in Poulantzas (1978, 205), where it is identified with "traditional functionalism" and "the various systematisms."

3. Harvard University, Columbia University, University of California, Berkeley, University of Chicago, Johns Hopkins University, Cornell University, Northwestern University, University of Michigan, Stanford University, Princeton University, Yale University, Indiana University.

4. In order of prestige at the time: *American Political Science Review*, *World Politics*, *Journal of Politics*, *Political Science Quarterly*, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, *Western Political Quarterly* [now *Political Research Quarterly*], *Public Administration Review*, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *Midwest Journal of Politics* [now *American Journal of Political Science*], *American Behavioral Scientist*, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. See Somit and Tanenhaus 1964, 89.

5. In a widely read essay, Hans Morgenthau (1955, 442) had argued that "much of political science has become a pretentious collection of trivialities." Elsewhere, Morgenthau (1966, 73) criticized behavioral political science for its "retreat into the trivial," where an obsession with the methodological aspects of political science had pushed aside any concern with "the great political issues" of the day.

6. See also Easton 1951. For example, in his 1961 APSA presidential address, Emmette S. Redford (1961, 755), stated, "We would like to find verifiable propositions or working assumptions about political activity which, like the law of gravity or the laws of

motion, transcend time, and technology and culture variations." See also Moon 1975, 134–54, on "the scientific ideal" in political science.

7. Despite Easton's statement, Waldo (1975, 59) would still argue 10 years later that "behavioralism was not—and is not, if it can be said to still exist 'as such'—a clear and firm creed, an agreed-upon set of postulates and rules."

CHAPTER 3

1. For a sampling of the behavioralist literature at the time, see Eulau et al. 1956; Ulmer 1961; Ranney 1962.

2. The structural-functionalist version of equilibrium theory in political science was anchored in the work of Robert K. Merton (1968).

3. Parsons (1951, 126–27) states that the scope of political science "is concerned with the power relations within the institutional system and with a broader aspect of settlement of terms. . . . Neither power in the political sense nor the operation of government as a sub-system of the social system can be treated in terms of a specifically specialized conceptual scheme . . . precisely for the reason that the political problem of the social system is a focus for the integration of all of its analytically distinguishable components, not of a specifically differentiated class of these components. Political science thus tends to be a synthetic science, not one built about an analytical theory as is the case with economics."

4. Of course, there were prominent political scientists who rejected Easton's claim, such as Hans J. Morgenthau (1966, 63), who continued to argue, "Political science deals with the nature, the accumulation, the distribution, the exercise, and the control of power on all levels of social interaction, with special emphasis upon the power of the state."

5. See Petras 1965, 1967 for an analysis of this ideological relationship. Easton (1965b, 22) articulates this relationship in the following way: "The behavioral approach testifies to the coming of age of theory in the social sciences as a whole, wedded, however, to a commitment to the assumptions and methods of empirical science. Unlike the great traditional theories of past political thought, new theory tends to be analytic, not substantive, explanatory rather than ethical, more general and less particular. That portion of political research which shares these commitments to both the new theory and the technical means of analysis and verification thereby links political science to broader behavioral tendencies in the social sciences; hence its description as political behavior."

6. For historical background, see Handy 1966; Carter 1971; Hopkins [1940] 1982.

7. Roelofs died of Parkinson's disease on August 17, 2008. See Marso et al. 2010, 389–426, for a symposium on the political thought of H. Mark Roelofs.

8. Christian Bay died of pneumonia on May 9, 1990; see Pace 1990, section D, 25).

9. Bay's work drew the muted ire of Straussians, although they agreed with him on some fundamental points regarding his critique of behavioralism; see Berns 1961.

10. Bay does not identify an exemplar for such a model, but when discussing the question of basic human needs, the New Left typically gravitated toward Abraham Maslow's theory of psychological health, which was based on a pyramid of needs. Although influenced by existentialist philosophy, Maslow's pyramid of needs bore some similarity to Aristotle's theory of self-actualization, which consisted of goods of the body

(health), goods of the spirit (honor), and goods of the mind (knowledge/wisdom); see Maslow (1954, 1962).

11. Bay (1968b, 214) concludes: "We study expressed wants and demands, often the result of indoctrination from the outside, and are unconcerned about inner needs, or prerequisites for social and individual health. We willingly submit to the deception that our corporate-ridden pluralist order is to be called 'democratic.'"

12. Wallis (1975a, 10) observes that "during the infancy of the CNPS, an influential critique of mainstream U.S. Political Science was published under the title of *Apolitical Politics*. Caucus people generally agreed with the view implied in that title, namely, that the notion of a neutral science of politics is a matter of self-deception." For brief biographies of Charles A. McCoy, see "Charles Allan McCoy" (1995) and Barrow (2024c).

13. It is an ironic twist that the Straussians used the term "New Political Science" when referring to behavioralism in the 1950s and early 1960s, because it was new in comparison to political philosophy, but they also sought to link behavioralism to its philosophical origins in Thomas Hobbes's "new science of politics"; see, for example, Stauffer (2007).

14. Bay (1970a, ix) criticized the Straussians, who were "the most vocal among the contemporary critics of the New Science of Politics, neo-Aristotelian by persuasion," for having "failed to produce any viable alternative approach" to behavioralism. Bay (1970a, x) lamented that one unfortunate result of the Straussians' critique of behavioralism is that "political *philosophy* (in the now widely accepted sense in which Lasswell distinguishes this discipline from that of political *science*) lately by default has become the almost exclusive domain of a neo-Aristotelian breed of political scientists which has no use at all for such facts as the behavioralists produce!"

15. William E. Connolly (1967, 5) states: "We accept, in short, the scientific ideal of political inquiry." Surkin and Wolfe (1970, 4) also note that "many members of the CNPS employed behavioral techniques and considered themselves 'behavioralists.'" Also see Surkin and Wolfe 1969, 51.

16. In contrast, Martin Landau (1968) defended behavioral extremism by arguing that it was not a break with traditional political science, but a more expansive and systematic restatement of a theoretical position that had been common among early APSA presidents.

17. Lasswell (1951, 15) goes on to emphasize that the policy sciences "will be directed toward providing the knowledge needed to improve the practice of democracy." For a more recent version of this argument, see Smith 1997. Similarly, Gunnell (2013, 197) notes that Lasswell "had originally appeared to eschew value judgments," but he subsequently concluded that, "as a policy science seeking to speak truth to power and devoted to a defense of democracy, it was necessary to provide democratic values with a scientific foundation and that this was the task of political inquiry."

18. Key (1960, 24) observes, "The invention of the sample survey gave the study of politics a powerful observational instrument. Yet it is a tool singularly difficult to bring to bear upon significant questions of politics. Over the past two decades, surveys of national, state, and local populations have, to be sure, produced many findings. . . . Most of these findings, though, have been primarily of sociological or psychological interest."

19. Kettler (2013c) acknowledges that "an important part of the [CNPS] constituency came from dissidents within the 'political theory' camp (obviously leaving aside the Straussians)," but he says this group quickly "ceased to be oriented to the Caucus" once

the International Conference for the Study of Political Thought was founded in 1967 by J. G. A. Pocock (Johns Hopkins University), Melvin Richter (CUNY), and Neal Wood (York University), and these scholars soon established close ties to the new journals, *Political Theory* and *History of Political Thought*.

20. For instance, Landau (1972, 6, 13), who otherwise offers a sophisticated rebuttal to the CNPS manifestos but falsely asserts that the positions articulated by McCoy and Playford and the Straussians "often merge, as a reading of both the Storing and the McCoy-Playford volumes reveals."

21. In fact, Bay (1969a, 19) argued that "the Aristotelian and Hobbesian approaches to politics have been contending for support in the ensuing centuries, and because of different normative assumptions in the two views, representatives of each camp have continued to talk past one another."

22. For example, several future CNPS members and sympathizers, including Theodore J. Lowi, Kenneth M. Dolbeare, Edward S. Greenberg, and James Prothro, participated in some of the first conferences sponsored by the SSRC's new Committee on Legal and Governmental Processes, which replaced its Committee on Political Behavior in 1964; see Ranney (1968, vii).

23. The philosopher Robert Paul Wolff (1966, 10) chastised behavioralists for their willingness to state "in forthright terms that political apathy is a Good Thing!" because they considered voter apathy a source of political stability or system equilibrium.

24. Waldo's (1956, 17) attitudinal survey of American political scientists demonstrated, as a matter of empirical fact, that "the political order has been 'accepted,' and distinctive American 'political theory' has tended to be concerned with means and methodology."

25. The irony is that Dahl understood the mobilization of bias well before he conducted his empirical research in New Haven, Connecticut. For example, Dahl (1956, 137) states that a basic proposition of democratic theory is that "constitutional rules are mainly significant because they help to determine what particular groups are to be given advantages or handicaps in the political struggle. In no society do people ever enter a political contest equally; the effect of the constitutional rules is to preserve, add to, or subtract from the advantages and handicaps with which they start the race. . . . constitutional rules . . . are crucial to the status and power of the particular groups who gain or suffer by the operation." However, what Dahl (1956, 137) claimed to verify in *Who Governs?* had already been assumed as an ideological proposition in *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, namely, that "a central guiding thread of American constitutional development has been the evolution of a political system in which all the active and legitimate groups in the population can make themselves heard at some crucial stage in the process of decision."

26. While they fail to acknowledge it, Bachrach and Baratz's (1962, 1963) concept of nondecisions is already advanced in *The Power Elite*, where C. Wright Mills (1956, 4) observes: "Whether they [the power elite] do or do not make such decisions is less important than the fact that they do occupy such pivotal positions; their failure to act, their failure to make decisions, is itself an act that is often of greater consequence than the decisions they do make."

27. Levinson (2009, 409) observed 40 years later that the arguments advanced for a new political science in 1969 "remain alive and well today."

28. For a brief autobiography, see Surkin (2024).

29. Surkin (1970, 15) was among the leading proponents of "an alternative methodology for the social sciences based on existential phenomenology the theoretical foundations of which are consistent with the position that for a social scientist to be empirical is not to assume that he must be value free or nonideological. In fact, existential phenomenology is well suited to the view that an empirical analysis of reality is not only a way of understanding the social world, but . . . also a way of criticizing society and of changing it as well."

30. These arguments are also reviewed in Barrow (2024b, 19–24).

31. Two important exceptions at the time were Harrington (1962) and Hirsch (1970).

32. For example, the Research Group's project resulted in an edited book by Eckstein (1964), which was presented to the discipline as disinterested and objective social scientific research.

33. Brzezinski received his PhD from Harvard University (1953), where he studied with Merle Fainsod and developed the concept of totalitarianism to describe the Soviet Union. Brzezinski was an adviser to President Lyndon B. Johnson and later became a primary organizer of the Trilateral Commission.

34. There are now many excellent studies that document the factual basis of Morgenthau's claims; see Kolko (1969); Diamond (1992); Simpson (1998); Nugent (2010); Rodhe (2013); Tamir (2024).

35. Morgenthau first presented this paper in 1965 at an invited conference sponsored by the American Academy of Political and Social Science, where he did not receive a particularly friendly reception among those he was criticizing at the conference, which included Karl W. Deutsch, Harry Eckstein, and Heinz Eulau in attendance, among others. Paul N. Ylvisaker, who attended the conference as a representative of the Ford Foundation, replied to his talk indignantly: "In this age of popular protest, I guess a political scientist could be corrupted more quickly by playing prophet than by acting as a king's consort. The agonies of carrying responsibility, of making decisions out of uncertainties, of melding egos into programs, and of sifting grains of hope out of ashes of trial and error—these are harder to bear, and no less edifying, than speaking loudly and critically of the mess we are in and the mice we are. And I believe they are equally as central to the purpose of political science" (quoted in Charlesworth 1962, 93).

36. Alfred G. Meyer (1976, 204) observed that "the Caucus does not proclaim itself as Marxist; but from its programs it is obvious that many of its activists think of themselves as Marxists and that one of its persistent efforts is to pay more attention to the contributions made by Engels, Marx, and their disciples."

CHAPTER 4

1. For a brief biography of Evron M. Kirkpatrick, see Binder 1995. Kirkpatrick was married to Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, a neoconservative who served as Ronald Reagan's foreign policy adviser during his 1980 presidential campaign. Reagan appointed her to serve as US ambassador to the United Nations. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick became known for the "Kirkpatrick Doctrine," which argued that the United States should support authoritarian regimes around the globe so long as they advanced US foreign policy objectives; see "In Memoriam" 2007.

2. Dahl (1967, 565) noted "one possible exception" to this finding. The APSA had received funds from the Asia Foundation, which had received funds from the CIA to

finance APSA memberships and subscriptions to the *American Political Science Review* "for a small number of Asian political scientists."

3. For the full report, see American Political Science Association 1968c.

4. See Barrow (2022) for a comprehensive discussion of the naming of CNPS. In this earlier article I observed that "the name [New Political Science] was something of an oddity in a context where dissident movements in other social science and humanities disciplines began adopting the terms Radical or Critical to name their counter-associations, such as the Union of Radical Political Economics (1969) or the Association for Critical Sociology (1969)." However, I noted at the time that I had not yet reviewed the Christian Bay papers archived at the University of Toronto, so I held out the possibility that these papers might shed some light on the choice of name. When I found a copy of the NCNP newsletter, as well as an announcement of the 1967 NCNP convention in Christian Bay's papers, the connection between the NCNP and the naming of CNPS seemed obvious. Similarly, in a quite obscure article by Bay (1972b), he often refers to an emerging "new politics." This hypothesis was confirmed by Surkin (2023).

5. Bookchin (1971, 221–22) observes that the affinity group as a form of organization has "often been intuitively adopted by American radicals. . . . Affinity groups are intended to function as catalysts within the popular movement, not as 'vanguards'; they provide initiative and consciousness, not a 'general staff.'"

6. Waldo identified the political science discipline's most powerful secessionist tendencies with its subfields, such as public administration, international relations, and political theory, where independent associations, such as the American Society for Public Administration (1945), International Studies Association (1959), and International Conference for the Study of Political Thought (1967) had already emerged as alternatives to the APSA based on subfield specialization, rather than ideology or methodology. See also Kaufman-Osborn (2006).

7. Caucus for a New Political Science (1973c, 1), states: "To achieve these goals, the Caucus nominates alternative candidates in APSA elections, introduces resolutions, and sponsors panels at APSA meetings."

8. The *OED* states that the origins of the word "caucus" are mysterious and obscure, but it unquestionably originated in colonial New England. It was possibly an anglicized version of the Algonquin word *caucauasu*, which means adviser.

9. Roelofs (1968d) wrote to the APSA Program Committee to inform the committee that "the Caucus for a New Political Science is sponsoring a Program of Panels at the 1968 Convention" and provided a copy of the program as it stood at the time.

10. These panels were discussed in the *New York Times* by Hechinger (1968, 1, 20) and Loftus (1968, 38).

11. Surkin (2023) recounts that Roelofs was reelected as chair in 1968 "and we had a suite at the hotel" where the Executive Committee was interviewing prospective new members for an expanded committee. Surkin recalls that "one of the invited interviewees was Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Roelofs decided to make a good impression and ordered a full coffee and breakfast for an 8am interview with Moynihan. He arrived a few minutes late, drunk, and we questioned him for about an hour or so. He was nominated by exec. Committee and won by 2 votes. I voted against as did David Morriss (if I remember correctly). Soon after, he was appointed ambassador to India and we never heard from him as far as I know." Moynihan, Janowitz, and Zinn resigned from the Executive Committee a year later (CNPS 1969c, 8).

12. Names in parentheses are committee chairs.

13. The newsletter editorial board consisted of John McDermott, Paul Minkoff, H. Mark Roelofs, Joan Rothschild, Marvin Surkin, and Alan Wolfe; see Caucus for a New Political Science 1969g, 1.

14. Joseph LaPalombara, the 1968 APSA Program Committee chair, obliquely concurred with Roelofs in his report to the APSA Council, observing that, while not all panel requests could be accommodated by the committee, "matters of public policy and major controversial political issues were being discussed" (APSA 1969c, 21).

15. The APSA Council took two votes before and after the Roelofs presentations. The first vote was 13 in favor, nine opposed, one abstaining, three absent. The second vote was 16 in favor, two opposed, four abstaining or absent. Individual votes by Council members were not reported in the minutes.

16. This message was reiterated by H. Mark Roelofs, who said the CNPS "wanted to work within the association and has no interest in staging a takeover, contrary to what some people might think" (quoted in Raymont 1969a, 30).

17. Ricci (1984, 189) also identifies David Easton as a member of CNPS.

18. The next year, Kirkpatrick (1969b, 412) withdrew from a panel on APSA governance that was chaired by Aaron Wildavsky, stating that "the governance of the Association has never reflected my own views about how a professional association should be governed. . . . I also do not believe that a paid employee of the Association should use a public forum to express personal views critical of past policies and policy-makers."

19. At the same time, Christian Bay (1968d), who was now department chair at the University of Toronto, invited David Easton to be a visiting professor at that institution.

20. For example, Evron M. Kirkpatrick (1969c) wrote to Christian Bay: "As you know, each year at our Annual Meeting we hold a small dinner party for the President the night of the Presidential Address . . . we very much hope that you and your wife will be able to attend." This was also the year that Easton (1969) delivered his infamous address on "the new revolution in political science" and declared the coming of a post-behavioral revolution. Similarly, Surkin (1968, 180), observed at the time that "the Caucus is already assured of some measure of success by the cooperation it has received from the APSA." Christian Bay (1972d) wrote to Evron M. Kirkpatrick informing him, "I have no reason to believe that there is any anti-Caucus conspiracy. . . . Mark Roelofs has told me about a very pleasant and useful conversation he had with you recently, and at this point I feel persuaded that you will be doing everything possible to accommodate the interests of our Caucus."

21. An anonymous group did distribute a seven-page mimeographed pamphlet that was critical of "the types of security measures the APSA has devised to keep its meetings hidden from public view." It claimed the APSA leadership was obsessed with "how to keep that fortress of Political Science secure from attack by the non-existent masses . . . by creating administrative overkill to deal with insurgencies real or imaginary" (Anonymous 1969).

22. Kendall had also collaborated with Austin Ranney (Ranney and Kendall 1956).

23. For intellectual background and context, see Berkowitz 2013.

24. Ironically, the conservative Conference for a Democratic Politics displayed more interest in New Left politics than the CNPS, with panels on "Participatory Democracy," "Marxism," "Anarchism," "the New Left," "Democratic Theory and Civil Disobedience," and "The New Elitism and the New Left." Also see Carey (1969a, 44–45).

25. The Platform Committee included Martin Brownstein, David Kettler, Paul Minkoff, Michael Parenti, Marvin Surkin, and Alan Wolfe.

26. Herzberg's only significant publication at the time was a coedited collection of essays and readings authored by other scholars; see Herzberg and Pomper 1966.

27. The remaining essays were generally noncommittal, but expressed a desire that paralleled Lowi's call to depoliticize APSA elections and focus on scholarship. These essays were authored by B. M. Rummel (University of Hawaii), Joyce M. Mitchell (University of Oregon), Mulford Q. Sibley (University of Minnesota), Robert J. Pranger (University of Washington), Phillip Monypenny (University of Illinois), and Anthony King (University of Essex).

28. The APSA Council rejected a resolution submitted by CNPS to require that APSA awards for "legislative achievement" be approved by the general membership at the annual business meeting, rather than being awarded by the APSA Executive Committee (APSA 1969a, 540). Also see CNPS 1969d, 2.

29. In a letter to the CNPS Executive Committee, H. Mark Roelofs (1969b) claimed that Robert E. Lane, the APSA's nominee for president, "has offered to make his [Bay's] nominating speech, and predicts that Bay will win." Christian Bay was elected to the Executive Council of the Western Political Science Association (1969–70) (WPSA 1969).

30. The 1969 CNPS Platform Committee included Paul Minkoff (CUNY), Martin Brownstein (Yale University), David Kettler (Ohio State University), Alan Wolfe (SUNY–Old Westbury), Michael Parenti (Yale University), and Marvin Surkin (Adelphi University) (CNPS 1969b, 3).

31. See Barry and Bommer 1970, 638, who concluded that if women were 5% of APSA membership, then even against this low standard "women have been underrepresented" on panels at the APSA annual meetings.

32. Kettler (2013a) writes that following his one-year term as CNPS chair, "I was shut out of the American 'profession' in 1970 (tripped up on my way, as full professor, from Ohio State to Purdue, and effectively blacklisted in the US) not least because of my identification with the Caucus." The result is that Kettler eventually moved to a newly established university (Trent University) in Canada, where he largely withdrew from the American profession for the next two decades.

33. Bay was alluding to the more radical Sociology Liberation Movement that had just emerged in that discipline (Flacks 1991).

34. Kettler (2009b) observes that "if you had put Mark [Roelofs] and Christian [Bay] and me on a panel to discuss just about anything, we would not have found agreement about much. I came from European social theory . . . Mark from American radical-liberal faith, and Christian from Scandinavian-Protestant moral philosophy."

35. Kettler (2009a) writes that "Alan [Wolfe] was too much taken up by stylistic trends in the constituency and he knew no more than he does now about the complexities of politics; he yearned for grand gestures and became quickly disillusioned by their absence."

36. Kettler (2013b) observes "the question unresolved when I became Chair was whether the organization would remain as a (sort of) loyal opposition within the APSA." Kettler rejected Wolfe's argument that the Caucus should become an off-campus political activist group. He also rejected Lowi's argument that new political science could somehow transform an otherwise conservative discipline through the sheer power of its scholarship.

37. The Caucus withdrew its resolution on the status of women after the business meeting agreed to amend the Council's resolution to include a Caucus amendment,

which stated that "the APSA, especially at its conventions, provide generous facilities by which members can organize on problems of women political scientists" (APSA 1970b, 60).

38. For a brief biography of Alex Gottfried, see University of Washington 2014.

39. For a brief biography of Harvey Mansfield Sr., see Mansfield and Redford 1988.

40. Elsewhere, Bay (1969c) observes, "It [the 1969 Caucus platform] certainly appears to me that this is a very good document, with which I ought to be comfortable."

41. The Election Committee reported that several hundred new members joined the APSA between the close of the annual business meeting and the October 3, 1969, voting deadline, including numerous family members of APSA members. It is not known whether this influx of new members helped or hurt the Caucus; see APSA 1970a, 28.

CHAPTER 5

1. Malecki and Anagnoson (2009, 414–15) recount that "in 1969, Harry [Hall] hired Alan Wolfe for the summer quarter. At that time Alan was co-chair of the recently formed Caucus for a New Political Science. Alan's presence in Los Angeles led to a number of CSULA political science faculty becoming leaders in the Caucus for a New Political Science. Harry's hiring of Alan was hailed by most of the new members of the department as a progressive step, but for some of the older members it represented a step in the wrong direction. All agreed that it had a significant impact on the department and the college for many years."

2. David Kettler (2013d) suggests that "the absence of Californians [from CNPS] was influenced as well by the fact that the key meetings (until 1970) were all in the East or mid-West and people did not travel so lightly then."

3. The Western Caucus nominated Richard L. Harris (UC Santa Barbara) for vice president and the following for Executive Council: Emily W. Card (UC Riverside), Donald Bray (California State University, Los Angeles), and Marc Morris (graduate student, UC Berkeley). However, the Western Caucus was largely absent from the 1971 WPSA meeting as it was absorbed back into the CNPS (WPSA 1971).

4. For a brief biography of Fox, see Cochran 2004. Fox received his PhD in political philosophy in 1977. After eight years at Western Washington University (1977–84), he spent the remainder of his career at Texas Tech University, where he achieved prominence for his application of postmodernist philosophy to public administration.

5. For a full account of Parenti's arrest and trial, see Parenti (1971), where he states, "On May 6, 1970, while participating in a non-violent strike demonstration where I was a visiting associate professor, I was, along with others, assaulted without warning by state troopers, badly clubbed on the face and head and arrested."

6. At its founding meeting, the Caucus collected a $70 treasury through voluntary donations (Caucus for a New Political Science Executive Committee 1968a, 3). A year later, the CNPS Executive Committee (1969a, 3) informed members that "financial contributions to the Caucus treasury are also urgently needed." The 1970 CNPS financial report disclosed a total of $187.50 in dues and donations received the previous year (CNPS 1970c, 8).

7. While the Western Caucus dissolved back into CNPS, under the leadership of Steve Sachs, a small Midwest branch appeared, which considered organizing panels and

nominating candidates at the Midwest Political Science Association, but it does not appear that anything came of it; see Sachs 1974.

8. Other members of the CNPS Executive Committee who endorsed the resolution were Martin L. Brownstein, David Kettler, Sanford Levinson, Philip Green, Lewis Lipsitz, and Alan Wolfe.

9. The APSA Council recommended defeat of both amendments by a vote of 20 for and three against, with only the two Caucus-endorsed members (Kariel, Prestage) plus one other (Spiro) voting to support the amendment.

10. A resolution to provide APSA financial support to the Chicano Caucus Scholar's Research was defeated by mail ballot (4,926 reject / 1,367 accept). A resolution to provide APSA funding to conduct research on the East Los Angeles riot was defeated by mail ballot (4,744 reject / 1,538 accept) (APSA 1971a, 48–49).

11. CNPS (1970a, 5) reports that many members at the CNPS business meeting "felt that an adjournment motion (or fiat from the 'Dutch' chair) might be attempted to foreclose consideration of Resolutions by the convened but unwashed masses."

12. The signatories to this letter included Hannah Arendt, Vernon V. Aspaturian, Samuel H. Beer, Leonard Binder, Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Bernard E. Brown, James MacGregor Burns, Louis Hartz, Robert S. Hirschfield, Stanley Hoffman, Roy Macridis, Seymour Z. Mann, Robert Osgood, Benjamin Rivlin, Dankwart A. Rustow, Nadav Safran, David Spitz, John G. Stoessinger, Tang Tsou, Kenneth W. Thompson, Nicholas Wahl, Donald S. Zagoria, and Aristide Zolberg. Hannah Arendt joined CNPS in 1972 but was not active, as she observed: "I'm afraid the only way I can become involved in your effort to reform the American Political Science Association is by contributing a little money Enc: Check #631" (CNPS 1973a, 3).

13. The Executive Committee of the Committee for a Responsible Political Science included Gabriel A. Almond, Gwendolen M. Carter, James. B. Christoph, Manning J. Dauer, Karl W. Deutsch, Merle Fainsod, Richard F. Fenno, Barbara Hinckley, Matthew Holder Jr., William J. Keefe, Joseph G. LaPalombara, Harold D. Lasswell, Theodore J. Lowi, Herbert McClosky, A. F. K. Organski, Clara Penniman, J. Roland Pennock, Kenneth Prewitt, Douglas Price, Lucian W. Pye, Donald E. Stokes, Raymond Tanter, David B. Truman, Vernon Van Dyke, Robert E. Ward, and Harmon Ziegler.

14. In the category of politics makes strange bedfellows, Kettler worked with George Carey, the founder and chair of the conservative Conference for a Democratic Politics to secure panels for the burgeoning special interest groups within APSA. Carey (1970) received a letter from Kettler stating, "Despite Verba's concession to us this time around, they are going to ease us out." Carey subsequently pressed Kettler to attend the next APSA Council meeting so they could jointly push "for a regularization or whatever one wants to call it of our panel sections."

15. For a brief biography of Peter Bachrach, see Botwinick 2008.

16. See Haire 2010, 16, where Kettler observes that after moving to Trent University in Canada, "I deliberately backed off" from the CNPS and "all those things really faded away." Similarly, see Kettler 2011.

17. James W. Prothro (1971) filed a complaint against the Ad Hoc Committee with the APSA Committee on Professional Ethics for "highly improper" conduct unrelated to the Morgenthau campaign. Donald G. Herzberg (1971a) responded that he was "astounded" by Prothro's complaint.

18. A. Belden Fields, a member of the CNPS Executive Committee in 1971 and now

a professor emeritus at the University of Illinois, was vocally raising "the question of whether the Caucus ought to become a counter-structure or to remain a confrontation group within the APSA" (see Malecki and Smith 1971a, 1). Similarly, Kenneth F. Johnson (1974, 3) continued to represent a significant strand of thought in the Caucus that "the APSA should be left as an association for conservative change-resistant interests."

19. The numerous proposals for constitutional amendments over the last three years resulted in APSA officials creating a Committee on Constitutional Revision to completely rewrite the APSA constitution under the chairmanship of Aaron Wildavsky. The Caucus and other dissenting caucuses considered it a highly repressive document that recentralized authority in the president and APSA Council.

20. In January 1973, Malecki wrote to Dankwart A. Rustow, the newly elected CNPS chair, to renew his membership in CNPS, but with the caveat: "I still remain unconvinced that the APSA can be reformed into a truly open association, but I am not about to try to stand in the way of those who wish to make the effort" (CNPS 1973a, 4). The same year, Malecki unsuccessfully tried to start a new journal called *Radical Politics* (CNPS 1973a, 15).

21. For a full text, see Eulau 1972.

22. For an autobiography, see Falk 2021.

23. John C. Wahlke, chair of the APSA Nominating Committee, wrote to Christian Bay asking for his suggested nominees for APSA office in 1971 (Wahlke 1971). Bay proposed Sheldon Wolin for president and Henry Kariel, Richard Falk, or David Spitz for vice president. For APSA Council, Bay nominated Hanna Pitkin, Mulford Q. Sibley, David Kettler, H. Mark Roelofs, Philip Jacob, Peter Bachrach, and Philip Green (Bay 1971a). Wahlke's inquiry was apparently pro forma, because not one of Bay's proposed nominees was endorsed by the APSA.

24. For a more recent elaboration of this idea by a former CNPS chair, see Barrow 2021a.

25. Bay (1972c) responded: "I am truly sorry that you find that you cannot make it to our Caucus meetings in September . . . for I think these may well be crucial to . . . the future of the Caucus."

26. Ollman (1978b, 100) concurs that "*Capital* contains a theory of the state which, unlike Marx's economic theories, is never fully worked out." See also Kesselman 1982a.

27. In 1969, Louis Kampf, a radical with strong Marxist leanings, was elected second vice president of the Modern Language Association, which led to his election as president in 1971 ("The MLA in World History," no date). In 1977, Eugene Genovese made national news by defeating Oscar Handlin to become president of the Organization of American Historians ("Genovese, a Marxist, Will Head Historians" 1977, 8). Two years later, William A. Williamson, also a Marxist, was elected president of the Organization of American Historians ("William Appleman Williams Papers, 1877–2012," no date).

28. *PS* also published the results of a rather weak mail survey ($n = 176$) of political scientists in the Mountain West (i.e., Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming), which found "that behavioralism has far more adherents within the profession than does post-behavioralism. . . . The popularity of post-behavioralism also seems to vary with field of specialization in political science. It is particularly strong among the Political Theorists" (Baker et al. 1972, 271–72).

29. Nevertheless, Edgerton (1974, 9) found that "the Caucus for a New Political Science and the Women's Caucus for Political Science continue to sponsor larger programs of panels and business meetings" than in the past.

30. During my last year of graduate school at UCLA, Dwaine Marvick saw me in the hallway and asked me to come to his office. I had never taken a class with him, nor even spoken to him in my six years at the university. Marvick began the conversation by saying: "I know you are a Marxist and I want to clarify something with you." I braced myself for what I thought would be the usual lecture on "this Marxism stuff won't get you a job in political science." Instead, Marvick pulled a copy of Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man* (1964, 114) from his bookshelf and pointed to a page where Marcuse was criticizing a 1956 article that Marvick had coauthored with Morris Janowitz (who later joined CNPS) to illustrate how "by virtue of its [behavioral] methodology, this empiricism is ideological." Marvick insisted that he "wasn't one of those behavioralists." Instead, he explained that he had been influenced by Harold Lasswell, and, consequently, he well understood the limitations of behavioralism. He felt that Marcuse's criticism was unfair, and twenty years after the fact, he was still genuinely stung by the criticism. Nevertheless, it proved to be an enlightening conversation as I learned a great deal about the Lasswellian "policy orientation" that early on had been juxtaposed as an alternative to the Easton/Dahl scientistic-positivist conception of empirical political science.

31. Samuel Lewis Popkin was an assistant professor of government at Harvard University who was imprisoned in the federal section of the Norfolk County jail in Dedham, Massachusetts on November 21, 1972, under a contempt order of the US District Court, District of Massachusetts. He was imprisoned for contempt of court for refusal to answer several questions before a federal grand jury investigating the publication of the Pentagon Papers (Carroll 1973). On the Angela Davis case, see Houh 2024 and Gordon 2022, 1–34.

32. For a brief biography of Peter Bachrach, see Botwinick 2008.

33. The 1972 election results were under a heavy cloud due to ballot irregularities attributed to the APSA's fluctuating membership. Roelofs and Bay pressed for a full investigation and recount, but it did not change the outcome (CNPS 1973a, 5, 9–10).

34. Rustow recounts that during the 1973 New Orleans conference a political science professor from a small Texas college rose and declaimed: "I'm interested in *teachin'* and I should've come to you people's panels all along. You're the only ones who told me anythin' interestin' that I can use to help my *students*" (CNPS 1973b, 3).

35. The CNPS Coordinating Council included John Rensenbrink (Bowdoin College), Kenneth Sherrill (Hunter College / CUNY), Stephen M. Sachs (Indiana University–Purdue University at Indianapolis), Harold Borkowski, Martin O. Heisler (University of Maryland), Margueritte Barnett (Princeton University), Gerald Houseman (Indiana University–Fort Wayne), Christian Bay (University of Toronto), and Philippa Strum, (CUNY–Brooklyn College).

CHAPTER 6

1. In 1975, the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Committee for a Representative Slate consisted mostly of ideological conservatives and a few centrist liberals, including Gwendolyn M. Carter, Manning J. Dauer, Jack Dennis, Thomas R. Dye, Valerie A. Earle, Harry Eckstein, David A. Fellman, John A. Ferejohn, Donald G. Herzberg, Ralph K. Huitt, Samuel P. Huntington, William J. Keefe, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, Martin Landau, Joseph LaPalombara, William S. Livingston, Warren E. Miller, Sarah M. Morehouse, A. F. K. Organski, Samuel C. Patterson, Clara Penniman, Howard

R. Penniman, Robert D. Putnam, Austin Ranney, William H. Riker, Stanley Rothman, Ellis Sandoz, Victoria Schuck, Kenneth A. Shepsle, Donald E. Stokes, David B. Truman, John C. Wahlke, Robert E. Ward, Ruth G. Weintraub, James Q. Wilson, Raymond E. Wolfinger, L. Harmon Ziegler, and Betty H. Zisk (Sindler 1975).

2. See Eckstein 1978 on the Great Recession of 1974–75, which marked the end of the so-called golden age of US higher education and the beginnings of a long-term fiscal crisis of the university.

3. For a brief biography of Parenti, see Pettengill 2024.

4. In response to this temporary rift within the Caucus, Kenneth F. Johnson (University of Missouri–St. Louis) wrote to Rensenbrink to reiterate his earlier position: "Why don't we establish the CNPS as a competing, alternative, an active association that could still meet concurrently with the APSA?"

5. For a brief biography of Victor Wallis, see Agee 2024.

6. The Caucus for a New Political Science (1975b) sent a notice to members at this time, which begins with the line: "We are woefully short of money." Another membership notice pleaded: "MAY WE HAVE YOUR DUES NOW!" (CNPS 1975d).

7. This task was eventually assigned to the new Coordinating Council.

8. Based on the one non-unanimous vote recorded in the official notes of the meeting (CNPS 1975b), it appears that only 17 persons attended the meeting, including John Rensenbrink, Morton Schoolman, Laura Katz Olson, Joan Landes, John R. Manley, Michael Parenti, H. Mark Roelofs, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Susan Rudolph, Theodore Norton, David Hebbenstone, Christian Bay, Dankwart A. Rustow, and Victor Wallis.

9. For a brief biography of Laura Katz Olson, see Stein 2024.

10. Kettler (2009a) states that "Ira Katznelson and Marvin Surkin put the whole project together on their own and came to the Executive Committee of the Caucus for financial support. We were glad to bet on them, but Ira was never involved in the Caucus as such, as far as I can recall." Kettler (2013a) also writes that "Ira Katznelson's 'Politics & Society' was subsidized at the very beginning by the Caucus, and its story belongs very much to the history" of CNPS.

11. Robertson (1993, 15) observes that "criticism of behavioral political science was institutionalized in the Caucus for a New Political Science and in the journal *Politics & Society*, founded in 1970 by several caucus members."

12. Kettler (2013e) very directly declares that "Alan Wolfe always was to us what we call technically a schmock."

13. Proposals to limit expenditures on APSA elections continued to be debated at subsequent meetings of the CNPS Coordinating Council; see, for example, CNPS 1976f.

14. For a detailed description of the River House conference, see Norton 1975.

15. The grant was $6,000, which at the time was sufficient to pay the full expenses of everyone who participated in the conference as a panelist (Schoolman 1975b; Rensenbrink 1975c).

16. Kirn (1977, 83) observed that "the emergence of a specifically socialist orientation within the Caucus for a New Political Science is a notable recent development."

17. Lowenberg (2007), 357, provides an oblique reminder of how CNPS was drawing on the patterns of traditional political science, but with a more radical content. Lowenberg recounts that in the 1940s and 1950s, APSA "panels were held in two-hour blocks . . . with scheduled breakfasts, lunches, and dinners outside of these times." There were "informal discussions, each led by two senior members of the profession, for groups of 15 'of the younger men.'"

18. John C. Wahlke achieved prominence as a specialist in legislative behavior when he joined with Heinz Eulau and others to conduct "a large-scale study grounded in personal interviews with state legislators in California, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Ohio." The study methodology was considered novel at the time—as it gleaned firsthand knowledge about legislative behavior from interviews with legislators themselves—with the result that the published findings are still considered a "monumental study of legislative behavior in the United States" (Patterson and Lodge 2008; also see Wahlke 1962).

19. For a brief biography of Frances Fox Piven, see Groarke 2024.

20. For a brief biography of Howard Zinn, see Olson 2024.

21. For a brief biography of Richard A. Cloward, see Lewis 2024.

22. Stephen M. Sachs (2021) confirms that "Vic Wallis and I" drafted the original Caucus constitution. Sachs became CNPS chair in 1976–77, while later serving as treasurer (1978–79) and Program Coordinator (1983–84).

23. This ambiguous phrase became a persistent source of discussion and dissatisfaction among Caucus members until it was finally replaced in September 2021, when the Caucus changed its name to the Caucus for a Critical Political Science (CCPS). In 2021, the CCPS more clearly defined itself as "an association of critical scholars committed to making the study of political science relevant to building a more democratic and egalitarian economic, social, and political order" (Government of District of Columbia 2021). A published draft of the original constitution contained a footnote indicating that "some CC members favored a more precise definition of the Caucus's political objectives; others favored no definition. This version of the Preamble . . . may be taken as a compromise" (Wallis 1977a, 9).

24. If a region was inactive and did not elect a regional coordinator from within that region, then the Coordinating Council was empowered to appoint a regional coordinator who would also become a member of the Coordinating Council.

25. For instance, there was concern that because the 1982 annual meeting of the APSA would be held in Denver, Colorado, the meeting's location "threatens to lower attendance at the CNPS meeting" (Caucus for a New Political Science 1982a, 90).

26. For a brief biography of C. B. Macpherson, see Hansen 2024.

27. For a brief biography of Bertell Ollman, see Barrow 2024d. For a brief discussion of Warren E. Miller's career, see Eulau 1991.

28. This letter was signed by Ann Stuart Diamond, George W. Carey, Herbert Deane, Robert Horwitz, Guenter Lewy, Harvey C. Mansfield Jr., and Ellis Sandoz.

29. In 1979, the CNPS panels had 266 attendees, compared to 86 for the Comparative Socialist Studies Committee, 480 for the Conference Group on the Political Economy of Advanced Industrial Societies, 148 for the Foundations of Political Theory Group, and 115 for the Women's Caucus for Political Science (APSA 1980b).

CHAPTER 7

1. The letter was sent to Bertell Ollman, Harry E. Vanden, [unreadable] Garson, Laura Katz Olson, John Rensenbrink, H. Mark Roelofs, Joan Roelofs, Dankwart A. Rustow, Stephen M. Sachs, Hamideh Sedghi, Philippa Strum, and Victor Wallis.

2. A sign-in list indicates that the attendees were Christian Bay, Nicole Fermon, Harry E. Vanden, Victor Wallis, John Rensenbrink, Bertell Ollman, Ezra Zisk, Frank

Fischer, Carl Lankowski, Charles J. Fox, Hamideh Sedghi (five of whom were members of the New York chapter) ("Pre-Council Meeting" 1978).

3. Jane Gruenebaum joined Isaacson Miller in 2004 after 30 years of experience in academia, nonprofit management, and political advocacy. In 2021, she was a vice president at Isaacson Miller and led its Washington, DC, office, where she focused on executive searches for educational institutions, public policy organizations, associations, and foundations.

4. While most complaints about the *APSR* have been directed at its biases toward a behavioral analysis of American politics, and the Straussian rendition of political philosophy, Michael Parenti called "attention to that portion of the *American Political Science Review* which is most read and least criticized, the book review section." For much of its existence, the *APSR* published book reviews in each of the discipline's subfields, where a small number of select books received a cursory review that at least brought these books to the attention of other political scientists. Parenti (1974b, 370) argues that most of the books selected for review in the *APSR* "adhere to the orthodox ideological values of today's political establishment," and "these books almost invariably are reviewed by political scientists who share the same centrist ideological slant as the authors they are reviewing."

5. The Ad Hoc Committee appointed to assist the APSA Council with the search for a managing editor, included James MacGregor Burns, Austin Ranney, Martin Diamond, Steven Stephens, John Turner, Dale Rogers Marshall, and Nelson W. Polsby (Kirkpatrick 1975, 271–72).

6. After completing her PhD at Columbia University, Nicole Fermon had a long and successful career as a professor of Political Science at Fordham University. She specialized in political theory and feminist thought ("Nicole Fermon" 2024).

7. Carl Lankowski received his PhD in political science from Columbia University. He was later recognized for his research on the German Green Party and the new social movements. Lankowski, who would later join the faculty of Hobart and William Smith Colleges, was writing a dissertation on Germany's role in the European Economic Community. His continuing research focused on the German economy, the political economy of European integration, environmental politics, the German Green Party, and other new social movements. Lankowski eventually left academia to become research director at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (1995–2000). He was later appointed deputy director of area studies and coordinator for European area studies at the US State Department's Foreign Service Institute ("Carl Lankowski" 2024).

8. On the Columbia University CNPS local chapter, see Johns (1978b).

9. Bruce Andrews was a professor of political science at Fordham University from 1975 to 2013, although he later achieved some fame as the author of more than 40 books of poetry. During his time as an academic, Andrews was a vocal critic of the US government's interventionist policies to subvert democratic movements around the world. Andrews appeared on the *O'Reilly Factor* in November 2006 after a Fordham student complained about Andrews' leftist views and his assigned reading list in a class on international relations (see "Bill O'Reilly vs. Bruce Andrews" 2006).

10. This account is confirmed by Stephen M. Sachs (2021), who observes that "a new group from Columbia took over *New Political Science* and became the Caucus leadership."

11. In 1978, CNPS dues were as follows: students and unemployed ($3), income to

$7,500 ($5), income to $10,000 ($8), income to $15,000 ($12), income above $15,000 ($15) (CNPS 1978d).

12. Numerous documents and publications subsequently referred to the Caucus for a New Political Science as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation. The CNPS was in fact an unincorporated, tax-exempt, nonprofit organization. It did not become a nonprofit corporation until 2021, when it incorporated in Washington, DC, under the leadership of Nancy S. Love.

13. Berg (1990). A little more than a decade earlier, Steven Sachs (1978, 27) had reported a CNPS balance of $850 and wrote that CNPS was doing "well financially."

14. Timothy W. Luke, who was a member of the Editorial Collective from 1983 to 1989 while an assistant professor at Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University, echoes this sentiment: "I did not have a sense that the editorial board was that involved in running the journal or communicating through him [John Rensenbrink]" (Luke 2017a).

15. Florindo Valpacchio was a graduate student in political theory at Columbia University who was working on a dissertation about George W.F. Hegel. He did not finish his PhD but went to work for Citibank and had a successful career in personal banking with several major international banks. He eventually retired early and returned to study philosophy at the New School (Luke 2017b).

16. Harry Vanden was a professor of political science at the University of South Florida. He received his PhD from the New School for Social Research and was a specialist in Latin America, social movements, and Marxist theory.

17. The four persons carried forward onto the new editorial board were Stephen E. Bronner, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Bertell Ollman, and Victor Wallis.

18. I offer an anecdote from my first year as a visiting assistant professor at the University of Texas, San Antonio (1984–1985) to exemplify what Jameson means by teaching to the "tendencies and needs and predispositions" of students. In spring of 1985, I was teaching an upper-division undergraduate course called Major Theories of the Social Sciences—the typical Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Parsons course. After giving the standard lecture on Marx's concept of surplus value and theory of exploitation, a student in his 30s approached me after class. The student informed me that he worked at Mexicana Airlines as a baggage handler. He told me that he had always had a sense of dissatisfaction with his job, but he could never put his finger on it. He thanked me for finally giving him the words to understand his feelings. It was the extraction of "surplus value" and "exploitation" that was at the root of his dissatisfaction and his sense of "alienation." He did the work, but his bosses reaped the economic benefits. Thus, I had not "converted" anyone to Marxism but had merely given him the words and concepts to understand his existential situation, which until then was merely a nondescript feeling.

19. For example, see Hernstein and Murray 1996; Murray 1998.

20. This total was derived by counting entries listed as essays, research notes, responses, and occasional statements by Caucus chairs. The total excludes the introductions to each issue, book reviews, "Caucus News," "Organizing News," "Chapter Reports," and "APSA Convention Reports."

21. The total for *New Political Science* was arrived at by counting entries listed as essays, research notes, responses, and occasional statements by Caucus chairs. The total excludes the introductions to each issue, book reviews, "Caucus News," "Organizing

News," "Chapter Reports," and "APSA Convention Reports." The same selection criteria were applied to the *American Political Science Review*.

22. In some cases, even the low totals for *APSR* are misleading, such as with the keyword "state." When this appears in *NPS*, it typically refers to the theory of the state, but when it appears in the *APSR*, it typically refers to a subnational unit of American government.

23. Besides Gruenebaum, the other persons attending this meeting were Bruce Andrews, Stanley Aronowitz, Vincent Brevetti, Stephen E. Bronner, Carol Brown, Angelo Falcon, Nicole Fermon, Jeff Frieden, David Johns, Carl Lankowski, Linda Longmire, Thomas Massucci, Charles Noble, Patricia O'Leary, Bertell Ollman, Michael Parenti, John Rensenbrink, Len Rodberg, Joel Rogers, and Karen Rosenblum-Cale ("CNPS Organizing Notes" 1980, 76).

24. At the August 1978 meeting of the APSA Executive Council, the only Council member to defend the Association's prior commitment to not hold conventions in nonratifying states was CNPS representative Peter Bachrach. However, this minority position on the Council was upheld by an overwhelming majority at the APSA general membership meeting (Wallis 1979, 89).

25. For a brief biography of Nancy Hartsock, see Nannerini 2024.

26. Lipset (1982, 156) dismissed this critique as nothing more than Nietzschean "*ressentiment* toward scholars who have been more successful than themselves. Those who are much more involved in teaching than research, who have published less, and who earn less, are more prone to explain success within their profession in invidious terms, to see the cards stacked unfairly in favor of those at the top." Yet this was a misrepresentation of CNPS activists that Parenti had already rebutted in his earlier debate with King, Dahl, and Deutsch.

27. My personal recollection of this encounter is that Polsby complained that he had graciously accepted the invitation to serve on this panel but would have declined if he had known that *he* was going to treated with such disrespect. As I recall, Parenti replied with something like: "Gee, Nelson, if I had known my critique of pluralism was going to make you cry, I wouldn't have been so critical of your work."

28. APSA (1980b, 16) reports that 38 persons attended the 1979 CNPS plenary session. For the 1979 plenary talk, see Wolfe (1981). For the 1980 plenary talk, see Boggs (1981).

29. Ladd and Lipset (1974, 8–10) found that during this time 90% of political science faculty were male, and women were also "a considerably smaller segment of graduate students and faculty in the discipline than in all fields."

30. For an overview of Marxist feminist scholarship at this time, see Vogel (1986).

31. For example, Flores (1989), which explicitly draws on Marxist state theory. For reviews of this literature, see Flores (1986); Bonilla et al. (1986); Garcia and Torres (2024).

32. For example, see the reading list in Flores (1989–90).

33. One such program is the Ralph Bunche Summer Institute (RBSI), which is an "annual, intensive five-week program held at Duke University. It is designed to introduce to the world of doctoral study in political science those undergraduate students from under-represented racial and ethnic groups or those interested in broadening participation in political science and pursuing scholarship on issues affecting underrepresented groups or issues of tribal sovereignty and governance." The RBSI focuses on "developing statistical skills for data analysis used in political science" ("Ralph Bunche Summer Institute" 2024).

34. For instance, in contrast to the founding meetings of the late 1960s, which were attended by hundreds of participants, see CNPS 1982a, 89, which reports that by 1981 approximately 30 persons attended the annual business meeting convened at the APSA conference and a large number of these attendees were officers and journal editors.

35. Poulantzas (1979, 305) was similarly claiming that the ideological state apparatuses have the greatest level of relative autonomy as they are only loosely connected to the central repressive state apparatus: "Ideological State apparatuses display *a degree and form of relative autonomy* which the branches of the repressive State apparatus do not possess." Thus, the ISAs are the easiest for nondominant classes and fractions to penetrate for purposes of delegitimating the state and capitalism, which is why in the transition to fascism they come under increasing scrutiny by government and by branches of the repressive state apparatus.

36. As a matter of fact, "they" did know (Barrow 2025).

37. Cyrus Zirakzadeh graduated from UC Berkeley and had a distinguished career at the University of Connecticut. He served on the executive councils of the Northeastern Political Science Association and the New England Political Science Association. He served as editor of the journal *Polity*. His main research interests are participatory democracy and political thought in art ("Cyrus Ernesto 'Ernie' Zirakzadeh" 2024).

38. Members of the New York chapter included Gordon Adams, Philip John Akre, Bruce Andres, Sherrie Baver, Stephen E. Bronner, Leslie J. Calman, Nicole Fermon, Frank Fischer, Aaron Gana, Norman Graham, Bertram M. Gross, Mary Jane Gruenebaum, David Johns, Samantha Karazinov, Mark Kesselman, Donna Kirchheimer, Carl Lankowski, John Otoshi, H. Mark Roelofs, Joan Roelofs, Joel Rogers, Luz Salgado, Rieccelle D. Schecter, Rick Shryock, Suzanne Silverman, Sarah Siskind, Larry B. Smerin, Chris Sorensen, Edward Volchock, Katherine B. Yatrakis, and Ezra Zisk (Caucus for a New Political Science 1978g).

39. For brief biographies of Mark Kesselman, see Worcester 2008, 2024.

40. At the time, the Bay Area Kapitalistate Collective was led by James O'Connor and included left scholars such as G. William Domhoff, Eric Olin Wright, David A. Gold, Clarence Lo, and Claus Offe.

41. For a brief biography of Stephen E. Bronner, see Steger 2024.

42. This claim is based on the fact that in announcing the new policy on organized sections, the APSA Council specifically referenced "unresolved" questions identical to the ones raised a year earlier in a letter from the CNPS chair (APSA 1982a, 628).

43. For example, Bernard Henri-Lévy (1977, 68) called for "a provisional politics, a small-scale program, which some of us think can only be precarious, uncertain, and circumstantial—in a word, a matter of feeling."

44. Timothy Mitchell (1991, 95) applied Foucault's approach to state theory and concluded that "focusing on the state as essentially a phenomenon of decision making or policy is inadequate," since the state is "as an effect of detailed processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, and supervision and surveillance, which create the appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society" and, consequently, "the state should not be taken as a free-standing entity, whether an agent, instrument, organization or structure, located apart from and opposed to another entity called society."

45. In the conclusion to my (Barrow 1993, 145) analysis of critical theories of the state, I too suggested that "we could well be witnessing the disintegration of the state as

a form of institutionalized political authority, at least as it has heretofore been understood in the modern era."

46. For instance, Castells (1997, 243) claims that "state control over space and time is increasingly bypassed by global flows of capital, goods, services, technology, communication, and information."

47. For a brief biography of John Berg, see Grover 2024.

48. For a brief biography of George Katsiaficas, see Wallis 2024; see also Katsiaficas 2005; "George Katsiaficas" 2021.

49. John Berg (2021) writes that "George [Katsiaficas] and I had been inmates at the Middlesex County (MA) House of Correction at the same time (1970). We were in different factions of the left at that time, so only interacted minimally; but one year he was at a panel at APSA so I went to hear him and reestablished contact; among other things, I convinced him that he should get involved in the Caucus."

50. Kling (2021) states that Denis Moran, a professor of political theory at the University of Notre Dame, also took a leadership role in the petition drive, although he was a person who "never forwarded himself" for credit.

CHAPTER 8

1. The new strategy was the subject of the CNPS 1979 plenary talk at the APSA (Wolfe 1981) and the CNPS 1980 plenary talk at the APSA (Boggs 1981). See also Bay 1978a.

2. Perhaps unknown to the new generation of Caucus leaders, Lucius Barker had been a cochair of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Popular Vote Amendments created in 1975 expressly for the purpose of undercutting the CNPS in proposing amendments to the APSA constitution at annual business meetings.

3. For a brief biography of Clyde W. Barrow, see Niemi (2024).

4. All data tabulated from preliminary programs of the APSA and Caucus newsletters.

5. Some papers dealt with two overlapping topics and, hence, the total number of topics (445) is greater than the total number of papers/presentations (395). Papers in the "Other" category dealt with topics such as anarchism, biopolitics, American political thought, civil society, critical theory, disciplinary history, education, genocide, immigration, media politics, nationalism, political violence, postmodernism, and the US Supreme Court.

6. The number of appearances does not include serving as a panel chair or discussant, but only counts paper or roundtable presentations.

7. CNPS (2000c, 3), where Claire Snyder, program coordinator for the 2000 meeting, reports that 49% of paper presenters on CNPS panels were not Caucus members.

8. This term was coined by Kirstie McClure, a professor of political theory at UCLA, at a San Francisco meeting of the APSA. The core group of this so-called mafia were all former students of Richard Ashcraft, a Marxist political theorist at UCLA, including Clyde W. Barrow (University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth), Bradley J. Macdonald (Colorado State University), William Niemi (Western State College of Colorado), and Daniel O'Connor (California State University, Long Beach). To cement their integration into CNPS, Manfred Steger, CNPS chair at the time, successfully pushed for my election as membership director in 2003.

9. For a brief biography of Christine A. Kelly, see Bronner 2022.

10. Desch (2019) suggests that political science has descended "into a cult of irrelevance," primarily because its practitioners conflate scientific rigor with "the use of particular methods such as statistics or formal modeling." See also Trent (2011).

11. After riding Perestroika to the APSA presidency in 2018–19, Smith (2020, 10) reversed course with his declaration that "the opportunity to serve as president of the American Political Science Association is a great honor; but it is greater still simply to have the chance to pursue a career in political science. I trust most political scientists share my feeling that it is a privilege to do what we do."

12. See Isaac (2015a) on the origins and history of *Perspectives on Politics*.

13. Atchison (2017) documents that as late as 2017 the APSA's leadership still disproportionately represented members of large doctoral-granting and elite graduate programs.

14. For example, see Monroe (1991); Green and Shapiro (1994); Hauptmann (1996).

15. Similarly, see Mead (2010). Fifteen years later, nothing had changed, as described by Hayward (2015), who observes "the fact that political science majors are *declining* . . . at a time when general interest in politics is rising suggests a crisis in the discipline. . . . The typical social science journal article is largely a mathematical exercise today, often revealing something counter-intuitive that is useful and interesting, but invariably noting that 'more research' is necessary, and that the narrow findings 'raise normative questions,' before abruptly ending."

16. Ehrenberg (2007, 510) would later reiterate this point by emphasizing that "Karl Marx himself used the most advanced quantitative tools of his day—but he did so in service of a *political* project. And surely, he hasn't been the only one."

17. Similarly, Ehrenberg (2007, 509), observes that "the Caucus for a New Political Science was born in conditions of mass mobilization, intense politicization, worldwide democratic upsurges, and a sharp critique of the profession's commitment to 'value-free' social science." See also Lynch (2005), 163–64; Latin (2015); Caterino (2016, chap. 2).

18. Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2010, 742), find that "the lists of section events and Perestroika panels at APSA and other meetings between 2001 and 2004 . . . demonstrate both Perestroika's methods focus and the extent to which QMMR took over that energy with its debut in 2003." Nevertheless, Monroe (2015, 423) argues that Perestroika's most critical triumph was its "successful challenge to the view that there was only one way to do political science and its legitimization of the view that political science was a humanistic as well as a scientific discipline."

19. The other members of the alternative slate were Marla Brettschneider, Michael Desch, Ange-Marie Hancock, Anne Norton, David Pion-Berlin, and Dvora Yanow (APSA 2010).

20. I (Barrow 2007a) had also been pressuring CNPS cochair Christine A. Kelly to move on this issue as early as 2007. I proposed a system that would allow APSA members three options: (1) APSA dues with *PS* and no other journal, (2) APSA dues with *PS* and one journal, (3) APSA dues with *PS* and two journals with the list of journals limited to official publications of the APSA and its organized sections. I wrote, "I'm sick of paying dues to support two journals that I just toss in the trash without opening," while noting, "It's quite ironic that an academic elite that purports to believe in electoral competition and market competition advocates monopoly when it comes to its journal" (Barrow 2007a).

21. Grant (2005, 383) mapped the political science discipline and found "the concentration of political science is in the scientific or hard section."

22. Notable exceptions are Barrow 1990b; Schram 2016b; Wilson and Kamola 2021.

CHAPTER 9

1. The publication of scholarly journals is now dominated by a global oligopoly consisting of Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Taylor & Francis, Springer Nature, and SAGE Publications (Cassidy 2024).

2. See Internal Revenue Service 1979, which states, "We have determined you are exempt from Federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the International Revenue Code."

3. The Coordinating Council members present at the meeting were Nancy S. Love (chair), William Sokoloff (treasurer), Sarah Surak (secretary), Clyde W. Barrow, Edwin Daniel Jacob, Robert Kirsch, and Claire Snyder-Hall (CNPS and APSA OS 2021a).

4. The Coordinating Council members present at the meeting were Nancy S. Love (chair), William Sokoloff (treasurer), Sarah Surak (secretary), Clyde W. Barrow, Bradley Macdonald, Daniel O'Connor, Andrew Scerri, Robert Kirsch, Isaac Kamola, Lucrecia Garcia Iommi, and Nikol Alexander-Floyd (CNPS and APSA Organized Section 2021b).

5. In 2022, the CCPS decided to transfer publication of *New Political Science: A Journal of Politics & Culture* from Taylor & Francis to Duke University Press, effective on January 1, 2025. The CCPS is contemplating changing the journal title to *Critical Political Science* in 2026 or thereafter.

6. Ong (1988, 57) agrees that CNPS helped to pluralize the political science discipline not just by providing a venue for methodological pluralism, but by "acting as midwife during the birth of several other groups designed to shake up the APSA: the Women's Caucus, the Black Caucus, the Chicano Caucus, the Foundations for Political Theory, and the Conference Group on Political Economy." Ong (1988, 58) is correct to note that many of the caucuses, as well as the later organized sections, adopted the Caucus model notwithstanding that some of the caucuses originally supported by CNPS "have become part of the establishment or have lost their radical impetus and vision."

7. See https://www.apsanet.org/sectioncounts.cfm

8. Wolfe (1970, 304), observes that "something seems to happen to people when they become political scientists, or maybe people who become political scientists were strange to begin with. But whatever the causal relationship, this profession is one of the least movable there is. (Economics may be worse)."

9. Kaufman-Osborne (2006, 42), writes, "On reviewing the history of American political science one might well conclude that the only concern that has truly unified this enterprise over the course of its first century is the question of whether political science is or is not a discipline."

10. Gunnell (2006b, 23) denies that "there is a pope of political science, or even a hierarchy of disciplinary cardinals and bishops, who are in a position to dispense indulgences or could be called upon to affirm the gospel and faith."

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